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EDITION        DE       LUXE 

The  Works  of 

George  Rawlinson,  M.A. 

The  Seven  Great  Monarchies 

of  the 
Ancie7it  Eastern  World 

PARTHIA 
NEW  PERSIA 


VOLUME  in. 

Maps,  Diagrams  and   Illustrations 


THE  NOTTINGHAM  SOCIETY 

New  York  Philadelphia  Chicago 


EDITION  DE  LUXE 

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Printed  for  Subscribers  Only 


3 

5-7 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAQB 

Geography  of  Parthia  Proper.  Character  of  the  Region.  Climate.  Character 
of  the  surrounding  countries 1 

CHAPTER  n. 

Early  notices  of  the  Parthians.  Their  Ethnic  character  and  connections. 
Their  position  under  the  Persian  Monarchs,  from  Cyrus  the  Great  to  Darius 
m.    (Codomannus) 8 

CHAPTER  ni. 

9ondition  of  Western  Asia  under  the  earlier  Seleucidae.  Revolts  of  Bactria  and 
Parthia.  Conflicting  accounts  of  the  establishment  of  the  Parthian  Kingdom. 
First  War  with  Syria 16 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Oonsolidation  of  the  Parthian  Kingdom.  Death  of  Tiridates  and  accession  of 
Arsaces  HI.  Attacli  on  Media.  War  of  Ai-tabanus  (Arsaces  III.)  with  An- 
tiochus  the  Great.  Period  of  inaction.  Great  development  of  Bactrian 
power.    Reigns  of  Priapatius  (Arsaces  IV.)  and  Phraates  I.  (Arsaces  V.) Si* 

CHAPTER  V. 

Ref^n  of  Mithridates  I.  Position  of  Bactria  and  Syria  at  his  accession.  His 
first  War  with  Bactria.  His  great  E.vpedition  against  tlie  Eastern  Syrian  pro- 
vinces, and  its  results.  His  second  war  with  Bactria,  terminating  in  its  con- 
quest. Extent  of  his  Empire.  Attempt  of  Demetrius  Nicator  to  recover  the 
lost  Provinces  fails.    Captivity  of  Demetrius.    Death  of  Mithridates 88 

CHAPTER  VL 

ystem  of  government  established  by  Mithridates  I.  Constitution  of  the  Par- 
thians. Government  of  the  Provinces.  Laws  and  institutions.  Character  of 
Mithridates  1 4S 


iy  CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   Ill 

CHAPTER  VII. 

t>AGB 

Reign  of  Phraates  n.  Expedition  of  Antiochus  Sidetes  against  Parthia.  Re- 
lease of  Demetrius.  Defeat  and  death  of  Sidetes.  War  of  Phraates  with  the 
Northern  Nomads.    His  death  and  character 53 

CHAPTER  Vni, 

Accession  of  Artibanus  H.  Position  of  Parthia.  Growing  pressure  upon  her, 
and  general  advance  towards  the  south  of  the  Saka  or  Scyths.  Causes  and 
extent  of  the  movement.  Character  and  principal  tribes  of  the  Saka. 
Scythic  War  of  Artabanus.    His  death 62 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Accession  of  Mithridates  II.  Termination  of  the  Scythic  Wars.  Commencement 
of  the  struggle  with  Armenia.  Previous  history  of  Armenia.  Result  of  the 
first  Armenian  War.  First  contact  of  Rome  with  Parthia.  Attitude  of  Rome 
towards  the  East  at  this  time.    Second  Armenian  War.   Death  of  Mithridates.     69 

CHAPTER  X. 

r»ark  period  of  Parthian  History.  Doubtful  Succession  of  the  Monarchs. 
Accession  of  SanatrcEces,  ab.  B.C.  76.  Position  of  Parthia  during  the  Mithri- 
datic  Wars.  Accession  of  Phraates  III.  His  Relations  with  Pompey.  His 
death.  Civil  War  between  his  two  sons,  Mithridates  and  Orodes.  Death  of 
Mithridates 77 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Accession  of  Orodes  I.  Expedition  of  Crassus.  His  fate.  Retaliatory  inroad 
of  the  Parthians  into  Syria  under  Pacorus,  the  son  of  Orodes.  Defeat  of 
Pacorus  by  Cassius.    His  recall.    End  of  first  War  with  Rome 84 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

Relations  of  Orodes  with  Pompey,  and  with  Brutus  and  Cassius.  Second  War 
with  Rome.  Great  Parthian  expedition  against  Syria,  Palestine,  and  Asia 
Minor.  Defeat  of  Saxa.  Occupation  of  Antioch  and  Jerusalem.  Parthians 
driven  out  of  Syria  by  Ventidius.    Death  of  Pacorus.    Death  of  Orodes 108 

CHAPTER  XHI. 

ieign  of  Phraates  TV.  His  cruelties.  Flight  of  Monaeses  to  Antony.  Antony's 
great  Parthian  Expedition,  or  Invasion  of  Media  AtropatenS.  I-ts  Complete 
Failure.  Subsequent  Alliance  of  the  Median  King  with  Antony.  War  be- 
tween Parthia  and  Media.  Rebellion  raised  against  Phraates  by  Tiridates. 
Pliraates  expelled.  He  recovers  his  Throne  with  the  help  of  the  Scythians. 
His  deaUngs  with  Augustus.    His  death  and  character Ill 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Shorts  Reigns  of  Phraataces,  Orodes  II.,  and  Vonones  I.  Accession  of  Arta- 
banus III.  His  relations  with  Germanicus  and  Tiberius.  His  war  with 
Pharasmanes  of  Iberia.  His  first  Expulsion  from  his  Kingdom,  and  return 
to  it.  His  Peace  with  Rome.  Internal  Troubles  of  the  Parthian  Kingdom. 
Second  Expulsion  and  Return  of  Artabanus.    His  death 123 


CONTEJS^S  OF   VOL.  III.  V 

CHAPTER  XV. 

PAGE 

Doubts  as  to  the  successor  of  Artabanus  III.  First  short  reign  of  Gotarzes. 
He  is  expelled  and  Vardanes  made  King.  Reign  of  Vardanes.  His  War  with 
Izates.  His  Death.  Second  reign  of  Gotarzes.  His  Contest  with  his  Nephew, 
Meherdates.    His  Death.    Short  and  inglorious  reign  of  Vonones  U 141 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Reign  of  Volagases  I.  His  first  attempt  on  Armenia  fails.  His  quarrel  with 
Izates.  Invasion  of  Parthia  Proper  by  the  Dahse  and  Sacee.  Second  Attack 
of  Volagases  on  Armenia.  Tiridates  established  as  King.  First  Expedition  of 
Corbulo.  Half  submission  of  Volagases.  Revolt  of  Vardanes.  Second  Expe- 
dition of  Corbulo.  Armenia  given  to  Tigranes.  Revolt  of  Hyrcania.  Third 
Attack  of  Volagases  on  Armenia.  Defeat  of  Paetus,  and  re-establishment  of 
Tiridates.  Last  Expedition  of  Corbulo,  and  arrangement  of  Terms  of  Peace. 
Tiridates  at  Rome.    Probable  time  of  the  Death  of  Volagases 143 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Results  of  the  establishment  of  Tiridates  in  Armenia.  Long  Period  of  Peace 
between  Parthia  and  Rome.  Obscurity  of  Parthian  History  at  this  time. 
Relations  of  Volagases  I.  with  Vespasian.  Invasion  of  Western  Asia  by  the 
Alani.  Death  of  Volagases  I.  and  Character  of  his  Reign.  Accession  and 
Long  Reign  of  Pacorus.  Relations  of  Pacorus  with  Decebalus  of  Dacia.  In- 
ternal Condition  of  Parthia  during  his  Reign.  Death  of  Pacorus  and  Acces- 
sion of  Chosroes l64 


CHAPTER  XVm. 

Reign  of  ChosroSs.  General  condition  of  Oriental  Affairs  gives  a  handle  to 
Trajan,  Trajan's  Schemes  of  Conquest.  Embassy  of  Chosroes  to  Trajan 
fails.  Great  Expedition  of  Trajan.  Campaign  of  a. d.  115.  Campaign  of  a. d. 
116.  Death  of  Trajan,  and  relinquishment  of  his  Parthian  Conquests  by  Had- 
rian. Interview  of  Chosroes  with  Hadrian.  Its  Consequences.  Death  of 
ChosroSs  and  Accession  of  Volagases  II 1 70 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Reign  of  Volagases  H.  Invasion  of  the  Alani.  Communications  between 
Volagases  and  Antoninus  Pius.  Death  of  Volagases  II.  and  Accession  of 
Volagases  III.  Aggressive  War  of  Volagases  III.  on  Rome.  Campaign  of 
A.D.  162.  Verus  sent  to  the  East.  Sequel  of  the  War.  Losses  suffered  by 
Parthia.    Death  of  Volagases  HI 182 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Accession  of  Volagases  IV.  His  Alliance  sought  by  Pescennius  Niger.  Part 
taken  by  Parthia  in  the  Contest  between  Niger  and  Severus.  Mesopotamia 
revolts  from  Rome.  First  Eastern  Expedition  of  Severus.  Its  results. 
Second  Expedition.  Successes  of  Severus.  His  failure  at  Hatra.  General 
Rfsults  of  the  War.    Death  of  Volagases  IV 190 


vi  CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   III. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

PAQB 

struggle  between  the  two  Sons  of  Volagases  IV.,  Volagases  V.  and  Artabanus. 
Continued  Sovereignty  of  both  Princes.  Ambition  of  Caracallus.  His  Pro- 
ceedings in  the  East.  His  Resolve  to  quarrel  with  Parthia.  First  Proposal 
made  by  him  to  Artabanus.  Perplexity  of  Artabanus.  Caracallus  invades 
Parthia.  His  Successes,  and  Death.  Macrinus,  defeated  by  Artabanus,  con- 
sents to  Terms  of  Peace.  Revolt  of  the  Persians  under  Artaxerxes.  Pro- 
longed Struggle.    Death  of  Artabanus,  and  Downfall  of  the  Parthian  Empire.  199 

CHAPTER  XXIL 
On  the  Architecture  and  Ornamental  Art  of  the  Parthians 212 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Customs  of  the  Parthians— in  Religion  ;  in  War  ;  in  their  Embassies  and  Deal- 
ings with  Foreign  Nations  ;  at  the  Court;  in  Private  Life.  Extent  of  the  re- 
finement to  which  they  reached.  Their  gradnal  Decline  in  Taste  and  Knowl- 
edge  ....223 


HISTORY  OF  THE  SASSANIAN  OR  NEW  PERSIAN  EMPIRE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Condition  of  the  Persians  under  the  Successors  of  Alexander.  Under  the 
Arsacidae.  Favor  shown  them  by  the  latter.  Allowed  to  have  Kings  of  their 
own.  Their  Religion  at  first  held  in  Honor.  Power  of  their  Priests.  Gradual 
Change  of  Policy  on  the  part  of  the  Parthian  Monarchs,  and  final  Oppression 
of  the  Magi.    Causes  which  produced  the  Insurrection  of  Artaxerxes 241 

CHAPTER  II. 

Situation  and  Size  of  Persia.  General  Character  of  the  Country  and  Climate. 
Chief  Products.  Characteristics  of  the  Persian  People,  Physical  and  Moral. 
Differences  observable  in  the  Race  at  different  Periods 250 

CHAPTER  III. 

Reign  of  Artaxerxes  I.    Stories  told  of  him.    Most  probable  Account  of  his 
Descent,  Rank,   and   Parentage.     His   Contest  with   Artabanus.    First  War         , 
with  Chosroes  of  Armenia.    Contest  with  Alexander  Severus.    Second  War 
wtf  h  Chosroes  and  Conquest  of  Armenia.    Religious  Reforms.    Internal  Ad- 
ministration and  Government.    Art.    Coinage.    Inscriptions  257 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Death  of  Artaxerxes  I.  and  Accession  of  Sapor  I.  War  of  Sapor  with  Manizen. 
His  first  War  with  Rome.  Invasion  of  Mesopotamia,  a.d.  241.  Occupation  of 
Antioch.  Espedition  of  Gordian  to  the  East.  Recovery  by  Rome  of  her  lost 
Territory.  I'eace  made  between  Rome  and  Persia.  Obscure  Interval.  Second 
War  with  Rome.  Mesopotamia  again  invaded,  a.d.  258,  Valerian  takes  the 
Command  in  the  East.  Struggle  between  him  and  Sapor.  Defeat  and  Cap- 
ture of  Valerian  a.d.  260.  Sapor  invests  Miriades  with  the  Purple.  He  takes 
Syria  and  Southern  Cappadocia,  but  is  shortly  afterwards  attacked  by  Odena- 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   Ill  vii 

PAOi> 

thus.  Successos  of  Odenathus.  Treatment  of  Valerian.  Further  Successes 
of  Odenathus.  Period  of  Tranquility.  Great  Works  of  Sapor.  His  Sculptures. 
His  Dyke.  His  Inscriptions.  His  Coins.  His  Religion.  Religious  Condition 
of  the  East  in  his  Time.  Rise  into  Notice  of  Manes.  His  Kejection  by  Sapor. 
Sapor's  Death.    His  Character 271 

CHAPTER  V. 

Short  Reign  of  Hormisdas  I.  His  dealings  with  Manes.  Accession  of  Varahran 
I.  He  puts  Manes  to  Death.  Persecutes  the  Manichseans  and  the  Christians. 
His  Relations  with  Zenobia.  He  is  threatened  by  Aurelian.  His  Death.  Reign 
of  Varahran  H.  His  Tyrannical  Conduct.  His  Conqutst  of  Seistan,  and  War 
with  India.  His  War  with  the  Roman  Emperors  Carus  and  Diocletian.  His 
Loss  of  Armenia.    His  Death.    Short  Reign  of  Varahran  HI 293 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Civil  War  of  Narses  and  his  Brother  Hormisdas.  Narses  victorious.  He  attacks 
and  expels  Tiridates.  War  declared  against  hivn  by  Diocletian.  First  Cam- 
paign of  Galerius,  a.d.  297.  Second  Campaign,  a  d.  298.  Defeat  suffered  by 
Narses.  Negotiations.  Conditions  of  Pea<ie.  Abdication  and  Death  of 
Narses 301 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Reign  of  Hormisdas  II.  His  Disposition.  General  Character  of  his  Reign.  His 
Taste  for  Building.  His  new  Court  of  Justice.  His  Marriage  with  a  Princess 
of  Cabul.  Story  of  his  Son  Hormisdas.  Death  of  Hormisdas  H.,  and  Imprison- 
ment of  his  son  Hormisdas.  Interregnum.  Crown  assigned  to  Sapor  II.  be- 
fore his  birth.  Long  Reign  of  Sapor.  First  Period  of  his  Reign,  from  a.d.  309 
to  A.D.  337.  Persia  plundered  by  the  Arabs  and  the  Turks.  Victories  Of 
Sapor  over  the  Arabs.  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  Escape  of  Hormisdas. 
Feelings  and  Conduct  of  Sapor 313 

CHAPTER  Vm. 

Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Death  of  Constantino.  First  War  of  Sapor  with  Rome, 
A.D.  337-350.  First  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Obscure  Interval.  Troubles  in  Armenia, 
and  Recovery  of  Armenia  by  the  Persians.  Sapor's  Second  Siege  of  Nisibis. 
Its  Failure.  Great  Battle  of  Singara.  Sapor's  son  made  Prisoner  and  mur- 
dered in  Cold  Blood.  Third  Siege  of  Nisibis.  Sapor  called  away  by  an  Inva- 
sion of  the  MassagetB 330 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Revolt  of  Armenia  and  Acceptance  by  Arsaces  of  the  Position  of  a  Roman 
Feudatory.  Character  and  Issue  of  Sapor's  Eastern  Wars.  His  Negotiations  , 
with  Constantius.  His  Extreme  Demands.  Circumstances  under  which  he 
determines  to  renew  the  War.  His  Preparations.  Desertion  to  him  of 
Antoninus.  Great  Invasion  of  Sapor.  Siege  of  Amida.  Sapor's  Severities. 
Siege  and  Capture  of  Singara;  of  Bezabde.  Attack  on  Virta  fails.  Aggres- 
sive Movement  of  Constantius.  He  attacks  Bezabde,  but  fails.  Campaign  of 
A.D.  361.    Death  of  Constantius 328 

CHAPTER  X. 

Julian  becomes  Emperor  of  Rome.  His  Resolution  to  invade  Persia.  His 
Views  and  Motivos.  His  Proceedings,  Proposals  of  Sapor  rejected.  Other 
Embassies.  Relations  of  Julian  with  Armenia.  Strength  of  his  Army.  His 
Invasion  of  Mesopotamia.  His  Line  of  March.  Siege  of  Perisabor;  of 
Maogamalcha.    Battle  of  the  Tigris.    Further  Progress  of  Julian  checked  by 


Viii  CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   111. 

PAGH 

his  inability  to  invest  Ctesiphon.  His  Retreat.  His  Death.  Retreat  con- 
tinued by  Jovian.  Sapor  offers  Terms  of  Peace.  Peace  made  by  Jovian.  Its 
Conditions.  Reflections  on  the  Peace  and  on  the  Termination  of  the  Second 
Period  of  Struggle  between  Rome  and  Persia —   343 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Attitude  of  Armenia  during  the  War  between  Sapor  and  Julian.  Sapor's 
Treachery  towards  Arsaces.  Sapor  conquers  Armenia.  He  attacks  Iberia, 
deposes  Sauromaces,  and  sets  up  a  new  King.  Resistance  and  Capture  of 
Artogerassa.  Difficulties  of  Sapor.  Division  of  Iberia  between  the  Roman 
and  Persian  Pretenders.  Renewal  of  Hostilities  between  Rome  and  Persia. 
Peace  made  with  Valens.    Death  of  Sapor.    His  Coins 378 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

Short  Reigns  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  UI.  Obscurity  of  their  History. 
Their  Relations  with  Armenia.  Monument  of  Sapor  IH.  at  Takht-i-Bostan. 
Coins  of  Artaxerxes  H.  and  Sapor  HI.  Reign  of  Varahran  rv.  His  Signets. 
His  Dealings  with  Armenia.    His  Death 378 

CHAPTER  XHI. 

Accession  of  Isdigerd  I.  Peaceful  Character  of  his  Reign.  His  alleged  Guard- 
ianship of  Theodosiua  H.  His  Leaning  towards  Christianity,  and  consequent 
Unpopularity  with  his  Subjects.  His  Change  of  View  and  Persecution  of  the 
Christians.  His  Relations  with  Armenia.  His  Coins.  His  Personal  Char- 
acter.   His  Death 385 

CHAPTER  XTV. 

Internal  Troubles  on  the  Death  of  Isdigerd  I.  Accession  of  Varahran  V.  His 
Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His  War  with  Rome.  His  Relations  with  Ar- 
menia from  A.D.  422  to  a.d.  428.  His  Wars  with  Scythic  Tribes  on  his  Eastern 
Frontier.    His  Strange  Death.    His  Coins.    His  Character 39* 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Reign  of  Isdigerd  H.  His  War  with  Rome.  His  Nine  Years'  War  with  th» 
Ephthalites.  His  Policy  towards  Armenia.  His  Second  EphthaUte  War. 
His  Character.    His  Coins tOS 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Right  of  Succession  disputed  between  the  two  Sons  of  Isdigerd  II.,  Perozes  (or 
Firuz)  and  Hormisdas.  Civil  War  for  two  years.  Success  of  Perozes,  through 
aid  given  him  by  the  Ephthalites.  Great  Famine.  Perozes  declares  War 
against  the  Ephthalites,  and  makes  an  Expedition  into  their  Country.  His 
111  Success.  Conditions  of  Peace  granted  him.  Armenian  Revolt  and  War. 
Perozes,  after  some  years,  resumes  the  Ephthalite  War.  His  Attack  fails,  and 
he  is  slain  in  Battle.  Summary  of  his  Character.  Coins  of  Hormisdas  HI. 
and  Perozes.    Vase  of  Perozes iVi 

CHAPTER  XVn. 

A-Ccession  of  Balas  or  Palash.  His  Relationship  to  Perozes.  Peace  made  with 
the  Ephthalites.  Pacification  of  Armenia  and  General  Edict  of  Toleration. 
Revolt  of  Zareh,  Son  of  Perozes,  and  Suppression  of  the  Revolt  with  the  help 
of  the  Armenians.  Flight  of  Kobad  to  the  Ephthalites.  Further  Changes  in 
Armenia.  Vahan  made  Governor.  Death  of  Balas;  his  Character.  Coin? 
as-bribed  to  hira. 4(0 


CONTENTS.  l^JC 

CHAPTER   XVIU. 

PAOE 

First  Reign  of  Kobad.  His  Favorites,  Sufral  and  Sapor.  His  Khazar  War. 
Rise,  Teaching,  and  Influence  uf  Mazdak.  His  Claim  to  Miraculous  Powers. 
Kobad  adopts  the  new  Religion,  and  attempts  to  impose  it  on  the  Armenians. 
Revolt  of  Armenia  under  Vahan,  successful.  Kobad  yields.  General  Rebellion 
in  Persia,  and  Deposition  of  Kobad.  Escape  of  Mazdak.  Short  Reign  of 
Zamasp.    His  Coins 426 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
Second  Reign  of  Kobad.  His  Change  of  Attitude  towards  the  Followers  of  Maz- 
dak. His  Cause  of  Quarrel  with  Rome.  First  Roman  War  of  Kobad.  Peace 
made  a.d.  505.  Rome  fortifies  Daras  and  Theodosiopolis.  Complaint  made 
by  Persia.  Negotiations  of  Kobad  with  Justin :  Proposed  Adoption  of  Chosroes 
by  the  Latter.  Internal  Troubles  in  Persia.  Second  Roman  War  of  Kobad, 
A.D.  524-531.    Death  of  Kobad.     His  Character.    His  Coins 432 

CHAPTER  XX. 
Accession  of  ChosroSs  I.  (Anushirwan.)  Conspiracy  to  Dethrone  him  crushed. 
General  Severity  of  his  Government.  He  concludes  Peace  with  Rome,  a.d. 
533.  Terms  of  the  Peace.  Causes  which  led  to  its  Rupture.  First  Roman 
War  of  Chosroes,  a.d.  540-544.  Second  Roman  War,  ,i  p.  549-557.  Eastern 
Wars.  Conquest  of  Arabia  Felix.  Supposed  Campaign  in  India.  War  with 
the  Turks.  Revolt  of  Persarmenia.  Third  Roman  War,  a.d.  572-579.  Death 
of  Chosroes 448 

CHAPTER  XXI.  • 
Administration  of  Persia  under  Chosroes  I.  Fourfold  D'fision  of  the  Empire. 
Careful  Sm-veillance  of  those  entrusted  with  Power  Severe  Punishment  of 
Abuse  of  Trust.  New  System  of  Taxation  introduced.  Correction  of  Abuse 
connected  with  the  Military  Service.  Encouragement  of  Agriculture  and 
Marriage.  Relief  of  Poverty.  Care  for  Travellers.  Encouragement  of  Learn- 
ing. Practice  of  Toleration  within  Certain  Limite.  Domestic  Life  of  Chosroes. 
His  Wivts.  Revolt  and  Death  of  his  Son,  Nushizad.  Coins  of  Chosroes.  Es- 
timate of  his  Character 483 

CHAPTER  XXIL 
Accession  of  Hormisdas  IV.  His  good  Government  in  the  Earlier  Portion  of  his 
Reign.  Invasion  of  Persia  by  the  Romaus  under  Maurice.  Defeats  of  Adar- 
man  and  Tamchosro.  Campaign  of  Johannes.  Campaignsof  Philippicusand 
Heraclius.  Tyranny  of  Hormisdas.  He  is  attacked  by  the  Arabs,  Khazars. 
and  Turks.  Bahran  defeats  the  Tui-ks.  His  Attack  on  Lazica.  He  suffers  a 
Defeat.  Disgrace  of  Bahram.  Dethronement  of  Hormisdas  IV.  and  Elevation 
of  Chosroes  II.    Character  of  Hormisdas.    Coins  of  Hormisdas 495 

CHAPTER   XXIII. 
Accession  of  Chosroes  II.    (Eherwiz.)    Bahram  rejects  his  Terms.    Contest  be- 
tween Chosroes  and  Bahram.    Flight  of  Chosroes.    Short  Reign  of  Bahram 
(Varahran  VI.).    Campaign  of  a.d.  591.    Recovery  of  the  Throne  by  Chosoijs. 
Couis  of  Bahram 504 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 
Second  Reign  of  Chosroes  II.  (Eberwiz.)  His  Rule  "at  first  Unpopular.  His 
Treatment  of  his  Uncles,  Bindoiis  and  Bostam.  His  Vindictive  Proceedings 
against  Bahram.  His  supposed  Leaning  towards  Christianity.  His  wives, 
Shirin  and  IKurdiveh.  His  Early  Wars.  His  Relation^  with  the  Emperor 
Maurice.  His  Attitude  towards  Phocas.  Great  W;ir  of  Chosrotis  with  Thooas, 
A  D.  fi03-610.  War  continued  with  Heraclius.  Imuuiise  Successes  of  Ciios- 
rot»s,  A.D.  611-620.    Aggressive  taken  by  Heraclius,  a.d.  622.    His  Campaigns 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

in  Persian  Territory  A.  D.  622-628.    Murder  of  Chosroes.    His  Character.    His 
Coins 514 

CHAPTER  XXV. 
Accession  of  Siroes,  or  Kobad  II.  His  Letter  to  Heraclius.  Peace  made  with 
Rome.  Terms  of  the  Peace.  General  Popularity  of  the  New  Reign.  Dissat- 
isfaction of  Shahr-Barz.  Kobad,  by  the  advice  of  the  Persian  Lords,  murders 
his  Brothers.  His  Sisters  reproach  him  with  their  Death.  He  falls  into  low- 
spirits  and  dies.  Pestilence  in  his  Reign.  His  coins.  Accession  of  Artax- 
erxes  HI.  Revolt  of  Shahr-Barz.  Reign  of  Shaur-Barz.  His  Murder.  Reign 
of  Purandocht.    Rapid  Succession  of  Pretenders.    Accession  of  Isdigerd  HI . .  535 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 
Death  of  Mohammed  and  Collapse  of  Mohammedanism.  Recovery  under  Abu- 
bekr.  Conquest  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hira.  Conquest  of  Obolla.  Invasion  of 
Mesopotamia.  Battle  of  the  Bridge— the  Arabs  suffer  a  Reverse.  Battle  of 
El  Boweib— Mihran  defeated  by  El  Mothanna.  Fresh  Effort  made  by  Persia- 
Battle  of  Cadesia— Defeat  of  the  Persians.  Pause  in  the  War.  March  of  Sa'ad 
on  Ctesiphon.  Flight  of  Isdigerd.  .  Capture  of  Ctesiphon.  Battle  of  Jalula. 
Conquest  of  Susiana  and  Invasion  of  Persia  Proper.  Recall  of  Sa'ad.  Isdigerd 
assembles  an  Army  at  Nehawend.  Battle  of  Nehawend.  Flight  of  Isdigerd. 
Conquest  of  the  various  Persian  Provinces.  Isdigerd  murdered.  Character 
of  Isdigerd.    Coins  of  Isdigerd 543 

CHAPTER  XXVU. 
Architecture  of  the  Sassanians.  Its  Origin.  Its  Peculierities.  Oblong  Square 
Plan.  Arched  Entrance  Halls.  Domes  resting  on  Pendentives.  Siutes  of 
Apartments.  Ornamentation:  Exterior,  by  Pilasters,  Cornices,  String-courses, 
and  Shallow  Arched  Recesses,  with  Pilasters  between  them;  Interior,  by  Pil- 
lars supporting  Transverse  Ribs,  or  by  Doorways  and  False  Windows,  like  the 
Persopolitan.  Specimen  Palaces  at  Serbistan,  at  Firzebad,  at  Ctesiphon,  at 
Mashita.  Elaborat  Decoration  at  the  last-named  Palace.  Decoration  Else- 
where. Arch  of  Takht-i-Bastan.  Sassanian  Statuary.  Sassanian  Bas-reliefs. 
Estimate  of  their  Artistic  Value.  Question  of  the  Employment  by  the  Sassa- 
nians of  Byzantine  Artists.    General  Summary ...  560 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
Religion  of  the  later  Persians,  Duelism  of  tlie  Extremest  Kind.  Ideas  enter- 
tained with  Respect  to  Ormazd  and  Ahriman.  Representations  of  them.  Or- 
mazd  the  Special  Guardian  of  the  Kings.  Lesser  Deities  subject  to  Ormazd: 
Mithra,  Serosh,  Vayu,  Airyanam,  Vitraha,  etc.  Tlie  Six  Amshashpands:  Rah- 
man, Ardibehesht,  Shahravar,  Isfand-armat.  Kh(jrdad,  and  Amerdat.  Re- 
ligion, how  far  Idolatrous.  Worship  of  Anaitis.  Chief  Evil  Spirits  subject  to 
Ahriman:  Akomano,  Indra,  Qanrva.  Naonhaitya,  Taiic,  and  Zaric.  Position 
of  Jlan  between  the  Two  Worlds  of  Good  and  Evil.  His  Duties:  Worship,  Ag- 
riculture, Purity.  Nature  of  the  Worship.  Hymns,  Invocations,  the  Homa 
Ceremony,  Sacrifice.  Agriculture  a  part  of  Religion.  Purity  required:  I, 
Moral;  2,  Legal.  Nature  of  each.  Man's  Future  Pi-ospects.  Position  of  the 
Magi  under  the  Sassanians;  their  Organization.  Dress,  etc.  Tlie  Fire-temples 
and  Altars.  The  Barsom.  The  Khraf^thraghna.  Magnificence  of  the  Sassa- 
nian Court;  the  Throne-room,  the  Seraglio,  the  Attendants,  the  Ministers. 
Multitude  of  Palaces.  Dress  of  the  Monarch:  1,  in  Peace;  2,  in  War.  Favor- 
ite Pastimes  of  the  Kings.  Hunting.  Maintenance  of  Paradises.  Stag  and 
Boar-hunts.  Music.  Hawking.  Games.  Character  of  the  Persian  Warfare 
under  the  Sassanians.  Sassanian  Chariots.  The  Elephant  Corps.  The  Cav- 
alry. The  Archers.  The  Ordinary  Infantry.  Officers  Standards.  Tactics. 
Private  Life  of  the  Later  Persians.  Agricultural  Emr>loympnt,  of  the  Men. 
Non-seclusion  of  the  Women.    General  Freedom  from  Oppression  of  all  Classes 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS- VOL.  m 


Map  of  Parthla  Proper ..To  face -page     1 

"      Parthian  Empire  at  Its  greatest  extent To  face  page    49 

"      Sassanian  Empire Tofacepage  256 


b 


PLATE 

L  Coiaof  DiodotusI 

2.  Coin  of  Phraates  I 

8.  Obverse  of  a  Coin  of  Phraates  I 

4.  Coins  of  Mithridates  I 

6.  Coins  of  Mithridates  I.,  Arsaces  I.^  and  Artabanus  I 

<S.  Coin  of  Labienus 3 

7.  Coin  of  Phraataces  and  Mousa 2 

8.  Coin  of  VononesI 2 

9.  Coin  of  Artabanus  m 2 

10.  Coin  of  Vardanes  1 2 

11.  Coin  of  Vardanes  II 3 

12.  Coin  of  Pacorus  II 3 

13.  Coins  of  Volagases  II.  and  Mithridates  IV 3 

14.  Coin  of  Volagases  II 3 

15.  Parthian  sculpture  of  a  female  head  (after  Ross) 4 

16.  Parthian  sculpture,  cornice  and  quasi-capital  (after  Ross) 4 

17.  Plan  of  Hatra  (after  Ross) 4 

18.  Plan  of  Palace-Temple  at  Hatra  (after  Fergusson  and  Ross) 4 

19.  Parthian  sculpture,  frieze  over  doorway  (after  Ross) 5 

20.  Restoration  of  Palace-Temple  at  Hatra  (after  Ainsworth) 5 

21.  Parthian  capitals  (after  Lof tus) 5 

23.  Parthian  diapering  (ditto) 5 

23.  Parthian  ornamented  coffin  (ditto) 6 

24.  Parthian  statuette  (ditto) 6 

25.  Parthian  vases,  jugs,  and  lamps  (ditto) 6 

26.  Bas-relief  of  Gotarzes  (after  Coste) 7 

27.  Parthian  bas-relief  (ditto) 8 

28.  Bas-relief  of  Magus,  probably  Parthian  (ditto) 9 

29.  Bas-relief  of  hunter  and  bear,  probably  Parthian  (ditto) 10 

80.  Parthian  kings  from  coins 10 

81.  Ancient  Persians,  from  a  bas-relief  at  Persepolis  (after  Ker  Porter) It 

$2.  £ariier  coins  of  Artaxerzes  I < < U 


Xii  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS— VOL.  Ill 

PLATK 

33.  Artaxerxes  I.  giving  the  crown  to  his  son,  Sapor  (after  Ker  Porter) 13 

34.  Sapor  I.  presenting  Cyriades    to  the   Romans  as  their  Emperor   (after 

Flandin) 13 

35.  Valerian  doing  homage  to  Cyriades  (after  Flandin) 14 

36.  Later  coins  of  Artaxerxes  1 15 

37.  Coins  of  Sapor  I  15 

38.  Head  of  Sapor  I.,  from  a  gem  (after  Mordtmann) 15 

39.  Coin  of  Hormisdas  I ..  15 

40.  Coin  of  Varahran  1 15 

41.  Coin  of  Varahran  n IS 

42.  Varahran  II.  addressing  his  nobles  (after  Ker  Porter) 16 

43.  Varahran  II.  receiving  the  submission  of  the  Segestani  (after  Flandin) 17 

44.  Coin  of  Varahran  UI 18 

45.  Head  of  Narses,  from  a  bas-relief  (after  Flandin) 18 

46.  Coins  of  Narses 18 

47.  Head  of  Hormisdas  n. .  from  a  gem  (after  Mordtmann) 18 

48.  Coin  of  Hormisdas  H.  (after  Thomas) 18 

49.  Coins  of  Sapor  II 19 

50.  Coin  of  Artaxerxes  H 20 

51.  Coins  of  Sapor  m 20 

52.  Portrait  of  Varahran  IV.,  from  a  seal  (after  Thomas) 20 

53.  Later  seal  of  Varahran  IV.  (after  Thomas) 20 

54.  Coin  of  Varahran  IV 20 

55.  Bas-relief  representing  Sapor  H.  and  Sapor  in.  (after  Ker  Porter) 2ft 

56.  Coin  of  Isdigerd  1 21 

57.  Coin  of  Varahran  V 21 

58.  Coin  of  Isdigerd  n 21 

59.  Doubtful  coin  of  Hormisdas  HI 21 

60.  Coin  of  Perozes 21 

61.  Coin  of  Balas 2] 

62.  Coin  of  Zamasp 22 

63.  Coinof  KobadI 22 

64.  Coin  of  Chosroes  1 22 

65.  Another  coin  of  Chosroes  1 22 

66.  Coin  of  Hormisdas  IV 23 

67.  Preregnal  coin  of  Varahran  VI.  (after  Thomas) 23 

68.  Late  coin  of  Varahran  VI 23 

69.  Coins  of  Chosroes  H.  (Parwiz) 23, 2^ 

70.  Coin  of  Kobad  H.  (SiroSs) 24 

71.  Coin  of  Artaxerxes  HI 24 

72.  Coin  of  Isdigerd  HI 24 

73.  Ground-plan  of  palace  at  Serbistan  (after  Flandin) 25 

74.  Front  view  of  Serbistan  Palace,  restored  (after  Flandin) 25 

75.  Ground-plan  of  palace  at  Firuzabad  (after  Flandin) 26 

76.  Section  of  domed  chamber  (after  Flandin) 27 

77.  External  ornamentation  of  palace  at  Firuzabad  (after  Flandin) 27 

78.  Ground-plan  and  elevation  of  Takht-i-Khosru  (after  Flandin) 28 

79.  General  view  of  Mashita  Palace  (from  a  photograph) 28 

80.  Ground-plan  of  palace  at  Mashita  (after  Tristram) 29 

81 .  Inner  gateway  of  Masliita  Palace  (from  a  photograph) 29 

82.  Ornamentation  of  palace  at  Mashita  (from  a  photograph) 30 

83.  Archivolte  of  arch  at  Takht-i-Bostan  (after  Flandin) 31 

84.  Flowered  panel  at  the  side  of  arch  (after  Flandin) 31 

65.  Sassanian  capitals  (after  Flandin) 33 

86.  Sassanian  capitals  (after  Flandin) 8& 

87.  General  vie w  of  arch  at  Takht-i-Bostan  (after  Flandin^ 34 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTEATIONS—VOL.   III. 

PI  VTE 

88.  Sassanian  angel  or  Victory  (after  Flandin) 34 

89.  Bas-relief  of  Ormazd  giving  the  crown  to  Artaxerxes  I.  (after  Ker  Porter). .  35 

90.  Statue  of  Sapor  I.  (after  Texier) 85 

91.  Head-dress  of  an  unknown  king  (after  Texier) 36 

92.  Bas-relief  representing  the  victory  of  Sapor  I.  over  Valerian  (after  Texier).  37 

93.  Bas-relief  of  Sapor  I.  representing  tribute-bearers  (after  Flandin) 38 

94.  Bas-relief  of  Varahran  IV.  representing  a  battle-scene  (after  Texier) 39 

95.  Bas-relief  of  uncertain  date  representing  a  battle-scene  (after  Flandin) 40 

96.  Bas-relief  of  Chosroes  I.  representing  him  as  receiving  tribute  from  the 

Romans  (after  Flandin) 41 

97.  Bas-relief  of  Chosroes  11.  under  arch  at  Takht-i-Bostan  (after  Flandin) 42 

98.  Bas-relief  'jf  stag-hunt,  at  same  place  (after  Flandin) 43 

99.  Bas-relief  of  boar-hunt,  at  same  place  (after  Flandin) 44 

100.  Bas-relief  representing  the  embroidery  of  the  royal  robes  (after  Flandin). . .  45 

101.  Bas-r'slief  representing   Chosroes   11.   on   horseback,  accompanied  by  a 

parasol-bearer  (after  Flandin) 46 

102.  Saddle-mule  of  Chosrot3S  I.,  from  a  bas-relief  (after  Texier) 46 

103.  Sassanian  chariot,  from  a  bas-relief  (after  Texier) 46 

104.  Persian  guardsman,  from  a  bas-relief  (after  Flandin) 46 


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A  HISTORY  OF  PARTHIA. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Geography  of  Parthia  Proper.     Character  of  the  Region. 
Climate.     Character  of  the  Surrounding  Countries. 

The  broad  tract  of  desert  which,  eastward  of  the  Caspian 
Sea,  extends  from  the  Moughojar  hills  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  a 
distance  of  above  1500  miles,  is  interrupted  about  midway  by 
a  strip  of  territory  possessing  features  of  much  beauty  and 
attraction.  This  strip,  narrow  compared  to  the  desert  on 
either  side  of  it,  is  yet,  looked  at  by  itself,  a  region  of  no  incon- 
siderable dimensions,  extending,  as  it  does  from  east  to  west, ' 
a  distance  of  320,  and  from  north  to  south  of  nearly  200  miles. 
The  mountain  chain,  which  running  southward  of  the  Cas- 
pian, skirts  the  great  plateau  of  Iran,  or  Persia,  on  the  north, 
broadens  out,  after  it  passes  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the 
sea,  into  a  valuable  and  productive  mountain -region.  Four  or 
five  distinct  ranges^  here  run  parallel  to  one  another,  having 
between  them  latitudinal  valleys,  with  glens  transverse  to 
their  courses.  The  sides  of  the  valleys  are  often  weU  wooded ;' 
the  flat  ground  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  is  fertile ;  water  abounds ; 
and  the  streams  gradually  collect  into  rivers  of  a  considerable 
size. 

The  fertile  territory  in  this  quarter  is  further  increased  by  the 
extension  of  cultivation  to  a  considerable  distance  from  the  base 
of  the  most  southern  of  the  ranges,  in  the  direction  of  the  Great 
Iranic  desert.  The  mountains  send  down  a  number  of  small 
streams  towards  the  south ;  and  the  water  of  these,  judiciously 
husbanded  by  means  of  reservoirs  and  hanats,  is  capable  of 
spreading  fertility  over  a  broad  belt  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  ;* 
Avhich,  left  to  nature,  would  be  almost  as  barren  as  the  desert 
itself,  into  which  it  would,  in  fact,  be  absorbed. 

It  was  undoubtedly  in  the  region  which  has  been  thus  briefly 


2  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  i. 

described  that  the  ancient  home  of  the  Parthians  lay.  In 
this  neighborhood  alone  are  found  the  geographic  names 
which  the  most  ancient  writers  who  mention  the  Parthians 
connect  with  them.  ^  Here  evidently  the  Parthians  were  set- 
tled" at  the  time  when  Alexander  the  Great  overran  the  East, 
and  first  made  the  Greeks  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  Par- 
thian name  and  territory.  Here,  lastly,  in  the  time  of  the 
highest  Parthian  splendor  and  prosperity,  did  a  province  of 
the  Empire  retain  the  name  of  Parthyene,  or  Parthia  Proper ;' 
and  here,  also,  in  their  palmiest  days,  did  the  Parthian  kings 
continue  to  have  a  capital  and  a  residence/ 

Parthia  Proper,  however,  was  at  no  time  coextensive  with 
the  region  described.  A  portion  of  that  region  formed  the 
district  called  Hyrcania ;  and  it  is  not  altogether  easy  to  deter- 
mine what  were  the  limits  between  the  two.  The  evidence 
goes,  on  the  whole,  to  show  that,  while  Hyrcania  lay  towards 
the  west  and  north,  the  Parthian  country  was  that  towards 
the  south  and  east,^  the  valleys  of  the  Ettrek  and  Gurghan 
constituting  the  main  portions  of  the  former,  while  the  tracts 
east  and  south  of  those  valleys,  as  far  as  the  sixty -first  degree 
of  E.  longitude,  constituted  the  latter. 

If  the  limits  of  Parthia  Proper  be  thus  defined,  it  will  have 
nearly  corresponded  to  the  modern  Persian  province  of  Khora- 
san.  It  will  have  extended  from  about  Damaghan  (long. 
54°  10')  upon  the  west, '°  to  the  Heri-rud  upon  the  east,  and 
have  comprised  the  modern  districts  of  Damaghan,  Shah-rud, 
Sebzawar,  Nishapur,  Meshed,  Shebri-No,  and  Tersheez.  Its 
length  from  east  to  west  will  have  been  about  300  miles,  and 
its  average  width  about  100  or  120.  It  wiU  have  contained  an 
area  of  about  33,000  square  miles,  being  thus  about  equal  in 
size  to  Ireland,  Bavaria,  or  St.  Domingo. 

The  character  of  the  district  has  been  already  stated  in 
general  terms;  but  some  further  particulars  may  now  be 
added.  It  consists,  in  the  first  place,  of  a  mountain  and  a 
plain  region — the  mountain  region  lying  towards  the  north 
and  the  plain  region  towards  the  south.  The  mountain  region 
is  composed  of  three  main  ranges,  the  Daman-i-Koh,  or  Hills 
of  the  Kurds,"  upon  the  north,  skirting  the  great  desert  of 
Kharesm,  the  Alatagh  and  Meerabee  mountains  in  the  centre ; 
and  the  Jaghetai  or  Djuvein  range,  upon  the  south,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  continued  in  the  hills  above  Tersheez  and 
Khaff.  The  three  ranges  are  parallel,  running  east  and  west, 
but  with  an  inclination,  more  or  less  strong,  to  the  north  of 


CH.  I.]  mVERS  OF  PARTHIA.  3 

west  and  the  south  of  east.  The  northern  and  central  ranges 
are  connected  by  a  water-shed,  which  runs  nearly  east  and 
west,  a  little  to  the  south  of  Kooshan,  and  separates  the  head 
streams  of  the  Ettrek  from  those  of  the  Meshed  river.  The 
central  and  southern  ranges  are  connected  by  a  more  decided 
mountain  line,  a  transverse  ridge  which  runs  nearly  north  and 
south,  dividing  between  the  waters  that  flow  westward  into 
the  Gurghan,  and  those  which  form  the  river  of  Nishapur. 
This  conformation  of  the  mountains  leaves  between  the  ranges 
three  principal  valleys,  the  valley  of  Meshed  towards  the 
south-east,  between  the  Kurdish  range  and  the  Alatagh  and 
Meerabee ;  that  of  Miyanabad  towards  the  west,  between  the 
Alatagh  and  the  Jaghetai ;  and  that  of  Nishapur  towards  the 
south,  between  the  eastern  end  of  the  Jaghetai  and  the  western 
flank  of  the  Meerabee.  As  the  valleys  are  three  in  number, 
so  likewise  are  the  rivers,  which  are  known  respectively  as  the 
Tejend,  or  river  of  Meshed,  the  river  of  Nishapur,  and  the 
river  of  Miyanabad.  '^ 

The  Tejend,  which  is  the  principal  stream  of  the  three,  rises 
from  several  sources  in  the  hills  south  of  Kooshan,  and  flows 
with  a  south-easterly  course  down  the  valley  of  Meshed,  re- 
ceiving numerous  tributaries  from  both  sides, "  until  it  reaches 
that  city,  when  it  bends  eastward,  and,  finding  a  way  through 
the  Kurdish  range,  joins  the  course  of  the  Heri-rud,  about 
long.  61°  10',  Here  its  direction  is  completely  changed.  Turn- 
ing at  an  angle,  which  is  slightly  acute,  it  proceeds  to  flow  to 
the  west  of  north,  along  the  northern  base  of  the  Kurdish 
range,  from  which  it  receives  numerous  small  streams,  till  it 
ends  finally  in  a  large  swamp  or  marsh,  in  lat.  39°,  long.  57°, 
nearly.  '*  The  entire  length  of  the  stream,  including  only  main 
windings,  is  about  475  miles.  In  its  later  course,  however,  it 
is  often  almost  dry,  the  greater  portion  of  the  water  being 
consumed  in  irrigation  in  the  neighborhood  of  Meshed. 

The  river  of  Nishapur  is  formed  by  numerous  small  streams, 
which  descend  from  the  mountains  that  on  three  sides  inclose 
that  city.  Its  water  is  at  times  wholly  consumed  in  the  culti- 
vation of  the  plain;  but  the  natural  course  may  be  traced, 
running  in  a  southerly  and  south-westerly  direction,  until  it 
debouches  from  the  hills  in  the  vicinity  of  Tershecz. 

The  Miyanabad  stream  is  believed  to  be  a  tributary  of  the 
Gurghan.  It  rises  from  several  sources  in  the  transverse 
range  joining  the  Alatagh  to  the  Jaghetai,  the  streams  from 
which  all  flow  westward  in  narrow  valleys,  uniting  about 


4  THW  SIXTH  MOKARCIIY.  [ch.  l 

long.  57°  35'.  The  course  of  the  river  from  this  point  to  Pi- 
perne  has  not  been  traced,  but  it  is  believed  to  run  in  a  general 
westerly  direction  along  the  southern  base  of  the  Alatagh,  and 
to  form  a  junction  with  the  Gurghan  a  little  below  the  ruins 
of  the  same  name.  Its  length  to  this  point  is  probably  about 
200  miles. 

The  elevation  of  the  mountain  chains  is  not  great.  No  very 
remarkable  peaks  occur  in  them;  and  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  they  anywhere  attain  a  height  of  above  6000  feet. 
They  are  for  the  most  part  barren  and  rugged,  very  scantily 
supplied  with  timber,  ^^  and  only  in  places  capable  of  furnish- 
ing a  tolerable  pasturage  to  flocks  and  herds.  The  valleys,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  rich  and  fertile  in  the  extreme;  that  of 
Meshed,  which  extends  a  distance  of  above  a  hundred  miles 
from  north-west  to  south-east,  and  is  from  twenty  to  thirty 
miles  broad,  has  almost  everywhere  a  good  and  deep  soil,'*^  is 
abundantly  supplied  with  water,  and  yields  a  plentiful  return 
even  to  the  simplest  and  most  primitive  cultivation.  The 
plain  about  Nishapur,  which  is  in  length  from  eighty  to  ninety 
miles,  and  in  width  from  forty  to  sixty,  boasts  a  still  greater 
fertUity.'' 

The  flat  country  along  the  southern  base  of  the  mountains, 
which  ancient  writers  regard  as  Parthia,  par  excellence,  '*  is  a 
strip  of  territory  about  300  miles  long,  varying  in  width  ac 
cording  to  the  labor  and  the  skill  applied  by  its  inhabitants  to 
the  perfecting  of  a  system  of  irrigation.  At  present  the 
Jcanats,  or  underground  water-courses,  are  seldom  carried  to  a 
distance  of  more  than  a  mile  or  two  from  the  foot  of  the  hills ; 
but  it  is  thought  that  anciently  the  cultivation  was  extended 
considerably  further.  Ruined  cities  dispersed  throughout  the 
tract '"  sufficiently  indicate  its  capabilities,  and  in  a  few  places 
where  much  attention  is  paid  to  agriculture  the  results  are 
such  as  to  imply  that  the  soil  is  more  than  ordinarily  produc- 
tive."" The  salt  desert  hes,  however,  in  most  places  within  ten 
or  fifteen  miles  of  the  hills;  and  beyond  this  distance  it  is 
obviously  impossible  that  the  "  Atak"  or  "Skirt"  should  at  any 
time  have  been  inhabited."' 

It  is  evident  that  the  entire  tract  above  described  must  have 
been  at  all  times  a  valuable  and  much  coveted  region.  Com 
pared  with  the  arid  and  inhospitable  deserts  which  adjoin  it 
upon  the  north  and  south,  Khorasan,  the  ancient  Parthia  and 
Hyrcania,  is  a  terrestrial  Paradise.  Parthia,  though  scantily 
wooded,"  still  produces  in  places  the  pine,  the  walnut,  the 


CH.  I.]  BORDER  DISTRICTS— CHORASMIA.  5 

sycamore,  the  ash,  the  poplar,  the  willow,  the  vine,  the  mul- 
berry, the  apricot,  and  nmnerous  other  fruit  trees. '^  Saffron, 
asafoetida,  and  the  gum  ammoniac  plant,  are  indigenous  in 
parts  of  it.^*  Much  of  the  soil  is  suited  for  the  cultivation  of 
wheat,  barley,  and  cotton."  The  ordinary  return  upon  wheat 
and  barley  is  reckoned  at  ten  for  one.^'^  Game  abounds  in 
the  mountains,  and  fish  in  the  underground  water-courses." 
Among  the  mineral  treasures  of  the  region  may  be  enumerated 
copper,  lead,  iron,  salt,""  and  one  of  the  most  exquisite  of  gems, 
the  turquoise.*'-'  This  gem  does  not  appear  to  be  mentioned  by 
ancient  writers;  but  it  is  so  easily  obtainable  that  we  can 
scarcely  suppose  it  was  not  known  from  very  ancient  times. 

The  severity  of  the  climate  of  Parthia  is  strongly  stated  by 
Justin. '"  According  to  modern  travellers,  the  winters,  though 
protracted,  are  not  very  inclement,  the  thermometer  rarely 
sinking  below  ten  or  eleven  degrees  of  Fahrenheit  during  the 
nights,"  and  during  the  daytime  rising,  even  in  December  and 
January,^-  to  40°  or  50".  The  cold  weather,  however,  wliich 
commences  about  October,  continues  till  nearly  the  end  of 
March,  when  storms  of  sleet  and  hail  are  common.^'  Much 
snow  falls  in  the  earher  portion  of  the  winter,  and  the  valleys 
are  scarcely  clear  of  it  tUl  March.  On  the  mountains  it  re- 
mains much  longer,  and  forms  the  chief  source  of  supply  to 
the  rivers  during  the  spring  and  the  early  summer  time.  In 
summer  the  heat  is  considerable,  more  especially  in  the  region 
known  as  the  "  Atak; "  and  here,  too,  the  unwholesome  wind, 
which  blows  from  the  southern  desert,  is  felt  from  time  to 
time  as  a  terrible  scourge.  ^*  But  in  the  upland  country  the 
heat  is  at  no  time  very  intense,  and  the  natives  boast  that  they 
are  not  compelled  by  it  to  sleep  on  their  house-tops  during 
more  than  one  month  in  the  year."^ 

The  countries  by  which  Parthia  Proper  was  bounded  were 
the  following :  Chorasmia,  Margiana,  Aria,  Sarangia,  Sagartia, 
and  Hyrcania. 

Chorasmia  lay  upon  the  north,  consisting  of  the  low  tract 
between  the  most  northerly  of  the  Parthian  mountain  chains 
and  the  old  course  of  the  Oxus.  This  region,  which  is  for  the 
most  part  an  arid  and  inhospitable  desert,'"  can  at  no  time  have 
maintained  more  than  a  sparse  and  scanty  population.  The 
Turkoman  tribes  which  at  the  present  day  roam  over  the  waste, 
feeding  their  flocks  and  herds  alternately  on  the  banks  of  the 
Oxus  and  the  Tejend,  or  finding  a  bare  subsistence  for  them 
about  the  ponds  and  pools  left  by  the  winter  rains,  represent,  it 


6  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  i. 

is  probable,  with  sufficient  faithfulness,  the  ancient  inhabitants, 
who,  whatever  their  race,  must  always  have  been  nomads,  and 
ofln  never  have  exceeded  a  few  hundred  thousands. "  On  this 
side  Parthia  must  always  have  been  tolerably  safe  from  at- 
tacks, unless  the  Cis-Oxianian  tribes  were  reinforced,  as  they 
sometimes  were,  by  hordes  from  beyond  the  river. 

On  the  north-east  was  Margiana,  sometimes  regarded  as  a 
country  by  itself,  sometimes  reckoned  a  mere  district  of  Bac- 
tria.  '*  This  was  the  tract  of  fertile  land  upon  the  Murg-ab,  or 
ancient  Margus  river,  which  is  known  among  moderns  as  the 
district  of  Merv.  The  Murg-ab  is  a  stream  flowing  from  the 
range  of  the  Paropamisus,  in  a  direction  which  is  a  little  east 
of  north ;  it  debouches  from  the  mountains  in  about  lat.  36°  25', 
and  thence  makes  its  way  through  the  desert.  Before  it 
reaches  Merv,  it  is  eighty  yards  wide  and  five  feet  deep,'"  thus 
carrying  a  vast  body  of  water.  By  a  judicious  use  of  dykes 
and  canals,  this  fertilizing  fluid  was  in  ancient  times  carried  to 
a  distance  of  more  than  twenty-five  miles  from  the  natural 
course  of  the  river ;  and  by  these  means  an  oasis  was  created 
with  a  circumference  of  above  170,  and  consequently  a  diame- 
ter of  above  fifty  miles.""  This  tract,  inclosed  on  every  side  by 
deserts,  was  among  the  most  fertile  of  all  known  regions ;  it 
was  especially  famous  for  its  vines,  which  grew  to  such  a  size 
that  a  single  man  could  not  encircle  their  stems  with  his  two 
arms,  and  bore  clusters  that  were  a  yard  long."'  Margiana 
possessed,  however,  as  a  separate  country,  little  military 
strength,  and  it  was  only  as  a  portion  of  some  larger  and  more 
populous  territory  that  it  could  become  formidable  to  the  Par- 
thians. 

South  of  Margiana,  and  adjoining  upon  Parthia  toward  the 
east,  was  Aria,  the  tract  which  lies  about  the  modern  Herat. 
This  was  for  the  most  part  a  mountain  region,  very  similar  in 
its  general  character  to  the  mountainous  portion  of  Parthia,"* 
but  of  much  smaller  dimensions."^  Its  people  were  fairly  war- 
like ;  but  the  Parthian  population  was  probably  double  or  triple 
their  number,  and  Parthia  consequently  had  but  little  to  fear 
in  this  quarter. 

Upon  the  south-east  Parthia  was  bordered  by  Sarangia,  the 
country  of  the  Sarangse,  or  Drangse.  This  appears  to  have 
been  the  district  south  of  the  Herat  valley,  reaching  thence  as 
far  as  the  Hamoon,  or  Sea  of  Seistan,  It  is  a  country  of  hills 
and  downs,""  watered  by  a  number  of  somewhat  scanty 
streams,  which  flow  south-westward  from  the  Paropamisus  to 


en.  II.]  EYRCANIA.  7 

tha  Hamoon.  Its  population  can  never  have  been  great,  and 
they  were  at  no  time  aggressive  or  enterprising,  so  that  on  this 
side  also  the  Parthians  were  secure,  and  had  to  deal  with  no 
formidable  neighbor. 

Sagartia  succeeded  to  Sarangia  towards  the  west,  and  bordered 
Parthia  along  almost  the  whole  of  its  southern  frontier.  Ex- 
cepting in  the  vicinity  of  Tebbes  and  Toun^^  (lat.  34°,  long.  56° 
to  58°),  this  district  is  an  absolute  desert,  the  haunt  of  the  ga- 
zelle and  the  wild  ass,"  dry,  saline,  and  totally  devoid  of  vege- 
tation. The  wild  nomads,  who  wandered  over  its  wastes,  ob- 
taining a  scanty  subsistence  by  means  of  the  lasso,*'  were  few 
in  number,"  scattered,  and  probably  divided  by  feuds.  South- 
ern Parthia  might  occasionally  suffer  from  their  raids;  but 
they  were  far  too  weak  to  constitute  a  serious  danger  to  the 
mountain  country. 

Lastly,  towards,  the  west  and  the  north-west,  Parthia  was 
bordered  by  Hyrcania,  a  region  geographically  in  the  closest 
connection  with  it,  very  similar  in  general  character,  but  richer, 
warmer,  and  altogether  more  desirable.  Hyrcania  was,  as  al- 
ready observed,*^  the  western  and  north-western  portion  of 
that  broad  mountain  region  which  has  been  described  as  inter- 
vening between  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Caspian  and  the  river 
Arius,  or  Heri-rud.  It  consisted  mainly  of  the  two  rich  valleys 
of  the  Gurghan  and  Ettrek,  with  the  mountain  chains  inclos- 
ing or  dividing  them.  Here  on  the  slopes  of  the  hills  grow  the 
oak,  the  beech,  the  elm,  the  alder,  the  wild  cherry ;  here  luxu- 
riant vines  spring  from  the  soil  on  every  side,  raising  them- 
selves aloft  by  the  aid  of  their  stronger  sisters,  and  hanging  in 
wild  festoons  from  tree  to  tree ;  beneath  their  shade  the  grovmd 
is  covered  with  flowers  of  various  kinds,  primroses,  violets, 
lihes,  hyacinths,  and  others  of  unknown  species ;  while  in  the 
flat  land  at  the  bottom  of  the  valleys  are  meadows  of  the  soft- 
est and  the  tenderest  grass,  capable  of  affording  to  numerous 
flocks  and  herds  an  excellent  and  unfailing  pastui-e.'"  Abun- 
dant game  finds  shelter  in  the  forests,"  while  towards  the 
mouths  of  the  rivers,  where  the  ground  is  for  the  most  part 
marshy,  large  herds  of  wild  boars  are  frequent ;  a  single  herd 
sometimes  containing  hundreds.  ""^  Altogether  Hyrcania  was  a 
most  productive  and  desirable  country,  capable  of  sustaining  a 
dense  population,  and  well  deserving  Strabo's  description  of  it 
as  "highly  favored  of  Heaven.""  The  area  of  the  country 
was,  however,  small  ;'*  probably  not  much  exceeding  one  half 


8  THE  SIXTH  MONAROnr.  [cii.  :i. 

that  of  Parthia  Proper ;  and  thus  the  people  were  not  sufSciently 
numerous  to  cause  the  Parthians  much  apprehension. 

The  situation  and  character  of  Parthia  thus,  on  the  whole, 
favored  her  becoming  an  imperial  power.  She  had  abundant 
resources  within  herself ;  she  had  a  territory  apt  for  the  pro- 
duction of  a  hardy  race  of  men ;  and  she  had  no  neighbors  of 
sufficient  strength  to  keep  her  down,  when  she  once  developed 
the  desire  to  become  dominant.  Surprise  has  been  expressed 
at  her  rise."  But  it  is  perhaps  more  astonishing  that  she 
passed  so  many  centuries  in  obscurity  before  she  became  an 
important  state,  than  that  she  raised  herself  at  last  to  the  first 
position  among  the  Oriental  nations.  Her  ambition  and  her 
material  strength  were  plants  of  slow  growth;  it  took  several 
hundreds  of  years  for  them  to  attain  maturity :  when,  how- 
ever, tliis  point  was  reached,  the  circumstances  of  her  geo- 
graphical position  stood  her  in  good  stead,  and  enabled  her 
rapidly  to  extend  her  way  over  the  greater  portion  of  Western 
Asia. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Early  notices  of  the  Parthians.  Their  Ethnic  character  and 
connections.  Their  position  under  the  Persian  Monarchs, 
from  Cyrus  the  Great  to  Darius  III.     {Codomannus.) 

Ilapdwp  veVos  SkuAi.koi'. — Arrian,  Fr.  1. 

The  Parthians  do  not  appear  in  history  until  a  comparatively 
recent  period.  Their  name  occurs  nowhere  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment Scriptures.  They  obtain  no  mention  in  the  Zendavesta. 
The  Assyrian  Inscriptions  are  wholly  silent  concerning  them. 
It  is  not  until  the  time  of  Darius  Hystaspis  that  we  have  trust- 
worthy evidence  of  their  existence  as  a  distinct  people. '  In 
the  inscriptions  of  this  king  we  find  their  country  included 
under  the  name  of  Parthva  or  Parthwa  among  the  provinces 
of  the  Persian  Empire,  joined  in  two  places  with  Sarangia, 
Aria,  Chorasmia,  Bactria,  and  Sogdiana,  "^  and  in  a  third  with 
these  same  countries  and  Sagartia.^  We  find,  moreover,  an 
account  of  a  rebellion  in  wliich  the  Parthians  took  part.  In 
Jje  troubles  which  broke  out  upon  the  death  of  the  Pseud o* 


CH.  11.]        EARLY  NOTICES  OF  THE  FABTHIAN8.  9 

Smerdis,  B.C.  521,  Parthja  revolted,  in  conjunction  (as  it  would 
seem)  with  Hyrcania,  espousing  the  cause  of  that  Median  pre- 
tender, who,  declaring  himself  a  descendant  of  the  old  Median 
monarchs,  set  himself  up  as  a  rival  to  Darius.  Hytaspes,  the 
father  of  Darius,  held  at  this  time  the  Parthian  satrapy.  In 
two  battles  within  the  limits  of  his  province  he  defeated  the 
rebels,  who  must  have  brought  into  the  field  a  considerable 
force,  since  in  one  of  the  two  engagements  they  lost  in  killed 
and  prisoners  between  10,000  and  11,000  men.  After  their 
second  defeat  the  Parthians  made  their  submission,  and  once 
more  acknowledged  Darius  for  their  sovereign.* 

With  these  earliest  Oriental  notices  of  the  Parthians  agree 
entirely  such  passages  as  contain  any  mention  of  them  in  the 
more  ancient  literature  of  the  Greeks.  Hecateeus  of  Miletus, 
who  was  contemporary  with  Darius  Hystaspis,  made  the 
Parthians  adjoin  upon  the  Chorasmians  in  the  account  which 
he  gave  of  the  geography  of  Asia.  ^  Herodotus  spoke  of  them 
as  a  people  subject  to  the  Persians  in  the  reign  of  Darius,  and 
assigned  them  to  the  sixteenth  satrapy,  which  comprised  also 
the  Arians,  the  Sogdians,  and  the  Chorasmians.  *  He  said  that 
they  took  part  in  the  expedition  of  Xerxes  against  Greece  (B.C. 
480),  serving  in  the  army  on  foot  under  the  same  commander 
as  the  Chorasmians,  and  equipped  like  them  with  bows  and 
arrows,  and  with  spears  of  no  great  length.'  In  another  pas- 
sage he  mentioned  their  being  compelled  to  pay  the  Persian 
water  tax,  and  spoke  of  the  great  need  which  they  had  of 
water  for  the  irrigation  of  their  millet  and  sesame  crops. ' 

It  is  evident  that  these  notices  agree  with  the  Persian  ac- 
counts, both  as  to  the  locality  of  the  Parthians  and  as  to  the 
fact  of  their  subjection  to  the  Persian  government.  They  fur- 
ther agree  in  assigning  to  the  Parthians  a  respectable  military 
character,  yet  one  of  no  very  special  eminency.  On  the  eth- 
nology of  the  nation,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
country  became  an  integral  part  of  the  Persian  dominions, 
they  throw  no  light.  We  have  still  to  seek  an  answer  to  the 
questions,  "Who  were  the  Parthians?"  and  "How  did  they 
become  Persian  subjects?" 

Who  were  the  Parthians  ?  It  is  not  until  the  Parthians  have 
emerged  from  obscurity  and  become  a  great  people  that  an- 
cient authors  trouble  themselves  with  inquiries  as  to  their 
ethnic  character  and  remote  antecedents.  Of  the  first  writers 
who  take  the  subject  into  their  consideration,  some  arc  con- 
tent to  say  that  the  Parthians  were  a  race  of  Scyths,  who  at  a 


10  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  n. 

remote  date  had  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  nation,  and  had 
occupied  the  southern  portion  of  the  Chorasmian  desert, 
whence  they  had  gradually  made  themselves  masters  of  the 
mountain  region  adjoining  it."  Others  added  to  this  that  the 
Scythic  tribe  to  which  they  belonged  was  called  the  Dahee  ;  that 
their  own  proper  name  was  Parni,  or  Apami ;  and  that  they 
had  migrated  originally  from  the  country  to  the  north  of  the 
Palus  Mseotis,  where  they  had  left  the  great  mass  of  their  fel- 
low tribesmen. "  Subsequently,  in  the  time  of  the  Antonines,  the 
theory  was  started  that  the  Parthians  were  Scyths,  whom 
Sesostris,  on  his  return  from  his  Scythian  expedition,  brought 
into  Asia  and  settled  in  the  mountain-tract  lying  east  of  the 
Caspian." 

It  can  scarcely  be  thought  that  these  notices  have  very  much 
historical  value.  Moderns  are  generally  agreed  that  the 
Scythian  conquests  of  Sesostris  are  an  invention  of  the  Egyptian 
priests,  which  they  palmed  on  Herodotus  "^  and  Diodorus. " 
Could  they  be  regarded  as  having  really  taken  place,  still  the 
march  back  from  Scythia  to  Egypt  round  the  north  and  east 
of  the  Caspian  Sea  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  improbable. 
The  settlement  of  the  Parthians  in  Parthia  by  the  returning 
conqueror  is,  in  fact,  a  mere  duplicate  of  the  tale  commonly  told 
of  his  having  settled  the  Colchians  in  Colchis,  '■*  and  is  equally 
worthless.  The  earlier  authors,  moreover,  know  nothing  of 
the  story,  which  first  appears  in  the  second  century  after  our 
era,  and  as  time  goes  on  becomes  more  circumstantial.'^ 

Even  the  special  connection  of  the  Parthians  with  the  Dahse, 
and  their  migration  from  the  shores  of  the  Palus  Mseotis, 
may  be  doubted.  Strabo  admits  it  to  be  uncertain  whether 
there  were  any  Dahee  at  all  about  the  Maeotis  ; '°  and,  if  there 
were,  it  would  be  open  to  question  whether  they  were  of  the 
same  race  with  the  Dahse  of  the  Caspian."  As  the  settlement 
of  the  Parthians  in  the  country  called  after  their  name  dated 
from  a  time  anterior  to  Darius  Hystaspis,  and  the  Greeks  cer- 
tainly did  not  set  on  foot  any  inquiries  into  their  origin  till  at 
least  two  centuries  later,  '*  it  would  be  unlikely  that  the  Parthi- 
ans could  give  them  a  true  account.  The  real  groundwork  of  the 
stories  told  seems  to  have  been  twofold.  First,  there  was  a 
strong  conviction  on  the  part  of  those  who  came  in  contact 
with  the  Parthians  that  they  were  Scyths ;  and  secondly,  it 
was  believed  that  their  name  meant  "  exile."  '"  Hence  it  was 
necessary  to  suppose  that  they  had  migrated  into  their  country 
from  some  portion  of  the  tract  known  as  Scythia  to  the  Greeks, 


CH.  II.]  TUE  PABTEIANS,   SCTTHS.  H 

and  it  was  natural  to  invent  stories  as  to  the  particular  cir- 
cumstances of  the  migration. 

The  residuum  of  the  truth,  or  at  any  rate  the  important  con- 
viction of  the  ancient  writers,  which  remains  after  their 
stories  are  sifted,  is  the  Scythic  character  of  the  Parthian  peo- 
ple. On  this  point,  Strabo,  Justin,  and  Arrian  are  agreed. 
The  manners  of  the  Parthians  had,  they  tell  us,  much  that 
was  Scythic  in  them.-"  Their  language  was  half  Scythic, 
half  Median.^'  They  armed  themselves  in  the  Scythic  fash- 
ion." They  were,  in  fact,  Scyths  in  descent,  in  habits,  in 
character. 

But  what  are  we  to  understand  by  this  ?  May  we  asstune  at 
once  that  they  were  a  Turanian  people,  in  race,  habits,  and 
language  akin  to  the  various  tribes  of  Turkomans  who  are  at 
present  dominant  over  the  entire  region  between  the  Oxus  and 
the  Parthian  mountain-tract,  and  within  that  tract  have  many 
settlements  ?  May  we  assume  that  they  stood  in  an  attitude 
of  natural  hostility  to  the  Arian  nations  by  which  they  were 
surrounded,  and  that  their  revolt  was  the  assertion  of  inde- 
pendence by  a  down-trodden  people  after  centuries  of  subjec- 
tion to  the  yoke  of  a  stranger  ?  Did  Turan,  in  their  persons, 
rise  against  Iran  after  perhaps  a  thousand  years  of  oppression, 
and  renew  the  struggle  for  predominance  in  regions  where  the 
war  had  been  waged  before,  and  where  it  still  contmues  to  be 
waged  at  the  present  day  ? 

Such  conclusions  cannot  safely  be  drawn  from  the  mere  fact 
that  the  Scythic  character  of  the  Parthians  is  asserted  in  the 
strongest  terms  by  the  ancient  writers.  The  term  "Scythic" 
is  not,  strictly  speaking,  ethnical.  It  designates  a  life  ratlier  a 
descent,  habits  rather  than  blood.  It  is  applied  by  the  Greeks 
and  Eomans  to  Indo-European  and  Turanian  races  indiffer- 
ently," provided  that  they  are  nomads,  dwelling  in  tents  or 
carts,  living  on  the  produce  of  their  flocks  and  herds,  uncivi- 
hzed,  and,  perhaps  it  may  be  added,  accustomed  to  pass  their 
lives  on  horseback.  We  cannot,  therefore,  assume  that  a  na- 
tion is  Turanian  simply  because  it  is  pronounced  "Scythic." 
Still,  as  in  fact  the  bulk  of  those  races  which  have  remained 
content  with  the  nomadic  condition,  and  which  from  the  ear- 
liest times  to  the  present  day  have  led  the  life  above  described 
in  the  broad  steppes  of  Europe  and  Asia,  appear  to  have  been 
of  the  Turian  type,  a  presumption  is  raised  in  favor  of  a 
people  being  Turanian  by  decided  and  concordant  statements 
that  it  is  Scythic.    The  presumption  may  of  course  be    re^ 


12,  THE  SIXTH  MONAECHT.  [ch.  ii. 

moved  by  evidence  to  the  contrary  ;  but,  until  such  evidence 
is  produced  it  has  weight,  and  constitutes  an  argument,  the 
force  of  which  is  considerable. 

In  the  present  instance  the  presumption  raised  is  met  by  no 
argument  of  any  great  weight;  while  on  the  other  hand  it 
receives  important  confirmation  from  several  different  quar- 
ters. It  is  said,  indeed,  that  as  all,  or  almost  all,  the  other 
nations  of  these  parts  were  confessedly  Arians  (e.g.  the 
Bactrians,  the  Sogdians,  the  Chorasmians,  the  Margians,  the 
Arians  of  Herat,  the  Sagartians,  the  Sarangians,  and  the 
Hyrcanians),  it  would  be  strange  if  the  Parthians  belonged  to 
a  wholly  different  ethnic  family.^*  But,  in  the  first  place,  the 
existence  of  isolated  nationahties,  detached  fragments  of  some 
greater  ethnic  mass,  embodied  amid  alien  material,  is  a  fact 
famihar  to  ethnologists;"  and,  further,  it  is  not  at  all  certain 
that  there  were  not  other  Turanian  races  in  these  parts,  as, 
for  instance,  the  Thamanseans.  Again,  it  is  said  that  the 
Parthians  show  their  Arian  extraction  by  their  names;  but 
this  argument  may  be  turned  against  those  who  adduce  it. 
It  is  time  that  among  the  Parthian  names  a  considerable 
number  are  not  only  Arian,  but  distinctly  Persian — e.g.,  Mith- 
ridates,  Tiridates,  Artabanus,  Orobazus,  Rhodaspes — but  the 
bulk  of  the  names  have  an  entirely  different  character.  There 
is  nothing  Arian  in  such  appellations  as  Amminapes,  Bacasis, 
Pacorus,  Vonones,  Sinnaces,  Abdus,  Abdageses,  Gotarzes, 
Vologeses,  Mnasciras,  Sanatroeces;  nor  anything  markedly 
Arian  in  Priapatius,"^  Himerus,  Orodes,  Aprgeteeus,  Omos- 
pades,  Parrhaces,  Vasaces,  Monesis,  Exedares.  If  the  Par- 
thians were  Arians,  what  account  is  to  be  given  of  these 
words  ?  That  they  employed  a  certain  number  of  Persian  names 
is  suflBciently  explained  by  their  subjection  during  more  than 
two  centuries  to  the  Persian  rule.  We  are  also  distinctly  told 
that  they  affected  Persian  habits,  and  desired  to  be  looked 
upon  as  Persians."  The  Arian  names  borne  by  Parthians  no 
more  show  them  to  be  Arians  in  race  than  the  Norman  names 
adopted  so  widely  by  the  Welsh  show  them  to  be  Northmen. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  non- Arian  names  in  the  former  case 
are  hke  the  non-Norman  names  in  the  latter,  and  equally  indi- 
cate a  second  source  of  nomenclature,  in  which  should  be  con- 
tained the  key  to  the  true  ethnology  of  the  people. 

The  non- Arian  character  of  the  Parthians  is  signified,  if  not 
proved,  by  the  absence  of  their  name  from  the  Zendavesta, 
The  Zendavesta  enumerates  among  Arian  nations  the  Bac- 


CH.  11.]  TURANIAN  CAST  OF  THE  NAMES.  13 

trians,  the  Sogdians,  the  Margians,  the  Hyrcanians,  the  Ai'ians 
of  Herat,,  and  the  Chorasmians,  or  all  the  important  nations 
of  these  parts  except  the  Parthians.  The  Parthian  country  it 
mentions  under  the  name  of  Nisaya  ^*  or  Nisaea,  implying 
apparently  that  the  Parthians  were  not  yet  settled  in  it.  The 
only  ready  way  of  reconciling  the  geography  of  the  Zenda- 
vesta  with  that  of  later  ages  is  to  suppose  the  Parthians  a 
non-Arian  nation  who  intruded  themselves  among  the  early 
Arian  settlements,  coming  probably  from  the  north,  the  great 
home  of  the  Turanians. 

Some  positive  arguments  in  favor  of  the  Turanian  origin  of 
the  Parthians  may  be  based  upon  their  names.  The  Parthians 
affect,  in  their  names,  the  termination  -ac  or  -aTc^  as,  for 
instance,  in  Arsac-es,  Sinnac-es,  Parrhaces,  Vesaces,  Sana- 
trseces,  Phraataces,  etc. — a  termination  which  characterizes 
the  primitive  Babylonian,  the  Basque,  and  most  of  the  Tura- 
nian tongues.  The  termination  -geses,  found  in  such  names  as 
Volo-geses,  Abda-geses,  and  the  like,  may  be  compared  with 
the  -ghiz  of  Yenghiz.  The  Turanian  root  annap,  "God,"  is 
perhaps  traceable  in  Amm-inap-es.  If  the  Parthian  ' '  Chos- 
roes  "  represents  the  Persian  "  Kurush"  or  Cyrus,  the  corrup- 
tion which  the  word  has  undergone  is  such  as  to  suggest  a 
Tatar  articulation. 

The  remains  of  the  Parthian  language,  which  we  possess, 
beyond  their  names,  are  too  scanty  and  too  little  to  be  de- 
pended on  to  afford  us  any  real  assistance  in  settUng  the 
question  of  their  ethnic  character.  Besides  the  words  surena, 
"Commander-in-chief,"  and  Jcarta  or  Jcerta,  "city,"  "fort," 
there  is  scarcely  one  of  which  we  can  be  assured  that  it  was 
really  understood  by  the  Parthians  in  the  sense  assigned  to 
it."  Of  these  two,  the  latter,  which  is  undoubtedly  Arian, 
may  have  been  adopted  from  the  Persians:'"  the  former  is 
non-Arian,  but  has  no  known  Turanian  congeners. 

If,  however,  the  consideration  of  the  Parthian  language  does 
not  help  us  to  determine  their  race,  a  consideration  of  their 
manners  and  customs  strengthens  much  the  presumption  that 
they  were  Turanians.  Like  the  Turkoman  and  Tatar  tribes 
generally,  they  passed  almost  their  whole  lives  on  horseback, 
conversing,  transacting  business,  buying  and  selling,  even 
eating  on  their  horses."  They  practised  polygamy,  secluded 
their  women  from  the  sight  of  men,  punished  unfaithfulness 
with  extreme  severity,  delighted  iji  hunting,  and  rarely  ate 
any  flesh  but  that  which  they  obtained  in  this  way,  were 


14  THE  SIXTH  MONAliCHY.  [ch.  n. 

moderate  eaters'^  but  great  drinkers, "  did  not  speak  much, 
but  yet  were  very  unquiet,  being  constantly  engaged  in  stir- 
ring up  trouble  either  at  home  or  abroad.'*  A  small  portion 
of  the  nation  alone  was  free;  the  remainder  were  the  slaves 
of  the  privileged  few.'^  Nomadic  habits  continued  to  prevail 
among  a  portion  of  those  who  remained  in  their  primitive 
seats,  even  in  the  time  of  their  greatest  national  prosperity  ;'* 
and  a  coarse,  rude,  and  semi-barbarous  character  attached 
always  even  to  the  most  advanced  part  of  the  nation,  to  the 
king,  the  court,  and  the  nobles  generally,  a  character  which, 
despite  a  certain  varnish  of  civilization,  was  constantly  show- 
ing itself  in  their  dealings  with  each  other  and  with  foreign 
nations.  "The  Parthian  monarchs,"  as  Gibbon  justly  ob- 
serves," "hke  the  Mogul  (Mongol)  sovereigns  of  Hindostan, 
delighted  in  the  pastoral  life  of  their  Scythian  ancestors,  and 
the  imperial  camp  was  frequently  pitched  in  the  plain  of 
Ctesiphon,  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Tigris."  Niebuhr  seems 
even  to  doubt  whether  the  Parthians  dwelt  in  cities  at  all.'* 
He  represents  them  as  maintaining  from  first  to  last  their 
nomadic  habits,  and  regards  the  insurrection  by  which  their 
empire  was  brought  to  an  end  as  a  rising  of  the  inhabitants  of 
towns— the  Tadjiks'"  of  those  times — against  the  Ilyats  or 
wanderers,  who  had  oppressed  them  for  centuries.  This  is,  no 
doubt,  an  overstatement;  but  it  has  a  foundation  in  fact, 
since  wandering  habits  and  even  tent-life  were  affected  by  the 
Parthians  during  the  most  flourishing  period  of  their  empire. 

On  the  whole,  the  Turanian  character  of  the  Parthians, 
though  not  absolutely  proved,  appears  to  be  in  the  highest 
degree  probable.  If  it  be  accepted,  we  must  regard  them  as  in 
race  closely  alhed  to  the  vast  hordes  which  from  a  remote 
antiquity  have  roamed  over  the  steppe  region  of  upper  Asia, 
from  time  to  time  bursting  upon  the  south,  and  harassing  or 
subjugating  the  comparatively  unwarUke  inhabitants  of  the 
warmer  countries.  We  must  view  them  as  the  congeners  of 
the  Huns,  Bulgarians,  and  Comans  of  the  ancient  world;  of 
the  Kalmucks,  Ouigurs,  Usbegs,  Eleuts,  etc.,  of  the  present 
day.  Perhaps  their  nearest  representatives  will  be,  if  we  look 
to  their  primitive  condition  at  the  founding  of  their  empire, 
the  modern  Turkomans,  who  occupy  nearly  the  same  districts ; 
if  we  regard  them  in  the  period  of  their  great  prosperity,  the 
Osmanli  Turks.  Like  the  Turks,  they  combined  great  mili- 
tary prowess  and  vigor  with  a  capacity  for  organization  and 
government  not  verj^  usual  among  Asiatics.     Like  them,  they 


CH.  IT.]         PARTIIIANS  CONQUERED  BY  CYJiUS.  15 

remained  at  heart  barbarians,  though  they  put  on  an  external 
appearance  of  civiUzation  and  refinement.  Like  them,  they 
never  to  any  extent  amalgamated  with  the  conquered  races, 
but  continued  for  centuries  an  exclusive  dominant  race, 
encamped  in  the  countries  which  they  had  overrun. 

The  circumstances  under  which  the  Parthians  became 
subjects  of  the  Persian  empire  may  readily  be  conjectured, 
but  cannot  be  laid  down  positively.  According  to  Diodoiois, 
who  probably  followed  Ctesias,  they  passed  from  the  do- 
minion of  the  Assyrians  to  that  of  the  Medes,  and  from  depend- 
ence upon  the  Medes  to  a  similar  position  under  the  Persians."" 
But  the  balance  of  evidence  is  against  these  views.  It  is,  on 
the  whole,  most  probable  that  neither  the  Assyrian  nor  the 
Median  empire  extended  so  far  eastward  as  the  country  of  the 
Parthians."'  The  Parthians  probably  maintained  their  inde- 
pendence from  the  time  of  their  settlement  in  the  district 
called  after  their  name  until  the  sudden  arrival  in  their 
country  of  the  great  Persian  conqueror,  Cyrus.  This  prince, 
as  Herodotus  tells  us,  subdued  the  whole  of  Western  Asia, 
proceeding  from  nation  to  nation,  and  subjugating  one  people 
after  another.  The  order  of  his  conquests  is  not  traceable; 
but  it  is  clear  that  after  his  conquest  of  the  Lydian  empire 
(about  B.C.  554)  he  proceeded  eastward,  with  the  special 
object  of  subduing  Bactria."^  To  reach  Bactria,  he  would  have 
to  pass  through,  or  close  by,  Parthia.  Since,  as  Herodotus 
says,"^  "he  conquered  the  whole  way,  as  he  went,"  we  may 
fairly  conclude  that  on  his  road  to  Bactria  he  subjugated  the 
Parthians.  It  was  thus,  almost  certainly,  that  they  lost  their 
independence  and  became  Persian  subjects.  Competent 
enough  to  maintain  themselves  against  the  comparatively 
smaU  tribes  in  their  near  neighborhood,  the  Chorasmians, 
Hyrcanians,  Arians  of  Herat,  Bactrians,  and  Sagartians,  it 
was  not  possible  for  them  to  make  an  effectual  resistance  to  a 
monarch  who  brought  against  them  the  entire  force  of  a 
mighty  empire.  Cyrus  had,  it  is  probable,  little  difficulty  in 
obtaining  their  submission.  It  is  possible  that  they  resisted ; 
but  perhaps  it  is  more  probable  that  their  course  on  this  occa- 
sion was  similar  to  that  which  they  pursued  when  the  Macedo- 
nian conqueror  swept  across  these  same  regions.  The  Parthi- 
ans at  that  period  submitted  without  striking  a  blow,""  There 
is  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  caused  any  greater  trouble 
to  Cyrus. 

When  the  Persian  empire  was  organized  by  Darius  Hystas- 


16  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [cu.  iii. 

pis  into  satrapies,  Parthia  was  at  first  united  in  the  same 
government  with  Chorasmia,  Sogdiana,  and  Aria."  Subse- 
quently, however,  when  satrapies  were  made  more  numerous, 
it  was  detached  from  these  extensive  countries  and  made  to 
form  a  distinct  government,  with  the  mere  addition  of  the 
comparatively  small  district  of  Hyrcania."'  It  formed,  ap- 
parently, one  of  the  most  tractable  and  submissive  of  the 
Persian  provinces.  Except  on  the  single  occasion  already 
noticed,*^  when  it  took  part  in  a  revolt  that  extended  to  nearly 
one-half  the  empire, ^*  it  gave  its  rulers  no  trouble;  no  second 
attempt  was  made  to  shake  off  the  alien  yoke,  which  may 
indeed  have  galled,  but  which  was  felt  to  be  inevitable.  In 
the  final  struggle  of  Persia  against  Alexander,  the  Parthians 
were  faithful  to  their  masters.  They  fought  on  the  Persian 
side  at  Arbela; '"'  and  though  they  submitted  to  Alexander 
somewhat  tamely  when  he  invaded  their  country,  yet,  as 
Darius  was  then  dead,  and  no  successor  had  declared  himself, 
they  cannot  be  taxed  with  desertion.  Probably  they  felt 
little  interest  in  the  event  of  the  struggle.  Habit  and  circum- 
stance caused  them  to  send  their  contingent  to  Arbela  at  the 
call  of  the  Great  King;  but  when  the  Persian  cause  was 
evidently  lost,  they  felt  it  needless  to  make  further  sacrifices. 
Having  no  hope  of  establishing  their  independence,  they 
thought  it  unnecessary  to  prolong  the  contest.  They  might 
not  gain,  but  they  could  scarcely  lose,  by  a  change  of  masters. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Condition  of  Western  Asia  under  the  earlier  Seleucidm.  Re- 
volts of  Bactria  and  Parthia.  Conflicting  accounts  of  the 
establishment  of  the  Parthian  Kingdom.  First  War  with 
Syria. 

To  idvoi;  Maice5oi'(ov  iLTvi<jTr}(Tav,  (cai  /cafl'  eauTous  Jip^av,  Koi.  em  /leya  Svvantio^  rjKairav. — 
Arrian,  Fr.  1. 

The  attempt  of  Alexander  the  Great  to  unite  the  whole  civ- 
ilized world  in  a  single  vast  empire  might  perhaps  have  been  a 
success  if  the  mind  which  conceived  the  end,  and  which  had  to 
a  considerable  extent  elaborated  the  means,  had  been  spared 
to  watch  over  its  own  work»  and  conduct  it  past  the  perilous 


CH.  iii.J  PARTIIIA    UNDER   THE  GREEKS.  1? 

period  of  infancy  and  adolescence.  But  the  premature  decease 
of  the  great  Macedonian  in  the  thirty-third  year  of  his  age, 
when  his  plans  of  fusion  and  amalgamation  were  only  just 
beginning  to  develop  themselves,  and  the  unfortunate  fact  that 
among  his  "Successors"  there  was  not  one  who  inherited 
either  his  grandeur  of  conception  or  his  powers  of  execution, 
caused  his  scheme  at  once  to  collapse ;  and  the  effort  to  unite 
and  consolidate  led  only  to  division  and  disintegration.  In  lieu 
of  Europe  being  fused  with  Asia,  Asia  itself  was  split  up.  For 
nearly  a  thousand  years,  from  the  formation  of  the  great  As- 
syrian empire  to  the  death  of  Darius  Codomannus,  Western 
Asia,  from  the  Mediterranean  to  Affghanistan,  or  even  to 
India,  had  been  united  under  one  head,  had  acknowledged 
one  sovereign.  Assyria,  Media,  Persia,  had  successively  held 
the  position  of  dominant  power;  and  the  last  of  the  three  had 
given  union,  and  consequently  peace,  to  a  wider  stretch  of 
country  and  a  vaster  diversity  of  peoples  than  either  of  her 
predecessors.  Under  the  mild  yoke  of  the  Achsemenian  princes 
had  been  held  together  for  two  centuries,  not  only  all  the 
nations  of  Western  Asia,  from  the  Indian  and  Tliibetan  deserts 
to  the  ^gean  and  the  Mediterranean,  but  a  great  part  of  Africa 
also,  that  is  to  say,  Egypt,  north-eastern  Libya,  and  the  Greek 
settlements  of  Cyrene  and  Barca.  The  practical  effect  of  the 
conquests  of  Alexander  was  to  break  up  this  unity,  to  intro- 
duce in  the  place  of  a  single  consolidated  empire  a  multitude 
of  separate  and  contending  kingdoms.  The  result  was  thus 
the  direct  opposite  of  the  great  conqueror's  design,  and  forms 
a  remarkable  instance  of  the  contradiction  which  so  often  sub- 
sists between  the  propositions  of  man  and  the  dispositions  of 
an  overruling  Providence. 

The  struggle  for  power  which  broke  out  dlmost  immediately 
after  his  death  among  the  successors  of  Alexander  may  be  re- 
garded as  having  been  brought  to  a  close  by  the  battle  of  Ipsus. 
The  period  of  fermentation  was  then  concluded,  and  something 
like  a  settled  condition  of  things  brought  about.  A  quadri- 
partite division  of  Alexander's  dominions  was  recognized, 
Macedonia,  Egypt,  Asia  Minor,  and  Syria  (or  south-western 
Asia)  becoming  thenceforth  distinct  political  entities.  Asia 
Minor,  the  kingdom  of  Lysimachus,  had  indeed  less  of  imity 
than  the  other  three  states.  It  was  already  disintegrated,  the 
kingdoms  of  Bithynia,  Pontus,  and  Cappadocia,  subsisting  side 
by  side  with  that  of  Lysimachus,  which  was  thus  limited  to 
■western  and  south-western  Asia  Minor.     After  the  death  of 


18  THE  SIXTH  MONAUCEY.  [ch.  in. 

Lysimachus,  further  changes  occurred;  but  the  state  of  Per- 
gamus,  which  sprang  up  this  time,  may  be  regarded  as  the 
continuation  of  Lysimachus's  kingdom,  and  as  constituting 
from  the  time  of  Eumenes  I.  (b.c.  263)  a  fourth  power  in  the 
various  pohtical  movements  and  combinations  of  the  Graeco- 
Oriental  world. 
Of  the  four  powers  thus  established,  the  most  important, 
r''"and  that  with  which  we  are  here  especially  concerned,  was 
the  kingdom  of  Syria  (as  it  was  called),  or  that  ruled  for  247 
years  by  the  Seleucidse.  Seleucus  Nicator,  the  founder  of  this 
kingdom,  was  one  of  Alexander's  officers,  but  served  without 
much  distinction  through  the  various  compaigns  by  which  the 
conquest  of  the  East  was  effected.'  At  the  first  distribution 
of  provinces  (b.c.  323)  among  Alexander's  generals  after  his 
death,  he  received  no  share  ;^  and  it  was  not  until  B.C.  320, 
when  upon  the  death  of  Perdiccas  a  fresh  distribution  was 
made  at  Triparadisus,  that  his  merits  were  recognized,  and  he 
was  given  the  satrapy  of  Babylon.^  In  this  position  he  ac- 
quired a  character  for  mildness  and  liberality,  and  made  him- 
self generally  beloved,  both  by  his  soldiers  and  by  those  who 
were  under  his  government.*  In  the  struggle  between  Anti- 
gonus  and  Eumenes  (b.c.  317—316),  he  embraced  the  side  of 
the  former,  and  did  him  some  good  service ;  but  this,  instead 
of  evoking  gratitude,  appears  to  have  only  roused  in  Antigonus 
a  spirit  of  jealousy.  The  ambitious  aspirant  after  universal 
dominion,  seeing  in  the  popular  satrap  a  possible,  and  far  from 
a  contemptible,  rival,  thought  it  politic  to  sweep  him  out  of 
his  way;  and  the  career  of  Seleucus  would  have  been  cut 
short  had  he  not  perceived  his  peril  in  time,  and  by  a  precipi- 
tate flight  secured  his  safety.  Accompanied  by  a  body  of  no 
more  than  fifty  horsemen,  he  took  the  road  for  Egypt,  es- 
caped the  pursuit  of  a  detachment  sent  to  overtake  him,  and 
threw  himself  on  the  protection  of  Ptolemy. 

This  event,  untoward  in  appearance,  proved  the  turning- 
point  in  Seleucus's  fortunes.  It  threw  him  into  irreconcilable 
hostility  with  Antigonus,  while  it  brought  him  forward  before 
the  eyes  of  men  as  one  whom  Antigonus  feared.  It  gave  him 
an  opportunity  of  showing  his  military  talents  in  the  West, 
and  of  obtaining  favor  with  Ptolemy,  and  with  all  those  by 
whom  Antigonus  was  dreaded.  When  the  great  struggle 
came  between  the  confederate  monarchs  and  the  aspirant 
after  universal  dominion,  it  placed  him  on  the  side  of  the  allies. 
Having  recovered  Babylon  (b.c.  312;,  Seleucus  led  the  flower 


en.  III.]  EXTENT  OF  UIS  EMPIRE.  19 

of  tlie  eastern  provinces  to  the  field  of  Ipsus  (B.C.  301),  and 
contributed  largely  to  the  victory,  thus  winning  himself  a 
position  among  the  foremost  potentates  of  the  day.  By  the 
terms  of  the  agreement  made  after  Ipsus,  Seleucus  was  recog- 
nized as  monarch  of  all  the  Greek  conquests  in  Asia,  with  the 
sole  exceptions  of  Lower  Syria  and  Asia  Minor.  ^ 

The  monarchy  thus  estabhshed  extended  from  the  Holy 
Land  and  the  Mediterranean  on  the  west,  to  the  Indus  valley 
and  the  Bolor  mountain-chain  upon  the  east,  and  from  the  Cas- 
pian and  Jaxartes  towards  the  north,  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  In- 
dian Ocean  towards  the  south.  It  comprised  Upper  Syria,  Meso- 
potamia, parts  of  Cappadocia  and  Phrygia,  Armenia, "  Assyria, 
Media,  Babylonia,  Susiana,  Persia,  Carmania,  Sagartia,  Hyr- 
cania,  Parthia,  Bactria,  Sogdiana,  Aria,  Zarangia,  Arachosia, 
Sacastana,  Gedrosia,  and  probably  some  part  of  India.'  Its 
entire  area  could  not  have  been  much  less  than  1,200,000  square 
miles.  Of  these,  some  300,000  or  400,000  may  have  been  desert ; 
but  the  remainder  was  generally  fertile,  and  comprised  within 
its  limits  some  of  the  very  most  productive  regions  in  the 
whole  world.  The  Mesopotamian  lowland,  the  Orontes  valley, 
the  tract  between  the  Caspian  and  the  mountains,  the  regions 
about  Merv  and  Balkli,  were  among  the  richest  in  Asia,  and 
produced  grain  and  fruits  in  incredible  abundance.  The  rich 
pastures  of  Media  and  Armenia  furnished  excellent  horses. 
Bactria  gave  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  camels.  Elephants 
in  large  numbers  were  readily  procurable  from  India.®  Gold, 
silver,  copper,  iron,  lead,  tin,  were  furnished  by  several  of  the 
provinces,  and  precious  stones  of  various  kinds  abounded." 
Moreover,  for  above  ten  centuries,  the  precious  m.etals  and  the 
most  valuable  kinds  of  merchandise  had  flowed  from  every 
quai'ter  into  the  region;  and  though  the  Macedonians  may 
have  carried  off,  or  wasted,  a  considerable  quantity  of  both, 
yet  the  accumulations  of  ages  withstood  the  drain,  and  the 
hoarded  wealth  which  had  come  down  from  Assyrian,  Babylo- 
nian, and  Median  times  was  to  be  found  in  the  days  of  Seleucus 
chiefly  within  the  Hmits  of  his  Empire. 

The  situation  which  nature  pointed  out  as  most  suitable  for 
the  capital  of  a  kingdom  having  the  extension  that  has  been 
here  indicated  was  some  portion  of  the  Mesopotamian  valley, 
which  was  at  once  central  and  fertile.  The  empire  of  Seleucus 
might  have  been  conveniently  ruled  from  the  site  of  the  ancient 
Nineveh,  or  from  either  of  the  two  still  existing  and  still  flour- 
ishing cities  of  Susa  and  Babylon.     The  impetus  given  to  com- 


20  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  hi. 

merce  by  the  circumstances  of  the  time'"  rendered  a  site  near 
the  sea  preferable  to  one  so  remote  as  that  of  Nineveh,  and  the 
same  consideration  made  a  position  on  the  Tigris  or  Euphi-ates 
more  advantageous  than  one  upon  a  smaller  river.  So  far,  all 
pointed  to  Babylon  as  the  natural  and  best  metropohs ;  and  it 
was  further  in  favor  of  that  place  that  its  merits  had  struck  the 
Great  Conqueror,  who  had  designed  to  make  it  the  capital  cf 
his  own  still  vaster  Empire."  Accordingly  Babylon  was  Se- 
leucus's  first  choice ;  and  there  his  Court  was  held  for  some 
years  previously  to  his  march  against  Antigonus.  But  either 
certain  disadvantages  were  found  to  attach  to  Babylon  as  a 
residence,  or  the  mere  love  of  variety  and  change  caused  him 
very  shortly  to  repent  of  his  selection,  and  to  transfer  his  capi- 
tal to  another  site.  He  founded,  and  built  with  great  rapidity, 
the  city  of  Seleucia  upon  the  Tigris'^,  at  the  distance  of  about 
forty  miles  from  Babylon,  and  had  transferred  thither  the  seat 
of  government  even  before  B.C.  301.  Thus  far,  however,  no 
fault  had  been  committed.  The  second  capital  was  at  least  as 
conveniently  placed  as  the  first,  and  would  have  served  equally 
well  as  a  centre  from  which  to  govern  the  Empire.  But  after 
Ipsus  a  further  change  was  made — a  change  that  was  injudi- 
cious in  the  extreme.  Either  setting  undue  store  by  his  newly- 
acquired  western  provinces,  or  over-anxious  to  keep  close 
watch  on  his  powerful  neighbors  in  those  parts,  Lysimachus 
and  Ptolemy,  Seleucus  once  more  transferred  the  seat  of  em- 
pire, exchanging  this  time  the  valley  of  the  Tigris  for  that  of 
the  Orontes,  and  the  central  position  of  Lower  Mesopotamia  for 
almost  the  extreme  western  point  of  his  vast  territories.  An- 
tioch  arose  in  extraordinary  beauty  and  magnificence  during 
the  first  few  years  that  succeeded  Ipsus,  and  Seleucus  in  a 
short  time  made  it  his  ordinary  residence."'  The  change 
weakened  the  ties  which  bound  the  Empire  together,  offended 
the  bulk  of  the  Asiatics,  who  saw  their  monarch  withdraw 
from  them  into  a  remote  region,  and  particularly  loosened  the 
gi'asp  of  the  government  on  those  more  eastern  districts  which 
were  at  once  furthest  from  the  new  metropolis  and  least  as- 
similated to  the  Hellenic  character.  Among  the  causes  which 
led  to  the  disintegration  of  the  Seleucid  kingdom,  there  is  none 
that  deserves  so  well  to  be  considered  the  main  cause  as  this. 
It  was  calculated  at  once  to  produce  the  desire  to  revolt,  and 
to  render  the  reduction  of  revolted  provinces  difficult,  if  not 
impossible. 
The  evil  day,  however,  might  have  been  indefinitely  delayed 


CH.  in.]  WAES  OF  SELEUOUS  AND  HIS  SUCCESSORS.       21 

had  the  Seleucid  princes  either  established  and  maintained 
through  their  Empire  a  vigorous  and  effective  administration, 
or  abstained  from  entangling  themselves  in  wars  with  their 
neighbors  in  the  West,  the  Ptolemies  and  the  princes  of  Asia 
Minor. 

But  the  organization  of  the  Empire  was  unsatisfactory.  In- 
stead of  pursuing  the  system  inaugurated  by  Alexander  and 
seeking  to  weld  the  heterogeneous  elements  of  which  his  king- 
dom was  composed  into  a  homogeneous  whole,  instead  of  at 
once  conciliating  and  elevating  the  Asiatics  by  uniting  them 
with  the  Macedonians  and  the  Greeks,  by  promoting  intermar- 
riage and  social  intercourse  between  the  two  classes  of  his  sub- 
jects, educating  the  Asiatics  in  Greek  ideas  and  Greek  schools, 
opening  his  court  to  them,  promoting  them  to  high  employ- 
ments, making  them  feel  that  they  were  as  much  valued  and 
as  well  cared  for  as  the  people  of  the  conquering  race,  '^  the  first 
Seleucus,  and  after  him  his  successors,  fell  back  upon  the  old 
simpler,  ruder  system,  the  system  pursued  before  Alexander's 
time  by  the  Persians,  and  before  them  perhaps  by  the  Medes — 
the  system  most  congenial  to  human  laziness  and  human  pride 
— that  of  governing  a  nation  of  slaves  by  means  of  a  class  of 
victorious  ahens.  Seleucus  divided  his  empire  into  satrapies, 
seventy-two  in  number.  He  bestowed  the  office  of  satrap  on 
none  but  Macedonians  and  Greeks.  The  standing  army,  by 
which  he  maintained  his  authority,  was  indeed  composed  in 
the  main  of  Asiatics,  disciplined  after  the  Greek  model;  but  it 
was  officered  entirely  by  men  of  Greek  or  Macedonian  parent- 
age. Nothing  was  done  to  keep  up  the  self-respect  of  Asiatics, 
or  to  soften  the  unpleasantness  that  must  always  attach  to  be- 
ing governed  by  foreigners.  Even  the  superintendence  over 
the  satraps  seems  to  have  been  insuflScient.  According  to 
some  writers,  it  was  a  gross  outrage  offered  by  a  satrap  to  an 
Asiatic  subject  that  stirred  up  the  Parthians  to  their  revolt.'' 
The  story  may  not  be  true ;  but  its  currency  shows  of  what 
conduct  towards  those  under  their  government  the  satraps  of 
the  Seleucidae  were  thought,  by  such  as  lived  near  the 
time,  to  have  been  capable. 

It  would,  perhaps,  have  been  difficult  for  the  Seleucid 
princes,  even  had  they  desired  it,  to  pursue  a  policy  of  abso- 
lute abstention  in  the  wars  of  their  western  neighbors.  So 
long  as  they  were  resolute  to  maintain  their  footing  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Euphrates,  in  Phrygia,  Cnppadocia,  and  up- 
per Syria,  they  were  of  necessity  mixed  up  with  the  quarrejs 


22  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  in. 

of  the  west.  Could  they  have  been  content  to  withdraw  with- 
in the  Euphrates,  they  might  have  remained  for  the  most  part 
clear  of  such  entanglements ;  but  even  then  there  would  have 
been  occasions  when  they  must  have  taken  the  field  in  self- 
defence.  As  it  was,  however,  the  idea  of  abstention  seems 
never  to  have  occurred  to  them.  It  was  the  fond  dream  of 
each  "  Successor"  of  Alexander  that  in  his  person  might,  per- 
haps, be  one  day  united  all  the  territories  of  the  great  Con- 
queror. Seleucus  would  have  felt  that  he  sacrificed  his  most 
cherished  hopes  if  he  had  allowed  the  west  to  go  its  own  way, 
and  had  contented  himself  with  consolidating  a  great  power  in 
the  regions  east  of  the  Euphrates. 

And  the  policy  of  the  founder  of  the  house  was  followed  by 
his  successors.  The  three  Seleucid  sovereigns  who  reigned 
prior  to  the  Parthian  revolt  were,  one  and  all,  engaged  in  fre- 
c[uent,  if  not  continual,  wars  with  the  monarchs  of  Egypt  and 
Asia  Minor.  The  first  Seleucus,  by  his  claim  to  the  sovereignty 
of  Lower  Syria,  established  a  ground  of  constant  contention 
with  the  Ptolemies;"  and  though  he  did  not  prosecute  the 
claim  to  the  extent  of  actual  hostility,  yet  in  the  reign  of  his 
son,  Antiochus  I.,  called  Soter,  the  smothered  quarrel  broke 
out.  Soter  fomented  the  discontent  of  Cyrene  with  its  subjec- 
tion to  Egypt, "  and  made  at  least  one  expedition  against 
Ptolemy  Philadelphus  in  person  (b.o.  264).  His  efforts  did  not 
meet  with  much  success ;  but  they  were  renewed  by  his  son, 
Antiochus  II.,  sumamed  "the  God"  (Sfds),  who  warred  with 
Philadelphus  from  B.C.  260  to  B.C.  250,  contending  with  him 
chiefly  in  Asia  Minor."  These  wars  were  complicated  with 
others.  The  first  Antiochus  aimed  at  adding  the  kingdom  of 
Bithynia  to  his  dominions,  and  attacked  successively  the 
Bythynian  monarchs,  Zipoetas'*  and  Nicomedes  I.  (b.c.  280— 
278).^°  This  aggression  brought  him  into  collision  with  the 
Gauls,  whom  Nicomedes  called  to  his  aid,  and  with  whom 
Antiochus  had  several  struggles,  some  successful  and  some  dis- 
astrous. °'  He  also  attacked  Eumenes  of  Pergamus  (b.c.  263), 
but  was  defeated  in  a  pitched  battle  near  Sardis.^''  The  second 
Antiochus  was  not  engaged  in  so  great  a  multiplicity  of  con- 
tests ;  but  we  hear  of  his  taking  a  part  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Miletus,^'  and  expelhng  a  certain  Timachus,  who  had  made 
himself  tyrant  of  that  city.  There  is  also  some  ground  for 
thinking  that  he  had  a  standing  quarrel  with  the  king  of  Media 
Atropatene.^*  Altogether  it  is  evident  that  from  B.C.  280  to  B.C. 
250  the  Seleucid  princes  were  incessantly  occupied  with  wars 


CH.  III.]  CUARACTER  OF  ANTIOCHUS.  23 

in  the  west,  in  Asia  Minor  and  in  Syria  Proper,  wars  which  so 
constantly  engaged  them  that  they  had  neither  time  nor  atten- 
tion to  spare  for  the  affairs  of  the  far  east.  So  long  as  the 
Bactrian  and  Parthian  satraps  paid  their  tributes,  and  supplied 
the  requisite  quotas  of  troops  for  service  in  the  western  wars, 
the  Antiochi  were  content.  The  satraps  were  left  to  manage 
affairs  at  their  own  discretion;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  absence  of  a  controlling  hand  led  to  various  complications 
and  disorders. 

Moreover,  the  personal  character  of  the  second  Antiochus 
must  be  taken  into  account.  The  vanity  and  impiety,  which 
could  accept  the  name  of  "  Theus"  for  a  service  that  fifty  other 
Greeks  had  rendered  to  oppressed  towns  Avithout  regarding 
themselves  as  having  done  anything  very  remarkable,"  would 
alone  indicate  a  weak  and  contemptible  morale,  and  might 
justify  us,  did  we  know  no  more,  in  regarding  the  calamities 
of  his  reign  as  the  fruit  of  his  own  unfitness  to  rule  an  empire. 
But  there  is  sufficient  evidence  that  he  had  other,  and  worse, 
vices.  He  was  noted,  even  among  Asiatic  sovereigns,  for 
luxury  and  debauchery;  he  neglected  all  state  affairs  in  the 
pursuit  of  pleasure ;  his  wives  and  male  favorites  were  allowed 
to  rule  liis  kingdom  at  their  will;  and  their  most  flagrant 
crimes  were  neither  restrained  nor  punished.-"  Such  a  charac- 
ter could  have  inspired  neither  respect  nor  fear.  The  satraps, 
to  whom  the  conduct  of  their  sovereign  could  not  but  become 
known,  would  be  partly  encouraged  to  follow  the  bad  example, 
partly  provoked  by  it  to  shake  themselves  free  of  so  hateful 
and  yet  contemptible  a  master. 

It  was,  probably,  about  the  year  B.C.  256,  the  fifth  of  the  sec- 
ond Antiochus,  when  that  prince,  hard  pressed  by  Philadelphus 
in  the  west,  was  also,  perhaps,  engaged  in  a  war  with  the  king 
of  Atropatene  in  the  north,  that  the  standard  of  revolt  was 
first  actually  raised  in  the  eastern  provinces,  and  a  Syrian 
satrap  ventured  to  declare  himself  an  independent  sovereign. 
Tliis  was  Diodotus,"  satrap  of  Bactria  a  Greek,  as  his  name 
shows.  Suddenly  assuming  the  state  and  style  of  king  he 
issued  coins  stamped  with  his  own  name,  and  established  him- 
self without  difficulty  as  sovereign  over  the  large  and  flourish- 
ing province  of  Bactria,"*  or  the  tract  of  fertile  land  about  the 
upper  and  middle  Oxus.  This  district  had  from  a  remote  an- 
tiquity been  one  with  special  pretensions.  The  country  was 
fertile,  and  much  of  it  strong;  the  people  were  hardy  and 
valiant;-"  they  were  generally  treated  with  exceptional  favor 


24  THE  SIXTH  MONABCHT.  [ch.  iil 

by  the  Persiau  monarchs ;"  and  they  seem  to  have  had  tradi- 
tions which  assigned  them  a  pre-eminence  among  the  Arian 
tribes  at  some  indefinitely  distant  iDeriod."  We  may  presume 
that  they  wovild  gladly  support  the  bold  enterprise  of  their 
new  monarch ;  they  would  feel  their  vanity  flattered  by  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  Bactria,  even  though  it  were 
under  Greek  kings ;  and  they  would  energetically  second  him 
in  an  enterprise  which  gratified  their  pride,  while  it  held  out 
to  them  hopes  of  a  career  of  conquest,  with  its  concomitants 
of  plunder  and  glory.  The  settled  quiet  which  they  had  en- 
joyed under  the  Achaemenide  and  the  Seleucidae  was  probably 
not  much  to  their  taste ;  and  they  would  gladly  exchange  so 
tame  and  dull  a  life  for  the  pleasures  of  independence  and  the 
chances  of  empire. 

It  would  seem  that  Antiochus,  sunk  in  luxury  at  his  capi- 
tal, could  not  bring  himself  to  make  even  an  effort  to  check 
the  spirit  of  rebellion,  and  recover  his  revolted  subjects.  Bac- 
tria was  allowed  to  estabhsh  itself  as  an  independent  mon- 
archy, without  having  to  undergo  the  ordeal  of  a  bloody  strug- 
£i;le.  Antiochus  neither  marched  against  Diodotus  in  person, 
nor  sent  a  general  to  contend  with  him.  The  authority  of  Di- 
odotus was  confirmed  and  riveted  on  his  subjects  by  an  undis- 
turbed reign  of  eighteen  years  before  a  Syrian  army  even 
showed  itself  in  his  neighborhood. 

The  precedent  of  successful  revolt  thus  set  could  not  well  be 
barren  of  consequences.  If  one  province  might  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  its  feudal  lord  with  impunity,  why  might  not  others? 
Accordingly,  within  a  few  years  the  example  set  by  Bactria 
was  followed  in  the  neighboring  country  of  Parthia,  but  with 
certain  very  important  differences.  In  Bactria  the  Greek 
satrap  took  the  lead,  and  the  Bactrian  kingdom  was,  at  any 
rate  at  its  commencement,  as  thoroughly  Greek  as  that  of  the 
Seleucidae.  But  in  Parthia  Greek  rule  was  from  the  first  cast 
aside.  The  natives  rebelled  against  their  masters.  An  Asiatic 
race  of  a  rude  and  uncivflized  type,  coarse  and  savage,  but 
brave  and  freedom-loving,  rose  up  against  the  polished  but  ef- 
feminate Greeks  who  held  them  in  subjection,  and  claimed  and 
estabUshed  their  independence.  The  Parthian  kingdom  was 
thoroughly  anti-Hellenic.^-  it  appealed  to  patriotic  feehngs, 
and  to  the  hate  universally  felt  towards  the  stranger.  It  set 
itself  to  undo  the  work  of  Alexander,  to  cast  out  the  Euro- 
peans, lo  recover  to  the  Asiatics  the  possession  of  Asia.  It 
was  naturally  almost  as  hostile  to  Bactria  as  to  Syria,  although 


11 


CH.  III.]    REVOLT  OF  rARTIIIA  UNDER  ARSACES  I.  25 

danger  from  a  common  enemy  might  cause  it  sometimes  to 
make  a  temporary  alliance  Avitli  that  kingdom.  It  had,  no 
doubt,  the  general  sympathy  of  the  populations  in  the  adjacent 
countries,  and  represented  to  them  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
autonomy. 

The  exact  circumstances  under  which  the  Parthian  revolt 
took  place  are  involved  in  much  obscurity.  According  to  one 
account  the  leader  of  the  revolt,  Arsaces,  was  a  Bactrian,  to 
whom  the  success  of  Diodotus  was  disagreeable,  and  who 
therefore  quitted  the  newly-founded  kingdom,  and  betook 
himself  to  Parthia,  where  he  induced  the  natives  to  revolt  and 
to  accept  him  for  their  monarch.''  Another  account,  which  is 
attractive  from  the  minute  details  into  which  it  enters,  is  the 
following: — "  Arsaces  and  Tiridates  were  brothers,  descendants 
of  Phriapites,  the  son  of  Arsaces.  Pherecles,  who  had  been 
made  satrap  of  their  country  by  Antiochus  Theus,  offered  a 
gross  insult  to  one  of  them,  whereupon,  as  they  could  not 
brook  the  indignity,  they  took  five  men  into  counsel,  and  with 
their  aid  slew  the  insolent  one.  They  then  induced  their  nation 
to  revolt  from  the  Macedonians,  and  set  up  a  government  of 
their  own,  which  attained  to  great  power."  '*  A  third  version 
says  that  the  Arsaces,  whom  all  represent  as  the  first  king,  was 
in  reality  a  Scythian,  who  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  Parnian 
Dahse,  nomads  inhabiting  the  valley  of  the  Attrek  (Ochus),  in- 
vaded Parthia,  soon  after  the  establishment  of  Bactrian  inde- 
pendence, and  succeeded  in  making  himself  master  of  it." 
With  this  account,  which  Strabo  seems  to  prefer,  agrees  toler- 
ably well  that  of  Justin,  who  says  '"  that  "Arsaces,  having 
been  long  accustomed  to  live  by  robbery  and  rapine,  attacked 
the  Parthians  with  a  predatory  band,  killed  ^heir  satrap,  An- 
dragoras,  and  seized  the  supreme  authority."  As  there  was  in 
all  probability  a  close  ethnic  connection  between  the  Dahae 
and  the  Parthians,''  it  would  be  likely  enough  that  the  latter 
might  accept  for  a  king  a  chieftain  of  the  former  who  had 
boldly  entered  their  country,  challenged  the  Greek  satrap  to 
an  encounter,  and  by  defeating  and  killing  him  freed  them — 
at  any  rate  for  the  time — from  the  Greek  yoke.  An  oppressed 
people  gladly  adopts  as  chief  the  head  of  an  allied  tribe  if  he 
has  shown  skill  and  daring,  and  offers  to  protect  them  from 
their  oppressors. 

The  revolt  of  Arsaces  has  been  placed  by  some  as  early  as  the 
year  b.c.  256.'*'  The  Bactrian  revolt  is  assigned  by  most  histo- 
rians to  that  year;'"  and  the  Parthian,  according  to  some,"  wa? 


26  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  iil 

contemporary.  The  best  authorities,  however,  give  a  short  in- 
terval between  the  two  insurrections;"  and,  on  the  whole, 
there  is  perhaps  reason  to  regard  the  Parthian  independence  as 
dating  from  about  B.C.  250.^"  This  year  was  the  eleventh  of 
Antiochus  Theus,  and  fell  into  the  time  when  he  was  still  en- 
gaged in  his  war  with  Ptolemy  Pliiladelphus.  It  might  have 
been  expected  that  when  he  concluded  a  peace  with  the  Egyp- 
tian monarch  in  B.C.  249,  he  would  have  turned  his  arms  at 
once  towards  the  east,  and  have  attempted  at  any  rate  the  re- 
covery of  his  lost  dominions.  But,  as  already  stated,  ^^  his  per- 
sonal character  was  weak,  and  he  preferred  the  pleasures  of 
repose  at  Antioch  to  the  hardships  of  a  campaign  in  the  Cas- 
pian region.  So  far  as  we  hear,  he  took  no  steps  to  re-establish 
his  authority ;  and  Arsaces,  like  Diodotus,  was  left  undisturbed 
to  consolidate  his  power  at  his  leisure. 

Arsaces  lived,  however,  but  a  short  time  after  obtaining  the 
crown.  His  authority  was  disputed  within  the  limits  of  Par- 
thia  itself;  and  he  had  to  engage  in  hostilities  with  a  portion 
of  his  own  subjects. "  We  may  suspect  that  the  nialcontents 
were  chiefly,  if  not  solely,  those  of  Greek  race,  who  may  have 
been  tolerably  numerous,  and  whose  strength  would  lie  in  the 
towns.  Hecatompylos,  the  chief  city  of  Parthia,  was  among 
the  colonies  founded  by  Alexander;"  and  its  inhabitants  would 
naturally  be  disinclined  to  acquiesce  in  the  rule  of  a  "barba- 
rian." Within  little  more  than  two  years  of  his  coronation, 
Arsaces,  who  had  never  been  able  to  give  his  kingdom  peace, 
was  killed  in  battle  by  a  spear-thrust  in  the  side ;"  and  was 
succeeded  (b.c.  247)  by  his  brother,  having  left,  it  is  probable, 
no  sons,  or  none  of  mature  age. 

Tiridates,  the  successor  of  Arsaces,  took  upon  his  accession 
his  brother's  name,  and  is  known  in  history  as  Arsaces  II. 
The  practice  thus  begun  passed  into  a  custom,^''  each  Parthian 
monarch  from  henceforth  bearing  as  king  the  name  of  Arsaces 
in  addition  to  his  own  real  appellation,  whatever  that  might 
be.  In  the  native  remains  the  assumed  name  almost  super- 
sedes the  other;*'  but,  fortunately,  the  Greek  and  Roman 
writers  who  treat  of  Parthian  affairs,  have  preserved  the  dis- 
tinctive appellations,  and  thus  saved  the  Parthian  history 
from  inextricable  confusion.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  from  what 
quarter  this  practice  was  adopted  ;*"  perhaps  we  should  regard 
it  as  one  previously  existing  among  the  Dahan  Scyths. 

If  the  Parthian  monarchy  owed  its  origin  to  Arsaces  I.,  it 
owed  its  consolidation,  and  settled  establishment  to  Arsaces 


CH.  III.]  TIRIDATES  THREATENED  BT  PTOLEMY  III.        27 

II.,  or  Tiridates.  This  prince,  who  had  the  good  fortune  to 
reign  for  above  thirty  years, '"  and  who  is  confused  by  many 
writers^-  with  the  actual  founder  of  the  monarchy,  having  re- 
ceived Parthia  from  his  brother,  in  the  weak  and  unsettled 
condition  above  described,  left  it  a  united  and  powerful  king- 
dom, enlarged  in  its  boundaries,  strengthened  in  its  defences, 
in  alliance  with  its  nearest  and  most  formidable  neighbor,  and 
triumphant  over  the  great  power  of  Syria,  which  had  hoped  to 
bring  it  once  more  into  subjection.  He  ascended  the  throne, 
it  is  probable,  early  in  B.C.  247,  and  had  scarcely  beeai  monarch 
a  couple  of  years  when  he  witnessed  one  of  those  vast  but 
transient  revolutions  to  which  Asia  is  subject,  but  which  are 
of  rare  occurrence  in  Europe.  Ptolemy  Euergetes,  the  son  of 
Pliiladelphus,  having  succeeded  to  his  father's  kingdom  in  the 
same  year  with  Tiridates,  marched  (in  B.C.  245)  a  huge  expedi- 
tion into  Asia,  defeated  Seleucus  II.  (Callinicus)  in  Syria,  took 
Antioch,  and  then,  having  crossed  the  Euphrates,  proceeded 
to  bring  the  greater  part  of  Western  Asia  under  his  sway. 
Mesopotamia,  Assyria,  Babylonia,  Susiana,  Persia,  Media,  sub- 
mitted to  him.  He  went  in  person  as  far  as  Babylon,  and, 
according  to  his  own  account, "  was  acknowledged  as  master 
by  all  the  Eastern  provinces  to  the  very  borders  of  Bactria. 
The  Parthian  and  Bactrian  kingdoms  cannot  but  have  trem- 
bled for  their  newly  won  independence.  Here  was  a  young 
warrior  who,  in  a  single  campaign,  had  marched  the  distance 
of  a  thousand  miles,  from  the  banks  of  the  NUe  to  those  of  the 
Lower  Euphrates,  without  so  much  as  receiving  a  check,  and 
who  was  threatening  to  repeat  the  career  of  Alexander.  What 
resistance  could  the  little  Parthian  state  hope  to  offer  to  such 
an  enemy?  It  must  have  rejoiced  Tiridates  to  hear  that  while 
the  new  conqueror  was  gathering  somewhat  too  hastily  the 
fruits  of  victory,  collecting  and  despatching  to  Egypt  the  most 
valuable  works  of  art  that  he  could  find  in  the  cities  which  he 
had  taken,  and  levying  heavy  contributions  on  the  submitted 
countries,  a  revolt  had  broken  out  in  his  own  land,  to  quell 
which  he  was  compelled  to  retire  suddenly  and  to  relinquish 
the  greater  part  of  his  acquisitions.  Thus  the  threatened  con- 
quest proved  a  mere  inroad,  and  instead  of  a  power  of  greater 
strength  replacing  Syria  in  these  regions,  Syria  practically  re- 
tained her  hold  of  them,  but  with  enfeebled  gi'asp,  her  strength 
crippled,  her  prestige  lost,  and  her  honor  tarnished.  Ptolemy 
had,  it  is  probable,  not  retired  very  long,  when,  encouraged 
by  what  he  had  seen  of  Syria's  weakness,  Tiridates  took  the 


28 


THE  SIXTH  MOKAUCnr.  [CH.  m. 


a-^'^ressive,  and  invading  the  neighboring  district  of  Hyrcania, 
succeeded  in  detaching  it  from  the  Syrian  state,  and  adding  it 
to  his  own  territory."  This  was  throwing  out  a  challenge 
which  the  Syrian  monarch,  Camnicus,  could  scarcely  decline 
to  meet,  unless  he  was  prepared  to  lose,  one  by  one,  aU  the 
outlying  provinces  of  his  empire. 

Accordingly  in  B.C.  237,  having  patched  up  a  peace  with  his 
brother,  Antiochus  Hierax,  the  Syrian  monarch  made  an  ex- 
pedition against  Parthia.  Not  feeling,  however,  altogether 
confident  of  success  if  he  trusted  wholly  to  his  own  unaided 
efforts,  he  prudently  entered  into  an  alliance  with  Diodotus 
the  Ba'ctrian  king,''  and  the  two  agreed  to  combine  their  forces 
against  Tiridates.  Hereupon  that  monarch,  impressed  with  a 
deep  sense  of  the  impending  danger,  quitted  Parthia,  and,  pro- 
ceeding northwards,  took  refuge  with  the  Aspasiacse,"  a  Scyth- 
ian tribe  which  dwelt  between  the  Oxus  and  the  Jaxartes.'" 
The  Aspasiacae  probably  lent  him  troops ;  at  any  rate,  he  did 
not  remain  long  in  retirement,  but,  hearing  that  the  Bactrian 
king,  whom  he  especially  feared,  was  dead,  he  contrived  to 
detach  his  son  and  successor  from  the  Syrian  alliance,  and  to 
draw  him  over  to  his  own  side.  Having  made  this  important 
stroke,  he  met  Callinicus  in  battle,  and  completely  defeated 

his  army. " 

This  victory  was  with  reason  regarded  by  the  Parthians  as  a 
sort  of  second  beginning  of  their  independence.''  Hitherto 
their  kingdom  had  existed  precariously,  and  as  it  were  by  suf- 
ferance. It  could  not  but  be  that  the  power  from  which  they 
had  revolted  would  one  day  seek  to  reclaim  its  lost  territory; 
and,  until  the  new  monarchy  had  measured  its  strength  against 
that  of  its  former  mistress,  none  could  feel  secure  that  it  would 
be  able  to  maintain  its  existence.  The  victory  gained  by  Tiri- 
dates over  Callinicus  put  an  end  to  these  doubts.  It  proved 
to  the  world  at  large,  and  also  to  the  Parthians  themselves, 
that  they  had  nothing  to  fear— that  they  were  strong  enough 
to  preserve  their  freedom.  Considering  the  enormous  dispro- 
portion between  the  military  strength  and  resources  of  the 
narrow  Parthian  State  and  the  vast  Syrian  Empire— consider- 
ing that  the  one  comprised  about  fifty  thousand  and  the  other 
above  a  million  of  square  miles;''  that  the  one  had  inherited 
the  wealth  of  ages  and  the  other  was  probably  as  poor  as  any 
province  in  Asia ;  that  the  one  possessed  the  Macedonian  arms, 
training,  and  tactics,  while  the  other  knew  only  the  rude  war- 
fare of  the  Steppes — the  result  of  the  struggle  cannot  but  be  re- 


CH.  IV.]       PARTHIAN  KINGDOM  CONSOLIDATED.  29 

garded  as  surprising.  Still  it  was  not  without  precedent,  and 
it  has  not  been  without  repetition.  It  adds  another  to  the 
many  instances  where  a  small  but  brave  people,  bent  on  re- 
sisting foreign  domination,  have,  when  standing  on  their  de- 
fence, in  their  own  territory,  proved  more  than  a  match  for 
the  utmost  force  that  a  foe  of  overwhelming  strength  could 
bring  against  them.  It  reminds  us  of  Marathon,  of  Bannock- 
burn,  of  Morgarten,  We  may  not  sympathize  wholly  with  the 
victors,  for  Greek  civilization,  even  of  the  type  introduced  by 
Alexander  into  Asia,  was  ill  replaced  by  Tatar  coarseness  and  ■ 
barbarism ;  but  we  cannot  refuse  our  admiration  to  the  spec- 
tacle of  a  handful  of  gallant  men  determinedly  resisting  in  the 
fastness  of  their  native  land  a  host  of  aliens,  and  triumphing 
over  their  would-be  oppressors. 

The  Parthians  themselves,  deeply  impressed  with  the  im- 
portance of  the  contest,  preserved  the  memory  of  it  by  a  sol- 
emn festival  on  the  anniversary  of  their  victory,  which  they 
still  celebrated  in  the  time  of  Trogus."" 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Consolidation  of  the  Parthian  Kingdom.  Death  of  Tiridatcs 
and  accession  of  Arsaces  III.  Attack  on  Media.  War  of 
Artabanus  (Arsaces  III.)  ivith  Antiochus  the  Great.  Period 
of  inaction.  Great  development  of  Bactrian  power.  Reigns 
of  Priapatius  (Arsaces  IV.)  and  Phraates  I.  (Arsaces  V.) 

Kar'  apxii  aaOevrji;  rjv  (cat  avToi    (sc.    'AptroKT)?)    icai    oi    ^taSe^ajuecoi    eKeivov. — Strab. 
Xi.   9,  §  2. 

Seleucus  might  perhaps  not  have  accepted  his  defeat  as 
final  had  he  been  altogether  free  to  choose  whether  he  would 
continue  the  Parthian  war  or  no.  The  resources  of  his  Empire 
were  so  vast,  his  conamand  of  men  and  money  so  unbounded, 
that  he  could  easily  have  replaced  one  army  by  another,  and 
so  have  prolonged  the  struggle.  But  renewed  troubles  had 
broken  out  in  the  western  portion  of  his  dominions, '  where  his 
brother,  Antiochus  Hierax,  was  still  in  arms  against  his  au- 
thority. Seleucus  felt  it  necessary  to  turn  his  attention  to  this 
quarter,  and  having  once  retired  from  the  Parthian  contest,  he 
never  afterwards  renewed  it."    Tiridates  was  left  unmolested, 


30  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  iv. 

to  act  as  he  thought  fit,  and  either  to  attempt  fui-ther  con- 
quests, or  to  devote  himself  to  securing  those  which  he  had 
effected.    He  chose  the  latter  course,  and  during  the  remainder 
of  his  reign — a  space  of  above  twenty  years— he  employed  him- 
self wholly  in  strengthening  and  adorning  his  small  kingdom. 
Having  built  a  number  of  forts  in  various  strong  positions,  and 
placed  garrisons  in  them,  he  carefully  selected  a  site  for  a  new 
city,  which  he  probably  intended  to  make  liis  capital.     The 
''  spot  chosen  combined  the  advantages  of  being  at  once  delight- 
ful and  easily  defensible.     It  was  surrounded  with  precipitous 
rocks,  which  enclosed  a  plain  of  extraordinary  fertility.    Abun- 
dant wood  and  copious  streams  of  water  were  in  the  neighbor- 
hood.   The  soil  was  so  rich  that  it  scarcely  required  cultiva- 
tion, and  the  woods  were  so  full  of  game  as  to  afford  endless 
amusement  to  hunters.'    To  the  town  which  he  built  in  this 
locaHty  Tiridates  gave  the  name  of  Dara,  a  word  which  the 
Greeks  and  Eomans  elongated  into  Dareium.*    Unfortunately, 
modern  travellers  have  not  yet  succeeded  in  identifying  the 
site,  which  should,  however.  He  towards  the  East, "  perhaps  in 
the  vicinity  of  Meshed. 

We  may  presume  that  Tiridates,  when  he  built  this  remark- 
able city,  intended  to  make  it  the  seat  of  government.  Hecat- 
ompylos,  as  a  Greek  town,  had  the  same  disadvantages,  which 
were  considered  in  later  times  to  render  Seleucia  unfit  for  the 
residence  of  the  Parthian  Court  and  monarch,  Dara,  like 
Ctesiphon,  was  to  be  wholly  Parthian.  Its  strong  situation 
would  render  it  easy  of  defence ;  its  vicinity  to  forests  abound- 
ing in  game  would  give  it  special  charms  in  the  eyes  of  persons 
so  much  devoted,  as  the  Parthian  princes  were,  to  the  chase. 
But  the  intention  of  Tiridates,  if  we  have  truly  defined  it, 
failed  of  taking  permanent  effect.  He  may  himself  have  fixed 
his  abode  at  Dara,  but  his  successors  did  not  inherit  his  pre- 
dilections ;  and  Hecatompylos  remained,  after  his  reign,  as  be- 
fore it,  the  head-quarters  of  the  government,  and  the  recog- 
nized metropolis  of  Parthia  Proper.  ® 

After  passing  in  peace  and  prosperity  the  last  twenty  years 
of  his  reign,  Tiridates  died  in  a  good  old  age,  leaving  his  crown 
to  a  son,  whose  special  name  is  a  little  uncertain,  but  who  is 
called  by  most  moderns'  Artabanus  I. 

Artabanus,  having  ascended  the  Parthian  throne  about  B.C. 
214,  and  being  anxious  to  distinguish  himself,  took  advantage 
of  the  war  raging  between  Antiochus  III.,  the  second  son  of 
Seleucus  Callinicus,  and  Achseus,  one  of  his  rebel  satraps,  to 


CH.  TV.]  REIGN  OF  ARTABANVS  I.  31 

advance  into  Media,  and  to  add  to  his  dominions  the  entire 
tract  between  Hyrcania  and  the  Zagros  mountains.  Of  the 
manner  in  which  he  effected  his  conquests  we  have  no  account; 
but  they  seem  to  have  been  the  fruit  of  a  single  campaign, 
which  must  have  been  conducted  with  great  vigor  and  miHtary 
skill.  The  Parthian  prince  appears  to  have  occupied  Ecbatana.* 
*)he  ancient  capital  of  the  Median  Empire,  and  to  have  thence 
inreatened  the  Mesopotamian  countries.  Upon  receiving  in- 
telligence of  his  invasion,  Antiochus  levied  a  vast  army,"  and 
set  out  towards  the  East,  with  a  determination  to  subjugate 
all  the  revolted  provinces,  and  to  recover  the  hmits  of  the  old 
Empire  of  Nicator.  Passing  the  Zagros  chain,  probably  by 
way  of  Behistun  and  Kermanshaw, "  he  easily  retook  Ecbatana, 
which  was  an  open  town,"  and  undefended  by  the  Parthians, 
and  proceeded  to  prepare  for  a  further  advance  eastward.  The 
The  route  from  Ecbatana  to  the  Caspian  Gates  crosses,  of  ne- 
cessity, unless  a  considerable  circuit  be  taken,  some  large  tracts 
of  barren  ground,  inlets  or  bays  of  the  Great  Salt  Desert  of 
Iran.  Artabanus  cherished  the  hope  that  here  the  difficulties 
of  the  way  would  effectually  bar  his  enemy's  progress,  more 
especially  as  his  troops  were  so  numerous,  and  as  water  was 
scanty  throughout  the  whole  region.  The  streams  which  flow 
from  Zagi'os  towards  the  East  are  few  and  scanty ;  they  mostly 
fan  in  summer,  which,  even  in  Asia,  is  the  campaigning  sea- 
son ;  and  those  who  cross  the  desert  at  this  time  must  depend 
on  the  wells  wherewith  the  more  western  part  of  the  region  is 
suppMed  by  means  of  kanats  or  underground  conduits,  '^  which 
are  sometimes  carried  many  miles  from  the  foot  of  the  moun- 
tains. The  position  of  the  wells,  which  were  few  in  number, 
was  kno^vn  only  to  the  natives;'^  and  Artabanus  hoped  that 
the  Syrian  monarch  would  be  afraid  to  place  the  hves  of  his 
soldiers  in  such  doubtful  keeping.  When,  however,  he  found 
that  Antiochus  was  not  to  be  deterred  by  any  fears  of  this 
kind,  but  was  bent  on  crossing  the  desert,  he  had  recourse  to 
the  barbaric  expedients  of  fiUing  in,  or  poisoning,  the  wells 
along  the  line  of  route  which  the  Syrian  prince  was  likely  to 
follow.'^  But  these  steps  seem  to  have  been  taken  too  late. 
Antiochus,  advancing  suddenly,  caught  some  of  the  Parthian 
troops  at  their  barbarous  work,  and  dispersed  them  without 
difficulty. '^  He  then  rapidly  effected  the  transit,  and,  pressing 
forward,  was  soon  in  the  enemy's  country,  where  he  occupied 
the  chief  city,  Hecatompylos.'° 
Up  to  this  point  the  Parthian  monarch  had  declined  an  en. 


32  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  iv. 

gagement.  No  information  has  come  down  to  us  as  to  kla 
motives  ;  but  they  may  be  readily  enough  conjectured.  To 
draw  an  enemy  far  away  from  his  resources,  while  retiring 
upon  one's  own  ;  to  entangle  a  numerous  host  among  narrow 
passes  and  defiles  ;  to  decline  battle  when  he  offers  it,  and  then 
to  set  upon  him.  unawares,  has  always  been  the  practice  of  weak 
mountain  races  when  attacked  by  a  more  numerous  foe.  It  is 
often  good  policy  in  such  a  case  even  to  yield  the  capital  with- 
out a  blow,  and  to  retreat  into  a  more  difficult  situation.  The 
assailant  must  follow  whithersoever  his  foe  retires,  or  quit  the 
country,  leaving  him  unsubdued.  Antiochus,  aware  of  this 
necessity,  and  rendered  confident  of  success  by  the  evacuation 
of  a  situation  so  strong,  and  so  suitable  for  the  Parthian  tac- 
tics as  Hecatompylos, ''  after  giving  his  army  a  short  rest  at 
the  captured  capital,  set  out  in  pursuit  of  Artabanus,  who  had 
withdrawn  his  forces  towards  Hyrcania.  To  reach  the  rich 
Hyrcanian  valleys,  he  was  forced  to  cross  the  main  chain  of 
the  Elburz,  which  here  attains  an  elevation  of  7000  or  8000  feet. 
The  route  which  his  army  had  to  follow  was  the  channel  of  a 
winter-torrent,  '*  obstructed  with  stones  and  trunks  of  trees, 
partly  by  nature,  partly  by  the  efforts  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  long  and  difficult  ascent  was  disputed  by  the  enemy  the 
whole  way,  and  something  like  a  pitched  battle  was  fought  at 
the  top ;  but  Antiochus  persevered,  and,  though  his  army  must 
have  suffered  severely,  descended  into  Hyrcanian  and  cap 
tured  several  of  the  towns. "  Here  our  main  authority,  Poly- 
bius,  suddenly  deserts  us,  and  we  can  give  no  further  account 
of  the  war  beyond  its  general  result — Artabanus  and  the 
Parthians  remained  unsubdued  after  a  strviggle  which  seems 
to  have  lasted  some  years;  Artabanus  himself  displayed 
great  valor  ;^°  and  at  length  the  Syrian  monarch  thought 
it  best  to  conclude  a  peace  with  him,  in  which  he  acknowl- 
edged the  Parthian  independence.  It  is  probable  that 
he  exacted  in  return  a  pledge  that  the  Parthian  monarch  should 
lend  him  his  assistance  in  the  expedition  which  he  was  bent 
on  conducting  against  Bactria;''  but  there  is  no  actual  proof 
that  the  conditions  of  peace  contained  this  clause.  We  are  left 
in  doubt  whether  Artabanus  stood  aloof  in  the  war  which 
Antiochus  waged  with  Euthydemus  of  Bactria  immediately 
after  the  close  of  his  Parthian  campaigns,  or  whether  he  lent 
his  aid  to  the  attempt  made  to  crush  his  neighbor.  Perhaps, 
on  the  whole,  it  is  most  probable  that,  nominally,  he  was  Anti- 


CHI/.]    BLANK  PERIOD  IN  PARTHIAN  1IIST0R7.  33 

ochus's  ally  in  the  war,  but  that,  practically,  he  gave  him  Httle 
help,  having  no  wish  to  see  Syria  aggrandized. 

At  any  rate,  whether  Euthydemus  had  to  meet  the  attack  of 
Syria  only,  or  of  Syria  and  Parthia  in  combination,  the  result 
was,  that  Bactria,  like  Parthia,  proved  strong  enough  to  main- 
tain her  groimd,  and  that  the  Syrian  King,  after  a  while,  grew 
tired  of  the  struggle,  and  consented  to  terms  of  accommodation. " 
The  Bactrian  monarchy,  like  the  Parthian,  came  out  of  the 
contest  unscathed — indeed  we  may  go  further,  and  say  that 
the  position  of  the  two  kingdoms  was  improved  by  the  attacks 
made  upon  them.  If  a  prince  possessing  the  personal  qualities 
that  distinguished  the  third  Antiochus,  and  justified  the  title 
of  "  Great "  which  he  derived  from  his  oriental  expedition^' — 
if  such  a  prince,  enjoying  profound  peace  at  home,  and  direct- 
ing the  whole  force  of  his  empire  against  them,  could  not  suc- 
ceed in  reducing  to  subjection  the  revolted  provinces  of  the 
northeast,  but,  whatever  military  advantages  he  might  gain, 
found  conquest  impossible,  and  returned  home,  having  ac- 
knowledged as  independent  kings  those  whom  he  went  out  to 
chastise  as  rebellious  satraps,  it  was  evident  that  the  kingdoms 
might  look  upon  themselves  as  firmly  established,  or,  at  least, 
as  secure  from  the  danger  of  re-absorption  into  the  Syrian 
State.  The  repulse  of  Callinicus  was  a  probable  indication  of 
the  fate  of  all  future  efforts  on  the  part  of  Syria  to  reduce 
Parthia  ;  the  conditions  of  peace  granted  by  Antiochus  to  both 
countries,  after  a  series  of  military  successes,  constituted  al- 
most a  proof  that  the  yoke  of  Syria  would  never  be  re-imposed 
on  either  the  Parthian  or  the  Bactrian  nation. 

With  the  departure  of  Antiochus  from  the  East,  about  b.  c. 
206,  we  enter  upon  a  period  when  Parthian  history  is,  for  a 
quarter  of  a  century,  almost  a  blank.  Nothing  more  is  known 
of  Arsaces  III.  after  Antiochus  retired  ;  and  nothing  at  all  is 
known  of  his  successor,  Priapatius,  beyond  his  name  and  the 
length  of  his  reign,  which  lasted  for  fifteen  years  "  (from  about 
B.C.  196  to  181).  The  reigns  of  these  princes  coincide  with 
those  of  Euthydemus  and  his  son,  Demetrius,  in  Bactria  ;  and 
perhaps  the  most  probable  solution  of  the  problem  of  Parthian 
inactivity  at  this  time  is  to  be  found  in  the  great  development 
of  Bactrian  power  which  now  took  place,  and  the  influence 
which  the  two  neighboring  kingdoms  naturally  exercised  upon 
each  other.  When  Parthia  was  strong  and  aggressive,  Bactria 
was,  for  the  most  part,  quiet  j  and  when  Bactria  shows  signs 


34  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  it. 

of  vigorous  and  active  life,  Parthia  languishes  and  retires  into 
the  shade. 

The  Bactrian  Kingdom,  founded  (as  we  have  seen  ")  a  Httle 
before  the  Parthian,  sought  from  the  first  its  aggrandizement 
in  the  East  rather  than  in  the  West.  The  Empire  of  Alexan- 
der had  included  all  the  countries  between  the  Caspian  Sea  and 
the  Sutlej  ;  and  these  tracts,  which  constitute  the  modem 
Ehorasan,  Afghanistan,  and  Punjaub,  had  all  been  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  Hellenized  by  means  of  Greek  settlements ''  and 
Greek  government.  But  Alexander  was  no  sooner  dead  than 
a  tendency  displayed  itself  in  these  regions,  and  particularly  in 
the  more  eastern  ones,  towards  a  relapse  into  barbarism,  or,  if 
this  expression  be  too  strong,  "  at  any  rate  towards  a  rejec- 
tion of  Hellenism.  During  the  early  wars  of  the  "Successors" 
the  natives  of  the  Punjaub  generally  seized  the  opportunity  to 
revolt ;  the  governors  placed  over  the  various  districts  by 
Alexander  were  murdered ;  and  the  tribes  everywhere  declared 
themselves  free.  Among  the  leaders  of  the  revolt  was  a  cer- 
tain Chandragupta  (or  Sandracottus),  who  contrived  to  turn 
the  circumstances  of  the  time  to  his''own  special  advantage,  and 
built  up  a  considerable  kingdom  in  the  far  East  out  of  the 
fragments  which  had  detached  themselves  from  what  was 
still  called  the  Macedonian  Empire.^*  When  Seleucus  Nicator, 
about  B.C.  305,  conducted  an  expedition  across  the  Indus,  he 
found  this  monarch  established  in  the  tract  between  the  Indus 
and  the  Ganges, '''' ruling  over  extensive  dominions  and  at  the 
head  of  a  vast  force.'"  It  is  uncertain  whether  the  two  rivals 
engaged  in  hostilities  or  no."  At  any  rate,  a  peace  was  soon 
made;  and  Seleucus,  in  return  for  five  hundred  elephants, 
ceded  to  Sandracottus  certain  lands  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Indus,  which  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  Macedonian." 
These  probably  consisted  of  the  low  grounds  between  the 
Indus  and  the  foot  of  the  mountains— the  districts  of  Peshawur, 
Bunnoo,  Murwut,  Shikarpoor,  and  Kurrachee — which  are  now 
in  British  occupation.  Thus  Hellenism  in  these  parts  receded 
more  and  more,  the  Sanskritic  Indians  recovering  by  degrees 
the  power  and  independence  of  which  they  had  been  deprived 
by  Alexander. 

This  state  of  things  could  not  have  been  pleasing  to  the 
Greek  princes  of  Bactria,  who  must  have  felt  that  the  reaction 
towards  barbarism  in  these  parts  tended  to  isolate  them,  and 
that  there  was  a  danger  of  their  being  crushed  between  the 
Parthians  on  the  one  hand  and  the  perpetually  advancing  In- 


r" 


Plite  L 


Coin  of  Diodotns'l.j 


Ejg..^ 


Coinof  Pliraatcs  I^ 


Phraates  I.    (Obverse.) 


El^* 


Coin  of  Mitbridates  I.    (XativeJ       Coin  ot  Mitluidatcs  I.'    (Greek.) 


(A-rsaces  L 


Mithridates  L. 


fnfosm' 


Artabanus  I^^ 


Plate,  il^ 


m^- 


F'g  ^ 


Fiff    3 


Piff  -4. 


Vol.  II 


i»      •  I  iv 


Coin  of  Lableims. 


COIN  OF  FBRAATACEa  AND  MOUSA. 


COIN    Oy   VONONES  I. 


Fife  ft 


COIN  OF  ABTABANUi  IH, 


COIN   OP  TABDANES  L 


en.  IV.]    AQGREbSIVE  ATTITUDE  OF  PER  A  ATE S  I.  35 

dians  on  the  other.  When  Antiochus  the  Great,  after 
concluding  his  treaty  with  Euthydemus,  marched  eastward, 
the  Bactrian  monarch  probably  indulged  in  hopes  that  the  In- 
dians would  receive  a  check,  and  that  the  Greek  frontier 
would  be  again  carried  to  the  Indus,  if  not  to  the  Sutlej.  But,  if 
so,  he  was  disappointed.  Antiochus,  instead  of  making  war 
upon  the  Indians,  contented  himself  with  renewing  the  old 
alliance  of  the  Seleucidae  with  the  Maurja  princes,''  and  obtain- 
ing a  number  of  elephants  from  Sophagesenus,  the  grandson  of 
Sandracottus.'*  It  is  even  possible  that  he  went  further,  and 
made  cessions  of  territory  in  return  for  this  last  gift,  =' which 
brought  the  Indian  frontier  still  nearer  than  before  to  that  of 
Bactria.  At  any  rate,  the  result  of  the  Indian  expedition  of 
Antiochus  seems  to  have  been  imsatisfactory  to  Euthydemus, 
who  shortly  afterwards  commenced  what  are  called  "Indian 
Wars'""  on  his  south-eastern  frontier,  employing  in  them 
chiefly  the  arms  of  his  son,  Demetrius.  During  the  latter  yeai*s 
of  Euthydemus  and  the  earlier  ones  of  Demetrius,  the  Bactrian 
rule  was  rapidly  extended  over  the  greater  portion  of  the  mod- 
ern Afghanistan;"  nor  did  it  even  stop  there.  The  arms  of 
Demetrius  were  carried  across  the  Indus  into  the  Punjaub  re- 
gion ; '"  and  the  city  of  Euthymedeia  upon  the  Hydaspes  re- 
mained to  later  times  an  evidence  of  the  extent  of  his  con- 
quests.'" From  B.C.  206  to  about  B.C.  185  was  the  most  flour- 
ishing period  of  the  Bactrian  monarchy,  which  expanded 
during  that  space  from  a  small  kingdom  into  a  considerable 
empire.'"* 

The  power  and  successes  of  the  Bactrian  princes  at  this  time 
account  sufficiently  for  the  fact  that  the  contemporary  Parthian 
monarchs  stood  upon  their  guard,  and  undertook  no  great  ex- 
peditions. Arsaces  III.,  who  continued  on  the  throne  for  about 
ten  or  twelve  years  after  his  peace  with  Antiochus,  and  Pria- 
patius,  or  Arsaces  IV.,  his  son,  who  succeeded  him,  and  had  a 
reign  of  fifteen  years,  were  content,  as  already  observed,"  to 
watch  over  their  own  State,  husbanding  its  resources,  and  liv- 
ing at  peace  with  all  their  neighbors.  It  was  not  till  Phraates 
I.  (Arsaces  V.),  the  son  of  Priapatius,  had  mounted  the  throne, 
B.C.  181,  that  this  policy  was  departed  from,  and  Parthia, 
which  had  remained  tranquil  for  a  quarter  of  a  century,  once 
nnore  aroused  herself,  and  assumed  an  attitude  of  aggression. 

The  quarter  to  which  Phraates  I.  directed  his  arms  was  the 
country  of  the  Mardians,  a  poor  but  warlike  people,"  who  ap- 
pear to  have  occupied  a  portion  of  the  Elburz  range,  probably 


36  THE  SIXTH  MONARCH!.  [ch.  iv. 

that  immediately  south  of  Mazanderan  and  Asterabad."  The 
reduction  of  these  fierce  mountaineers  is  Hkely  to  have  occu- 
pied him  for  some  years,  since  their  country  was  exceedingly 
strong  and  difficult."  Though  the  Mardi  were  (nominally,  at 
any  rate)  subjects  of  the  Seleucidse,  we  do  not  hear  of  any  as- 
sistance being  rendered  them,  or,  indeed,  of  any  remonstrance 
being  made  against  the  unprovoked  aggression  of  the  Parthian 
monarch.  The  reign  of  Phraates  I.  in  Parthia  coincides  with 
that  of  Seleucus  IV.  (Philopator)  in  Syria ;  and  we  may  account 
for  the  inactivity  of  this  prince,  in  part  by  his  personal  charac- 
ter, which  was  weak  and  pacific,"  in  part  by  the  exhaustion  of 
Syria  at  the  time,  in  consequence  of  his  father's  great  war  with 
Rome  (B.C.  197-190),  and  of  the  heavy  contribution  which  was 
imposed  upon  him  at  the  close  of  it.  Syria  may  scarcely  have 
yet  recovered  sufficient  strength  to  enter  upon  a  new  struggle, 
especially  one  with  a  distant  and  powerful  enemy.  The  mate- 
rial interests  of  the  Empire  may  also  have  seemed  to  be  but  little 
touched  by  the  war,  since  the  Mardi  were  too  poor  to  furnish 
much  tribute;  and  it  is  possible,  if  not  even  probable,  that 
their  subjection  to  Syria  had  long  been  rather  formal  than 
real."  Seleucus  therefore  allowed  the  Mardians  to  be  reduced, 
conceiving,  probably,  that  their  transfer  to  the  dominion  of 
the  Arsacidee  neither  increased  the  Parthian  power  nor  dimin- 
ished his  own. 

But  the  nation  which  submits  to  be  robbed  of  a  province, 
however  unproductive  and  valueless,  must  look  to  having  the 
process  repeated  at  intervals,  until  it  bestirs  itself  and  offers 
resistance.  There  is  reason  to  beheve  that  Phraates  had  no 
sooner  conquered  the  Mardians  than  he  cast  his  eyes  on  an  ad- 
jacent district,  and  resolved  to  add  it  to  his  territories.  This 
was  the  tract  lying  immediately  to  the  West  of  the  Caspian 
Gates,  which  was  always  reckoned  to  Media,  forming ,  how- 
ever, a  distinct  district,  know  as  Media  Rhagiana."'  It  was  a 
region  of  much  natural  fertility,  being  watered  by  numerous 
streams  from  the  Elburz  range,  and  possessing  a  soil  of  re- 
markable productiveness."  Its  breadth  was  not  great,  since  it 
consisted  of  a  mere  strip  between  the  mountains  and  the  Salt 
Desert  which  occupies  the  whole  centre  of  the  Iranic  table- 
land ;  but  it  extended  in  length  at  least  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles,  from  the  Caspian  Gates  to  the  vicinity  of  Kasvin.  Its 
capital  city,  from  a  remote  antiquity,  was  Rhages,^' situated 
near  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  strip,  probably  at  the  spot 
now  called  Kaleh  Erij,^"  about  twenty-three  miles  from  the 


en.  IV.]      HIS  mVASION  OF  MEDIA  REAOIANA.  "'  37 

"  Gates."  On  this  region  it  is  clear  that  Phraates  cast  a  covet- 
ous eye.  How  much  of  it  he  actually  occupied  is  doubtful ; 
but  it  is  at  least  certain  that  he  effected  a  lodgment  in  its  east- 
ern extremity,^'  which  must  have  put  the  whole  region  in 
jeopardy.  Nature  has  sot  a  remarkable  barrier  between  the 
more  eastern  and  the  more  western  portions  of  Occidental  Asia, 
about  midway  in  the  tract  which  lies  due  south  of  the  Caspian 
Sea.  The  Elburz  range  in  tliis  part  is  one  of  so  tremendous  a 
character,  and  northward  abuts  so  closely  on  the  Caspian,  that 
all  communication  between  the  east  and  the  west  necessarily 
passes  to  the  south  of  it.  In  this  quarter  the  Great  Desert  of- 
fering an  insuperable  obstacle  to  transit,  the  line  of  communi- 
cation has  to  cling  to  the  flanks  of  the  mountain  chain,  the 
narrow  strip  between  the  mountains  and  the  desert— rarely  ten 
miles  in  width — being  alone  traversable.  But  about  long.  52° 
20'  this  strip  itself  fails.  A  rocky  spur  runs  due  south  from 
the  Elburz  into  the  desert  for  a  distance  of  some  twenty  or 
thirty  miles,  breaking  the  line  of  communication,  and  seeming 
at  first  sight  to  obstruct  it  completely.  ^^  This,  however,  is  not 
the  case  absolutely.  The  spur  itself  is  penetrable  by  two 
passes,  one  where  it  joins  the  Elburz,  which  is  the  more  diffi- 
cult of  the  two,  and  another,  further  to  the  south,  which  is 
easier."  The  latter  now  known  as  the  Girduni  Sudurrah 
pass,  constitutes  the  famous  ' '  Pylse  Caspiae."  Through  tliis  pass 
alone  can  armies  proceed  from  Armenia,  Media,  and  Persia 
eastward,  or  from  Turkestan,  Khorasan,  and  Afghanistan  into 
the  more  western  parts  of  Asia.  The  position  is  therefore  one 
of  primary  importance.  It  was  to  guard  it  that  Phages  was 
built  so  near  the  eastern  end  of  its  territory.  So  long  as  it  re- 
mained in  the  possession  of  Syria,  Parthian  agression  was 
checked.  Rhagiana,  the  rest  of  Media,  and  the  other  province* 
were  safe,  or  nearly  so.  On  the  other  hand,  the  loss  of  it  to 
Parthia  laid  the  eastern  provinces  open  to  her,  and  was  at  once 
almost  equivalent  to  the  loss  of  all  Rhagiana,  Avhich  had  no 
other  natural  protection.  Now  we  find  that  Phraates  sur- 
mounted the  "Gates,"  and  effected  a  lodgment  in  the  plain 
country  beyond  them.  He  removed  a  portion  of  the  conquered 
Mardians  from  their  mountain  homes  to  the  city  of  Charax, 
which  was  on  the  western  side  of  the  Gates,  ^*  probably  on 
the  site  now  occupied  by  the  ruins  known  as  UewaniJcifJ^ 
Their  location  in  this  strong  post  ''"'^  was  a  menace  to  the  neigh- 
boring town  of  Phages,  which  can  scarcely  have  maintained 
itself  long  against  an  enemy  encamped  at  its  doors.    We  are 


38  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCIIT.  [ch.  t. 

not  informed,  however,  of  any  results  which  followed  on  the 
occupation  of  Charax  during  the  lifetime  of  Phraates.  His 
reign  lasted  only  seven  years — from  B.C.  181  to  b.o.  174 — and  it 
is  thus  probable  that  he  died  before  there  was  time  for  his  sec- 
ond important  conquest  to  have  any  further  consequences. 

Phraates  had  sufficient  warning  of  his  coming  decease  to 
make  preparations  with  respect  to  a  successor.  Though  he  had 
several  sons,  some  of  whom  were  (we  must  suppose)  of  sufficient 
age  to  have  ascended  the  throne,"  he  left  his  crown  to  his 
brother,  Mithridates.  He  felt,  probably,  that  the  State  re- 
quired the  direction  of  a  firm  hand,  that  war  might  at  any 
time  break  out  with  either  Syria  or  Bactria ;  while,  if  the  ca- 
reer of  conquest  on  which  he  had  made  Parthia  enter  were  to 
be  pursued,  he  could  trust  his  brother  better  than  any  of  his 
sons  to  conduct  aggressive  expeditions  with  combined  vigor  and 
prudence.  We  shall  see,  as  the  history  proceeds,  how  Mith- 
ridates justified  his  choice.  Phraates  would  also  appear  to 
have  borne  his  brother  especial  affection,  since  he  takes  the 
name  of  " Philadelphus"  (brother-loving)  upon  his  coins.'"  It 
must  have  been  a  satisfaction  to  him  that  he  was  able  by  his 
last  act  at  once  to  consult  for  the  good  of  liis  country,  and  to 
gratify  a  sentunent  on  which  it  is  evident  that  he  prided  him- 
self. 


CHAPTER  V. 


Reign  of  Mithridates  L  Position  of  Bactria  and  Syria  at  his 
accession.  His  first  war  with  Bactria.  His  great  Expedi- 
tion against  the  Eastern  Syrian  provinces,  and  its  results. 
His  second  war  with  Bactria,  terminating  in  its  conquest. 
Extent  of  his  Empire.  Atteinpt  of  Demetrius  Nicator  to 
recover  the  lost  Provinces  fails.  Captivity  of  Demetrius. 
Death  of  Mithridates. 

"  Mithridati,  insignis  virtutis  viro,  reliquit  imperium  (Phrahates)." 

Justin,  xli.  5. 

The  reign  of  Mithridates  I.  is  the  most  important  in  the  Par- 
thian history.  [PI.  1.  Fig.  3.]  Receiving  from  his  brother 
Phraates  a  kingdom  of  but  narrow  dimensions,  confined  (as  it 
would  seem)  between  the  city  of  Charax  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  river  Arius,  or  Heri-iaid;  on  the  other,  he  ti-ansformed  it, 


CH.  v.]  CONDITION  OF  BACTRIA.  39 

vithin  the  space  of  thirty-seven  years  (which  was  the  time  that 
his  reign  lasted) ,  into  a  great  and  flourishing  Empire.  It  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that,  but  for  him,  Parthia  might  have  re- 
mained a  mere  petty  State  on  the  oulrekirts  of  the  Syrian  king- 
dom, and,  instead  of  becoming  a  rival  to  Rome,  might  have 
sunk  shortly  into  obscurity  and  insignificance. 

As  commonly  happens  in  the  grand  changes  which  constitute 
the  turning-points  of  history,  the  way  for  Mithridates's  vast 
successes  was  prepared  by  a  long  train  of  antecedent  circum- 
stances. To  show  how  the  rise  of  the  Parthians  to  greatness 
in  the  middle  of  the  second  century  before  our  era  was  rendered 
possible,  we  must  turn  aside  once  more  from  our  proper  sub- 
ject and  cast  a  glance  at  the  condition  of  the  two  kingdoms  be- 
tween which  Parthia  stood,  at  the  time  when  Mithridates  as- 
cended the  throne. 

The  Bactrian  monarchs  in  their  ambitious  struggles  to  possess 
themselves  of  the  tracts  south  of  the  Paropamisus, '  and  ex- 
tending from  the  Heri-rud  to  the  Sutlej  and  the  mouths  of  the 
Indus,  overstrained  the  strength  of  their  State,  and  by  shifting 
the  centre  of  its  power  injured  irretrievably  its  principle  of 
cohesion.  As  early  as  the  reign  of  Demetrius^  a  tendency  to 
disruption  showed  itself,  Eucratidas  having  held  the  supreme 
power  for  many  years  in  Bactria  itself,  while  Demetrius  exer- 
cised authority  on  the  southern  side  of  the  mountains.^  It  is 
true  that  at  the  death  of  Demetrius  this  tendency  was  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  checked,  since  Eucratidas  was  then  able  to  extend 
his  sway  over  almost  the  whole  of  the  Bactrian  territorj^.*  But 
the  old  evO  recurred  shortly,  though  in  a  less  pronounced 
form.  Eucratidas,  without  being  actually  supplanted  in  the 
north  by  a  rival,  found  that  he  could  devote  to  that  portion  of 
the  Empire  but  a  small  part  of  his  attention.  The  southern 
countries  and  the  prospect  of  southern  and  eastern  conquests 
engrossed  him.  While  he  carried  on  successful  wars  with  the 
Arachotians,  the  Drangians,  and  the  Indians  of  the  Punjaub 
region,  his  hold  on  the  more  northern  countries  was  relaxed, 
and  they  began  to  slip  from  his  grasp.  ^  Incursions  of  the 
nomad  Scyths  from  the  Steppes  carried  fire  and  sword  over 
portions  of  these  provinces,  some  of  which  were  even,  it  is 
probable,  seized  and  occupied  by  the  invaders.  ° 

Such  was,  it  would  seem,  the  condition  of  Bactria  under 
Eucratidas,  the  contemporary  of  Mithridates.  In  Syria,  Anti- 
ochus  Epiphanes  had  succeeded  his  brother  Seleucus  IV. 
(Pliilopator)  about  a  year  before   Mithridates  ascended  the 


40  "TSE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  V. 

Parthian  throne.'  He  was  a  prince  of  courage  and  energy; 
but  his  hands  were  fully  occupied  with  wars  in  Egypt,  Pales- 
tine, and  Armenia,  and  the  distant  East  could  attract  but  a 
small  share  of  his  thought  or  attention.  The  claim  put 
forward  by  Egypt  to  the  possession  of  Coele-Syria  and  Pales- 
tine, promised  to  Ptolemy  V.  (it  was  aflBrmed)  as  a  dowry 
with  Cleopatra,  the  daughter  of  Antiochus  the  Great,  led  to 
hostihties  in  the  south-west  which  lasted  continuously  for  four 
years  (b.c.  171  to  B.C.  168),  and  were  complicated  during  two 
of  them  with  troubles  in  Judaea,  rashly  provoked  by  the 
Syrian  monarch,  who,  unaware  of  the  stubborn  temper  of  the 
Jews,  goaded  them  into  insurrection.  ^  The  war  with  Egypt 
came  to  an  end  in  B.C.  168;  it  brought  Syria  no  advantage, 
since  Rome  interposed,  and  required  the  restitution  of  all 
conquests.  The  war  with  the  Jews  had  no  such  rapid  termin- 
ation. Antiochus,  having  not  only  plundered  and  desecrated 
the  Temple,  but  having  set  himself  to  eradicate  utterly  the 
Jewish  religion,  and  completely  Hellenize  the  people,  was  met 
with  the  most  determined  resistance  on  the  part  of  a  moiety 
of  the  nation.  A  patriotic  party  rose  up  under  devoted 
leaders,'  who  asserted,  and  in  the  end  secured,  the  independ- 
ence of  their  country.  Not  alone  during  the  remaining  years 
of  Epiphanes,  but  for  half  a  century  after  his  death,  through- 
out seven  reigns,  the  struggle  continued;  Judsea  taking 
advantage  of  every  trouble  and  difficulty  in  Syria  to  detach 
herself  more  and  more  completely  from  her  oppressor;  being 
a  continual  thorn  in  her  side,  a  constant  source  of  weakness, 
preventing  more  than  anything  else  the  recovery  of  her  power. 
The  triumph  which  Epiphanes  obtained  in  the  distant  Ar- 
menia (B.C.  166-5),  where  he  defeated  and  captured  the  king, 
Artaxias,"  was  a  poor  set-off  against  the  foe  which  he  had 
created  to  himself  at  his  doors  through  his  cruelty  and  intoler- 
ance. 

In  another  quarter,  too,  the  Syrian  power  received  a  severe 
shake  through  the  injudicious  violence  of  Epiphanes.  The 
Oriental  temples  had,  in  some  instances,  escaped  the  rapacity 
of  Alexander's  generals  and  "Successors;"  their  treasuries 
remained  unviolated,  and  contained  large  hoards  of  the 
precious  metals.  Epiphanes,  haying  exhausted  his  own  ex- 
chequer by  his  wars  and  his  lavish  gifts,  saw  in  these  un- 
plundered  stores  a  means  of  replenisliing  it,  and  made  a 
journey  into  his  south-eastern  provinces  for  the  purpose.  The 
natives  of  Elymais,  ho wevex*,  resisted  his  attempt,  and  proved 


CH.  v.]  CONDITION  OF  STRIA.  41 

strong  enough  to  defeat  it;"  the  baffled  monarch  retired  to 
Tabae,  where  he  shortly  afterward  fell  sick  and  died.  In  the 
popular  belief  his  death  was  a  judgment  upon  him  for  his 
attempted  sacrilege ; ''  and  in  the  exultation  caused  by  the 
event  the  bands  which  joined  these  provinces  to  the  Empire 
must  undoubtedly  have  been  loosened. 

Nor  did  the  removal  of  Epiphanes  (B.C.  164)  improve  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  Syria.  The  throne  fell  to  his  son,  Anti- 
ochus  Eupator,  a  boy  of  nine,  according  to  Appian,'^  or, 
according  to  another  authority,'^  of  twelve  years  of  age.  The 
regent,  Lysias,  exercised  the  chief  power,  and  was  soon 
engaged  in  a  war  with  the  Jews,"  whom  the  death  of  Epiph- 
anes had  encouraged  to  fresh  efforts.  The  authority  of 
Lysias  was  further  disputed  by  a  certain  Philip,  whom  Epiph- 
anes, shortly  before  his  death,  had  made  tutor  to  the  young 
king.'"  The  claims  of  this  tutor  to  the  regent's  office  being 
supported  by  a  considerable  portion  of  the  army,  a  civil  war 
arose  between  him  and  Lysias,  which  raged  for  the  greater 
part  of  two  years  (b.c.  163-2),  terminating  in  the  defeat  and 
death  of  Pliilip.  But  Syrian  affairs  did  not  even  then  settle 
down  into  tranquillity.  A  prince  of  the  Seleucid  house,  Deme- 
trius by  name,  the  son  of  Seleucus  IV.,  and  consequently  the 
first  cousin  of  Eupator,  was  at  this  time  detained  in  Rome  as 
a  hostage,  having  been  sent  there  during  his  father's  lifetime 
as  a  security  for  his  fidelity.  Demetrius,  with  some  reason, 
regarded  his  claim  to  the  Syrian  throne  as  better  than  that  of 
his  cousin,  the  son  of  the  younger  brother,  and  being  in  the 
fidl  vigor  of  early  youth, "  he  determined  to  assert  his  preten- 
sions in  Syria,  and  to  make  a  bold  stroke  for  the  crown. 
Having  failed  to  obtain  the  Senate's  consent  to  his  quitting 
Italy,  he  'took  his  departure  secretly, ''  crossed  the  Mediterra- 
nean in  a  Carthaginian  vessel,  and,  landing  in  Asia,  succeeded 
within  a  few  months  in  establishing  himseK  as  Syrian 
monarch. 

From  this  review  it  sufficiently  appears  that  the  condition 
of  tilings,  both  in  Syria  and  Bactria,  was  favorable  to  any 
aspirations  which  the  power  that  lay  between  them  might 
entertain  after  dominion  and  self-aggrandizement.  The  Sy- 
rian and  Bactrian  kings,  at  the  time  of  Mithridates's  accession, 
were,  both  of  them,  men  of  talent  and  energy ;  but  the  Syrian 
monarch  was  soon  involved  in  difficulties  at  home,  while  the 
Bactrian  had  his  attention  attracted  to  prospects  of  advantage 
in  a  remote  quarter.     Mithridates  migbt,  perhaps,  have  at* 


42  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  v. 

tacked  the  territory  of  either  with  an  equal  chance  of  victory ; 
and  as  his  predecessor  had  set  him  the  example  of  successful 
warfare  on  his  western  frontier,  we  might  have  expected  his 
first  efforts  to  have  been  in  this  direction,  against  the  depend- 
encies of  Syria.  But  circumstances  which  we  cannot  exactly 
trace  determined  his  choice  differently.  While  Eucratidas 
was  entangled  in  his  Indian  wars,  Mithridates  invaded  the 
Bactrian  territory  where  it  adjoined  Parthia,  and  added  to  his 
Empire,  after  a  short  struggle,  two  provinces,  called  respect- 
ively Turiua  and  that  of  Aspionus.'"  It  is  conjectured  that 
these  provinces  lay  towards  the  north  and  the  north-west,  the 
one  being  that  of  the  Turanians  proper,  and  the  other  that  of  the 
Aspasiacee,^"  who  dwelt  between  the  Jaxartes  and  the  Oxus.'^' 
But  there  is  scarcely  sufficient  ground  for  forming  even  a 
conjecture  on  the  sutject,  since  speculation  has  nothing  but 
the  names  themselves  to  rest  upon." 

Successful  in  this  quarter,  Mithridates,  a  few  years  later, 
having  waited  until  the  Syrian  throne  was  occupied  by  the 
boy  Eupator,  and  the  two  claimants  of  the  regency,  Lysias 
and  Philip,  were  contending  in  arms  for  the  supreme  power, 
made  suddenly  an  expedition  towards  the  west,  falling  upon 
Media,  which,  though  claimed  by  the  Syrian  kings  as  a  prov- 
ince of  theii"  Empire,  was  perhaps  at  this  time  almost,  if  not 
quite,  independent."  The  Medes  offered  a  vigorous  resistance 
to  his  attack ;  and,  in  the  war  which  followed,  each  side  had 
in  turn  the  advantage;^*  but  eventually  the  Parthian  prince 
proved  victorious,  and  the  great  and  valuable  province  of 
Media  Magna  was  added  to  the  dominons  of  the  Arsacidse.  A 
certain  Bacasis  was  appointed  to  govern  it,  whether  as  satrap 
or  as  tributary  monarch  is  not  apparent;"^  while  the  Parthian 
king,  recalled  towards  home  by  a  revolt,  proceeded  to  crush 
rebellion  before  resuming  his  career  of  conquest. 

The  revolt  which  now  occupied  for  a  time  the  attention  of 
Mithridates  was  that  of  Hyrcania.''"  The  Hyrcanians  were 
Arians  in  race;  they  were  brave  and  high-spirited,"  and  under 
the  Persian  monarchs  had  enjoyed  some  exceptional  privi- 
leges"® which  placed  them  above  the  great  mass  of  the  con- 
quered nations.  It  was  natural  that  they  should  dislike  the 
yoke  of  a  Turanian  people ;  and  it  was  wise  of  them  to  make 
their  effort  to  obtain  their  freedom  before  Parthia  grew  into 
a  power  against  which  revolt  would  be  utterly  hopeless. 
Hyrcania  might  now  expect  to  be  joined  by  the  Medes,  and 
even  the  Mardi,  who  were  Arians  like  themselves,  ■^'  and  could 


CH.  v.]  MEDIA   AND  SUSIANA   COKQITERED.  4?j 

not  yet  have  forgotten  the  i^leasures  of  independence.  Eut 
though  the  effort  does  not  seem  to  have  been  ill-timed,  it  was 
unsuccessful.  No  aid  was  given  to  the  rebels,  so  far  as  we 
hear,  by  any  of  their  neighbors.  Llithridates's  prompt  return 
nipped  the  insurrection  in  the  Dud;  Hyrcania  at  once  sub- 
mitted, and  became  for  centuries  the  obedient  vassal  of  hei 
powerful  neighbor. 

The  conquest  of  Media  had  brought  the  Parthians  into  con- 
tact with  the  rich  country  of  Susiana  or  Elymais ;  and  it  was 
not  long  before  Mithridates,  having  crushed  the  Hyrcanian 
revolt,  again  advanced  westward,  and  invaded  this  important 
province.  Elymais  appears  to  have  a  had  a  king  of  its  own,'" 
who  must  either  have  been  a  vassal  of  the  Seleucidse,  or  have 
acquired  an  independent  position  by  revolt  after  the  death  of 
Epiphanes.  In  the  war  which  followed  between  this  monarch 
and  Mithridates,  the  Elymseans  proved  wholly  unsuccessful, 
and  Mithridates  rapidly  overran  the  country  and  added  it  to 
his  dominions.  After  this  he  appears  to  have  received  the  sub- 
mission of  the  Persians  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Babylonians 
on  the  other,"  and  to  have  rested  on  his  laurels  for  some 
years,''  having  extended  the  Parthian  sway  from  the  Hindoo 
Koosh  to  the  Euphrates. 

The  chronological  data  which  have  come  down  to  us  for  this 
period  are  too  scanty  to  allow  of  any  exact  statement  of  the 
number  of  years  occupied  by  Mithridates  in  effecting  these 
conquests.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  he  appears  to  have 
commenced  them  about  B.C.  163  and  to  have  concluded 
them  some  time  before  B.C.  140,  when  he  was  in  his  turn 
attacked  by  the  Syrians.  Probably  they  had  been  all  effected 
by  the  year  B.C.  150 ;  since  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  about 
that  time'-*  Mithridates  found  his  power  sufficiently  estab- 
lished in  the  west  to  allow  of  his  once  more  turning  his  atten- 
tion eastward,  and  renewing  his  aggressions  upon  the  Bactrian 
kingdom,  which  had  passed  from  the  rule  of  Eucratidas  under 
that  of  his  son  and  successor,  Heliocles. " 

Heliocles,  who  was  allowed  by  Ms  father  a  quasi-royal  posi- 
tion,'^ obtained  the  full  possession  of  the  Bactrian  throne  by 
the  crime  of  parricide.  It  is  conjectui-ed  that  he  regarded 
with  disapproval  his  father's  tamo  submission  to  Parthian 
ascendency,  and  desired  the  recovery  of  the  provinces  which 
Eucratidas  had  been  content  to  cede  for  the  sake  of  peace.** 
We  are  told  that  ho  justified  his  crime  on  the  grotmd  that  his 
faiher  was  a  public  enemy ;"'  which  is  beet  explained  by  st^ip- 


44  THE  SIXTH  MONARCUT.  [ch.  v. 

posing  that  he  considered  him  the  friend  of  Bactria's  great 
enemy,  Parthia.  If  this  be  the  true  account  of  the  circum- 
stances under  which  he  became  king,  his  accession  would  have 
been  a  species  of  challenge  to  the  Parthian  monarch,  whose 
ally  he  had  assassinated.  Mithridates  accordingly  marched 
against  him  with  all  speed,  and,  easily  defeating  his  troops, 
took  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  his  dominion.  ^'  Elated 
by  this  success,  he  is  said  to  have  pressed  eastward,  to  have 
invaded  India,  and  overrun  the  country  as  far  as  the  river 
Hydaspes,  ^"^  but,  if  it  be  true  that  his  arms  penetrated  so  far, 
it  is,  at  any  rate,  certain  that  he  did  not  here  effect  any  con- 
quest. Greek  monarchs^"  of  the  Bactrian  series  continued 
masters  of  Cabul  and  Western  India  till  about  B.C.  126;  no 
Parthian  coins[are  found  in  this  region ;  nor  do  the  best  authori- 
ties claim  for  Mithridates  any  dominion  beyond  the  mountains 
which  enclose  on  the  west  the  valley  of  the  Indus. 

By  his  war  with  Heliocles  the  empire  of  Mithridates  reached 
its  greatest  extension.  It  comprised  now,  besides  Parthia 
Proper,  Bactria,  Aria,  Drangiana,  Arachosia,  Margiana,  Hyr- 
cania,  the  country  of  the  Mardi,  Media  Magna,  Susiana,  Persia 
and  Babylonia.  Very  probably  its  limits  were  stiU  wider. 
The  power  which  possessed  Parthia,  Hyrcania,  and  Bactria, 
would  rule  almost  of  necessity  over  the  whole  tract  between 
the  Elburz  range  and  the  Oxus,  if  not  even  over  the  region  be- 
tween the  Oxus  and  the  Jaxartes ;  that  which  held  the  Caspian 
mountains  and  eastern  Media  could  not  fail  to  have  influence 
over  the  tribes  of  the  Iranic  desert;  while  Assyria  Proper 
would  naturally  follow  the  fortunes  of  Babylonia  and  Susi- 
ana.^' Still  the  extent  of  territory  thus  indicated  rests  only 
on  conjecture.  If  we  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  known  by 
positive  evidence,  we  can  only  say  that  the  Parthian  Kingdom 
of  this  period  contained,  at  least,  twelve  provinces  above 
enumerated.  It  thvis  stretched  from  east  to  west  a  distance  of 
fifteen  hundred  miles  between  the  Suleiman  mountains  and 
the  Euphrates,  varying  in  width  from  three  or  four  hundred 
miles— or  even  more— towards  the  west  and  east,  to  a  narrow 
strip  of  less  than  a  hundred  miles  toward  the  centre.  It  prob- 
ably comprised  an  area  of  about  450,000  square  miles;  which 
is  somewhat  less  than  that  of  the  modern  Persia. 

Unhke  the  modern  Persia,  however,  the  territory  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  productive  regions.  The  excellent  quality 
of  the  soU  in  Parthia  Proper,  Hyrcania,  and  Margiana,  has 
been  already  noticed.^-    Bactria,  the  next  province  to  Margiana 


C'H.  v.]  TROUBLES  IN  STRIA.  45 

towards  the  east,  was  less  uniformly  fertile;  but  still  it  con- 
tained a  considerable  proportion  of  good  land  along  the  course 
of  the  Oxus  and  its  tributaries,  which  was  cultivated  in  vine- 
yards and  cornfields,  or  else  pastured  large  herds  of  cattle. "  The 
Mardian  mountain  territory  was  well  wooded ;"  and  the  plain 
between  the  mountains  and  the  Caspian  was  rich  in  the  ex- 
treme/^ Media,  where  it  adjoined  on  the  desert,  was  compar- 
atively sterile ;  but  still  even  here  an  elaborate  system  of  arti- 
ficial irrigation  brought  a  belt  of  land  under  culture."  Further 
'west,  in  the  Zagros  chain.  Media  comprised  some  excellent 
pasture  lands,  ^'  together  with  numerous  valleys  as  productive 
as  any  in  Asia.***  Elymais  was,  in  part,  of  the  same  character 
with  the  mountainous  portion  of  Media,  while  beyond  the 
mountain  it  sank  down  into  a  rich  alluvium,  not  much  inferior 
to  the  Babylonian."''  Babylonia  itself  was  confessedly  the 
most  fertile  country  in  Asia.  It  produced  wheat,  barley,  mil- 
let, sesame,  vetches,  dates,  and  fruits  of  all  kinds.  ^°  The  re- 
turn of  the  wheat  crop  was  from  fifty  to  a  hundred-and-fifty- 
fold;^'  while  that  of  the  barley  crop  was  three  hundred-fold.'^^ 
The  dates  were  of  unusual  size  and  superior  flavor;"  and  the 
palm,  which  abounded  throughout  the  region,  furnished  an 
inexhaustible  supply  both  of  fruit  and  timber.  ^* 

The  great  increase  of  power  which  Mithridates  had  obtained 
by  his  conquests  could  not  be  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the 
Syrian  monarchs.  Their  domestic  troubles — the  contentions 
between  Philip  and  Lysias,  between  Lysias  and  Demetrius 
Soter,  Soter  and  Alexander  Balas,  Balas  and  Demetrius  II., 
Demetrius  II.  and  Tryphon,  had  so  engrossed  them  for  the 
space  of  twenty  years  (from  B.C.  162  to  B.C.  142)  that  they  had 
felt  it  impossible,  or  hopeless,  to  attempt  any  expedition  to- 
wards the  East,  for  the  protection  or  recovery  of  their  prov- 
inces. Mithridates  had  been  allowed  to  pursue  his  career  of 
conquest  unopposed,  so  far  as  the  Syrians  were  concerned, 
and  to  establish  his  sway  from  the  Hindoo  Eoosh  to  the  Eu- 
])lirates.  But  a  time  at  last  came  when  home  dangers  were 
less  pressing,  and  a  prospect  of  engaging  the  terrible  Parthians 
with  success  seemed  to  present  itself.  The  second  Demetrius 
had  not,  indeed,  wholly  overcome  his  domestic  enemy,  Try- 
phon; but  he  had  so  far  brought  him  into  difficulties  as  to 
believe  that  he  might  safely  be  left  to  be  dealt  with  by  his 
wife,  Cleopatra,  and  by  his  captains. "  At  the  same  time  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  East  seemed  to  invite  his  interfer- 
ence.   Mithridates  ruled  his  new  conquests  with  some  strict- 


46  THE  SIXTH  MOKAItCIIY.  '  [ch.  y. 

ness,^"  suspecting,  probably,  their  fidelity,  and  detei-mined 
that  he  would  not  by  any  remissness  allow  them,  to  escape 
from  his  grasp.  Tiie  native  inhabitants  could  scarcely  be 
much  attached  to  the  Syro-Macedonians,  who  had  certainly 
not  treated  them  very  tenderly;"  but  a  possession  of  170  years' 
duration  confers  prestige  in  the  East,  and  a  strange  yoke  may 
have  galled  more  than  one  to  whose  pressure  they  had  become 
accustomed.  Moreover,  all  the  provinces  which  Parthia  took 
from  Syria  contained  Greek  towns,  and  the^T  inhabitants 
might  at  all  times  be  depended  on  to  side  with  thoir  country- 
men against  the  Asiatics.  At  the  present  con ji  .ncture,  too, 
the  number  of  the  malcontents  was  swelled  by  the  addition  of 
the  recently  subdued  Bactrians,  who  hated  the  Parthian  yoke, 
and  longed  earnestly  for  a  chance  of  recovering  their  freedom. 
Thus  when  Demetrius  II.,  anxious  to  escape  the  reproach  of 
inertness,  ^^  determined  to  make  an  expedition  against  the 
great  Parthian  monarch,  he  found  himself  welcomed  as  a  de- 
liverer by  a  considerable  number  of  his  enemy's  subjects, 
whom  the  harshness,  or  the  novelty,  of  the  Parthian  rule  had 
offended.^'  The  malcontents  joined  his  standard  as  he  ad- 
vanced ;  and  supported,  as  he  thus  was,  by  Persian,  Elymaen, 
and  Bactrian  contingents,  he  engaged  and  defeated  the  Par- 
thians  in  several  battles.^"  Upon  this,  Mithridates,  finding 
himself  inferior  in  strength,  had  recourse  to  stratagem,  and 
having  put  Demetrius  off  his  guard  by  proposals  of  peace," 
attacked  him,  defeated  him,  and  took  him  prisoner.*^  The  in- 
vading army  appears  to  have  been  destroyed.  "'^  The  captive 
monarch  was,  in  the  first  instance,  conveyed  about  to  the  sev- 
eral nations  which  had  revolted,  and  paraded  before  each  in 
turn,  as  a  proof  to  them  of  their  folly  in  lending  him  aid, "  but 
afterwards  he  was  treated  in  a  manner  befitting  his  rank  and 
the  high  character  of  his  captor.  "^^  Assigned  a  residence  in 
Hyrcania,  he  was  maintained  in  princely  state,  and  was  even 
promised  by  Mithridates  the  hand  of  his  daughter,  Ehodo- 
gun6/'  The  Parthian  monarch,  it  is  probable,  had  the  design 
of  conquering  Syria,  and  thought  it  possible  that  he  might 
find  it  of  advantage  to  have  a  Syrian  prince  in  his  camp,  well 
disposed  towards  him,  connected  by  marriage,  and  thus  fitted 
for  the  position  of  tributary  monarch.  But  the  schemes  of 
Mithridates  proved  abortive.  His  career  had  now  reached  its 
close.  Attacked  by  illness"  not  very  long  after  his  capture  of 
Demetrius,  his  strength  proved  insufficient  to  bear  up  against 
the  malady,  and  be  died  after  a  glorious  reign  of  about  thirty 
eight  years,  B.C.  13(>» 


CH.  VI.J    PARTEIAN  SYSTEM  OF  GOVERNMENT.  47 


CHAPTER  VI. 

System  of  government  established  by  Mithridates  I.  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Parthians.  Government  of  the  Provinces. 
Laws  and  Institutions.     Character  of  Mithridates  I. 

"  Rex,  magno  et  regio_animo."— Justin,  xxxviii.  9,  §  3. 

The  Parthian  institutions  possessed  great  simplicity ;  and  it 
is  probable  that  they  took  a  shape  in  the  reign  of  Arsaces  I.,  or, 
at  any  rate,  of  Tiridates,  which  was  not  greatly  altered  after- 
wards. Permanency  is  the  law  of  Oriental  governments ;  and 
in  a  monarchy  which  lasted  less  than  five  hundred  years,  it  is 
not  hkely  that  many  changes  occurred.  The  Parthian  institu- 
tions are  referred  to  Mithridates  I.,  rather  than  to  Tiridates, 
because  in  the  reign  of  Mithridates  Parthia  entered  upon  a  new 
phase  of  her  existence — became  an  empire  instead  of  a  mere 
monarchy ;  and  the  sovereign  of  the  time  covdd  not  but  have 
reviewed  the  circumstances  of  his  State,  and  have  determined 
either  to  adopt  the  previous  institutions  of  his  country,  or  to 
reject  them.  Mitlu-idates  I.  had  attained  a  position  which  en- 
titled and  enabled  him  to  settle  the  Parthian  constitution  as  he 
thought  best;  and,  if  he  maintained  an  earlier  arrangement, 
which  is  uncertain,  he  must  have  done  so  of  his  own  free  will, 
simply  because  he  preferred  the  existing  Partliian  institutions 
to  any  other.  Thus  the  institutions  may  be  regarded  as  start- 
ing from  him,  since  he  approved  them,  and  made  them  those 
of  the  Parthian  EMPIRE. 

Like  most  sovereignties  which  have  arisen  out  of  an  associa- 
tion of  chiefs  banding  themselves  together  for  warlike  purposes 
under  a  single  head,  the  Parthian  monarchy  was  limited. 
The  king  was  permanently  advised  by  two  councils,  consisting 
of  persons  not  of  his  own  nomination,  whom  rights,  conferred 
by  birth  or  office,  entitled  to  their  seats.  One  of  these  was  a 
family  conclave  (concilium  domesticum),  or  assembly  of  the 
full-grown  males  of  the  Royal  House ;  the  other  was  a  Senate 
comprising  both  the  spiritual  and  the  temporal  chiefs  of  the 
nation,  the  Sophi,  or  "  Wise  Men,"  and  the  Magi,  or  "Priests."  ' 
Together  these  two   bodies   constituted  the  Megistanes,   the 


48  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vi. 

"  Nobles"  or  ;"  Great  Men"— the  privileged  class  which  to  a 
considerable  extent  checked  and  controlled  the  monarch.  The 
monarchy  was  elective,  but  only  in  the  house  of  the  Arsacid^ ; 
and  the  concurrent  vote  of  both  councils  was  necessary  in  the 
appointment  of  a  new  king.  Practically,  the  ordinary  law  of 
hereditary  descent  appears  to  have  been  followed,  unless  in  the 
case  where  a  king  left  no  son  of  sufficient  age  to  exercise  the 
royal  office.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  Megistanes 
usually  nominated  the  late  king's  next  brother  to  succeed  him,'' 
or,  if  he  had  left  behind  him  no  brother,  went  back  to  an 
uncle.  ^  When  the  line  of  succession  had  once  been  changed,  the 
right  of  the  elder  branch  was  lost,  and  did  not  revive  unless 
the  branch  preferred  died  out  or  possessed  no  member  qualified 
to  rule.  When  a  king  had  been  duly  nominated  by  the  two 
councils,  the  right  of  placing  the  diadem  upon  his  head  be- 
longed to  the  Surena,^  the  "  Field-Marshal,"  or  "Commander 
in  Chief  of  the  Parthian  armies."  The  Megistanes  further 
claimed  and  sometimes  exercised  the  right  of  deposing  a  mon- 
arch whose  conduct  displeased  them ;  but  an  attempt  to  exer- 
cise this  privilege  was  sure  to  be  followed  by  a  civil  war,  no 
monarch  accepting  his  deposition  without  a  struggle;  and 
force,  not  right,  practically  determining  whether  he  should 
remain  king  or  no. 

After  a  king  was  once  elected  and  firmly  fixed  upon  the 
throne,  his  power  appears  to  have  been  nearly  despotic.  At  any 
rate  he  could  put  to  death  without  trial  whomsoever  he  chose ; 
and  adult  members  of  the  Eoyal  House,  who  provoked  the 
reigning  monarch's  jealousy,  were  constantly  so  treated.* 
Probably  it  would  have  been  more  dangerous  to  arouse  the 
fears  of  the  "Sophi"  and  "Magi."  The  latter  especially  were 
a  powerful  body,  consisting  of  an  organized  hierarchy,  which 
had  come  down  from  ancient  times,  and  was  feared  and  vene- 
rated by  aU  classes  of  the  people.  *  Their  numbers  at  the  close 
of  the  Empire,  counting  adult  males  only,  are  reckoned  at 
eighty  thousand ;'  they  possessed  considerable  tracts  of  fertile 
land,*  and  were  the  sole  inhabitants  of  many  large  towns  or 
villages,  which  they  were  permitted  to  govern  as  they  pleased. '' 
The  arbitrary  power  of  the  monarchs  must,  in  practice,  have 
been  largely  checked  by  the  privileges  of  this  numerous  priestly 
caste,  of  which  it  would  seem  that  in  later  times  they  became 
jealous,  thereby  preparing  the  way  for  their  own  downfall." 

The  dominion  of  the  Parthians  over  the  conquered  provinces 
was  maintained  by  reverting  to  the  system  which  had  pre- 


en.  VI.]  THE  GREEK  TOWNS.  49 

vailed  generally  through  the  East  before  the  accession  of  the  Per- 
sians to  power,  and  establishing  in  the  various  countries  either 
viceroys,  holding  oflQce  for  life,  or  sometimes  dependent  dy- 
nasties of  kings."  In  either  case,  the  rulers,  so  long  as  they 
paid  tribute  regularly  to  the  Parthian  monarchs  and  aided 
thenx  in  their  wars,  were  allowed  to  govern  the  people  beneath 
their  sway  at  their  pleasure.  Among  monarchs,  in  the  higher 
sense  of  the  term,  maybe  enumerated  the  kings  of  Persia,'^ 
Elymais,'^  Adiabene, '*  Osrhoene,'^  and  of  Armenia  and  Media 
Atropatene,  when  they  formed,  as  they  sometimes  did,  por- 
tions of  the  Parthian  Empire.  The  viceroys,  who  governed 
the  other  provinces,  bore  the  title  of  VitaxcB  (/?i^raK£5),  and 
were  fourteen  or  fifteen  in  number.'^  The  remark  has  been 
made  by  the  historian  Gibbon"  that  the  system  thus  estab- 
lished "exhibited  under  other  names  a  lively  image  of  the 
feudal  system  which  has  since  prevailed  in  Europe."  The 
comparison  is  of  some  value,  but,  like  most  historical  parallels, 
it  is  inexact,  the  points  of  difference  between  the  Parthian  and 
the  fsudal  system  being  probably  more  numerous  than  those 
of  resemblance,  but  the  points  of  resemblance  being  very  main 
points,  not  fewer  in  number,  and  striking. 

It  was  with  special  reference  to  the  system  thus  established 
that  the  Parthian  monarchs  took  the  title  of  "  King  of  Kings  " 
{fiadiXEvi  /SadiXsGov),  SO  frequent  upon  their  coins,'*  which 
seems  sometimes  to  have  been  exchanged  for  what  was 
regarded  as  an  equivalent  phrase,'*  "Satrap  of  Satraps" 
{darpaTtrji  r^v  darpaTtoov).  This  title  seems  to  appear  first  on 
the  coins  of  Mithridates  I. 

In  the  Parthian  system  there  was  one  anomaly  of  a  very 
curious  character.  The  Greek  towns,  which  were  scattered 
in  large  numbers  throughout  the  Empire,""  enjoyed  a  munici- 
pal government  of  their  own,  and  in  some  cases  were  almost 
independent  communities,  the  Parthian  kings  exercising  over 
them  little  or  no  control.  The  great  city  of  Seleucia  on  the 
Tigris  was  the  most  important  of  all  these :  its  population  was 
estimated  in  the  first  century  after  Christ  at  six  hundred 
thousand  souls ;^'  it  had  strong  walls,"  and  was  surrounded 
by  a  most  fertile  territory."  It  had  its  own  senate,  or  mimi- 
cipal  council,  of  three  hundred  members,  elected  by  the  people 
to  nile  them  from  among  the  wealthiest  and  best  educated  of 
the  citizens."*  Under  ordinary  circumstances  it  enjoyed  the 
blessing  of  complete  self-government,  and  was  entirely  free 
from  Parthian  interference,  paying  no  doubt  its  tribute,  but 


50  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vi. 

otherwise  holding  the  position  of  a  "free  city."  It  was  only 
in  the  case  of  internal  dissensions  that  these  advantages  were 
lost,  and  the  Parthian  soldiery,  invited  within  the  walls,  ar- 
ranged the  quarrels  of  parties,  and  settled  the  constitution  of 
the  State  at  its  pleasure.  Privileges  of  a  similar  character, 
though,  probably,  less  extensive,  belonged  (it  would  seem)  to 
most  of  the  other  Greek  cities  of  the  Empire.  The  Parthian 
monarchs  thought  it  polite  to  favor  them ;  and  their  practice 
justified  the  title  of  "Phil-Hellene,"  which  they  were  fond  of 
assuming  upon  their  coins.  On  the  whole,  the  policy  may 
have  been  wise,  but  it  diminished  the  unity  of  the  Empire ; 
and  there  were  times  when  serious  danger  arose  from  it.  The 
Syro-Macedonian  monarchs  could  always  count  with  certainty 
on  having  powerful  friends  in  Parthia,  whatever  portion  of  it 
they  invaded ;  and  even  the  Romans,  though  their  ethnic  con- 
nection with  the  cities  was  not  so  close,  were  sometimes 
indebted  to  them  for  very  important  assistance." 

We  are  told  that  Mithridates  I. ,  after  effecting  his  conquests, 
made  a  collection  of  the  best  laws  which  he  found  to  prevail 
among  the  various  subject  peoples,  and  imposed  them  upon 
the  Parthian  nation.'^''  This  statement  is,  no  doubt,  an  exag- 
geration; but  we  may  attribute,  with  some  reason,  to  Mith- 
ridates the  introduction  at  this  time  of  various  practices  and 
usages,  whereby  the  Parthian  Court  was  assimilated  to  those 
of  the  earlier  Great  Monarchies  of  Asia,  and  became  in  the 
eyes  of  foreigners  the  successor  and  representative  of  the  old 
Assyrian  and  Persian  Kingdoms.  The  assumption  of  new- 
titles  and  of  a  new  state — the  organization  of  the  Court  on  a 
new  plan — the  bestowal  of  a  new  character  on  the  subordinate 
officers  of  the  Empire,  were  suitable  to  the  new  phase  of  its 
life  on  which  the  monarchy  had  now  entered,  and  may  with 
the  highest  probability,  if  not  with  absolute  certainty,  be  as- 
signed to  this  x)eriod. 

It  has  been  already  noticed  that  Mithridates  appears  to  have 
been  the  first  Parthian  sovereign  who  took  the  title  of  ' '  King 
of  Kings.""  The  title  had  been  a  favorite  one  with  the  old 
Assyrian  and  Persian  monarchs,^*  but  was  not  adopted  either 
by  the  Seleucidae  or  by  the  Greek  kings  of  Bactria."  Its  re- 
vival implied  a  distinct  pretension  to  that  mastery  of  Western 
Asia  which  had  belonged  of  old  to  the  Assyrians  and  Persians, 
and  which  was,  in  later  times,  formally  claimed  by  Arta- 
xerxes,'"  the  son  of  Sassan,  the  founder  of  the  New  Persian 
Kingdom.     Previous  Parthian  monarchy  had  been  content  to 


CH.  VI.]  TITLES  AND  STATE  OF  THE  KINO.  51 

call  themselves  "the  King,"  or  "the  Great  King  " — Mithridates 
is  "the  King  of  Kings,  the  great  and  illustrious  Arsaces." 

At  the  same  time  Mithridates  appears  to  have  assumed  the 
tiara,  or  tall  stiff  crown,  which,  with  certain  modifications 
in  its  shape,  had  been  the  mark  of  sovereignty,  both  under  the 
Assyrians  and  under  the  Persians.  Previously  the  royal  head- 
dress had  been  either  a  mere  cap  of  a  Scythic  type,  but  lower 
than  the  Scyths  commonly  wore  it ;"  or  the  ordinary  diadem, 
which  was  a  band  round  the  head  terminating  in  two  long 
ribbons  or  ends,  that  hung  down  behind  the  head  on  the  back. 
According  to  Herodian,  the  diadem,  in  the  later  times,  was 
double;'-  but  the  coins  of  Parthia  do  not  exhibit  this  pecu- 
liarity.    [PI.  1,  Fig.  4.  J 

Ammianus  says"  that  among  the  titles  assumed  by  the 
Parthian  monarchs  was  that  of  "Brother  of  the  Sun  and 
Moon."  It  appears  that  something  of  a  divine  character  was 
regarded  as  attaching  to  the  race.  In  the  civil  contentions, 
which  occur  so  frequently  throughout  the  later  history,  com- 
batants abstained  from  lifting  their  hands  knowingly  against 
an  Arsacid,  to  kill  or  wound  one  being  looked  upon  as  sacri- 
lege." The  name  of  0£oS  was  occasionally  assumed,  as  it  Avas 
in  Syria;  and  more  frequently  kings  took  the  epithet  of 
OEOTtdrcjp,  which  implied  the  divinity  of  their  father."*  After 
his  death  a  monarch  seems  generally  to  have  been  the  object 
of  a  qualified  worship;  statues  were  erected  to  him  in  the 
temples,  where  (apparently)  they  were  associated  with  the 
images  of  the  great  luminaries.  ^^ 

Of  the  Parthian  Court  and  its  customs  we  have  no  account 
that  is  either  complete  or  trustworthy.  Some  particulars, 
however,  may  be  gathered  of  it  on  which  we  may  place  re- 
hance.  The  best  authorities  are  agreed  that  it  was  not  station- 
ary, but  migrated  at  different  times  of  the  year  to  different 
cities  of  the  Empire,  in  this  resembling  the  Court  of  the 
Achaemonians.  It  is  not  quite  clear,  however,  which  were  the 
cities  thus  honored.  Ctesiphon  was  undoubtedly  one  of  them. 
All  writers  agree  that  it  was  the  chief  city  of  the  Empire,  and 
the  ordinary  seat  of  the  government."  Here,  according  to 
Strabo,  the  kings  passed  the  winter  months,  delighting  in  the 
excellence  of  tho  air.'"  The  town  was  situated  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tigris,  opposite  to  Seleucia,  twelve  or  thirteen  miles 
below  the  modern  Baghdad.  Pliny  says"  that  it  was  built  by 
the  Parthians  in  order  to  reduce  Seleucia  to  insignificance,  and 
that  AvheD   it  failed  of  its  purpose  they  built  another  city. 


52  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  vi 

Vologesocerta,  in  the  same  neighborhood  with  the  same  ob- 
ject; but  the  account  of  Strabo  is  more  probable — viz.,  that  it 
grew  up  gradually  out  of  the  wish  of  the  Parthian  kings  to 
spare  Seleucia  the  unpleasantness  of  having  the  rude  soldiery, 
which  followed  the  Court  from  place  to  place,  quartered  upon 
them.  *"  The  remainder  of  the  year,  Strabo  tells  us,  was  spent 
by  the  Parthian  kings  either  at  the  Median  city  of  Ecbatana, 
which  is  the  modern  Hamadan,  or  in  the  province  of  Hyrca- 
nia."  In  Hyrcania,  the  palace,  according  to  him,  was  at 
Tap6  ■*'  and  between  this  place  and  Ecbatana  he  no  doubt  re- 
garded the  monarchs  as  spending  the  time  which  was  not 
passed  at  Ctesiphon.  Athenseus,  however,  declares  that  Phages 
was  the  spring  residence  of  the  Parthian  kings ;"  and  it  seems 
not  unhkely  that  this  famous  city,  which  Isidore,  writing  in 
Parthian  times,  calls  "  the  greatest  in  Media,"**  was  among  the 
occasional  residences  of  the  Court.  Parthia  itself  was,  it 
would  seem,  deserted;"  but  still  a  city  of  that  region  preserved 
in  one  respect  a  royal  character,  being  the  place  where  all  the 
earlier  kings  were  interred.*" 

The  pomp  and  grandeur  of  the  Parthian  monarchs  are  de- 
scribed only  in  the  vaguest  terms  by  the  classical  writers. 
No  author  of  repute  appears  to  have  visited  the  Parthian 
Court.  We  may  perhaps  best  obtain  a  true  notion  of  the 
splendor  of  the  sovereign  from  the  accounts  which  have 
reached  us  of  his  relations  and  officers,  who  can  have  reflected 
only  faintly  the  magnificence  of  the  sovereign.  Plutarch  tells 
us  that  the  general  whom  Orodes  deputed  to  conduct  the  war 
against  Crassus  came  into  the  field  accompanied  by  two 
hundred  litters  wherein  were  contained  his  concubines,  and  by 
a  thousand  camels  which  carried  his  baggage.*'  His  dress  was 
fashioned  after  that  of  the  Medes ;  he  wore  his  hair  parted  in 
the  middle  and  had  his  face  painted  with  cosmetics.*"  A  body 
of  ten  thousand  horse,  composed  entirely  of  his  clients  and 
slaves,  followed  him  in  battle.*"  We  may  conclude  from  this 
picture,  and  from  the  general  tenor  of  the  classical  notices, 
that  the  Arsacidae  revived  and  maintained  very  much  such  a 
Court  as  that  of  the  old  Achaemenian  princes,  falling  probably 
somewhat  below  their  model  in  politeness  and  refinement,  but 
equalling  it  in  luxury,  in  extravagant  expenditure,  and  in 
display. 

Such  seems  to  have  been  the  general  character  of  those 
practices  and  institutions  whicli  distinguish  the  Parthians 
from  the  foundation  of  their  Empire  by  Mithridates.    Some  of 


CH.  vii.]  BEIGN  OF  PHRAATES  II.  53 

them,  it  is  probable,  he  rather  adopted  than  invented;  but 
there  is  no  good  reason  for  doubting  that  of  many  he  was  the 
originator.  He  appears  to  have  been  one  of  those  rare  indi- 
viduals to  whom  it  has  been  given  to  unite  the  powers  which 
form  the  conqueror  with  those  which  constitute  the  suc- 
cessful organizer  of  a  State.  Brave  and  enterprising  in  war, 
prompt  to  seize  an  occasion  and  to  turn  it  to  the  best  advan- 
tage, not  even  averse  to  severities  where  they  seemed  to  be 
required,  he  yet  felt  no  acrimony  towards  those  who  had 
resisted  his  arms,  but  was  ready  to  befriend  them  so  soon  as 
their  resistance  ceased.  Mild,  clement,  philanthropic,^"  he 
conciliated  those  whom  he  subdued  almost  more  easily  than 
he  subdued  them,  and  by  the  efforts  of  a  few  yeare  succeeded 
in  welding  together  a  dominion  which  lasted  without  suffer- 
ing serious  mutilation  for  nearly  four  centuries.  Though  not 
dignified  with  the  epithet  of  "Great,"  he  was  beyond  all 
question  the  greatest  of  the  Parthian  monarchs.  Later  times 
did  him  more  justice  than  his  contemporaries,  and,  when  the 
names  of  almost  all  the  other  kings  had  sunk  into  oblivion, 
retained  his  in  honor,  and  placed  it  on  a  par  with  that  of  the 
original  founder  of  Parthian  independence.^' 


CHAPTER  VII. 


Reign  of  Phraates  II.  Expedition  of  Antiochus  Sidetes  against 
Parthia.  Release  of  Demetrius.  Defeat  and  Death  of 
Sidetes.  War  of  Phraates  ivith  the  Northern  Nomads. 
His  death  and  character. 

"  Post  necem  Mithridates,  Part  honim  regis,  Phrahates  Alius  ejus 
rex  constituitur."— Justin,  xlii.  1,  §  1. 

Mithridates  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Phraates,  the  second 
monarch  of  the  name,  and  the  seventh  Arsaces.  This  prince, 
entertaining,  like  his  father,  the  design  of  invading  Syria,  and 
expecting  to  find  some  advantage  from  having  in  his  camp 
the  rightful  occupant  of  the  Syrian  throne, '  treated  the  captive 
Demetrius  with  even  greater  kindness  than  his  father  had 
done,  not  only  maintaining  him  handsomely,  but  even  giving 
him  his  sister  Rhodogune,  in  marriage.'  Demetrius,  however, 
was  not  to  be  reconciled  to  his  captivity  by  any  such  blandish- 


54  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  Vlt 

ments,  and  employed  his  thoughts  chiefly  in  devising  plans  by 
which  he  might  escape.  By  the  help  of  a  friend  he  twice 
managed  to  evade  the  vigilance  of  his  guards,  and  to  make  his 
way  from  Hyrcania  towards  the  frontiers  of  his  own  kingdom ; 
but  each  time  he  was  pursued  and  caught  without  effecting 
his  purpose.^  The  Parthian  monarch  was  no  doubt  vexed  at 
Ms  pertinacity,  and  on  the  second  occasion  thought  it  prudent 
to  feign,  if  he  did  not  even  really  feel,  offence :  he  banished  his 
ungrateful  brother-in-law  from  his  presence,^  but  otherwise 
visited  his  crime  with  no  severer  penalty  than  ridicule.  Choos- 
ing to  see  in  his  attempts  to  change  the  place  of  his  abode  no 
serious  design,  but  only  the  wayward  conduct  of  a  child,  he 
sent  him  a  present  of  some  golden  dice,  implying  thereby  that 
it  was  only  for  lack  of  amusement  he  had  grown  discontented 
with  his  Hyrcanian  residence.  ^ 

Antiochus  Sidetes,  the  brother  of  Demetrius,  had  been  gen- 
erally accepted  by  the  Syrians  as  their  monarch,  at  the  time 
when  the  news  reached  them  of  that  prince's  defeat  and  cap- 
ture by  Mithridates.  He  was  an  active  and  enterprising  sov- 
ereign, though  fond  of  luxury  and  display.  For  some  years 
(B.C.  140-137)  the  pretensions  of  Tryphon  to  the  throne  gave 
him  full  occupation;^  but,  having  finally  established  his  au- 
thority after  a  short  war,  and  punished  the  pretender  with 
death,  he  found  himself,  in  B.C.  137,  at  Uberty  to  turn  his 
arms  against  foreign  enemies.  He  would  probably  have  at 
once  attacked  Parthia,  but  for  the  attitude  of  a  nearer  neigh- 
bor, which  he  regarded  as  menacing,  and  as  requiring  his  im- 
mediate attention.  Demetrius,  before  his  departure  for  the 
East,  had  rewarded  the  Jews  for  services  rendered  him  in  his 
war  with  Tryphon  by  an  open  acknowledgment  of  their  inde- 
pendence.' Sidetes,  though  indebted  to  the  Jewish  High  Priest, 
Simon,  for  offers  of  aid  against  the  same  adversary,*  could  not 
bring  himself  to  pay  the  price  for  it  which  Demetrius  had 
thought  reasonable— an  independent  Palestine  appeared  to  him 
a  danger  close  to  his  doors,  and  one  that  imperilled  the  very 
existence  of  the  Syrian  State.  Accordingly,  he  had  no  sooner 
put  down  Tryphon  than  he  resolved  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  the 
Jews,  and  to  force  them  to  resume  their  old  position  of  vassal- 
age to  Syria."  His  general,  Cendebaeus,  invaded  their  country, 
but  was  defeated  near  Azotus. '"  Antiochus  had  to  take  the 
field  in  person."  During  two  years,  John  Hyrcanus,  who  had 
succeeded  his  father,  Simon  (b.c.  135),  baffled  all  his  efforts; 
but  at  last,  in  b,c.  133,  he  was  forced  to  submit,  to  acknowli 


CH.  vn.]      HIS  WAR  WITH  ANTIOCHUS  SlDETES.  55' 

edge  the  authority  of  Syria,  to  dismantle  Jerusalem,  and  to 
resume  the  payment  of  tribute.  Sidetes  then  considered  the 
time  come  for  a  Parthian  expedition,  and,  having  made  great 
preparations,  he  set  out  for  the  East  in  the  spring  of  B.C.  129. 

It  is  impossible  to  accept  without  considerable  reserve  the 
accounts  that  have  come  down  to  us  of  the  force  which  Antio- 
chus  collected.  According  to  Justin,  '^  it  consisted  of  no  more 
than  80,000  fighting  men,  to  which  was  attached  the  incredible 
number  of  300,000  camp-followers,  the  majority  being  com- 
posed of  cooks,  bakers,  and  actors.  As  in  other  extreme  cases 
the  camp-followers  do  but  equal  or  a  little  exceed  the  number 
of  men  fit  for  service, "  this  estimate,  which  makes  them  nearly 
four  times  as  munerous,  is  entitled  to  but  little  credit.  The 
late  writer,  Orosius,'*  corrects  the  error  here  indicated;  but 
his  account  seems  to  err  in  rating  the  supernumeraries  too  low. 
According  to  him.  the  armed  force  amounted  to  300,000,  while 
the  camp-followers,  including  grooms,  sutlers,  courtesans,  and 
actors,  were  no  more  than  a  third  of  the  number.  From  the 
two  accounts,  taken  together,  we  are  perhaps  entitled  to  con- 
clude that  the  entire  host  did  not  fall  much  short  of  400,000 
men.  This  estimate  receives  confirmation  from  an  independent 
statement  made  by  Diodorus,  with  respect  to  the  number  who 
fell  in  the  campaign — a  statement  of  which  we  shall  have  to 
speak  later. '^ 

The  army  of  Phraates,  according  to  two  accounts  of  it" 
(which,  however,  seem  to  represent  a  single  original  authority), 
numbered  no  more  than  120,000.  An  attempt  which  he  made 
to  enlist  in  his  service  a  body  of  Scythian  mercenaries  failed, 
the  Scyths  being  willing  to  lend  their  aid,  but  arriving  too  late 
to  be  of  any  use. ''  At  the  same  time  a  defection  of  the  subject 
princes'*  deprived  the  Parthian  monarch  of  contingents  which 
usually  swelled  his  numbers,  and  threw  him  upon  the  support 
of  his  own  countrymen,  chiefly  or  solely.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  is  more  surprising  that  he  was  able  to  collect 
120,000  men  than  that  he  did  not  bring  into  the  field  a  larger 
number. 

The  Syrian  troops,  magnificently  appointed'*  and  supported 
by  a  body  of  Jews  under  John  Hyrcanus,^"  advanced  upon 
Babylon,  receiving  on  their  way  the  adhesion  of  many  of  the 
Parthian  tributaries,  who  professed  themselves  disgusted  by 
the  arrogance  and  pride  of  their  masters.^'  Phraates,  on  his 
part,  advanced  to  meet  his  enemies,  and  in  person  or  by  his 
generals  engaged  Antiochus  in  three  battles,  but  without  sue- 


56  THW  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  l.ctt.  rit , 

cess.  Antiochus  was  three  times  a  conqueror.  In  a  battle 
fought  upon  the  river  Lycus  (Zab)  in  further  Assyria  he  de- 
feated the  Parthian  general,  Indates,  and  raised  a  trophy  in 
honor  of  his  victory.  ■''^  The  exact  scene  of  the  other  com- 
bats is  unknown,  but  they  were  probably  in  the  same  neigh- 
borhood. The  result  of  them  was  the  conquest  of  Babylonia, 
and  the  general  revolt  of  the  remaining  Parthian  provinces," 
which  followed  the  common  practice  of  deserting  a  falling 
house,  and  drew  off  or  declared  for  the  enemy. 

Under  these  circumstances  Phraates,  considering  that  the 
time  was  come  when  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  submit  or  to 
create  a  diversion  by  raising  troubles  in  the  enemy's  territory, 
released  Demetrius  from  his  confinement,  and  sent  him,  sup- 
ported by  a  body  of  Parthian  troops,  to  reclaim  his  kingdom.  "* 
He  thought  it  probable  that  Antiochus,  when  the  intelhgence 
reached  him,  would  retrace  his  steps,  and  return  from  Babylon 
to  his  own  capital.  At  any  rate  his  efforts  would  be  distracted ; 
he  would  be  able  to  draw  fewer  reinforcements  from  home ;  and 
he  would  be  less  inclined  to  proceed  to  any  great  distance  from 
his  own  country. 

Antiochus,  however,  was  either  uninformed  of  the  impend- 
ing danger  or  did  not  regard  it  as  very  pressing.  The  winter 
was  approaching ;  and,  instead  of  withdrawing  his  troops  from 
the  occupied  provinces  and  marching  them  back  into  Syria, 
he  resolved  to  keep  them  where  they  were,  merely  dividing 
them,  on  account  of  their  numbers,  among  the  various  cities 
which  he  had  taken,  and  making  them  go  into  winter  quar- 
ters." It  was,  no  doubt,  his  intention  to  remain  quiet  during 
the  two  or  three  winter  months,  after  which  he  would  have 
resumed  the  war,  and  have  endeavored  to  penetrate  through 
Media  into  Parthia  Proper,  where  he  might  expect  his  adver- 
sary to  make  his  last  stand. 

But  Phraates  saw  that  the  position  of  affairs  was  favorable 
for  striking  a  blow  before  the  spring  came.  The  dispersion  of 
his  enemy's  troops  deprived  him  of  all  advantage  from  the 
superiority  of  their  numbers.  The  circumstance  of  their  being 
quartered  in  towns  newly  reduced,  and  unaccustomed  to  the 
rudeness  and  rapacity  of  soldiers  and  camp-followers,  made  it 
almost  certain  that  complications  woxild  arise,  and  that  it 
would  not  be  long  before  in  some  places  the  Parthians,  so  late- 
ly declared  to  be  oppressors,  would  be  hailed  as  liberators. 
Moreover,  the  Parthians  wei'e,  probably,  better  able  than  their 
adversaries  to  endure  the  hardships  and  severities  of  a  cam- 


CH.  vn.i         ATTEMPT  AT  NEGOTIATION  FAILS.  tl 

paign  in  the  cold  season.""  Parthia  is  a  cold  country,  and  the 
winters,  both  of  the  great  plateau  of  Iran  and  of  all  the  moun- 
tam  tracts  adjoining  it,  are  severe.  The  climate  of  Syria  is  far 
milder.  Moreover,  the  troops  of  Antiochus  had,  we  are  in- 
formed, been  enervated  by  an  excessive  indulgence  on  the  part 
of  their  leader  during  the  marches  and  halts  of  the  preceding 
summer."  Their  appetites  had  been  pampered;  their  habits 
had  become  unmanly;  their  general  tone  was  relaxed;  and 
they  were  likely  to  deteriorate  still  more  in  the  wealthy  and 
luxurious  cities  where  they  were  bidden  to  pass  the  winter. 

These  various  circumstances  raised  the  spirits  of  Phraates, 
and  made  him  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  resume  hostilities 
at  a  moment's  notice.  Nor  was  it  long  befoi-e  the  complications 
which  he  had  foreseen  began  to  occur.  The  insolence  of  the 
soldiers""  quartered  upon  them  exasperated  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Mesopotamian  towns,  and  caused  them  to  look  back  with 
regret  to  the  time  when  they  were  Parthian  subjects.  The 
requisitions  made  on  them  for  stores  of  all  kinds  was  a  further 
grievance."'-'  After  a  while  they  opened  communications  with 
Phraates,  and  offered  to  return  to  their  allegiance  if  he  would 
assist  them  against  their  oppressors.  Phraates  gladly  listened 
to  these  overtures.  At  his  instigation  a  plot  was  formed  like 
that  which  has  given  so  terrible  a  significance  to  the  phrase 
"Sicilian  vespers.''  It  was  agreed  that  on  an  appointed  day  all 
the  cities  should  break  out  in  revolt :  the  natives  should  take 
arms,  rise  against  the  soldiers  quartered  upon  them,  and  kill 
all,  or  as  many  as  possible.  Phraates  promised  to  be  at  hand 
with  his  army,  to  prevent  the  scattered  detachments  from 
giving  help  to  each  other.  It  was  calculated  that  in  this  way 
the  invaders  might  be  cut  off  almost  to  a  man  without  the 
trouble  of  even  fighting  a  battle. 

But,  before  he  proceeded  to  extremities,  the  Parthian  prince 
determined  to  give  his  adversary  a  chance  of  escaping  the  fate 
prepared  for  him  by  timely  concessions.  The  winter  was  not 
over;  but  the  snow  was  beginning  to  melt  through  the  increas- 
ing warmth  of  the  sun's  rays,  '■"'  and  the  day  appointed  for  the 
general  rising  was  probably  drawing  near.  Phraates  felt  that 
no  time  was  to  be  lost.  Accordingly,  he  sent  ambassadors  to 
Antiochus  to  propose  peace,  and  to  inquire  on  what  conditions 
it  would  be  granted  him.  The  reply  of  Antiochus,  according 
to  Diodotus,  was  as  follows:  "If  Phraates  would  release  his 
prisoner,  Demetrius,  from  captivity,  and  deliver  him  up  with- 
out ransom, "  at  the  same  time  restoring   all    the  i)rovinces 


58  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vii. 

which  had  been  taken  from  Syria,  and  consenting  to  pay  a 
tribute  for  Parthia  itself,  peace  might  be  had ;  but  not  other- 
wise." To  such  terms  it  was,  of  course,  impossible  that 
Phraates  should  listen;  and  his  ambassadors,  therefore,  re- 
turned without  further  parley. 

Soon  afterwards  the  day  appointed  for  the  outbreak  arrived. 
Apparently,  no  suspicion  had  been  excited.  The  Syrian  troops 
were  everywhere  quietly  enjoying  themselves  in  their  winter 
quarters,  when,  suddenly  and  without  warning,  they  found 
themselves  attacked  by  the  natives.'^  Taken  at  disadvantage, 
it  was  impossible  for  them  to  make  a  successful  resistance ; 
and  it  would  seem  that  the  great  bulk  of  them  were  massacred 
in  their  quarters.  Antiochus,  and  the  detachment  stationed 
with  him,  alone,  so  far  as  we  hear,  escaped  into  the  open  field 
and  contended  for  their  lives  in  just  warfare."  It  had  been 
the  intention  of  the  Syrian  monarch,  when  he  took  the  field, 
to  hasten  to  the  protection  of  the  troops  quartered  nearest  to 
him ;  but  he  no  sooner  commenced  his  march  than  he  found 
himself  confronted  by  Phraates,  who  was  at  the  head  of  his 
entire  army,  having,  no  doubt,  anticipated  Antiochus's  design 
and  resolved  to  frustrate  it.  The  Parthian  prince  was  anxious 
to  engage  at  once,  as  his  force  far  outnumbered  that  command- 
ed by  his  adversary ;  but  the  latter  might  have  declined  the 
battle,  if  he  had  so  willed,  and  have,  at  any  rate,  greatly  pro- 
tracted the  struggle.  He  had  a  mountain  region— Mount 
Zagros,  probably— within  a  short  distance  of  him,  and  might 
have  fallen  back  upon  it,  so  placing  the  Parthian  horse  at 
great  disadvantage ;  but  he  was  still  at  an  age  when  caution  is 
apt  to  be  considered  cowardice,  and  temerity  to  pass  for  true 
courage.  Despite  the  advice  of  one  of  his  captains,  he  de- 
termined to  accept  the  battle  which  the  enemy  offered,  and 
not  to  fly  before  a  foe  whom  he  had  three  times  defeated.^* 
But  the  determination  of  the  commander  was  ill  seconded  by 
his  army.  Though  Antiochus  fought  strenuously,"  he  was  de- 
feated, since  his  troops  were  without  heart  and  offered  but  a 
poor  resistance. '"  Antiochus  himself  perished,  either  slain  by 
the  enemy  or  by  his  own  hand.''  His  son,  Seleucus,  a  boy  of 
tender  age,'*  and  his  niece,  a  daughter  of  Demetrius,'"  who  had 
accompanied  him  in  his  expedition,  were  captured.  His  troops 
Were  either  cut  to  pieces  or  made  prisoners.  The  entire  num- 
ber of  those  slain  in  the  battle,  and  in  the  previous  massacre, 
was  reckoned  at  300,000.'"' 

Such  was  the  issue  of  this  great  expedition.    It  was  the  last 


tn.  vn.]  PHRAATES  AFTER  HIS  VICTORY.  5^ 

which  any  Seleucid  monarch  conducted  into  these  countries — 
the  final  attempt  made  by  Syria  to  repossess  herself  of  her  lost 
Eastern  provinces.  Henceforth  Parthia  was  no  further 
troubled  by  the  power  that  had  hitherto  been  her  most  dan- 
gerous enemy,  but  was  allowed  to  enjoy  without  molestation 
from  Syria  the  conquests  which  she  had  effected.  Syria,  in 
fact,  had  from  this  time  a  difficulty  in  preserving  her  own  ex- 
istence. The  immediate  result  of  the  destruction  of  Antiochus 
and  his  host  was  the  revolt  of  Judsea,,"  which  henceforth 
maintained  its  independence  uninterruptedly.  The  dominions 
of  the  Seleucidae  were  reduced  to  Cilicia  and  Syria  Proper,^-  or 
the  tract  west  of  the  Euphrates,  between  Amanus  and  Pales- 
tine. Internally,  the  state  was  agitated  by  constant  commo- 
tions from  the  claims  of  various  pretenders  to  the  sovereignty : 
externally,  it  was  kept  in  continual  alarm  by  the  Egyptians, 
Arabians,  or  Eomans.  During  the  sixty  years"  which  elapsed 
between  the  •  return  of  Demetrius  to  his  kingdom  and  the  con- 
version of  Syria  into  a  Roman  province,  she  ceased  wholly  to 
be  formidable  to  her  neighbors.  Her  flourishing  period  was 
gone  by,  and  a  rapid  decline  set  in,  from  which  there  was  no 
recovery.  It  is  surprising  that  the  Romans  did  not  step  in 
earlier  and  terminate  a  rule  which  was  but  a  little  removed 
from  anarchy.  Rome,  however,  had  other  work  on  her  hands ; 
and  the  Syrian  kingdom  continued  to  exist  till  B.C.  65,  though 
in  a  feeble  and  moribund  condition. 

But  Phraates  could  not,  without  prophetic  foresight,  have 
counted  on  such  utter  prostration  following  as  the  result  of  a 
single — albeit  a  terrible— blow.  Accordingly,  we  find  him  still 
exhibiting  a  dread  of  the  Seleucid  power  even  after  his  great 
victory.  He  had  released  Demetrius  too  late  to  obtain  any 
benefit  from  the  hostile  feeling  which  that  prince  probably  en- 
tertained towards  his  brother.  Had  he  not  released  him  too 
soon  for  his  own  safety?  Was  it  not  to  be  feared  that  the  Syr- 
ians might  rally  under  one  who  was  their  natural  leader,  might 
rapidly  recover  their  strength,  and  renew  the  struggle  for  the 
mastery  of  Western  Asia?  The  first  thought  of  the  dissatisfied 
monarch  was  to  hinder  the  execution  of  his  own  project.  De- 
metrius was  on  liis  way  to  Syria,  but  had  not  yet  arrived 
there,  or,  at  any  rate,  his  arrival  had  not  been  as  yet  reported. 
Was  it  not  possible  to  intercept  him?  The  Parthian  king  has- 
tily sent  out  a  body  of  horse,  with  orders  to  pursue  the  Syrian 
prince  at  their  best  speed,  and  endeavor  to  capture  him  before 
he  passed  the  frontier."    If  they  succeeded,  they  were  to  bring 


60  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vil 

him  back  to  their  master,  who  "would  probably  have  then  com- 
mitted his  prisoner  to  close  custody.  The  pursuit,  however, 
failed.  Demetrius  had  anticipated,  or  at  least  feared,  a  change 
of  purpose,  and,  having  prosecvited  his  journey  with  the  great- 
est  diligence,  had  reached  his  own  territory  before  the  emissa' 
ries  of  Phraates  could  overtake  him.^^ 

It  is  uncertain  whether  policy  or  inclination  dictated  the 
step  which  Phraates  soon  afterwards  took  of  allaying  himself 
by  marriage  with  the  Seleucidae.  He  had  formally  given  his 
sister,  Rhodogune,  as  a  wife  to  Demetrius,^"  and  the  marriage 
had  been  fruitful,  Rhodogune  having  borne  Demetrius  several 
children."  The  two  houses  of  the  Seleucidse  and  Arsacidae 
were  thus  already  allied  to  some  extent.  Phraates  resolved  to 
strengthen  the  bond.  The  unmarried  daughter  of  Demetrius 
whom  he  had  captured  after  his  victory  over  Antiochus  took 
his  fancy;  and  he  deterinined  to  make  her  his  wife."^  At  the 
same  time  he  adopted  other  measures  calculated  to  conciliate 
the  Seleucid  prince.  He  treated  his  captive,  Seleucus,  the  son 
of  Antiochus,  with  the  greatest  respect.^"  To  the  corpse  of  An- 
tiochus he  paid  royal  honors;^"  and,  having  placed  it  in  a  silver 
coflSn,  he  transmitted  it  to  the  Syrians  for  sepulture. " 

StUl,  if  we  may  believe  Justin,  ^"  he  entertained  the  design  of 
carrying  his  arms  across  the  Euphrates  and  invading  Syria,  in 
order  to  avenge  the  attack  of  Antiochus  upon  his  territories. 
But  events  occurred  which  forced  him  to  relinquish  this  enter- 
prise. The  Scythians,  whom  he  had  called  to  his  aid  under  the 
pressure  of  the  Syrian  invasion,  and  who  had  arrived  too  late 
to  take  part  in  the  war,  demanded  the  pay  which  they  had  been 
promised,  and  suggested  that  their  arms  should  be  employed 
against  some  other  enemy. "  Phraates  was  unwilling  either  to 
requite  services  not  rendered,  or  to  rush  needlessly  into  a  fresh 
war  merely  to  gratify  the  avarice  of  his  auxiharies.  He 
therefore  peremptorily  refused  to  comply  with  either  sugges- 
tion. Upon  this,  the  Scythians  determined  to  take  their  pay- 
ment into  their  own  hands,  and  began  to  ravage  Parthia  and  to 
carry  off  a  rich  booty.  Phraates,  who  had  removed  the  head- 
quarters of  his  government  to  Babylonia,  felt  it  necessary  to 
entrust  affairs  there  to  an  officer,  and  to  take  the  field  in  per- 
son against  this  new  enemy,  which  was  certainly  not  less  for- 
midable than  the  Syrians.  He  selected  for  his  representative 
at  the  seat  of  Empire  a  certain  Himerus^*  (or  Evemerus),"a 
youth  with  whom  he  had  a  disgraceful  connection,  and  having 
estabhshed  him  as  a  sort  of  viceroy,  ^^  marched  away  to  the  north- 


CH. 


vn.3  i)EATII  OF  PHRAATWS.  6l 


east,  and  proceeded  to  encounter  the  Scythians  in  that  remote 
region.  Besides  his  native  troops,  he  took  with  him  a  number  of 
Greeks,  whom  he  had  made  prisoners  in  his  war  with  Antiochus. " 
Their  fidehty  could  not  but  be  doubtful ;  probably,  however,  he 
thought  that  at  a  distance  from  Syria  they  would  not  dare  to  fail 
him,  and  that  with  an  enemy  so  barbarous  as  the  Scythians  they 
would  have  no  temptation  to  fraternize.  But  the  event  proved 
him  mistaken.  The  Greeks  were  sullen  at  their  captivity,  and 
exasperated  by  some  cruel  treatment  which  they  had  received 
when  first  captured.  They  bided  their  time ;  and  when,  in  a 
battle  with  the  Scythians,  they  saw  the  Parthian  soldiery  hard 
pressed  and  in  danger  of  defeat,  they  decided  matters  by  going 
over  in  a  body  to  the  enemy.  The  Parthian  army  was  com- 
pletely routed  and  destroyed,  and  Phraates  himself  was  among 
the  slain. ""  We  are  not  told  what  became  of  the  victorious 
Greeks ;  but  it  is  to  be  presumed  that,  like  the  Ten  Thousand, 
they  fought  their  way  across  Asia,  and  rejoined  their  own 
countrymen. 

Thus  died  Phraates  I.,  after  a  reign  of  about  eight  or  nine 
years.  ^^  Though  not  possessing  the  talents  of  his  father,  he  was 
a  brave  and  warlike  prince,  active,  entei'prising,  fertile  in  re- 
sources, and  bent  on  maintaining  against  all  assailants  the 
honor  and  integrity  of  the  Empire.  In  natural  temperament 
he  was  probably  at  once  soft""  and  cruel."  But,  when  policy 
requii*ed  it,  he  could  throw  his  softness  aside  and  show  himself 
a  hardy  and  intrepid  warrior."^  Similarly,  he  could  control 
his  natural  harshness,  and  act  upon  occasion  with  clemency 
and  leniency."  He  was  not,  perhaps,  withoiit  a  grim  humor, 
which  led  liim  to  threaten  more  than  he  intended,  in  order  to 
see  how  men  would  comport  themselves  when  greatly  alarmed."* 
There  is  some  evidence  that  he  aimed  at  saying  good  things; 
though  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  wit  is  not  of  a  high 
order."'  Altogether  he  has  more  character  than  most  Oriental 
monarchs;  and  the  monotony  of  Arsacid  biography  is  agree- 
ably interrupted  by  the  idiosyncrasy  which  his  words  and  con- 
duct indicate. 


62  THE  SiXm  MONAilCHY.  [ch.  viii 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Accession  of  Artahanus  II.  Position  of  Parthia.  Growing 
pressure  upon  her,  and  general  advance  towards  the  south, 
of  the  SaTca  or  Scyths.  Causes  and  extent  of  the  move- 
ment. Character  andprincij^al  tribes  of  the  Saha.  Scythic 
war  of  Artahanus.    His  death. 

"Imperium  Asiae  [Scytha3]  terqusesivere."— Justin,  ii.  3,  §  i. 

The  successor  of  Phraates  was  his  uncle,  Artahanus,  *  a  son 
of  Priapatius.  It  is  probable  that  the  late  king  had  either  left 
no  son,  or  none  of  sufficient  age  to  be  a  fit  occupant  of  the 
throne  at  a  season  of  difiiculty.  The  ' '  Megistanes, "  therefore, 
elected  Artahanus  in  his  nephew's  place,  ^  a  man  of  mature 
age,  ^  and,  probably,  of  some  experience  in  war.  The  situation 
of  Parthia,  despite  her  recent  triumph  over  the  Syro-Macedo- 
nians,  was  critical ;  and  it  was  of  the  greatest  importance  that 
the  sceptre  should  be  committed  to  one  who  would  bring  to  the 
discharge  of  his  ofiice  those  quahties  of  wisdom,  promptness, 
and  vigor,  which  a  crisis  demands. 

The  difficulty  of  the  situation  was  two-fold.  In  the  first 
place,  there  was  an  immediate  danger  to  be  escaped.  The 
combined  Greeks  and  Scythians,  who  had  defeated  the  Par- 
thian army  and  slain  the  monarch,  might  have  been  ex- 
pected to  push  their  advantage  to  the  utmost,  and  seek  to 
establish  themselves  as  conquerors  in  the  country  which  lay 
apparently  at  their  mercy.  At  any  rate,  the  siege  and 
sack  of  some  of  the  chief  towns  was  a  probable  contingency, 
if  permanent  occupation  of  the  territory  did  not  suit  the 
views  of  the  confederates.  The  new  monarch  had  to  rid  Par- 
thia of  her  invaders  at  as  little  cost  as  possible,  before  he 
could  allow  himself  to  turn  his  attention  to  any  other  mat- 
ter whatsoever.  Nor  did  this,  under  the  circumstances,  ap- 
pear to  be  an  easy  task.  The  flower  of  the  Parthian  troops 
had  been  destroyed  in  the  late  battle,  and  it  was  not  easy  to 
replace  them  by  another  native  army.  The  subject-nations 
were  at  no  time  to  be  depended  upon  when  Parthia  was  re- 
duced to  straits,  and  at  the  present  conjecture  some  of  the 
most  important  were  in  a  condition  bordering  upon  rebellion. 


CH.  V7il.}  DANGER  OF  PARTEIA  FROM  THE  SCTTHS.  63 

Himerus,  the  viceroy  left  by  Phraates  in  Babylonia,  had  fii'st 
driven  the  Babylonians  and  Seleucians  to  desperation  by  his 
tyranny,*  and  then  plunged  into  a  war  with  the  people  of 
Mesene,^  which  must  have  made  it  difficult  for  him  to  send 
Artabanus  any  contingent.  Fortunately  for  the  Parthians,  the 
folly  or  moderation  of  their  enemies  rendered  any  great  effort 
on  their  part  unnecessary.  The  Greeks,  content  with  having 
revenged  themselves,  gave  the  new  monarch  no  trouble  at  all : 
the  Scythians  were  satisfied  with  plundering  and  wasting  the 
open  country,  after  which  they  returned  quietly  to  their 
homes.  ^  Artabanus  found  himself  quit  of  the  immediate  dan- 
ger which  had  threatened  him  almost  without  exertion  of  his 
own,  and  could  now  bend  his  thoughts  to  the  position  of  his 
country  generally,  and  the  proper  policy  to  pursue  under  the 
circumstances. 

For  there  was  a  second  and  more  formidable  danger  im- 
pending over  the  State — a  danger  not  casual  and  temporary 
like  the  one  just  escaped,  but  arising  out  of  a  condition  of 
things  in  neigboring  regions  which  had  come  about  slowly, 
and  which  promised  to  be  permanent.  To  give  the  reader  the 
means  of  estimating  this  danger  aright,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
take  a  somewhat  wide  view  of  the  state  of  affairs  on  the 
northern  and  north-eastern  frontiers  of  Parthia  for  some  time 
previously  to  the  accession  of  Artabanus,  to  trace  out  the 
causes  which  were  at  work,  producing  important  changes  in 
these  regions,  and  to  indicate  the  results  which  threatened, 
and  those  which  were  accomplished.  Tlie  opportunity  will 
Also  serve  for  giving  such  an  account  of  the  chief  races  which 
here  bordered  the  empire  as  will  show  the  nature  of  the  peril 
to  which  Parthia  was  exposed  at  this  pei'iod. 

In  the  wide  plains  of  Northern  Asia,  extending  from  the 
Arctic  Ocean  to  the  Thian  Chan  mountains  and  the  Jaxartes, 
there  had  been  nurtured  from  a  remote  antiquity  a  nomadic 
population,  at  no  time  very  numerous  in  proportion  to  the 
area  over  which  it  was  spread,  but  liable  on  occasions  to  accu- 
mulate, owing  to  a  combination  of  circumstances,  in  this  or 
that  portion  of  the  region  occupied,  and  at  such  times  causing 
trouble  to  its  neighbors.  From  about  the  close  of  the  third 
century  B.C.  symptoms  of  such  an  accumulation  had  begiui  to 
display  themselves  in  the  tract  immediately  north  of  the 
Jaxartes,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  countries  south  of  that 
rivsr  had  suffered  from  a  succession  of  raids  and  inroads, 
Vhich  -w^ere  not  regarded  as  dangerous,  but  which  gave  con- 


64  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.]  [ch.  viii. 

slant  annoyance.  Crossing  the  great  desert  of  Eharesm  by 
forced  marches,  some  of  the  hordes  invaded  the  green  valleys 
of  Hyrcania  and  Parthia,  and  carried  desolation  over  those 
fair  and  flourishing  districts.'  About  the  same  time  other 
tribes  entered  the  Bactrian  territory  and  caused  alarm  to  the 
Greek  kingdom  recently  established  in  that  province.*  It  ap- 
pears that  the  Parthian  monarchs,  unable  to  save  their 
country  from  incursions,  consented  to  pay  a  sort  of  black-mail 
to  their  invaders,  by  allowing  them  the  use  of  their  pasture, 
grounds  at  certain  fixed  times — probably  during  some  months 
of  each  year.  ^  The  Bactrian  princes  had  to  pay  a  heavier 
penalty.  Province  after  j)rovince  of  their  kingdom  was  swal- 
lowed up  by  the  northorn  hordes,'"  who  gi-adually  occupied 
Sogdiana,  or  the  tract  between  the  lower  Jaxartes  and  the 
lower  Oxus,  whence  they  proceeded  to  make  ini'oads  into 
Bactria  itself.  The  rich  land  on  the  Polytimetus,  or  Ak  Su, 
the  river  of  Samarkand,  and  even  the  highlands  between  the 
upper  Jaxartes  and  upper  Oxus,  were  permanently  occupied 
by  the  invaders;  and  if  the  Bactrians  had  not  compensated 
themselves  for  their  losses  by  acquisitions  of  territory  in 
Afghanistan  and  India,  they  woiild  soon  have  had  no  king- 
dom left.  The  hordes  were  always  increasing  in  strength 
through  the  influx  of  fresh  immigrants,  and  in  lieu  of  Bactria 
a  power  now  stood  arrayed  on  the  north-eastern  frontier  of 
the  Parthians,  which  was  reasonably  regarded  with  the  most 
serious  alarm  and  suspicion. 

The  origin  of  the  state  of  things  here  described  is  to  be 
sought,  according  to  the  best  authorities,  in  certain  movements 
which  took  place  about  b.  c.  200, "  in  a  remote  region  of  inner 
Asia.  At  that  time  a  Turanian  people  called  the  Yue-chi  were 
expelled  from  their  territory  on  the  west  of  Chen-si  by  the 
Hiong-nu,  whom  some  identified  with  the  Huns.  ' '  The  Yue- 
chi  separated  into  two  bands;  the  smaller  descended  south- 
wards into  Thibet;  the  larger  passed  westwards,  and  after  a 
hard  struggle  dispossessed  a  people  called  '  Su'  of  the  plains 
west  of  the  river  of  Hi.  These  latter  advanced  to  Ferghana 
and  the  Jaxartes;  and  the  Yue-chi  not  long  afterwards  re- 
treating from  the  U-siun,  another  nomadic  race,  passed  the 
'  Su'  on  the  noi'th  and  occupied  the  tracts  between  the  Oxus 
and  the  Caspian.  The  Su  were  thus  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Bactrian  Greeks ;  the  Yue-chi  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Par- 
thians.""^ On  the  particulars  of  this  account,  which  comes 
from  the  Chinese  historians,  we  cannot  perhaps  altogether  de- 


OH.  vin.]        CONqVESTS  MADE  BY  THE  8CTTHS.  65 

pend ;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  main  fact,  attested 
by  a  writer  who  visited  the  Yue-chi  in  B.C.  139,  '^  that  they  had 
migrated  about  the  period  mentioned  from  the  interior  of  -Asia, 
and  had  established  themselves  sixty  years  later  in  the  Cas- 
pian region.  Such  a  movement  wovild  necessarily  have  thrown 
the  entire  previous  population  of  those  parts  into  commotion, 
and  would  probably  have  precipitated  them  upon  their  neigh- 
bors. It  accounts  satisfactorily  for  the  pressure  of  the  north- 
ern hordes  at  this  period  on  the  Parthians,  Bactrians,  and 
even  the  Indians ;  and  it  completely  explains  the  crisis  in  Par- 
thian history,  which  we  have  now  reached,  and  the  neces- 
sity which  lay  upon  the  nation  of  meeting  and,  if  possible, 
overcoming,  an  entirely  new  danger. 

In  fact,  one  of  those  occasions  of  peril  had  arisen,  to  which 
in  ancient  times  the  civilized  world  was  always  liable  from  an 
outburst  of  northern  barbarism.  Whether  the  peril  has  alto- 
gether passed  away  or  not.  we  need  not  here  inquire ;  but  cer- 
tainly in  the  old  world  there  was  always  a  chance  that  civili- 
zation, ai't,  refinement,  luxury,  might  suddenly  and  almost 
without  warning  be  swept  away  by  an  overwhelming  influx  of 
savage  hordes  from  the  unpolished  North.  From  the  reign 
of  Cyaxares,  when  the  evil  first  snowed  itself,  '^  the  danger  was 
patent  to  all  wise  and  far-seeing  governors  both  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  and  was  from  time  to  time  guarded  against.  The  expe- 
ditions of  Cyrus  against  the  Massagetse,  of  Darius  Hystaspis 
against  the  European  Scyths,  of  Alexander  against  the  Getse, 
of  Trajan  and  Probus  across  the  Danube,  were  designed  to 
check  and  intimidate  the  northern  nations,  to  break  their 
power,  and  diminish  the  likelihood  of  their  taking  the  offen- 
sive. It  was  now  more  than  four  centuries  since  in  this  part 
of  Asia  any  such  effort  had  been  made;'^  and  the  northern 
barbarians  might  naturally  have  ceased  to  fear  the  arms  and 
discipline  of  the  South.  Moreover  the  circumstances  of  the 
time  scarcely  left  them  a  choice.  Pressed  on  continually 
more  and  more  by  the  newly-arrived  Su  and  Yue-chi,  the  old 
inhabitants  of  the  Transoxianian  regions  were  under  the 
necessity  of  seeking  new  settlements,  and  could  only  attempt 
to  find  them  in  the  quarter  towards  which  they  were  driven 
by  the  new-comers.  Strengthened,  probably,  by  daring  spirits 
from  among  their  conquerors  themselves'"  they  crossed  the 
rivers  and  the  deserts  by  which  they  had  been  hitherto  con- 
fined, and  advancing  against  the  Parthians,  Bactrians,  and 
Arians,  tln-eatened  to  carry  all  before  them.    We  have  seen 


66  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  vuL 

how  successful  they  were  against  the  Bactrians."  In  Ariana, 
they  passed  the  mountains,  and,  proceeding  southwards,  occu- 
pied the  tract  helow  the  great  lake  wherein  the  Helmend  ter- 
minates, which  took  from  them  the  name  of  Sacastane'^  ("land 
of  the  Saka,"  or  Scyths) — a  name  still  to  be  traced  in  the 
modern  "Seistan."'  Further  to  the  east  they  effected  a  lodg- 
ment in  Kabul,  and  another  in  the  the  southern  portion  of 
the  Indus  valley,  which  for  a  time  bore  the  name  of  Indo- 
Scythia."  They  even  crossed  the  Indus  and  attempted  to 
penetrate  into  the  interior  of  India,  but  here  they  were  met 
and  repulsed  by  a  native  monarch,  about  the  year  B.C.  56.^° 

The  people  engaged  in  this  great  movement  are  called,  in  a 
general  way,  by  the  classical  writers,  Sacae,  or  Scythse — i.e. 
Scyths.  They  consisted  of  a  munber  of  tribes,  similar  for  the 
most  part  in  language,  habits,  and  mode  of  life,  and  allied 
more  or  less  closely  to  the  other  nomadic  races  of  Central 
and  Northern  Asia.  Of  these  tribes  the  principal  were  the 
Massagetee  ("great  Jits,  or  Jats"),  who  occupied  the  country 
on  both  sides  of  the  lower  course  of  the  Oxus;"  the  Dahae, 
who  bordered  the  Caspian  above  Hyrcania,  and  extended 
thence  to  the  latitude  of  Herat;"  the  Tochari,^^  who  settled  in 
the  mountains  between  the  upper  Jaxartes  and  the  upper 
Oxus,  where  they  gave  name  to  the  tract  known  as  Tokhar- 
estan;  the  Asii,  or  Asiani,  who  were  closely  connected  with 
the  Tochari  ;'^  and  the  Sakarauh  (Saracucae?),  who  are  found 
connected  with  both  the  Tochari  and  the  Asiani."  Some  of 
these  tribes  contained  within  them  further  sub-divisions;  e.g. 
the  Dahae,  who  comprised  the  Parni  (or  Aparni),  the  Pissuri, 
and  the  Xanthii;'"  and  the  Massagetae,  who  included  among 
them  Chorasmii,  Attasii,  and  others." 

The  general  character  of  the  barbarism  in  which  these  vari- 
ous races  were  involved  may  be  best  learnt  from  the  descrip- 
tion given  of  one  of  them,  the  Massagetae,  with  but  few  differ- 
ences, by  Herodotus^®  and  Strabo.  ^'^  According  to  this  descrip- 
tion, the  Massagetae  were  nomads,  who  moved  about  in  wagons 
or  carts,  accompanied  by  their  flocks  and  herds,  on  whose  milk 
they  chiefly  sustained  themselves.  Each  man  had  only  one 
wife,  but  all  the  wives  were  held  in  common  They  were  good 
riders  and  excellent  archers,  but  fought  both  on  horseback  and 
on  foot,  and  used,  besides  their  bows  and  arrows,  lances, 
knives,  and  battle-axes.  They  had  little  or  no  iron,  but  made 
their  spear  and  arrow-heads,  and  their  other  weapons,  of 
bronze.    They  had  also  bronze  breast-plates ;  but  otherwise  the 


Yo<:  m. 


Plate. 


Fig-  ?., 


rig.  2. 


com  01*  VARDANES  U.', 


Coin  of  Pacorua  H. 


Fig.  3. 


Early  Coin  of  VolngaBcs,!!. 


Coin  of  Mithridatca  IV. 


Fig.  4 


Volagasea   II, 


■g^~'^^«iU».Ji.JI.  I.  J.--—I-I— »»——■-; 


J 


Irscetifffatf! 


FifT    3       Plan  of  Palace-Tcmplo  at  Hatra  (after  FergussoD  and  Kobb)/ 


5'>Wlgg)t°>da<o^to3Co^oX:':JJ^:--?;^ 


Fig.  4. 


Cornice  and  quasi  capital,  Hatra  (after  Ross). 


CH.  viii.]  CHARACTER  OF  THE  SCYTHIC  BARBARISM.       67 

metal  with  which  they  adorned  and  protected  their  own  per- 
sons, and  the  heads  of  their  horses,  was  gold.  To  a  certain  ex- 
tent they  were  cannibals. '"  It  was  their  custom  not  to  let  the 
aged  among  them  die  a  natural  death,  but,  when  life  seemed 
approaching  its  natural  term,  to  offer  them  up  in  sacrifice,  and 
then  boil  the  flesh  and  feast  on  it.  This  mode  of  ending  life 
was  regarded  as  the  best  and  most  honorable ;  such  as  died  of 
disease  were  not  eaten  but  buried,  and  their  friends  bewailed 
their  misfortune. 

It  may  be  added  to  this  that  we  have  sufficient  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  Massagetae  and  the  other  nomads  of  these  parts 
regarded  the  use  of  poisoned  arrows  as  legitimate  in  warfare, 
and  employed  the  venom  of  serpents,  and  the  corrupted  blood 
of  man,  to  make  the  wounds  which  they  inflicted  more 
deadly. '' 

Thus,  what  was  threatened  was  not  merely  the  conquest  of 
one  race  by  another  cognate  to  it,  like  that  of  the  Medes  by  the 
Persians,  or  of  the  Greeks  by  Rome,  but  the  obliteration  of 
such  art,  civilization,  and  refinement  as  Western  Asia  had  at- 
tained to  in  course  of  ages  by  the  successive  efforts  of  Baby- 
lonians, Assyrians,  Medes,  Persians,  and  Greeks— the  spread 
over  some  of  the  fairest  regions  of  the  earth  of  a  low  type  of 
savagery — a  type  wliich  m  religion  went  no  further  than  the 
worship  of  the  sun  f'  in  art  knew  but  the  easier  forms  of  met-, 
allurgy  and  the  construction  of  carts ;  in  manners  and  customs, 
included  camiibalism,  the  use  of  poisoned  weapons,  and  a  rela- 
tion between  the  sexes  destructive  alike  of  aU  delicacy  and  of 
all  family  affection.  The  Parthians  were,  no  doubt,  rude  and 
coarse  in  their  character  as  compared  with  the  Persians ;  but 
they  had  been  civilized  to  a  certain  extent  by  three  centuries 
of  subjection  to  the  Persians  and  the  Greco-Macedonians  befoi-e 
they  rose  to  power ;  they  affected  Persian  manners ;  they  pat- 
ronized Greek  art,  they  appreciated  the  advantages  of  having 
in  their  midst  a  number  of  Greek  states.  Had  the  Massagetse 
and  their  kindred  tribes  of  Sakas,  Tochari,  Dahae,  Yue-clii,  and 
Su,  which  now  menaced  the  Parthian  power,  succeeded  in 
sweeping  it  away,  the  general  declension  of  all  which  is  lovely 
or  excellent  in  human  life  would  have  been  marked.  Scythi- 
cism  would  have  overspread  Western  Asia.  No  doubt  the  con- 
querors would  have  learned  something  from  those  whom  they 
subjected;  but  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  they  would  have 
learned  much.  The  change  would  have  been  like  that  winch 
passed  over  the  Empirq^of  tii^  ^-Vest,  when  Goths,  Vandals, 


68 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.       ''  [ch.  viil 


Burgundians,  Alans,  Heruli,  depopulated  its  fairest  provinces 
and  laid  its  civilization  in  the  dust.  The  East  would  have  been 
barbarized;  the  gains  of  centuries  would  have  been  lost;  the 
work  of  Cyrus,  Darius,  Alexander,  and  other  great  benefactors 
of  Asiatic  humanity,  have  been  undone ;  Western  Asia  would 
have  sunk  back  into  a  condition  not  very  much  above  that 
from  which  it  was  raised  two  thousand  years  earlier  by  the 
primitive  Chaldseans  and  the  Assyrians. 

Artabanus    II.,    the    Parthian    monarch    who    succeeded 
Phraates  II.,  appears  to  have  appreciated  aright  the  perils  of 
his  position.     He  was  not  content,  when  the  particular  body  of 
barbarians  which  had  defeated  and  slain  his  predecessor,  hav- 
ing ravaged  Parthia  Proper,  returned  home,  to  fold  his  arms 
and  wait  until  he  was  again  attacked.    According  to  the  brief, 
but  expressive  words  of  Justin,^' he  assumed  the  aggressive, 
and  invaded  the  country  of  the  Tochari,  one  of  the  most  power- 
ful of  the  Scythic  tribes,  which  was  now  settled  in  a  portion  of 
the  region  that  had,  tUl  lately,  belonged  to  the  Bactrian  king- 
dom."   Artabanus  evidently  felt  that  what  was  needed  was  to 
roll  back  the  flood  of  invasion  which  had  advanced  so  near  to 
the  sacred  home  of  his  nation ;  that  the  barbarians  required  to 
be  taught  a  lesson ;  that  they  must  at  least  be  made  to  under- 
stand that  Parthia  was  to  be  respected ;  or  that,  if  this  could 
not  be  done,  the  fate  of  the  Empire  was  sealed.    He  therefore, 
with  a  gallantry  and  boldness  that  we  cannot  suflficiently  ad- 
mire—a boldness  that  seemed  like  rashness,  but  was  in  reality 
prudence— without    calciilating    too    closely   the   immediate 
chances  of  battle,  led  his  troops  against  one  of  the  most  forward 
of  the  advancing  tribes.    But  fortune,  imhappdy,  was  adverse. 
How  the  battle  was  progressing  we  are  not  told;  but  it  ap- 
pears that  in  the  thick  of  an  engagement  Artabanus  received 
a  wound  in  the  fore-arm,  from  the  effects  of  which  he  died  al- 
most immediately. "  The  death  of  the  leader  decides  in  the  East, 
almost  to  a  certainty,  the  issue  of  a  contest.    We  cannot  doubt 
that  the  Parthians,  having  lost  their  monarch,  were  repulsed; 
that   the  expedition  failed;  and  that  the  situation  of  affairg 
became  once  more  at  least  as  threatening  as  it  had  been  bC' 
fore  Artabanus  made  his  attempt.     Two  Parthian  monarchs  ha<X 
now  fallen  within  the  space  of  a  few  years  in  combat  with  the 
aggressive  Scyths— two  Parthian  armies  had  suffered  defeat. 
Was  this  to  be  always  so?    If  it  was,  then  Parthia  had  only  to 
make  up  her  mind  to  faU,  and,  hke  the  great  Roman,  to  let  it 
be  her  care  that  she  should  fall  grandly  and  with  dignity. 


to.  IX. J  ACCESSION  OF  MlTERIDATES  It  69 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Accession  of  Mithridates  II.  Termination  of  the  Scytliic  Wars. 
Commencement  of  the  struggle  with  Armenia.  Previous 
history  of  Airmenia.  Result  of  the  first  Armenian  War. 
First  contact  of  Rome  icith  Parthia.  Attitude  of  Rome 
towards  the  East  at  this  time.  Second  Armenian  War. 
Death  of  Mithridates. 

"  Mithridati  res  gestae  Magni  cognomen  dedere."— Justin,  xlii.  8,  §  8. 

On  the  death  of  Artahanus  II.,  about  b.c.  124,  his  son,  Mith- 
ridates II.,  was  proclaimed  king.  Of  this  monarch,  whose 
achievements  (according  to  Justin')  procured  him  the  epithet 
of  "the  Great,"  the  accounts  which  have  come  down  to  us  are 
extremely  scanty  and  unsatisfactory.  Justin,  who  is  our  prin- 
cipal informant  on  the  subject  of  the  early  Parthian  history, 
has  unfortunately  confounded  him  with  the  third  monarch  of 
the  name,^  who  ascended  the  throne  more  than  sixty  years 
later,  and  has  left  us  only  the  slightest  and  most  meagre  out- 
line of  his  actions.  The  other  classical  writers,  only  to  a  very 
small  extent,  supplement  Justin's  narrative ;  and  the  result  is 
that  of  a  reign  which  was  one  of  the  most  important  in  the 
early  Parthian  series,  the  historical  inquirer  at  the  present 
day  can  form  but  a  most  incomplete  conception. 

It  appears,  however,  from  the  account  of  Justin,  and  from 
such  other  notices  as  have  reached  us  of  the  condition  of 
things  at  this  time  in  the  regions  lying  east  of  the  Caspian, 
that  Mithridates  was  entirely  successful  where  his  father  and 
his  cousin  had  signally  failed.  He  gained  a  number  of  victo- 
ries over  the  Scythic  hordes;'  and  effectually  checked  their 
direct  progress  towards  the  south,  throwing  them  thereby 
upon  the  east  and  the  south-east.  Danger  to  Parthia  from  the 
Scyths  seems  after  his  reign  to  have  passed  away.  They 
found  a  vent  for  their  superabundant  population  in  Seistan, 
Afghanistan,  and  India,  and  ceased  to  have  any  hopes  of 
making  an  impression  on  the  Arsacid  kingdom.  Mithridates, 
it  is  probable,  even  took  territory  from  them.  The  acquisition 
of  parts  of  Bactria  by  the  Partisans /?'o?Ji  the  Scyths,  which  is 
attested  by  Strabo,*  belongs,  in  all  likelihood,  to  his  reign;  and 


%  THE  SIXTii  MOnArGHT.  '     [ca.  ix. 

the  extension  of  the  Parthian  dominion  to  Seistan^  may  well 
date  from  the  same  period.  Justin  tells  us  that  he  added 
many  nations  to  the  Parthian  Empire.  ^  The  statements  made 
of  the  extent  of  Parthia  on  the  side  of  Syria  in  the  time  of 
Mithridates  the  First  render  it  impossible  for  us  to  discover 
these  nations  in  the  west :  we  are,  therefore,  compelled  to  re- 
gard them  as  consisting  of  races  on  the  eastern  frontier,  who 
could  at  this  period  only  be  outlying  tribes  of  the  recent 
Scythic  immigration. 

The  victories  of  Mithridates  in  the  East  encouraged  him  to 
turn  his  arms  in  the  opposite  direction,  and  to  make  an  attack 
on  the  important  country  of  Armenia,  which  bordered  his 
north-western  frontier.  Armenia  was  at  the  time  under  the 
government  of  a  certain  Ortoadistus, '  who  seems  to  have  been 
the  predecessor,  and  was  perhaps  the  father,  of  the  great  Ti- 
granes.*  Ortoadistus  ruled  the  tract  called  by  the  Eomans 
"Armenia  Magna,"  which  extended  from  the  Euphrates  on 
the  west  to  the  mouth  of  the  Araxes  on  the  east,  and  from  the 
valley  of  the  Kur  northwards  to  Mount  Niphates  and  the  head 
streams  of  the  Tigris  towards  the  south.  The  people  over 
which  he  i-uled  was  one  of  the  oldest  in  Asia  and  had  on  many 
occasions  shown  itself  impatient  of  a  conqueror.  Justin,  on 
reaching  this  point  in  his  work,  observes  that  he  could  not  feel 
himself  justified  if,  when  his  subject  brought  before  him  so 
mighty  a  kingdom,  he  did  not  enter  at  some  length  on  its  pre- 
vious history.^  The  modern  historian  would  be  even  less  ex- 
cusable than  Justin  if  he  omitted  such  a  review,  since,  while 
he  has  less  right  to  assume  a  knowledge  of  early  Armenian 
history  on  the  part  of  his  readers,  he  has  greater  means  of 
gratifying  their  curiosity,  owing  to  the  recent  discovery  of 
sources  of  information  unknown  to  the  ancients. 

Armenia  first  comes  before  us  in  Genesis,  where  it  is  men* 
tioned  as  the  country  on  whose  mountains  the  ark  rested. '? 
A  recollection  of  it  was  thenceforth  retained  in  the  semi-mythio' 
traditions  of  the  Babylonians."  According  to  some,"  the 
Egyptian  monarchs  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  dynasties 
carried  their  arms  into  its  remote  valleys,  and  exacted  tribute 
from  the  petty  chiefs  who  then  ruled  there.  At  any  rate,  it  is 
certain  that  from  about  the  ninth  century  B.C.  it  was  well 
known  to  the  Assyrians,  who  were  engaged  from  that  time 
till  about  B.C.  640  in  almost  constant  wars  with  its  inhabit- 
ants. "  At  this  period  three  principal  races  inhabited  the  coun- 
try—the Nairi,  who  were  spread  from  the  mountains  west  of 


CH.  IX. J  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  ARMENIA.  71 

Lake  Van  along  both  sides  of  the  Tigris  to  Bir  on  the  Eu- 
phrates, and  even  further ;  the  Urarda  (Alarodii,  or  people  of 
Ararat),  who  dwelt  north  and  east  of  the  Nairi,  on  the  upper 
Euphrates,  about  the  lake  of  Van,  and  probably  on  the  Araxes ; 
and  the  Minni,  whose  country  lay  south-east  of  the  Urarda,  in 
the  Urumiyeh  basin  and  the  adjoining  parts  of  Zagros.  Of 
these  three  races,  the  Urarda  were  the  most  powerful,  and  it 
was  with  them  that  the  Assyrians  waged  their  most  bloody 
wars.  The  capital  city  of  the  Urarda  was  Van,  on  the  eastern 
shores  of  the  lake ;  and  here  it  was  that  their  kings  set  up  the 
most  remarkable  of  their  inscriptions.  Six  monarchs,  who 
apparently  all  belong  to  one  dynasty,  left  inscriptions  in  this 
locality  commemorative  of  their  military  expeditions  or  of 
their  offerings  to  the  gods.'*  The  later  names  of  the  series 
can  be  identified  with  those  of  kings  who  contended  with 
Assyrian  monarchs  belonging  to  the  last,  or  Sargonid  dy- 
nasty;'^ and  hence  we  are  entitled  approximately  to  fix  the 
series  to  the  seventh  and  eighth  centuries  before  our  era.  The 
Urarda  must  at  this  time  have  exercised  a  dominion  over  al- 
most the  whole  of  the  region  to  which  the  name  of  Armenia 
commonly  attaches.'"  They  were  worthy  antagonists  of  the 
Assyrians,  and,  though  occasionally  worsted  in  fight,  main- 
tained their  independence,  at  any  rate,  till  the  time  of  Asshur- 
bani-pal  (about  B.C.  640),  when  the  last  king  of  the  Van  series, 
whose  name  is  read  as  Bilat-duri,  succumbed  to  the  Assyrian 
power,  and  consented  to  pay  a  tribute  for  his  dominions. " 

There  is  reason  to  beheve  that  between  the  time  when  we 
obtain  this  view  of  the  primitive  Armenian  peoples  and  that 
at  which  we  next  have  any  exact  knowledge  of  the  condition 
of  the  country — the  time  of  the  Persian  monarchy — a  great 
revolution  had  taken  place  in  the  region.  The  Nairi,  Urarda, 
and  Minni  were  Turanian,  or,  at  any  rate,  non- Arian,  races.  '* 
Their  congeners  in  Western  Asia  were  the  early  Babylonians 
and  the  Susianians,  not  the  Medes,  the  Persians,  or  the  Phryg- 
ians. But  by  the  time  of  Herodotus  the  Ai-ian  character  of 
the  Armenians  had  become  established.  Their  close  connec- 
tion with  the  Phrygians  was  recognized. '"  They  had  changed 
their  national  appellation;  for  while  in  the  Assyrian  period 
the  terms  Nairi  and  Urarda  had  preponderated,  under  th« 
Persians  they  had  come  to  be  called  Armenians  and  their 
country  Armenia.""  The  personal  names  of  individuals  in  the 
country,  both  men  and  women,  had  acquired  a  decidedly  Arian 
cast."    Everything  seems  to  indicate   that  a  strange  people 


If^  'TUB  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  ix. 

had  immigrated  into  the  land,  bringing  with  them  a  new  lan- 
guage, new  manners  and  customs,  and  a  new  rehgious 
system."  From  what  quarter  they  had  come,  whether  from 
Phrygia  as  Herodotus  and  Stephen"  believed,  or,  as  we  should 
gather  from  their  language  and  religion,  from  Media,  is  per- 
haps doubtful ;  but  it  seems  certain  that  from  one  quarter  or 
another  Armenia  had  been  Ai'ianized;  the  old  Turanian 
character  had  passed  away  from  it ;  immigrants  had  flocked 
in,  and  a  new  people  had  been  formed — ^the  real  Armenian  of 
later  times,  and  indeed  of  the  present  day — by  the  admixture 
of  ruling  Arian  tribes  with  a  primitive  Turanian  population, 
the  descendants  of  the  old  inhabitants. 

The  new  race,  thus  formed,  though  perhaps  not  less  brave 
and  warlike  than  the  old,  was  less  bent  on  maintaining  its 
independence.  Moses  of  Chorene,  the  Armenian  historian, 
admits  that  from  the  time  of  the  Median  preponderance  in 
Western  Asia  the  Armenians  held  under  them  a  subject 
position."  That  such  was  their  position  under  the  Persians  is 
abundantly  evident;"  and,  so  far  as  appears,  there  was  only 
one  occasion  during  the  entire  Achsemenian  period  (B.C.  559  to 
B.C.  331)  when  they  exhibited  any  impatience  of  the  Persian 
yoke,  or  made  any  attempt  to  free  themselves  from  it.  In  the 
early  portion  of  the  reign  of  Darius  Hystaspis  they  took  part 
in  a  revolt  raised  by  a  Mede  called  Phraortes,  and  were  not 
reduced  to  obedience  without  some  difficulty.^"  But  from 
henceforth  their  fidelity  to  the  Achsemenian  Kings  was  un- 
broken; they  paid  their  tribute  (apparently)  without  reluc- 
tance," and  furnished  contingents  of  troops  to  the  Persian 
armies  when  called  upon.^*  After  Ai'bela  they  submitted 
without  a  struggle  to  Alexander;"  and  when  in  the  division 
of  his  dominions,  w^hich  followed  upon  the  battle  of  Ipsus, 
they  fell  naturally  to  Seleucus,  they  acquiesced  in  the  arrange- 
ment.^" It  was  not  until  Antiochus  the  Great  suffered  his 
great  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Eomans  (b.c.  190)  that 
Armenia  bestirred  itself,  and,  after  probably  four  and  a  half 
centuries  of  subjection,  became  once  more  an  independent 
power.  Even  then  the  movement  seems  to  have  originated 
rather  in  the  ambition  of  a  chief  than  in  a  desire  for  liberty 
on  the  part  of  the  people.  Artaxias  had  been  governor  of  the 
Greater  Ai'menia  under  Antiochus."  and  seized  the  opportu- 
nity afforded  by  the  battle  of  Magnesia  to  change  his  title  of 
satrap  into  that  of  sovereign.  No  war  followed.  Antiochus 
was  too  much  weakened  by  his  reverses  to  make  any  attempt 


cii.  XI. J    AimmtA  ATTACKED  BY  MITURIDAfES  tl         73 

to  reduce  Artaxias  or  recover  Armenia;  and  the  nation  ob- 
tained autonomy  without  having  to  undergo  the  usual  ordea?. 
of  a  bloody  struggle.  When  at  the  expiration  of  five-and- 
twenty  years  Epiphanes,  the  son  of  Antiochus  the  Great, 
determined  on  an  effort  to  reconquer  the  lost  province,  no 
very  stubborn  resistance  was  offered  to  him.  Artaxias  was 
defeated  and  made  prisoner  in  the  very  first  year  of  the  war 
(B.C.  165),  and  Armenia  seems  to  have  passed  again  under  the 
sway  of  the  Seleucidae. '" 

It  would  seem  that  matters  remained  in  this  state  for  the 
space  of  about  fifteen  or  sixteen  years.  When,  however, 
Mithridates  I.  (Arsaces  VI.),  about  B.C.  150,  had  overrun  the 
eastern  provinces  of  Syria,  and  made  himself  master  in 
succession  of  Media,  Elymais,  and  Babylonia,  the  revolution- 
ary movement  excited  by  his  successes  reached  Armenia,  and 
the  standard  of  independence  was  once  more  raised  in  that 
country.  Accoixling  Co  the  Armenian  historians, ''  an  Arsacid 
prince,  Wagharshag  or  Valarsaces,  was  established  as  sover- 
eign by  the  influence  of  the  Parthian  monarch,  but  was 
allowed  to  rule  independently.  A  reign  of  twenty-two  years 
is  assigned  to  this  prince,  whose  kingdom  is  declared  to  have 
reached  from  the  Caucasus  to  Nisibis,  and  from  the  Caspian 
to  the  Mediterranean. "  He  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Arshag 
(Arsaces),  who  reigned  thirteen  years,  and  was,  like  his  father, 
active  and  warUke,  contending  chiefly  with  the  people  of 
Pontus.'*  At  his  death  the  crown  descended  to  his  son, 
Ardashes,'"  who  is  probably  the  Ortoadistus  of  Justin.^' 

Such  were  the  antecedents  of  Armenia  when  Mithridates 
II.,  having  given  an  effectual  check  to  the  progress  of  the 
Scythians  in  the  east,  determined  to  direct  his  arms  towards 
the  west,  and  to  attack  the  dominions  of  his  relative,  the 
thii'd  of  the  Armenian  Arsacidse.  Of  the  circumstances  of 
this  war,  and  its  results,  we  have  scarcely  any  knowledge. 
Justin,  who  alone  distinctly  mentions  it,  gives  us  no  details. 
A  notice,  however,  in  Strabo,  which  must  refer  to  about  this 
time,  is  thought  to  indicate  with  sufficient  clearness  the  result 
of  the  struggle,  which  seems  to  have  been  unfavorable  to  the 
Armenians.  Strabo  says  that  Tigranes,  before  his  accession 
to  the  throne,  was  for  a  time  a  hostage  among  the  Parthians.  '• 
As  hostages  are  only  given  by  the  vanciuished  party,  we  may 
assume  that  Ortoadistus  (Ardasbcs)  found  himself  unable  to 
offer  an  effectual  resistance  to  the  Parthian  king,  and  con- 
sented after  a  while  to  a  disadvantageous  peace,  for  his 
observance  of  which  hostages  were  required  by  the  victoa:. 


/J'4  TBE  SIXTH  MONARCBT.  fcH.  Dt 

It  cannot  have  been  more  than  a  few  years  after  the  ternii- 
nation  of  this  war,  wiiich  must  have  taken  place  towards  the 
close  of  the  second,  or  soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  first  cen- 
tury,'' that  Parthia  was  for  the  first  time  brouglit  into  contact 
■with  Rome. 

The  Great  Eepublic,  which  after  her  complete  victory  over 
Antiochus  III.,  B.C.  190,  had  declined  to  take  possession  of  a 
single  foot  of  ground  in  Asia,  regarding  the  general  state  of  af- 
fairs as  not  then  ripe  for  an  advance  of  Terminus  in  that  quar- 
ter, had  now  for  some  time  seen  reason  to  alter  its  policy,  and 
to  aim  at  adding  to  its  European  an  extensive  Asiatic  dominion. 
Macedonia  and  Greece  having  been  absorbed,  and  Carthage  de- 
stroyed (B.C.  148-146),  the  conditions  of  the  political  problem 
seemed  to  be  so  far  changed  as  to  render  a  further  advance  to- 
wards the  east  a  safe  measure ;  and  accordingly,  when  it  was 
seen  that  the  line  of  the  kings  of  Pergamus  was  coming  to  an 
end,  the  Senate  set  on  foot  intrigues  which  had  for  their  object 
the  devolution  upon  Rome  of  the  sovereignty  belonging  to 
those  monarchs.  By  clever  management  the  third  Attains  was 
induced,  in  repayment  of  his  father's  obligations  to  the  Ro- 
mans,*" to  bequeath  his  entire  dominions  as  a  legacy  to  the  Re- 
public. In  vain  did  his  illegitimate  half-brother,  Aristonicus, 
dispute  the  validity  of  so  extraordinary  a  testament;  the 
Romans,  aided  by  Mithi'idates  IV.,  then  monarch  of  Pontus, 
easily  triumphed  over  such  resistance  as  this  unfortunate 
prince  could  offer,"'  and  having  ceded  to  their  ally  the  portion 
of  Phrygia  which  had  belonged  to  the  Pergamene  kingdom," 
entered  on  the  possession  of  the  remainder.  Having  thus  be- 
come an  Asiatic  power,  the  Great  Republic  was  of  necessity 
mixed  up  henceforth  Avith  the  various  movements  and  strug-/ 
gles  which  agitated  Western  Asia,  and  was  naturally  led  to 
strengthen  its  position  among  the  Asiatic  kingdoms  by  such 
alliances  as  seemed  at  each  conjuncture  best  fitted  for  its  in- 
terests. 

Hitherto  no  occasion  had  arisen  for  any  direct  dealings 
between  Rome  and  Parthia.  Their  respective  territories  were 
still  separated  by  considerable  tracts,  which  were  in  the  occu- 
pation  of  the  Syrians,  the  Cappadocians,  and  the  Armenians. 
Tlieir  interests  had  neither  clashed,  nor  as  yet  sufficiently 
united  them  to  give  rise  to  any  diplomatic  intercourse.  But 
the  progress  of  the  two  Empires  in  opposite  directions  was 
continually  bringing  them  nearer  to  each  other;  and  events  had 


CH.  ix.i         PARTHIA  ATTAVKEt)  ST  TIGRANES.  7.^ 

now  reached  a  point  at  which  the  Empires  bewail  to  have  (or 
seem  to  have)  such  a  community  of  interests  as  led  naturolly 
to  an  exchange  of  communications.  A  great  power  had  been 
recently  developed  in  these  parts.  In  the  rapid  way  so  com- 
mon in  the  East,  Mithridates  V. ,  of  Pontus,  the  son  and  succes- 
sor of  Rome's  ally,  had,  between  B.C.  112  and  b.c.  93,  built  up 
an  Empire  of  vast  extent,  nvuncrous  population,  and  almost  in- 
exhaustible resources.  He  had  established  his  authority  over 
Armenia  Minor,  Colchis,  the  entire  east  coast  of  the  Black  Sea, 
the  Chersonesus  Taurica,  or  kingdom  of  the  Bosporus,  and 
even  over  the  whole  tract  lying  west  of  the  Chersonese  as  far 
as  the  mouth  of  the  Tyras,  or  Dniester."  Nor  had  these  gains 
contented  him.  He  had  obtained  half  of  Paphlagonia  by  an 
iniquitous  compact  with  Nicomedes,  King  of  Bithynia ;  he  had 
occupied  Galatia;  and  he  was  engaged  in  attempts  to  bring 
Cappadocia  under  his  influence.  In  this  last-named  project  he 
was  assisted  by  the  Armenians,  with  whose  king,  Tigranes,  he 
had  (about  e.g.  96)  formed  a  close  alliance,  at  the  same  time 
giving  him  his  daughter,  Cleopatra,  in  marriage."  Rome, 
though  she  had  not  yet  determined  on  war  with  Mithridates, 
was  resolved  to  thwart  his  Cappadocian  projects,  and  in  b.c. 
92  sent  Svilla  into  Asia  with  orders  to  put  down  the  puppet 
whom  Mithridates  and  Tigranes  were  establishing,  and  to  re- 
place upon  the  Cappadocian  throne  a  certain  Ariobarzanes, 
whom  they  had  driven  from  his  kingdom.  ^^  In  the  execution 
of  this  commission,  Sulla  was  brought  into  hostile  collision 
with  the  Armenians,  whom  he  defeated  with  great  slaugliter, 
and  drove  from  Cappadocia  together  with  their  puppet  king.*^ 
Thus,  not  only  did  the  growing  power  of  Mithridates  of  Pontus, 
by  inspiring  Rome  and  Parthia  with  a  common  fear,  tend  to 
draw  them  together,  but  the  course  of  events  had  actually  given 
them  a  common  enemy  in  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  who  was 
ecpially  obnoxious  to  both. 

For  Tigranes,  who,  during  the  time  that  he  was  a  hostage  in 
Partliia,  had  contracted  engagements  towards  the  Parthian 
monarch  which  involved  a  cession  of  territory,  and  who  in  con- 
sequence of  his  promises  had  been  aided  by  the  Parthians  in 
seating  himself  on  his  father's  throne"  though  he  made  the  ces- 
sion required  of  him  in  the  first  instance  had  soon  afterwards 
repented  of  his  good  faith,  had  gone  to  war  with  his  benefac- 
tors, recovered  the  ceded  territory,  and  laid  waste  a  consider- 
able tract  of  country  lying  within  the  admitted  Umits  of  the 
Parthian  kingdom. *'    These  proceedings  had,  of  course,  alien- 


76 


THE  SIXTH  MONAnCHY.  [m.  IX 


ated  Mithridates  II.  -,  and  we  may  with  much  probability  as- 
cribe to  them  the  step,  which  he  now  took,  of  sending  an  ambas- 
sador to  Sulla.  Orobazus,  the  individual  selected,  was  charged 
to  propose  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  between  the  two 
countries.*'  Sulla  received  the  overture  favorably,  but  proba- 
bly considered  that  it  transcended  his  powers  to  conclude  a 
treaty;  and  thus  notliing  more  was  effected  by  the  embassy 
than  the  estabUshment  of  a  good  understanding  between  the 
two  States.'" 

Soon  after  this  Tigranes  appears  to  have  renewed  his  attacks 
upon  Parthia,"  which  in  the  interval  between  B.C.  92  and  B.C. 
83  he  greatly  humbled,''  depriving  it  of  the  whole  of  Upper 
Mesopotamia,  at  this  time  cailled  Gordyene,  and  under  rule  of 
one  of  the  Parthian  tributary  kings."  Of  the  detail's  of  this 
war  we  have  no  account ;  and  it  is  even  uncertain  whether  it 
fell  within  the  reign  of  Mithridates  II.  or  no.  The  unfortunate 
mistake  of  Justin,  '*  whereby  he  confounded  this  monarch  with 
Mithridates  III.,  has  thrown  this  portion  of  the  Parthian  his- 
tory into  confusion,  and  has  made  even  the  successor  of  Mith- 
ridates II.  uncertain. 

Mithridates  II.  probably  died  about  B.C.  89,  after  a  reign 
which  must  have  exceeded  thirty-five  years.  His  great 
successes  against  the  Scythians  in  the  earlier  portion  of  his 
reign  were  to  some  extent  counterbalanced  by  his  losses  to  Ti- 
granes in  his  old  age ;  but  on  the  whole  he  must  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  more  vigorous  and  successful  of  the  Parthian  mon- 
arc*hs,  and  as  combining  courage  with  prudence.  It  is  to  his 
credit  that  he  saw  the  advantage  of  establishing  friendly  rela- 
tions with  Rome  at  a  time  when  an  ordinary  Oriental  monarch 
might  have  despised  the  distant  Republic,  and  have  thought  it 
beneath  his  dignity  to  make  overtures  to  so  strange  and  anom- 
alous a  power.  Whether  he  definitely  foresaw  the  part  which 
Rome  was  about  to  play  in  the  East,  we  may  doubt ;  but  at  any 
rate  he  must  have  had  a  prevision  that  the  part  would  not  be 
trifling  or  insignificant  Of  the  private  character  of  Mithri- 
dates we  have  no  suflicient  materials  to  judge.  If  it  be  true 
that  he  put  his  envoy,  Orobazus,  to  death  on  acount  of  his 
having  allowed  Sulla  to  assume  a  position  at  their  conference 
derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  the  Parthian  State,"  we  must 
pronounce  him  a  harsh  master ;  but  the  tale,  which  rests  whoUy 
on  the  weak  authority  of  the  gossip-loving  Plutarch,  is  perhapi 
scarcely  to  he  accepted. 


CH.  X,]     GAP  IN  TEE  LIST  OF  PABTUIAN  KINGS.  77 


CHAPTER  X. 

Dark  period  of  Parthian  History.  Doubtful  succession  of  the 
Monarchs.  Accession  of  Sanatrceces,  ah.  B.C.  76.  Posi- 
tion of  Parthia  during  the  Mithridatic  Wars.  Accession 
of  Phraates  III.  His  relations  ivith  Pompey.  His  death. 
Civil  War  heticeen  his  two  sons,  Mithridates  and  Orodes. 
Death  of  Mithridates. 

"  Varia  complurium  regum  in  Parthis  successione  imperium  accepit  Orodes." 

Trog.  Pomp.  Epit.  lib.  xlii. 

The  successor  of  Mithridates  II.  is  unknown.  It  has  been 
argued,  indeed,  that  the  reigns  of  the  known  monarchs  of  this 
period  would  not  be  unduly  long  if  we  regarded  them  as 
strictly  consecutive,  and  placed  no  blank  between  the  death  of 
Mithridates  II.  and  the  accession  of  the  next  Arsaces  whose 
name  has  come  down  to  us. '  Sanatrodoeces,  it  has  been  said, 
may  have  been,  and  may,  therefore,  weU  be  regarded  as,  the 
successor  of  Mithridates.  But  the  words  of  the  epitomizer  of 
Trogus,  placed  at  the  head  of  this  chapter,  forbid  the  accept- 
ance of  this  theory.  The  epitomizer  would  not  have  spoken 
of  ' '  many  kings  "  as  intervening  between  Mithridates  II.  and 
Orodes,  if  the  number  had  been  only  three.  The  expression  im- 
phes,  at  least,  four  or  five  monarchs ;  and  thus  we  have  no  choice 
but  to  suppose  that  the  succession  of  the  kings  is  here  imper- 
fect,^ and  that  at  least  one  or  two  reigns  were  interposed  between 
those  of  the  second  Mithridates  and  of  the  monarch  known  as 
Sanatrceces,  Sinatroces,  or  Sintricus. 

A  casual  notice  of  a  Parthian  monarch  in  a  late  writer  may 
supply  the  gap,  either  wholly  or  in  part.  Lucian  speaks  of  a 
certain  Mnasciras  as  a  Parthian  king,  who  died  at  the  advanced 
age  of  ninety-six.'  As  there  is  no  other  place  in  the  Parthian 
history  at  which  the  succession  is  doubtful,  and  as  no  such 
name  as  Mnascris  occurs  elsewhere  in  the  list,  it  seems  neceS' 
sary,  unless  we  reject  Lucian's  authority  altogether,  to  insert 
this  monarch  here.  We  cannot  say,  however,  how  long  he 
reigned,  or  ascribe  to  him  any  particular  actions;  nor  can  we 
Sfiy  definitely  what  king  he  either  succeeded  or  preceded.  It 
js  jiossible  that  his  reign  covered  the  entire  interyal  betweeu 


78  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHT.  [cH.  X. 

Mithridates  II.  and  Sanatroeces;  it  is  possible,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  he  had  successors  and  predecessors,  whose  names 
have  altogether  perished. 

The  expression  used  by  the  epitomizer  of  Trogus,*  and  a  few 
words  dropped  by  Plutarch, '  render  it  probable  that  about  this 
time  there  were  contentions  between  various  members  of  the 
Arsacid  family  which  issued  in  actual  civil  war.  Such  con- 
tentions are  a  marked  feature  of  the  later  history ;  and,  ac- 
cording to  Phitarch,  they  commenced  at  this  period.  We  may 
suspect,  from  the  great  age  of  two  of  the  monarchs  chosen,' 
that -the  Arsacid  stock  was  now  very  limited  in  number,  that 
it  offered  no  candidates  for  the  throne  whose  claims  were  in- 
disputable, and  that  consequently  at  each  vacancy  there  was 
a  division  of  opinion  among  the  "  Megistanes,"  which  led  to 
the  claimants  making  appeal,  if  the  election  went  against  them, 
to  the  arbitrament  of  arms. 

The  dark  time  of  Parthian  history  is  terminated  by  the  ac- 
cession—probably  in  B.C.  76'— of  the  king  above  mentioned  as 
known  by  the  three  names  of  Sanatroeces^,  Sinatroces,  and 
Sintricus.*  The  form,  Sanatroeces,  which  appears  upon  the 
Parthian  coins,  is  on  that  account  to  be  preferred.  The  king 
so  called  had  reached  when  elected  the  advanced  age  of  eighty.' 
It  may  be  suspected  that  he  was  a  son  of  the  sixth  Arsaces  '" 
(Mithridates  I.),  and  consequently  a  brother  of  Phraates  II. 
He  had,  perhaps,  been  made  prisoner  by  that  Scythians  in  the 
course  of  the  disastrous  war  waged  by  that  monarch,  and  had 
been  retained  in  captivity  for  above  fifty  years.  At  any  rate, 
he  appears  to  have  been  indebted  to  the  Scythians  in  some 
measure  for  the  crown  which  he  acquired  so  tardily,  his  en- 
joyment of  it  having  been  secured  by  the  help  of  a  contingent 
of  troops  furnished  to  him  by  the  Scythian  tribe  of  the 
Sacauracee. " 

The  position  of  the  Empire  at  the  time  of  his  accession  was 
one  of  considerable  difficulty.  Parthia,  during  the  period  of 
her  civil  contentions,  had  lost  much  ground  in  the  west,  having 
been  deprived  by  Tigranes  of  at  least  two  important  provinces.  '^ 
At  the  same  time  she  had  been  witness  of  the  tremendous 
struggle  between  Pome  and  Pontus  which  commenced  in  B.C. 
88,  was  still  continuing,  and  stiU  far  from  decided,  when 
Sanatroeces  came  to  the  throne.  An  octogenarian  monarch 
was  unfit  to  engage  in  strife,  and  if  Sanatroeces,  notwithstand- 
ing this  drawback,  had  been  ambitious  of  military  distinction,  it 
would  have  been  difficult  for  him  to  determine  into  which  scale 


CH.  X.]       CONTEMPORARY  POWER  OF  TIGRAXE8.  79 

the  interests  of  liis  country  required  that  he  should  cast  the 
weight  of  his  sword.  On  the  one  hand,  Parthia  had  evi- 
dently much  to  fear  from  the  military  force  and  the  covetous 
disposition  of  Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia,  the  son-in-law  ol 
Mithridates,  and  at  this  time  his  chosen  alley.  Tigranes  had 
hitherto  been  continually  increasing  in  strength.  By  the  de- 
feat of  Artanes,"'  king  of  Sophene,  or  Armenia  Minor,  he  had 
made  himself  master  of  Armenia  in  its  widest  extent ;  by  his 
wars  with  Parthia  herself  he  had  acquired  Gordyene,  or 
Northern  Mesopotamia,  and  Adiabene,  or  the  entire  rich  tract 
east  of  the  middle  Tigris  (including  Assyria  Proper  and  Arbe- 
litis,  as  far,  at  any  rate,  as  the  course  of  the  lower  Zab;'*  by 
means  which  are  not  stated  he  had  brought  under  subjection 
the  king  of  the  important  country  of  Media  Artropatene,  inde- 
pendent  since  the  time  of  Alexander.'^  Invited  into  Syria, 
about  B.C.  83,  by  the  wretched  inhabitants,  wearied  with  the 
perpetual  civil  wars  between  the  princes  of  the  house  of  the 
Seleucidse,  he  had  found  no  difficulty  in  estabhshing  himself 
as  king  over  CUicia,  Syria,  and  most  of  Phoenicia. '"  About  b,c. 
80  he  had  determined  on  building  himself  a  new  capital  in  the 
province  of  Gordyene",  a  capital  of  a  vast  size,'"  provided  with 
all  the  luxuries  required  by  an  Oriental  court,''' and  fortified 
with  waUs  which  recalled  the  glories  of  the  ancient  cities  of 
the  Assyrians.-"  The  position  of  this  huge  town  on  the  very 
borders  of  the  Parthian  kingdom,  in  a  province  which  had  till 
very  recently  been  Parthian,  could  be  no  otherwise  understood 
that  as  a  standing  menace  to  Parthia  itself,  the  proclamation 
of  an  intention  to  extend  the  Armenian  dominion  southwards, 
and  to  absorb  at  any  rate  all  the  rich  and  fertile  country  between 
Gordyene  and  the  sea.  Thus  threatened  by  Ai-menia,"  it  was 
impossible  for  Sanatroeces  cordially  to  embrace  the  side  of 
Mithridates,-"-  with  which  Armenia  and  its  king  were  so 
closely  allied ;  it  was  impossible  for  him  even  to  wish  that  the 
two  allies  should  be  free  to  work  their  will  on  the  Asiatic  con- 
tinent unchecked  by  the  power  which  alone  had  for  the  last 
twelve  years  obstructed  their  ambitious  projects. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  already  among  the  Asiatic 
princes  generally  a  deep  distrust  of  Rome "' — a  fear  that  in  the 
new  people,  which  had  crept  so  quietly  into  Asia,  was  to  be 
foiaid  a  power  more  permanently  formidable  than  the  Macedo- 
nians, a  power  which  would  make  up  for  want  of  brilliancy 
and  da.sh  by  a  dogged  perseverance  in  its  aims,  and  a  stealthy, 
crafty  policy,  sure  in  tiie  end  to  acliieve  great  and  striking  re- 


30  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  x. 

suits.  The  acceptance  of  the  kingdom  of  Attains  had  not,  per- 
haps, alarmed  any  one ;  but  the  seizure  of  Phrygia  during  the 
minority  of  Mithridates,  without  so  much  as  a  pretext,'*  and 
the  practice,  soon  afterwards  established,  of  setting  up  pup- 
pet kings,"  bound  to  do  the  bidding  of  their  Eoman  alHes,  had 
raised  suspicions;  the  ease  with  which  Mithridates  notwith- 
standing his  great  power  and  long  preparation,  had  been  van- 
quished in  the  first  war  (b.c.88— 84)  had  aroused  fears;  and 
Sanatroeces  could  not  but  misdoubt  the  advisabiUty  of  lending 
aid  to  the  Romans,  and  so  helping  them  to  obtain  a  still  firmer 
hold  on  Western  Asia.  Accordingly  we  find  that  when  the  final 
war  broke  out,  in  B.C.  74,  his  inchnation  was,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  stand  wholly  aloof,  and  when  that  became  impossible,  then 
to  temporize.  To  the  application  for  assistance  made  by  Mith- 
ridates in  B.C.  72  a  direct  negative  was  returned;  "^^  and  it  was 
not  until,  in  B.C.  69,  the  war  had  approached  his  own  frontier, 
and  both  parties  made  the  most  earnest  appeals  to  him  for  aid, 
that  he  departed  from  the  line  of  pure  abstention,  and  had  re- 
course to  the  expedient  of  amusing  both  sides  with  promises, 
while  he  helped  neither."  According  to  Plutarch,  this  line  of 
procedure  offended  Lucullus,  and  had  nearly  induced  him  to 
defer  the  final  struggle  with  Mithridates  and  Tigranes,  and 
turn  his  arms  against  Parthia."  But  the  prolonged  resistance 
of  Nisibis,  and  the  successes  of  Mithridates  in  Pontus,  diverted 
the  danger ;  and  the  war  rolling  northwards,  Parthia  was  not 
yet  driven  to  take  a  side,  but  was  enabled  to  maintain  her 
neutral  position  for  some  years  longer. 

Meanwhile  the  aged  Sanatroeces  died,'^  and  was  succeeded 
by  his  son,  Phraates  III.  This  prince  followed  at  first  his 
father's  example,  and  abstained  from  mixing  himself  up  in 
the  Mithridatic  war;  but  in  B.C.  66,  being  courted  by  both 
sides,  and  promised  the  restoration  of  the  provinces  lost  to 
Tigranes,'"  he  made  alliance  with  Pompey,  and  undertook, 
while  the  latter  pressed  the  war  against  Mithridates,  to  find 
occupation  for  the  Armenian  monarch  in  his  own  land.  This 
engagement  he  executed  with  fidehty.  It  had  happened  that 
the  eldest  li-\ang  son  of  Tigranes,  a  prince  bearing  the  same 
name  as  his  father,  having  raised  a  rebelHon  in  Armenia  and 
been  defeated,  had  taken  refuge  in  Parthia  with  Phraates." 
Phraates  determined  to  take  advantage  of  this  circumstance. 
The  young  Tigranes  was  supported  by  a  party  among  his 
countrymen  who  wished  to  see  a  youthful  monarch  upon  the 
throne ;  and  Phraates  therefore  considered  that  he  would  best 


Vol.  111. 


prate.  V. 


..^ie'.i 


Frieze  oyer  Temple  doorway,  Hatra  (after  Ross). 


Fig.  2. 


Restoration  of  the  Ilntra  PalaccTempIc  (after  Ainswortli); 


Parthian  Capitals  (after  Loftus). 
fig.  4. 


Partliiaa  Diapering  (after  Loftus). 


K;t'«V 


J 


Plate  VI 


fig.   ?.. 


Vol.  III. 


Figure  on  cogjo.  'J^afterlLoftug)), 


Parthian  statuette  (after  Loftus). 


Fig.  4. 


MiM 


m 


r> 


rarthiaii  vases,  jugs,  and  l:unps  (after  Loftus). 


CH.  X.]  DEALINGS  OF  PURAATES  III.  WITH  POMPET.        81 

discharge  his  obhgations  to  the  Romans  by  fomenting  this 
family  quarrel,  and  lending  a  moderate  support  to  the  younger 
Tigranes  against  his  father.  He  marched  an  army  into  Ar- 
menia in  the  interest  of  the  young  prince,  overran  the  open 
country,  and  advanced  on  Artaxata,  the  capital.  Tigranes, 
the  king,  fled  at  his  approach,  and  betook  himself  to  the 
neighboring  movmtains.  Artaxata  was  invested;  but  as  the 
siege  promised  to  be  long,  the  Parthian  monarch  after  a  time 
withdrew,  leaving  the  pretender  with  as  many  troops  as  he 
thought  necessary  to  press  the  siege  to  a  successful  issue.  The 
result,  however,  disappointed  his  expectations.  Scarcely  was 
Phraates  gone,  when  the  old  king  fell  upon  his  son,  defeated 
him,  and  drove  him  beyond  his  borders.'^  He  was  forced, 
however,  soon  afterwards,  to  submit  to  Pompey,''^  who,  while 
the  civil  war  was  raging  in  Armenia,  had  defeated  Mithridates 
and  driven  him  to  take  refuge  in  the  Tauric  Chersonese. 

Phraates,  now,  naturally  expected  the  due  reward  of  his 
services,  according  to  the  stipulations  of  his  agreement  with 
Pompey.  But  that  general  was  either  dissatisfied  with  the 
mode  in  which  the  Parthian  had  discharged  his  obhgations,  or 
disinclined  to  strengthen  the  power  which  he  saw  to  be  the 
only  one  in  these  parts  capable  of  disputing  with  Pome  the 
headship  of  Asia.  He  could  scarcely  prevent,  and  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  tried  to  prevent,  the  recovery  of  Adiabene  by 
the  Parthians ;  but  the  nearer  province  of  Gordyene  to  which 
they  had  an  equal  claim,  he  would  by  no  means  consent  to 
their  occupying.  At  first  he  destined  it  for  the  younger  Ti- 
granes. '^  When  the  prince  offended  him,  he  made  it  over  to 
Ariobarzanes,  the  Cappadocian  monarch.  ^^  That  arrangement 
not  taking  effect,  and  the  tract  being  disputed  between  Phraates 
and  the  elder  Tigranes,  he  sent  his  legate,  Afranius,  to  drive 
the  Parthians  out  of  the  country,  and  delivered  it  over  into 
the  hands  of  the  Armenians.'"  At  the  same  time  he  insulted 
the  Parthian  monarch  by  refusing  him  his  generally  recognized 
title  of  "  King  of  Kings.""  He  thus  entirely  alienated  his  late 
ally,  who  remonstrated  against  the  injustice  with  which  he  was 
treated, '**  and  was  only  deterred  fi'om  declaring  war  by  the 
wholesome  fear  which  he  entertained  of  the  Roman  arms. 

Pompey,  on  his  side,  no  doubt  took  the  question  into  con- 
sideration whether  or  no  he  should  declare  the  Parthian 
prince  a  Roman  enemy,  and  proceed  to  direct  against  him  the 
available  forces  of  the  Empire.  He  had  purposely  made  him 
hostile,  and  compelled  him  to  take  steps  which  might  have 


g2  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  X, 

furnished  a  plausible  casus  belli.  But,  on  the  whole,  he  found 
that  he  was  not  prepared  to  venture  on  the  encounter.  The 
war  had  not  been  formally  committed  to  him ;  and  if  he  did 
not  prosper  in  it,  he  dreaded  the  accusations  of  his  enemies  at 
Rome.  He  had  seen,  moreover,  with  his  own  eyes^  that  the 
Parthians  were  an  enemy  far  from  despicable,  and  his  knowl- 
edge of  campaigning  told  him  that  success  against  them  was 
not  certain.  He  feared  to  risk  the  loss  of  all  the  glory  which 
he  had  obtained  by  grasping  greedily  at  more,  and  preferred 
enjoying  the  fruits  of  the  good  luck  which  had  hitherto  at- 
tended him  to  tempting  fortune  on  a  new  field. '^  He  therefore 
determined  that  he  would  not  allow  himself  to  be  provoked 
into  hostilities  by  the  reproaches,  the  dictatorial  words,  or 
even  the  daring  acts  of  the  Parthian  King.  When  Phraates 
demanded  his  lost  provinces  he  replied,  that  the  question  of 
borders  was  one  which  lay,  not  between  Parthia  and  Rome, 
but  between  Parthia  and  Armenia.*"  When  he  laid  it  down 
that  the  Euphrates  properly  bounded  the  Roman  territory, 
and  charged  Pompey  not  to  cross  it,  the  latter  said  he  would 
keep  to  the  just  bounds,  whatever  thej^  were."  When  Ti- 
granes  complained  that  after  having  been  received  into  the 
Roman  alliance  he  was  still  attacked  by  the  Parthian  armies, 
the  reply  of  Pompey  was  that  he  was  wilUng  to  appoint  ar- 
bitrators who  should  decide  all  the  disputes  between  the  two 
nations."  The  moderation  and  caution  of  these  ansAvers 
proved  contagious.  The  monarchs  addressed  resolved  to  com- 
pose their  differences,  or  at  any  rate  to  defer  the  settlement  of 
them  to  a  more  convenient  time.  They  accepted  Pompey's 
proposal  of  an  arbitration ;  and  in  a  short  time  an  arrangement 
was  effected  by  which  relations  of  amity  were  re-established 
between  the  two  countries." 

It  would  seem  that  not  very  long  after  the  conclusion  of 
this  peace  and  the  retirement  of  Pompey  from  Asia  (b.c.  62), 
Phraates  lost  his  life.  He  was  assassinated  by  his  two  sons, 
Mithridates  and  Orodes;"  for  what  cause  we  are  not  told, 
Mithridates,  the  elder  of  the  two,  succeeded  him  (about  B.C. 
60) ;  and,  as  all  fear  of  the  Romans  had  now  passed  away  in 
consequence  of  their  apparently  peaceful  attitude,  he  returned 
soon  after  his  accession  to  the  policy  of  his  namesake,  Mithri- 
dates II.,  and  resumed  the  struggle  with  Armenia  from  which 
his  father  had  desisted."  The  object  of  the  war  was  probably 
the  recovery  of  the  lost  province  of  Gordyen^,  which,  having 
been  dehvered  to  the  elder  Tigranes  by  Pompey,  had  remained 


m.x.'\  SIS  CIVIL  WAE  WITH  ORODES.  83 

in  the  occupation  of  the  Armenians,  Mithridates  seems  to 
have  succeeded  in  his  enterprise.  When  we  next  obtain  a  dis- 
tinct view  of  the  boundary  line  which  divides  Parthia  from 
her  neighbors  towards  the  north  and  the  north-west,  which  is 
within  five  years  of  the  probable  date  of  Mithridates 's  accession, 
we  fijid  Gordyene  once  more  a  Parthian  province."  As  the 
later  years  of  this  intermediate  lustre  are  a  time  of  civil  strife, 
during  which  territorial  gains  can  scarcely  have  been  made, 
we  are  compelled  to  refer  the  conquest  to  about  b.c.  59-57. 
But  in  this  case  it  must  have  been  due  to  Mithridates  III., 
whose  reign  is  fixed  with  much  probability  to  the  years  B.C. 
60-56. 

The  credit  which  Mithridates  had  acquired  by  his  conduct  ot 
the  Armenian  war  he  lost  soon  afterwards  by  the  severity  of 
his  home  administration.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  he 
drove  his  brother,  Orodes,  into  banishment."  At  any  rate,  he 
ruled  so  harshly  and  cruelly  that  within  a  few  years  of  his  ac- 
cession the  Parthian  nobles  deposed  him, "and,  recalling  Orodes 
from  his  place  of  exile,  set  him  up  as  king  in  his  brother's 
room.  Mithridates  was,  it  would  seem,  at  first  allowed  to 
govern  Media  as  a  subject  monarch;  but  after  a  while  his 
brother  grew  jealous  of  him,  and  deprived  him  of  this  dignity.*^ 
UnwiUing  to  acquiesce  in  his  disgrace,  Mithridates  fled  to  the 
Romans,  and  being  favorably  received  by  Gabinius,  then  pro- 
consul of  Syria,  endeavored  to  obtain  his  aid  against  his  coun- 
trymen. Gabinius,  who  was  at  once  weak  and  ambitious,  lent 
a  ready  ear  to  his  entreaties,  and  was  upon  the  point  of  con- 
ducting an  expedition  into  Parthia,  when  he  received  a  still 
more  tempting  invitation  from  another  quarter.^"  Ptolemy 
Auletes,  expelled  from  Egypt  by  his  rebellious  subjects,  asked 
his  aid,  and  having  recommendations  from  Pompey,  a*nd  a  fair 
sum  of  ready  money  to  disburse,  found  little  difficulty  in  per- 
suading the  Syrian  proconsul  to  reUnquish  his  Parthian  plans 
and  march  the  force  at  his  disposal  into  Egypt.  Mithridates, 
upon  this,  withdrew  from  Syria,  and  re-entering  the  Parthian 
territory,  commenced  a  civil  war  against  his  brother,  finding 
nmnerous  partisans,  especially  in  the  region  about  Babylon. " 
It  may  be  suspected  that  Seleucia,  the  second  city  in  the  Em- 
pire, embraced  his  cause.  ^-  Babylon,  into  which  he  had  thrown 
himself,  sustained  a  long  siege  on  his  behalf,  and  only  yielded 
when  compelled  by  famine."  Mithridates  might  again  have 
become  a  fugitive ;  but  he  was  weary  of  the  disappointments 
and  hardships  which  are  the  ordinary  lot  of  a  pretender,  and 


g4  TSE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xt. 

preferred  to  cast  himself  on  the  mercy  and  affection  of  his 
brother.  Accordingly  he  surrendered  himself  unconditionally 
to  Orodes;  but  this  prince,  professing  to  place  the  claims  of 
patriotism  above  those  of  relationship,  "^  caused  the  traitor  who 
had  sought  aid  from  Rome  to  be  instantly  executed.  Thus 
perished  Mithridates  III.  after  a  reign  which  cannot  have  ex- 
ceeded five  years,  in  the  winter  of  B.C.  56,  or  the  early  spring 
of  B.C.  55.  Orodes,  on  his  death,  was  accepted  as  king  by  the 
whole  nation. 


CHAPTER  XL 


Accession  of  Orodes  I.  Expedition  of  Crassus.  His  fate. 
Retaliatory  inroad  of  the  Parthians  into  Syria  under 
Pacorus,  the  son  of  Orodes.  Defeat  of  Pacorus  by  Cassius. 
His  recall.    End  of  the  first  War  with  Rome. 

"  Parthi  ...  a  Romanis,  bellis  per  maximos  duces  florentissimis  temporibus  laces- 
siti,  soli  ex  omnibus  gentibus  non  pares  solum,  sed  etiam  victores  fuere." 

Justin,  xli.  1,  §  7. 

The  complete  triumph  of  Orodes  over  Mithridates,  and  his 
full  estabhshment  in  his  kingdom,  cannot  be  placed  earlier 
than  B.C.  56,  and  most  probably  fell  in  B.C.  55.'  In  this  latter 
year  Crassus  obtained  the  consulship  at  Rome,  and,  being  ap- 
pelated at  the  same  time  to  the  command  of  the  East,''  made 
no  secret  of  his  intention  to  march  the  Roman  legions  across 
the  Euphrates,  and  engage  in  hostihties  with  the  great  Parthian 
kingdom.  =  According  to  some  writers,  his  views  extended 
even  further.  He  spoke  of  the  wars  which  LucuUus  had  waged 
against  Tigranes  and  Pompey  against  Mithridates  of  Pontus  as 
mere  child's  play,  and  announced  his  intention  of  carrying  the 
Roman  arms  to  Bactria,  India,  and  the  Eastern  Ocean."  The 
Parthian  king  was  thus  warned  betimes  of  the  impending  dan- 
ger, and  enabled  to  make  all  such  preparations  against  it  as  he 
deemed  necessary.  More  than  a  year  elapsed  between  the  as- 
signment to  Crassus  of  Syria  as  his  province,  and  his  first 
overt  act  of  hostility  against  Orodes. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  breathing-time  was  weU  spent 
by  the  Parthian  monarch.  Besides  forming  his  general  plan 
of  campaign  at  his  leisure,  and  collecting,  arming,  and  exer 


CH.  XI.]  EXPEDITION  OF  CRA8SU8.  85 

cising  his  native  forces,  he  was  enabled  to  gain  over  certain 
chiefs  upon  his  borders,  who  had  hitherto  held  a  semi-depend- 
ent position,  and  might  have  been  expected  to  welcome  the» 
Romans.  One  of  these,  Abgarus,  ^  prince  of  Osrhoene,  or  the 
tract  east  of  the  Euphrates,  about  the  city  of  Edessa,  had  been 
received  into  the  Roman  alliance  by  Pompey,  but,  with  ths 
fickleness  common  among  Orientals,  he  now  readily  changed 
sides,  and  undertook  to  play  a  double  part  for  the  advantage 
of  the  Parthians. "  Another,  Alchaudonius,  an  Arab  sheikh  of 
these  parts,  had  made  his  submission  to  Rome  even  earlier;'' 
but  having  become  convinced  that  Parthia  was  the  stronger 
power  of  the  two,  he  also  went  over  to  Orodes.*  The  impor- 
tance of  these  adhesions  would  depend  greatly  on  the  line  of 
inarch  which  Crassus  might  determine  to  follow  in  making 
his  attack.  Three  plans  were  open  to  him.  He  might  either 
throw  himself  on  the  support  of  Artavasdes,  the  Armenian 
monarch,  who  had  recently  succeeded  his  father  Tigranes,  and 
entering  Armenia,  take  the  safe  but  circuitous  route  through 
the  mountains  into  Adiabene,  and  so  by  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tigris  to  Ctesiphon ;  or  he  might,  like  the  younger  Cyrus,  fol- 
low the  course  of  the  Eviphrates  to  the  latitude  of  Seleucia,  and 
then  cross  the  narrow  tract  of  plain  which  there  separates  the 
two  rivers ;  or,  finally,  he  might  attempt  the  shortest  but  most 
dangerous  line  across  the  Belik  and  Khabour,  and  directly 
through  the  Mesopotamian  desert.  If  the  Armenian  route 
were  preferred,  neither  Abgarus  nor  Alchavidonius  would  be 
able  to  do  the  Parthians  much  service ;  but  if  Crassus  resolved 
on  following  either  of  the  others,  their  alliance  could  not  but 
be  most  valuable. 

Crassus,  however,  on  reaching  his  province,  seemed  in  no 
haste  to  make  a  decision.  He  must  have  arrived  in  Syria  tol- 
erably eai'ly  in  the  spring  -^  bvit  his  operations  during  the  first 
year  of  his  proconsulship  were  imimportant.  He  seems  at 
once  to  have  made  up  his  mind  to  attempt  nothing  more  than 
a  reconnaissance.  Crossing  the  Euphrates  at  Zeugma,  the 
modern  Bir  or  Bireh-jik,  he  proceeded  to  ravage  the  open 
country,  and  to  receive  the  submission  of  the  Greek  cities, 
which  were  numerous  throughout  the  region  between  the 
Euphrates  and  the  Belik.'"  The  country  was  defended  by  the 
Parthian  satrap  with  a  small  force;  but  this  was  easily  de- 
feated, the  satrap  himself  receiving  a  wound. "  One  Greek  city 
only,  Zenodotium,  offered  resistance  to  the  invader;  its  in- 
habitants, having  requested  and  received  a  Roman  garrison  of 


gg  m^  SIXTH  MONAHCBT.  [en.  tl\ 

one  hundred  men^  rose  upon  them  and  put  them  barbarously 
to  the  sword ;  whereupon  Crassus  besieged  and  took  the  place, 
gave  it  up  to  his  army  to  plunder,  and  sold  the  entire  popula- 
tion for  slaves/^  He  then,  as  winter  drew  near,  determined 
to  withdraw  into  Syria,  leaving  garrisons  in  the  various 
towns.  The  entire  force  left  behind  is  estimated  at  eight 
thousand  men. " 

It  is  probable  that  Orodes  had  expected  a  more  determined 
attack,  and  had  retained  his  army  near  his  capital  until  it 
should  become  evident  by  which  route  the  enemy  would  ad- 
vance against  him.  Acting  on  an  inner  circle,  he  could  readily 
have  interposed  his  forces,  on  whichever  line  the  assailants 
threw  themselves.  But  the  tardy  proceedings  of  his  antagonist 
made  his  caution  superfluous.  The  first  campaign  was  over, 
and  there  had  scarcely  been  a  collision  between  the  troops  of 
the  two  nations.  Parthia  had  been  insulted  by  a  wanton  at- 
tack, and  had  lost  some  disaffected  cities ;  but  no  attempt  had 
been  made  to  fulfil  the  grand  boasts  with  which  the  war  had 
been  midertaken. 

It  may  be  suspected  that  the  Parthian  monarch  began  now 
to  despise  his  enemy.  He  would  compare  him  with  LucuUus 
and  Pompey,  and  understand  that  a  Roman  army,  like  any 
other,  was  formidable,  or  the  reverse,  according  as  it  was  ably 
or  feebly  commanded.  He  would  know  that  Crassus  was  a 
sexagenarian,  and  may  have  heard  that  he  had  never  yet 
shown  himself  a  captain  or  even  a  soldier.  Perhaps  he  almost 
doubted  whether  the  proconsul  had  any  real  intention  of  press- 
ing the  contest  to  a  decision,  and  might  not  rather  be  expected, 
when  he  had  enriched  himself  and  his  troops  with  Mesopota- 
mian  plunder,  to  withdraw  his  garrisons  across  the  Euphrates. 
Crassus  was  at  this  time  showing  the  worst  side  of  his  char- 
acter in  Syria,  despoihng  temples  of  their  treasures, "  and  ac- 
cepting money  in  lieu  of  contingents  of  troops  from  the 
dynasts  of  Syria  and  Palestine.  '^  Orodes,  under  these  circum- 
stances, sent  an  embassy  to  him,  which  was  well  calculated  to 
Btir  to  action  the  most  sluggish  and  poor-spirited  of  com- 
manders. "If  the  war,"  said  his  envoys,  "was  really  waged 
by  Rome,  it  must  be  fought  out  to  the  bitter  end.  But  if,  as 
they  had  good  reason  to  believe, "  Crassus,  against  the  wish  of 
his  country,  had  attacked  Parthia  and  seized  her  territory  for 
his  own  private  gain,  Arsaces  would  be  moderate.  He  would 
have  pity  on  the  advanced  years  of  the  proconsitl,  and  would 
give  the  Romans  back  those  men  of  theirs,  who  were  not  so 


CH.  XI.]      SECOND  INVASION  OF  CRASSVS,  B.C.  53.  8t 

much  keeping  watch  in  Mesopotamia  as  having  watch  kept  on 
them."  Crassus,  stung  with  the  taunt,  exclaimed,  "He  would 
return  the  ambassadors  an  answer  at  Seleucia."  Wagises,  the 
chief  ambassador,  prepared  for  some  such  exhibition  of  feeling, 
and,  glad  to  heap  taunt  on  taunt,  replied,  striking  the  palm  of 
one  hand  with  the  fingers  of  the  other :  ' '  Hairs  will  grow  here, 
Crassus,  before  you  see  Seleucia."" 

Still  further  to  quicken  the  action  of  the  Romans,  before  the 
wmter  was  well  over,  the  offensive  was  taken  against  their  ad- 
herents in  Mesopotamia.  The  towns  which  held  Roman  garri- 
sons were  attacked  by  the  Parthians  in  force;  and,  though  we 
do  not  hear  of  any  being  captured,  all  of  them  were  menaced, 
and  all  suffered  considerably.  '* 

If  Crassus  needed  to  be  stimulated,  these  stimulants  were 
effective ;  and  he  entered  on  his  second  campaign  with  a  full 
determination  to  compel  the  Parthian  monarch  to  an  en- 
gagemert,  and,  if  possible,  to  dictate  peace  to  him  at  his  capi- 
tal. He  had  not,  however,  in  his  second  campaign,  the  same 
freedom  with  regard  to  his  movements  that  he  had  enjoyed 
the  year  previous.  The  occupation  of  Western  Mesopotamia 
cramped  his  choice.  It  had,  in  fact,  compelled  him  before 
quitting  Syria  to  decline,  definitely  and  decidedly,  the  over- 
tures of  Artavasdes,  who  strongly  urged  on  him  to  advance  by 
way  of  Armenia,  and  promised  him  in  that  case  an  important 
addition  to  his  forces. '"  Crassus  felt  hmiself  compelled  to  sup- 
port his  garrisons,  and  therefore  to  make  Mesopotamia,  and 
not  Armenia,  the  basis  of  his  operations.  He  crossed  the 
Euphrates  a  second  time  at  the  same  point  as  before,^"  with 
an  army  composed  of  35,000  heavy  infantry,  4,000  Hght  infan- 
try, and  4,000  horse.'"  There  was  still  open  to  him  a  certain 
choice  of  routes.  The  one  preferred  by  his  chief  officers  was 
the  line  of  the  Euphrates,  known  as  that  which  the  Ten  Thou- 
sand had  pursued  in  an  expedition  that  would  have  been  sue- 
oessful  but  for  the  death  of  its  commander.  Along  this  line 
water  would  be  plentiful ;  forage  and  other  supplies  might  be 
counted  on  to  a  certain  extent ;  and  the  advancing  army,  rest- 
ing on  the  river,  could  not  be  surrounded."  Another,  but  one 
that  does  not  appear  to  have  been  suggested  till  too  late,"  was 
that  which  Alexander  had  taken  against  Darius;"*  the  line 
along  the  foot  of  the  Mens  Masius,  by  Edessa,  and  Nisibis,  to 
Nineveh.  Here  too  waters  and  suppUes  would  have  been 
readily  procurable,  and  by  cUnging  to  the  skirts  of  the  hOls 
the  Roman  infantry  would  have  sot  the  Parthian  cavalry  at 


gg  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xi. 

defiance.  Between  these  two  extreme  courses  to  the  right  and 
to  the  left  were  numerous  slightly  divergent  lines  across  the 
Mesopotamian  plain,  all  shorter  than  either  of  the  two  above- 
mentioned,  and  none  offering  any  great  advantage  over  the 
remainder. 

It  is  uncertain  what  choice  the  proconsul  would  have  made, 
had  the  decision  been  left  simply  to  his  own  judgment.  Prob- 
ably the  Romans  had  a  most  dim  and  indistinct  conception  of 
the  geographical  character  of  the  Mesopotamian  region,  and 
were  ignorant  of  its  great  difficulties.  They  remained  also,  it 
must  be  remembered,  up  to  this  time,  absolutely  unacquainted 
with  the  Parthian  tactics  and  accustomed  as  they  Avei-e  to 
triumph  over  every  enemy  against  whom  they  fought,  it 
Avould  scarcely  occur  to  them  that  in  an  open  field  they  could 
suffer  defeat.  They  were  ready,  like  Alexander,  to  encounter 
any  number  of  Asiatics,  and  only  asked  to  be  led  against  the 
foe  as  quickly  as  possible.  When,  therefore,  Abgarus,  the 
Osrhoene  prince,  soon  after  Crassus  had  crossed  the  Euphrates, 
rode  into  his  camp,  and  declared  that  the  Parthians  did  not  in- 
tend to  make  a  stand,  but  were  quitting  Mesopotamia  and  fly- 
ing with  their  treasure  to  the  remote  regions  of  Hyrcania  and 
Scythia,  leaving  only  a  rear  guard  under  a  couple  of  generals 
to  cover  the  retreat,^  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  resolution 
was  taken  to  give  up  the  circuitous  route  of  the  Euphrates, 
and  to  march  directly  across  Mesopotamia  in  the  hope  of 
crushing  the  covering  detachment,  and  coming  upon  the  fly- 
ing multitude  encumbered  with  baggage,  which  would  furnish 
a  rich  spoil  to  the  victors.  In  after  times  it  was  said  that  C. 
Cassius  Longinus  and  some  other  officers  were  opposed  to  this 
movement,^"  and  foresaw  its  danger;  but  it  must  be  questioned 
whether  the  whole  army  did  not  readily  obey  its  leader's  order, 
and  commence  without  any  forebodings  its  march  through 
Upper  Mesopotamia.  That  region  has  not  really  the  character 
which  the  apologists  for  Eoman  disaster  in  later  times  gave  to 
it.  It  is  a  region  of  swelling  hills,  and  somewhat  dry  gravelly 
plains.  It  possesses  several  streams  and  rivers,  besides 
numerous  springs. ^^  At  intervals  of  a  few  miles  it  was  studded 
with  cities  and  villages  ;  '^  nor  did  the  desert  really  begin  until 
the  Khabour  was  crossed.  The  army  of  Crassus  had  traversed 
it  throughout  its  whole  extent  during  the  summer  of  the  pre- 
ceding year,  and  must  have  been  well  acquainted  with  both 
its  advantages  and  drawbacks. 

But  it  is  time  that  we  should  consider  what  preparations  the 


t 


cfl.  XI.]  UlS  ABVEUSABT,  TITS  PAUTlItAN  SVUENAfi.        SO 

Parthian  monarch  had  made  against  the  threatened  attack. 
He  had,  as  already  stated,  come  to  terms  with  his  outlying 
vassals,  the  prince  of  Osrhoene,  and  the  sheikh  of  the  Scenite 
Arabs,  and  had  engaged  especially  tlie  services  of  the  former 
against  his  assailant.  He  had  furthur,  on  considering  the 
various  possibilities  of  the  campaign,  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  would  be  best  to  divide  his  forces,  and,  while  himself 
attacking  Artavasd  es  inthe  mountain  fastnesses  of  his  own 
country,  to  commit  the  task  of  meeting  and  coping  with  th( 
Romans  to  a  general  of  approved  talents.^'  It  was  of  th( 
greatest  importance  to  prevent  the  Armenians  from  effecting  a 
junction  with  the  Romans,  and  strengthening  them  in  thaf 
arm  in  which  they  were  especially  deficient,  the  cavalry. 
Perhaps  nothing  short  of  an  invasion  of  his  country  by  the 
Parthian  king  in  person  would  have  prevented  Artavasdes 
from  detaching  a  portion  of  his  troops  to  act  in  Mesopotamia. 
And  no  doubt  it  is  also  true  that  Orodes  had  great  confidence 
in  his  general,  whom  he  may  even  have  felt  to  be  a  better 
commander  than  himself.  Sui-enas,  as  we  must  call  him,  since 
his  name  has  not  been  preserved  to  us, '"  was  in  all  respects  a 
person  of  the  highest  consideration.  He  was  the  second  man 
in  the  kingdom  for  birth,  wealth,  and  reputation.  In  courage 
and  ability  ho  excelled  all  his  countrymen ;  and  he  had  the 
physical  advantages  of  commanding  height  and  great  personal 
beauty.  When  he  went  to  battle,  he  was  accompanied  by  a 
train  of  a  thousand  camels,  which  carried  his  baggage;  and 
the  concubines  in  attendance  on  him  required  for  their  con- 
veyance two  hundred  chariots.  A  thousand  horseman  clad  in 
mail,  and  a  still  greater  number  of  light-armed,  formed  hij 
bodyguard.  At  the  coronation  of  a  Parthian  monarch,  it  was 
his  hereditary  right  to  place  the  diadem  on  the  brow  of  the 
now  sovereign.  When  Orodes  was  driven  into  banishment  it 
was  he  who  brought  him  back  to  Parthia  in  triumph.  When 
Seleucia  revolted,  it  was  he  who  at  the  assault  first  mounted 
the  breach  and,  striking  terror  into  the  defenders,  took  the  city. 
Though  less  than  thirty  years  of  age  at  the  time  when  he  was 
appointed  commander,  he  was  believed  to  possess,  besides  these 
various  qualifications,  consummate  prudence  and  sagacity." 

The  force  which  Orodes  committed  to  his  brave  and  skilful 
lieutenant  consisted  entirely  of  horse.  This  was  not  the  ordi- 
nary character  of  a  Parthian  army,  which  often  comprised 
four  or  five  times  as  many  infantry  as  cavalry.  It  was,  per- 
haps, rather  fortunate  accident  than  profound  calculation  that 


^0  fim  StXflT  MO^AncItY.  [en.  xi 

caused  the  sole  employment  against  the  Eomans  of  this  arm.' 
The  foot  soldiers  were  needed  for  the  rough  warfare  of  the 
Armenian  mountains;  the  horse  would,  it  was  known,  act 
with  fair  effect  in  the  comparatively  open  and  level  Mesopo- 
tamia. As  the  king  wanted  the  footmen  he  took  them,  and 
left  to  his  general  the  troops  which  were  not  required  for  his 
own  operations. 

The  Parthian  horse,  like  the  Persian,'^  was  of  two  kinds, 
standing  in  strong  contrast  the  one  to  the  other.  The  bulk  ol 
their  cavalry  was  of  the  Mghtest  and  most  agUe  description. 
Fleet  and  active  coursers,  with  scarcely  any  caparison  but  a 
headstall  and  a  single  rein,  were  mounted  by  riders  clad  only 
in  a  tunic  and  trousers,  °*  and  armed  with  nothing  but  a  strong 
bow  and  a  quiver  full  of  arrows.  A  training  begun  in  early 
boyhood  made  the  rider  almost  one  with  his  steed;  and  he 
could  use  his  weapons  with  equal  ease  and  effect  whether  his 
horse  was  stationary  or  at  full  gallop,  and  whether  he  was  ad- 
vancing towards  or  hurriedly  retreating  from  his  enemy. '^ 
His  supply  of  missUes  was  almost  inexhaustible,  for  when  he 
found  his  quiver  empty,  he  had  only  to  retire  a  short  distance 
and  replenish  his  stock  from  magazines,  borne  on  the  backs  of 
camels,  in  the  rear.^^  It  was  his  ordinary  plan  to  keep  con- 
stantly in  motion  when  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  to  gallop 
backwards  and  forwards,  or  round  and  round  his  square  or 
column,  never  charging  it,  but  at  a  moderate  interval  plying 
it  with  his  keen  and  barbed  shafts ;''  which  were  driven  by  a 
practised  hand  from  a  bow  of  unusual  strength.  Clouds  of 
this  light  cavalry  enveloped  the  advancing  or  the  retreating 
foe,  and  inflicted  grievous  damage  without,  for  the  most  part, 
suffering  anything  in  return. 

But  this  was  not  the  whole.  In  addition  to  these  light 
Troops,  a  Parthian  army  comprised  always  a  body  of  heavy 
cavalry,"*  armed  on  an  entirely  different  system.  The  strong 
horses  selected  for  this  service  were  clad  almost  wholly  in 
mail.  Their  head,  neck,  chest,  even  their  sides  and  flanks, 
were  protected  by  scale-armor  of  brass  or  iron,  sewn,  probably, 
upon  leather.''  Their  riders  had  cuirasses  and  cuisses  of  the 
same  materials,  and  helmets  of  burnished  iron.'"  For  an  offen- 
sive weapon  they  carried  a  long  and  strong  spear  or  pike.'' 
They  formed  a  serried  line  in  battle,  bearing  down  with  great 
weight  on  the  enemy  whom  they  charged,  and  standing  firm 
as  an  iron  wall  against  the  charges  that  were  made  upon 
them.     A  cavalry  answering  to  this  in  some  i-espects  had  been 


CH.  XI.]  ADVANCE  OF  CRASS  US.  91 

employed  by  the  later  Persian  monarchs,"  and  was  in  use  also 
among  the  Armenians  at  this  period ;  but  the  Parthian  pike 
was  apparently  more  formidable  than  the  corresponding  weap- 
ons of  those  nations,  and  the  Hght  spear  carried  at  this  time 
by  the  cavalry  of  a  Roman  army  was  no  match  for  it. 

The  force  entrusted  to  Surenas  comprised  troops  of  both 
these  classes.  No  estimate  is  given  us  of  their  number,  but  it 
was  probably  considerable."  At  any  rate  it  was  sufficient  to 
induce  him  to  make  a  movement  in  advance — to  cross  the 
Sin  jar  range  and  the  river  Khabour,  and  take  up  his  position 
in  the  country  between  that  stream  and  the  Belik — instead  of 
merely  seeking  to  cover  the  capital.  The  presence  of  the 
traitor  Abgarus  in  the  camp  of  Crassus  was  now  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  Parthian  commander.  Abgarus,  fully 
trusted,  and  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  hght  horse,  admirably 
adapted  for  outpost  service,  was  allowed,  upon  his  own  re- 
quest, to  scour  the  country  in  front  of  the  advancing  Romans, 
and  had  thus  the  means  of  communicating  freely  with  the 
Parthian  chief.  He  kept  Surenas  informed  of  all  the  move- 
ments and  intensions  of  Crassus, "  while  at  the  same  time  he 
suggested  to  Crassus  such  a  line  of  route  as  suited  the  views 
and  designs  of  his  adversary.  Our  chief  authority  for  the  de- 
tails of  the  expedition  tells  us^^  that  he  led  the  Roman  troops 
through  an  arid  and  trackless  desert,  across  plains  without 
tree,  or  shrub,  or  even  grass,  where  the  soil  was  composed  of 
a  light  shifting  sand,  which  the  wind  raised  into  a  succession 
of  hillocks  that  resembled  the  waves  of  an  interminable  sea. 
The  soldiers,  he  says,  fainted  with  the  -heat  and  with  the 
drought,  while  the  audacious  Osrhoene  scoffed  at  their  com- 
plaints and  reproaches,  asking  them  whether  they  expected  to 
find  the  border-tract  between  Arabia  and  Assyria  a  country  of 
cool  streams  and  shady  groves,  of  baths,  and  hostelries,  like 
their  own  deUcious  Campania.  But  our  knowledge  of  the 
geographical  character  of  the  region  through  which  the  march 
lay  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  accept  this  account  as  true.*" 
The  country  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Belik,  as  already 
observed,  is  one  of  alternate  hill  and  plain,  neither  destitute  of 
trees  nor  ill-provided  with  water.  The  march  through  it  could 
have  presented  no  great  difficulties.  All  that  Abgarus  could 
do  to  serve  the  Parthian  cause  was,  first,  to  induce  Crassus  to 
ti'ust  himself  to  the  open  countiy,  without  clinging  either  to  a 
river  or  to  the  mountains,  and,  secondly,  to  bring  him,  after 
a  hasty  march,  and  in  the  full  heat  of  the  day,  into  the  pres- 


92  THE  SIXTH  MON^iRCHY.  [ch.  x^ 

ence  of  the  enemy.  Both  these  things  he  contrived  to  effect, 
and  Surenas  was,  no  doubt,  so  far  beholden  to  him.  But  the 
notion  that  he  enticed  the  Eoman  army  into  a  trackless  desert, 
and  gave  it  over,  when  it  was  perishing  through  weariness, 
hunger,  and  thirst,  into  the  hands  of  its  enraged  enemy,"  is 
in  contradiction  with  the  topographical  facts,  and  is  not  even 
maintained  consistently  by  the  classical  writers.'' 

It  was  probably  on  the  third  or  fourth  day  after  he  had 
quitted  the  Euphrates'"  that  Crassus  found  himself  approach- 
ing his  enemy.  After  a  hasty  and  hot  march^"  he  had  ap- 
proached the  banks  of  the  Belik,  when  his  scouts  brought  him 
word  that  they  had  fallen  in  with  the  Parthian  army,  which 
was  advancing  in  force  and  seemingly  full  of  confidence. 
Abgarus  had  recently  quitted  him  on  the  plea  of  doing  him 
some  undefined  service,  but  really  to  range  himself  on  the  side 
of  his  real  friends,  the  Parthians."  His  officers  now  advised 
Crassus  to  encamp  upon  the  river,  and  defer  an  engagement 
till  the  morrow ;  but  he  had  no  fears ;  his  son,  Publius,  who 
had  lately  joined  him  with  a  body  of  Gallic  horse  sent  by 
Julius  Csesar,  was  anxious  for  the  fray ;  and  accordingly  the 
Eoman  commander  gave  the  order  to  Ms  troops  to  take  some 
refreshment  as  they  stood,  and  then  to  push  forward  rapidly. " 
Surenas,  on  his  side,  had  taken  up  a  position  on  wooded  and 
hilly  ground,  which  concealed  his  numbers,^'  and  had  even, 
we  are  told,  made  his  troops  cover  their  arms  with  cloths  and 
skins,"'  that  the  glitter  might  not  betray  them.  But,  as  the 
Romans  drew  near,  all  concealment  was  cast  aside ;  the  signal 
for  battle  was  given ;  the  clang  of  the  kettledrums  arose  on 
every  side;  the  squadrons  came  forward  in  their  brilliant 
array,  and  it  seemed  at  first  as  if  the  heavy  cavalry  was 
about  to  charge  the  Roman  host,"'^  which  was  formed  in  a 
hollow  square  with  the  Ught-armed  in  the  middle,  and  with 
supporters  of  horse  along  the  whole  line,  as  well  as  upon  the 
flanks."^  But,  if  this  intention  was  ever  entertained,  it  was 
altoi'ed  almost  as  soon  as  formed,  and  the  better  plan  was 
adopted  of  halting  at  a  convenient  distance  and  assailing  the 
legionaries  with  flight  after  flight  of  arrows,  delivered  without 
a  pause  and  with  extraordinary  force.  The  Roman  en- 
deavored to  meet  this  attack  by  throwing  forward  his  own 
skirmishers;  but  they  were  quite  unable  to  cope  with  the 
numbers  and  the  superior  weapons  of  the  enemy,  who  forced 
them  almost  immediately  to  retreat,  and  take  refuge  behind 
the  line  of  the  heavy-armed."    These  were  then  once  more 


en.  XI.]  BATTLE  OF  THE  BELIK.  93 

exposed  to  the  deadly  missiles,  which  pierced  alike  through 
shield  and  breast-plate  and  greaves,  and  inflicted  the  most 
fearful  wounds.  More  than  once  the  legionaries  dashed  for- 
ward, and  sought  to  close  with  their  assailants,  but  in  vain. 
The  Parthian  squadrons  retired  as  the  Eoman  infantry  ad- 
vanced, maintaining  the  distance  which  they  thought  best 
between  themselves  and  their  foe,  whom  they  plied  with  their 
shafts  as  incessantly  while  they  fell  back  as  when  they  rode 
forward.  For  a  while  the  Romans  entertained  the  hope  that 
the  missiles  woiild  at  last  be  all  spent ;""  but  when  they  found 
that  each  archer  constantly  obtained  a  fresh  supply  from  the 
rear,  this  expectation  deserted  them.  It  became  evident  to 
Ci'assus  that  some  new  movement  must  be  attempted ;  and,  as 
a  last  resource,  he  commanded  his  son,  Publius,  whom  the 
Parthians  were  threatening  to  outflank,  to  take  such  troops 
as  he  thought  proper,  and  charge.  The  gallant  youth  was 
only  too  glad  to  receive  the  order.  Selecting  his  Gallic  cav- 
alry, who  numbered  1000,  and  adding  to  them  500  other  horse- 
men, 500  archers,  and  about  4000  legionaries,  ^ "  he  advanced  at 
speed  against  the  nearest  squadrons  of  the  enemy.  The 
Parthians  pretended  to  be  afraid,  and  beat  a  hasty  retreat. 
Publius  followed  with  all  the  impetuosity  of  youth,  and  was 
soon  out  of  the  sight  of  his  friends,  pressing  the  flying  foe, 
whom  he  believed  to  be  panic-stricken.  But  when  they  had 
drawn  him  on  sufficiently,  they  suddenly  made  a  stand, 
brought  their  heavy  cavalry  up  against  his  line,  and  com- 
pletely enveloped  him  and  his  detachment  with  their  light- 
armed.  Publius  made  a  desperate  resistance.  His  Gauls 
seized  the  Parthian  pikes  with  their  hands  and  dragged  the 
encmnbered  horsemen  to  the  ground ;  or  dismounting,  slipped 
beneath  the  horses  of  their  opponents,  and  stabbing  thena  in 
the  belly,  brought  steed  and  rider  down  upon  themselves. 
His  legionaries  occupied  a  slight  hillock,  and  endeavored  to 
make  a  wall  of  their  shields,  but  the  Parthian  archers  closed 
around  them,  and  slew  them  almost  to  a  man.  Of  the  whole 
detachment,  nearly  six  thousand  strong,  no  more  than  500 
were  taken  prisoners,'"  and  scarcely  one  escaped.  The  young 
Crassus  might,  possibly,  had  he  chosen  to  make  the  attempt, 
have  forced  his  way  through  the  enemy  to  Ichnae,  a  Greek 
town  not  far  distant;"'  but  he  preferred  to  share  the  fate  of 
his  men.  Rather  than  i'all  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  he 
caused  his  shield-bearer  to  dispatch  him;  and  his  example 
was  followed  by  his  principal  officers.    The  victors  struck  off 


94  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xi 

his  head,  and  elevating  it  on  a  pike,  returned  to  resume  their 
attack  on  the  main  body  of  the  Eoman  army. 

The  main  body,  much  relieved  by  the  diminution  of  the  pres- 
sure upon  them,  had  waited  patiently  for  Publius  to  return  in 
triumph,  regarding  the  battle  as  well-nigh  over  and  success  as 
certain.  After  a  time  the  prolonged  absence  of  the  young 
captain  aroused  suspicions,  which  grew  into  alarms  when  mes- 
sengers arrived  telling  of  his  extreme  danger."^  Crassus, 
almost  beside  himself  with  anxiety,  had  given  the  word  to  ad- 
vance, and  the  army  had  moved  forward  a  short  distance, 
-when  the  shouts  of  the  returning  enemy  were  heard,  and  the 
head  of  the  unfortunate  officer  was  seen  displayed  aloft,  whUe 
the  Parthian  squadrons,  closing  in  once  more,  renewed  the 
assault  on  their  remaining  foes  with  increased  vigor.  The 
mailed  horsemen  approached  close  to  the  legionaries  and  thrust 
at  them  with  the  long  pikes, "  while  the  light-armed,  galloping 
across  the  Eoman  front,  discharged  their  unerring  arrows  over 
the  heads  of  their  own  men.  The  Eomans  coiild  neither  suc- 
cessfully defend  themselves  nor  effectively  retaliate.  Still 
time  brought  some  relief.  Bowstrings  broke,  spears  were 
blunted  or  sphntered,  arrows  began  to  fail,  thews  and  sinews 
to  relax ;"  and  when  night  closed  in  both  parties  were  almost 
equally  glad  of  the  cessation  of  arms  which  the  darkness  ren- 
dered compulsory. 

It  was  the  custom  of  the  Parthians,  as  of  the  Persians,'^  to 
bivouac  at  a  considerable  distance  from  an  enemy.    Accor- 
dingly, at  nightfall  they  drew  off,  having  first  shouted  to  the 
Eomans  that  they  would  grant  the  general  one  night  in  whicj 
to  bewail  his  son ;  on  the  morrow  they  would  come  and  tak 
him  prisoner,  unless  he  preferred  the  better  course  of  surreb 
dering  himself  to  the  mercy  of  Arsaces.  ^^    A  short  breathing 
space  was  thus  allowed  the  Eomans,  who  took  advantag&of  it  to 
retire  towards  Carrhae,  leaving  behind  them  the  greater  part  of 
their  wounded,  to  the  number  of  4, 000.     A  small  body  of  horse 
reached  Carrhae  about  midnight,  and  gave  the  commandant 
such  information  as  led  him  to  put  his  men  under  arms  and 
issue  forth  to  the  succor  of  the  proconsul.     The  Parthians, 
though  the  cries  of  the  wounded  made  them  well  aware  of  the 
Eoman  retreat,  adhered  to  their  system  of  avoiding  night  com- 
bats, and  attempted  no  pursuit  till  morning. "    Even  then  they 
allowed  themselves  to  be  delayed  by  comparatively  trivial 
matters— the  capture  of  the  Eoman  camp,  the  massacre  of  the 
wounded,  and  the  slaughter  of  the  numerous  stragglers  scattered 


Vol  Ui.' 


--> 

Plate.  VIA 


Plate  VI I L 


Vol.   Ill 


Fartliian  bos-rcliet  (after  Flandin  and  Coste). 


CH.  XI.]        FLIGHT  OF  CRASS  US  FROM  CARRII^^.  95 

along  the  line  of  march — and  made  no  haste  to  overtake  the 
retreating  army.  The  bulk  of  the  troops  were  thus  enabled  to 
effect  their  retreat  in  safety  to  Carrhse,  where,  having  the  pro- 
tection of  walls,  they  were,  at  any  rate  for  a  time  secure. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  Romans  would  here 
have  made  a  stand.  The  siege  of  a  fortified  place  by  cavalry 
is  ridiculous,  if  we  understand  by  siege  anything  more  than  a 
very  incomplete  blockade.  And  the  Parthians  were  notori- 
ously inefficient  against  walls.  ^^  There  was  a  chance,  moreover, 
that  Artavasdes  might  have  been  more  successful  than  his  ally, 
and,  having  repulsed  the  Parthian  monarch,  might  march  his 
troops  to  the  relief  of  the  Romans.  But  the  soldiers  were 
thoroughly  dispirited,  and  would  not  listen  to  these  sugges- 
tions."" Provisions  no  doubt  ran  short,  since,  as  there  had 
been  no  expectation  of  a  disaster,  no  preparations  had  been 
made  for  standing  a  siege.  The  Greek  inhabitants  of  the  place 
could  not  be  trusted  to  exhibit  fidelity  to  a  falling  cause. 
Moreover,  Armenia  was  near ;  and  the  Parthian  system  of  ab- 
staining from  action  during  the  night  seemed  to  render  escape 
tolerably  easy.  It  was  resolved,  therefore,  instead  of  clinging 
to  the  protection  of  the  walls,  to  issue  forth  once  more,  and  to 
endeavor  by  a  rapid  night  march  to  reach  the  Armenian  hiUs. 
The  various  officers  seem  to  have  been  allowed  to  arrange  mat- 
ters for  themselves.  Cassius  took  his  way  towards  the 
Euphrates,  and  succeeded  in  escaping  with  500  horse.  Octa- 
vius,  with  a  division  which  is  estimated  at  5,000  men,  reached 
the  outskirts  of  the  the  hills  at  a  place  called  Sinnaca, "  and  found 
himself  in  comparative  security.  Crassus,  misled  by  his  guides, 
made  but  poor  progress  during  the  night ;  he  had,  however,  ar- 
rived within  little  more  than  a  mile  of  Octavius  before  the 
enemy,  who  woidd  not  stir  till  daybreak,  overtook  him. 
Pressed  upon  by  their  advancing  squandrons,  he,  with  his 
small  band  of  2,000  legionaries  and  a  few  horsemen,  occupied 
a  low  hillock  connected  by  a  ridge  of  rising  ground  with  the 
position  of  Sinnaca.  Here  the  Parthian  host  beset  him ;  and 
he  would  infallibly  have  been  slain  or  captured  at  once,  liad 
not  Octavius,  deserting  his  place  of  safety,  descended  to  the 
aid  of  his  commander.  The  united  7,000  held  their  own  against 
the  enemy,  having  the  advantage  of  the  ground,  and  having 
perhaps  by  the  experience  of  some  days  learnt  the  weak  points 
of  Parthian  warfare. 

Surenas  was  anxious,  above  all  things,  to  secure  the  person 
of  the  Roman  commander.     In  the  East  an  excessive  impor- 


Qg  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.      ~Z'  [ch.  XI. 

tance  is  attached  to  this  proof  of  success ;  and  there  were  reasons 
which  made  Crassiis  particularly  obnoxious  to  his  antagonists. 
He  was  believed  to  have  originated,  and  not  merely  conducted, 
the  war,  incited  thereto  by  simple  greed  of  gold."  He  had  re- 
fused with  the  utmost  haughtiness  all  discussion  of  terms,  and 
had  insulted  the  majesty  of  the  Parthians  by  the  declaration 
that  he  would  treat  nowhere  but  at  their  capital.  If  he  escaped, 
he  would  be  bound  at  some  future  time  to  repeat  his  attempt; 
if  he  were  made  prisoner,  his  fate  would  be  a  terrible  warning  to 
others.  But  now,  as  evening  approached,  it  seemed  to  the 
Parthian  that  the  prize  which  he  so  much  desired  was  about 
to  elude  his  grasp.  The  highlands  of  Armenia  would  be 
gained  by  the  fugitives  during  the  night,  and  further  pursuit 
of  them  would  be  hopeless.  It  remained  that  he  should  effect 
by  craft  what  he  could  no  longer  hope  to  gain  by  the  employ- 
ment of  force ;  and  to  this  point  all  his  efforts  were  now  di- 
rected. He  drew  off  his  troops  and  left  the  Romans  without 
further  molestation.  He  allowed  some  of  his  prisoners  to  es- 
cape and  rejoin  their  friends,  having  first  contrived  that  they 
should  overhear  a  conversation  among  his  men,  of  which  the 
theme  was  the  Parthian  clemency,  and  the  wish  of  Orodes  to 
come  to  terms  with  the  Romans.  He  then,  having  allowed  time 
for  the  report  of  his  pacific  intentions  to  spread,  rode  with  a 
few  chief s  towards  the  Roman  camp,  carrying  his  bow  unstrung 
and  his  right  hand  stretched  out  in  token  of  amity.  ' '  Let  the 
Roman  General,"  he  said,  "  come  forward  with  an  equal  num- 
ber of  attendants,  and  confer  with  me  in  the  open  spaoe  be- 
tween the  armies  on  terms  of  peace."  The  aged  proconsul  was 
disinclined  to  trust  these  overtures;  but  his  men  clamored 
and  threatened,  upon  which  he  yielded,  and  went  down  into 
the  plain,  accompanied  by  Octavius  and  a  few  others.  Here 
he  was  received  with  apparent  honor,  and  terms  were  arranged ; 
but  Surenas  required  that  they  should  at  once  be  reduced  to 
writing,  "since,"  he  said,  with  pointed  allusion  to  the  bad 
faith  of  Pompey,  "you  Romans  are  not  very  apt  to  remember 
your  engagements."  A  movement  being  requisite  for  the 
drawing  up  of  the  formal  instruments,  Crassus  and  his  officers 
were  induced  to  mount  upon  horses  furnished  by  the  Parthians, 
who  had  no  sooner  seated  the  proconsul  on  his  steed,  than  he 
proceeded  to  hurry  him  forward,  with  the  evident  intention  of 
carrying  him  off  to  their  camp."  The  Roman  officers  took  the 
alarm  and  resisted.  Octavius  snatched  a  sword  from  a  Par 
thian  and  killed  one  of  the  grooms  who  was  hurrying  CrassuS 


m  XI.]  Causes  of  his  failure.  97 

away.  A  blow  from  behind  stretched  him  on  the  ground  life- 
less. A  general  melee  followed,  and  in  the  confusion  Crassus 
Was  killed,  whether  by  one  of  his  own  side  and  with  his  own 
consent,  or  by  the  hand  of  a  Parthian  is  uncertain. "  The  army, 
learning  the  fate  of  their  general,  with  but  few  exceptions,  sur- 
rendered. Such  as  sought  to  escape  under  cover  of  the  ap- 
proaching night  were  hunted  down  by  the  Bedouins  who 
served  under  the  Parthian  standard,  and  killed  almost  to  a 
man.  Of  the  entire  army  which  had  crossed  the  Euphrates, 
consisting  of  above  40,000  men,  not  more  than  one  fourth  re- 
turned. One  half  of  the  whole  number  perished.'*  Nearly 
10,000  prisoners  were  settled  by  the  victors  in  the  fertile  oasis 
of  Margiana,"  near  the  northern  frontier  of  the  empire,  where 
they  intermarried  with  native  wives,'"  and  became  submissive 
Parthian  subjects." 

Such  was  the  result  of  this  great  expedition,  the  first  at- 
tempt of  the  grasping  and  ambitious  Romans,  not  so  much  to 
conquer  Parthia,  as  to  strike  terror  into  the  heart  of  her  peo- 
ple, and  to  degi'ade  them  to  the  condition  of  obsequious  de- 
pendants on  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the  "world's  lords."'* 
The  expedition  failed  so  utterly,  not  from  any  want  of  bravery 
on  the  part  of  the  soldiers  employed  in  it,  nor  from  any  abso- 
lute superiority  of  the  Parthian  over  the  Roman  tactics,  but 
partly  from  the  incompetence  of  the  commander,  partly  from 
the  inexperience  of  the  Romans,  up  to  this  date,  in  the  nature 
of  the  Parthian  warfare  and  in  the  best  manner  of  meeting  it. 
To  attack  an  enemy  whose  main  arm  is  the  cavalry  with  a 
body  of  foot-soldiers,  supported  by  an  insignificant  number  of 
horse,  must  be  at  all  times  rash  and  dangerous.  To  direct 
such  an  attack  on  the  more  open  part  of  the  country,  where  cav- 
alry could  operate  freely,  was  wantonly  to  aggravate  the  peril. 
After  the  first  disaster,  to  quit  the  protection  of  walls,  when  it 
had  been  obtained,  was  a  piece  of  reckless  folly.  Had  Crassus 
taken  care  to  obtain  the  support  of  some  of  the  desert  tribes,'^ 
if  Armenia  could  not  help  him,  and  had  he  then  advanced 
either  by  the  way  of  the  Mons  Masius  and  the  Tigris,  or  along 
the  line  of  the  Euphrates,  the  issue  of  his  attack  might  have 
been  different.  He  might  have  fought  his  way  to  Seleucia  and 
Ctesiphon,  as  did  Trajan,  Avidius  Cassius,  and  Septimius  Sev- 
erus,  and  might  have  taken  and  plundered  those  cities.  He 
would  no  doubt  have  experienced  difficixlties  in  his  retreat; 
but  ho  might  have  come  off  no  worse  than  Trajan,  whose  Par- 
thian expedition  has  been  generally  regarded  as  rather  aug' 


98  THE  STXTii  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xi. 

menting  than  detracting  from  his  reputation.  But  an  ignorant 
and  inexperienced  commander,  venturing  on  a  trial  of  arms 
with  an  enemy  of  whom  he  knew  Httle  or  nothing,  in  their 
own  country,  without  support  or  allies,  and  then  neglecting 
every  precaution  suggested  by  his  officers,  allowing  himself  to 
be  deceived  by  a  pretended  friend,  and  marching  straight  into 
a  net  prepared  for  him,  naturally  suffered  defeat.  The  credit 
of  the  Roman  arms  does  not  greatly  suffer  by  the  disaster,  nor 
is  that  of  the  Parthians  greatly  enhanced.  The  latter  showed, 
as  they  had  shown  in  their  wars  against  the  Syro-Macedonians, 
that  there  somewhat  loose  and  irregular  array  was  capable  of 
acting  with  effect  against  the  solid  masses  and  well-ordered 
movements  of  disciplined  troops.  They  acquired  by  their  use 
of  the  bow  a  fame  like  that  which  the  English  archers  ob- 
tained for  the  employment  of  the  same  weapon  at  Crecy  and 
Agincourt.  They  forced  the  arrogant  Romans  to  respect  them, 
and  to  allow  that  there  was  at  least  one  nation  in  the  world 
which  could  meet  them  on  equal  terms  and  not  be  worsted  in 
the  encounter.^"  They  henceforth  obtained  recognition  from 
Grseco-Roman  writers — albeit  a  grudging  and  covert  recogni- 
tion—as the  second  Power  in  the  world,  the  admitted  rival  of 
Rome,"'  the  only  real  counterpoise  upon  the  earth  to  the  power 
which  ruled  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

While  the  general  of  King  Orodes  was  thus  successful 
against  the  Romans  in  Mesopotamia,  the  king  himself  had  in 
Armenia  obtained  advantages  of  almost  equal  value,  though 
of  a  different  kind.  Instead  of  contending  with  Artavasdes, 
he  had  come  to  terms  with  him,  and  had  concluded  a  close 
alhance,  which  he  had  sought  to  confirm  and  secure  by  unit- 
ing his  son,  Pacorus,  in  marriage  with  a  sister  of  the  Arme- 
nian monarch.*^  A  series  of  festivities  was  being  held  to  cele- 
brate this  auspicious  event,  when  news  came  of  Surenas's 
triumph,  and  of  the  fate  of  Crassus.  According  to  the  barbar- 
ous customs  of  the  East,  the  head  and  hand  of  the  slain  pro- 
consul accompanied  the  intelligence.  We  are  told  that  at  the 
moment  of  the  messenger's  arrival  the  two  sovereigns,  with 
their  attendants,  were  amusing  themselves  with  a  dramatic 
entertainment.  Both  monarchs  had  a  good  knowledge  of  the 
Greek  literature  and  language,  in  which  Artavasdes  had  him- 
self composed  historical  works  and  tragedies.  The  actors  were 
representing  the  famous  scene  in  the  "  Bacchse"  of  Euripides,^' 
where  Agave  and  the  Bacchanals  come  upon  the  stage  with 
the  mutilated  remains  of  the  murdered  Pentheus,  when  the 


CH.  xi.j      CUASSl/S'S  HEAD   CARRIED  TO   OROBES.  9^ 

liead  of  Crassus  was  thrown  in  among  them.  Instantly  the 
player  who  personated  Agave  seized  the  bloody  trophy,  and 
placing  it  on  his  thyrsus  instead  of  the  one  he  was  carrying, 
paraded  it  before  the  delighted  spectators,  while  he  chanted 
the  weU- known  lines:"* 

From  the  mountain  to  the  hall 
New-cut  tendril,  see,  we  bring — 
Blessed  prey  I 

The  horrible  spectacle  was  one  well  suited  to  please  an  Eastern 
audience :  it  was  followed  by  a  proceeding  of  equal  barbarity 
and  still  more  thoroughly  Oriental."^  The  Parthians,  in  deris- 
ion of  the  motive  which  was  supposed  to  have  led  Crassvis  to 
make  his  attack,  had  a  quantity  of  gold  melted  and  poured  it 
into  his  mouth.*® 

Meanwhile  Surenas  was  amusing  his  victorious  troops,  and 
seeking  to  annoy  the  disaffected  Seleucians,  by  the  perform- 
ance of  a  farcical  ceremony.  He  spread  the  report  that  Cras- 
sus was  not  killed  but  captured ;  and,  selecting  from  among  the 
prisoners  the  Roman  most  like  him  in  appearance,  he  dressed 
the  man  in  woman's  clothes,  mounted  him  upon  a  horse,  and 
requiring  him  to  answer  to  the  names  of  "Crassus"  and  "Im- 
pcrator,"  conducted  him  in  triumph  to  the  Grecian  city.  Be- 
fore him  went,  mounted  on  camels,  a  band,  arrayed  as  trum- 
peters and  lictors,  the  lictors'  rods  having  purses  suspended 
to  them,  and  the  axes  in  their  midst  being  crowned  with  the 
bleeding  heads  of  Romans.  In  the  rear  foUowed  a  train  of 
Seleucian  music-girls,  who  sang  songs  derisive  of  the  effemi- 
nacy and  cowardice  of  the  proconsul.  After  this  pretended 
parade  of  his  prisoner  through  the  streets  of  the  town,  Surenas 
called  a  meeting  of  the  Seleucian  senate,  and  indignantly  de- 
nounced to  them  the  indecency  of  the  literature  which  he  had 
found  in  the  Roman  tents.  The  charge,  it  is  said,  was  true ;"' 
but  the  Seleucians  were  not  greatly  impressed  by  the  moral 
lesson  read  to  them,  when  they  remarked  the  train  of  concu- 
bines that  had  accompanied  Surenas  himself  in  the  field,  and 
thought  of  the  loose  crowd  of  dancers,  singers,  and  prostitutes, 
that  was  commonly  to  be  seen  in  the  rear  of  a  Parthian  army. 

The  political  consequences  of  the  great  triumph  which  the 
Parthians  had  achieved  were  less  than  might  have  been  anti- 
cipated. Mesopotamia  was,  of  course,  recovered  to  its  extrena- 
est  hmit,  the  Euphrates;  Armenia  was  lost  to  the  Roman 
alliance,  and  tlirown  for  the  time  into  complete  dependence 


^00  I^HE  SIXTH  MONAncHt.  [cH.  xt 

upon  Parthia.  The  whole  East  was,  to  some  extent,  excited-, 
and  the  Jews,  always  impatient  of  a  foreign  yoke,  and  recently 
aggrieved  by  the  unprovoked  spoiliation  of  their  Temple  by 
Crassus,  flew  to  arms.*"  But  no  general  movement  of  the 
Oriental  races  took  place.  It  might  have  been  expected  that 
the  Syrians,  Phoenicians,  Cilicians,  Cappadocians,  Phrygians, 
and  other  Asiatic  peoples  whose  proclivities  were  altogether 
Oriental,  would  have  seized  the  opportunity  of  rising  against 
their  Western  lords  and  driving  the  Eomans  back  upon 
Europe.  It  might  have  been  thought  that  Parthia  at  least 
would  have  assumed  the  offensive  in  force,  and  have  made  a 
determined  effoi't  to  rid  herseK  of  neighbors  who  had  proved 
so  troublesome.  But  though  the  conjuncture  of  circumstances 
was  most  favorable,  the  man  was  wanting.  Had  Mithridates 
or  Tigi-anes  been  Hving,  or  had  Surenas  been  king  of  Parthia, 
instead  of  a  mere  general,  advantage  would  probably  have 
been  taken  of  the  occasion,  and  Eome  might  have  suffered 
seriously.  But  Orodes  seems  to  have  been  neither  ambitious 
as  a  prince  nor  skilful  as  a  commander ;  he  lacked  at  any  rate 
the  keen  and  all-embracing  glance  which  could  sweep  the 
poUtical  horizon  and,  comprehending  the  exact  character  of  the 
situation,  see  at  the  same  time  how  to  make  the  most  of  it. 
He  allowed  the  opportunity  to  shp  by  without  putting  forth 
his  strength  or  making  any  considerable  effort;  and  the  occa- 
sion once  lost  never  returned. 

In  Parthia  itself  one  immediate  result  of  the  expedition 
seems  to  have  been  the  ruin  of  Surenas.  His  services  to  his 
sovereign  had  exceeded  the  measure  which  it  is  safe  in  the 
East  for  a  subject  to  render  to  the  crown.  The  jealousy  of  his 
royal  master  was  aroused,  and  he  had  to  pay  the  penalty  of 
over-much  success  with  liis  life.«'  Parthia  was  thus  left  with- 
out a  general  of  approved  merit,  for  SiUaces,  the  second  in 
command  during  the  war  with  Crassus,'"  had  in  no  way  dis- 
tinguished himself  through  the  campaign.  This  condition  of 
things  may  account  for  the  feebleness  of  the  efforts  made  in 
B.C.  52  to  retaliate  on  the  Romans  the  damage  done  by  their 
invasion.  A  few  weak  bands  only  passed  the  Euphrates,  and 
began  the  work  of  plunder  and  ravage,  in  which  they  were 
speedUy  disturbed  by  Cassius,  who  easOy  drove  them  back 
over  the  river."  The  next  year,  however,  a  more  determined 
attempt  was  made.  Orodes  sent  his  son,  Pacorus,  the  young 
bridegroom,  to  win  his  spurs  in  Syria,  at  the  head  of  a  consid- 
erable force,  and  supported  by  the  experience  and  authority  of 


CH.  xi.j  lNVASI02f  OF  STRIA  AND  CILICIA.  lOl 

an  oflScer  of  ripe  age,  named  Osaces."'  The  army  crossed  the 
Euphrates  unresisted,  for  Cassius,  the  governor,  had  with  him 
only  the  broken  remains  of  Crassus's  army,  consisting  of  about 
two  legions,  and,  deeming  himself  too  weak  to  meet  the  enemy 
in  the  open  field,  was  content  to  defend  the  towns.  The 
open  country  was  consequently  overrun;  and  a  thrill  of 
mingled  alarm  and  excitement  passed  through  all  the  Roman 
provinces  in  Asia."^  The  pi-ovinces  were  at  the  time  most  in- 
adequately supplied  with  Roman  troops,"*  through  the  desire 
of  Caesar  and  Pompey  to  maintain  large  armies  about  their  own 
persons.  The  natives  were  for  the  most  part  disaffected  and 
inclined  to  hail  the  Parthians  as  brethren  and  deliverers."'' 
Excepting  Deiotarus  of  Galatia,  and  Ariobarzanes  of  Cappa- 
docia,  Rome  had,  as  Cicero  (then  proconsul  of  Cilicia)  plain- 
tively declared, "°  not  a  friend  on  the  Asiatic  continent.  And 
Cappadocia  was  miserably  weak,"'  and  open  to  attack  on  the 
side  of  Armenia.  Had  Orodes  and  Artavasdes  acted  in  con- 
cert, and  had  the  latter,  while  Orodes  sent  his  armies  into 
Syria,  poured  the  Armenian  forces  into  Cappadocia  and  then 
into  Cilicia  (as  it  was  expected  that  he  would  do),"**  there  would 
have  been  the  greatest  danger  to  the  Roman  possessions.  As 
it  was,  the  excitement  in  Asia  Minor  Avas  extreme.  Cicero 
marched  into  Cappadocia  with  the  bulk  of  the  Roman  troops, 
and  summoned  to  his  aid  Deiotarus  with  his  Galatians,""  at  the 
same  time  writing  to  the  Roman  Senate  to  implore  reinforce- 
ments.'"" Cassius  shut  himself  up  in  Antioch, ""  and  allowed 
the  Parthian  cavalry  to  pass  liim  by,  and  even  to  proceed  be- 
yond the  bounds  of  Syria  into  Cilicia. '"'^  But  the  Parthians 
seem  scarcely  to  have  understood  the  situation  of  their  adver- 
saries, or  to  have  been  aware  of  their  own  advantages.  In- 
stead of  spi'eading  themselves  wide,  raising  the  natives,  and 
leaving  them  to  blockade  the  towns,  while  with  their  as  yet 
unconquered  squandrons  they  defied  the  enemy  in  the  open 
coimtry,  we  find  them  engaging  in  the  siege  and  blockade  of 
cities,  for  which  they  were  wholly  unfit,  and  confining  them- 
selves almost  entirely  to  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Orontes. '"' 
Under  these  circumstances  we  are  not  surprised  to  learn  that 
Cassius,  having  first  beat  them  back  from  Antioch,*  *  contrived 
to  lead  them  into  an  ambush  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  se- 
verely handled  their  troops,  even  killing  the  general  Osaces.'"" 
The  Parthians  withdrew  from  the  neighborhood  of  the  Syrian 
capita-1  after  this  defeat,  which  must  have  taken  place  about 
the  end  of  September,  and  soon  afterwards  went  into  winter 


i02  THE  SIXTH  MONARCH t.  [m.  Xtt. 

quartere  in  Cyrrhestica,  ""^  or  the  part  of  Syria  immediately 
east  of  Amanus.  Here  they  remained  during  the  winter 
months  under  Paconis,  and  it  was  expected  that  the  war  would 
breakout  again  with  fresh  fury  in  the  spring;'"'  but  Bibulus, 
the  new  proconsul  of  Syria,  conscious  of  his  military  deficien- 
cies, contrived  to  sow  dissensions  among  the  Parthians  them- 
selves, and  to  turn  the  thoughts  of  Pacorus  in  another  direc- 
tion. He  suggested  to  Ornodapantes,  a  Parthian  noble,  with 
whom  he  had  managed  to  ojien  a  correspondence,  that  Pacorus 
would  be  a  more  worthy  occupant  of  the  Parthian  throne  than 
his  father,  and  that  he  would  consult  well  for  his  own  interests 
if  he  were  to  proclaim  the  young  prince,  and  lead  the  army  of 
Syria  against  Orodes.^"*  These  intrigues  seem  to  have  first 
caused  the  war  to  languish,  and  then  produced  the  recall  of  the 
expedition.  Orodes  summoned  Pacorus  to  return  to  Parthia 
before  the  plot  contrived  between  him  and  the  Romans  was 
ripe  for  execution ;  and  Pacorus  felt  that  no  course  was  open 
to  him  but  to  obey.'"^  The  Parthian  legions  recrossed  the  Eu- 
phrates in  July,  B.C.  50;  and  the  First  Roman  War,  which  had 
lasted  a  little  more  than  four  years,  terminated  without  any 
real  recovery  by  the  Romans  of  the  laurels  that  they  had  lost 
at  Carrhae. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


Relations  of  Orodes  ivith  Pompey,  and  ivith  Brutus  and 
Cassius.  Second  War  icith  Rome.  Great  Partliian  Ex- 
pedition against  Syria,  Palestine,  and  Asia  Minor.  De- 
feat of  Saxa.  Occupation  of  Antioch  and  Jerusalem. 
Parthians  driven  out  of  Syria  by  Ventidius.  Death  oj 
Pacorus.    Death  of  Orodes. 

'  Jam  bis  Monseses  et  Pacori  manus 
Non  auspicates  contudit  impetus 
Nostros,  et  adjecisse  prasdam 
Torquibus  exiguis  renldet."— Hor.  Od.  iii.  6,  10-13. 

The  civil  troubles  that  had  seemed  to  threaten  Parthia  from 
the  ambition  of  the  youthful  Pacorus  passed  away  without 
any  explosion.  The  son  showed  his  obedience  by  returning 
home  submissively  when  he  miglit  have  flown  to  arms;  and 
the  father  accepted  the  act  of  obedience  as  a  sufficient  indica- 


CH.  xn.]     RELATIONS  OF  ORODES  WITH  POMPEf.  lO:"} 

tion  that  no  rebellion  had  been  seriously  meant.  We  find 
Pacorus  not  only  allowed  to  live,  but  again  entrusted  a  few 
years  later  with  high  office  by  the  Parthian  monarch;'  and  on 
this  occasion  we  find  him  showing  no  signs  of  disaffection  or 
discontent. 

Nine  years,  however,  elapsed  between  the  recall  of  the 
young  prince  and  his  reappointment  to  the  supreme  com- 
mand against  the  Romans.  Of  the  internal  condition  of 
Parthia  during  this  interval  we  have  no  account.  Appar- 
ently, Orodes  ruled  quietly  and  peaceably,  contenting  him- 
self with  the  glory  which  he  had  gained,  and  not  anxious  to 
tempt  fortune  by  engaging  in  any  fresh  enterprise.  It  was 
no  doubt  a  satisfaction  to  him  to  see  the  arms  of  the  Romans, 
instead  of  being  directed  upon  Asia,  employed  in  intestine 
strife;  and  we  can  well  understand  that  he  might  even  deem 
it  for  his  interest  to  foment  and  encourage  the  quarrels  which, 
at  any  rate  for  the  time,  secured  his  own  empire  from  attack. 
It  appears  that  communications  took  place  in  the  year  B.C.  49 
or  48  between  him  and  Pompey,  a  request  for  alliance  being 
made  by  the  latter,  and  an  answer  being  sent  by  Orodes,  con- 
taining the  terms  upon  which  he  would  consent  to  give  Pom- 
pey effective  aid  in  the  war.^  If  the  Roman  leader  would 
deliver  into  his  hands  the  province  of  Syria  and  make  it  wholly 
over  to  the  Parthians,  Orodes  would  conclude  an  alliance  with 
him  and  send  help ;  but  not  otherwise.  It  is  to  the  credit  of 
Pompey  that  he  rejected  these  terms,  and  declined  to  secure 
his  own  private  gain  by  depriving  his  country  of  a  province. 
Notwithstanding  the  failure  of  these  negotiations  and  the  im- 
prisonment of  his  envoy  Hirrus,^  when  a  few  months  later, 
having  lost  the  battle  of  Pharsalia,  the  unhappy  Roman  was 
in  need  of  a  refuge  from  his  great  enemy,  he  is  said  to  have 
proposed  throwing  himself  on  the  friendship,  or  mercy,  of 
Orodes.^  He  had  hopes,  perhaps,  of  enlisting  the  Parthian 
battalions  in  his  cause,  and  of  recovering  power  by  means  of 
this  foreign  aid.  But  his  friends  combated  his  design,  and 
persuaded  him  that  the  risk,  both  to  himself  and  to  his  wife, 
Cornelia,  was  too  great  to  be  compatible  with  prudence. 
Pompey  yielded  to  their  representations ;  and  Orodes  escaped 
the  difficulty  of  having  to  elect  between  repulsing  a  suppliant, 
and  provoking  the  hostility  of  the  most  powerful  chieftain  and 
the  greatest  general  of  the  age. 

Caesar  quitted  the  East  in  B.  c.  47  without  entering  into  any 
communication  with  Orodes.     He  had  plenty  of  work  upon 


104  ^^^^  SIXTS  MONARCSt.  [ctt.  im. 

his  hands;  and  whatever  designs  he  may  have  even  then 
entertained  of  punishing  the  Parthian  inroad  into  Syria,  or 
avenging  the  defeat  of  Carrhse/  he  was  wise  enough  to 
keep  his  projects  to  liimself  and  to  leave  Asia  without  ex- 
asperating by  threats  or  hostile  movements  the  Power  on 
which  the  peace  of  the  East  principally  depended.  It  was  not 
until  he  had  brought  the  African  and  Spanish  wars  to  an  end 
that  he  allowed  his  intention  of  leading  an  expedition  against 
Parthia  to  be  openly  talked  about.  In  B.C.  34,  four  years 
after  Pharsalia,  having  put  down  aU  his  domestic  enemies, 
and  arranged  matters,  as  he  thought,  satisfactorily  at  Rome, 
he  let  a  decree  be  passed  formally  assigning  to  him  ' '  the  Par- 
thian War,'"'  and  sent  the  legions  across  the  Adriatic  on  their 
way  to  Asia.  What  plan  of  campaign  he  may  have  contem- 
plated is  uncertain;'  but  there  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  an  ex- 
pedition under  his  auspices  would  have  been  a  most  serious 
danger  to  Parthia,  and  might  have  terminated  in  her  sub- 
jection. The  mihtary  talents  of  the  Great  Dictator  were  of 
the  most  splendid  description ;  his  powers  of  organization  and 
consohdation  enormous;  his  prudence  and  caution  equal  to 
his  ambition  and  his  courage.  Once  launched  on  a  career  of 
conquest  in  the  East,  it  is  impossible  to  say  whither  he  might 
not  have  carried  the  Roman  eagles,  or  what  countries  he  might 
not  have  added  to  the  Empii-e.  But  Parthia  was  saved  from 
the  imminent  peril  without  any  effort  of  her  own.  The  daggers 
of  "the  Liberators  "  struck  down  on  the  15th  of  March,  B.C.  44, 
the  only  man  whom  she  had  seriously  to  fear ;  and  with  the 
removal  of  Julius  passed  away  even  from  Roman  thought  for 
many  a  year'  the  design  which  he  had  entertained,  and  which 
he  alone  could  have  accomplished. 

In  the  civil  war  that  followed  on  the  murder  of  Julius  the 
Parthians  are  declared  to  have  actually  taken  a  part.  It  ap- 
pears that— about  B.C.  46— a  small  body  of  Parthian  horse- 
archers  had  been  sent  to  the  assistance  of  a  certain  Bassus,'  a 
Roman  who  amid  the  trovibles  of  the  times  was  seeking  to 
obtain  for  himself  something  like  an  independent  principality 
in  Syria.  The  soldiers  of  Bassus,  after  a  while  (b.c.  43),  went 
over  in  a  body  to  Cassius,  who  was  in  the  East  collecting 
troops  for  his  great  struggle  with  Antony  and  Octavian ;  and 
thus  a  handful  of  Parthians  came  into  his  power.'"  Of  this 
circumstance  he  determmed  to  take  advantage,  in  order  to 
obtain,  if  possible,  a  considerable  body  of  troops  from  Orodes. 
He  presented  each  of  the  Parthian  soldiers  with  a  sum  of 


CH.  XII.]    SECOND  PARTHIAN  ATTACK  ON  ROME.  105 

money,  and  dismissed  them  all  to  their  homes,  at  the  same 
time  seizing  the  opportunity  to  send  some  of  his  own  officers, 
as  ambassadors,  to  Orodes,  with  a  request  for  substantial  aid.'' 
On  receiving  this  application  the  Parthian  monarch  appears  to 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  to  his  interest  to 
comply  with  it.  Whether  he  made  conditions,  or  no,  is  un- 
certain; but  he  seems  to  have  sent  a  pretty  numerous  body 
of  horse  to  the  support  of  the  "Liberators"  against  their  an- 
tagonists. '^  Perhaps  he  trusted  to  obtain  from  the  gi-atitude 
of  Cassius  what  he  had  failed  to  extort  from  the  fears  of 
Pompey.  Or,  perhaps,  he  was  only  anxious  to  prolong  the 
period  of  civil  disturbance  in  the  Roman  State,  which  secured 
his  own  territory  from  attack,  and  might  ultimately  give  liim 
an  opportimity  of  helping  himself  to  some  portion  of  the 
Eoman  dominions  in  Asia. 

The  opportunity  seemed  to  him  to  have  arrived  in  B.C.  40. 
Philippi  had  been  fought  and  lost.  The  "Liberators"  were 
crushed.  The  struggle  between  the  Republicans  and  the  Mon- 
archists had  come  to  an  end.  But,  instead  of  being  united, 
the  Roman  world  was  more  than  ever  divided ;  and  the  chance 
of  making  an  actual  territorial  gain  at  the  expense  of  the 
tiyant  power  appeared  fairer  than  it  had  ever  been  before. 
Three  rivals  now  held  divided  sway  in  the  Roman  State;''  each 
of  them  jealous  of  the  other  two,  and  anxious  for  his  own  ag- 
grandizement. The  two  chief  pretenders  to  the  first  place 
were  bitterly  hostile ;  and  while  the  one  was  detained  in  Italy 
by  insurrection  against  his  authority,  the  other  was  plunged 
in  luxury  and  dissipation,  enjoying  the  first  delights  of  a 
lawless  passion,  at  the  Egyptian  capital.  The  nations  of  the 
East  were,  moreover,  alienated  by  the  recent  exactions  of  the 
profligate  Triumvir,  '^  who,  to  reward  his  parasites  and  favor- 
ites, had  laid  upon  them  a  burden  that  they  were  scarcely 
able  to  bear.  Further,  the  Parthians  enjoyed  at  this  time  the 
advantage  of  having  a  Roman  officer  of  good  position  in  their 
service,"'  whose  knowledge  of  the  Roman  tactics,  and  influence 
in  Roman  provinces,  might  be  expected  to  turn  to  their  ad- 
vantage. Under  these  circumstances,  when  the  spring  of  the 
year  arrived,  Antony  being  still  in  Egypt,  and  Octavian  (as 
far  as  was  known)  occupied  in  the  siege  of  Perusia,'"  the 
Parthian  hordes,  under  Labienus  and  Pacorus,  burst  upon 
Syria  in  greater  force  than  on  any  previous  occasion.  Over- 
running with  their  numerous  cavalry  the  country  betAveen 
the  Euphrates    and  Antioch,  and  thence  the  valley  of  tli^j 


IQQ  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xn 

Orontes,  they  had  (as  usual)  some  difficulty  with  the  towns. 
From  Apamsea,  placed  (like  Durham)  on  a  rocky  peninsula 
almost  surrotmded  by  the  river/'  they  were  at  first  repulsed;'' 
but,  having  shortly  afterwards  defeated  Decidius  Saxa,  the 
governor  of  Syria,  in  the  open  field,  they  received  the  sub- 
mission of  Apamaea  and  Antioch,  which  latter  city  Saxa  aban- 
doned at  their  approach,  flying  precipitately  into  Cilicia." 
Encouraged  by  these  successes,  Labienus  and  Pacorus  agreed 
to  divide  their  troops,  and  to  engage  simultaneously  in  two 
great  expeditions.  Pacorus  undertook  to  carry  the  Parthian 
standard  throughout  the  entire  extent  of  Syria,  Phoenicia,  and 
Palestine,  while  Labienus  determined  to  invade  Asia  Minor, 
and  to  see  if  he  could  not  wrest  some  of  its  more  fertile  regions 
from  the  Romans.  Both  expeditions  were  crowned  with  suc- 
cess. Pacorus  reduced  all  Syria,  and  all  Phoenicia,  except  the 
single  city  of  Tyre,  which  he  was  unable  to  capture  for  want 
of  a  naval  force.  ■'°  He  then  advanced  into  Palestine,  which  he 
found  in  its  normal  condition  of  intestine  commotion.'^'  Hyr- 
canus  and  Antigonus,  two  princes  of  the  Asmoua^'an  house, 
were  rivals  for  the  Jewish  crown ;  and  the  latter,  whom  Hyr- 
canus  had  expelled,  was  content  to  make  common  cause  with 
the  invader,  and  to  be  indebted  to  a  rude  foreigner  for  the 
possession  of  the  kingdom  whoreto  he  aspired.  He  offered 
Pacorus  a  thousand  talents,  and  five  hundred  Jetvish  women, 
if  he  would  espouse  his  cause  and  seat  him  upon  his  uncle's 
throne.^-  The  offer  was  readily  embraced,  and  by  the  irresti- 
ble  help  of  the  Parthians  a  revolution  was  effected  at  Jerusa- 
lem. Hyrcanus  was  deposed  and  mutilated.  A  new  priest- 
king  was  set  up  in  the  person  of  Antigonus,  the  last  Asmo- 
nsean  prince,  who  held  the  capital  for  three  years — B.C.  40-37 
— as  a  Parthian  satrap,  the  creature  and  dependant  of  the 
great  monarchy  on  the  further  side  of  the  Euphrates.  Mean- 
while in  Asia  Minor  Labienus  carried  all  before  him.  Deci- 
dius Saxa,  having  once  more  (in  Cilicia)  ventured  upon  a 
battle,  was  not  only  defeated,  but  slain."  Pamphylia,  Lycia, 
and  Caria  were  overrun.  Stratonicea  was  besieged;  Mylasa 
and  Alabanda  were  taken.  ^*  According  to  some  writers  the 
Parthians  even  pillaged  Lydia  and  Ionia,  and  were  in  possess- 
ion of  Asia  to  the  shores  of  the  Hellespont.^'  It  may  be  said 
that  for  a  full  year  Western  Asia  changed  masters ;  the  rule 
and  authority  of  Rome  disappeared ;  and  the  Parthians  were 
recognized  as  the  dominant  power. 
But  the  fortune  of  war  now  began  to  turn.     In  the  autumn 


CH.  XII.]  VICTORIES  OF  VENTIDIUS.  107 

of  B.C.  39  Antony,  having  set  out  from  Italy  to  resume  his 
command  in  the  East,  despatched  his  lieutenant,  Publius 
Ventidius,  into  Asia,  with  orders  to  act  against  Labienus  and 
the  triumphant  Parthians.'"  Ventidius  landed  unexpectedly 
on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  so  alarmed  Labienus,  who  had 
no  Parthian  troops  with  him,  that  the  latter  fell  back  hur- 
riedly towards  Cilicia,  evacuating  all  the  more  western  pro- 
vinces, and  at  the  same  time  sending  urgent  messages  to 
Pacorus  to  implore  succor.  Pacorus  sent  a  body  of  horse  to  his 
aid ;  but  these  troops,  instead  of  putting  themselves  under  his 
command,  acted  independently,  and,  in  a  rash  attempt  to  sur 
prise  the  Roman  camp,  were  defeated  by  Ventidius,  whereupon 
they  fled  hastily  into  Cilicia,  leaving  Labienus  to  his  fate."' 
The  self-styled  "  Imperator, " '^''  upon  this,  deserted  his  men, 
and  sought  safety  in  flight ;  but  his  retreat  was  soon  discov- 
ered, and  he  was  pursued,  captured,  and  put  to  death. '''' 

The  Parthians,  meanwhile,  alarmed  at  the  turn  which  affairs 
had  taken,  left  Antigonus  to  maintain  their  interests  in  Pales- 
tine, and  concentrated  themselves  in  Northern  Syria  and 
Commagene,  where  they  awaited  the  advance  of  the  Romans. 
A  strong  detachment,  under  Pharnapates,  was  appointed  to 
guard  the  Syrian  Gates,  or  narrow  pass  over  Mount  Amanus, 
leading  from  Cilicia  into  Syria.  ^°  Here  Ventidius  gained  ano- 
ther victory.  He  had  sent  forward  an  officer  named  Pompse- 
dius  Silo  with  some  cavalry  to  endeavor  to  seize  this  post,  and 
Pompaedius  had  found  himself  compelled  to  an  engagement 
with  Pharnapates,  in  which  he  was  on  the  point  of  suffering 
defeat,  when  Ventidius  himself,  who  had  probably  feared  for 
his  subordinate's  safety,  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  turned  the 
scale  in  favor  of  the  Romans.  The  detachment  under  Pharna- 
I)ates  was  overpowered,  and  Pharnapates  himself  was  among 
the  slain.-"  When  news  of  this  defeat  reached  Pacorus,  he  re- 
solved to  retreat,  and  withdrew  his  troops  across  the 
Euphrates.  This  movement  he  appears  to  have  executed  with- 
out being  molested  by  Ventidius,  who  thus  recovered  Syria  to 
the  Romans  towards  the  close  of  B.C.  39,  or  early  in  B.C.  38. 

But  Pacorus  was  far  from  intending  to  relinquish  the  con- 
test. He  had  made  himself  popular  among  the  Syi'ians  by  his 
mild  and  just  administration,-'' and  knew  that  they  preferred 
his  government  to  that  of  the  Romans.  He  had  many  allies 
among  the  petty  princes  and  dynasts,"  who  occupied  a  semi- 
independent  position  on  the  borders  of  the  Parthian  and  Roman 
empires.     Antigonus,  whom  he  had  established  as  king  of  the 


508  THE  SIXTH  MONARCnr.  [ch.  xit. 

Jews,  still  maintained  himself  in  Judaea  against  the  efforts  of 
Herod, "  to  whom  Augustus  and  Antony  had  assigned  the  throne. 
Pacorus  therefore  arranged  during  the  remainder  of  the  win- 
ter for  a  fresh  invasion  of  Syria  in  the  spring,  and,  taking  the 
field  earher  than  his  adversary  expected,  made  ready  to  recross 
the  Euphrates.  We  are  told  that  if  he  had  crossed  at  the  usual 
point,  he  would  have  found  the  Eomans  unprepared,  the 
legions  heing  still  in  their  winter  quarters,  some  north  and 
some  south  of  the  range  of  Taurus.'^  Ventidius,  however, 
contrived  by  a  stratagem  to  induce  him  to  effect  the  passage  at 
a  different  point,  considerably  lower  down  the  stream,  and  in 
this  way  to  waste  some  valuable  time,  which  he  himself  em- 
ployed in  collecting  his  scattered  forces.  Thus,  when  the  Par- 
thians  appeared  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates,  the  Roman 
general  was  prepared  to  engage  them,  and  was  not  even  loath 
to  decide  the  fate  of  the  war  by  a  single  battle.  He  had  taken 
care  to  provide  himself  with  a  strong  force  of  slingers,  and  had 
entrenched  himself  in  a  position  on  high  ground  at  some  dis- 
tance from  the  river.  ^^  The  Parthians,  finding  their  passage  of 
the  Euphrates  unopposed,  and,  when  they  fell  in  with  the 
enemy,  seeing  him  entrenched,  as  though  resolved  to'  act  only 
on  the  defensive,  became  overbold ;  they  thought  the  force  op- 
posed to  them  must  be  weak  or  cowardly,  and  might  yield  its 
position  without  a  blow,  if  briskly  attacked.  Accordingly,  as 
on  a  former  occasion,"  they  charged  up  the  hill  on  which  the 
Roman  camp  was  placed,  hoping  to  take  it  by  sheer  audacity. 
But  the  troops  inside  were  held  ready,  and  at  the  proper  mo- 
ment issued  forth;  the  assailants  found  themselves  in  their 
turn  assailed,  and,  fighting  at  a  disadvantage  on  the  slope,  were 
soon  driven  down  the  declivity.  The  battle  was  renewed  in 
plain  below,  where  the  mailed  horse  of  the  Parthians  made  a 
brave  resistance;  but  the  slingers  galled  them  severely,  and 
in  the  midst  of  the  struggle  it  happened  that  by  ill-fortune 
Pacorus  was  slain.  The  result  followed  which  is  almost  in- 
variable with  an  Oriental  army :  having  lost  their  leader,  the 
soldiers  every  where  gave  way ;  flight  became  universal,  and  the 
Romans  gained  a  complete  victory. '«  The  Parthian  army  fled 
in  two  directions.  Part  made  for  the  bridge  of  boats  by  which 
it  hod  crossed  the  Euphrates,  but  was  intercepted  by  the 
Romans  and  destroyed.  Part  turned  northwards  into  Com- 
magene,  and  there  took  refuge  with  the  king,  Antiochus,  who 
refused  to  surrender  them  to  the  demand  of  Ventidius,  and  no 
doubt  allowed  them  to  return  to  their  own  coimtry. 


Cfl.  xil]     ROMANS  AND  PABTHIANS  COMPARED.  IQQ 

Thus  ended  the  great  Parthian  invasion  of  Syria,  and  with  it 
ended  the  prospect  of  any  further  spread  of  the  Arsacid  do- 
minion towards  the  west.  When  the  two  great  powers,  Rome 
and  Parthia,  first  came  into  collision — when  the  first  blow 
struck  by  the  latter,  the  destruction  of  the  army  of  Crassus, 
was  followed  up  by  the  advance  of  their  clouds  of  horse  into 
Syria,  Palestine,  and  Asia  Minor — when  Apameea,  Antioch, 
and  Jerusalem  fell  into  their  hands,  when  Decidius  Saxa  was 
defeated  and  slain,  Cilicia,  Pamphylia,  Caria,  Lydia,  and  Ionia 
occupied — it  seemed  as  if  Rome  had  found,  not  so  much  an 
equal  as  a  superior ;  it  looked  as  if  the  power  heretofore  pre- 
dominant would  be  compelled  to  contract  her  frontier,  and  as 
if  Parthia  would  advance  hers  to  the  Egean  or  the  Mediterra- 
nean. The  history  of  the  contest  between  the  East  and  the 
West,  between  Asia  and  Europe,  is  a  history  of  reactions.  At 
one  time  one  of  the  continents,  at  another  time  the  other,  is  in 
the  ascendant.  The  time  appeared  to  have  come  when  the 
Asiatics  were  once  more  to  recover  their  own,  and  to  beat  back 
the  European  aggressor  to  his  proper  shores  and  islands.  The 
triumphs  achieved  by  the  Seljukian  Turks  between  the 
eleventh  and  the  fifteenth  centuries  would  in  that  case  have 
been  anticipated  by  above  a  thousand  years  through  the  efforts 
of  a  kindred,  and  not  dissimilar  people.  '^  But  it  turned  out 
that  the  effort  made  was  premature.  While  the  Parthian  war- 
fare was  admirably  adapted  for  the  national  defence  on  the 
broad  plains  of  inner  Asia,  it  was  ill  suited  for  conquest,  and, 
comparatively  speaking,  ineffective  in  more  contracted  and 
difiicult  regions.  The  Parthian  military  system  had  not  the 
elasticity  of  the  Roman — it  did  not  in  the  same  way  adapt  it- 
self to  circvimstances,  or  admit  of  the  addition  of  new  arms,  or 
the  indefinite  expansion  of  an  old  one.  However  loose  and 
seemingly  flexible,  it  was  rigid  in  its  uniformity ;  it  never  al- 
tered ;  it  remained  under  the  thirtieth  Arsaces  such  as  it  had 
been  under  the  first,  improved  in  details,  perhaps,  but  essen- 
tially the  same  system.  The  Romans,  on  the  contrary,  were 
ever  modifying  their  system,  ever  learning  new  combinations 
or  new  manoeuvres  or  new  modes  of  warfare  from  their  enemies. 
They  met  the  Parthian  tactics  of  loose  array,  continuous  dis- 
tant missiles,  and  almost  exclusive  employment  of  cavalry,  with 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  their  own  horse,  a  larger  employ- 
ment of  auxiliary  irregulars,  and  a  gi'eater  use  of  the  sUng. "'  At 
the  same  time  they  learnt  to  takefull  advantage  of  the  Parthian 
inefficiency  against  Avails,  and  to  practice  against  them  the 
arts  of  pretended  retreat  and  ambush.    The  result  was.  that 


110  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xil 

Parthia  found  she  could  make  no  impression  upon  the  domin- 
ions of  Rome,  and,  having  become  persuaded  of  this  by  the 
experience  of  a  decade  of  years,  thenceforth  laid  aside  for  ever 
the  idea  of  attempting  Western  conquests.  She  took  up,  in 
fact,  from  this  time,  a  new  attitude.  Hitherto  she  had  been 
consistently  aggressive.  She  had  labored  constantly  to  extend 
herself  at  the  expense  successively  of  the  Bactrians,  the  Scy= 
thians,  the  Syro-Macedonians,  and  the  Armenians.  She  had 
proceeded  from  one  aggression  to  another,  leaving  only  short 
intervals  between  her  wars,  and  had  always  been  looking  out 
for  some  fresh  enemy.  Henceforth  she  became,  comparatively 
speaking,  pacific.  She  was  content  for  the  most  part,  to  main- 
tain her  limits.  She  sought  no  new  foe.  Her  contest  with 
Rome  degenerated  into  a  struggle  for  influence  over  the  king- 
dom of  Armenia :  and  her  hopes  were  limited  to  the  reduction 
of  that  kingdom  into  a  subject  position. 

The  death  of  Pacorus  is  said  to  have  caused  Orodes  intense 
grief."  For  many  days  he  would  neither  eat  nor  speak;  then 
his  sorrow  took  another  turn.  He  imagined  that  his  son  had 
returned ;  he  thought  continually  that  he  heard  or  saw  him ; 
he  could  do  nothing  but  repeat  his  name.  Every  now  and  then, 
however,  he  awoke  to  a  sense  of  the  actual  fact,  and  mourned 
the  death  of  his  favorite  with  tears.  After  a  while  this  ex- 
treme grief  wore  itself  out,  and  the  aged  king  began  to  direct 
his  attention  once  more  to  public  affairs.  He  grew  anxious 
about  the  succession."^  Of  the  thirty  sons  who  still  remained 
to  him  there  was  not  one  who  had  made  himself  a  name,  or  was 
in  any  way  distinguished  above  the  remainder.  In  the  absence 
of  any  personal  ground  of  preference,  Orodes — who  seems  to 
have  regarded  himself  as  possessing  a  right  to  nominate  the  son 
who  should  succeed  him— thought  the  claims  of  primogeniture 
deserved  to  be  considered,  and  selected  as  his  successor,  Phraa- 
tes,  the  eldest  of  the  thirty."  Not  content  with  nominating 
him,  or  perhaps  doubtful  whether  the  nomination  would  be  ac- 
cepted by  the  Megistanes,  he  proceeded  further  to  abdicate  in 
his  favor,  whereupon  Phraates  became  king.  The  transaction 
proved  a  most  unhappy  one.  Phraates,  jealous  of  some  of  his 
brothers,  who  were  the  sons  of  a  princess  married  to  Orodes,'* 
whereas  his  own  mother  was  only  a  concubine,  removed  them 
by  assassination,  and  when  the  ex-monarch  ventured  to  express 
disapproval  of  the  act  added  the  crime  of  parricide  to  fratri- 
cide by  putting  to  death  his  aged  father."'  Thus  perished 
Orodos.  after  a  reign  of  eighteen  years— the  most  memorable 
in  the  Parthian  annals. 


CH.  xiii]  REIGN  OF  PHRAATES  IV.  HI 


CHAPTER  Xin. 

Reign  of  Phraates  IV.  His  cruelties.  Flight  of  Monceses  to 
Antony.  Antonyms  great  Parthian  Expedition,  or  Invasion 
of  Media  Atropatene.  Its  Comjjlete  Failure.  Subsequent 
Alliance  of  the  Median  King  ivith  Antony.  War  between 
Parthia  and  Media.  Rebellion  raised  against  Phraates  by 
Tiridates.  Phraates  expelled.  He  recovers  his  Throne 
with  the  help  of  the  Scythians.  His  dealings  with  Augus- 
tus.   His  death  and  Character. 

"  Redditum  Cyri  solio  Phraatem 
Dissidens  plebi  numero  beatorum 
Eximit  Virtus."— Hor.  Od.  ii.  2.  16-18. 

The  shedding  of  blood  is  like  "the  letting  out  of  water." 
When  it  once  begins,  none  can  say  where  it  will  stop.  The  ab- 
solute monarch  who,  for  his  own  fancied  security,  commences 
a  system  of  executions,  is  led  on  step  by  step  to  wholesale  atro- 
cities from  which  he  would  have  shrunk  with  horror  at  the 
outset.  Phraates  had  removed  brothers  whose  superior  advan- 
tages of  birth  made  them  formidable  rivals.  He  had  punished 
with  death  a  father  who  ventured  to  blame  his  act,  and  to  for- 
get that  by  abdication  he  had  sunk  himself  to  the  position  of  a 
subject.  Could  he  have  stopped  here,  it  might  have  seemed 
that  his  severities  proceeded  not  so  much  from  cruelty  of  dis- 
position as  from  political  necessity;  and  historians,  always 
tender  in  the  judgments  which  they  pass  on  kings  under  such 
circumstances,  would  probably  have  condoned  or  justified  his 
conduct.  But  the  taste  for  bloodshed  grows  with  the  indul- 
gence of  it.  In  a  short  time  the  young  king  had  killed  all  his 
remaining  brothers, '  although  their  birth  was  no  better  than 
his  own,  and  there  was  no  valid  ground  for  his  fearing  them ; 
and  soon  afterwards,  not  content  with  the  murder  of  his  own 
relations,  he  began  to  vent  his  fury  upon  the  Parthian  nobles. 
Many  of  these  suffered  death;-  and  such  a  panic  seized  the 
order  that  numbers  quitted  the  country,  and  dispersed  in  dif- 
ferent directions,  content  to  remain  in  exile  until  the  danger 
which  threatened  them  should  have  passed  by.  There  were 
others,  however,  who  were  not  so  patient.  A  body  of  chiefs 
had  fled  to  Antony,  among  whom  was  a  certain  Monseses,  a 


119 


TllM  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xnt 


nobleman  of  the  highest  rank,'  who  seems  to  have  distinguished 
himself  previously  in  the  Syrian  wars."  This  person  repre- 
sented to  Antony  that  Phraates  had  by  his  tyrannical  and 
bloody  conduct  made  himself  hateful  to  his  subjects,  and  that 
a  revolution  could  easily  be  effected.  If  the  Romans  would 
support  him,  he  offered  to  invade  Parthia;  and  he  made  no 
doubt  of  wresting  the  greater  portion  of  it  from  the  hands  of 
the  tyrant,  and  of  being  himself  accepted  as  king.  In  that  case 
he  would  consent  to  hold  his  crown  of  the  Romans,  who  might 
depend  upon  his  fidelity  and  gratitude.  Antony  is  said  to 
have  listened  to  these  overtures,  and  to  have  been  induced  by 
them  to  turn  his  thoughts  to  an  invasion  of  the  Parthian  king- 
dom.' He  began  to  collect  troops  and  to  obtain  allies  with  this 
object.  He  entered  into  negotiations  with  Artavasdes,  the  Ar- 
menian king, "  who  seems  at  this  time  to  have  been  more  afraid 
of  Rome  than  of  Parthia,  and  engaged  him  to  take  a  part  in  his 
projected  campaign.  He  spoke  of  employing  Monseses  in  a 
separate  expedition.  Under  these  circumstances  Phraates  be- 
came alarmed.  He  sent  a  message  to  Monaeses  with  promises 
of  pardon  and  favor,  which  that  chief  thought  worthy  of  ac- 
ceptance. Hereupon  Monaeses  represented  to  Antony  that  by 
a  peaceful  return  he  might  perhaps  do  him  as  much  service  as 
by  having  recourse  to  arms ;  and  though  Antony  was  not  per- 
suaded, he  thought  it  prudent  to  profess  himself  weU  satisfied, 
and  to  allow  Monaeses  to  quit  liim.  His  relations  with  Parthia, 
he  said,  might  perhaps  be  placed  on  a  proper  footing  without  a 
war,  and  he  was  quite  willing  to  try  negotiation.  His  ambas- 
sadors should  accompany  Monaeses.  They  would  be  instructed 
to  demand  nothing  of  Phraates  but  the  restoration  of  the 
Roman  standards  taken  from  Crassus,  and  the  liberation  of 
such  of  the  captive  soldiers  as  were  still  living.'' 

But  Antony  had  really  determined  on  war.  It  may  be 
doubted  whether  it  had  required  the  overtures  of  Monaeses  to 
put  a  Parthian  expedition  into  his  thoughts.  He  must  have 
been  either  more  or  less  than  a  man  if  the  successes  of  his 
lieutenants  had  not  stirred  in  his  mind  some  feeling  of  jealousy, 
and  some  desire  to  throw  their  victories  into  the  shade  by  a 
grand  and  noble  achievement.  Especially  the  glory  of  Venti- 
dius,  who  had  been  allowed  the  much-coveted  honor  of  a 
triumph  at  Rome  on  account  of  his  defeats  of  the  Parthians  in 
Cilicia  and  Syria,^  must  have  moved  him  to  emulation,  and 
have  caused  him  to  cast  about  for  some  means  of  exalting  his 
own  military  reputation  above  that  of  his  subordinates.     For 


CH.  xm.]      PARTHIAN  EXPEDITION  OE  ANTONY.  113 

this  purpose  nothing,  he  must  have  known,  would  be  so  ef- 
fectual as  a  real  Parthian  success,  the  inflicting  on  this  hated 
and  dreaded  foe  of  an  unmistakable  humiliation,  the  dictating 
to  them  terms  of  peace  on  their  own  soil  after  some  crushing 
and  overwhelming  disaster.  And,  after  the  victories  of  Venti- 
dius,  this  did  not  appear  to  be  so  very  diflBcult.  The  prestige 
of  the  Parthian  name  was  gone.  Eoman  soldiers  could  be 
trusted  to  meet  them  without  alarm,  and  to  contend  with  them 
without  undue  excitement  or  flurry.  The  weakness,  as  well 
as  the  strength,  of  their  military  system  had  come  to  be 
known ;  and  expedients  had  been  devised  by  which  its  strong 
points  were  met  and  counterbalanced.''  At  the  head  of  six- 
teen legions, '"  Antony  might  well  think  that  he  could  invade 
Parthia  successfully,  and  not  only  avoid  the  fate  of  Crassus, 
but  gather  laurels  which  might  serve  him  in  good  stead  in  hia 
contest  with  his  great  political  rival. 

Nor  can  the  Roman  general  be  taxed  with  undue  precipita- 
tion or  with  attacking  in  insufiicient  force.  He  had  begun,  as 
already  noticed,  with  securing  the  co-operation  of  the  Arme- 
nian king,  Artavasdes,  who  promised  him  a  contingent  of 
7000  foot  and  6000  horse.  His  Roman  infantry  is  estimated 
at  60,000;  besides  which  he  had  10,000  Gallic  and  Iberian  horse, 
and  30,000  light  armed  and  cavalry  of  the  Asiatic  allies."  His 
own  army  thus  amounted  to  100,000  men;  and,  with  the 
Armenian  contingent,  his  entire  force  would  have  been  113,000. 
It  seems  that  it  was  his  original  intention  to  cross  the 
Euphrates  into  Mesopotamia,  and  thus  to  advance  almost  in 
the  footsteps  of  Crassus:'- but  when  he  reached  the  banks  of 
the  river  (about  midsummer  B.C.  37)  he  found  such  prepara- 
tions made  to  resist  him  that  he  abandoned  his  first  design, 
and,  turning  northwards,  entered  Armenia,  determined  to 
take  advantage  of  his  alliance  with  Artavasdes,  and  to  attack 
Parthia  with  Armenia  as  the  basis  of  his  operations.  Arta- 
vasdes gladly  received  him,  and  persuaded  him,  instead  of 
penetrating  into  Parthia  itself,  to  direct  his  arms  against  the 
territory  of  a  Parthian  subject-ally,''  the  king  of  Media  Atro- 
patene,  whose  territories  adjoined  Armenia  on  the  southeast. 
Artavasdes  pointed  out  that  the  Median  monarch  was  absent 
from  his  own  country,  having  joined  his  troops  to  those  which 
Phraates  had  collected  for  the  defence  of  Parthia.  His  terri- 
tory therefore  would  be  open  to  ravage,  and  even  Praaspa,  hia 
capital,  might  prove  an  easy  prey.  The  prospect  excited  An- 
tony, who  at  once  divided  his  troops,  and  ha\'ing  given  orders 


;II4  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xin. 

to  Oppiiis  Statianus  to  follow  him  leisurely  with  the  more  un- 
wieldy part  of  the  army,  the  baggage-train,  and  the  siege 
batteries,  proceeded  himself  by  forced  marches  to  Praaspa 
with  all  the  calvary  and  the  infantry  of  the  better  class.** 
This  town  was  situated  at  the  distance  of  nearly  three  hun- 
dred miles  from  the  Armenian  frontier;'^  but  the  way  to  it 
lay  through  well-cultivated  plains,  where  food  and  water 
were  abundant.  Antony  performed  the  march  without  diffi- 
culty and  at  once  invested  the  place.  The  walls  were 
strong,  and  the  defenders  numerous,  so  that  he  made  little 
impression;  and  when  the  Median  king  returned,  accom- 
panied by  his  Parthian  suzerain,  to  the  defence  of  his  coun- 
try, the  capital  seemed  in  so  little  danger  that  it  was  re- 
solved to  direct  the  first  attack  on  Statianus,  who  had  not  yet 
joined  his  chief.  A  most  successful  onslaught  was  made  on 
this  officer,  who  was  surprised,  defeated,  and  slain. '°  Ten 
thousand  Romans  fell  in  the  battle,"  and  all  the  baggage- 
wagons  and  engines  of  war  were  taken.  A  still  worse  result 
of  the  defeat  was  the  desertion  of  Artavasdes,  who,  regarding 
the  case  of  the  Romans  as  desperate,  drew  off  his  troops,  and 
left  Antony  to  his  own  resources. '' 

The  Roman  general  now  found  himself  in  great  difficulties. 
He  had  exhausted  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Praaspa, 
and  was  obliged  to  send  his  foraging-parties  on  distant  expedi- 
tions, where,  being  beyond  the  reach  of  his  protection,  they 
were  attacked  and  cut  to  pieces  by  the  enemy. '"  He  had  lost 
his  siege-train,  and  found  it  impossible  to  construct  another. 
Such  works  as  he  attempted  suffered  through  the  sallies  of  the 
besieged ;  and  in  some  of  these  his  soldiers  behaved  so  ill  that 
he  was  forced  to  punish  their  cowardice  by  decimation.^"  His 
supplies  failed,  and  he  had  to  feed  his  troops  on  barley  instead 
of  wheat.  Meantime  the  autumnal  equinox  was  approaching, 
and  the  weather  was  becoming  cold.  The  Medes  and  Par- 
tihians,  under  their  respective  monarchs,  hung  about  him,  im- 
peded his  movements,  and  cut  off  his  stragglers,  but  carefully 
avoided  engaging  him  in  a  pitched  battle.  If  he  could  have 
forced  the  city  to  a  surrender,  he  would  have  been  in  compara- 
tive safety,  for  he  might  have  gone  into  winter  quarters  there 
and  have  renewed  the  war  in  the  ensuing  spring.  But  all  his 
assaults,  with  whatever  desperation  they  were  made,  failed; 
and  it  became  necessary  to  relinquish  the  siege  and  retire  into 
Armenia  before  the  rigors  of  winter  should  set  in.  He  could, 
however,  with  difficulty  bring  himself  to  make  a  confession  of 


CH.  xiil]  ANTONY  IS  FOHCED   TO  liBTlRE.  115 

failure,  and  flattered  himself  for  a  while  that  the  Parthians 
would  consent  to  purchase  his  retirement  by  the  surrender  of 
the  Crassian  captives  and  standards.  Having  lost  some  valu- 
able time  in  negotiations,  at  which  the  Parthians  laughed,^'  at 
length,  when  the  equinox  was  passed,  he  broke  up  from  before 
Praaspa,  and  commenced  the  work  of  retreat.  There  were 
two  roads"  by  which  he  might  reach  the  Araxes  at  the  usual 
point  of  passage,  One  lay  towards  the  left,  throvigh  a  plain 
and  open  country,'^  probably  that  through  which  he  had 
come ;  the  other,  which  was  shorter,  but  more  diflBcult,  lay  to 
the  right,  leading  across  a  mountain-tract,  but  one  fairly  sup- 
plied with  water,  and  in  which  there  were  inhabited  villages. 
Antony  was  advised  that  the  Parthians  had  occupied  the  easier 
route,  ^*  expecting  that  he  would  follow  it,  and  intended  to 
overwhelm  him  with  their  cavalry  in  the  plains.  He  there- 
fore took  the  road  to  the  right  through  a  rugged  and  inclement 
country— probably  that  between  Tahkt-i-Suleiman  and  Tabriz" 
—and,  guided  by  a  Mardian  who  knew  the  region  weU,  pro- 
ceeded to  make  his  way  back  to  the  Araxes.  His  decision 
took  the  Parthians  by  surprise,  and  for  two  days  he  was  un- 
molested. But  by  the  third  day  they  had  thrown  themselves 
across  his  path ;  and  thenceforward,  for  nineteen  consecutive 
days,  they  disputed  with  Antony  every  inch  of  his  retreat, 
and  inflicted  on  him  the  most  serious  damage.  The  sufl:ei'ings 
of  the  Roman  army  during  this  time,  says  a  modern  historian 
of  Rome,^*  were  unparalleled  in  their  military  annals.  The 
intense  cold,  the  blinding  snow  and  driving  sleet,  the  want 
sometimes  of  provisions,  sometimes  of  water,  the  use  of  poison- 
ous herbs,  and  the  harassing  attacks  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
and  bowmen,  which  could  only  be  repelled  by  maintaining  the 
dense  array  of  the  phalanx  or  the  tortoise,  reduced  the  retreat- 
ing army  by  one-third  of  its  numbers.  At  length,  after  a 
march  of  300  Roman,  or  277  British,  miles,  they  reached  the 
river  Araxes,  probably  at  the  Julfa  ferry,  and,  crossing  it, 
found  themselves  in  Armenia.  But  the  calamities  of  the 
return  were  not  yet  ended.  Though  it  was  arranged  with 
Artavasdes  that  the  bulk  of  the  army  should  winter  in 
Armenia,"  yet,  before  the  various  detachments  could  reach 
their  quarters  in  difi'erent  parts  of  the  country,  eight  thousand 
more  had  perished  through  the  effects  of  past  sufferings  or  the 
severity  of  the  weather.^*  Altogether,  out  of  the  hundred 
thousand  men  whom  Antony  led  into  Media  Atropatene,  less 
than  seventy  thousand'''  remained  to  commence  the  campaign 


21(5  THE  SIXTH  MONABCnr.  [ch  xni 

which  was  threatened  for  the  ensuing  year.  Well  may  the 
unfortunate  commander  have  exclaimed  as  he  compared  his 
own  heavy  losses  with  the  light  ones  of  Xenophon  and  his 
Greeks  in  these  same  regions,  "Oh,  those  Ten  Thousand! 
those  Ten  Thousand !"  =" 

On  the  withdrawal  of  Antony  into  Armenia  a  quarrel  broke 
out  between  Phraates  and  his  Median  vassal.  The  latter  re- 
garded himself  as  wronged  in  the  division  made  of  the  Eoman 
spoils,^' and  expressed  himself  with  so  much  freedom  on  the 
subject  as  to  offend  his  suzerain.  He  then  began  to  fear  that 
he  had  gone  too  far,  and  that  Phraates  would  punish  him  by 
depriving  him  of  his  sovereignty.  Accordingly,  he  was  anxious 
to  obtain  a  powerful  alliance,  and  on  turning  over  in  his  mind 
all  feasible  pohtical  combinations  it  seems  to  have  occurred  to 
him  that  his  late  enemy,  Antony,  might  be  disposed  to  take 
him  under  his  protection.  He  doubtless  knew  that  Artavasdes 
of  Armenia  had  offended  the  Roman  leader  by  deserting  him 
in  the  hour  of  his  greatest  peril,  and  felt  that,  if  Antony  was 
intending  to  revenge  himself  on  the  traitor,  he  would  be  glad 
to  have  a  friend  on  the  Armenian  border.  He  therefore  sent 
an  ambassador  of  rank^-  to  Alexandria,  where  Antony  was 
passing  the  winter,  and  boldly  proposed  the  alhance.  Antony 
readily  accepted  it ;  he  was  intensely  angered  by  the  conduct 
of  the  Armenian  monarch,  and  determined  on  punishing  his 
defection ;  he  viewed  the  Median  alliance  as  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance in  connection  with  the  design,  which  he  still  enter- 
tained, of  invading  Parthia  itself;'^  and  he  saw  in  the  powerful 
descendant  of  Atropates  a  prince  whom  it  would  be  well  worth 
his  while  to  bind  to  his  cause  indissolubly.  He  therefore  em- 
braced the  overtures  made  to  him  with  joy,  and  even  rewarded 
the  messenger  who  had  brought  them  with  a  principality.'* 
After  sundry  efforts  to  entice  Artavasdes  into  his  power,  which 
occupied  him  dtiring  most  of  B.C.  35,  in  the  spring  of  B.C.  34  he 
suddenly  appeared  in  Armenia.  His  army,  which  had  re- 
mained there  from  the  previous  campaign,  held  all  the  more 
impoi-tant  positions,  and,  as  he  professed  the  most  friendly 
feelings  towards  Artavasdes,  even  proposing  an  alliance  be- 
tween their  famihes,''  that  prince,  after  some  hesitation,  at 
length  ventured  into  his  presence.  He  was  immediately  seized 
and  put  in  chains. ''  Annenia  was  rapidly  overrun.  Artaxias, 
whom  the  Armenians  made  king  in  the  room  of  his  father, 
was  defeated  and  forced  to  take  refuge  with  the  Parthians. 
Antony  then  arranged  a  marriage  between  the  daughter  of  the 


CH.  XIII.]  ANTONY  PUNISHES  ARMENIA.  \YI 

Median  monarch''  and  his  own  son  by  Cleopatra,  Alexander, 
and,  leaving  garrisons  in  Armenia,  carried  off  Artavasdes  and 
a  rich  booty  into  Egypt. 

Phraates,  during  these  transactions,  stood  wholly  upon  the 
defensive.  It  may  not  have  been  vm  pleasing  to  him  to  see 
Artavasdes  punished.  It  must  have  gratified  him  to  observe 
how  Antony  was  injuring  his  own  cause  by  exasperating  the 
Armenians,  and  teaching  them  to  hate  Eorae  even  more  than 
they  hated  Parthia.'^  But  while  Antony's  troops  held  both 
Syria  and  Armenia,  and  the  alliance  between  Media  Atropatene 
and  Rome  continued,  he  could  not  venture  to  take  any  ag- 
gressive step  or  do  aught  but  protect  his  own  frontier.  He 
was  obliged  even  to  look  on  with  patience,  when,  early  in  B.C. 
33,  Antony  appeared  once  more  in  these  parts, '"  and  advanc- 
ing to  the  Araxes,  had  a  conference  with  the  Median  monarch, 
whereat  their  aUiance  was  confirmed,  troops  exchanged,  part 
of  Armenia  made  over  to  the  Median  king,  and  Jotapa,  his 
daughter,  given  as  a  bride  to  the  young  Alexander,  whom 
Antony  designed  to  make  satrap  of  the  East."  But  no  sooner 
had  Antony  withdrawn  into  Asia  Minor  in  preparation  for  his 
contest  with  Octavian  than  Phraates  took  the  offensive.  In 
combination  with  Artaxias,  the  new  Armenian  king,  he  at- 
tacked Antony's  ally ;  but  the  latter  repulsed  bun  by  the  help 
of  his  Roman  troops.  Soon  afterwards,  however,  Antony  re- 
called these  troops  without  restoring  to  the  Median  king  his 
own  contingent;  upon  which  the  two  confederates  renewed 
their  attack,  and  were  successful.  The  Median  prmce  was  de- 
feated and  taken  prisoner."'  Artaxias  recovered  Armenia  and 
massacred  all  the  Roman  garrisons  which  he  found  in  it." 
Both  countries  became  once  more  wholly  independent  of 
Rome,  and  it  is  probable  that  Media  returned  to  its  old  al- 
legiance. 

But  the  successes  of  Phraates  abroad  produced  ill  conse- 
quences at  home.  Elated  by  his  victories,  and  regarding  his 
position  in  Parthia  as  thereby  secured,  he  resumed  the  series 
of  cruelties  towards  his  subjects  which  the  Roman  war  had  in- 
terrupted, and  pushed  them  so  far  that  an  insurrection  broke 
out  against  his  authority  (B.C.  33),  and  he  was  compelled  to 
quit  the  country."  The  revolt  was  headed  by  a  certain  Tiri- 
dates,  who,  upon  its  success,  was  made  king  by  the  insurgents. 
Phraates  fled  into  Scythia,  and  persuaded  the  Scythians  to  em- 
brace his  cause.  These  nomads,  nothing  loth,  took  up  arms, 
and  without  any  great  difficulty  restored  Phraates  to  the 


118  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xin. 

throne  from  which  his  people  had  expelled  him.  Tiridates 
fled  at  their  approach,  and,  having  contrived  to  carry  off  in 
his  flight  the  youngest  son  of  Phraates,  presented  himself  be- 
fore Octavian,  who  was  in  Syria  at  the  time  on  his  return 
from  Egypt  (B.C.  30),"  surrendered  the  young  prince  into  his 
hands,  and  requested  his  aid  against  the  tyrant."^  Octavian 
accepted  the  valuable  hostage,  but  with  his  usual  caution,  de- 
*  clined  to  pledge  himself  to  furnish  any  help  to  the  pretender ; 
he  might  remain,  he  said,  in  Ssrria,  if  he  so  wished,  and  while 
he  continued  under  Eoman  protection,  a  suitable  provision 
shoidd  be  made  for  his  support,  but,  he  must  not  expect  armed 
resistance  against  the  Parthian  monarch.  To  that  monarch, 
when  some  years  afterwards  (B.C.  23)  he  demanded  the  sur- 
render of  his  subject  and  the  restoration  of  his  young  son, 
Octavian  answered^"  that  he  could  not  give  Tiridates  up  to 
him,  but  he  would  restore  him  his  son  without  a  ransOm.  He 
should  expect,  however,  that  in  return  for  this  kindness  the 
Parthian  king  would  on  his  part  deliver  to  the  Romans  the 
standards  taken  from  Crassus  and  Antony,  together  with  all 
who  survived  of  the  Roman  captives.  It  does  not  appear  that 
Phraates  was  much  moved  by  the  Emperor's  generosity.  He 
gladly  received  his  son ;  but  he  took  no  steps  towards  the  resto- 
ration of  those  proofs  of  Parthian  victory  which  the  Romans 
were  so  anxious  to  recover.  It  was  not  until  B.C.  20,  when 
Octavian  (now  become  Augustus)  visited  the  East,  and  war 
seemed  the  probable  alternative  if  he  continued  obstinate,  that 
the  Parthian  monarch  brought  himself  to  relinquish  the  tro- 
phies which  were  as  much  prized  by  the  victors  as  the  van- 
quished." In  extenuation  of  his  act  we  must  remember  that 
he  was  unpopular  with  his  subjects,  and  that  Augustus  could 
at  any  moment  have  produced  a  pretender,  who  had  once  oc- 
cupied, and  with  Roman  help  might  easily  have  movmted  for 
a  second  time,  the  throne  of  the  Arsacidae. 

The  remaining  years  of  Phraates— and  he  reigned  for  nearly 
twenty  years  after  restoring  the  standards— are  almost  un- 
broken by  any  event  of  importance.  The  result  of  the  twenty 
years'  struggle  between  Rome  and  Parthia  had  been  to  impress 
either  nation  with  a  wholesome  dread  of  the  other.  Both  had 
triumphed  on  their  own  ground;  both  had  failed  when  they 
ventured  on  sending  expeditions  into  the  enemy's  territory. 
Each  now  stood  on  its  guard,  watching  the  movements  of  its 
adversary  across  the  Euphrates.  Both  had  become  pacific. 
It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  Augustus  left  it  as  a  principle  of 


CH.  xiii.]    PHRAATES  SENDS  HIS  SONS  TO  HOME.  119 

policy  to  his  successors  that  the  Eoman  Empire  had  reached 
its  proper  Hmits,  and  could  not  with  advantage  be  extended 
further.""  This  principle,  followed  with  the  utmost  strictness 
by  Tiberius,  was  accepted  as  a  rule  by  all  the  earlier  Caesars, 
and  only  regarded  as  admitting  of  rare  and  shght  exceptions. 
Trajan  was  the  first  who,  a  hundred  and  thirty  years  after 
the  accession  of  Augustus,  made  light  of  it  and  set  it  at  de- 
fiance. With  him  re-awoke  the  spirit  of  conquest,  the  aspira- 
tion after  universal  dominion.  But  in  the  meantime  there 
was  peace — peace  indeed  not  absolutely  unbroken,  for  border 
wars  occurred,  and  Rome  was  tempted  sometimes  to  interfere 
by  arms  in  the  internal  quarrels  of  her  neighbor"'' — but  a  gen- 
eral state  of  peace  and  amity  prevailed — neither  state  made 
any  grand  attack  on  the  other's  dominions— no  change  occurred 
in  the  frontier,  no  great  battle  tested  the  relative  strength  of 
the  two  peoples.  Such  rivalry  as  remained  was  exhibited  less 
in  arms  than  in  diplomacy  and  showed  itself  mainly  in  en- 
deavors on  either  side  to  obtain  a  predominant  influence  in 
Armenia.  There  alone  during  the  century  and  a  half  that  in- 
tervened between  Antony  and  Trajan  did  the  interests  of  Rome 
and  Parthia  come  into  collision,  and  in  connection  with  this 
kingdom  alone  did  any  struggle  between  the  two  countries 
continue. 

Phraates,  after  yielding  to  Augustus  in  the  matter  of  the 
standards  and  prisoners,  appears  for  many  years  to  have 
studiously  cultivated  his  good  graces.  In  the  interval  between 
B.C.  11  and  B.C.  7,^°  distrustful  of  his  subjects,  and  fearful  of 
their  removing  him  in  order  to  place  one  of  his  sons  upon  the 
Parthian  throne,  he  resolved  to  send  these  possible  rivals  out 
of  the  country;  and  on  this  occasion  he  paid  Augustus  the 
compliment  af  selecting  Rome  for  his  children's  residence." 
The  youths  were  four  in  number,  Vonones,  Seraspadanes, 
Rhodaspes,  and  Phraates;"  two  of  them  were  married  and 
had  children ;  they  resided  at  Rome  during  the  remainder  of 
their  father's  lifetime,  and  were  treated  as  became  their  rank, 
being  supported  at  the  pubhc  charge  and  in  a  magnificent 
manner."  The  Roman  writers  speak  of  these  as  "hostages" 
given  by  Phraates  to  the  Roman  Emperor;"  but  this  was 
certainly  not  the  intention  of  the  Parthian  monarch;  nor 
could  the  idea  well  be  entertained  by  the  Romans  at  the  time 
of  their  residence. 

These  amicable  relations  between  the  two  sovereigns  would 
probably  have  continued  undisturbed  till  the  death  of  one  or 


120  THE  SIXTH  MONAllCHY.  [ch.  xnt 

the  other,  had  not  a  revolution  occured  in  Armenia,  which 
tempted  the  Parthian  king  beyond  his  powers  of  resistance. 
On  the  death  of  Artaxias  (B.C.  20),  Augiistus,  who  was  then 
in  the  East,  had  sent  Tiberius  into  Armenia  to  arrange  matters, 
and  Tiberius  had  placed  upon  the  throne  a  brother  of  Artaxias, 
named  Tigranes."    Tigranes  died  in  B.C.  6,  and  the  Armenians, 
without  waiting  to  know  the  will  of  the  Roman  Emperor,  con- 
ferred the  royal  title  on  his  sons,  for  whose  succession  he  had 
before  his  death  paved  the  way  by  associating  them  with  him 
in  the  government.  ^"^    Enraged  at    this  assumption  of  inde- 
pendence, Augustus  sent  an  expedition  into  Armenia  (B.C.  5), 
deposed  the  sons  of  Tigranes,  and  established  on  the  throne  a 
certain  Artavasdes,  whose  birth  and  parentage  are  not  known 
to  us. "    But  the  Armenians  were  not  now  inclined  to  submit 
to  foreign  dictation;  they  rose  in  revolt  against  Artavasdes 
(ab.  B.C.  3),  defeated  his  Eoman  supporters,  and  expelled  him 
from  the  kingdom.^*    Another  Tigranes  was  made  king;^'  and, 
as  it  was  pretty  certain  that  the  Romans  woiild  interfere  with 
this  new  display  of  the  spirit  of  independence,  the  Parthians 
were  called  in  to  resist  the  Roman  oppressors.    Armenia,  was, 
in  fact,  too  weak  to  stand  alone,  and  was  obliged  to  lean  upon 
one  or  other  of  the  two  great  empires  upon  her  borders.    Her 
people  had  no  clear  political  foresight,   and  allowed  them- 
selves to  veer  and  fluctuate  between  the  two  influences  ac- 
cording as  the  feelings  of  the  hour  dictated.    Rome  had  now 
angered  them  beyond  their  very  limited  powers  of  endurance, 
and  they  flew  to  Parthia  for  help,  just  as  on  other  occasions 
we  shall  find  them  flying  to  Rome.     Phraates  could  not  bring 
himself  to  reject  the  Armenian  overtures.     Ever  since  the 
time  of  the  second  Mithridates  it  had  been  a  settled  maxim  of 
Parthian  pohcy  to  make  Armenia  dependent ;  and,  even  at  the 
cost  of  a  rupture  with  Rome,  it  seemed  to  Phraates  that  he 
must  respond  to  the  appeal  made  to  him.     The  rupture  might 
not  come.    Augustus  was  now  aged,  and  might  submit  to  the 
affront  without  resenting  it.    He  had  lately  lost  the  services 
of  his  best  general,  Tiberius,  who,  indignant  at  slights  put 
upon  him,  had  gone  into  retirement  at  Rhodes.     He  had  no 
one  that  he  could  employ  but  his  grandsons,  youths  who  had 
not  yet    fleshed  their  maiden    swords.      Phraates   probably 
hoped  that  Augustus  would  draw  back  before  the  terrors  of  a 
Parthian  war  under  such  circumstances,   and  would  allow 
without  remonstrance  the  imssing  of  Armenia  into  the  position 
of  a  subject-ally  of  Parthia. 


CH.  XIII.]  DEATH  OF  PIIRAATES  IV.  121 

But  if  these  were  his  thoughts,  he  had  miscalculated.  Au- 
gustus, from  the  time  that  he  heard  of  the  Armenian  troubles, 
and  of  the  support  given  to  them  by  Parthia,  seems  never  to 
have  wavered  in  his  determination  to  vindicate  the  claims  of 
Rome  to  paramount  influence  in  Armenia,  and  to  have  only- 
hesitated  as  to  the  person  whose  services  he  should  employ  in 
the  business.  He  would  have  been  glad  to  employ  Tiberius ; 
but  that  morose  prince  had  deserted  him  and,  declining  pub- 
lic life,  had  betaken  himself  to  Rhodes,  where  he  was  living  in 
a  self-chosen  retirement.  Caius,  the  eldest  of  his  grandsons, 
was,  in  B.C.  2,  only  eighteen  years  of  age;  and,  though  the 
thoughts  of  Augustus  at  once  turned  in  this  direction,  the  ex- 
treme youth  of  the  prince  caused  him  to  hesitate  somewhat ; 
and  the  consequence  was  that  Caius  did  not  start  for  the  East 
till  late  in  B.C.  1.  Meanwhile  a  change  had  occured  in  Parthia. 
Phraates,  who  had  filled  the  throne  for  above  thirty-five  years, 
ceased  to  exist,  ""and  was  succeeded  by  a  young  son,  Phraataces, 
who  reigned  in  conjunction  with  the  queen-mother,  Thermusa, 
or  Musa." 

The  circumstances  which  brought  about  this  change  were  the 
following.  Phraates  IV.  had  married,  late  in  life,  an  Italian 
slave-girl,  sent  him  as  a  present  by  Augustus;  and  she  had 
borne  him  a  son  for  whom  she  was  naturally  anxious  to  secure 
the  succession.  According  to  some,  it  was  under  her  influence 
that  the  monarch  had  sent  his  four  elder  boys  to  Rome,  there 
to  receive  their  education.  ^'^  At  any  rate,  in  the  absence  of 
these  youths,  Phraataces,  the  child  of  the  slave-girl,  became 
the  chief  support  of  Phraates  in  the  administration  of  affairs, 
and  obtained  a  position  in  Parthia  which  led  him  to  regard 
himself  as  entitled  to  the  throne  so  soon  as  it  should  become 
vacant.  Doubtful,  however,  of  his  father^s  goodwill,  or  fear- 
ful of  the  rival  claims  of  his  brothers,  if  he  waited  till  the 
throne  was  vacated  in  the  natural  covirse  of  events,  Phraataces 
resolved  to  anticipate  the  hand  of  time,  and,  in  conjunction 
with  his  mother,  administered  poison  to  the  old  monarch," 
from  the  effects  of  which  he  died.  A  just  Nemesis  for  once 
showed  itself  in  that  portion  of  human  affairs  which  passes  be- 
fore our  eyes.  Phraates  IV.,  the  parricide  and  fratricide, 
was,  after  a  reign  of  thirty-five  years,  himself  assassinated  (b. 
c.  2)  by  a  wife  whom  he  loved  only  too  fondly  and  a  son 
whom  he  esteemed  and  ti'usted. 

Phraates  cannot  but  bo  roc^nrded  as  one  of  the  ablest  of  the 
Parthian  monarchs.     His  conduct  of  the  campaign  against 


122  TEE  SIXTH  monarchy:  [ch.  xtii. 

Antony— one  of  the  best  soldiers  that  Eome  ever  produced— 
was  admirable,  and  showed  him  a  master  of  guerilla  warfare. 
His  success  in  maintaining  himself  upon  the  throne  for  five 
and  thirty  years,  in  spite  of  rivals,  and  notwithstanding  the 
character  which  he  obtained  for  cruelty,  implies,  in  such  a 
state  as  Parthia,  considerable  powers  of  management.     His 
dealings  with  Augustus  indicate  much  suppleness  and  dex- 
terity.   If  he  did  not  in  the  course  of  his  long  reign  advance  the 
Parthian  frontier,  at  any  rate  he  was  not  obliged  to  retract  it. 
Apparently,  he  ceded  nothing  to  the  Scyths  as  the  price  of 
their  assistance.    He  maintained  the  Partliian  supremacy  over 
Northern  Media.    He  lost  no  inch  of  territory  to  the  Eomans. 
It  was  undoubtedly  a  prudent  step  on  his  part  to  soothe  the 
irritated  vanity  of  Rome  by  a  surrender  of  useless  trophies, 
and  scarcely  more  useful  prisoners ;  and,  we  may  doubt  if  this 
concession  was  not  as  effective  as  the  dread  of  the  Parthian 
arms  in  producing  that  peace  between  the  two  countries  which 
continued  unbroken  for  above  ninety  years  from  the  campaign 
of  Antony,  "and  without  serious  interruption  for  yet  another 
half  century. "    If  Phraates  felt,  as  he  might  well  feel  after  the 
campaigns  of  Pacorus,  that  on  the  whole  Rome  was  a  more 
powerful  state  than  Parthia,  and  that  consequently  Parthia 
had  nothing  to  gain  but  much  to  lose  in  the  contest  with  her 
western  neighbor,  he  did  well  to  allow  no  sentiment  of  foolish 
pride  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  concession  that  made  a  pro- 
longed peace  between  the  two  countries  possible.    It  is  some- 
times more  honorable  to  yield  to  a  demand  than  to  meet  it 
with  defiance ;  and  the  prince  who  removed  a  cause  of  war 
arising  out  of  mere  national  vanity,  while  at  the  same  time  he 
maintained  in  all  essential  points  the  interests  and  dignity  of 
his  kingdom,  deserved  well  of  his  subjects,  and  merits  the  ap- 
proval of  the  historian.     As  a  man,  Phraates  has  left  behind 
him  a  bad   name:    he  was  cruel,  selfish,  and   ungrateful,  a 
fratricide  and  a  parricide;  but  as  a  king  he  is  worthy  oi 
respect,  and,  in  certain  points,  of  admiration. 


CH.  XIV. J  ACCESSION  OF  PHBAATACES.  123 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

ShoH  reigns  of  Phraataces,  Orodes  11. ,  and  Vonones  I.  Ac- 
cession of  Artabanus  III.  His  relations  with  Germanicus 
and  Tiberius.  His  War  ivith  Pharasmanes  of  Iberia.  His 
First  Expulsion  from  his  Kingdom,  and  return  to  it.  His 
peace  with  Rome.  Internal  troubles  of  the  Parthian  King- 
dom. Second  Expulsion  and  return  of  Artabanus.  His 
Death. 

"Mota  Orientis  regna,  provinciasque  Romanae,  initio  apud  Parthos  orto." 

Tacit.  Ann.  ii.  1. 

The  accession  of  Phraataces  made  no  difference  in  the  atti- 
tude of  Parthia  towards  Armenia.  The  young  prince  was  as 
anxious  as  his  father  had  been  to  maintain  the  Parthian  claims 
to  that  country,  and  at  first  perhaps  as  inclined  to  believe  that 
Augustus  would  not  dispute  them.  Immediately  upon  his 
accession  he  sent  ambassadors  to  Rome  announcing  the  fact, 
apologizing  for  the  circumstances  under  which  it  had  taken 
place,  and  proposing  a  renewal  of  the  peace  which  had  sub- 
sisted between  Augustus  and  his  father. '  Apparently,  he  said 
nothing  about  Armenia,  but  preferred  a  demand  for  the  sur- 
render of  his  four  brothers,  whom  no  doubt  he  designed  to 
destroy.  The  answer  of  Augustus  was  severe  in  the  extreme. 
Addressing  Phraataces  by  his  bare  name,  without  adding  the 
title  of  king,  he  required  him  to  lay  aside  the  royal  appella- 
tion, which  he  had  arrogantly  and  without  any  warrant  as- 
sumed, and  at  the  same  time  to  withdraw  his  forces  from 
Armenia.'^  On  the  surrender  of  the  Parthian  princes  he  kept 
silence,  ignoring  a  demand  which  he  had  no  intention  of  ac- 
cording. It  was  clearly  his  design  to  set  up  one  of  the  elder 
brothers  as  a  rival  claimant  to  Phraataces,  or  at  any  rate  to 
alarm  him  with  the  notion  that,  unless  he  made  concessions, 
this  policy  would  be  adopted.  But  Phraataces  was  not  to  be 
frightened  by  a  mere  message.  He  responded  to  Augustus 
after  his  own  fashion,  dispatching  to  liim  a  letter  wherein  he 
took  to  himself  the  favorite  Parthian  title  of  "  king  of  kings," 
and  addressed  the  Roman  Emperor  simply  as  "  Csesar."  '  The 
attitude  of  defiance  would  no  doubt  have  been  maintained,  had 
Augustus  confined  himself  to  menaces;  when,  however,  it 


124  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xiY 

appeared  that  active  measures  would  be  taken,  when  Augus- 
tus, in  B.C.  1,  sent  his  grandson,  Caius,  to  the  East  with 
orders  to  re-estabhsh  the  Roman  influence  in  Armenia  even  at 
the  cost  of  a  Parthian  war,  and  that  prince  showed  himself  in 
Syria  with  all  the  magnificent  surroundings  of  the  Imperial 
dignity,  the  Parthian  monarch  became  alarmed.  He  had  an 
interview  with  Caius  in  the  spring  of  a.d.  1,  upon  an  island  in 
the  Euphrates  ;*  where  the  terms  of  an  arrangement  between 
the  two  Empires  were  discussed  and  settled.  The  armies  of 
the  two  chiefs  were  drawn  up  on  the  opposite  banks  of  the 
river,  facing  one  another;  and  the  chiefs  themselves,  accom- 
panied by  an  equal  number  of  attendants,  proceeded  to  deUb- 
erate  in  the  sight  of  both  hosts.  Satisfactory  pledges  having 
been  given  by  the  Parthian  monarch,  the  prince  and  king  in 
turn  entertained  each  other  on  the  borders  of  their  respective 
dominions;^  and  Caius  returned  into  Syria,  having  obtained 
an  engagement  from  the  Parthians  to  abstain  from  any  further 
interference  with  Armenian  affairs. "  The  engagement  appears 
to  have  been  honorably  kept;  for  when,  shortly  afterward, 
fresh  compUcations  occurred,  and  Caius  in  endeavoring  to 
settle  them  received  his  death-wound  before  the  walls  of  an 
Armenian  tower,'  we  do  not  hear  of  Parthia  as  in  any  way 
involved  in  the  unfortunate  occurrence.  The  Eomans  and 
their  partisans  in  the  country  were  left  to  settle  the  Armenian 
succession  as  they  pleased;  and  Parthia  kept  herself  wholly 
aloof  from  the  matters  transacted  upon  her  borders. 

One  cause — perhaps  the  main  cause — of  this  abstinence,  and 
of  the  engagement  to  abstain  entered  into  by  Phraataces,  was 
doubtless  the  unsettled  state  of  things  in  Parthia  itself.^  The 
circumstances  under  which  that  prince  had  made  himself  king, 
though  not  unparalleled  in  the  Parthian  annals,  were  such  as 
naturally  tended  towards  civil  strife,  and  as  were  apt  to  pro- 
duce in  Parthia  internal  difficulties,  if  not  disorders  or  com- 
motions. Phraataces  soon  found  that  he  would  have  a  hard 
task  to  establish  his  rule.  The  nobles  objected  to  him,  not 
only  for  the  murder  of  his  father,  but  his  descent  from  an 
Italian  concubine,  and  the  incestuous  commerce  which  he  was 
supposed  to  maintain  vsdth  her.*  They  had  perhaps  grounds 
for  this  last  charge.  At  any  rate  Phraataces  provoked  sus- 
^Dicion  by  the  singular  favors  and  honors  which  he  granted  to 
a  woman  whose  origin  was  mean  and  extraction  foreign.  Not 
content  with  ])rivate  marks  of  esteem  and  love,  he  departed 
from  the  practice  of  all  former  Parthian  sovereigns'"  in  placing 


CH.  XTV.]  DEATH  OF  PlIR  A  AT  ACES.  125 

her  eflfigy  upon  Ms  coins ;  and  he  accompanied  this  act  with 
fulsome  and  absurd  titles.  Musa  was  styled,  not  merely 
"Queen,"  but  "Heavenly  Goddess,""  as  if  the  realities  of 
slave  origin  and  concubinage  could  be  covered  by  the  fiction  of 
an  apotheosis.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  proud  Parthian 
nobles  were  offended  by  these  proceedings,  and  determined  to 
rid  themselves  of  a  monarch  whom  they  at  once  hated  and 
despised.  Within  a  few  years  of  his  obtaining  the  throne  an 
insurrection  broke  out  against  his  authority ;  and  after  a  brief 
struggle  he  was  deprived  of  his  crown  and  put  to  death. '^  The 
nobles  then  elected  an  Arsacid,  named  Orodes,  whose  residence 
at  the  time  and  relationship  to  the  former  monarchs  are  un- 
certain. It  seems  probable'"  that,  like  most  princes  of  the 
blood  royal,  he  had  taken  refuge  in  a  foreign  country  from  the 
suspicions  and  dangers  that  beset  all  possible  pretenders  to  the 
royal  dignity  in  Parthia,  and  was  living  in  retirement,  unex- 
pectant  of  any  such  offer,  when  a  deputation  of  Parthian 
nobles  arrived  and  brought  him  the  intelligence  of  his  election. 
It  might  have  been  expected  that,  obtaining  the  crown  under 
these  circumstances,  he  would  have  ruled  weU ;  but,  according 
to  Josephus  (who  is  here,  unfortunately,  our  sole  authority), 
he  very  soon  displayed  so  much  violence  and  cruelty  of  dispo- 
sition that  his  rule  was  felt  to  be  intolerable;  and  the  Par- 
thians,  again  breaking  into  insurrection,  rid  themselves  of  him, 
killing  hun  either  at  a  banquet  or  on  a  hunting  excursion."'' 
This  done,  they  sent  to  Eome,  and  requested  Augustus  to 
allow  Vonones,  the  eldest  son  of  Phraates  IV.,  to  return  to 
Parthia  in  order  that  he  might  receive  his  father's  kingdom.  '^ 
The  Emperor  complied  readily  enough,  since  he  regarded  his 
own  dignity  as  advanced  by  the  transaction;  and  the  Par- 
thians  at  first  welcomed  the  object  of  their  choice  with  rejoic- 
ings. But  after  a  little  time  their  sentiments  altered.  The 
young  prince,  bred  up  in  Rome,  and  accustomed  to  the  refine- 
ments of  Western  civilization,  neglected  the  occupations  which 
seemed  to  his  subjects  alone  worthy  of  a  monarch's  regard, 
absented  himself  from  the  hunting-field,  took  small  pleasure 
in  riding,  when  he  passed  through  the  streets  indulged  in  the 
foreign  luxury  of  a  litter,  shrank  with  disgust  from  the  rude 
and  coarse  feastings  which  formed  a  portion  of  the  national 
manners.  He  had,  moreover,  brought  with  him  from  the 
place  of  his  exile  a  number  of  Greek  companions,  whom  the 
Parthians  despised  and  ridiculed ;  and  the  favors  bestowed  on 
these  foi-eign  interlopers  were  seen  with  jealousy  and  rage,     l!; 


126  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCET.     ■  i.cH.  xrv. 

■was  in  vain  that  he  endeavored  to  conciliate  his  offended  sub- 
jects by  the  openness  of  his  manners  and  the  facihty  with 
which  he  allowed  access  to  his  person.  In  their  prejudiced 
eyes  virtues  and  graces  unknown  to  the  nation  hitherto  were 
not  merits  but  defects, ' "  and  rather  increased  than  diminished 
their  aversion.  Having  conceived  a  dislike  for  the  monarch 
personally,  they  began  to  look  back  with  dissatisfaction  on 
their  own  act  in  sending  for  him.  "Parthia,"  they  said, 
"had  indeed  degenerated  from  her  former  self  to  have  re- 
quested a  king  to  be  sent  her  who  belonged  to  another  world 
and  had  had  a  hostile  civilization  ingrained  into  him.  All  the 
glory  gained  by  destroying  Crassus  and  repulsing  Antony  was 
utterly  lost  and  gone,  if  the  country  was  to  be  ruled  by  Caesar's 
bond-slave,  and  the  throne  of  the  Arsacidse  to  be  treated  like 
a  Roman  province.  It  would  have  been  bad  enough  to  have 
had  a  prince  imposed  on  them  by  the  will  of  a  superior,  if  they 
had  been  conquered;  it  was  worse,  in  all  respects  worse,  to 
suffer  such  an  insult,  when  they  had  not  even  had  war  made 
on  them."  Under  the  influence  of  such  feelings  as  these,  the 
Parthians,  after  tolerating  Vonones  for  a  few  years,  rose 
against  him  (ab.  a.d.  16),  and  summoned  Artabanus,  an  Arsa- 
cid  who  had  grown  to  manhood  among  the  Dahae  of  the  Cas- 
pian region,  but  was  at  this  time  king  of  Media  Atropatene,  to 
rule  over  them." 

It  was  seldom  that  a  crown  was  declined  in  the  ancient 
world ;  and  Artabanus,  on  receiving  the  overture,  at  once  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  accept  the  proffered  dignity.  He  in- 
vaded Parthia  at  the  head  of  an  army  consisting  of  his  own 
subjects,  and  engaged  Vonones,  to  whom  in  his  difiiculties  the 
bulk  of  the  Parthian  people  had  rallied.  The  engagement  re- 
sulted in  the  defeat  of  the  Median  monarch,  '*  who  returned  to 
his  own  country,  and,  having  collected  a  larger  army,  made  a 
second  invasion.  This  time  he  was  successful.  "Vonones  fled 
on  horseback  to  Seleucia  with  a  small  body  of  followers ;  while 
his  defeated  army,  following  in  his  track,  was  pressed  upon  by 
the  victorious  Mede,  and  suffered  great  losses.  Artabanus,  hav- 
ing entered  Ctesiphon  in  triumph,  was  immediately  proclaimed 
king. '"  Vonones,  escaping  from  Seleucia,  took  refuge  among 
the  Armenians;  and,  as  it  happened  that  just  at  this  time  the 
Armenian  throne  was  vacant,  not  only  was  an  asylum  granted 
him,  but  he  was  made  king  of  the  country.'"  It  was  impossible 
that  Artabanus  should  tamely  submit  to  an  arrangement  which 
would  have  placed  his  deadly  enemy  in  a  position  to  cause  him 


CH.  XIV.]  REIQN  OF  ARTABANCTS  III  127 

constant  annoyance.  He,  therefore,  at  once  remonstrated,  both 
in  Armenia  and  at  Rome.  As  Rome  now  claimed  the  investi- 
ture of  the  Armenian  monarchs,  he  sent  an  embassy  to  Tiberius, 
and  threatened  war  if  Vonones  were  acknowledged ;  while  at 
the  same  time  he  applied  to  Armenia  and  required  the  surrender 
of  the  refugee.  An  important  section  of  the  Armenian  nation 
was  inchned  to  grant  his  demand;^'  Tiberius,  who  would  will- 
ingly have  supported  Vonones,  drew  back  before  the  Parthian 
threats  ;^^  Vonones  found  himself  in  imminent  danger,  and, 
imder  the  circumstances,  determined  on  quitting  Armenia  and 
betaking  himself  to  the  protection  of  the  Roman  governor  of 
Syria.  This  was  Creticus  Silanus,  who  received  liim  gladly, 
gave  him  a  guard,  and  allowed  him  the  state  and  title  of  king." 
Meanwhile  Artabanus  laid  claim  to  Armenia,  and  suggested  as 
a  candidate  for  the  throne  one  of  his  own  sons,  Orodes.^^ 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Roman  Emperor,  Tiberius, 
who  had  recently  succeeded  Augustus,  resolved  to  despatch  to 
the  East  a  personage  of  importance,  who  should  command  the 
respect  and  attention  of  the  Oriental  powers  by  his  dignity,  and 
impose  upon  them  by  the  pomp  and  splendor  with  which  he 
was  surrounded.  He  selected  for  this  office  Germanicus,  his 
nephew,  the  eldest  son  of  his  deceased  brother,  Drusus,  a  prince 
of  much  promise,  amiable  in  his  disposition,  courteous  and  affa- 
ble in  his  manners,  a  good  soldier,  and  a  man  generally  popu- 
lar. The  more  to  strike  the  minds  of  the  Orientals,  he  gave 
Germanicus  no  usual  title  or  province,  but  invested  him  with 
an  extraordinary  command  over  all  the  Roman  dominions  to 
the  east  of  the  Hellespont,  ^'^  thus  rendering  him  a  sort  of  mon- 
arch of  Roman  Asia.  Full  powers  were  granted  him  for  mak- 
ing peace  or  war,  for  levying  troops,  annexing  provinces,  ap- 
pointing subject  kings,  and  performing  other  sovereign  acts, 
without  referring  back  to  Rome  for  instructions.  A  train  of 
unusual  magnificence  accompanied  him  to  his  charge,  calcu- 
lated to  impress  the  Orientals  with  the  conviction  that  this  was 
no  common  negotiator,  Germanicus  arrived  in  Asia  early  in 
A.D.  18,  and  applied  himself  at  once  to  his  task.  Entering  Ar- 
menia at  the  head  of  his  troops,  he  proceeded  to  the  capital, 
Artaxata,^"  and,  having  ascertained  the  wishes  of  the  Arme- 
nians themselves,  determined  on  his  course  of  conduct.  To 
have  insisted  on  the  restoration  of  Vonones  woidd  have  been 
grievously  to  offend  the  Armenians  who  had  expelled  him,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  provoke  the  Parthians,  who  could  not  have 
tolerated  a  pretender  in  a  position  of  power  upon  their  borders  j 


128  THE  SIXTH  MONARCIIT.  [CH.  xrv. 

to  have  allowed  the  pretensions  of  the  Partliian  monarch,  and 
accepted  the  candidature  of  his  son,  Orodes,  would  have  lowered 
Home  in  the  opinion  of  all  the  surrounding  nations,  and  been 
equivalent  to  an  abdication  of  all  influence  in  the  affairs  of 
Western  Asia.  Germanicus  avoided  either  extreme,  and  found 
happily  a  middle  course.  It  happened  that  there  was  a  foreign 
prince  settled  in  Armenia,  who  having  grown  up  there  had  as- 
similated himself  in  all  respects  to  the  Armenian  ideas  and 
habits,  and  had  thereby  won  golden  opinions  from  both  the 
nobles  and  the  people.  This  was  Zeno,  the  son  of  Polemo,  once 
king  of  the  curtailed  Pontus,  and  afterwards  of  the  Lesser  Ar- 
menia," an  outlying  Eoman  dependency.  The  Armenians 
themselves  suggested  that  Zeno  should  be  their  monarch ;  and 
Grermanicus  saw  a  way  out  of  his  difficulties  in  the  suggestion. 
At  the  seat  of  government,  Artaxata,  in  the  presence  of  a  vast 
multitude  of  the  people,  with  the  consent  and  approval  of  the 
principal  nobles,  he  placed  with  his  own  hand  the  diadem  on 
the  brow  of  the  favored  prince,  and  saluted  him  as  king  under 
the  new  name  of  "  Artaxias."  "  He  then  returned  into  Syria, 
where  he  was  shortly  afterwards  visited  by  ambassadors  from 
the  Parthian  monarch.  "^  Artabanus  reminded  him  of  the  peace 
concluded  between  Rome  and  Parthia  in  the  reign  of  Augustus, 
and  assumed  that  the  circumstances  of  his  own  appointment  to 
the  throne  had  in  no  way  interfered  Avith  it.  He  would  be 
glad,  he  said,  to  renew  with  Germanicus  the  interchange  of 
friendly  assurances  wliich  had  passed  between  his  predecessor, 
Phraataces,  and  Caius;  and  to  accommodate  the  Roman 
general,  he  would  willingly  come  to  meet  him  as  far  as  the  Eu- 
phrates; meanwhile,  until  the  meeting  could  take  place,  he 
must  request  that  Vonones  should  be  removed  to  a  greater  dis- 
tance from  the  Parthian  frontier,  and  that  he  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  continue  the  correspondence  in  which  he  was  engaged 
with  many  of  the  Parthian  nobles  for  the  purpose  of  raising 
fresh  troubles.  Germanicus  replied  politely,  but  indefinitely, 
to  the  proposal  of  an  interview,  which  he  may  have  thought 
unnecessary,  and  open  to  misconstruction.  To  the  request  for 
the  removal  of  Vonones  he  consented.'"  Vonones  was  trans- 
ferred from  Syria  to  the  neighboring  province  of  Cihcia ;  and 
the  city  of  Pompeiopolis,  built  by  the  great  Pompey  on  the 
site  of  the  ancient  Soli,  was  assigned  to  him  as  his  residence 
With  this  arrangeir.ent  the  Parthian  monarch  appears  to  have 
been  contented.  Vonones  on  the  other  hand  was  so  dissatisfied 
with  the  change  that  in  the  course  of  the  next  year  (a.d.  19)  he 


CH.  XIV.]      ATtTABAms  QtlARRJSLS  mm  ROME.  1«29 

endeavored  to  ixiake  his  escape;  his  flight  was,  however,  dis 
covered,  and,  pursuit  being  made,  he  was  overtaken  and  slaiu 
on  the  banks  of  the  Pyramus."    Thus  perished  mgloriously  one 
of  the  least  blamable  and  most  unfortunate   of  the  Parthian 
princes. 

After  the  death  of  Germanicus,  in  a.d.  19,  the  details  of  the 
Parthian  history  are  for  some  years  unknown  to  us.  It  ap- 
pears that  during  this  interval  Artabanus  [PI.  II.  Fig.  5.]  was 
engaged  in  wars  with  several  of  the  nations  upon  his  borders,  ^^ 
and  met  with  so  much  success  that  he  came  after  a  while  to 
desire,  rather  than  fear,  a  rupture  with  Rome.  He  knew  that 
Tiberius  was  now  an  old  man,^^  and  that  he  was  disinclined  to 
engage  in  distant  wars ;  he  was  aware  that  Germanicus  was 
dead ;  and  he  was  probably  not  much  afraid  of  L.  Vitellius,  the 
governor  of  Syria,  who  had  been  recently  deputed  by  Tiberius 
to  administer  that  province.'^  Accordingly  in  a.d.  34,  the  Ar- 
menian throne  being  once  more  vacant  by  the  death  of  Artaxias 
(Zeno),  he  suddenly  seized  the  country,  and  appointed  his  eldest 
son,  whom  Dio  and  Tacitus  call  simply  Arsaces,'^  to  be  king. 
At  the  same  time  he  sent  ambassadors  to  require  the  restora- 
tion of  the  treasure  which  Vonones  had  carried  off  from  Par- 
thia  and  had  left  behind  him  in  Syria  or  Cilicia.  To  this  plain 
and  definite  demand  were  added  certain  vague  threats,  or 
boasts,  to  the  effect  that  he  was  the  rightful  master  of  all  the 
territory  that  had  belonged  of  old  to  Macedonia  or  Persia,  and 
that  it  was  his  intention  to  resume  possession  of  the  provinces, 
whereto,  as  the  representative  of  Cyrus  and  Alexander,  he  was 
entitled.'"  He  is  said  to  have  even  commenced  operations 
against  Cappadocia,"  which  was  an  actual  portion  of  the 
Eoman  Empire,  when  he  found  that  Tiberius,  so  far  from  re- 
senting the  seizure  of  Armenia,  had  sent  instructions  to  Vitel- 
lius, that  he  was  to  cultivate  peaceful  relations  with  Parthia. "' 
Apparently  he  thought  that  a  good  opportunity  had  arisen  for 
picking  a  quarrel  with  his  Western  neighbor,  and  was  deter- 
mined to  take  advantage  of  it.  The  aged  despot,  hidden  in  his 
retreat  of  Capreae,  seemed  to  him  a  pure  object  of  contempt ; 
and  he  entertained  the  confident  hope  of  defeating  his  armies 
and  annexing  portions  of  his  territory. 

But  Tiberius  was  under  no  circumstances  a  man  to  be 
wholly  despised.  Simultaneouslj^  with  the  Parthian  demands 
and  threats  intelligence  reached  him  that  the  subjects  of 
Artabanus  were  greatly  dissatisfied  with  his  rule,  and  that  it 
would  be  easy  by  fomenting  the  discontent  to  bring  about  a 


130  THE  SIXTH  MONAUCHY.  [ch.  xiv. 

revolution."  Some  of  the  nobles  even  went  in  person  to  Rome 
(a.d.  35),  and  suggested  that  if  Phraates,  one  of  the  surviv- 
ing sons  of  Phraates  IV.,  were  to  appear  under  Eoman 
protection  upon  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  an  insurrection 
would  immediately  break  out.  Artabanus,  they  said,  among 
his  other  cruelties  had  put  to  death  almost  all  the  adult 
males  of  the  Arsacid  family;  a  successful  revolution  could 
not  be  hoped  for  without  an  Ai^sacid  leader;  if  Tiberius, 
however,  would  dehver  to  them  the  prince  for  whom  they 
asked,  this  difficulty  woidd  be  removed,  and  there  was  then 
every  reason  to  expect  a  happy  issue  to  the  rebeUion.  The 
Emperor  was  not  hard  to  persuade ;  he  no  doubt  argued  that, 
whatever  became  of  the  attempt  and  those  engaged  in  it,  one 
result  at  least  was  certain — Artabanus  would  find  plenty  of 
work  to  occupy  him  at  home,  and  would  desist  from  his 
foreign  aggressions.  He  therefore  let  Phraates  take  his  de- 
parture and  proceed  to  Syria,  glad  to  meet  the  danger  which 
had  threatened  him  by  craft  and  policy  rather  than  by  force 
of  arms.  ^^ 

Artabanus  soon  became  aware  of  the  intrigue.  He  found 
that  the  chief  conspirators  in  Parthia  were  a  certain  Sinnaces,  || 
a  nobleman  distinguished  alike  for  his  high  bii'th  and  his 
great  riches,  and  a  eunuch  named  Abdus,  who  held  a  position 
about  the  court,  and  was  otherwise  a  personage  of  imi^ortance. 
it  would  have  been  easy  to  seize  these  two  men,  and  execute 
them ;  but  Artabanus  was  uncertain  how  far  the  conspiracy 
extended,  and  thought  *it  most  prudent  to  defer  bringing 
matters  to  a  crisis.  He  therefore  dissembled,  and  was  content 
to  cause  a  delay,  first  by  administering  to  Abdus  a  slow 
poison,  and  then  by  engaging  Sinnaces  so  constantly  in  affairs 
of  state  that  he  had  little  or  no  time  to  devote  to  plotting. 
Successful  thus  far  by  his  own  cunning  and  dexterity,  he  was 
further  helped  by  a  stroke  of  good  fortune,  on  which  he  could 
not  have  calculated.  Phraates,  who  thought  that  after  forty 
years  of  residence  in  Pome  it  was  necessary  to  fit  himself  for 
the  position  of  Parthian  king  by  resuming  the  long-disused 
habits  of  his  nation,  was  carried  off,  after  a  short  residence  in 
Syria,  by  a  disease  which  he  was  supposed  to  have  contracted 
through  the  change  in  his  mode  of  hfe."'  His  death  must  for 
the  time  have  paralyzed  the  conspirators,  and  have  greatly 
relieved  Artabanus.  It  was  perhaps  now,  under  the  stimulus 
of  a  sudden  change  from  feehngs  of  extreme  alarm  to  fancied 
aecm-ity,  that  he  wrote  the  famous  letter  to  Tiberius,  in  which 


Vol.  IIL 


Plate  iX. 


Parthian  baa  jreJief  of  a  Mngus  (after  Flandiu  and  Co?te). 


Plate  X 


yol. 


3 

0 

5 


o 

s 


*^ 


s 


o 

o 


CH,  XIV.]        TIBEnrUS  SUPrOETS  PnETENDERS.  \^\ 

he  reproached  him  for  his  cruelty,  cowardice,  and  hixiirious- 
ness  of  hving,  and  recommended  him  to  satisfy  the  just 
desires  of  the  subjects  who  hated  him  by  an  immediate 
suicide/^ 

This  letter,  if  genuine,  must  be  pronounced  under  any  cir- 
cumstances a  folly ;  and  if  really  sent  at  this  tinae,  it  may  have 
had  tragical  consequences.  It  is  remarkable  that  Tiberius,  on 
learning  the  death  of  Phraates,  instead  of  relaxing,  intensified 
his  efforts.  Not  only  did  he  at  once  send  out  to  Syria  another 
pretender,  Tiridates,  a  nephew  of  the  deceased  prince/'  in 
order  to  replace  him,  but  he  made  endeavors,  such  as  we  do 
not  hear  of  before,  to  engage  other  nations  in  the  struggle ;" 
and  further,  he  enlarged  the  commission  of  Vitellius,  giving 
him  a  general  superintendence  over  the  affairs  of  the  East. 
Thus  Artabanus  found  himself  in  greater  peril  than  ever,  and 
if  he  had  really  indulged  in  the  silly  effusion  ascribed  to  him 
was  rightly  punished.  Pharasmanes,  king  of  Iberia,  a  portion 
of  the  modern  Georgia,  incited  by  Tiberius,  took  the  field  (a.d. 
35),  and  proclaimed  his  intention  of  placing  his  brother,  Mith- 
ridates,  on  the  Armenian  throne.''^  Having  by  corrupticm 
succeeded  in  bringing  about  the  murder  of  Arsaces  by  his 
attendants,"  he  marched  into  Armenia,  and  became  master  of 
the  capital  without  meeting  any  resistance.  Artabanus,  upon 
this,  sent  his  son  Orodes  to  maintain  tbe  Parthian  cause  in  the 
disputed  province ;  but  he  proved  no  match  for  the  Iberian, 
who  was  superior  in  numbers,  in  the  variety  of  his  troops,  and 
in  familiarity  with  the  localities.  Pharasmanes  had  obtained 
the  assistance  of  his  neighbors,  the  Albaniims,  and,  opening 
the  passes  of  the  Caucasus,  had  admitted  thi-ough  them  a 
number  of  the  Scythic  or  Sarmatian  hordes,"  who  were 
always  ready,  when  their  swords  were  hired,  to  take  a  part  in 
the  quarrels  of  the  south.  Orodes  was  unable  to  procure 
either  mercenaries  or  allies,^*  and  had  to  contend  unassisted 
against  the  three  enemies  who  had  joined  their  forces  to 
oppose  him.  For  some  time  he  prvidently  declined  an  engage- 
ment ;  but  it  was  difficult  to  restrain  the  ardor  of  his  troops, 
whom  the  enemy  exasperated  by  their  reproaches."  After  a 
while  he  was  compelled  to  accept  the  battle  which  Pharas- 
manes incessantly  offered.  His  force  consisted  entirely  of 
cavalry,  while  Pharasmanes  had  besides  his  horse  a  powerful 
body  of  infantry.  The  battle  was  nevertheless  stoutly  con- 
tested ;  and  the  victory  might  have  been  doubtful,  had  it  not 
happened  that  in  a  hand-to-hand  combat  between  the  two 


132  'PilE  SIXTB  MONARCHY.  [en.  xiv. 

commanders  Orodes  was  strack  to  the  ground  by  his  antago- 
nist,  and  thought  by  most  of  his  own  men  to  be  killed.'"  As 
usual  under  such  circumstances  in  the  East,  a  rout  followed. 
If  we  may  believe  Josephus,"  "  many  tens  of  thousands"  were 
slain.  Armenia  was  wholly  lost ;  and  Artabanus  found  him- 
self left  with  diminished  resources  and  tarnished  fame  to  meet 
the  intrigues  of  his  domestic  enemies. 

Still,  he  would  not  succumb  without  an  effort.  In  the 
spring  of  a.d.  36,  having  levied  the  whole  force  of  the  Em- 
pire, he  took  tne  field  and  marched  northwards,  determined, 
if  possible,  to  revenge  himself  on  the  Iberians  and  recover  his 
lost  province.  ^^  But  his  first  efforts  were  unsuccessful ;  and 
before  he  could  renew  them  ViteUius  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  his  legions,  and  marching  towards  the  Euphrates  threatened 
Mesopotamia  with  invasion.  Placed  thus  between  two  fires, 
the  Parthian  monarch  felt  that  he  had  no  choice  but  to  with- 
draw from  Armenia  and  return  to  the  defence  of  his  own 
proper  territories,  which  in  his  absence  must  have  lain  tempt- 
ingly open  to  an  enemy.  His  return  caused  ViteUius  to  change 
his  tactics.  Instead  of  measuring  his  strength  against  that 
which  still  remained  to  Artabanus,  he  resumed  the  weapon  of 
intrigue  so  dear  to  his  master,  and  proceeded  by  a  lavish  ex- 
penditure of  money  ^^  to  excite  disaffection  once  more  among 
the  Parthian  nobles.  This  time  conspiracy  was  successful. 
The  military  disasters  of  the  last  two  years  had  alienated  from 
Artabanus  the  affections  of  those  whom  his  previous  cruelties 
had  failed  to  disgust  or  alarm ;  and  he  found  himself  without 
any  armed  force  whereon  he  could  rely,  beyond  a  small  body 
of  foreign  guards  which  he  maintained  about  his  person.  It 
seemed  to  him  that  his  only  safety  was  ia  flight;  and  ac- 
cordingly he  quitted  his  capital  and  removed  himself  hastily 
into  Hyrcania,  which  was  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
Scythian  Dahse,  among  whom  he  had  been  brought  up.  Here 
the  natives  were  friendly  to  him,  and  he  lived  a  retired  life, 
waiting  (as  he  said)  until  the  Parthians,  who  could  judge  an 
absent  prince  with  equity,  though  they  could  not  long  continue 
faithful  to  a  present  one,  should  repent  of  their  behavior  to 
him." 

Upon  learning  the  flight  of  Artabanus,  ViteUius  advanced  to 
the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  and  introduced  Tiridates  into  his 
kingdom."  Fortunate  omens  were  said  to  have  accompanied 
the  passage  of  the  river;  and  these  were  foUowed  by  adhesions 
of  greater  importance.   Ornospades,  satrap  of  Mesopotamia,  was 


CH.  XIV.]  Tim  DATES  It   BECOMES  KING.  133 

the  first  to  join  the  standard  of  the  pretender  with  a  large 
•body  of  horse.  He  was  followed  by  the  conspirator  Sinnaces, 
his  father  Abdageses,  the  keeper  of  the  king's  treasures,  and 
other  personages  of  high  position.  The  Greek  cities  in  Meso- 
potamia readily  opened  their  gates  to  a  monarch  long  domiciled 
at  Rome,  from  whom  they  expected  a  politeness  and  refine- 
ment that  would  harmonize  better  with  their  feelings  than  the 
manners  of  the  late  king,  bred  up  among  the  uncivilized  Scyths. 
Parthian  towns,  like  Halus  and  Artemita,  ^^  followed  their  ex- 
ample. Seleucia,  the  second  city  in  the  Empire,  received  the 
new  monarch  with  an  obsequiousness  that  bordered  on  adula- 
tion." Not  content  with  paying  him  all  customary  royal 
honors,  they  appended  to  their  acclamations  disparaging  re- 
marks upon  his  predecessor,  whom  they  affected  to  regard  as 
the  issue  of  an  adulterous  intrignie,  and  as  no  true  Arsacid. 
Tiridates  was  pleased  to  reward  the  unseemly  flattery  of  these 
degenerate  Greeks  by  a  new  arrangement  of  their  constitution. 
Hitherto  they  had  lived  under  the  government  of  a  Senate  of 
Three  Hundred  members,  the  wisest  and  wealthiest  of  the 
citizens,  a  certain  control  being,  however,  secured  to  the 
people.  Artabanus  had  recently  modified  the  constitution  in 
an  aristocratic  sense ;  and  therefore  Tiridates  pursued  the  con- 
trary course,  and  established  an  unbridled  democracy  in  the 
place  of  a  mixed  government.  He  then  entered  Ctesiphon,  the 
capital,  and  after  waiting  some  days  for  certain  noblemen,  who 
had  expressed  a  wish  to  attend  his  coronation  but  continually 
put  off  their  coming,  he  was  crowned  in  the  ordinary  manner 
by  the  Surena  of  the  time  being,  in  the  sight  and  amid  the  ac- 
clamations of  a  vast  multitude. 

The  pretender  now  regarded  his  work  as  completed,  and 
forbore  any  further  efforts.  The  example  of  the  Western 
provinces  would,  he  assumed,  be  followed  by  the  Eastern,  and 
the  monarch  approved  by  Mesopotamia,  Babylonia,  and  the 
capital  would  carry,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the  rest  of  the 
nation.  Policy  required  that  the  general  acquiescence  should 
not  have  been  taken  for  granted.  Tiridates  should  have  made 
a  military  progress  through  the  East,  no  less  than  the  West, " 
and  have  sought  out  his  rival  in  the  distant  Hyrcania,  and 
slain  him,  or  driven  him  beyond  the  borders.  Instead  of  thus 
occupying  himself,  he  was  content  to  besiege  a  stronghold 
where  Artabanus  had  left  his  treasure  and  his  harem.  This 
conduct  was  imprudent;  and  the  imprudence  cost  him  his 
crown.    That  fickle  temper  which  Artabanus  had  noted  in 


134 


TBB  SIXTH  MONAnCTTT.  [ch.  xnr. 


his  countrymen  began  to  work  so  soon  as  the  new  king  was 
well  installed  in  his  office;  the  coveted  post  of  chief  vizier- 
could  but  be  assigned  to  one,  and  the  selection  of  the  fortunate 
individual  was  the  disappointment  of  a  host  of  expectants; 
nobles    absent  from  the    coronation,    whether  by  choice  or 
necessity,  began  to  be  afraid  that  their  absence  would  cost 
them  dear,  when  Tiridates  had  time  to  reflect  upon  it  and  to 
listen  to  their  detractors.     The  thoughts  of  the  malcontents 
turned  towards  their  dethroned  monarch ;  and  emissaries  were 
despatched  to  seek  him  out,  and  put  before  him  the  project  of 
a  restoration.    He  was  found  in  Hyrcania,   in  a  miserable 
dress  and  plight,  living  on  the  produce  of  his  bow.     At  first  he 
suspected  the  messengers,  beheving  that  their  intention  was  to 
seize  him  and  deliver  him  up  to  Tiridates;  but  it  was  not  long 
ere  they  persuaded  him  that,  whether  their  affection  for  him- 
self were  true  or  feigned,  their  enmity  to  Tiridates  was  real.'" 
They  had  indeed  no  worse  charges  to  bring  against  this  prince 
than  his  youth,  and  the  softness  of  his  Roman  breeding;  but 
they  were  evidently  in  earnest,  and  had  committed  themselves 
too  deeply  to  make  it  possible  for  them  to  retract.    Artabanus, 
therefore,  accepted  their  offers,  and  having  obtained  the  ser- 
vices of  a  body  of  Daha3  and  other  Scyths,'"  proceeded  west- 
ward, retaining  the  miserable  garb  and  plight  in  which  he  had 
been  found,  in  order  to  draw  men  to  his  side  by  pity;  and 
making  all  haste,  in  order  that  his  enemies  might  have  less 
opportunity  to  prepare  obstructions  and  his  friends  less  time 
to  change  their    minds.     He  reached  the    neighborhood  of 
Ctesiphon  while  Tiridates  was  still  doubting  what  he  should 
do,  distracted  between  the  counsels  of  some  who  recommended 
an  immediate  engagement  with  the  rebels  before  they  recov- 
ered from  the  fatigues  of  their  long  march  or  grew  accustomed 
to  act  together,  and  of  others  who  advised  a  retreat  into  Meso- 
potamia, reUance  upon  the  Armenians  and  other  tribes  of  the 
north,"  and  a  union  ^vith  the  Eoman  troops,  which  ViteUius, 
on  the  first  news  of  what  had  happened,  had  thrown  across  the 
Euphrates.     The  more  timid  counsel  had  the  support  of  Ab- 
dageses,  whom  Tiridates  had  made  his  vizier,  and  therefore 
naturally  prevailed,  the  prince  himself  being  moreover  of  an 
unwarlike  temper.   It  had,  in  appearance,  much  to  recommend 
it ;  and  if  its  execution  had  been  in  the  hands  of  Occidentals 
might  have  succeeded.    But,  in  the  East,  the  first  movement 
in  retreat  is  taken  as  a  confession  of  weakness  and  almost  as 
an  act  of  despair :  an  order  to  retire  is  regarded  as  a  direction 


CH.  XIV.]     ARTABANU8  RECOVERS  THE  THRONE.  135 

to  fly.  No  sooner  was  the  Tigris  crossed  and  the  march 
through  Mesopotamia  began,  than  the  host  of  Tiridates  melted 
away  hke  an  iceberg  in  the  Gulf  Stream.  The  tribes  of  the 
Desert  set  the  example  of  flight;"^  and  in  a  little  time  almost 
the  whole  army  had  dispersed,  drawing  off  either  to  the  camp 
of  the  enemy  or  to  their  homes.  Tiridates  reached  the  Eu- 
phrates with  a  mere  handful  of  followers,  and  crossing  into 
Syria  found  himself  once  more  safe  under  the  protection  of 
the  Eomans. 

The  flight  of  Tiridates  gave  Parthia  back  into  the  hands  of 
its  former  ruler.  Artabanus  reoccupied  the  throne,  apparently 
without  having  to  fight  a  battle.  "^  He  seems,  however,  not  to 
have  felt  himself  strong  enough  either  to  resume  his  designs 
upon  Armenia,  or  to  retaliate  in  any  way  upon  the  Romans 
for  their  support  of  Tiridates.  Mithridates,  the  Iberian,  was 
left  in  quiet  possession  of  the  Armenian  kingdom,  and  VitelHus 
found  himself  unmolested  on  the  Euphrates.  Tiberius,  how- 
ever, was  anxious  that  the  war  with  Parthia  should  be  formally 
terminated,  and,  having  failed  in  his  attempts  to  fill  the  Par- 
thian throne  with  a  Roman  nominee,  was  ready  to  acknowl- 
edge Artabanus,  and  eager  to  enter  into  a  treaty  with  him. 
He  instructed  Vitellius  to  this  effect;"  and  that  officer  (late  in 
A.D.  36  or  early  in  a.d.  37),  having  invited  Artabanus  to  an  in- 
terview on  the  Euphrates,"  persuaded  him  to  terms  which 
were  regarded  by  the  Romans  as  highly  honorable  to  them- 
selves, though  Artabanus  probably  did  not  feel  them  to  be  de- 
grading to  Parthia.  Peace  and  amity  were  re-established  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  Rome,  it  may  be  assumed,  undertook 
to  withhold  her  countenance  from  all  pretenders  to  the  Par- 
thian throne,  and  Parthia  withdrew  her  claims  upon  Armenia. 
Artabanus  was  persuaded  to  send  his  son,  Darius,  with  some 
other  Parthians  of  rank,  to  Rome,  and  was  thus  regarded  by 
the  Romans  as  having  given  hostages  for  his  good  behavior.^' 
He  was  also  induced  to  throw  a  few  grains  of  frankincense  on 
the  sacrificial  fire  which  burnt  in  front  of  the  Roman  standards 
and  the  Imperial  images,  an  act  which  was  accepted  at  Rome 
as  one  of  submission  and  homage."  The  terms  and  circum- 
stances of  the  peace  did  not  become  known  in  Italy  till  Tibe- 
rius had  been  succeeded  by  Caligula  (March,  a.d.  37)."*  When 
known,  they  gave  gi-eat  satisfaction,  and  were  regarded  as 
glorious  alike  to  the  negotiator,  Vitellius,  and  to  the  prince 
whom  he  represented.  The  false  report  was  spread  that  the 
Parthian  monarch  had  granted  to  the  new  Caesar  what  hi« 


j3g  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xiv. 

contempt  and  hatred  would  have  caused  him  to  refuse  to  Ti- 
berius ;  and  the  inchnation  of  the  Romans  towards  their  young 
sovereign  was  intensified  by  the  ascription  to  him  of  a  diplo- 
matic triumph  which  belonged  of  right  to  his  predecessor. 

Contemporaneously  with  the  troubles  which  have  been  above 
described,  but  reaching  down,  it  would  seem,  a  few  years  be- 
yond them,  were  other  disturbances  of  a  peculiar  character  in 
one  of  the  Western  provinces  of  the  Empire.    The  Jewish  ele- 
ment in  the  population  of  Western  Asia  had  been  one  of  im- 
portance from  a  date  anterior  to  the  rise,  not  only  of  the  Par- 
thian, but  even  of  the  Persian  Empire.    Dispersed  colonies  of 
Jews  were  to  be  found  in  Babylonia,  Armenia,  Media,  Susiana, 
Mesopotamia,  and  probably   in    other  Parthian   provinces." 
These  colonies  dated  from  the  time  of  Nebuchadnezzar's  cap- 
tivity, and  exhibited  everywhere  the  remarkable  tendency  of 
the  Jewish  race  to  an  increase  disproportionate  to  that  of  the 
population  among  which  they  are  settled.     The  Jewish  ele- 
ment became  perpetually  larger  and  more  important  in  Baby- 
lonia and  Mesopotamia,  in  spite  of  the  draughts  which  were 
made  upon  it  by  Seleucus  and  other  Syrian  princes."'    Under 
the  Parthians,  it  would  seem  that  the  Mesopotamian  Jews  en- 
joyed generally  the  same  sort  of  toleration,  and  the  same  per- 
mission to  exercise  a  species  of  self-government,  which  Jews 
and  Christians  enjoy  now  in  many  parts  of  Turkey.     They 
formed  a  recognized  community,  had  some  cities  which  were 
entirely  their  own,  possessed  a  common  treasury,  and  from 
time  to  time  sent  up  to  Jerusalem  the  offerings  of  the  people 
under  the  protection  of  a  convoy  of  30,000  or  40,000  men.'"  The 
Parthian  kings  treated  them  well,  and  no  doubt  valued  them 
as  a  counterpoise  to  the  disaffected  Greeks  and  Syrians  of  this 
part  of  their  Empire.     They  had  no  grievance  of  which  to 
complain,  and  it  might  have  been  thought  very  unlikely  that 
any  troubles  would  arise  in  connection  with  them;  but  cir- 
cumstances seemingly  trivial  threw  the  whole   community 
into  commotion,  and  led  on  to  disasters  of  a  very  lamentable 
character. 

Two  young  Jews,  Asinai  and  Anilai,  brothers,  natives  of 
Nearda,  the  city  in  which  the  treasury  of  the  community  was 
established,  upon  suffering  some  ill-treatment  at  the  hands  of 
the  manufacturer  who  employed  them,  gave  up  their  trade, 
and,  withdrawing  to  a  marshy  district  between  tw^oarms  of  the 
Euphrates,  made  up  their  minds  to  live  by  robbery."  A  band 
of  needy  youths  soon  gathered  about  them,  and  they  became 


CH.  xiY.]  ASINAI  AND  ANILAL  137 

the  terror  of  the  entire  neighborhood.  They  exacted  a  black- 
mail from  the  peaceable  population  of  shepherds  and  others 
who  lived  near  them,  made  occasional  plundering  raids  to  a 
distance,  and  required  an  acknowledgment  (bakhshish)  from 
travellers.  Their  doings  having  become  notorious,  the  satrap 
of  Babylonia  marched  against  them  with  an  army,  intending 
to  surprise  them  on  the  Sabbath,  when  it  was  supposed  that 
they  would  not  fight ;  but  his  approach  was  discovered,  it  was 
determined  to  disregard  the  obligation  of  Sabbatical  rest,  and 
the  satrap  was  himself  surprised  and  completely  defeated, 
Artabanus,  having  heard  of  the  disaster,  made  overtures  to  the 
brothers,  and,  after  receiving  a  visit  from  them  at  his  court, 
assigned  to  Asinai,  the  elder  of  the  two,  the  entire  government 
of  the  Babylonian  satrapy.  The  experiment  appeared  at  first 
to  have  completely  succeeded.  Asinai  governed  the  province 
with  prudence  and  zeal,  and  for  fifteen  years"  no  complaint 
was  made  against  his  administration.  But  at  the  end  of  this 
time  the  lawless  temper,  held  in  restraint  for  so  long,  reasserted 
Itself,  not,  indeed,  in  Asinai,  but  in  his  brother.  Anilai  fell  in 
rove  with  the  wife  of  a  Parthian  magnate,  commander  (appar- 
fintly)  of  the  Parthian  troops  stationed  in  Babylonia,  and,  seeing 
no  other  way  of  obtaining  his  wishes,  made  war  upon  the  chief- 
tain and  killed  him.  He  then  married  the  object  of  his  affec- 
tions, and  might  perhaps  have  been  content;  but  the  Jews 
under  Asinai's  government  remonstrated  against  the  idolatries 
which  the  Parthian  woman  had  introduced  into  a  Jewish 
household,  and  prevailed  on  Asinai  to  require  that  she  should 
be  divorced.  His  compliance  with  their  wishes  proved  fatal  to 
him,  for  the  woman,  fearing  the  consequences,  contrived  to 
poison  Asinai ;  and  the  authority  which  he  had  wielded  passed 
into  the  hands  of  Anilai,  without  (so  far  as  we  hear)  any  fresh 
appointment  from  the  Parthian  monarch.  Anilai  had,  it  ap-  . 
pears,  no  instincts  but  those  of  a  freebooter,  and  he  was  no  -; 
sooner  settlea  in  the  government  than  he  proceeded  to  indulge 
them  by  attacking  the  territory  of  a  neighboring  satrap,  Mith- 
ridates,  who  was  not  only  a  Partliian  of  high  rank,  but  had 
married  one  of  the  daughters  of  Artabanus.  Mithridates  flew 
to  arms  to  defend  his  province ;  but  Anilai  fell  upon  his  encamp- 
ment in  the  night,  completely  routed  his  troops,  and  took 
Mithridates  himself  prisoner.  Having  subjected  him  to  a 
gross  indignity.'*  he  was  nevertheless  afraid  to  put  him  to 
death,  lest  the  Parthian  king  should  avenge  the  slaughter  of 
his  relative  on  ohe  Jews  of  Babylon,    Mithridates  was  conse- 


13S  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xiv 

quently  released,  and  returned  to  his  wife,  who  was  so  indig- 
nant at  the  insult  whereto  he  had  been  subjected  that  she  left 
him  no  peace  till  he  collected  a  second  army  and  resumed  the 
war.  Analai  was  no  ways  daunted.  Quitting  his  stronghold 
in  the  marshes,  he  led  his  troops  a  distance  of  ten  miles  through 
a  hot  and  dry  plain  to  meet  the  enemy,  thus  unnecessarily  ex- 
hausting them,  and  exposing  them  to  the  attack  of  their  ene- 
mies under  the  most  unfavorable  circumstances.  He  was  of 
course  defeated  with  loss ;  but  he  himself  escaped  and  revenged 
himself  by  carrying  fire  and  sword  over  the  lands  of  the  Baby- 
lonians, who  had  hitherto  lived  peaceably  under  his  protection. 
The  Babylonians  sent  to  Nearda  and  demanded  his  surrender ; 
but  the  Jews  of  Nearda,  even  if  they  had  had  the  will,  had  no 
power  to  comply.  A  pretence  was  then  made  of  arranging 
matters  by  negotiation ;  but  the  Babylonians,  having  in  this 
way  obtained  a  knowledge  of  the  position  which  Anilai  and  his 
troops  occupied,  fell  upon  them  in  the  night,  when  they  were 
all  either  drunk  or  asleep,  and  at  one  stroke  exterminated  the 
whole  band. 

Thus  far  no  great  calamity  had  occurred.  Two  Jewish  rob- 
ber-chiefs had  been  elevated  into  the  position  of  Parthian  sa- 
traps ;  and  the  result  had  been,  first,  fifteen  years  of  peace,  and 
then  a  short  civil  war,  ending  in  the  destruction  of  the  surviv- 
ing chief  and  the  annihilation  of  the  band  of  marauders.  But 
the  lamentable  consequences  of  the  commotion  were  now  to 
show  themselves.  The  native  Babylonians  had  always  looked 
■with  dislike  on  the  Jewish  colony,  and  occasions  of  actual 
collision  between  the  two  bodies  had  not  been  wholly  wa  t- 
ing."  The  circumstances  of  the  existing  time  seemed  to  fur- 
nish a  good  excuse  for  an  outbreak;  and  scarcely  were  Anilai 
and  his  followers  destroyed,  when  the  Jews  of  Babylon  were 
set  upon  by  their  native  fellow-citizens.  Unable  to  make  an 
effectual  resistance,  they  resolved  to  retire  from  the  place,  and, 
at  the  immense  loss  which  such  a  migration  necessarOy  costs, 
they  quitted  Babylon  and  transferred  themselves  in  great  num- 
bers to  Seleucia.  Here  they  lived  quietly  for  five  years  (about 
A.D.  34-39),  but  in  the  sixth  year  (a.d.  40)  fresh  troubles  broke 
out.  The  remnant  of  the  Jews  at  Babylon  were  assailed,  either 
by  their  old  enemies  or  by  a  pestilence, '"  and  took  refuge  at 
Seleucia  with  their  brethren.  It  happened  that  at  Seleucia 
there  was  a  feud  of  long  standing  between  the  Syrian  popula- 
tion and  the  Greeks.  The  Jews  naturally  joined  the  Syrians, 
who  were  a  kindred  race,  and  the  two  together  brought  the 


CH.  XIV.]         REFLECTIONS   ON  THE  TROUBLES.  139 

Greeks  under ;  whereupon  these  last  contrived  to  come  to  terms 
with  the  Syrians,  and  persuaded  them  to  join  in  an  attack  on 
the  late  allies.  Against  the  combined  Greeks  and  Syrians  the 
Jews  were  powerless,  and  in  the  massacre  which  ensued  they 
lost  above  50,000  men.  The  remnant  withdrew  to  Ctesiphon; 
but  even  there  the  malice  of  their  enemies  pursued  them,  and 
the  persecution  was  only  brought  to  an  end  by  their  quitting 
the  metropoUtan  cities  altogether,  and  withdrawing  to  the 
provincial  towns  of  which  they  were  the  sole  occupants." 

The  narrative  of  these  events  derives  its  interest,  not  so 
much  from  any  sympathy  that  we  can  feel  with  any  of  the  ac- 
tors in  it  as  from  the  light  which  it  throws  upon  the  character 
of  the  Parthian  rule,  and  the  condition  of  the  countries  under 
Parthian  government.  In  the  details  given  we  seem  once 
more  to  trace  a  near  resemblance  between  the  Parthian  system 
and  that  of  the  Turks ;  we  seem  to  see  thrown  back  into  the 
mirror  of  the  past  an  image  of  those  terrible  conflicts  and  dis- 
orders which  have  passed  before  our  own  eyes  in  Syria  and  the 
Lebanon  while  under  acknowledged  Turkish  sovereignty. 
The  picture  has  the  same  features  of  antipathies  of  race  unsof- 
tened  by  time  and  contact,  of  perpetual  feud  bursting  out  into 
occasional  conflict,  of  undying  religious  animosities,  of  strange 
combinations,  of  fearful  massacres,  and  of  a  government  look- 
ing tamely  on,  and  aUowing  things  for  the  most  part  to  take  their 
course.  We  see  how  utterly  the  Parthian  system  failed  to 
blend  together  or  amalgamate  the  conquered  peoples ;  and  not 
only  so,  but  how  impotent  it  was  even  to  effect  the  first  object 
of  a  government,  the  securing  of  peace  and  ti-anquillity  within 
its  borders.  If  indeed  it  were  necessary  to  believe  that  the 
picture  brought  before  us  represented  truthfully  the  normal 
condition  of  the  people  and  countries  with  which  it  is  con- 
cerned, we  should  be  forced  to  conclude  that  Parthian  govern- 
ment was  merely  another  name  for  anarchy,  and  that  it  was 
only  good  fortune  that  preserved  the  empire  from  falling  to 
pieces  at  this  early  date,  within  two  centuries  of  its  establish- 
ment But  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  reign  of  Arta- 
banus  III.  represents,  not  the  normal,  but  an  exceptional  state 
of  things  —a  state  of  things  which  could  only  arise  in  Parthia 
when  the  powers  of  government  were  relaxed  in  consequence 
of  rebellion  and  civil  war.'"  We  must  remember  that  Arta- 
banus  was  actually  twice  driven  from  his  kingdom,  and  that 
during  the  greater  part  of  his  reign  he  lived  in  pei'petual  fear 
of  revolt  and  insurrection.     It  is  not  improbable  that  the  cul* 


140  '^^SE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xiv. 

minating  atrocities  of  the  struggle  above  described  synchro- 
nized Avith  the  second  expulsion  of  the  Parthian  monarch/"  and 
are  thus  not  so  much  a  sign  of  the  ordinary  weakness  of  the 
Parthian  rule  as  of  the  terrible  strength  of  the  forces  which 
that  rule  for  the  most  part  kept  under  control. 

The  causes  which  led  to  the  second  expulsion  of  Artabanus  *' 
are  not  distinctly  stated,  but  they  were  probably  not  very  differ- 
ent from  those  that  brought  about  the  first.  Artabanus  was 
undoubtedly  a  harsh  ruler;  and  those  who  fell  under  his  dis- 
pleasure, naturally  fearing  his  severity,  and  seeing  no  way  of 
meeting  it  but  by  a  revolution,  were  driven  to  adopt  extreme 
measures.  Something  like  a  general  combination  of  the  nobles 
against  him  seems  to  have  taken  place  about  the  year  a.d.  40; 
and  it  appears  that  he,  on  becoming  aware  of  it,  determined  to 
quit  the  capital  and  throw  himself  on  the  protection  of  one  of 
the  tributary  monarchs.  This  was  Izates,  the  sovereign  of 
Adiabene,  or  the  tract  between  the  Zab  rivers,  who  is  said  to 
have  been  a  convert  to  Judaism.*'^  On  the  flight  of  Artabanus 
to  Izates  it  would  seem  that  the  Megistanes  formally  deposed 
him,  and  elected  m  his  place  a  certain  Kinnam,  or  Kinnamus, 
an  Arsacid  who  had  been  brought  up  by  the  king.  Izates, 
when  he  interfered  on  behalf  of  the  deposed  monarch,  was  met 
by  the  objection  that  the  newly-elected  prince  had  rights  which 
could  not  be  set  aside.  The  difficulty  appeared  ir.superable ; 
but  it  was  overcome  by  the  voluntary  act  of  Kinnamus,  who 
wrote  to  Artabanus  and  offered  to  retire  in  his  favor.  Here- 
upon Artabanus  returned  and  remounted  his  throne,  Kinnamus 
carrying  his  magnanimity  so  far  as  to  strip  the  diadem  from 
his  own  brow  and  replace  it  on  the  head  of  the  old  monarch. 
A  condition  of  the  restoration  was  a  complete  amnesty  for  all 
political  offences,  wliich  was  not  only  promised  by  Artabanus, 
but  likewise  guaranteed  by  Izates. 

It  was  very  shortly  after  his  second  restoration  to  the 
throne  that  Artabanus  died.  One  further  calamity  must,  how- 
ever, be  noticed  as  having  fallen  within  the  1  units  of  his 
reign.  The  great  city  of  Seleucia,  the  second  in  the  Empire, 
shortly  after  it  had  experienced  the  troubles  above  narrated," 
revolted  absolutely  from  the  Parthian  power,  and  declared  it- 
self independent.  No  account  has  reached  us  of  the  circum- 
i'tances  which  caused  this  revolt ;  but  it  was  indicative  of  a 
feeling  that  Parthia  was  beginning  to  decline,  and  that  the  dis- 
integration of  the  Empire  was  a  thing  that  might  be  expected. 
The  Seleucians  had  at  no  time  been  contented  with  their  position 


CH.  XV.]    SUCCESSOR  OF  ARTABANUS  ILL  DOUBTFUL.     141 

as  Parthian  subjects.  Whether  they  supposed  that  they  could 
stand  alone,  or  whether  they  looked  to  enjoying  under  Eoman 
protection  a  greater  degree  of  independence  than  had  been 
allowed  them  by  the  Parthians,  is  uncertain.  They  revolted, 
however,  in  a.  d.  40,  and  declared  themselves  a  self-governing 
community.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Romans  lent  them, 
any  assistance,  or  broke  for  their  sake  the  peace  established 
with  Parthia  in  A.  D.  37.  The  Seleucians  had  to  depend  upon 
themselves  alone,  and  to  maintain  their  rebellion  by  means  of 
their  own  resources.  No  doubt  Artabanus  proceeded  at  once 
to  attack  them,  but  his  arms  made  no  impression.  They  were 
successful  in  defending  their  independence  during  his  reign, 
and  for  some  time  afterwards,  although  compelled  in  the  end 
to  succumb  and  resume  a  subject  position  under  their  own 
masters.  Artabanus  seems  to  have  died  in  August  or  Septem- 
ber A.  D.  42,  '^  the  year  after  the  death  of  Caligula.  His  checkered 
reign  had  covered  a  space  which  cannot  have  fallen  much 
short  of  thirty  years. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


Douhts  as  to  the  successor  of  Artabanus  III.  First  short  reign 
of  Gotarzes.  He  is  expelled  and  Vardanes  made  king. 
Reign  of  Vardanes.  His  icar  icith  Izates.  His  Death. 
Second  reign  of  Gotarzes.  His  Contest  with  his  Nephew, 
Meherdates.  His  Death.  Short  and  inglorious  reign  of 
Vonones  II. 

"  Turbatae  Parthorum  res,  inter  arabiguos,  quis  in  regnura  acciperetur." 

Tacit.  Ann  xi.  10. 

There  is  considerable  doubt  as  to  the  immediate  successor 
of  Artabanus.  According  to  Josephus'  he  left  his  kingdom  to 
his  son,  Bardanes  or  Vardanes,  and  this  prince  entered  without 
difficulty  and  at  once  upon  the  enjoyment  of  his  sovereignty. 
According  to  Tacitus,^  the  person  who  obtained  the  throne 
directly  upon  the  death  of  Artabanus  was  his  son,  Gotarzes, 
who  was  generally  accepted  for  king,  and  might  have  reigned 
without  having  his  title  disputed,  had  he  not  given  indications 
of  a  harsh  and  cruel  temper.     Among  other  atrocities  whereof 


J42  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xv. 

he  was  guilty  was  the  murder  of  his  brother,  Artabanus,' 
whom  he  put  to  death,  together  with  his  wife  and  son,  appar- 
ently upon  mere  suspicion.  This  bloody  initiation  of  his  reign 
spread  alarm  among  the  nobles,  who  thereupon  determined  tq 
exert  their  constitutional  privilege  of  deposing  an  obnoxious 
monarch  and  supplying  his  place  with  a  new  one.  Their 
choioe  fell  upon  Vardanes,  brother  of  Gotarzes,  who  was  resid- 
ing in  a  distant  province,  350  miles  from  the  Court.  [PI.  II. 
Fig.  5.]  Having  entered  into  communications  with  this  prince, 
they  easily  induced  him  to  quit  his  retirement,  and  to  take  up 
arms  against  the  tyrant.  Vardanes  was  ambitious,  bold  and 
prompt :  he  had  no  sooner  received  the  invitation  of  the  Megis- 
tanes  than  he  set  out,  and,  having  accomphshed  his  journey  to 
the  Court  in  the  space  of  two  days,*  found  Gotarzes  whoUy 
unprepared  to  offer  resistance.  Thus  Vardanes  became  king 
\vithout  fighting  a  battle.  Gotarzes  fled,  and  escaped  iato  the 
country  of  the  Dahse,  which  lay  east  of  the  Caspian  Sea,  and 
north  of  the  Parthian  province  of  Hyrcania.  Here  he  was 
allowed  to  reign  for  some  time  unmolested  by  his  brother,  and 
to  form  plans  and  make  preparations  for  the  recovery  of  his 
lost  power. 

The  statements  of  Tacitus  are  so  circumstantial,  and  his 
authority  as  an  historian  is  so  great,  that  we  can  scarcely 
hesitate  to  accept  the  history  as  he  delivers  it,  rather  than  as 
it  is  related  by  the  Jewish  writer.     It  is,  however,  remarkable 
that  the  series  of  Parthian  coins  presents  an  appearance  of 
accordance  rather  with  the  latter  than  the  former,  since  it 
affords  no  trace  of  the  supposed  first  reign  of  Gotarzes  in  a.d. 
42,  while  it  shows  Vardanes  to  have  held  the  throne  from 
Sept.  A.D.  42  to  at  least  a.d.  46.^    Still  this  does  not  absolutely 
contradict  Tacitus,    It  only  proves  that   the  first  reign  of 
Gotarzes  was  comprised  within  a  few  weeks,  and  that  before 
two  months  had  passed  from  the  death  of  Artabanus,  the 
kingdom  was  established  in  the  hands  of  Vardanes.    That 
pi'ince,  after  the  flight  of  his  brother,  applied  himseK  for  some 
time  to  the  reduction  of  the  Seleucians,"  whose  continued  inde- 
pendence in  the  midst  of  a  Parthian  province  he  regarded  as  a 
disgrace  to  the  Empire.    His  efforts  to  take  the  town  failed, 
however,    of    success.      Being    abundantly    provisioned    and 
strongly  fortified,  it  was  well  able  to  stand  a  siege ;  and  the 
high  spirit  of  its  inhabitants  made  them  determined  to  resist 
to  the  uttermost.     While  they  still  held  out,  Vardanes  was 
called  away  to  the  East,  where  his  brother  had  been  gathering 


Cfl.  XV.]      ..  EEiQN  OF  VARDANES  i.  143 

strength,  and  was  once  more  advancing  his  pretensions.  The 
Hyrcanians,  as  well  as  the  Dahae,  had  embi-aced  Ms  cause,  and 
Parthia  was  threatened  with  dismemberment.  Vardanes,  hav- 
ing collected  his  troops,  occupied  a  position  in  the  plain  region 
of  Bactria,^  and  there  prepared  to  give  battle  to  his  brother, 
who  was  likewise  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  army.  Before, 
however,  an  engagement  took  place,  Gotarzes  discovered  that 
there  was  a  design  among  the  nobles  on  either  side  to  rid  them- 
selves of  both  the  brothers,  and  to  set  up  a  wholly  new  king. 
Apprehensive  of  the  consequences,  he  communicated  his  dis 
covery  to  Vardanes ;  and  the  result  was  that  the  two  brothers 
made  up  their  differences  and  agreed  upon  terms  of  peace. 
Gotarzes  yielded  his  claim  to  the  crown,  and  was  assigned  a 
residence  in  Hyrcania,  which  was,  probably,  made  over  to  his 
government.  Vardanes  then  returned  to  the  west,  and,  resum- 
ing the  siege  of  Seleucia,  compelled  the  rebel  city  to  a  sur- 
render in  the  seventh  year  after  it  had  revolted  (a.d.  46.)^ 

Successful  thus  far,  and  regarding  his  quarrel  with  his 
brother  as  finally  arranged,  Vardanes  proceeded  to  contem- 
plate a  mihtary  expedition  of  the  highest  importance.  The 
time,  he  thought,  was  favorable  for  reviving  the  Parthian 
claim  to  Armenia,"  and  disputing-  once  more  with  Rome  the 
possession  of  a  paramount  influence  over  that  country.  The 
Eoman  government  of  the  dependency,  since  Artabanus  for- 
mally rehnquished  it  to  them,  had  been  far  from  proving 
satisfactory.  Mithridates,  their  protege, '°  had  displeased  them, 
and  had  been  smnmoned  to  Rome  by  CaUgula, "  who  kept  him 
there  a  prisoner  until  his  death."  Armenia,  left  without  a 
king,  had  asserted  her  independence;  and  when,  after  an 
absence  of  several  years,  Mithridates  was  authorized  by 
Claudius  to  return  to  his  kingdom,  the  natives  resisted  him  in 
arms,  and  were  only  brought  under  his  rule  by  the  combined 
help  of  the  Romans  and  the  Iberians.  Forced  upon  a  reluctant 
people  by  foreign  arms,  Mithridates  felt  himself  insecure,  and 
this  feeling  made  him  rule  his  subjects  with  imprudent 
severity."  Under  these  circumstances  it  seemed  to  Vardanes 
that  it  would  not  be  very  difficult  to  recover  Armenia,  and 
thus  gain  a  signal  triumph  over  the  Romans. 

But  to  engage  in  so  great  a  matter  with  a  good  prospect  of 
success  it  was  necessary  that  the  war  should  be  approved^ 
not  only  by  himsself ,  but  by  his  principal  feudatories. "  The 
most  important  of  these  was  now  Izates,  king  of  Adiabene  and 
Gordyene,"  who  m  the  last  reign  had  restored  Artabanus  to 


J44  ^-ff^  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xv. 

his  lost  throne. "  Vardanes,  before  committing  himself  by  any 
overt  act,  appears  to  have  taken  this  prince  into  his  counsels, 
and  to  have  requested  his  opinion  on  affronting  the  Romans  by 
an  interference  with  Armenian  affairs.  Izates  strenuously 
opposed  the  project.  He  had  a  personal  interest  in  the  matter, 
since  he  had  sent  five  of  his  boys  to  Rome,  to  receive  there  a 
polite  education,  and  he  had  also  a  profound  respect  for  the 
Roman  power  and  military  system.  He  endeavored,  both  by 
persuasion  and  reasoning,  to  induce  Vardanes  to  abandon  his 
design.  His  arguments  may  have  been  cogent,  but  they  were 
not  thought  by  Vardanes  to  have  much  force,,  and  the  result  of 
the  conference  was  that  the  Great  King  declared  war  against 
his  feudatory." 

The  war  had,  apparently,  but  just  begun,  when  fresh  trou- 
bles broke  out  in  the  north-east.  Gotarzes  had  never  ceased  to 
regret  his  renunciation  of  his  claims,  and  was  now,  on  the  in- 
vitation of  the  Parthian  nobility,  prepared  to  came  forward 
again  and  contest  the  kingdom  with  his  brother.  Vardanes 
had  to  relinquish  his  attempt  to  coerce  Izates,  and  to  hasten  to 
Hyrcania  in  order  to  engage  the  troops  which  Gotarzes  had  col- 
lected in  that  distant  region.  These  he  met  and  defeated  more 
than  once  in  the  country  between  the  Caspian  and  Herat;'" 
but  the  success  of  his  military  operations  failed  to  strengthen 
his  hold  upon  the  affections  of  his  subjects.  Like  the  gener- 
ality of  the  Parthian  princes,  he  showed  himself  harsh  and 
cruel  in  the  hour  of  victory,  and  in  conquering  an  opposition 
roused  an  opposition  that  was  fiercer  and  more  formidable. 
A  conspiracy  was  formed  against  him  shortly  after  his  return 
from  Hyrcania,  and  he  was  assassinated  while  indulging  in 
the  national  amusement  of  the  chase.  '^ 

The  murder  of  Vardanes  was  immediately  followed  by  the 
restoration  of  Gotarzes  to  the  throne.  There  may  have  been 
some  who  doubted  his  fitness  for  the  regal  office,"'  and  inclined 
to  keep  the  throne  vacant  till  they  could  send  to  Rome  and  ob- 
tain from  thence  one  of  the  younger  and  more  civihzed  Par- 
thian princes.  But  we  may  be  sure  that  the  general  desire  was 
not  for  a  Romanized  sovereign,  but  for  a  truly  national  king, 
one  bom  and  bred  in  the  country.  Gotarzes  was  proclaimed 
by  common  consent,  and  without  any  interval,  after  the  death 
of  Vardanes,  and  ascended  the  Parthian  throne  before  the  end 
of  the  year  a.d.  46."  It  is  not  likely  that  his  rule  would  have 
been  resisted  had  he  conducted  himself  well;  but  the  cruelty 
of  his  temper,  which  had  already  once  cost  him  his  crown, 


Vol 


Fig 


Plate  XI 


EAKLIEB   COINS   OF   ARTAXEKXES  I. 


Fie.    2. 


ANCIENT  TERSiANs  (from  a  bas-relief  at  Perscpolis). 
/...     —  '^ 


■MMM^HiMMiaiMAB 


Plata  XII. 


VqL  III. 


y^ 


£n.  XV. j  GOTARZES  ANtf  MEHEBDATESi  145 

again  displayed  itself  after  his  restoration,  and  to  this  defect 
was  added  a  slothful  indulgence  yet  more  distasteful  to  his 
subjects."  Some  military  expeditions  which  he  undertook, 
moreover,  failed  of  success,  and  the  crime  of  defeat  caused  the 
cup  of  his  offences  to  brim  over.  The  discontented  portion  of 
liis  people,  who  were  a  strong  party,  sent  envoys  to  the  Roman 
Emperor,  Claudius  (a.d.  49),  and  begged  that  he  would  surren- 
der to  them  Meherdates,  the  grandson  of  Phraates  IV.  and  son 
of  Vonones,  who  still  remained  at  Rome  in  a  position  between 
that  of  a  guest  and  a  hostage.  "They  were  not  ignorant," 
they  said,  "of  the  treaty  which  bound  the  Romans  to  Parthia, 
nor  did  they  ask  Claudius  to  infringe  it.  Their  desire  was  not 
to  throw  off  the  authority  of  the  Arsacidse,  but  only  to  ex- 
change one  Arsacid  for  another.  The  rule  of  Gotarzes  had  be- 
came intolerable,  alike  to  the  nobility  and  the  common  people. 
He  had  mvirdered  all  his  male  relatives,  or  at  least  all  that 
were  within  his  reach— first  his  brothers,  then  his  near  kins- 
men, finally  even  those  whose  relationship  was  remote ;  nor 
had  he  stopped  there ;  he  had  proceeded  to  put  to  death  their 
young  children  and  their  pregnant  wives.  He  was  sluggish  in 
his  habits,  unfortunate  in  his  wars,  and  had  betaken  himself 
to  cruelty,  that  men  might  not  despise  him  for  his  want  of 
manliness.  The  friendship  between  Rome  and  Parthia  was  a 
public  matter ;  it  bound  the  Romans  to  help  the  nation  allied 
to  them — a  nation  which,  though  equal  to  them  in  strength, 
was  content  on  account  of  its  respect  for  Rome  to  yield  her 
precedence.  Parthian  princes  were  allowed  to  be  hostages  in 
foreign  lands  for  the  very  reason  that  then  it  was  always  possi- 
ble, if  their  own  monarch  displeased  them,  for  the  peoi)lfi  to 
obtain  a  king  from  abroad,  brought  up  under  milder  in- 
fluences." ^^ 

This  harangue  was  made  before  the  Emperor  Claudius  and 
the  assembled  Senate,  Meherdates  himself  being  also  present. 
Claudius  responded  to  it  favorably.  "He  would  follow  the 
example  of  the  Divine  Augustus,  and  allow  the  Partliians  to 
take  from  Rome  the  monarch  whom  they  requested.  That 
prince,  bred  up  in  the  city,  had  always  been  remarkable  for 
his  moderation.  He  would  (it  was  to  be  hoped)  regard  himself 
in  his  new  position,  not  as  a  master  of  slaves,  but  as  a  ruler  of 
citizens.  He  would  find  that  clemency  and  justice  were  the 
more  appreciated  by  a  barbarous  nation,  the  less  they  had  had 
experience  of  them  Meherdates  might  accompany  the  Par- 
thian envoys ;  and  a  Roman  of  rank,  Caius  Cassius,  the  prefect 


l46  ^^^  SIXTH  MONARCRt.  [cH.  xY 

oi  Syria,  should  be  instructed  to  receive  them  on  their  arrival 
m  Asia,  and  to  see  them  safely  across  the  Euphrates.  ""* 

The  young  prince  accordingly  set  out,  and  reached  the  city 
of  Zeugma  in  safety.  Here  he  was  joined,  not  only  by  a 
number  of  the  Parthian  nobles,  but  also  by  the  reigning  king 
of  Osrhoene,  who  bore  the  usual  name  of  Abgarus."*  The 
Parthians  were  anxious  that  he  should  advance  at  his  best 
speed  and  by  the  shortest  route  on  Ctesiphon,  and  the  Roman 
governor,  Cassius,  strongly  advised  the  same  course;  but 
Meherdates  fell  under  the  influence  of  the  Osrhoene  monarch, 
who  is  thought  by  Tacitus  to  have  been  a  false  friend,  and  to 
have  determined  from  the  first  to  do  his  best  for  Gotarzes. 
Abgarus  induced  Meherdates  to  proceed  from  Zeugma  to  his 
own  capital,  Edessa,  and  there  detained  him  for  several  days 
by  means  of  a  series  of  festivities.  He  then  persuaded  him, 
though  the  winter  was  approaching,  to  enter  Armenia,  and  to 
proceed  against  his  antagonist  by  the  circuitous  route  of  the 
Upper  Tigris,  instead  of  the  more  direct  one  through  Meso- 
potamia. In  this  way  much  valuable  time  was  lost.  The 
rough  mountain-routes  and  snows  of  Armenia  harassed  and 
fatigued  the  pretender's  troops,  while  Gotarzes  was  given  an 
interval  during  which  to  collect  a  tolerably  large  body  of 
soldiers.  Still,  the  delay  was  not  very  great.  Meherdates 
marched  probably  by  Diarbekr,  Til,  and  Jezireh,  or  in  other 
words,  followed  the  course  of  the  Tigris,  which  he  crossed  in 
the  neigborhood  of  Mosul,  after  taking  the  small  town  which 
represented  the  ancient  Nineveh.  His  line  of  march  had  now 
brought  him  into  Adiabene ;  and  it  seemed  a  good  omen  for 
the  success  of  his  cause  that  Izates,  the  powerful  monarch  of 
that  tract,  declared  in  his  favor,  and  brought  a  body  of  troops 
to  his  assistance."  Gotarzes  was  in  the  neighborhood,  but 
was  distrustful  of  his  strength,  and  desirous  of  collecting  a 
larger  force  before  committing  himself  to  the  hazard  of  an  en- 
gagement. He  had  taken  up  a  strong  position  with  the  river 
Corma  in  his  front, ="  and,  remaining  on  the  defensive,  con- 
tented himself  with  trjang  by  his  emissaries  the  fidelity  of  his 
rival's  troops  and  alHes.  The  plan  succeeded.  After  a  Uttle 
time,  the  army  of  Meherdates  began  to  melt  away.  Izates  of 
Adiabene  and  Abgarus  of  Edessa  drew  off  their  contingents, 
and  left  the  pretender  to  depend  wholly  on  his  Parthian  sup- 
porters. Even  their  fidelity  was  doubtful,  and  might  have 
given  way  on  further  trial;  Meherdates  therefore  resolved, 
before  being  wholly  deserted,  to  try  the  chance  of  a  battle! 


CH.  XV.]  ROCK  SCULPTtJUB  OP  GOTAliZKS.  147 

His  adversary  was  now  as  willing  to  engage  as  himself,  since 
he  felt  that  he  was  no  longer  outnumbered.  The  rivals  met, 
and  a  fierce  and  bloody  action  was  fouglit  between  the  two 
armies,  no  important  advantage  being  f(jr  a  long  time  gained 
by  either.  At  length  Carrhenes,  the  chief  general  on  the  side 
of  Meherdates,  having  routed  the  troops  opposed  to  him  and 
pursued  them  too  hotly,  was  intercepted  by  the  enemy  on  his 
return  and  either  killed  or  made  prisoner.  This  event  proved 
decisive.  The  loss  of  their  leader  caused  the  army  of  Meher- 
dates to  fly;  and  he  himself,  being  induced  to  intrust  his 
safety  to  a  certain  Parrhaces,  a  dependent  of  his  father's,  was 
betrayed  by  this  miscreant,  loaded  with  chains,  and  given  up 
to  his  rival.  Gotarzes  now  proved  less  unmerciful  than  might 
have  been  expected  from  his  general  character.  Instead  of 
punishing  Meherdates  with  death,  he  thought  it  sufficient  to 
insult  him  with  the  names  of  "foreigner"  and  "  Eoman,"  and 
to  render  it  impossible  that  he  should  be  again  put  forward  as 
monarch  by  subjecting  him  to  mutilation."  The  Roman 
historian  supposes  that  this  was  done  to  cast  a  slur  upon 
Rome  ;'*  but  it  was  a  natural  measure  of  precaution  under  the 
circumstances,  and  had  probably  no  more  recondite  motive 
than  compassion  for  the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the  pre- 
tender. 

Gotarzes,  having  triumphed  over  his  rival,  appears  to  have 
resolved  on  commemorating  his  victory  in  a  novel  manner. 
Instead  of  striking  a  new  coin,  like  Vonones,"  he  determined 
to  place  his  achievement  on  record  by  making  it  the  subject 
of  a  rock-tablet,  which  he  caused  to  be  engraved  on  the  sacred 
mountain  of  Baghistan,  adorned  already  with  sculptures  and 
inscriptions  by  the  greatest  of  the  Achsemenian  monarchs. 
The  bas-relief  and  its  inscription  have  been  much  damaged, 
both  by  the  waste  of  ages  and  the  rude  hand  of  man;  but 
enough  remains  to  show  that  the  conqueror  was  represented 
as  pursuing  his  enemies  in  the  field,  on  horseback,  while  a 
winged  Victory,  flying  in  the  air,  Avas  on  the  point  of  placing 
a  diadem  on  his  head.^"  In  the  Greek  legend  which  accom- 
panied the  sculpture  he  was  termed  "Satrap  of  Satraps"— an 
equivalent  of  the  ordinary  title  "  Kmgof  Kings";  and  his  con- 
quered rival  was  mentioned  under  the  name  of  Mithrates,  a  cor- 
rupt form  of  the  more  common  or  Mithridates  or  Meherdates." 

Very  shortly  after  his  \dctory  Gotarzes  died.  His  last  year 
seems  to  have  been  a.d.  51.'^  According  to  Tacitus,  he  died  a 
natvu'al  death,  from  the  effects  of  disease  f''  but,  according  to 


148 


THE  SIXTH  MONAUCHY. 


[ctt.  XV. 


Josephiis,  he  was  the  victim  of  a  conspiracy.  ^^  The  authority 
of  Tacitus,  here  as  elsewhere  generally,  is  to  be  preferred;  and 
we  may  regard  Gotarzes  as  ending  peacefully  his  unquiet 
reign,  which  had  begun  in  a.d.  42,  immediately  after  the  death 
of  his  father,  had  been  interrupted  for  four  years— from  a.d. 
42  to  A.D.  46 — and  had  then  been  renewed  and  lasted  from  a.d. 
46  to  A.D.  51.  Gotarzes  was  not  a  prince  of  any  remarkable 
talents,  or  of  a  character  differing  in  any  important  respects 
from  the  ordinary  Parthian  type.  He  was  perhaps  even  moi'e 
cruel  than  the  bvdk  of  the  Arsacidse,  though  his  treatment  of 
Meherdates  showed  that  he  could  be  lenient  xx^on  occasion. 
He  was  more  prudent  than  daring,  more  politic  than  brave, 
more  bent  on  maintaining  his  own  position  than  on  advancing 
the  power  or  dignity  of  his  country.  Parthia  owed  little  or 
nothing  to  him.  The  internal  organization  of  the  country 
must  have  suffered  from  his  long  wars  with  his  brother  and 
his  nephew ;  its  external  reputation  was  not  increased  by  one 
whose  foreign  expeditions  were  uniformly  unfortunate. 

The  successor  of  Gotarzes  was  a  certain  Vonones.  His  rela- 
tionship to  previous  monarchs  is  doubtful— and  may  be  sus- 
pected to  have  been  remote.  ^^  Gotarzes  had  murdered  or 
mutilated  all  the  Arsacidse  on  whom  he  could  lay  his  hands ; 
and  the  Parthians  had  to  send  to  Media^"  upon  his  disease  in 
order  to  obtain  a  sovereign  of  the  required  blood.  The  coins 
of  Vonones  II.  are  scarce,  and  have  a  peculiar  rudeness.  The 
only  date"  found  upon  them  is  one  equivalent  to  a.d.  51-52; 
and  it  would  seem  that  his  entire  reign  was  comprised  within 
the  space  of  a  few  months.  Tacitus  tells  us  that  his  rule  was 
brief  and  inglorious,  marked  by  no  important  events,  either 
prosperous  or  adverse.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Vola- 
gases  I.,  who  appears  to  have  ascended  the  throne  before  the 
year  a.d.  51  had  expired.'* 


CH.  XYi.]  ACCESSION  OF  VOLAOASES  I.  149 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

Beign  of  Volagases  I.  His  first  attempt  on  Armenia  fails. 
His  quarrel  with  Izates.  Invasion  of  Parthia  Proper  by 
the  DahcB  and  Sacce.  Second  attack  of  Volagases  on  Ar- 
menia. Tiridates  established  as  King.  First  expedition 
of  Corbulo.  Half  submission  of  Volagases.  Revolt  of 
Vardanes.  Second  expedition  of  Corbulo.  Armenia  given 
to  Tigranes.  Revolt  of  Hyrcania.  Third  attack  of  Vola- 
gases on  Armenia.  Defeat  of  Pcetus,  and  re-establishment 
of  Tiridates.  Last  expedition  of  Corbtdo,  and  arrange- 
ment of  Terms  of  Peace.  Tiridates  at  Rome.  Probable 
time  of  the  Death  of  Volagases. 

"Qenti  Parthorum  Vologeses  imperitabat,  materna  origine  ex  pellice  Graeca." 

Tac.  Ann.  xii.  44. 

VoNONES  the  Second  left  behind  him  three  sons,  Volagases, 
Tiridates,  and  Pacorus.  It  is  doiibtfvil  which  of  them  was  the 
eldest,  but,  on  the  whole,  most  probable  that  that  position  be- 
longed to  Paconxs.  We  are  told  that  Volagases  obtained  the 
crown  by  his  brothers'  yielding  up  their  claim  to  him, '  from 
which  we  must  draw  the  conclusion  that  both  of  them  were 
his  elders.  These  circumstances  of  his  accession  will  account 
for  much  of  lais  subsequent  conduct.  It  happened  that  he  was 
able  at  once  to  bestow  a  principality  upon  Pacorus,^  to  whom 
he  felt  specially  indebted ;  but  in  order  adequately  to  reward 
his  other  benefactor,  he  found  it  necessary  to  conquer  a  prov- 
ince and  then  make  its  government  over  to  him.  Hence  his 
frequent  attacks  upon  Armenia,  and  his  numerous  wars  with 
Rome  for  its  possession,  which  led  ultimately  to  an  arrange- 
ment by  which  the  quiet  enjoyment  of  the  Armenian  throne 
was  secured  to  Tiridates. 

The  circumstances  under  which  Volagases  made  his  first 
attack  upon  Armenia  were  the  following.  Pharasmanes  of 
Iberia,' whose  brother,  Mithridates,  the  Romans  had  (in  A.D. 
47)  replaced  upon  the  Armenian  throne,  had  a  son  named 
Rhadamistus,  whose  lust  of  power  was  so  great  that  to  pre- 
vent his  making  an  attempt  on  his  own  crown  Pharasmanes 
fourul  it  necessary  to  divert  his  thoughts  to  another  fjuarter* 


150  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvl 

Armenia,  he  suggested,  lay  near,  and  was  a  prize  worth  win 
ning;  Khadamistus  had  only  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the 
people,  and  then  craftily  remove  his  uncle,  and  he  would 
probably  step  with  ease  into  the  vacant  place.  The  son  took 
the  advice  of  his  father,  and  in  a  little  time  succeeded  in  get- 
ting Mithridates  into  his  power,  when  he  ruthlessly  put  him 
to  death,  together  with  his  wife  and  children.^  Rhadamistus 
then,  supported  by  his  father,  obtained  the  object  of  his  ambi- 
tion, and  became  king.  It  was  known,  however,  that  a  con- 
siderable number  of  the  Armenians  were  adverse  to  a  rule 
which  had  been  brought  about  by  treachery  and  murder ;  and 
it  was  suspected  that,  if  an  attack  were  made  upon  him,  ho 
would  not  be  supported  with  much  zeal  by  his  subjects.  This 
was  the  condition  of  things  when  Volagases  ascended  the  Par 
thian  throne,  and  found  himself  in  want  of  a  principality  with 
which  he  might  reward  the  services  of  Tiridates,  his  brother. 
It  at  once  occurred  to  him  that  a  happy  chance  presented  him 
with  an  excellent  opportunity  of  acquiring  Armenia,  and  he 
accordingly  proceeded,  in  the  very  year  of  his  accession,  to 
make  an  expedition  against  it. "  At  first  he  carried  all  before 
him.  The  Iberian  supporters  of  Ehadamistus  fled  without 
risking  a  battle ;  his  Armenian  subjects  resisted  weakly ;  Ar- 
taxata  and  Tigranocerta  opened  their  gates ;  and  the  country 
generally  submitted.  Tiridates  enjoyed  his  kingdom  for  a  few 
months ;  but  a  terrible  pestilence,  brought  about  by  a  severe 
winter  and  a  want  of  proper  provisions,  decimated  the  Par- 
thian force  left  in  garrison;  and  Volagases  found  himself 
obliged,  after  a  short  occupation,  to  relinquish  his  conquest. 
Rhadamistus  returned,  and,  although  the  Armenians  opposed 
him  in  arms,  contrived  to  re-establish  himself.  The  Parthians 
did  not  renew  their  efforts,  and  for  three  years — from  a.d.  51 
to  A.D.  54 — Rhadamistus  was  left  in  quiet  possession  of  the 
Armenian  kingdom.' 

It  appears  to  have  been  in  this  interval  that  the  arms  of 
Volagases  were  directed  against  one  of  his  great  feudatories, 
Izates.  As  in  Europe  during  the  prevalence  of  the  feudal  sys- 
tem, so  under  the  Parthian  government,  it  was  always  possible 
that  the  sovei-eign  might  be  forced  to  contend  with  one  of  the 
princes  who  owed  him  fealty.  Volagases  seems  to  have 
thought  that  the  position  of  the  Adiabenian  monarch  was  bo- 
coming  too  independent,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  recall 
him,  by  a  sharp  mandate,  to  his  proper  position  of  subordinate 
and  tributary.     Accordingly,  he  sent  him  a  demand  that  he 


1 


CH.  XVI.]  niS  WAE  WITH  IZATES.  151 

should  surrender  the  special  privileges  wliich  had  been  con- 
ferred upon  him  by  Artabanus  III.,^  and  resume  the  ordinary- 
status  of  a  Parthian  feudatory.  Izates,  who  feared  that  if  he 
yielded  he  would  find  that  this  demand  was  only  a  prelude  to 
others  more  intolerable,  i-eplied  by  a  positive  refusal,  and  im- 
mediately prepared  to  resist  an  invasion.  He  sent  his  wives 
and  children  to  the  strongest  fortress  within  his  dominions,  col- 
lected all  the  grain  that  his  subjects  possessed  into  fortified 
places,  and  laid  waste  the  whole  of  the  open  country,  so  that 
it  should  afford  no  sustenance  to  an  invading  army.  He  then 
took  up  a  position  on  the  lower  Zab,  or  Caprius,  and  stood 
prepared  to  resist  an  attack  upon  his  territory.  Volagascs 
advanced  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  and  was  preparing 
to  invade  Adiabene,  when  news  reached  him  of  an  important 
attack  upon  his  eastern  provinces.  A  horde  of  barbarians, 
consisting  of  Dahse  and  other  Scythians,  had  poured  into  Par- 
thia  Proper,  knoAving  that  he  was  engaged  elsewhere,  and 
threatened  to  carry  fire  and  sword  through  the  entire  prov- 
ince. The  Parthian  monarch  considered  that  it  was  his  first 
duty  to  meet  these  aggressors ;  and  leaving  Izates  unchastised, 
he  marched  away  to  the  north-east  to  repel  the  external 
enemy." 

Volagases,  after  defeating  this  foe,  would  no  dovibt  have  re- 
turned to  Adiabene,  and  resumed  the  war  with  Izates,  but  in 
his  absence  that  prince  died."  Monobazus,  his  brother,  who 
inherited  his  crown,  could  have  no  claim  to  the  privileges 
which  had  been  conferred  for  personal  services  upon  Izates ; 
and  conseqviontly  there  was  no  necessity  for  the  war  to  be  re- 
newed. The  bones  of  Izates  were  conveyed  to  the  holy  soil  of 
Palestine  and  buried  in  the  vicinity  of  Jerusalem.  Monobazus 
was  accepted  by  Volagases  as  his  brother's  successor  without 
any  apparent  reluctance,  and  proved  a  faithful  tributary,  on 
whom  his  suzerain  could  place  complete  dependence. 

The  quarrel  with  Izates,  and  the  war  with  the  Dahse  and 
Sacse,  may  have  occupied  the  years  a.d.  52  and  53.  At  any 
rate  it  was  not  till  a.d.  54,  his  fourth  year,  that  Volagases  re- 
sumed liis  designs  against  Armenia."  Rhadamistus,  though 
he  had  more  than  once  had  to  fly  the  country,  Avas  found  in 
possession  as  king,  and  for  some  time  he  opposed  the  progress 
of  tlie  Parthian  ai-iiis;  but,  before  the  year  was  out,  despairing 
of  success,  he  again  fled,  and  left  Volagases  to  arrange  the  af- 
fairs of  Armenia  at  his  pleasure.  Tiridates  was  at  once  estab* 
liBhed  as  king,  and  Armenia  brought  into  the  position  of  a 


152 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvl 


regular  Parthian  dependency.     The  claims  of  Rome  were  ig- 
nored.   Volagases  was  probably  aware  that  the  Imperial  throne 
was  occupied  by  a  mere  youth,  not  eighteen  years  old,  one 
destitute  of  all  warlike  tastes,  a  lover  of  music  and  of  the  arts, 
who  might  be  expected  to  submit  to  the  loss  of  a  remote  prov- 
ince without  much  difficulty.     He  therefore  acted  as  if  Rome 
had  no  rights  in  this  part  of  Asia,  estabhshed  his  brother  at 
Artaxata,  and  did  not  so  much  as  send  an  embassy  to  Nero  to 
excuse  or  explain  his  acts.     These  proceedings  caused  much 
uneasiness  in  Italy.    If  Nero  himself  cannot  be  regarded  as 
likely  to  have  felt  very  keenly  the  blow  struck  at  the  prestige 
of  the  Empire,  yet  there  were  those  among  his  advisers  who 
could   well   understand    and    appreciate    the    situation.    The 
ministers  of  the  young  prince  resolved  that  efforts  on  the 
largest  scale  should  be  made.     Orders  were  at  once  issued  for 
recruiting  the  Oriental  legions,  and  moving  them  nearer  to 
Armenia;  preparations  were  set  on  foot  for  bridging  the  Eu- 
phrates;  Antiochus  of  Commagene,  and  Herod  Agrippa  II., 
were  required  to  collect  troops  and  hold  themselves  in  readiness 
to  invade  Parthia;  the  Roman  provinces  bordering  upon  Ar- 
menia were  placed  under  new  governors;''  above  aU,  Corbulo, 
regarded  as  the  best  general  of  the  time,  was  summoned  from 
Germany,  and  assigned  the  provinces  of  Cappadocia  and  Gala- 
tia,  together  with  the  general  superintendence  of  the  war  "  for 
retaining  possession  of  Armenia."  "    At  the  same  tune  instruc- 
tions were  sent  oiit  to  Ummidius,  proconsul  of  Syria,  requiring 
him  to  co-operate  with  Corbulo ;  and  arrangements  were  made 
to  obviate  the  clashing  of  authority  which  was  to  be  feared  be- 
tween two  equal  commanders.     In  the  spring  of  a.d.  55  the 
Roman  armies  were  ready  to  take  the  field,  and  a  struggle 
seemed  impending  which  would  recall  the  times  of  Antony  and 
Phraates. 

But,  at  the  moment  when  expectation  was  at  its  height,  and 
the  clang  of  arms  appeared  about  to  resound  throughout 
Western  Asia,  suddenly  a  disposition  for  peace  manifested  it- 
self. Both  Corbulo  and  Ummidius  sent  embassies  to  Volagases, 
exhorting  him  to  make  concessions,  and  apparently  giving  him 
to  understand  that  something  less  was  reqviired  of  him  than 
the  restoration  of  Armenia  to  the  Romans.  '*  Volagases  listened 
favorably  to  the  overtures,  and  agreed  to  put  into  the  hands  of 
the  Roinan  commanders  the  most  distinguished  members  of  the 
royal  family  as  hostages.  At  the  same  time  he  withdrew  his 
troops  from  Armenia;"  which  the  Romans,  however,  did  not 


CH.  xvi.]  REBELLION  OF  VARDANES  IL  153 

occupy,  and  which  continued,  as  it  would  seem,  to  be  governed 
by  Tiridates.  The  motive  of  the  Parthian  king  in  acting  as  he 
did  is  obvious.  A  revolt  against  his  authority  had  broken  out 
in  Parthia,  headed  by  his  son,  Vardanes ;  and,  until  this  inter- 
nal trouble  should  be  suppressed,  he  could  not  engage  with  ad- 
vantage in  a  foreign  war.'"  [PI.  III.  Fig.  1.]  The  reasons 
which  actuated  the  Roman  generals  aro  far  more  obscure.  It 
is  difficult  to  understand  their  omission  to  press  upon  Volagases 
in  his  difficulties,  or  their  readiness  to  accept  the  persons  of  a 
few  hostages,  however  high  their  rank,  as  an  equivalent  for  the 
Roman  claim  to  a  province.  Perhaps  the  jealousy  which  sub- 
sequently showed  itself  in  regard  to  the  custody  of  the 
hostages"  may  have  previously  existed  between  the  two  com- 
manders, and  they  may  have  each  consented  to  a  peace  disad- 
vantageous to  Rome  through  fear  of  the  other's  obtaining  the 
chief  laurels  if  war  were  entered  on. 

The  struggle  for  power  between  Volagases  and  his  son  Var- 
danes seems  to  have  lasted  for  three  years'' — from  a.d.  55  to 
A.D.  58.  Its  details  are  unknown  to  us;  but  Volagases  must 
have  been  successful ;  and  we  may  assume  that  the  pretender, 
of  whom  we  hear  no  more,  was  put  to  death.  No  sooner  was 
the  contest  terminated  than  Volagases,  feeling  that  he  was  now 
free  to  act,  took  a  high  tone  in  his  communications  with  Cor- 
bulo  and  Ummidius,  and  declared  that  not  only  must  his 
brother,  Tiridates,  be  left  in  the  undisturbed  possession  of  Ar- 
menia, but  it  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  he  held  it  as  a 
Parthian,  and  not  as  a  Roman,  feudatory. '"  At  the  same  time 
Tiridates  began  to  exercise  his  authority  over  the  Armenians 
with  severity,  and  especially  to  persecute  those  whom  he  sus- 
pected of  inclining  towards  the  Romans.""  Corbulo  appears  to 
have  felt  that  it  was  necessary  to  atone  for  his  three  years  of 
inaction  by  at  length  prosecuting  the  war  in  earnest.  He 
tightened  the  discipline  of  the  legions,  while  he  recruited  them 
to  their  fuU  strength,'^' made  fresh  friends  among  the  hardy 
races  of  the  neighborhood,"-  renewed  the  Roman  alhance  with 
Pharasmanes  of  Iberia,  urged  Antiochus  of  Commagene  to 
cross  the  Armenian  frontier,  and  taking  the  field  himself, 
carried  fire  and  sword  over  a  large  portion  of  the  Armenian 
territory.  Volagases  sent  a  contingent  of  troops  to  the  assist- 
ance of  his  feudatory,  but  was  unable  to  i:)roceed  to  his  relief  in 
person,  owing  to  the  occurrence  of  a  revolt  in  Hyrcania," 
which  broke  out,  fortunately  for  the  Romans,  in  the  very  year 
that  the  rebellion  of  Vardanes  was  suppressed.    Under  these 


J54  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvi 

circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  Tiridates  had  recourse  to 
treachery,''*  or  that  on  his  treachery  failing  he  continually  lost 
ground,  and  was  at  last  compelled  to  evacuate  the  country  and 
yield  the  possession  of  it  to  the  Romans.  It  is  more  remarka- 
ble that  he  prolonged  his  resistance  into  the  third  year  than 
that  he  was  unable  to  continue  the  struggle  to  a  later  date.  He 
lost  his  capital,  Artaxata,  in  a.d.  58,  and  Tigranocerta,  the 
second  city  of  Armenia,  in  a.d.  60.  After  this  he  made  one 
further  effort  from  the  side  of  Media,"  but  the  attempt  was  un- 
availing;  and  on  suffering  a  fresh  defeat  he  withdrew  alto- 
gether  from  the  struggle,  whereupon  Armenia  reverted  to  the 
Romans.  They  entrusted  the  government  to  a  certain  Tigranes, 
a  grandson  of  Archelaiis,  king  of  Cappadocia,  but  at  the  same 
time  greatly  diminished  the  extent  of  the  kingdom  by  granting 
portions  of  it  to  neighboring  princes.  Pharasmanes  of  Iberia, 
Polemo  of  Pontus,  Aristobulus  of  the  Lesser  Armenia,  and  An- 
tiochus  of  Commagene,  received  an  augmentation  of  their  terri- 
tories at  the  expense  of  the  rebel  state,  which  had  shown  itself 
incapable  of  appreciating  the  blessings  of  Roman  rule  and  had 
manifested  a  decided  preference  for  the  Parthians.^" 

But  the  fate  of  Armenia,  and  the  position  which  she  was  to 
hold  in  i-espect  of  the  two  great  rivals,  Rome  and  Parthia,  were 
not  yet  decided.  Hitherto  Volagases,  engaged  in  a  contest 
with  the  Hyrcanians  and  with  other  neighboring  nations, 
whereto  the  flames  of  war  had  spread,"  had  found  himself 
unable  to  take  any  personal  part  in  the  struggle  in  which  his 
brother  and  vassal  had  been  engaged  in  the  west.  Now  mat- 
ters in  Hyrcania  admitted  of  arrangment,  and  he  was  at  lib- 
erty to  give  his  main  attention  to  Armenian  affairs.  His  pres- 
ence in  the  West  had  become  absolutely  necessary.  Not  only 
was  Armenia  lost  to  him,  but  it  had  been  made  a  centre  from 
which  his  other  provinces  in  this  quarter  might  be  attacked 
and  harassed.  Tigranes,  proud  of  his  newly-won  crown,  and 
anxious  to  show  himself  worthy  of  it,  made  constant  incursions 
into  Adiabene,  ravaging  and  harrying  the  fertile  covintry  far 
and  wide.^*  Monobazus,  unable  to  resist  him  in  the  field,  was 
beginning  to  contemplate  the  transfer  of  his  allegiance  to  Rome, 
as  the  only  means  of  escaping  from  the  evils  of  a  perpetual 
border  war.'"  Tiridates,  discontented  with  the  position 
whereto  he  found  himself  reduced,  and  angry  that  his  brother 
had  not  given  him  more  effective  support,  was  loud  in  his  com- 
plaints, and  openly  taxed  Volagases  with  an  inertness  that 
bordered  on  cowardice. '"    Public  opinion  was  incliiied  to  accept 


CH.  XVI.]       TIURD  EXPEDITION  OF  VOLAOASES.  155 

and  approve  the  charge ;  and  in  Parthia  pubhc  opinion  could 
not  be  safely  contemned.  Volagases  found  it  necessary  to  win 
hack  his  subjects'  good-will  by  calling  a  council  of  the  nobility, 
and  making  them  a  formal  address:"  "Parthians,"  he  said, 
"when  I  obtained  the  first  place  among  you  by  my  brothers 
ceding  their  claims,  I  endeavored  to  substitute  for  the  old  sys- 
tem of  fraternal  hatred  and  contention  a  new  one  of  domestic 
affection  and  agreement ;  my  brother  Pacorus  received  Media 
from  my  hands  at  once ;  Tiridates,  whom  you  see  now  before 
you,  I  inducted  shortly  afterwards  into  the  sovereignty  of 
Armenia,  a  dignity  reckoned  the  third  in  the  Parthian  king- 
dom. Thus  I  put  my  family  matters  on  a  peaceful  and  satisfac- 
tory footing.  But  these  arrangements  are  now  disturbed  by  the 
Eomans,  who  have  never  hitherto  broken  their  treaties  with 
us  to  their  profit,  and  who  will  now  find  that  they  have  done 
80  to  their  ruin.  I  will  not  deny  that  hitherto  I  have  preferred 
to  maintain  my  right  to  the  territories,  which  have  come  to  me 
from  my  ancestors,  by  fair  dealing  rather  than  by  shedding  of 
blood— by  negotiation  rather  than  by  arms;  if,  however,  I 
have  erred  in  this  and  have  been  weak  to  delay  so  long,  I  will 
now  correct  my  fault  by  showing  the  more  zeal.  You  at  any 
rate  have  lost  nothing  by  my  abstinence ;  your  strength  is  in- 
tact, your  glory  undiminished ;  you  have  added,  moreover,  to 
your  reputation  for  valor  the  credit  of  moderation — a  virtue 
which  not  even  the  highest  among  men  can  afford  to  despise, 
and  which  the  Gods  view  with  special  favor."  Having  con- 
cluded his  speech,  he  placed  a  diadem  on  the  brow  of  Tiridates, 
proclaiming  by  this  significant  act  his  determination  to  restore 
liim  to  the  Armenian  throne.  At  the  same  time  he  ordered 
Monaeses,  a  Parthian  general,  and  Monobazus,  the  Adiabenian 
monarch,  to  take  the  field  and  enter  Armenia,  while  he  him- 
self with  the  main  strength  of  the  empire  advanced  towards 
the  Euphrates  and  theatened  Syria  with  invasion.  ^^ 

The  results  of  the  campaign  which  followed  (a.d.  62)  scarcely 
answered  to  this  magnificent  opening.  Monseses  indeed,  in 
conjunction  with  Monobazus,  invaded  Armenia,  and,  advanc- 
ing to  Tigranocerta,  besieged  Tigranes  in  that  city,"  which, 
upon  the  destruction  of  Artaxata  by  Corbulo,'*  had  become  the 
seat  of  government.  Volagases  himself  proceeded  as  far  as 
Nisibis,'-'  whence  he  could  threaten  at  the  same  time  Armenia 
and  Syria.  The  Parthian  arms  proved,  however,  powerless  to 
effect  any  serious  impression  upon  Tigranocerta;  and  Vola- 
gases,  being  met  at  Nisibis  by  envoys  from    Corbulo,  who 


156  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.     '■'"  [ch.  xvi. 

threatened  an  invasion  of  Parthia  in  retaliation  of  the  Parthian 
attack  upon  Armenia,  consented  to  an  arrangement.  A  plague 
of  locusts  had  spread  itself  over  Upper  Mesopotamia,  and  the 
consequent  scarcity  of  forage  completely  paralyzed  a  force 
which  consisted  almost  entirely  of  cavalry.'*  Volagases  was 
glad  under  the  circumstances  to  delay  the  conflict  which  had 
seemed  impending,  and  readily  agreed  that  his  troops  should 
suspend  the  siege  of  Tigranocerta  and  withdraw  from  Armenia 
on  condition  that  the  Eoman  should  at  the  same  time  evacuate 
the  province."  He  would  send,  he  said,  ambassadors  to  Rome 
who  should  arrange  with  Nero  the  footing  upon  which  Armenia 
was  to  be  placed.  Meanwhile,  until  the  embassy  returned,  there 
should  be  peace— the  Armenians  should  be  left  to  themselves — 
neither  Rome  nor  Parthia  should  maintain  a  soldier  within  the 
limits  of  the  province,  and  any  collision  between  the  armies  of 
the  two  countries  should  be  avoided. 

A  pause,   apparently  of  some  months'  duration,  followed. 
Towards  the  close  of  autumn,  however,  a  new  general  came  upon 
the  scene ;  and  a  new  factor  was  introduced  into  the  poHtical 
and  military  combinations  of  the  period.    L.  Caesennius  Psetus, 
a  favorite  of  the  Roman  Emperor,  but  a  man  of  no  capacity, 
was  appointed  by  Nero  to  take  the  main  direction  of  affairs  in 
Armenia,  while  Corbulo  confined  himself  to  the  care  of  Syria, 
his  special  province.     Corbulo  had  requested  a  coadjutor,'* 
probably  not  so  much  from  an  opinion  that  the  war  would  be 
better  conducted  by  two  commanders  than  by  one,  as  from 
fear  of  provoking  the  jealousy  of  Nero,  if  he  continued  any 
longer  to  administer  the  whole  of  the  East.     On  the  arrival  of 
Peetus,  who  brought  one  legion  with  him,  an  equitable  division 
of  the  Roman  forces  was  made  between  the  generals.    Each 
had  three  legions ;  and  while  Corbulo  retained  the  Syrian  aux- 
iharies,  those  of  Pontus.  Galatia,  and  Cappadocia  were  attached 
to  the  army  of  Psetus.     But  no  friendly  feeling  united  the 
leaders.    Corbulo  was  jealous  of  the  rival  whom  he  knew  to 
have  been  sent  out  as  a  check  upon  him  rather  than  as  a  help ; 
and  Psetus  was  inclined  to  despise  the  slow  and  temporizing 
policy  of  the  elder  chief.     The  war,  according  to  his  views,  re- 
quired to  be  carried  on  with  more  dash  and  vigor  than  had 
hitherto  appeared  in  its  conduct— cities  shotdd  be  stormed,  he 
said— the  whole  country  plundered — severe  examples  made  of 
the  guilty.    The  object  of  the  war  also  should  be  changed— in- 
stead of  setting  up  shadowy  kings,  his  own  aim  would  be  tQ 
reduce  Armenia  into  the  form  of  a  province/* 


CH.  xvi.j  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  PyETUS.  157 

The  truce  established  in  the  early  summer,  when  Volagases 
sent  his  envoys  to  Nero,  expired  in  the  autumn,  on  their  re- 
turn without  a  definite  reply  ;*"  and  the  Eoman  commanders 
at  once  took  the  offensive  and  entered  upon  an  autumn  cam- 
paign, the  second  within  the  space  of  a  year.  Corbulo  crossed 
the  Euphrates  in  the  face  of  a  large  Parthian  army,  which  he 
forced  to  retire  from  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river  by  means 
of  military  engines  worked  from  ships  anchored  in  mid-stream. 
He  then  advanced  and  occupied  a  strong  position  in  the  hills 
at  a  httle  distance  from  the  river,  where  he  caused  his  legions 
to  construct  an  entrenched  camp."  Psetus,  on  his  part,  en- 
tered Armenia  from  Cappadocia  with  two  legions,  and,  passing 
the  Taurus  range,  ravaged  a  large  extent  of  country ;  winter, 
however,  approaching,  and  the  enemy  nowhere  appearing  in 
force,  he  led  back  his  troops  across  the  mountains,  and,  re- 
garding the  campaign  as  finished,  wrote  a  despatch  to  Nero 
boasting  of  his  successes,  sent  one  of  his  three  legions  to  winter 
in  Pontus,  and  placed  the  other  two  in  quarters  between  the 
Taurus  and  the  Euphrates,  at  the  same  time  granting  furloughs 
to  as  many  of  the  soldiers  as  chose  to  apply  for  them.  A 
large  number  took  advantage  of  his  liberality,  preferring  no 
doubt  the  pleasures  and  amusements  of  the  Syrian  and  Cap- 
padocian  cities  to  the  hardships  of  a  winter  in  the  Armenian 
highlands.  While  matters  were  in  this  position  Paetus  sud- 
denly heard  that  Volagases  was  advancing  against  him.  As 
once  before  at  an  important  crisis,*'  so  now  with  the  prospect 
of  Armenia  as  the  prize  of  victory,  the  Parthians  defied  the 
severities  of  winter  and  commenced  a  compaign  when  their 
enemy  regarded  the  season  for  war  as  over.  In  this  crisis 
Peetus  exhibited  an  entire  unfitness  for  command.  First,  he 
resolved  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  his  camp ;  then,  affect- 
ing to  despise  the  protection  of  ramparts  and  ditches,  he  gave 
the  order  to  advance  and  meet  the  enemy ;  finally,  after  losing 
a  few  scouts  whom  he  had  sent  forward,  he  hastily  retreated 
and  resumed  his  old  position,  but  at  the  same  time  unwisely 
detached  three  thousand  of  his  best  foot  to  block  the  pass  of 
Taurus,  through  which  Volagases  Avas  advancing.*'  After 
some  hesitation  he  was  induced  to  make  Corbulo  acquainted 
with  his  position ;  but  the  message  which  he  sent  merely  stated 
that  he  was  expecting  to  be  attacked."  Corbulo  was  in  no 
hurry  to  proceed  to  his  relief,  preferring  to  appear  upon  the 
scene  at  the  last  moment,  when  he  would  be  hailed  as  a 
savior. 


1^8  ^^^  SIXTH  MOi^AUCUf.  [cH.  xvL 

Volagases,  meanwhile,  continued  his  march.  The  small  force 
ieft  by  Psetus  to  block  his  progress  was  easily  overpowered, 
and  for  the  most  part  destroyed.''  The  castle  of  Ai-samosata," 
where  Paetus  had  placed  liis  wife  and  child,  and  the  fortified 
camp  of  the  legions,  were  besieged."'  The  Eomans  were  chal- 
lenged to  a  battle,  but  dared  not  show  themselves  outside  their 
entrenchments.  Having  no  confidence  in  their  leader,  the 
legionaries  despaired  and  began  openly  to  talk  of  a  surrender. 
As  the  danger  drew  nearer,  fresh  messengers  had  been  des- 
patched to  Corbulo,  and  he  had  been  implored  to  come  at  his 
best  speed  in  order  to  save  the  poor  remnant  of  a  defeated 
army.**  That  commander  was  on  his  march,  by  way  of  Com- 
magene  and  Cappadocia ;  it  could  not  be  very  long  before  he 
would  arrive;  and  the  supplies  in  the  camp  of  Psetus  were 
sufficient  to  have  enabled  him  to  hold  out  for  weeks  and 
months."^  But  an  unworthy  terror  had  seized  both  Psetus  and 
his  soldiers.  Instead  of  holding  out  to  the  last,  the  alarmed 
chief  proposed  negotiations,  apd  the  result  was  that  he  con- 
sented to  capitulate.  His  troops  were  to  be  allowed  to  quit 
their  entrenchments  and  withdraw  from  the  country,  but  were 
to  surrender  their  strongholds  and  their  stores.  Armenia  was 
to  be  completely  evacuated  by  the  Eomans ;  and  a  truce  was  to 
be  observed  and  Armenia  not  again  invaded,  until  a  fresh  em- 
bassy, which  Volagases  proposed  to  send  to  Rome,  returned. 
Moreover,  a  bridge  was  to  be  made  by  the  Romans  over  the 
Arsanias,  a  tributary  of  the  Euphrates,  which,  as  it  was  of  no 
immediate  service  to  the  Parthians,  could  only  be  intended  as 
a  monument  of  the  Roman  defeat. '"  Psetus  assented  to  these 
terms,  and  they  were  carried  out ;  not,  however,  without  some 
further  ignominy  to  the  Romans.  The  Parthians  entered  the 
Roman  entrenchments  before  the  legionaries  had  left  them, 
and  laid  their  hands  on  anything  which  they  recognized  as 
Armenian  spoil.  They  even  seized  the  soldiers'  clothes  and 
arms,  which  were  relinquished  to  them  without  a  struggle, 
lest  resistance  should  provoke  an  outbreak. ''  Psetus,  once 
more  at  liberty,  proceeded  vnth.  unseemly  haste  to  the  Eu- 
phrates, deserting  his  wounded  and  his  stragglers,  "'^  whom  he 
left  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  Armenians.  At  the  Euphrates 
lie  effected  a  junction  with  Corbulo,  who  was  but  three  days' 
march  distant  when  Psetus  so  gracefully  capitulated. 

The  chiefs,  when  they  met,  exchanged  no  cordial  greeting. 
Corbulo  complained  that  he  had  been  induced  to  make  a  use- 
less journey,  and  to  weary  his  troops  to  no  purpose,  since 


Vol.   111. 


Plate  XIII 


Plate  'XIV 


Vol.  HI. 


"-^ 


Oii.  xvi.]  WAIi  COMMITTED  TO   CORBULO.  \^Q 

without  any  aid  from  him  the  legions  might  have  escaped 
from  their  difficulties  by  simply  waiting  until  the  Parthians 
had  exhausted  their  stores,  when  they  must  have  retired, 
Psetus,  anxious  to  obliterate  the  memory  of  his  failure,  pro- 
posed that  the  combined  armies  should  at  once  enter  Armenia 
and  overrun  it,  since  Volagases  and  his  Parthians  had  with- 
drawn. Corbtdo  replied  coldly — that  ' '  he  had  no  such  orders 
from  the  Emperor.  He  had  quitted  his  province  to  rescue 
the  threatened  legions  from  their  peril;  now  that  the  peril 
was  past,  he  must  return  to  Syria,  since  it  was  quite  uncertain 
what  the  enemy  might  next  attempt.  It  would  be  hard  work 
for  his  infantry,  tired  with  the  long  marches  it  had  made,  to 
keep  pace  with  the  Parthian  cavalry,  which  was  fresh  and 
would  pass  rapidly  through  the  plains.  The  generals  upon 
this  parted.  Psetus  wintered  in  Cappadocia ;  Corbulo  returned 
into  Syria,  where  a  demand  reached  him  from  Volagases  that 
he  would  evacuate  Mesopotamia.  He  agreed  to  do  so  on  the 
condition  that  Armenia  should  be  evacuated  by  the  Parthians.  ^' 
To  this  Volagases  consented;  since  he  had  re-established  Tiri- 
dates  as  king,  and  the  Armenians  might  be  trusted,  if  left  to 
themselves,  to  prefer  Parthian  to  Eoman  ascendancy. 

There  was  now,  again,  a  pause  in  the  war  for  some  months. 
The  envoys  sent  by  Volagases  after  the  capitulation  of  Psetus 
reached  Eome  at  the  commencement  of  spring^*  (a.d.  63),  and 
were  there  at  once  admitted  to  an  audience.  They  proposed 
peace  on  the  terms  that  Tiridates  should  be  recognized  as  king 
of  Armenia,  but  that  he  should  go  either  to  Rome,  or  to  the 
head-quarters  of  the  Roman  legions  in  the  East,  in  order  to  re- 
ceive investiture,  either  from  the  Emperor  or  his  representa- 
tive. It  was  with  some  difficulty  that  Nero  was  brought  to 
believe  in  the  success  of  Volagases,  so  entirely  had  he  trusted 
the  despatches  of  Psetus,  which  represented  the  Romans  as 
triumphant. "  When  the  state  of  affairs  was  fully  understood 
from  the  letters  of  Corbulo  and  the  accounts  given  by  a  Roman 
officer  who  had  accompanied  the  Parthian  envoys,  there  was 
no  doubt  or  hesitation  as  to  the  course  which  should  be  pur- 
sued. The  Parthian  proposals  must  be  rejected.  Rome  must 
not  make  peace  immediately  upon  a  disaster,  or  until  she  had 
retrieved  her  reputation  and  shown  her  power  by  again  taking 
the  offensive.  Psetus  was  at  once  recalled,  and  the  whole  di- 
rection of  the  war  given  to  Corbulo,  who  was  intrusted  with  a 
wide-spreading  and  extraordinary  authority.^"  The  Parthian 
envoys  were  dismissed,  but  with  gifts,  wliich  seemed  to  shovr 


1^0  ^'^^^  SIXTH  MONARCIlT.  [en.  xvt 

that  it  was  not  so  much  their  proposals  as  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  had  been  made  that  were  unpalatable/' 
Another  legion  was  sent  to  the  East ;  and  the  semi-independent 
princes  and  dynasts  were  exhorted  to  support  Corbulo  with 
zeal.  That  commander  used  his  extraordinary  powers  to  draw 
together,  not  so  much  a  very  large  force,  as  one  that  could  be 
thoroughly  trusted;"*  and,  collecting  his  troops  at  Melitene 
(Malatiyeh),  made  his  arrangements  for  a  fresh  invasion. 

Penetrating  into  Armenia  by  the  road  formerly  followed  by 
Lucullus,  Corbulo,  with  three  legions,  and  probably  the  usual 
proportion  of  allies — an  army  of  about  30,000  men— advanced 
against  the  combined  Armenians  and  Parthians  under  Tiri- 
dates  and  Volagases,  freely  offering  battle,  and  at  the  same 
time  taking  vengeance,  as  he  proceeded,  on  the  Armenian 
nobles  who  had  been  especially  active  in  opposing  Tigranes, 
the  late  Roman  puppet-king.  "^  His  march  led  him  near  the 
spot  where  the  capitulation  of  Pa?tus  had  occurred  in  the  pre- 
ceding winter ;  and  it  was  while  he  was  in  this  neighborhood 
that  envoys  from  the  enemy  met  him  with  proposals  for  an 
accommodation.  Corbulo,  who  had  never  shown  himself 
anxious  to  push  matters  to  an  extremity,  readily  accepted  the 
overtures.  The  site  of  the  camp  of  Psetus  was  chosen  for  the 
place  of  meeting ;  and  there,  accompanied  by  twenty  horsemen 
each,  Tiridates  and  the  Roman  general  held  an  interview/" 
The  terms  proposed  and  agreed  upon  were  the  same  that  Nero 
had  rejected ;  and  thus  the  Parthians  could  not  but  be  satisfied, 
since  they  obtained  all  for  which  they  had  asked,  Corbulo, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  content  to  have  made  the  arrangement 
on  Armenian  soU,  while  he  was  at  the  head  of  an  intact  and 
unblemished  army,  and  held  possession  of  an  Armenian  dis- 
trict ;  so  that  the  terms  could  not  seem  to  have  been  extorted 
by  fear,  but  rather  to  have  been  allowed  as  equitable.  He 
also  secured  the  immediate  performance  of  a  ceremony  at 
which  Tiridates  divested  himself  of  the  regal  ensigns  and 
placed  them  at  the  foot  of  the  statue  of  Nero ;  and  he  took  se- 
curity for  the  performance  of  the  promise  that  Tiridates 
should  go  to  Rome  and  receive  his  crown  from  the  hands  of 
Nero,  by  reqiiiring  and  obtaining  one  of  his  daughters  as  a 
hostage.  In  return,  he  readily  imdertook  that  Tiridates  should 
be  treated  with  all  proper  honor  during  his  stay  at  Rome,  and 
on  his  journeys  to  and  from  Italy,  assuring  Volagases,  who 
was  anxious  on  these  points,  that  Rome  regarded  only  the  sub- 
stance, and  made  no  account  of  the  mere  show  and  trappings 
of  power." 


ca.  XVI.]  PEACE  BETWEEN  PARTHIA  AND  ROME.  161 

The  arrangement  thus  made  was  honestly  executed.  After 
a  delay  of  about  two  years, ""  for  which  it  is  difficult  to  account, 
Tiridates  set  out  upon  his  journey.  He  was  accompanied  by 
his  wife,  by  a  number  of  noble  youths,  among  whom  were  sons 
of  Volagases  and  of  Monobazus,  and  by  an  escort  of  three 
thousand  Parthian  cavalry.  ''^  The  long  cavalcade  passed,  like 
a  magnificent  triumphal  procession,  through  two  thirds  of  the 
Empire,  and  was  everywhere  warmly  welcomed  and  sumptu- 
ously entertained.  Each  city  which  lay  upon  its  route  was 
decorated  to  receive  it ;  and  the  loud  acclaims  of  the  multitudes 
expressed  their  satisfaction  at  the  novel  spectacle.  The  riders 
made  the  whole  journey,  except  the  passage  of  the  Hellespont, 
by  land,  proceeding  through  Thrace  and  Illyricum  to  the  head 
of  the  Adriatic,"  and  then  descending  the  peninsula.  Their 
entertainment  was  furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  and 
Is  said  to  have  cost  the  treasury  800,000  sesterces  (about  6250Z.) 
a  day:""  this  outlay  was  continued  for  nine  months,  and  must 
have  amounted  in  the  aggi*egate  to  above  a  million  and  a  half 
of  our  money.  The  first  interview  of  the  Parthian  prince  with 
his  nominal  sovereign  was  at  Naples,  where  Nero  happened  to 
be  staying.  According  to  the  ordinary  etiquette  of  the  Roman 
court,  Tiridates  was  requested  to  lay  aside  his  sword  before 
approaching  the  Emperor ;  but  this  he  declined  to  do ;  and  the 
difficulty  seemed  serious  until  a  compromise  was  suggested, 
and  he  was  allowed  to  approach  wearing  his  weapon,  after  it 
had  first  been  carefully  fastened  to  the  scabbard  by  nails.  He 
then  drew  near,  bent  one  knee  to  the  gi^ound.  interlaced  his 
hands,  and  made  obeisance,  at  the  same  time  saluting  the  Em- 
peror as  his  "lord.""" 

The  ceremony  of  the  investiture  was  performed  afterwards 
at  Rome.  On  the  night  preceding,  the  whole  city  was  illumi- 
nated and  decorated  with  garlands;  the  Forum,  as  morning 
approached,  was  filled  with  "the  people,"  arranged  in  their 
several  tribes,  clothed  in  white  robes  and  bearing  boughs  of 
laurel ;  the  Praetorians,  in  their  splendid  arms,  were  drawn  up 
in  two  lines  from  the  further  extremity  of  the  Forum  to  the 
Rostra,  to  maintain  the  avenue  of  approach  clear ;  all  the  roofs 
of  the  buildings  on  every  side  were  thronged  with  crowds  of 
spectators ;  at  break  of  day  Nero  arrived  in  the  attire  appro- 
priated to  triumphs,  accompanied  by  the  members  of  the 
Senate  and  his  body-g:uard,  and  took  his  seat  on  the  Rostra 
in  a  curule  ehair.  Tiridates  and  his  suite  were  then  introduced 
between  the  two  long  lines  of  soldiers ;  and  the  prince,  advanc 


162  WE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.         ^         [cii.  xVi 

ing  to  the  Rostra,  made  an  oration,  "which  (as  reported  by  Dio) 
was  of  a  sufficiently  abject  character. "  Nero  responded  proudly  •, 
and  then  the  Armenian  prince,  ascending  the  Rostra  by  a  way 
constructed  for  the  purpose,  and  sitting  at  the  feet  of  the 
Roman  Emperor,  received  from  his  hand,  after  his  speech 
had  been  interpreted  to  the  assembled  Romans,  the  coveted 
diadem,  the  symbol  of  Oriental  sovereignty.  ^* 

After  a  stay  of  some  weeks,  or  possibly  months,  at  Rome, 
during  which  he  was  entertained  by  Nero  with  extreme  mag- 
nificence, Tiridates  returned,  across  the  Adriatic  and  through 
Greece  and  Asia  Minor,  ''•'  to  his  own  land.  The  circumstances 
of  his  journey  and  his  reception  involved  a  concession  to  Rome 
of  all  that  could  be  desired  in  the  way  of  formal  and  verbal 
acknowledgment.  The  substantial  advantage,  however,  re- 
mained with  the  Parthians.  The  Romans,  both  in  the  East  and 
at  the  capital,  were  flattered  by  a  show  of  submission ;  but  the 
Orientals  must  have  concluded  that  the  long  struggle  had 
terminated  in  an  acknowledgment  by  Rome  of  Parthia  as 
the  stronger  power.  Ever  since  the  time  of  Lucullus,  Armenia 
had  been  the  object  of  contention  between  the  two  states,  both 
of  which  had  sought,  as  occasion  served,  to  place  upon  the 
throne  its  own  nominees.  Recently  the  rival  powers  had  at 
one  and  the  same  time  brought  forward  rival  claimants ;  and 
the  very  tangible  issue  had  been  raised,  Was  Tigranes  or 
Tiridates  to  be  king?  When  the  claims  of  Tigranes  were  finally, 
with  the  consent  of  Rome,  set  aside,  and  those  of  Tiridates  al- 
lowed, the  real  point  in  dispute  was  yielded  by  the  Romans.  A 
Parthian,  the  actual  brother  of  the  reigning  Parthian  king,  was 
permitted  to  rule  the  country  which  Rome  had  long  deemed  her 
own.  It  could  not  be  doubted  that  he  would  rule  it  in  accord- 
ance with  Parthian  interests.  His  Roman  investiture  was  a 
form  which  he  had  been  forced  to  go  through;  what  effect 
could  it  have  on  him  in  the  future,  except  to  create  a  feeling  of 
soreness?  The  arms  of  Volagases  had  beeen  the  real  force 
which  had  placed  him  upon  the  throne ;  and  to  those  arms  he 
must  have  looked  to  support  him  in  case  of  an  emer- 
gency. Thus  Armenia  was  in  point  of  fact  relinqmshed  to 
Parthia  at  the  very  time  when  it  was  nominally  replaced 
under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Romans,'"' 

There  is  much  doubt  as  to  the  time  at  which  Volagases  I. 
ceased  to  reign.  The  classical  writers  give  no  indication  of  the 
death  of  any  Parthian  king  between  the  year  a.d.  51,  when 
they  record  the  demise  of  Vonones  II.,  and  about  the  year  A.Df 


CH.  xYi.]  LENGTH  OF  THE  REIGN  OF  VOLAGASES.  163 

90,  -when  they  speak  of  a  certain  Pacorus  as  occupying  the 
throne."  Moreover,  during  tiiis  interval,  whenever  they  have 
occasion  to  mention  the  reigning  Partliian  monarch,  they  al- 
ways give  him  the  name  of  Volagases."  Hence  it  has  been 
customary  among  writers  on  Partliian  history  to  assign  to 
Volagases  I.  the  entire  period  between  A.D.  51  and  A.D.  90 — a 
space  of  thirty-nine  years."  Eecently,  however,  the  study  of 
the  Parthian  coins  has  shown  absolutely  that  Pacorus 
began  to  reign  at  least  as  early  as  a.d.  78,'^  while  it  has  raised 
a  suspicion  that  the  space  between  a.d.  51  and  a.d.  78  was 
shared  between  two  kings,"  one  of  whom  reigned  from  a.d.  51 
to  about  A.D.  Q2,  and  the  other  from  about  a.d.  62  to  a.d.  78. 
It  has  been  proposed  to  call  these  kings  respectively  Volagases  I. 
and  Artabanus  IV."  or  Volagases  I.  and  Volagases  II.,"  and 
Partliian  liistory  has  been  written  on  this  basis;'"*  but  it  is  con- 
fessed that  the  entire  absence  of  any  intimation  by  the  clas- 
sical writers  that  there  was  any  change  of  monarch  in  this 
space,  or  that  the  Volagases  of  whom  they  speak  as  a  contem- 
porary of  Vespasian  was  any  other  than  the  adversary  of 
Corbulo,  is  a  very  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  this  view 
being  accepted ;  and  it  is  suggested  that  the  two  kings  which 
the  coins  indicate  rnay  have  been  contemporary  monarchs 
reigning  in  different  parts  of  Parthia."  To  such  a  theory 
there  can  be  no  objection.  The  Parthian  coins  distinctly  show 
the  existence  under  the  later  Arsacidae  of  numerous  pretenders, 
or  rivals  to  the  true  monarch,  of  whom  we  have  no  other 
trace.  In  the  time  of  Volagases  I.  there  was  (we  know)  a 
revolt  in  Hyrcania,'"  which  was  certainly  not  suppressed  as  late 
as  A.D.  75.  The  king  who  has  been  called  Artabanus  IV.  or 
Volagases  II.  may  have  maintained  himself  in  this  region, 
while  Volagases  I.  continued  to  rule  in  the  Western  provinces 
and  to  be  the  only  monarch  known  to  the  Romans  and  the 
Jews.  If  this  be  the  true  account  of  the  matter,  we  may  regard 
Volagases  T.  as  having  most  probably  reigned  from  *  D.  51  to 
about  A.D.  78 — a  space  of  twenty -seven  years. 


164 


TUE  SIXTH  MONARCllY.  [en.  xviL 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Results  of  the  Establishment  of  Tiridates  in  Armenia.  Long 
period  of  Peace  betiveen  Parthia  and  Rome.  Obscurity  of 
Parthian  History  at  this  time.  Relations  of  Volagases  I. 
with  Vespasian.  Invasion  of  Western  Asia  by  Alani. 
Death  of  Volagases  I.  and  Character  of  his  Reign.  Acces- 
sion and  Long  Reign  of  Pacorus.  Relations  of  Pacorus 
icith  Decebalus  of  Dacia.  Internal  Condition  of  Parthia 
during  his  Reign.  Death  of  Pacorus  and  Accession  of 
Chosroes. 

"  Longa  Concordia  quietus  Oriens.  .  .  tantura  adversus  Parthos  minae." 

Tacit.  Hist.  ii.  6. 

The  establishment  of  Tiridates  as  king  of  Armenia,  with  the 
joint  consent  of  Volagases  and  Nero,  inaugurated  a  period  of 
peace  between  the  two  Empires  of  Rome  and  Parthia,  which 
exceeded  half  a  century.'  This  result  was  no  doubt  a  fortunate 
one  for  the  inhabitants  of  Western  Asia;  but  it  places  the 
modern  historian  of  the  Parthians  at  a  disadvantage.  Hitherto 
the  classical  writers,  in  relating  the  wars  of  the  Syro-Macedo- 
nians  and  the  Romans,  have  furnished  materials  for  Parthian 
history,  which,  if  not  as  complete  as  we  might  wish,  have  been 
at  any  rate  fairly  copious  and  satisfactory.  Now,  for  the  space 
of  half  a  century,  we  are  left  without  anything  like  a  consecu- 
tive narrative,  and  are  thrown  upon  scattered  and  isolated 
notices,  which  can  form  only  a  most  incomplete  and  disjointed 
narrative.  The  reign  of  Volagases  I.  appears  to  have  continued 
for  about  twelve  years  after  the  visit  of  Tiridates  to  Rome  ;^ 
and  no  more  than  three  or  four  events  are  known  as  having 
faUen  into  this  interval.  Oui-  knowledge  of  the  reign  of  Pacorus 
is  yet  more  scanty.  But  as  the  business  of  the  workman  is 
simply  to  make  the  best  use  that  he  can  of  his  materials,  such 
a  sketch  of  this  dark  period  as  the  notices  which  have  come 
down  to  us  allow  will  now  be  attempted. 

When  the  troubles  which  followed  upon  the  death  of  Nero 
shook  the  Roman  world,  and  after  the  violent  ends  of  Galba 
and  Otho,  the  governor  of  Judaea,  Vespasian,  resolved  to  be- 
come a  candidate  for  the  imperial  power  (a.d.  69),  Volagases 


CH.  XVII.]  TROUBLES  IN  COMMAOENE.  166 

■was  at  once  informed  by  envoys  of  the  event,  and  was  exhorted 
to  maintain  towards  the  new  monarch  the  same  peaceful  atti- 
tude which  he  had  now  for  seven  ysars  observed  towards  his 
predecessors.'  Volagases  not  only  comphed  with  the  request, 
but  sent  ambassadors  in  return  to  Vespasian,  while  he  was  still 
at  Alexandria  (a.d.  70),  and  offered  to  put  at  his  disposal  a  body 
of  forty  thousand  Parthian  cavalry. "  The  circmnstances  of  his 
position  allowed  Vespasian  to  decline  this  magnificent  proposal, 
and  to  escape  the  odium  which  would  have  attached  to  the 
employment  of  foreign  troops  against  his  countrymen.  Hijs 
generals  in  Italy  had  by  this  time  carried  all  before  them ;  and 
he  was  able,  after  thanking  the  Parthian  monarch,  to  inform 
him  that  peace  was  restored  to  the  Roman  world,  and  that  he 
had  therefore  no  need  of  auxiliaries.''  In  the  same  friendly 
spirit  in  which  he  had  made  this  offer,  Volagases,  in  the  next 
year  (a.d.  71),  sent  envoys  to  Titus  at  ZeugTia,  who  presented 
to  him  the  Parthian  king's  congratulations  on  his  victorious 
conclusion  of  the  Jewish  war,  and  begged  his  acceptance  of  a 
crown  of  gold.  The  polite  attention  was  courteously  received ; 
and  before  allowing  them  to  return  to  their  master  the  young 
prince  hospitably  entertained  the  Parthian  messengers  at  a 
banquet. " 

Soon  after  this,  circumstances  occurred  in  the  border  state  of 
Conunagene  which  tlireatened  a  rupture  of  the  friendly  rela- 
tions that  had  hitherto  subsisted  between  Volagases  and  Ves- 
pasian.' Caesennius  Pastus,  proconsul  of  Syria,  the  unsuc- 
cessful general  in  the  late  Armenian  war,  informed  Vespasian, 
early  in  a.d.  73,  that  he  had  discovered  a  plot,  by  which  Com- 
niagejie,  one  of  the  Roman  subject  kingdoms,  was  to  be  de- 
tached from  the  Roman  alliance,  and  made  over  to  the  Pai'- 
thians.  Antiochus,  the  aged  monarch,  and  his  son  Epiphanes 
were,  according  to  Paetus,  both  concerned  in  the  treason ;  and 
the  arrangement  with  the  Parthians  was,  he  said,  actually  con- 
cluded. It  would  be  well  to  nip  the  evil  in  the  bud.  If  the 
transfer  of  territory  once  took  place,  a  most  serious  disturbance 
of  the  Roman  power  would  follow.  Commagene  lay  west  of 
the  Euphrates;  and  its  capital  city,  Samosata  (the  modern 
Sumeisat),  conmianded  one  of  the  points  where  the  great  river 
was  most  easily  crossed ;  so  that,  if  the  Parthians  held  it,  they 
would  have  a  ready  access  at  all  times  to  the  Roman  provinces 
of  Cajipadocia,  Cilicia,  and  Syria,  with  a  perfectly  safe  retreat. 
These  arguments  had  weight  with  Vespasian,  who  seems  to 
have  had  entire  confidence  in  Psetus,  and  induced  him  to  give 


IQQ  THE  SIXTH  MONARCIIT.  [ch.  xvn. 

the  proconsul  full  liberty  to  act  as  he  thought  best.  ThuB  em- 
powered, Psetus  at  once  invaded  Commagene  in  force,  and 
meeting  at  first  with  no  resistance  (for  the  Commagenians  were 
either  innocent  or  unprepared),  succeeded  in  occupying  Samo- 
sata  by  a  coup  de  main.  The  aged  king  wished  to  yield  every- 
thing without  a  blow ;  but  his  two  sons,  Epiphanes  and  Cal- 
linicus,  were  not  to  be  restrained.  They  took  arms,  and,  at  the 
head  of  such  a  force  as  they  could  hastily  muster,  met  Psetus 
in  the  field,  and  fought  a  battle  with  him  which  lasted  the 
whole  day,  and  ended  without  advantage  to  either  side.  But 
the  decision  of  Antiochus  was  not  to  be  shaken ;  he  refused  to 
countenance  his  sons'  resistance,  and,  quitting  Commagene, 
passed  with  his  wife  and  daughters  into  the  Roman  province 
of  Cilicia,  where  he  took  up  his  abode  at  Tarsus.  The  spirit  of 
the  Commagenians  could  not  hold  out  against  this  defection ; 
the  force  collected  began  to  disperse ;  and  the  young  princes 
found  themselves  forced  to  fly,  and  to  seek  a  rofuge  in  Parthia, 
which  they  reached  with  only  ten  horsemen.*  Volagases  re- 
ceived them  with  the  courtesy  and  hospitality  due  to  their  royal 
rank ;  but  as  he  had  given  them  no  help  in  the  struggle,  so  now 
he  made  no  effort  to  reinstate  them.  All  the  exertion  to  which 
he  could  be  brought  was  to  write  a  letter  on  their  behalf  to  Ves- 
pasian,' in  which  he  probably  declared  them  guiltless  of  the 
charges  that  had  been  brought  against  them  by  Psetus.  "Ves- 
pasian, at  any  rate,  seems  to  have  become  convinced  of  their 
innocence;  for  though  he  allowed  Commagene  to  remain  a 
Roman  province,  he  ijermitted  the  two  princes  with  their  father 
to  reside  at  Rome,  assigned  the  ex- monarch  an  ample  reve- 
nue, and  gave  the  family  an  honorable  status. 

It  was  probably  not  more  than  two  or  three  years  after  the 
events  above  narrated, '"  that  Volagases  found  himself  in  cir- 
cumstances which  impelled  him  to  send  a  petition  to  the  Ro- 
man Emperor  for  help.  The  Alani,  a  Scythian  people,  who 
had  once  dwelt  near  the  Tanais"  and  the  Lake  Mseotis,  or  Sea 
of  Azof,  but  who  must  now  have  lived  further  to  the  East,  had 
determined  on  a  great  predatory  invasion  of  the  coimtries  west 
of  the  Caspian  Gates,  and  having  made  alliance  with  the 
Hyrcanians,  who  were  in  possession  of  that  important  pass, '" 
had  poured  into  Media  through  it,  driven  King  Pacorus  to  the 
mountains,  and  overrun  the  whole  of  the  open  country. 
From  hence  they  had  passed  on  into  Armenia,  defeated  Tiri- 
dates,  in  a  battle,  and  almost  succeeded  in  capturing  him  by 
means  of  a  lasso."    Volagases,  whose  subject-kings  were  thus 


CH.  XVII.]  DEATH  AND   CHARACTER  OF  V0LAGASE8.      167 

rudely  treated,  and  who  might  naturally  expect  his  own  pro- 
per territories  to  be  next  attacked,  sent  in  this  emergency 
a  request  to  Vespasian  for  aid.  He  asked  moreover  that  the 
forces  put  at  his  disposal  should  be  placed  under  the  command 
of  either  Titus  or  Domitian,'*  probably  not  so  much  from  any 
value  that  he  set  on  their  military  talents  as  from  a  convic- 
tion that  if  a  member  of  the  Imperial  family  was  sent,  the 
force  which  accompanied  him  would  be  considerable.  We  are 
told  that  the  question,  whether  help  be  given  or  no,  was  seri- 
ously discussed  at  Rome,  and  that  Domitian  was  exceedingly 
anxious  that  the  troops  should  go,  and  begged  that  he  might 
be  their  commander.  But  Vespasian  was  disinclined  for  any 
expenditure  of  which  he  did  not  recognize  the  necessity,  and 
disliked  all  perilous  adventure.  His  own  refusal  of  extraneous 
support,  when  offered  by  his  rival,  rendered  it  impossible  for 
him  to  reject  Volagases's  request  without  incurring  the  charge 
of  ingratitude.  The  Parthians  were  therefore  left  to  their  own 
resources;  and  the  result  seems  to  have  been  that  the  inva- 
ders, after  ravaging  and  harrying  Media  and  Armenia  at 
their  pleasure,  carried  off  a  vast  number  of  prisoners  and  an 
enormous  booty  into  their  ovsm  country.'^  Soon  after  this, 
Volagases  must  have  died.  The  coins  of  his  successor'"  com- 
mence in  June,  a.d.  78,  and  thus  he  cannot  have  outhved  by 
more  than  three  years  the  irruption  of  the  Alani.  If  he  died, 
as  is  most  probable,  in  the  spring  of  A.D.  78,  his  reign  would 
have  covered  the  space  of  twenty-seven  years.  It  was  an 
eventful  one  for  Parthia.  It  brought  the  second  period  of 
struggle  with  the  Romans  to  an  end"  by  compromise  which 
gave  to  Rome  the  shadow  and  to  Parthia  the  substance  of  vic- 
tory. And  it  saw  the  first  completed  disintegration  of  the 
Empire  in  the  successful  revolt  of  Hyrcania— an  event  of  evil 
portent.  Volagases  was  undoubtedly  a  monarch  of  consider- 
able ability.  He  conducted  with  combined  prudence  and  firm- 
ness the  several  campaigns  against  Corbulo;  he  proved  him- 
self far  superior  to  Psetus ;  exposed  to  attacks  in  various  quar- 
ters from  many  different  enemies,  he  repulsed  all  foreign  in- 
vaders and,  as  against  them,  maintained  intact  the  ancient 
dominions  of  the  Arsacidae.  He  practically  added  Arminia  to 
the  Empire.  Everywhere  success  attended  him,  except  against 
a  domestic  foe.  Hyrcania  seceded  during  his  reign,  and  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  Parthia  ever  afterwards  recovered  it. 
An  example  was  thus  sot  of  successful  Arian  revolt  against  the 
hitherto  irresistible  Turanians,  which  may  have  tended  in  no 


168  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvil 

slight  degree  to  produce  the  insurrection  Avhich  eventually 
subverted  the  Parthian  Empire. 

The  successor  of  Volagases  I.  was  Pacorus,  whom  most 
writers  on  Parthian  history  have  regarded  as  his  son.'*  There 
is,  however,  no  evidence  of  this  relationship ;  and  the  chief 
reason  for  regarding  Pacorus  as  belonging  even  to  the  same 
branch  of  the  Arsacidse  with  Volagases  I.  is  his  youth  at  his 
accession,  indicated  by  the  beardless  head  upon  his  early  coins, 
which  is  no  doubt  in  favor  of  his  having  been  a  near  re- 
lation of  the  preceding  king.  PL  III.,  Fig  1.  The  Parthian 
coins  show  that  his  reign  continued  at  least  till  a.d.  93;  it  may 
have  lasted  considerably  longer,  for  the  earliest  date  on  any 
coin  of  Chosroes  is  ^r.  Seleuc.  421,  or  a.d.  110.  The  accession 
of  Chosroes  has  been  conjecturally  assigned  to  a.d.  108,  which 
would  allow  to  Pacorus  the  long  reign  of  thirty  years.  Of  this 
interval  it  can  only  be  said  that,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes, 
it  was  almost  wholly  uneventful.  We  know  absolutely  noth- 
ing of  this  Pacorus  except  that  he  gave  encouragement  to  a 
person  who  pretended  to  be  Nero ;  that  he  enlarged  and  beau- 
tified Ctesiphon;'"  that  he  held  friendly  communications  with 
Decebalus,  the  great  Dacian  chief,  who  was  successively  the 
adversary  of  Domitian  and  Trajan ;  and  that  he  sold  the 
sovereignty  of  Osrhoene  at  a  high  price  to  the  Edessene  prince 
who  was  cotemporary  with  him.  The  Pseudo-Nero  in  question 
appears  to  have  taken  refuge  with  the  Parthians  in  the  year 
A.D.' 89.  and  to  have  been  demanded  as  an  impostor  by  Domi- 
tian. ^°  Pacorus  was  at  first  inclined  to  protect  and  to  even  assist 
him,  but  after  a  while  was  induced  to  give  him  up,  probably  by 
a  threat  of  hostilities.  The  communication  with  the  Dacian 
chief  was  most  likely  earlier.  The  Dacians,  in  one  of  those  in- 
cursions into  Moesia  which  they  made  during  the  first  years  of 
Domitian,  took  captive  a  certain  Callidromus,^'  a  Greek,  if  we 
may  judge  by  his  name,  slave  to  a  Roman  of  some  rank, 
named  Liberius  Maximus.  This  prisoner  Decebalus  (we  are 
told)  sent  as  a  present  to  Pacorus,  in  whose  service  and  favor 
he  remained  for  a  number  of  years.  This  circumstance,  insig- 
7iificant  enough  in  itself,  acquires  an  interest  from  the  indica- 
tion which  it  gives  of  intercommunication  between  the  enemies 
of  Rome,  even  when  they  were  separated  by  vast  spaces,  and 
might  have  been  thought  to  have  been  wholly  ignorant  of  each 
other's  existence.  Decebalus  can  scarcely  have  been  drawn  to 
Pacorus  by  any  other  attraction  than  that  which  always  sub- 
sists between  enemies  of  any  great  dominant  power.    He  must 


CH.  xvu.]  REIGN  OF  PACORUS  II.  169 

have  looked  to  the  Parthian  monarch  as  a  friend  who  might 
make  a  diversion  on  his  behalf  upon  occasion ;  and  that  mon- 
arch, by  accepting  his  gift,  must  be  considered  to  have  shown 
a  wilUngness  to  accept  this  kind  of  relation. 

The  sale  of  the  Osrhoene  territory  to  Abganis  by  Pacorus^' 
was  not  a  fact  of  much  consequence.  It  may  indicate  an  ex- 
haustion of  his  treasury,  resulting  from  the  expenditure  of 
vast  sums  on  the  enlargement  and  adornment  of  the  capital, 
but  otherwise  it  has  no  bearing  on  the  general  condition  of  the 
Empire.  Perhaps  the  Parthian  feudatories  generally  paid  a 
price  for  their  investiture.  If  they  did  not,  and  the  case  of 
Abgarus  was  peculiar,  still  it  does  not  appear  that  his  pur- 
chase at  all  altered  his  position  as  a  Parthian  subject.  It  was 
not  until  they  transferred  their  allegiance  to  Rome  that  the 
Osrhoene  princes  struck  coins,  or  otherwise  assumed  the  status 
of  kings.  Up  to  the  time  of  M.  Aurelius  they  continued  just 
as  much  subject  to  Parthia  as  before,  and  were  far  from  ac- 
quiring a  position  of  independence. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  reign  of  Pacorus  was  a 
good  deal  disturbed  by  internal  contentions.  We  hear  of  an 
Artabanus"  as  king  of  Parthia  in  a.d.  79;  and  the  Parthian 
coins  of  about  this  period  present  us  with  two  very  marked 
types  of  head,  both  of  them  quite  unlike  that  of  Pacorus,'^* 
which  must  be  those  of  monarchs  who  either  contended  with 
Pacorus  for  the  crown,  or  ruled  contemporaneously  with  him 
over  other  portions  of  the  Parthian  Empire.  [PI.  III.,  Fig.  2.] 
Again,  towards  the  close  of  Pacorus's  reign,  and  early  in  that 
of  his  recognized  successor,  Chosroes,  a  monarch  called  Mith- 
ridates  is  shown  by  the  coins  to  have  borne  sway  for  at  least 
six  years — from  a.d.  107  to  113.  This  monarch  commenced 
the  practice  of  placing  a  Semitic  legend  vipon  his  coins,  ^'^  which 
would  seem  to  imply  that  he  ruled  in  the  western  rather  than 
the  eastern  provinces.  The  probability  appears,  on  the  whole, 
to  be  that  the  disintegi*ation  which  has  been  already  noticed  as 
having  commenced  under  Volagases  I.  was  upon  the  increase. 
Three  or  four  monarchs  were  ruling  together  in  different  por- 
tions of  the  Parthian  world,  each  claiming  to  be  the  true  Ar- 
saces,  and  using  the  full  titles  of  Parthian  sovereignty  upon 
his  coins.  The  Romans  knew  but  little  of  these  divisions  and 
contentions,'^''  their  dealings  being  only  with  the  Arsacid  who 
reigned  at  Ctesiphon  and  bore  sway  over  Mesopotamia  and 
A-diabene. 

Pacorus  must  have  died  about  a.d.  108   or  a  little  later. 


I'-^Q  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvnt 

He  le^  behind  him  two  sons,  Exedares  and  Parthamasiris,** 
but  neither  of  these  two  princes  was  allowed  to  succeed  him. 
The  Parthian  Megistanes  assigned  the  crown  to  Chosroes,  the 
brother  of  their  late  monarch,  perhaps  regarding  Exedares  and 
Parthamasiris  as  too  young  to  administer  the  government  of 
Parthia  satisfactorily.  If  they  knew,  as  perhaps  they  did,'* 
that  the  long  period  of  peace  with  Rome  was  coming  to  an 
end,  and  that  they  might  expect  shortly  to  be  once  more  at- 
tacked by  their  old  enemy,  they  might  well  desire  to  have 
upon  the  throne  a  prince  of  ripe  years  and  approved  judg- 
ment. A  raw  youth  would  certainly  have  been  unfit  to  cope 
with  the  age,  the  experience,  and  the  military  genius  of 
Trajan. 


CHAPTER  XVin. 


Reign  of  Chosroes.  General  condition  of  Oriental  Affairs 
gives  a  handle  to  Trajan.  Trajan's  Schemes  of  Conquest. 
Embassy  of  Chosroes  to  Trajan  fails.  Great  Expedition  of 
Trajan.  Campaign  of  A.  D.  115.  Campaign  of  A.  D.  IW. 
Death  of  Trajan,  and  relinquishment  of  his  Parthian 
Conquests  by  Hadrian.  Interview  of  Chosroes  tvith 
Hadrian.  Its  Consequences.  Death  of  Chosroes  and 
Accession  of  Volagases  II. 

"  Ad  ortum  solis,  cunctae  gentes  quae  inter  Indum  et  Euphratem  amnes  inclytos 
sunt,  concussse  bello."— Aurel.  Vict.  Hist.  §  13. 

The  general  state  of  Oriental  affairs  at  the  accession  of 
Chosroes  seems  to  have  been  the  following.  Upon  the  demise 
of  Tiridates  (about  a.d.  100)'  Pacorus  had  established  upon  the 
Annenian  throne  one  of  his  sons,  named  Exedares,  or  Axidares, 
and  tbis  prince  had  thenceforth  reigned  as  king  of  Armenia 
without  making  any  application  to  Rome  for  investiture,  or 
acknowledging  in  any  way  the  right  of  the  Romans  to  interfere 
with  the  Armenian  succession."  Trajan,  sufficiently  occupied 
in  the  West,'  had  borne  this  insult.  When,  however,  in  a.d. 
114,  the  subjugation  of  Dacia  was  completed,  and  the  Roman 
Emperor  found  his  hands  free,  he  resolved  to  turn  his  arms 
towards  Asia,  and  to  make  the  Armenian  difiiculty  a  pretext 
for  a  gi'eat  military  expedition,  designed  to  establish  unmis- 


*H.  xviii.j  PLANS  OF  TRAJAN.  l7l 

takably  the  supremacy  of  Rome  throughout  the  Eaet.  The 
condition  of  the  East  at  once  called  for  the  attention  of  Rome, 
and  was  eminently  favorable  for  the  extension  of  her  influence 
at  this  period.  Disintegrating  forces  were  everywhere  at 
■work,  tending  to  produce  a  confusion  and  anarchy  which 
invited  the  interposition  of  a  gi'eat  power,  and  rendered  resist- 
ance to  such  a  power  difficult.  Christianity,  which  was  daily 
spreading  itself  more  and  more  widely,  acted  as  a  dissolvent 
upon  the  previously-existing  forms  of  society,  loosening  the 
old  ties,  dividing  man  from  man  by  an  irreconcilable  division, 
and  not  giving  much  indication  as  yet  of  its  power  to  combine 
and  unite.  Judaism,  embittered  by  persecution,  had  from  a 
nationality  become  a  conspiracy ;  and  the  disaffected  adherents 
of  the  Mosaic  system,  dispersed  through  aU  the  countries  of 
the  East,  formed  an  explosive  element  in  the  population  w^hich 
involved  the  constant  danger  of  a  catastrophe.^  The  Parthian 
political  system  was  also,  as  already  remarked,  giving  symp- 
toms of  breaking  up.  Those  bonds  which  for  two  centuries 
and  a  half  had  sufficed  to  hold  together  a  heterogeneous  king- 
dom extending  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Indus,  and  from  the 
Oxus  to  the  Southern  Ocean,  were  beginning  to  grow  weak, 
and  the  Parthian  Empire  appeared  to  be  falling  to  pieces. 
There  seemed  to  be  at  once  a  call  and  an  opportunity  for  a 
fresh  arrangement  of  the  East,  for  the  introduction  of  a  uni- 
fying power,  such  as  Rome  recognized  in  her  own  administra- 
tive system,  which  should  compel  the  crumbling  atoms  of  the 
Oriental  world  once  more  into  cohesion. 

To  this  call  Trajan  responded.  His  vast  ambition  had  been 
whetted,  rather  than  satiated,  by  the  conquest  of  a  barbarous 
nation,  and  a  single,  not  very  valuable,  province.  In  the  East 
he  might  hope  to  add  to  the  Roman  State  half  a  dozen  countries 
of  world-wide  repute,  the  seats  of  ancient  empires,  the  old 
homes  of  Asiatic  civilization,  countries  associated  with  the 
immortal  names  of  Sennacherib  and  Sardanapalus,  Cyrus, 
Darius,  and  Alexander.  The  career  of  Alexander  had  an 
attraction  for  him,  which  he  was  fain  to  confess ;  ^  and  he 
pleased  himself  by  imitating,  though  he  could  not  hope  at  his 
age  to  equal  it.  His  Eastern  expedition  was  conceived  very 
much  in  the  same  spirit  as  that  of  Crassus ; "  but  he  possessed 
the  mihtary  ability  in  which  the  Triumvir  was  deficient,  and 
the  enemy  whom  he  had  to  attack  was  groAvn  less  formidable. 

Trajan  commenced  his  Eastern  expedition  in  a.d.  114,  seven 
years  after  the  close  of  the  Dacian   War.     He  was  met  a< 


272  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxm 

Athens  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  by  envoys  trom  Chosroes, 
who  brought  him  presents,  and  made  representations  which, 
it  was  hoped,  would  induce  him  to  consent  to  peace.'  Chosroes 
stated  that  he  had  deposed  his  nephew,  Exedares,  the  Armenian 
prince  whose  conduct  had  been  offensive  to  Rome ;  and  pro- 
posed that,  as  the  Armenian  throne  was  thereby  vacant,  it 
should  be  filled  by  the  appointment  of  Parthamasiris,  Exedares's 
bi'other.  This  prince  would  be  willing,  he  said,  to  receive 
investiture  at  the  hands  of  Rome ;  and  he  requested  that  Trajan 
would  transmit  to  him  the  symbol  of  sovereignty.  The 
accommodation  suggested  would  have  re-established  the  re- 
lations of  the  two  countries  towards  Armenia  on  the  basis  on 
which  they  had  been  placed  by  the  agreement  between 
Volagases  and  Nero.  It  would  have  saved  the  credit  of  Rome, 
while  it  secured  to  Parthia  the  substantial  advantage  of  re- 
taining Armenia  under  her  authority  and  protection.  Trajan 
might  well  have  consented  to  it,  had  his  sole  object  been  to 
reclaim  the  rights  or  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  his  covtntry. 
But  he  had  distinctly  made  up  his  mind  to  aim,  not  at  the  re- 
establishment  of  any  former  condition  of  things,  but  at  the 
placing  of  matters  in  the  East  on  an  entirely  new  footing.* 
He  therefore  gave  the  ambassadors  of  Chosroes  a  cold  reception, 
declined  the  gifts  offered  him,  and  replied  to  the  proposals  of 
accommodation  that  the  friendship  of  kings  was  to  be  meas- 
m^ed  by  deeds  rather  than  by  words— he  would  therefore  say 
nothing,  but  when  he  reached  Syria  would  act  in  a  becoming 
manner.  ^  The  envoys  of  the  Parthian  monarch  were  obliged 
to  return  with  this  unsatisfactory  answer ;  and  Chosroes  had 
to  wait  and  see  what  interpretation  it  would  receive  from  the 
course  of  events. 

During  the  later  months  of  autumn,  Trajan  advanced  from 
Athens  to  Antioch. "  At  that  luxurious  capital,  he  mvistered 
his  forces  and  prepared  for  the  campaign  of  the  ensuing  year. 
Abgarus,  the  Osrhoene  prince  who  had  lately  purchased  his 
sovereignty  from  Pacorus, "  sent  an  embassy  to  him  in  the 
course  of  the  winter,  with  presents  and  an  offer  of  friendship.''* 
Parthamasiris  also  entered  into  communications  with  him,  first 
assuming  the  royal  title,  and  then,  when  his  letter  received  no 
answer,  dropping  it,  and  addressing  the  Roman  Emperor  as  a 
mere  private  person.'^  Upon  this  act  of  self-humiliation,  nego- 
tiations were  commenced.  Parthamasiris  was  encouraged  to 
present  himself  at  the  Roman  cnmp,  and  was  given  to  under- 
stand that  he  would  there  receive  from  Trajan,  as  Tiridates  had 


CH.  xviii.]     TRAJAN  ENTRAPS  PARTlUMASIRrs^.  173 

received  from  Nero,  the  emblein  of  sovereiji:nty  and  permission 
to  rule  Armenia.  The  mihtary  preparations  were,  however, 
continued.  Vigorous  measures  were  taken  to  restore  the  dis- 
ciphne  of  the  Syrian  legions,  which  had  suffered  through  the 
long  tranquillity  of  the  East  and  the  enervating  influence  of  the 
climate.'*  With  the  spring  Trajan  commenced  his  march. 
Ascending  the  Euphrates,  to  Samosata,  and  receiving  as  he  ad- 
vanced the  submission  of  various  semi-independent  dynasts 
and  princes,  he  took  possession  of  Satala  and  Elegeia,  Armeni- 
an cities  on  or  near  the  Euphrates,  and  establishing  himself  at 
the  last-named  place,  waited  for  the  arrival  of  Parthamasiris. 
That  prince  shortly  rode  into  the  Roman  camp,  attended  by  a 
small  retinue ;  and  a  meeting  was  arranged,  at  which  the  Par- 
thian, in  the  sight  of  the  whole  Roman  array,  took  the  diadem 
from  his  brows  and  laid  it  at  the  feet  of  the  Roman  Emperor, 
expecting  to  have  it  at  once  restored  to  him.  But  Trajan  had 
determined  otherwise.  He  made  no  movement ;  and  the  army, 
prepared  no  doubt  for  the  occasion,  shouted  with  all  their 
might,  sahiting  him  anew  as  Imperator,  and  congratvdating 
him  on  his  "bloodless  victory."  '"  Parthamasiris  felt  that  he 
had  fallen  into  a  trap,  and  would  gladly  have  turned  and  fled ; 
but  he  found  himself  surrounded  by  the  Roman  troops  and 
virtually  a  prisoner.  Upon  this  he  demanded  a  private  audi- 
ence, and  was  conducted  to  the  Emperor's  tent,  where  he  made 
proposals  which  were  coldly  rejected,  and  he  was  given  to 
understand  that  he  must  regard  his  crown  as  forfeited.  It  was 
further  required  of  him  that,  to  prevent  false  rumors,  he 
should  present  himself  a  second  time  at  the  Emperor's  tribunal, 
prefer  his  requests  openly,  and  hear  the  Imperial  decision. 
The  Parthian  consented.  With  a  boldness  worthy  of  his  high 
descent,  he  affirmed  that  he  had  neither  been  defeated  nor 
made  prisoner,  but  had  come  of  his  own  free  will  to  hold  a  con- 
ference with  the  Roman  chief,  in  the  full  expectation  of  receiv- 
ing from  him,  as  Tiridates  had  received  from  Nero,  the  crown 
of  Armenia,  confident,  moreover,  that  in  any  case  he  would 
suffer  no  wrong,  but  be  allowed  to  depart  in  safety.  Trajan 
answered  that  he  did  not  intend  to  give  the  crown  of  Armenia 
to  any  one— the  country  belonged  to  the  Romans,  and  should 
have  a  Roman  governor.  As  for  Parthamasiris,  he  was  free 
to  go  whithersoever  he  pleased,  and  his  Parthian  attendants 
might  accompany  him.  The  Armenians,  however,  must  re- 
main. They  were  Roman  subjects,  and  owed  no  allegiance 
to  Parthia.'* 


^74  THE  SIXTH  MONAUCHY.  [ch.  xvin. 

The  tale  thus  told,  with  no  appearance  of  shame,  by  the 
Eoman  historian,  Dio  Cassius,  is  sufficiently  disgraceful  to 
Trajan,  but  it  does  not  reveal  to  us  the  entire  baseness  of  his 
conduct.  We  learn  from  other  writers, "  two  of  them  contem- 
porary with  the  events,  that  the  pompous  dismissal  of  Partha- 
masiris,  with  leave  to  go  wherever  he  chose,  was  a  mere  pre- 
tence. Trajan  had  coine  to  the  conclusion,  if  not  before  the 
interview,  at  any  rate  in  the  course  of  it,  that  the  youth  was 
dangerous,  and  covQd  not  be  allowed  to  live.  He  therefore 
gent  troops  to  arrest  him  as  he  rode  off  from  the  camp,  and 
when  he  offered  resistance  caused  him  to  be  set  upon  and  slain. 
This  conduct  he  afterwards  strove  to  justify  by  accusing  the 
young  prince  of  having  violated  the  agreement  made  at  the  in- 
terview;'«  but  even  the  debased  moral  sense  of  his  age  was  re- 
volted by  this  act,  and  declared  the  grounds  whereon  he  ex- 
cused it  insufficient.  Good  faith  and  honor  had  been  sacrificed 
(it  was  said)  to  expediency— the  reputation  of  Rome  had  been 
tarnished— it  would  have  been  better,  even  if  Parthamasii'is 
were  guilty,  to  have  let  him  escape,  than  to  have  punished  him 
at  the  cost  of  a  pubhc  scandal. ''  So  strongly  was  the  disgi-ace 
felt  that  some  (it  seems)  endeavored  to  exonerate  Trajan  from 
the  responsibility  of  having  contrived  the  deed,  and  to  throw 
the  blame  of  it  on  Exedares,  the  ex-king  of  Armenia  and 
brother  of  Parthamasiris.  But  Trajan  had  not  sunk  so  low  as 
to  shift  his  fault  on  another.  He  declared  openly  that  the  act 
was  his  own,  and  that  Exedares  had  had  no  part  in  it." 

The  death  of  Parthamasiris  was  followed  by  the  complete 
submisson of  Armenia."  Chosroes  made  no  attempt  to  avenge 
the  murder  of  his  nephew,  or  to  contest  with  Trajan  the  pos- 
session of  the  long-disputed  territory.  A  Httle  doubt  seems  for 
a  short  time  to  have  been  entertained  by  the  Romans  as  to  its 
disposal.  The  right  of  Exedares  to  be  reinstated  in  his  former 
kingdom"-  was  declared  by  some  to  be  clear;  and  it  was  prob- 
ably urged  that  the  injuries  which  he  had  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  Chosroes  would  make  him  a  sure  Roman  ally.  But  these  ar- 
guments had  no  weight  with  Ti'ajan.  He  had  resolved  upon  his 
coui'se.  An  end  should  be  put,  at  once  and  forever,  to  the 
perpetual  intrigues  and  troubles  inseparable  from  such  rela- 
tions as  had  hitherto  subsisted  between  Rome  and  the  Arme- 
nian kingdom.  The  Greater  and  the  Lesser  Armenia  should  be 
aaanexed  to  the  Empire,  and  should  form  a  single  Roman 
province."  This  settled,  attention  was  turned  to  the  neigh- 
boring countries.    Alliance  was  made  with  Anchialus,  king 


CH.  xvm.]  ARMENIA  AND  MESOPOTAMIA  CONQUERED.  175 

of  the  Heniochi  and  Macheloni,  and  presents  were  sent  to 
him  in  return  for  those  which  his  envo\-s  had  brought  to  Tra- 
jan.^* A  new  king  was  given  to  the  Albanians.  Friendly  re- 
lations were  established  with  the  chiefs  of  the  Iberi,  Sauro- 
matse,  Colchi,  and  even  with  the  tribes  settled  on  the  Cimme- 
rian Bosphorus."  The  nations  of  these  parts  were  taught  that 
Rome  was  the  power  which  the  inhabitants  even  of  the  remote 
East  and  North  had  most  to  fear ;  and  a  wholesome  awe  was 
instilled  into  them  which  would,  it  was  hoped,  conduce  to 
the  general  tranquillity  of  the  Empire. 

But  the  objects  thus  accomphshed^  considerable  as  they 
were,  did  not  seem  to  the  indefatigable  Emperor  sufficient  for 
one  year.  Having  settled  the  affairs  of  the  North-east,  and 
left  garrisons  in  the  chief  Armenian  strongholds,""  Trajan 
marched  southwards  to  Edessa,  the  capital  of  the  province  of 
Gsrhoene,  and  there  received  the  humble  submission  of  Ab- 
ganis,  who  had  hitherto  wavei*ed  between  the  two  contending 
powers.  ^'  Manisares,  a  satrap  of  these  parts,  who  had  a  quar- 
rel of  his  own  with  Chosroes,  also  embraced  his  cause,***  while 
other  chiefs  wavered  in  their  allegiance  to  Parthia,  but  feared 
to  trust  the  invader.  Hostilities  were  commenced  by  attacks 
in  two  directions— southward  against  the  tract  known  as  An- 
themusia,  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Khabour;""  and  east- 
ward against  Batnae,  Nisibis,  and  the  mountain  region  known 
as  Gordyene,  or  the  Mons  Masius.^"  Success  attended  both 
these  movements ;  and,  before  winter  set  in,  the  Romans  had 
made  themselves  masters  of  the  whole  of  Upper  Mesopotamia, 
and  had  even  pushed  southwards  as  far  as  Singara,^'  a  town  on 
the  skirts  of  the  modern  Sin  jar  mountain-range.  Mesopotamia 
was  at  once,  like  Armenia,  "  reduced  into  the  form  of  a  Roman 
province."  Medals  were  issued  representing  the  conqueror 
with  these  subject  countries  at  his  foot  ;^"  and  the  obsequious 
Senate  conferred  the  title  of  "Parthicus"  upon  the  Imperator,^^ 
who  had  thus  robbed  the  Parthians  of  two  provinces. 

According  to  some,  the  headquarters  of  Trajan  during  the 
ensuing  winter  were  at  Nisibis  or  Edessa,'^  but  the  nexus  of 
the  narrative  in  Dio  seems  rather  to  require,  and  the  other 
ancient  notices  to  allow,  the  behef  that  he  returned  to  Syria 
and  wintered  at  Antioch,"  leaving  his  generals  in  possession  of 
the  conquered  regions,  with  orders  to  make  every  preparation 
for  the  campaign  of  the  next  year.  Among  other  instructions 
which  they  received  was  the  command  to  build  a  large  fleet  at 
J^isibis,  where  good  timber  was  abundant,""  and  to  prepare  for 


176  "PSE  SIXTH  MONARCHT.  [ch.  xvm. 

its  transport  to  the  Tigris,  at  the  point  where  that  stream  quits 
the  mountains  and  enters  on  the  open  country. ''  Meanwhile, 
in  the  month  of  December,'*  the  magnificent  Syrian  capital, 
where  Trajan  had  liis  headquarters,  was  visited  by  a  calamity 
of  a  most  appalling  character.  An  earthquake,  of  a  violence 
and  duration  unexampled  in  ancient  times,  destroyed  the 
greater  part  of  its  edifices,  and  buried  in  their  ruins  vast  multi- 
tudes of  the  inhabitants  and  of  the  strangers  that  had  flocked 
into  the  town  in  consequence  of  the  Imperial  presence.  Many 
Romans  of  the  highest  rank  perished,  and  among  them  M. 
Virgilianus  Pedo,  one  of  the  consuls  for  the  year.  The  Emperor 
himself  was  in  danger,  and  only  escaped  by  creeping  through 
a  window  of  the  house  in  which  he  resided ;  nor  was  his  person 
quite  unscathed.  Some  falling  fragments  struck  him ;  but  for- 
tunately the  injuries  that  he  received  were  slight,  and  had  no 
permanent  consequence.  The  bulk  of  the  surviving  inhabitants, 
finding  themselves  houseless,  or  afraid  to  enter  their  houses  if 
they  still  stood,  bivouacked  during  the  height  of  the  winter  in 
the  open  air,  in  the  Circus,  and  elsewhere  about  the  city.  The 
terror  which  legitimately  followed  from  the  actual  perils  was 
heightened  by  imaginary  fears.  It  was  thought  that  the  Mons 
Casius,  which  towers  above  Antioch  to  the  south-west,  was 
abovit  to  be  shattered  by  the  violence  of  the  shocks,  and  to  pre- 
cipitate itself  upon  the  ruined  town.''' 

Nor  were  the  horrors  of  the  catastrophe  confined  to  Antioch. 
The  earthquake  was  one  of  a  series  which  carried  destruction 
and  devastation  through  the  greater  part  of  tlie  East.  In  the 
Roman  province  of  Asia,  four  cities  were  completely  destroyed 
— Eleia,  Myrina,  Pitane,  and  Cyme.  In  Greece  two  towns  were 
reduced  to  ruins,  namely.  Opus  in  Locris,  and  Oritus.  In 
Galatia  three  cities,  unnamed,  suffered  the  same  fate.*""  It 
seemed  as  if  Providence  had  determined  that  the  new  glories 
which  Rome  was  gaining  by  the  triumphs  of  her  arms  should 
be  obscured  by  calamities  of  a  kind  that  no  human  power  could 
avert  or  control,  and  that  despite  the  efforts  of  Trajan  to  make 
his  reign  a  time  of  success  and  splendor,  it  should  go  down  to 
posterity  as  one  of  gloom,  suffering,  and  disaster. 

Trajan,  however,  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  diverted  from 
the  objects  that  he  had  set  before  him  by  such  trifling  matters 
as  the  sufferings  of  a  certain  number  of  provincial  towns. 
With  the  approach  of  spring  (a.d.  116)  he  was  up  and  doing.*' 
His  officers  had  obeyed  his  orders,  and  a  fleet  had  been  built 
at  Nisibis  during  the  winter  amply  suflQcient  for  the  purpose 


en.  XVIII.]  CAMPAIGN  OP  A.D.  Il6.  177 

for  which  it  was  wanted.  The  ships  were  so  constructed  that 
they  could  he  easily  taken  to  pieces  and  put  together  again. 
Trajan  had  them  conveyed  on  wagons  to  the  Tigris  at  Jezireh/' 
and  there  proceeded  to  make  preparations  for  passing  the  river 
and  attacking  Adiabene.  By  embarking  on  board  some  of  his 
ships  companies  of  heavy-armed  and  archers,  who  protected 
his  working  parties,  and  at  the  same  time  threatening  with 
other  ships  to  cross  at  many  different  points,  he  was  able, 
though  with  much  difficulty,  to  bridge  the  stream  in  the  face 
of  a  powerful  body  of  the  enemy,  and  to  land  his  troops  safely 
on  the  opposite  bank.  This  done,  his  work  was  more  than  half 
accomplished.  Chosroes  remained  aloof  from  the  war,  either 
husbanding  his  resources,  or  perhaps  occupied  by  civil  feuds," 
and  left  the  defence  of  his  outlying  provinces  to  their  respective 
governors.  Mebarsapes,  the  Adiabenian  monarch,  had  set  his 
hopes  on  keeping  the  invader  out  of  his  kingdom  by  defending 
the  line  of  the  Tigris,  and  when  that  was  forced  he  seems  to 
have  despaired,  and  to  have  made  no  further  effort.  His  towns 
and  strongholds  were  taken  one  after  another,  without  their 
offering  any  serious  resistance.  Nineveh,  Arbela,  and  Gauga- 
mala  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Adenystrae,  a  place  of  great 
strength,  was  captured  by  a  small  knot  of  Roman  prisoners, 
who,  when  they  found  their  friends  near,  rose  upon  the  garri- 
son, killed  the  commandant,  and  opened  the  gates  to  their 
countrymen."^  In  a  short  time  the  whole  tract  between  the 
Tigris  and  the  Zagros  mountains  was  overrun;  resistance 
ceased ;  and  the  invader  was  able  to  proceed  to  further  con- 
quests. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  an  advance  would  have  at 
once  been  directed  on  Ctesiphon,  the  Parthian  capital;  but 
Trajan,  for  some  reason  which  is  not  made  clear  to  us.  deter- 
mined otherwise.  He  repassed  the  Tigris  into  Mesopotamia, 
took  Hatra''  (now  el-Hadhr),  at  that  time  one  of  the  most  con- 
siderable places  in  those  parts,  and  then,  crossing  to  the  Eu- 
phrates, descended  its  course  to  Hit""'  and  Babylon.  No  re- 
sistance was  offered  him,  and  he  became  master  of  the  mighty 
Babylon  without  a  blow.  Seleucia  seems  also  to  have  sub- 
mitted ;"  and  it  remained  only  to  attack  and  take  the  capital 
in  order  to  have  complete  possession  of  the  entire  region 
watered  by  the  two  great  rivers.  For  this  purpose  a  fleet 
was  again  necessary,  and,  as  the  ships  used  on  the  upper 
Tigris  had,  it  would  seem,  been  abandoned,""  Trajan  conveyed 
a  flotilla,  which  had  descended  the  Euphrates,  across  Meso 


178  Tni!  SIXTH  laONAttCET.  \cR.  xna 

potamia  oii  rollers,  and  launching  it  upon  the  Tigris,  proceeded 
to  the  attack  of  the  great  metropolis."^  Here  again  the  resist- 
ance that  he  encountered  was  trivial.  Like  Bahylon  and  Se- 
leucia,  Ctesiphon  at  once  opened  its  gates.  The  monarch  had 
departed  with  his  family  and  his  chief  treasures,^"  and  had 
placed  a  vast  space  hetween  himself  and  his  antagonist.  He 
was  prepared  to  contend  with  his  Roman  foe,  not  in  battle 
array,  but  by  means  of  distance,  natural  obstacles,  and  guerilla 
warfare.  He  had  evidently  determined  neither  to  risk  a  battle 
nor  stand  a  siege.  As  Trajan  advanced,  he  retreated,  seeming 
to  yield  all,  but  no  doubt  intending,  if  it  should  be  necessary, 
to  turn  to  bay  at  last,  and  in  the  meantime  diligently  foment- 
ing that  spirit  of  discontent  and  disaffection  which  was  shortly 
to  render  the  further  advance  of  the  Imperial  troops  impos- 
sible. 

But,  for  the  moment,  all  appeared  to  go  well  with  the  in- 
vaders. The  surrender  of  Ctesiphon  brought  with  it  the  sub- 
mission of  the  whole  region  on  the  lower  courses  of  the  great 
rivers,  and  gave  the  conqueror  access  to  the  waters  of  a  new 
sea.  Trajan  may  be  excused  if  he  overrated  his  successes,  re- 
garded himself  as  another  Alexander,  and  deemed  that  the 
great  monarchy,  so  long  the  rival  of  Rome,  was  now  at  last 
swept  away,  and  that  the  entire  East  was  on  the  point  of  being 
absorbed  into  the  Roman  Empire.  The  capture  by  his  lieuten- 
ants of  the  golden  throne  of  the  Parthian  kings  may  well  have 
seemed  to  him  emblematic  of  this  change ;  and  the  flight  of 
Chosroes  into  the  remote  and  barbarous  regions  of  the  far  East 
may  have  helped  to  lull  his  adversary  into  a  feeling  of  com- 
plete security.  Such  a  feeling  is  implied  in  the  pleasure  voy- 
age of  the  conqueror  down  the  Tigris  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  in 
his  embarkation  on  the  waters  of  the  Southern  Sea,  in  the  in- 
quiries which  he  instituted  with  respect  to  Indian  affairs,  and 
in  the  regret  to  which  he  gave  utterance,  that  his  advanced 
years  prevented  hina  from  making  India  the  term  of  his 
labors.^'  No  shadow  of  his  coming  troubles  seems  to  have 
flitted  before  the  eyes  of  the  Emperor  during  the  weeks  that 
he  was  thus  occupied — weeks  which  he  passed  in  self-com- 
placent contemplation  of  the  past  and  dreams  of  an  impossible 
future. 

Suddenly,  tidings  of  a  most  alarming  kind  dispelled  his 
pleasing  visions,  and  roused  him  to  renewed  exertions.  Re- 
volt, he  found,  had  broken  out  everywhere  in  his  rear.  At 
Seleucia,  at  Hatra,  at  Nisibis,  at  Edessa,"""  the  natives  had 


CH.  XVIII.]      TRAJAN  REPULSED  FROM  HATRA.  179 

flown  to  arms;  his  entire  line  of  retreat  was  beset  by  foes,  and 
he  ran  a  risk  of  having  his  return  cut  off,  and  of  perishing  in 
the  land  which  he  had  invaded.  Trajan  had  hastily  to  retrace 
his  steps,  and  to  send  his  generals  in  aU  directions  to  check  the 
spread  of  insurrection.  Seleucia  was  recovered  by  Erucius 
Clarus  and  Julius  Alexander,  who  punished  its  rebellion  by 
dehvering  it  to  the  flames.  Lucius  Quietus  retook  Nisibis, 
and  plundered  and  biu-nt  Edessa.  Maximus,  on  the  contrary, 
was  defeated  and  slain  by  the  rebels,"  who  completely  de- 
stroyed the  Roman  army  under  his  orders.  ^*  Trajan,  perceiv- 
ing how  slight  his  hold  Avas  upon  the  conquered  populations, 
felt  compelled  to  change  his  policy,  and,  as  the  only  mode  of 
pacifying,  even  temporarily,  the  growing  discontent,  instead 
of  making  Lower  Mesopotamia  into  a  Roman  province,  as  he 
had  made  Armenia,  Upper  Mesopotamia,  and  Adiabene  (or 
Assyria),  he  proceeded  with  much  pomp  and  display  to  set 
up  a  native  king.  The  prince  selected  was  a  certain  Partha- 
maspates,  a  member  of  the  royal  family  of  the  Arsacidae,  who 
had  previously  sided  Avith  Rome  against  the  reigning  mon- 
arch. '•'  In  a  plain  near  Ctesiphon,  where  he  had  had  his  tri- 
bunal erected,  Trajan,  after  a  speech  wherein  he  extolled  the 
greatness  of  his  own  exploits,  presented  to  the  assembled 
Romans  and  natives  this  youth  as  King  of  Parthia,  and  with 
his  own  hand  placed  the  diadem  upon  his  brow.  ^'^ 

Under  cover  of  the  popularity  acquired  by  this  act  the  aged 
Emperor  now  commenced  his  retreat.  The  line  of  the  Tigris 
was  no  doubt  open  to  him,  and  along  this  he  might  have 
marched  in  peace  to  Upper  Mesopotamia  or  Armenia;  but 
either  he  preferred  the  direct  route  to  Syria  by  way  of  Hatra 
and  Singara,  or  the  insult  offered  to  the  Roman  name  by  the 
independent  attitude  which  the  people  of  the  former  place  still 
maintained  induced  him  to  diverge  from  the  general  hne  of  his 
course,  and  to  enter  the  desert  in  order  to  chastise  their  pre- 
sumption. Hatra  was  a  small  town,  but  strongly  fortified. 
The  inhabitants  at  this  time  belonged"  to  that  Arabian  immi- 
gi"ation  which  was  always  more  and  more  encroaching  upon 
Mesopotamia.  They  were  Parthian  subjects,  but  appear  to 
have  had  their  own  native  kings."*  On  the  approach  of  Tra- 
jan, nothing  daunted,  they  closed  their  gates,  and  prepared 
themselves  for  resistance.  Though  he  battered  down  a  por- 
tion of  the  wall,  they  repulsed  all  the  attempts  of  his  soldiers 
to  enter  through  the  breach,  and  when  he  himself  came  near  to 
reconnoitre,  they  drove  him  off  with  their  arrows.    His  troops 


180  THE  SIXTH  MONARGIIT.  [ch.  xviil 

suffered  from  the  heat,  from  the  want  of  provisions  and  fodder, 
from  the  swarms  of  flies  which  disputed  with  them  every  mor- 
sel of  their  food  and  every  drop  of  their  drink,  and  finally 
from  violent  hail  and  thunderstorms.  Trajan  was  forced  to 
withdraw  after  a  time  without  effecting  anytliing,  and  to  own 
himself  baffled  and  defeated  by  the  garrison  of  a  petty  for- 
tress/' 

The  year,  a.d.  116,  seems  to  have  closed  with  this  memo- 
rable failure.  In  the  following  spring,  Chosroes,  learning  the 
retreat  of  the  Romans,  returned  to  Ctesiphon,  expelled  Par- 
thamaspates,  who  retired  into  Roman  territory,  and  re-estab 
Hshed  his  authority  in  Susiana  and  Southern  Mesopotamia."" 
The  Romans,  however,  still  held  Assyria  (Adiabene)  and  Upper 
Mesopotamia,  as  well  as  Armenia,  and  had  the  strength  of 
the  Empire  been  exerted  to  maintain  these  possessions,  they 
might  have  continued  in  all  probability  to  be  Roman  provinces, 
despite  any  efforts  that  Parthia  could  have  made  to  recover 
them.  But  in  August,  a.d.  117,  Trajan  died;  and  his  succes- 
sor, Hadrian,  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  opinion  that 
Trajan's  conquests  had  been  impolitic,  and  that  it  was  unsafe 
for  Rome  to  attempt  under  the  circumstances  of  the  time  any 
extension  of  the  Eastern  frontier.  The  first  act  of  Hadrian 
was  to  relinquish  the  three  provinces  which  Trajan's  Parthian 
war  had  added  to  the  Empire,  and  to  withdraw  the  legions 
within  the  Euphrates."  Assyria  and  Mesopotamia  were  at 
once  re-occupied  by  the  Parthians.  Armenia  appears  to  have 
been  made  over  by  Hadrian  to  Parthamaspates,  "^  and  to  have 
thus  returned  to  its  former  condition  of  a  semi-independent 
kingdom,  leaning  alternately  on  Rome  and  Parthia.  It  has 
been  asserted  that  Osrhoene  was  placed  Ukewise  upon  the 
same  footing;"  but  the  numismatic  evidence  adduced  in  favor 
of  this  view  is  weak  ;*"*  and  upon  the  whole  it  appears  most 
probable  that,  like  the  other  Mesopotamian  countries,  Os- 
rhoene again  fell  under  the  dominion  of  the  Arsacidae.  Rome 
therefore  gained  nothing  by  the  great  exertions  which  she  had 
made,"  unless  it  were  a  partial  recovery  of  her  lost  influence 
in  Armenia,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  growing  weakness  of  her 
Eastern  rival— a  knowledge  which,  though  it  produced  no  im- 
mediate fruit,  was  of  importance,  and  was  borne  in  mind 
when,  after  another  half -century  of  peace,  the  relations  of  the 
two  empires  became  once  more  unsatisfactory. 

The  voluntary  withdrawal  of  Hadrian  from  Assyria  and 
Mesopotamia  placed  him  on  amicable  terms  with  Parthia  dur- 


CH.  xvin.]  HADRIAN  GIVES  UP  TRAJAN'S  CONQUESTS.  181 

ing  the  whole  of  his  reign.  Chosroes  and  his  successor  could 
not  but  feel  themselves  under  obligations  to  the  monarch  who, 
without  being  forced  to  it  by  a  defeat,  had  restored  to  Parthia 
the  most  valuable  of  her  provinces.  On  one  occasion  alone  do 
we  hear  of  any,  even  threatened,  interruption  of  the  friendly 
relations  subsisting  between  the  two  powers;  and  then  the 
misunderstanding,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  was  easily  rec- 
tified and  peace  maintained,  Hadrian,  in  a.d.  122,  had  an 
interview  with  Chosroes  on  his  eastern  frontier,  and  by  per- 
sonal explanations  and  assurances  averted,  we  are  told,""  an 
impending  outbreak.  Not  long  afterwards  (a.d.  130,  probably) 
he  returned  to  Chosroes  the  daughter  who  had  been  captured 
by  Trajan,  and  at  the  same  time  promised  the  restoration  of 
the  golden  throne, "  on  which  the  Parthians  appear  to  have  set 
a  special  value. 

It  must  have  been  soon  after  he  received  back  his  daughter 
that  Chosroes  died.  His  latest  coins  bear  a  date  equivalent  to 
A.D.  128;"*  and  the  Roman  historians  give  Volagases  II.  as 
king  of  Parthia  in  a.d.  133."^  It  has  been  generally  supposed 
that  this  prince  was  Chosroes'  son,  and  succeeded  him  in  the 
natural  course;'"  but  the  evidence  of  the  Parthian  coins  is 
strong  against  these  suppositions.  According  to  them,  Vola- 
gases had  been  a  pretender  to  the  Parthian  throne  as  early  as 
A.D.  78,  and  had  struck  coins  both  in  that  year  and  the  follow- 
ing one,  about  the  date  of  the  accession  of  Pacorus.  His  at- 
tempt had,  however,  at  that  time  failed,  and  for  forty-one 
years  he  kept  his  pretensions  in  abeyance;  but  about  a.d. 
119  or  120  he  appears  to  have  again  come  forward,  and  to  have 
disputed  the  crown  with  Chosroes,  or  reigned  contemporane- 
ously with  him  over  some  portion  of  the  Parthian  kingdom, 
till  about  A.D.  130,  when— pi'obably  on  the  death  of  Chosroes — 
he  was  acknowledged  as  sole  king  by  the  entire  nation.  Such 
is  the  evidence  of  the  coins,  which  in  this  case  are  very  pecu- 
liar, and  bear  the  name  of  Volagases  from  first  to  last."'  It 
seems  to  follow  from  them  that  Chosroes  was  succeeded,  not 
by  a  son,  but  by  a  rival,  an  old  claimant  of  the  crown,  who 
cannot  have  been  much  younger  than  Chosroes  himself. 


X82  THE  SIXTH  M02iARCH7.  [cH.  xix. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Reign  of  Volagases  II.  Invasion  of  the  Alani.  Communica' 
tions  between  Volagases  and  Antoninus  Pius.  Death  of  Vola' 
gases  II.  and  Accession  of  Volagases  III.  Aggressive  War 
of  Volagases  III.  on  Rome.  Campaign  of  a.d.  162.  Verus 
sent  to  the  East.  Sequel  of  the  War.  Losses  suffered  by 
Parthia.    Death  of  Volagases  III. 

"  Parthicum  bellum,  quod  Volagessus  .  .  .  indixit." 

Jul.  Capit.  M.  Antonin.  §  8. 

Volagases  II.  appears  to  have  occupied  the  Parthian  throne, 
after  the  death  of  Chosroes,  for  the  space  of  nineteen  years. 
His  reign  has  a  general  character  of  tranquiUity,  which  agrees 
well  with  the  advanced  period  of  hfe  at  which,  according  to 
the  coins,  he  first  became  actual  king  of  Parthia. '  It  was  dis- 
turbed by  only  one  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities,  an  occasion 
upon  which  Volagases  stood  upon  the  defensive ;  and  on  one 
other  occasion  was  for  a  brief  period  threatened  with  disturb- 
ance. Otherwise  it  seems  to  have  been  wholly  peaceful.  So 
far  as  appears,  no  pretenders  troubled  it.  The  coins  show,  for 
the  years  between  a.d.  130  and  a.d.  149,  the  head  of  but  one 
monarch,  a  head  of  a  marked  type,  which  is  impossible  to  be 
mistaken.  =    [PI.  III.,  Fig.  4.] 

The  occasion  upon  which  actual  hostilities  disturbed  the  re- 
pose of  Volagases  was  in  a.d.  133,  when,  by  the  intrigues  of 
Pharasmanes,  king  of  the  Iberians,  a  great  horde  of  Alani  from 
the  tract  beyond  the  Caucasus  was  induced  to  pour  itself 
through  the  passes  of  that  mountain  chain  upon  the  territories 
of  both  the  Parthians  and  the  Romans.'  Pharasmanes  had 
previously  shown  contempt  for  the  power  of  Rome  by  refusing 
to  pay  court  to  Hadrian,  when,  in  a.d.  130,  he  invited  the  mon- 
archs  of  Western  Asia  generally  to  a  conference. "  He  bad  also, 
it  would  seem,  been  insulted  by  Hadrian,  who,  when  Pharas- 
manes sent  him  a  number  of  cloaks  made  of  cloth-of-gold,  em- 
ployed them  in  the  adornment  of  three  hundred  convicts  con^ 
demned  to  furnish  sport  to  the  Romans  in  the  amphitheatre. ' 
What  quarrel  he  had  with  the  Parthians  we  are  not  told ;  but 
it  is  related  that  at  his  instigation  the  savage  Alani,  introduced 


CH.  XIX.]  INROAD   OF  THE  ALANI.  183 

■within  the  mountain  barrier,  poured  at  one  and  the  same  time 
into  Media  Atropatene,  which  was  a  dependency  of  Parthia; 
into  Armenia,  which  was  under  Parthamaspates ;  and  into  the 
Roman  province  of  Cappadocia.  Volagases  sent  an  embassy  to 
Rome  complaining  of  the  conduct  of  Pharasmanes, '  who  ap- 
pears to  have  been  regarded  as  ruHng  under  Roman  protection ; 
and  that  prince  was  summoned  to  Rome  in  order  to  answer  for 
his  conduct.  But  the  Alanian  inroad  had  to  be  dealt  with  at 
once.  The  Roman  governor  of  Cappadocia,  who  was  Arrian, 
the  historian  of  Alexander,  by  a  mere  display  of  force  drove 
the  barbarians  from  his  province.  Volagases  showed  a  tamer 
spirit ;  he  was  content  to  follow  an  example,  often  set  in  the 
East,  and  already  in  one  instance  imitated  by  Rome,'  but  never 
adopted  by  any  nation  as  a  settled  policy  without  fatal  conse- 
quences, and  to  buy  at  a  high  price  the  retreat  of  the  invaders. 

It  was  to  have  been  expected  that  Rome  would  have  punished 
severely  the  guilt  of  Pharasmanes  in  exposing  the  Empire  and 
its  allies  to  horrors  such  as  always  accompany  the  inroads  of  a 
barbarous  people.  But  though  the  Iberian  monarch  was  com- 
pelled to  travel  to  Rome  and  make  his  appearance  before  the 
Emperor's  tribunal,"  yet  Hadrian,  so  far  from  punishing  him, 
was  induced  to  load  him  with  benefits  and  honors.  He  per- 
mitted him  to  sacrifice  in  the  Capitol,  placed  his  equestrian 
statue  in  the  temple  of  BeUona,  and  granted  Mm  an  augmenta- 
tion of  territory."  Volagases  can  scarcely  have  been  pleased  at 
these  results  of  his  complaints ;  he  bore  them,  however,  with- 
out murmuring,  and,  when  (in  a.d.  138)  Hadrian  died  and  was 
succeeded  by  his  adopted  son,  T.  Am-elius,  better  known  aa 
Antoninus  Pius,  Volagases  sent  to  Rome  an  embassy  of  con- 
gratvdation,  and  presented  the  new  monarch  with  a  crown  of 
gold.'" 

It  was  probably  at  this  same  time  that  he  ventured  to  make 
an  unpleasant  demand.  Hadrian  had  promised  that  the  golden 
throne  which  Trajan  had  captured  in  his  expedition,  and  by 
which  the  Parthians  set  so  much  store,  should  be  surrendered  to 
them;  "  but  this  promise  he  had  failed  to  perform.  Volagases 
appears  to  have  thought  that  his  successor  might  be  more 
facile,  and  accordingly  instructed  his  envoys  to  re-open  the 
subject,  to  remind  Antoninus  of  the  pledged  faith  of  his  adopted 
father,  and  to  make  a  formal  request  for  the  delivery  of  the 
valued  relic."  Antoninus,  however,  proved  as  obdurate  as 
Hadrian  He  was  not  to  be  persuaded  by  any  argiunent  to 
give  back  the  trophy  •,  and  the  envoys  had  to  return  with  the 


Ig4  THE  SIXTH  IIONARCHY.  [ch.  xix 

report  that  their  representations  upon  the  point  had  been  in 
vain,  and  had  wholly  failed  to  move  the  new  Emperor. 

The  history  of  Volagases  II.  ends  with  this  transaction.  No 
events  are  assignable  to  the  last  ten  years  of  his  reign,  which 
was  probably  a  season  of  profound  repose,  in  the  East  as  it  was 
in  the  West— a  period  having  (as  our  greatest  historian  observes 
of  it)  "the  rare  advantage  of  furnishing  very  few  materials  for 
history,"  which  is,  indeed  (as  he  says),  "little  more  than  the 
register  of  the  crunes,  follies,  and  misfortunes  of  mankind."  '^ 
The  influence  of  Rome  extended  beyond  his  borders.  As  in 
modern  times  it  has  become  a  proverb  that  when  a  particular 
European  nation  is  satisfied  the  peace  of  the  world  is  assured, 
so  in  the  days  whereof  we  are  treating  it  would  seem  that 
Rome  had  only  to  desire  repose,  for  the  surrounding  nations  to 
find  themselves  tranquil.  The  inference  appears  to  be  that 
not  only  were  the  wars  which  occurred  between  Rome  and  her 
neighbors  for  the  most  part  stirred  up  by  herself,  but  that  even 
the  civil  commotions  which  disturbed  States  upon  her  borders 
had  very  generally  their  origin  in  Roman  intrigues,  which, 
skilfully  concealed  from  view,  nevertheless  directed  the  course 
of  afliairs  in  surrounding  States,  and  roused  in  them,  when 
Rome  thought  her  interests  required  it,  civil  differences,  disor- 
ders, and  contentions. 

The  successor  of  Volagases  II.  was  Volagases  III. ,  who  was 
most  probably  his  son,  although  of  this  there  is  no  direct  evi- 
dence. The  Parthian  coins  show  "  that  Volagases  III.  ascended 
the  throne  in  a.d.  148  or  149,  and  reigned  till  a.d.  190  or  191 — 
a  space  of  forty -two  years.  We  m.ay  assume  that  he  was  a 
tolerably  young  man  at  his  accession,  though  the  effigy  upon 
his  earhest  coins  is  weU  bearded,  and  that  he  was  somewhat 
tired  of  the  long  inactivity  which  had  characterized  the  period 
of  his  father's  rule.  He  seems  very  early  to  have  meditated  a 
war  with  Rome,'^  and  to  have  taken  certain  steps  which  be- 
trayed his  intentions ;  but,  upon  their  coming  to  the  knowledge 
of  Antoninus,  and  that  prince  writing  to  him  on  the  subject, 
Volagases  altered  his  plans, '^  and  resolved  to  wait,  at  any  rate, 
until  a  change  of  Emperor  at  Rome  should  give  him  a  chance 
of  taking  the  enemy  at  a  disadvantage.  Thus  it  was  not  till 
A.D.  161 — twelve  years  after  his  accession — that  his  original  de- 
sign was  carried  out,  and  the  flames  of  war  were  once  more 
lighted  in  the  Ea^t  to  the  ruin  and  desolation  of  the  fairest  por- 
tion of  Western  Asia. 

The  good  Antoninus  was  succeeded  in  the  spring  of  a.d.  161 


CH.  XIX.]  VOLAGASES  III.   INVADES  SYRIA.  185 

by  his  adopted  son,  Marcus  Aurelius,  who  at  once  associated 
with  him  in  the  government  the  other  adopted  son  of  Antoni- 
nus, Lucius  Verus.  Upon  this,  thinking  that  the  opportunity 
for  which  he  had  been  so  long  waiting  had  at  last  arrived,  Vo- 
lagases  marched  his  troops  suddenly  into  Armenia,  expelled 
Soeemus,  the  king  protected  by  the  Eomans,"  and  established 
in  his  place  a  certain  Tigranes,  a  scion  of  the  old  royal  stock, 
whom  the  Armenians  regarded  as  their  rightful  monarch.'* 
News  of  this  bold  stroke  soon  reached  the  governors  of  the 
adjacent  Roman  provinces,  and  Severianus,  praefect  of  Cap- 
padocia,  a  Gaul  by  birth,  incited  by  the  predictions  of  a  pseudo- 
prophet  of  those  parts,  named  Alexander,'"  proceeded  at  the 
head  of  a  legion  into  the  adjoining  kingdom,  in  the  hope  of 
crushing  the  nascent  insurrection  and  punishing  at  once  the 
Armenian  rebels  and  their  Parthian  supporters.  Scarcely, 
however,  had  he  crossed  the  Euphrates,  when  he  found  him- 
self confronted  by  an  overwhelming  force,  commanded  by  a 
Parthian  called  Chosroes,^"  and  was  compelled  to  throw  himself 
into  the  city  of  Elegeia,  where  he  was  immediately  surrounded 
and  besieged.  '  Various  tales  were  told  of  his  conduct  under 
these  circumstances,  and  of  the  fate  which  overtook  him ;"  the 
most  probable  account  being  that  after  holding  out  for  three 
days  he  and  his  troops  were  assailed  on  all  sides,  and,  after  a 
brave  resistance,  were  shot  down  almost  to  a  man.  The  Par- 
thians  then  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  carried  fire  and  sword 
through  Syria.--'  Attidius  Cornelianus,  the  proconsul,  having 
ventured  to  oppose  them,  was  repulsed. ^^  Vague  thoughts  of 
flying  to  arms  and  shaking  off  the  Roman  yoke  possessed  the 
minds  of  the  Syrians,  ^^  and  threatened  to  lead  to  some  overt 
act.  The  Parthians  passed  through  Syria  into  Palestine,  and 
almost  the  whole  East  seemed  to  lie  open  to  their  incursions. 
When  these  facts  were  reported  at  Rome,  it  was  resolved  to 
send  Lucius  Verus  to  the  East.  He  was  of  an  age  to  undergo 
the  hardships  of  campaigning,  and  therefore  better  fitted  than 
Marcus  Aurelius  to  undertake  the  conduct  of  a  great  war.  But, 
as  his  military  talent  was  distrusted,  tt  was  considered  neces- 
sary to  place  at  his  disposal  a  number  of  the  best  Roman  gen- 
erals of  the  time,  whose  services  he  might  use  while  he  claimed 
as  liis  own  their  successes.  Statins  Priscus,  Avidius  Cassius, 
and  Martins  Verus,  were  the  most  important  of  these  officers ; 
and  it  was  by  them,  and  not  by  Verus  himself,  that  the  military 
operations  were,  in  fact,  conducted. 
Jt  was  not  till  late  in  the  year  a.d.  162  that  Verus,  having 


186  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.      \  [ch.  xix. 

I 
with  reluctance  torn  himself  from  Italy,"  appeared,  with  his 
lieutenants,  upon  the  scene  in  Syria,  and,  after  vainly  offering 
them  terms  of  peace,"  commenced  hostihties  against  the  trium- 
phant Parthians.  The  young  Emperor  did  not  adventure  his 
own  person  in  the  field,  but  stationed  himself  at  Antioch,'* 
where  he  coidd  enjoy  the  pleasures  and  amusements  of  a  luxu- 
rious capital,  while  he  committed  to  his  lieutenants  the  task 
of  recovering  Syria  and  Armenia,  and  of  chastising  the  in- 
vaders. Avidius  Cassius,  to  whom  the  Syrian  legions  were 
entrusted,  had  a  hard  task  to  bring  them  into  proper  disciphne 
after  their  long  period  of  inaction,  ^^  but  succeeded  after  a  while 
by  the  use  of  almost  unexampled  severities.  Attacked  by  Vo- 
lagases  within  the  limits  of  his  province,  he  made  a  successful 
defence,'"  and  in  a  short  time  was  able  to  take  the  offensive,  to 
defeat  Volagases  in  a  great  battle  near  Europus,"  and  (a.d.  163) 
to  drive  the  Parthians  across  the  Euphrates.  The  Armenian 
war  was  at  the  same  time  being  pressed  by  Statins  Priscus,  who 
advanced  without  a  check  from  the  frontier  to  the  capital,  Ar- 
taxata,  which  he  took  and  (as  it  seems)  destroyed.''  He  then 
built  a  new  city,  which  he  strongly  garrisoned  with  Roman 
troops,  and  sent  intelligence  of  his  successes  to  Rome,  whither 
Sosemus,  the  expelled  monarch,  had  betaken  himself.  Sosemus 
was  upon  this  replaced  on  the  Armenian  throne,  the  task  of 
settling  him  in  the  government  being  deputed  to  a  certain 
Thucydides,  by  whose  efforts,  together  with  those  of  Martins 
Verus,  all  opposition  to  the  restored  monarch  was  suppressed, 
and  the  entire  country  tranquillized.  '^ 

Rome  had  thus  in  the  space  of  two  years  recovered  her  losses, 
and  shown  Parthia  that  she  was  still  well  able  to  maintain  the 
position  in  Western  Asia  which  she  had  acquired  by  the  vic- 
tories of  Trajan.  But  such  a  measure  of  success  did  not  con- 
tent the  ambitious  generals  into  whose  hands  the  incompetence 
of  Verus  had  thrown  the  real  direction  of  the  war.  Military 
distinction  at  this  time  offered  to  a  Roman  a  path  to  the  very 
highest  honors,  each  successful  general  becoming  at  once  by 
force  of  his  position  a  candidate  for  the  Imperial  dignity.  Of 
the  various  able  officers  employed  under  Verus,  the  most  dis- 
tinguished and  the  most  ambitious  was  Cassius— a  chief  who 
ultimately  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  against  Aurelius,  and 
lost  his  life  in  consequence.''  Cassius,  after  he  had  succeeded 
in  clearing  Syria  of  the  invaders,  was  made  by  Aurelius  a 
sort  of  generalissimo :"  and  being  thus  free  to  act  as  he  chose, 
determined  to  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country,  and  to 


CH.  XIX. 3  DESTRUCTIVE  PESTILENCE.  l8t 

try  if  he  could  not  rival,  or  outdo,  the  exploits  of  Trajan  fifty 
years  previously.  Though  we  have  no  continuous  narrative  of 
liis  expedition,  we  may  trace  its  course  with  tolerable  accuracy 
in  the  various  fragmentary  writings  which  bear  upon  the  his- 
tory of  the  time — from  Zeugma,  when  he  crossed  the  Euphra- 
tes into  Mesopotamia,^"  to  Nicephorium, "  near  the  junction 
of  the  Belik  with  the  Euphrates ;  and  thence  down  the  course 
of  the  stream  to  Sura^*  (Sippara?)  and  Babylon.^"  At  Sura  a 
battle  was  fought,  in  which  the  Romans  were  victorious ;  and 
then  the  final  efforts  were  made,  which  covered  Cassius  with 
glory.  The  great  city  of  Seleucia,  upon  the  Tigris,  which  had 
a  population  of  400,000  souls,  was  besieged,  taken,  and  burnt, 
to  punish  an  alleged  treason  of  the  inhabitants."  Ctesiphon, 
upon  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream,  was  occupied,  and  the 
summer  palace  of  Volagases  there  situated  was  levelled  with 
the  ground."'  The  various  temples  were  plundered;  secret 
places,  where  it  was  thought  treasure  might  be  hid,  were  ex- 
amined, and  a  rich  booty  was  carried  off  by  the  invaders.  The 
Parthians,  worsted  in  every  encounter,  ceased  to  resist ;  and  all 
the  conquests  made  by  Trajan  were  recovered.  Nor  was  this 
all.  The  Roman  general,  after  conquering  the  Mesopotamian 
plain,  advanced  into  the  Zagros  mountams,  and  occupied,  at 
any  rate,  a  portion  of  Media,  thereby  entithng  his  Imperial 
masters  to  add  to  the  titles  of  "  Armeniacus, "  and  "  Parthicus," 
which  they  had  already  assumed,  the  further  and  wholly  novel 
title  of  "Medicus.""' 

But  Rome  was  not  to  escape  the  Nemesis  which  is  wont  to 
pursue  the  over -fortunate.  During  the  stay  of  the  army  in 
Babylonia  a  disease  was  contracted  of  a  strange  and  terrible 
character,  whereto  the  superstitious  fears  of  the  soldiers  as- 
signed a  supernatural  origin.  The  pestilence,  they  said,  had 
crept  forth  from  a  subterranean  cell  in  the  temple  of  Comeean 
Apollo  at  Seleucia,"  which  those  who  were  plundering  the 
town  rashly  opened  in  the  hope  of  its  containing  treasure,  but 
which  held  nothing  except  this  fearful  scourge,  placed  there  in 
primeval  times  by  the  spells  of  the  Chaldeans.  Such  a  belief, 
however  fanciful,  was  calculated  to  increase  the  destructive 
power  of  the  malady,  and  so  to  multiply  its  victims.  Vaslj 
numbers  of  the  soldiers  perished,  we  are  told,  from  its  effects 
during  the  march  homeward;  their  sufferings  being  further 
aggravated  by  the  failure  of  supplies,  which  was  such  that 
many  died  of  famine.''*  The  stricken  army,  upon  entering  the 
Roman   territory,  communicated  the  infection  to  the  iiinabt' 


j^8  ^^^  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  \p^.  xtx. 

tants,  and  the  return  of  Verus  and  his  troops  to  Rome  was  a 
inarch  of  Death  through  the  provinces.  The  pestilence  raged 
with  special  force  throughout  Italy,  and  spread  as  far  as  the 
Khine  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean."'  According  to  one  writer" 
more  than  one  half  of  the  entire  population,  and  almost  the 
whole  Roman  army,  was  carried  off  by  it. 

But  though  Rome  suffered  in  consequence  of  the  war,  its  gen- 
eral result  was  undoubtedly  disadvantageous  to  the  Parthians. 
The  expedition  of  Cassius  was  the  first  invasion  of  Parthia  in 
wlaich  Rome  had  been  altogether  triumphant.  Trajan's  cam- 
paign had  brought  about  the  submission  of  Armenia  to  the 
Romans ;  but  it  did  not  permanently  de  prive  Parthia  of  any 
portion  of  her  actual  territory.  And  the  successes  of  the  Em- 
peror in  his  advance  were  almost  balanced  by  the  disasters 
which  accompanied  his  retreat — disasters  so  serious  as  to  cause 
a  general  behef  that  Hadrian's  concessions  sprang  more  from 
prudence  than  from  generosity.  The  war  of  Verus  produced 
the  actual  cession  to  Rome  of  a  Parthian  province,  which  con- 
tinued thenceforth  for  centuries  to  be  an  integral  portion  of 
the  Roman  Empire."  Western  Mesopotamia,  or  the  tract  be- 
tween the  Euphrates  and  the  Khabour,  passed  under  the  domin- 
ion of  Rome  at  this  time ;  and,  though  not  reduced  to  the  con- 
dition of  a  province,  was  none  the  less  lost  to  Parthia,  and  ab- 
sorbed by  Rome  into  her  territory.  Parthia,  moreover,  was 
penetrated  by  the  Roman  arms  more  deeply  at  this  time  than 
she  had  ever  been  previously,  and  was  made  to  feel,  as  she  had 
never  felt  before,  that  in  contending  with  Rome  she  was  fight- 
ing a  losing  battle.  It  added  to  the  disgrace  of  her  defeats, 
and  to  her  own  sense  of  their  decisive  character,  that  they 
were  inflicted  by  a  mere  general,  a  man  of  no  very  great  emi- 
nence, and  one  who  was  far  from  possessing  the  free  command 
of  those  immense  resources  which  Rome  had  at  her  disposal. 

Parthia  had  now.  in  fact,  entered  upon  the  third  stage  of 
her  decline.  The  first  was  reached  when  she  ceased  to  be  an 
aggressive  and  was  content  to  become  a  stationary  power  ;■** 
the  second  set  in  when  she  began  to  lose  territory  by  the  revolt 
of  her  own  subjects:"  the  third— which  commences  at  this 
point— is  marked  by  her  inability  to  protect  herself  from  the 
attacks  of  a  foreign  assailant.  The  causes  of  her  decline  were 
various.  Luxury  had  no  doubt  done  its  ordinary  work  upon 
the  conquerors  of  rich  and  highly-civilized  regions,  softening 
down  their  original  ferocity,  and  rendering  them  at  once  less 
robust  in  frame  and  less  bold  and  venturesome  in  character, 


CK.  xix.i  MARKED  DECLINE  OF  PAtlflifA.  189 

The  natural  law  of  exhaustion,  which  sooner  or  later  affects 
all  races  of  any  distinction,  may  also  not  improbably  have 
come  into  play,  rendering  the  Parthians  of  the  age  of  Verus 
very  degenerate  descendants  of  those  who  displayed  such 
brilliant  qualities  when  they  contended  with  Crassus  and  Mark 
Antony.  Loyalty  towards  the  monarch,  and  the  absolute  de- 
votion of  every  energy  to  his  service,  which  characterized  the 
earlier  times,  dwindled  and  disappeared  as  the  succession  be- 
came more  and  more  disputed,  and  the  kings  less  worthy  of 
their  subjects'  admiration.  The  strength  needed  against  for- 
eign enemies  was,  moreover,  frequently  expended  in  civil 
broils ;  the  spirit  of  patriotism  declined ;  and  tameness  under 
insult  and  indignity  took  the  place  of  that  fierce  pride  and 
fiery  self-assertion  which  had  once  characterized  the  people. 

The  Avar  with  Rome  terminated  in  the  year  a.d.  165.  Vola- 
gases  survived  its  close  for  at  least  twenty-five  years ;  but  he 
did  not  venture  at  any  time  to  renew  the  struggle,  or  to  make 
any  effort  for  the  recovery  of  his  lost  territory.  Once  only  does 
he  appear  to  have  contemplated  an  outbreak.  When,  about 
the  year  a.d.  174  or  175,  Aurelius  being  occupied  in  the  west 
with  repelling  the  attacks  of  the  wild  tribes  upon  the  Danube, 
Avidius  Cassius  assumed  the  purple  in  Syria,  '■"'  and  a  civil  war 
seemed  to  be  imminent,  Volagases  appears  to  have  shown  an 
intention  of  once  more  taking  arms  and  trying  his  fortune.  A 
Parthian  war  was  at  this  time  expected  to  break  out  by  the 
Romans."  But  the  crisis  passed  without  an  actual  explosion. 
The  promptness  of  Aurelius,  who,  on  hearing  the  news,  at  once 
quitted  the  Danube  and  marched  into  Syria,  together  with  the 
rapid  collapse  of  the  Cassian  revolt,  rendered  it  imprudent 
for  Volagases  to  persist  in  his  project.  He  therefore  laid  aside 
all  thought  of  renewing  hostilities  with  Rome ;  and,  on  the  ar- 
rival of  Aurelius  in  Syria,  sent  ambassadors  to  him  with 
friendly  assurances,  who  were  received  favorably  by  the  philo- 
sophic Emperor.'*^ 

Four  years  after  this  Marcus  Aurelius  died, "  and  was  suc- 
ceeded in  the  purple  by  his  youthful  son,  Lucius  Aurelius  Corn- 
modus.  It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  accession  of  this 
weak  and  inexperienced  prince  would  have  induced  Volagases 
to  resume  his  warlike  projects,  and  attempt  the  recovery  of 
Mesopotamia.  But  the  scanty  history  of  the  time  which  has 
come  down  to  us^^  shows  no  trace  of  his  having  entertained  any 
such  design.  He  had  probably  reached  the  age  at  which  repose 
becomes  a  distinct  object  of  desire,  and  is  infinitely  preferred 


190  THE  SIXTH  MONARCH  f.  [ctt.  xt 

to  active  exertion.  At  any  rate,  it  is  clear  that  he  made  no 
effort.  The  reign  of  Commodus  was  from  first  to  last  un- 
troubled by  Oriental  disturbance.  Volgases  III.  was  for  ten 
years  contemporary  with  this  mean  and  un warlike  prince ;  but 
Eome  was  allowed  to  retain  her  Parthian  conquests  unmolest- 
ed. At  length,  in  a.d.  190  or  191,  Volagases  died, "  and  the  des- 
tinies of  Parthia  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  new  monarch. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


Accession  of  Volagases  IV.  His  Alliance  sought  by  Pescen- 
nius  Niger.  Part  taken  by  Parthia  in  the  Contest  between 
Niger  and  Severus.  Mesopotamia  revolts  from  Rome. 
First  Eastern  Expedition  of  Severus.  Its  Residts.  Sec- 
ond Expedition.  Successes  of  Severus.  His  Failure  at 
Hatra.  General  Results  of  the  War.  Death  of  Volagases 
IV. 

Mera  Se  raura  6  Se^^pos  eKiTTparevei  Kara  rCiV  JldpOutv  .  .  .  Jip\e  8'  avTwi'  OvoAdyouro?. — . 

Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  9. 

On  the  death  of  Volagases  III.,  in  a.d.  190  or  191,  the  Parthian 
crown  fell  to  another  prince  of  the  same  name,  who  was  prob- 
ably the  eldest  son  of  the  late  monarch.'  This  prince  was 
scarcely  settled  upon  the  throne  when  the  whole  of  Western 
Asia  was  violently  disturbed  by  the  commotions  which  shook 
the  Roman  Empire  after  the  murder  of  Commodus.  The 
virtuous  Pertinax  was  allowed  to  reign  but  three  months  (a.d. 
193,  January — March) .  His  successor  was  scarcely  proclaimed 
when  in  three  different  quarters  the  legionaries  rose  in  arms, 
and,  saluting  their  commanders  as  "Emperors," invested  them 
with  the  purple.  Clodius  Albinus,  in  Britain;  Severus,  in 
Pannonia;  and  Pescennius  Niger,  in  Syria,  at  one  and  the 
same  time  claimed  the  place  which  the  wretched  Julianus  had 
bought,  and  prepared  themselves  to  maintain  their  rights 
against  all  who  should  impugn  them.  It  seems  that,  on  the 
first  proclamation  of  Niger,  and  before  it  had  become  evident 
that  he  would  have  to  establish  his  authority  by  force  of  arms, 
either  the  Parthian  monarch,  or  at  any  rate  princes  who  were 
among  his  dependants,'^  sent  to  congratulate  the  new  Emperor 


CH.  XX.]     VOLAGASES  IV.   LENDS  AID  TO  NIGER.  191 

on  his  accession  and  to  offei*  him  contingents  of  troops,  if  he 
required  them.  These  spontaneous  proposals  were  at  the  first 
poHtely  declined,  since  Niger  expected  to  find  himself  accepted 
joyfully  as  sovereign,  and  did  not  look  to  have  to  engage  in 
war.  When,  however,  the  news  reached  him  that  he  had 
formidable  competitors,  and  that  Severus,  acknowledged  Em- 
peror at  Rome,  was  about  to  set  out  for  the  East,  at  the  head 
of  vast  forces,  he  saw  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  him,  if  he 
were  to  make  head  against  his  powerful  rival,  to  draw  together 
troops  from  all  quarters.  Accordingly,  towards  the  close  of 
A.D.  193,  he  sent  envoys  to  the  princes  beyond  the  Euphrates, 
and  especially  to  the  kings  of  Parthia,  Armenia,  and  Hatra, 
entreating  them  to  send  their  troops  at  once  to  his  aid.'  Vo- 
lagases,  under  these  circumstances,  appears  to  have  hesitated. 
He  sent  an  answer  that  he  would  issue  orders  to  his  satraps  for 
the  collection  of  a  force,  but  made  no  haste  to  redeem  his  pro- 
mise, and  in  fact  refrained  from  despatching  any  body  of  dis- 
tinctly Parthian  troops  to  the  assistance  of  Niger  in  the  im- 
pending struggle. 

While,  however,  thus  abstaining  from  direct  interference  in 
the  contest  between  the  two  Roman  pretenders,  Volagases 
appears  to  have  allowed  one  of  his  dependent  monarchs  to  mix 
himself  up  in  the  quarrel.  Hatra,  at  this  time  the  capital  of  an 
Arabian  community,"  and  the  chief  city  of  central  Mesopotamia 
(or  the  tract  between  the  Sin  jar  and  the  Babylonian  alluvium), 
was  a  dependency  of  Parthia,  and  though,  like  so  many  other 
Parthian  dependencies,  it  possessed  its  native  kings,"*  cannot 
have  been  in  a  position  to  engage  in  a  great  war  without  per- 
mission from  the  Court  of  Ctesiphon.  When,  therefore,  we 
find  that  Barsemius,  the  King  of  Hatra,  not  only  received  the 
envoys  of  Niger  favorably,  but  actually  sent  to  his  aid  a  body 
of  archers, "  we  must  understand  that  Volagases  sanctioned  the 
measure.  Probably  he  thought  it  prudent  to  secure  the  friend- 
ship of  the  pretender  whom  he  expected  to  be  successful,  but 
sought  to  effect  this  in  the  way  that  would  compromise  him 
least  if  the  result  of  the  struggle  should  be  other  than  he  looked 
for.  The  sending  of  liis  own  troops  to  the  camp  of  Niger  would 
have  committed  him  irretrievably ;  but  the  actions  of  a  vassal 
monarch  might  with  some  plausibility  be  disclaimed. 

As  the  struggle  between  the  two  pretenders  progressed  in  the 
early  months  of  a.d.  194,  the  nations  beyond  the  Euphrates 
grew  bolder,  and  allowed  themselves  to  indulge  their  natural 
feelings  of  hostility  towards  the  Romans.     The  newly  subjected 


j92  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  3tx 

Mesopotamians  flew  to  arms,  massacred  most  of  the  Eoman 
detachments  stationed  about  their  country,  and  laid  siege  to 
Nisibis,'  which  since  the  cession  Rome  had  made  her  head-quar- 
ters.   The  natives  of  the  region  were  assisted  by  their  kindred 
races  across  the  Tigris,  particularly  by  the  people  of  Adiabene,' 
who,  like  the  Arabs  of  Hatra,  were  Parthian  vassals.    Severus 
had  no  sooner  overcome  his  rival  and  slain  him,  than  he 
hastened  eastward  with  the  object  of  relieving  the  troops  shut 
up  in  Nisibis,  and  of  chastising  the  rebels  and  their  abettors. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  Mesopotamians  sought  to  disarm  his 
resentment  by  declaring  that  they  had  taken  up  arms  in  his 
cause,  and  had  been  only  anxious  to  distress  and  injure  the 
partisans  of  his  antagonist.      Though  they  sent  ambassadors 
10  him  with  presents,  and  offered  to  make  restitution  of  the 
lEloman  spoil  still  in  their  hands,  and  of  the  Roman  prisoners,  it 
was  observed  that  they  said  nothing  about  restoring  the  strong- 
holds which  they  had  taken,  or  resiuningthe  position  of  Roman 
tributaries.      On  the  contrary,  they  required  that  all  Roman 
soldiers  still  in  their  country  should  be  withdrawn  from  it,  and 
that  their  independence  should  henceforth  be  respected.'     As 
Severus  was  not  inclined  to  surrender  Roman  territory  without 
a  contest,  war  was  at  once  declared.     His  immediate  adversa- 
ries were  of  no  great  account,  being,  as  they  were,  the  petty 
kings  of  Osrhoene,  Adiabene,  and  Hatra;  but  behind  them 
loomed  the  massive  form  of  the  Parthian  State,  which  was 
attacked  through  them,  and  could  not  be  indifferent  to  their 
fortunes. 

In  the  spring  of  a.d.  195,  Severus,  at  the  head  of  his  troops, 
crossed  the  Euphrates  in  person,  and  taking  up  his  own 
quarters  at  Nisibis,  which  the  Mesopotamians  had  been  un- 
able to  capture,  proceeded  to  employ  his  generals  in  the  re- 
duction of  the  rebels  and  the  castigation  of  their  aiders  and 
'  abettors.  Though  his  men  suffered  considerably  from  the 
scarcity  and  badness  of  the  water,'"  yet  he  seems  to  have 
found  no  great  difficulty  in  reducing  Mesopotamia  once  more 
into  subjection.  Having  brought  it  completely  under,  and 
formally  made  Nisibis  the  capital,  at  the  same  tune  raising  it 
to  the  dignified  position  of  a  Roman  colony,"  he  caused  his 
troops  to  cross  the  Tigris  into  Adiabene,  and,  though  the  in- 
habitants offered  a  stout  resistance,  succeeded  in  making  him- 
self master  of  the  country.  '^  The  Parthian  monarch  seems  to 
have  made  no  effort  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  this  province. 
He  stood  probably  on  the  defensive,  expecting  to  be  attacked, 


Ch.  XX.]  SECOND  EASTERN  ElXPEDITION  OF  SEVERUS.  193 

in  or  near  his  capital.  But  Seveinis  could  not  afford  to  remain 
in  these  remote  regions.  He  had  still  a  rival  in  the  West  in 
the  person  of  Clodius  Albinus,  who  might  be  expected  to 
descend  upon  Italy,  if  it  were  left  exposed  to  his  attacks  much 
longer.  He  therefore  quitted  the  East  early  in  a.d.  196,  and 
returned  to  Rome  with  all  speed,  leaving  Parthia  very  insuf- 
ficiently chastised,  and  his  new  conquests  very  incompletely 
settled. 

Scarcely  was  he  gone  when  the  war  broke  out  with  greater 
violence  than  ever.  Volagases  took  the  offensive,  recovered 
Adiabene,  and  crossing  the  Tigris  into  Mesopotamia,  swept  the 
Romans  from  the  open  country.  Nisibis  alone,  which  two 
years  before  had  defied  all  the  efforts  of  the  Mesopotamians, 
held  out  against  him,  and  even  this  stronghold  was  within  a 
Uttle  of  being  taken. '^  According  to  one  writer,'*  the  trium- 
phant Parthians  even  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  once  more 
spread  themselves  over  the  fertile  plains  of  Syria.  Severus 
was  forced  in  a.d.  197  to  make  a  second  Eastern  expedition,  to 
recover  his  lost  glory  and  justify  the  titles  which  he  had  taken. 
On  his  first  arrival  in  Syria,  he  contented  himself  with  ex- 
pelling the  Parthians  from  the  province,  nor  was  it  till  late  in 
the  year, '^  that,  having  first  made  ample  preparation,  he 
crossed  the  Euphrates  into  Mesopotamia. 

The  success  of  any  expedition  against  Parthia  depended 
greatly  on  the  dispositions  of  the  semi-dependent  princes,  who 
possessed  territories  bordering  upon  those  of  the  two  great  em- 
pires. Among  these  the  most  important  were  at  this  time  the 
kings  of  Armenia  and  Osrhoene.  Armenia  had  at  the  period  of 
Niger's  attempt  been  solicited  by  his  emissaries ;  but  its  mon- 
arch had  then  refused  to  take  any  part  in  the  civU  conflict.'" 
Subsequently,  however,  'he  in  some  way  offended  Severus, 
who,  when  he  reached  the  East,  regarded  Armenia  as  a  hos- 
tile State  requiring  instant  subjugation."  It  seems  to  have 
been  in  the  summer  of  a.d.  197,  soon  after  his  first  arrival  in 
Syria,  that  Severus  despatched  a  force  against  the  Armenian 
prince,  who  was  named  (like  the  Parthian  monarch  of  the 
time)  Volagases.  That  prince  mustered  his  troops  and  met 
the  invaders  at  the  frontier  of  his  kingdom.  A  battle  seemed 
imminent ;  but  ere  the  fortune  of  war  was  tried  the  Armenian 
made  an  application  for  a  truce,  which  was  granted  by  the  Ro- 
man leaders.  A  breathing-space  being  thus  gained,  Volagases 
sent  ambassadors  Avith  presents  and  hostages  to  the  Roman 
emperor  in  Syria,  professed  to  be  animated  by  friendly  feehngs 


194  ^tlE  SIXTH  MOMAncnt.  [ca.  %)L 

towards  Rome,  and  entreated  Severus  to  allow  him  terms  of 
peace.  Severus  permitted  himself  to  be  persuaded ;  a  formal 
treaty  was  made,  and  the  Armenian  prince  even  received  an 
enlargement  of  his  previous  territory  at  the  hands  of  his  molli- 
fied suzerain.'* 

The  Osrhoenian  monarch,  who  bore  the  usual  name  of  Ab- 
ganis,  made  a  more  comjDlete  and  absolute  submission.  He 
came  in  person  into  the  emperor's  camp,  accompanied  by  a 
numerous  body  of  archers,  and  bringing  with  him  his  sons  as 
hostages.  '^  Severus  must  have  hailed  with  especial  satisfac- 
tion the  adhesion  of  this  chieftain,  which  secured  him  the  un- 
disturbed possession  of  Western  Mesopotamia  as  far  as  the 
junction  of  the  Khabour  with  the  Euphrates.  It  was  his  de- 
sign to  proceed  himself  by  the  Euphrates  route,  ^°  while  he  sent 
detachments  imder  other  leaders  to  ravage  Eastern  Mesopo- 
tamia and  Adiabene,^'  which  had  evidently  been  re-occupied 
by  the  Parthians.  To  secure  his  army  from  want,  he  deter- 
mined, like  Trajan,"  to  build  a  fleet  of  ships  in  Upper  Mesopo- 
tamia, where  suitable  timber  abotmded,  and  to  march  his 
army  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Euphrates  into  Babylonia, 
while  his  transports,  laden  with  stores,  descended  the  course 
of  the  river."  In  this  way  he  reached  the  neighborhood  of 
Ctesiphon  without  suffering  any  loss,  and  easily  captured  the 
two  great  cities  of  Babylon  and  Seleucia,  which  on  his  ap- 
proach were  evacuated  by  their  garrisons.  He  then  proceeded 
to  the  attack  of  Ctesiphon  itself,  passing  his  ships  probably 
through  one  of  the  canals  which  united  the  Tigris  with  the 
Euphrates,  or  else  (like  Ti-ajan)  conveying  them  on  rollers 
across  the  neck  of  land  which  separates  the  two  rivers, 

Volagases  had  taken  up  his  own  position  at  Ctesiphon,  bent 
on  defending  his  capital.  It  is  possible  that  the  approach  of 
Severus  by  the  line  of  march  which  he  pursued  was  unex- 
pected,-' and  that  the  sudden  presence  of  the  Romans  before 
the  waUs  of  Ctesiphon  came  upon  the  Parthian  monarch  as  a 
surprise.  He  seems,  at  any  rate,  to  have  made  but  a  poor  re- 
sistance. It  may  be  gathered,  indeed,  from  one  author"'  that 
he  met  the  invaders  in  the  open  field,  and  fought  a  battle  in 
defence  of  Ctesiphon  before  allowing  himself  to  be  shut  up 
within  its  walls.  But  after  the  city  was  once  invested  it  ap- 
pears to  have  been  quickly  taken.  We  hear  of  no  such  resist- 
ance as  that  which  was  soon  afterwards  offered  by  Hatra. 
The  soldiers  of  Severus  succeeded  in  storming  Ctesiphon  on 
the  first  assault;  the  Parthian  monarch  betook  himself  to 


Vol.    I  If.  Fig.  1- 


Fig.  3. 


Plate  XV. 


LATEE   COINS    OF  AETAXEEXES   I. 


COIN   OF   HOEMISDAS    i. 


Fig    2. 


COINS   OF   SAPOE   I. 


COIN    OF    YAEAIIRAN    I 


COIN   OF  VAEAHEA2f   II. 


HEAD   OF  SAFOE   I. 

(&om  a  gem). 


Fig.  7. 


COIN   OP   SAPOR    I. 


CH.  XX.]       CTESIPHON  TAKEN  BY  THE  ROMANS.  195 

flight,  accompanied  by  a  few  horsemen  ;''*  and  the  seat  of  em- 
pire thus  fell  easily — a  second  time  within  the  space  of  eighty- 
two  3'ears — into  the  hands  of  a  foreign  invader.  The  treat- 
ment of  the  city  was  such  as  we  might  expect  from  the  ordi- 
nary character  of  Roman  warfare.  A  general  massacre  of  the 
male  population  was  made.  The  soldiers  were  allowed  to  plun 
der  both  the  public  and  the  private  buildings  at  their  pleasure. 
The  precious  metals  accumulated  in  the  royal  treasury  were 
seized,  and  the  chief  ornaments  of  the  palace  were  taken  and 
carried  off.  Nor  did  blood  and  plunder  content  the  victors. 
After  slaughtering  the  adult  males  they  made  prize  of  the  wo- 
men and  children,  who  were  torn  from  their  homes  without 
compunction  and  led  into  captivity,  to  the  number  of  a  hun- 
dred thousand.^' 

Not^vithstanding  the  precautions  which  he  had  taken,  Seve- 
rus  appears  to  have  become  straitened  for  supplies  about  the 
time  that  he  captured  Ctesiphon.  His  soldiers  were  compelled 
for  some  days  to  exist  on  i*oots,  which  produced  a  dangerous 
dysentery.'"'  He  found  himself  unable  to  pursue  Volagases,"* 
and  recognized  the  necessity  of  retreating  before  disaster  over- 
took him.  He  could  not,  however,  return  by  the  route  of  the 
Euphrates,  since  his  army  had  upon  its  advance  completely 
exhausted  the  resources  of  the  Euphrates  region.  ^^  The  line  of 
the  Tigris  was  therefore  preferred  for  the  retreat ;  and  while 
the  ships  with  difficulty  made  their  way  up  the  course  of  the 
stream,  the  army  pursued  its  naarch  upon  the  banks,  without, 
so  far  as  appeal's,  any  molestation.  Tt  happened,  however, 
that  the  route  selected  led  Severus  near  to  the  small  state  of 
Hatra,  which  had  given  liim  special  offence  by  supporting  the 
cause  of  his  rival,  Niger ;  and  it  seemed  to  him  of  importance 
that  the  inhabitants  should  receive  condign  punishment  for 
this  act  of  audacity.  He  may  also  have  hoped  to  eclipse  the 
fame  of  Trajan  by  the  capture  of  a  town  which  had  success- 
fully resisted  that  hero."'  He  therefore  stopped  his  march  in 
order  to  lay  siege  to  the  place,  which  he  attacked  with  military 
engines,  and  with  aU  the  other  offensive  means  known  at  the 
time  to  the  Romans.  His  first  attempt  was,  however,  easily 
repulsed.'-  The  walls  of  the  town  were  strong,  its  defenders 
brave  and  full  of  enterprise.  They  burnt  the  siege-macliinea 
brought  against  them,  and  committed  great  havoc  among  the 
soldiers.  Under  these  circumstances  disorders  broke  out 
among  the  besiegers ;  mutinous  words  were  heard ;  and  the 
emperor  thought    himself    compelled   to   have   recourse  to 


jgg  THE  SIXTH  MONABCHT.  [CH.  SX 

severe  measures  of  repression.  Having  put  to  death  two  of 
liis  chief  officers,"  and  then  found  it  necessary  to  deny  that  he 
had  given  orders  for  the  execution  of  one  of  them,  he  broke  up 
from  before  the  place  and  removed  his  camp  to  a  distance. 

He  had  not,  however,  as  yet  rehnquished  the  hope  of  bring- 
ing liis  enterprise  to  a  successful  issue.     In  the  security  of  his 
distant  camp  he  constructed  fresh  engines  in  increased  num- 
bers, collected  an  abundant  supply  of  provisions,  and  made 
every  preparation  for  renewing  the  siege  with  effect  at  no  re- 
mote period.'^    The  treasures  stored  up  in  the  city  were  re- 
ported to  be  great,  especially  those  which  the  piety  of  succes- 
sive generations  had  acciunulated  in  the  Temple  of  the  Sun." 
This  rich  booty  appealed  forcibly  to  the  cupidity  of  the  em- 
peror, while  his  honor  seemed  to  require  that  he  should  not 
sufiEer  a  comparatively  petty  town  to  defy  his  arms  with  im- 
punity.    He,   therefore,    after  a  short  absence  retraced  his 
steps,  and  appeared  a  second  time  before  Hatra  with  a  stronger 
siege-train  and  a  better  appointed  army  than  before.     But  the 
Hatreni  met  his  attack  with  a  resolution  equal  to  his  own. 
They  were  excellent  archers ;  they  possessed  a  powerful  force 
of  cavalry ;  they  knew  their  walls  to  be  strong ;  and  they  were 
masters  of  a  peculiar  kind  of  fire,  which  was  calculated  to  ter- 
rify and  alarm,  if  not  greatly  to  injure,  an  enemy  unacquainted 
with  its  qualities.  ^^    Severus  once  more  lost  almost  all  liis  ma- 
chines ;  the  Hatrene  cavalry  severely  handled  his  foragers ;  his 
men  for  a  long  time  made  but  little  impression  upon  the  waUs, 
while  they  suffered  grievously  from  the  enemy's  shngers^'  and 
archers,  from  his  warlike  engines,  and  especially,  we  are  told, 
from  the  fiery  darts  which  were  rained  upon  them  incessantly. " 
However,  after  enduring  these  various  calamities  for  a  length 
of  time,  the  perseverance  of  the  Romans  was  rewarded  by  the 
formation  of  a  practicable  breach  in  the  outer  wall ;  and  the 
soldiers  demanded  to  be  led  to  the  assault,  confident  m  their 
power  to  force  an  entrance  and  carry  the  place.  ^^    But  the 
emperor  resisted  their  inclination.     He  did  not  wish  that  the 
city  should  be  stormed,  since  in  that  case  it  must  have  been 
given  up  to  indiscriminate  pillage,  and  the  treasures  which  he 
coveted  would  have  become  the  prey  of  the  soldiery.     The 
Hatreni,  he  thought,  would  make  their  submission,  if  he  only 
gave  them  a  little  time,  now  that  they  must  see  further  resist- 
ance to  be  hopeless.    He  waited  therefore  a  day,  expecting  an 
ofiEer  of  surrender.     But  the  Hatreni  made  no  sign,  and  in  the 
night  restored  their  wall  where  it  had  been  broken  down. 


CH.  XX.]  INACTION  OF  VOLAGASES.  197 

Severus  then  made  up  his  mind  to  sacrifice  the  treasures  on 
which  his  heart  had  been  set,  and,  albeit  with  reluctance,  gave 
the  word  for  the  assault.  But  now  the  legionaries  refused. 
They  had  been  forbidden  to  attack  when  success  was  certain 
and  the  danger  trivial — they  were  now  required  to  imperil 
their  lives  while  the  result  coiild  not  but  be  doubtful.  Perhaps 
they  divined  the  emperor's  motive  in  withholding  them  from 
the  assault,  and  resented  it ;  at  any  rate  they  openly  declined 
to  execute  his  orders.  After  a  vain  attempt  to  force  an  en- 
trance by  means  of  his  Asiatic  allies,  Severus  desisted  from 
his  undertaking.  The  summer  was  far  advanced ;"  the  heat 
was  great ;  disease  had  broken  out  among  his  troops ;  above 
all,  they  had  become  demoralized,  and  their  obedience  could 
no  longer  be  depended  on."'  Severus  broke  up  from  before 
Hatra  a  second  time,  after  having  besieged  it  for  twenty 
days,"^  and  returned— by  what  route  we  are  not  told — into 
Syria. 

Nothing  is  more  surprising  in  the  history  of  this  campaign 
than  the  inaction  and  apparent  apathy  of  the  Parthians.  Vo- 
lagases,  after  quitting  his  capital,  seems  to  have  made  no  effort 
at  all  to  hamper  or  harass  his  adversary.  The  prolonged  re- 
sistance of  Hatra,  the  sufferings  of  the  Romans,  their  increas- 
ing difficulties  with  respect  to  provisions,  the  injurious  effect 
of  the  summer  heats  upon  their  unacclimatized  constitutions, 
would  have  been  irresistible  temptations  to  a  prince  of  any 
spirit  or  energy,  inducing  him  to  advance  as  the  Romans  re- 
tired, to  hang  upon  their  rear,  to  cut  off  their  supplies,  and  to 
render  their  retreat  difficult,  if  not  disastrous.  Volagases  ap- 
pears to  have  remained  wholly  inert  and  passive.  His  conduct 
is  only  explicable  by  the  consideration  of  the  rapid  decline 
which  Parthia  was  now  undergoing,  of  the  general  decay  of 
patriotic  spirit,  and  the  sea  of  difficulties  into  which  a  mon- 
arch was  plunged  who  had  to  retreat  before  an  invader. 

The  expedition  of  Severus  was  on  the  whole  glorious  for) 
Rome,  and  disastrous  for  Parthia,  though  the  glory  of  the- 
victor  was  tarnished  at  the  close  by  his  failure  before  Hatra. 
It  cost  Parthia  a  second  province.  The  Roman  emperor  not 
only  recovered  his  previous  position  in  Mesopotamia,  but  over- 
stepping the  Tigris,  established  the  Roman  dominion  firmly  in 
the  fertile  tract  between  that  stream  and  the  Zagros  mountain- 
range.  The  title  of  "  Adiabenicus"  became  no  empty  boast. 
Adiabene,  or  the  tract  betAveen  the  Zab  rivers— probably  in- 
cluding at  this  time  the  entire  low  region  at  the  foot  of  Zagroi 


i9S  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  :xx. 

from  the  eastern  Khabour  on  the  north  to  the  Adhem  towards 
the  south— passed  under  the  dominion  of  Rome,  the  monarch 
of  the  country,  hitherto  a  Parthian  vassal,  becoming  her  tribu- 
tary/^ Thus  the  imperial  standards  were  planted  permanently 
at  a  distance  less  than  a  degree  from  the  Parthian  capital, 
which,  with  the  great  cities  of  Seleucia  and  Babylon  in  its 
neighborhood,  was  exposed  to  be  captured  almost  at  any  mo- 
ment by  a  sudden  and  rapid  inroad. 

Volagases  survived  his  defeat  by  Severus  about  ten  or  eleven 
years.  For  this  space  Parthian  history  is  once  more  a  blank, 
our  authorities  containing  no  notice  that  directly  touches  Par- 
thia  during  the  period  in  question.  The  stay  of  Severus  in  the 
East"  during  the  years  a.d.  200  and  201,  would  seem  to  indi 
cate  that  the  condition  of  the  Oriental  provinces  was  imsettled 
and  required  the  presence  of  the  Imperator.  But  we  hear  of 
no  effort  made  by  Parthia  at  this  time  to  recover  her  losses— 
of  no  further  collision  between  her  troops  and  those  of  Rome : 
and  we  may  assume  therefore  that  peace  was  preserved,  and 
that  the  Parthian  monarch  acquiesced,  however  unwilUngly, 
in  the  curtailment  of  his  territory.  Probably  internal,  no  less 
than  external,  diflaculties  pressed  upon  him.  The  diminution 
of  Parthian  prestige  which  had  been  brought  abovit  by  the  suc- 
cessive victories  of  Trajan,  Avidius  Cassius,  and  Severus  must 
have  loosened  the  ties  which  bovmd  to  Parthia  the  several  vas- 
sal kingdoms.  Her  suzerainty  had  been  accepted  as  that  of 
the  Asiatic  nation  most  competent  to  make  head  against  Eu- 
ropean intruders,  and  secure  the  native  races  in  continued  in- 
dependence of  a  wholly  alien  power."  It  may  well  have  ap- 
peared at  this  time  to  the  various  vassal  states  that  the  Par- 
thian vigor  had  become  effete,  that  the  qualities  which  had 
advanced  the  race  to  the  leadership  of  Western  Asia  were 
gone,  and  that  luiless  some  new  power  could  be  raised  up  to 
act  energetically  against  Rome,  the  West  would  obtain  com- 
plete dominion  over  the  East,  and  Asia  be  absorbed  into  Eu- 
rope. Thoughts  of  this  kind,  fermenting  among  the  subject 
populations,  would  produce  a  general  debility,  a  want  both  of 
power  and  of  incUnation  to  make  any  combined  effort,  a  desire 
to  wait  untU  an  opportunity  of  acting  with  effect  should  offer. 
Hence  probably  the  deadness  and  apathy  which  characterize 
this  period,  and  which  seem  at  first  sight  so  astonishing.  Dis- 
trust of  their  actual  leader  paralyzed  the  nations  of  Western 
Asia,  and  they  did  not  as  yet  see  their  way  clearly  towards 
placing  themselves  under  any  other  guidance. 


CH.  XXI.]       VOLAGASES  V.  AND  AliTABANUS  IV.  1&9 

Volagases  IV,  reigned  till  a.d,  208-9,  dying  thus  about  two 
years  before  his  great  adversary,  who  expired"  at  York, 
February  4,  a.d.  311. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


Struggle  behveen  the  two  Sons  of  Volagases  IV.,  Volagases  V. 
and  Artabamis.  Continued  Sovereignty  of  both  Princes. 
Ambition  of  Caracallus.  His  Proceedings  in  the  East. 
His  Resolve  to  quarrel  with  Parthia.  First  Proposal 
made  by  him  to  Artabamis.  Perplexity  of  Artabanus. 
Caracallus  invades  Parthia.  His  Successes,  and  Death. 
Macrinus,  defeated  by  Artabanus,  consents  to  Terms  of 
Peace.  Revolt  of  the  Persians  under  Artaxerxes.  Pro- 
longed Struggle.  Death  of  Artabanus,  and  Downfall  of 
the  Parthian  Empire. 

TeAeuTaios  ■ye'yocei'  o  'ApTafiavoi. — Dio  CflSS.  Ixxx.  3. 

On  the  death  of  Volagases  IV.,  the  Parthian  crown  was 
disputed  between  his  two  sons,  Artabanus  and  Volagases. 
According  to  the  classical  writers,  the  contest  resulted  in 
favor  of  the  former,  whom  they  regard  as  undisputed  sov- 
ereign of  the  Parthians,  at  any  rate  from  the  year  a.d.  216.' 
It  api^ears,  however,  from  the  Parthian  coins,  that  both  the 
brothers  claimed  and  exercised  sovereignty  during  the  entire 
term  of  seventeen  or  eighteen  years  which  intervened  between 
the  death  of  Volagases  IV.  and  the  revolt  of  the  Persians. - 
Artabanus  must  beyond  all  doubt  have  acquired  the  sole  rule 
in  the  western  portions  of  the  empire,  since  (from  a.d.  216  to 
A.D.  22Q)  he  was  the  only  monarch  known  to  the  Romans. 
But  Volagases  may  at  the  same  time  have  been  recognized  in 
the  more  eastern  provinces,  and  may  have  maintained  hunself 
in  power  in  those  remote  regions  without  interfering  with  his 
brother's  dominion  in  the  West.  Still  this  division  of  the 
empire  must  naturally  have  tended  to  weaken  it;  and  the 
position  of  Volagases  has  to  be  taken  into  accoimt  in  esti- 
mating the  difficulties  under  which  the  last  monarch  of  the 
Arsacid  series  found  himself  placed— difficulties  to  which, 
after  a  struggle,  he  was  at  last  forced  to  succumb.    Domestic 


200  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xxi 

dissension,  wars  with  a  powerful  neighbor  (Rome),  and  in- 
ternal disaffection  and  rebellion  formed  a  combination, 
against  which  the  last  Parthian  monarch,  albeit  a  man  of 
considerable  energy,  strove  in  vain.  But  he  strove  bravely; 
and  the  closing  scenes  of  the  empire,  in  which  he  bore  the 
chief  part,  are  not  unworthy  of  its  best  and  palmiest  days. 

An  actual  civU  war  appears  to  have  raged  between  the  two 
brothers  for  some  years.  Caracallus,  who  in  a.d.  311  suc- 
ceeded his  father,  Severus,  as  Emperor  of  Eome,  congratulated 
the  Senate  in  a.d.  212  on  the  strife  still  going  on  in  Parthia, 
which  could  not  fad  (he  said)  to  inflict  serious  injury  on  that 
hostile  state.'  The  balance  of  advantage  seems  at  first  to  have 
inchned  towards  Volagases,  whom  Caracallus  acknowledged 
as  monarch  of  Parthia^  in  the  year  a.d.  215.  But  soon  after 
this  the  fortune  of  war  must  have  turned;  for  subsequently 
to  the  year  a.d.  215,  we  hear  nothing  more  of  Volagases,  but 
find  Caracallus  negotiating  with  Artabanus  instead,  and  treat- 
ing with  htm  as  undisputed  monarch  of  the  entire  Parthian 
empire.  ^  That  this  was  not  his  real  position,  appears  from  the 
coins ;  but  the  classical  evidence  may  be  accepted  as  showing 
that  from  the  year  a.d.  216,  Volagases  ceased  to  have  much 
power,  sinking  from  the  rank  of  a  rival  monarch  into  that  of 
a  mere  pretender,  who  may  have  caused  some  trouble  to  the 
established  sovereign,  but  did  not  inspire  serious  alarm. 

Artabanus,  having  succeeded  in  reducing  his  brother  to  this 
condition,  and  obtained  a  general  acknowledgment  of  his 
claims,  found  himself  almost  immediately  in  circumstances  of 
much  difficulty.  From  the  moment  of  his  accession,  Cara- 
callus had  exhibited  an  inordinate  ambition ;  and  this  ambition 
had  early  taken  the  shape  of  a  special  desire  for  the  glory  of 
Oriental  conquests.  The  weak  and  dissolute  son  of  Severus 
fancied  himself ,  and  called  himself,  a  second  Alexander;"  and 
thus  he  was  in  honor  bound  to  imitate  that  hero's  marvellous 
exploits.  The  extension  of  the  Roman  territory  towards  the 
East  became  very  soon  his  great  object,  and  he  shrank  from 
no  steps,  however  base  and  dishonorable,  which  promised  to 
conduce  towards  the  accomplishment  of  his  wishes.  As  early 
as  A.D.  212  he  summoned  Abgarus,  the  tributary  king  of 
Osrhoene,  into  liis  presence,  and  when  he  unsuspectingly  com- 
plied, seized  him,  threw  him  into  prison,  and  declaring  his 
territories  forfeited,  reduced  them  into  the  form  of  a  Roman 
province.'  Successful  in  this  bold  proceeding,  he  attempted 
to  deal  with  Armenia  in  the    c;ame  way;  but,   though  the 


Ctt.  XXI.]  ENVOYS  TO  ARTABANUS.  gOl 

monarch  fell  foolishly  into  the  trap  set  for  him,  the  nation  was 
not  so  easily  managed.  The  Armenians  flew  to  arms  on 
learning  the  imprisonment  of  their  king  and  royal  family  f 
and  when,  three  year  afterwards  (a.d.  215),  Caracallus  sent  a 
Roman  army  under  Theocritus,  one  of  his  favorites,  to  chastise 
them,  they  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  on  their  assailant.*  But 
the  desire  of  Caracallus  to  effect  Oriental  conquests  was  in- 
creased, rather  than  diminished,  by  this  occurrence.  He  had 
sought  a  quarrel  with  Parthia  as  early  as  a.d.  214,  when  he 
demanded  of  Volagases  the  surrender  of  two  refugees  of  dis- 
tinction.^" The  rupture,  which  he  courted,  was  deferred  by 
the  discreditable  compliance  of  the  Great  King  with  his 
requisition.  '^ 

Volagases  surrendered  the  two  unfortunates ;  and  the  Roman 
Emperor  was  compelled  to  declare  himself  satisfied  with  the 
concession.  But  a  year  had  not  elapsed  before  he  had  devised 
a  new  plan  of  attack  and  proceeded  to  put  it  in  execution. 

Volagases  V.  was  about  this  time  compelled  to  yield  the 
western  capital  to  his  brother ;  and  Ai^tabanus  IV.  became  the 
representative  of  Parthian  power  in  the  eyes  of  the  Romans. 
Caracallus  in  the  summer  of  a.d.  215,  having  transferred  his 
residence  from  Nicomedia  to  Antioch,  sent  ambassadors  from 
the  last-named  place  to  Artabanus,  who  were  to  present  the 
Parthian  monarch  with  presents  of  unusual  magnificence,  "* 
and  to  make  him  an  unheard-of  proposition.  ' '  The  Roman 
Emperor,"  said  the  despatch  with  which  they  were  intrusted, 
"could  not  fitly  wed  the  daughter  of  a  subject  or  accept  the 
position  of  son-in-law  to  a  private  person.  No  one  could  be  a 
suitable  wife  to  him  who  was  not  a  princess.  He  therefore 
asked  the  Parthian  monarch  for  the  hand  of  his  daughter. 
Rome  and  Parthia  divided  between  them  the  sovereignty  of 
the  world;  united,  as  they  would  be  by  this  marriage,  no 
longer  recognizing  any  boundary  as  separating  them,  they 
would  constitute  a  power  that  could  not  but  be  irresistible  It 
would  be  easy  for  them  to  reduce  under  their  sway  all  the  bar- 
barous races  on  the  skirts  of  their  empires,  and  to  hold  them 
in  subjection  by  a  flexible  system  of  administration  and  gov- 
ernment. The  Roman  infantry  was  the  best  in  the  world,  and 
in  steady  hand-to-hand  fighting  must  be  allowed  to  be  un- 
rivaUed.  The  Parthians  surpassed  aU  nations  in  the  number 
of  their  cavalry  and  in  the  excellency  of  their  archers.  If 
these  advantages,  instead  of  being  separated,  were  combined, 
and  the  various  elements  on  which  success  in  war  depends 


202  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxr. 

were  thvis  brought  into  harmonious  union,  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  in  establishing  and  maintaining  a  universal  mon- 
archy. Were  that  done,  the  Parthian  spices  and  rare  stuffs, 
as  also  the  Roman  metals  and  manufactures,  would  no  longer 
need  to  be  imported  secretly  and  in  small  quantities  by  mer- 
chants, but,  as  the  two  countries  would  form  together  but  one 
nation  and  one  state,  there  would  be  a  free  interchange  among 
all  the  citizens  of  their  various  products  and  commodities."*' 

The  recital  of  this  despatch  threw  the  Parthian  monarch 
into  extreme  perplexity.  He  did  not  believe  that  the  propo- 
sals made  to  him  w^ere  serious,  or  intended  to  have  an  honor- 
able issue.  The  project  broached  appeared  to  him  altogether 
extravagant,  and  such  as  no  one  in  Ms  senses  could  entertain 
for  a  moment.  Yet  he  was  anxious  not  to  offend  the  master 
of  two-and-thirty  legions,'*  nor  even  to  give  him  a  pretext  for 
a  rupture  of  amicable  relations.  Accordingly  he  temporized, 
contenting  himself  with  setting  forth  some  objections  to  the 
request  of  Caracallus,  and  asking  to  be  excused  comphance 
with  it.''*  "Such  a  union,  as  Caracallus  proposed,  could 
scarcely,"  he  said,  "j^rove  a  happy  one.  The  wife  and  hus- 
band, differing  in  lang-uage,  habits,  and  mode  of  life,  could  not 
but  become  estranged  from  one  another.  There  was  no  lack 
of  patricians  at  Rome,  possessing  daughters  with  whom  the 
emperor  might  wed  as  suitably  as  the  Parthian  kings  did  with 
the  females  of  their  own  royal  house.  It  was  not  fit  that  either 
family  should  sully  its  blood  by  mixture  with  the  other." 

There  is  some  doubt  whether  Caracallus  construed  this  re- 
sponse as  an  absolute  refusal,  and  thereupon  undertook  his 
expedition,  or  whether  he  regarded  it  as  inviting  further  nego- 
tiation, and  sent  a  second  embassy,  whose  arguments  and  per- 
suasions induced  Artabanus  to  consent  to  the  proposed  alli- 
ance. The  contemporary  historian,  Dio,  states  positively  that 
Artabanus  refused  to  give  his  daughter  to  the  Roman  monarch, 
and  that  Caracallus  undertook  his  expedition  to  avenge  this 
insult;'"  but  Herodian,  another  contemporary,  declares  exactly 
the  reverse.  According  to  him,  the  Roman  Emperor,  on  re- 
ceiving the  reply  of  Artabanus,  sent  a  new  embassy  to  urge 
his  suit,  and  to  protest  with  oaths  that  he  was  in  earnest  and 
had  the  most  friendly  intentions.  Artabanus  upon  this  yielded, 
addressed  Caracallus  as  his  son-in-law,  and  invited  him  to 
come  and  fetch  home  his  bride."  Herodian  describes  with 
much  minuteness,  and  with  a  good  deal  of  picturesque  effect, 
the  stately  march  of  the  Imperial  prince  through  the  Parthian 


CH.  XXI.J  TREACHEROUS  ATTACK  OF  CAR  A  CALLUS.       203 

territory,  the  magnificent  welcome  which  he  received,  and  the 
peaceful  meeting  of  the  two  kings  in  the  plain  before  Ctesi- 
phon,  which  was  suddenly  interrupted  by  the  meditated  trea- 
son of  the  crafty  Roman.  Taken  at  disadvantage,  the  Parthian 
monarch  with  ditficulty  escaped,  while  his  soldiers  and  other 
subjects,  incapable  of  making  any  resistance,  were  slaughtered 
like  sheep  by  their  assailants,  who  then  plundered  and  ravaged 
the  Parthian  territory  at  their  ^vill,  and  returned  laden  with 
spoil  into  Mesopotamia.  In  general,  Dio  is  a  more  trustworthy 
authority  than  Herodian,  and  most  moderns  have  therefore 
preferred  his  version  of  the  story.'*  But  it  may  be  ques- 
tioned whether  in  this  particular  case  the  truth  has  not  been 
best  preserved  by  the  historian  on  whom  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances we  place  less  dependence.  If  so  disgraceful  an 
outrage  as  that  described  by  Herodian  was,  indeed,  committed 
by  the  head  of  the  Roman  State  on  a  foi'eign  potentate,  Dio, 
as  a  great  State  official,  would  naturally  be  anxious  to  gloss  it 
over.  There  are,  moreover,  internal  difficulties  in  his  narra- 
tive ;  '^  and  on  more  than  one  point  of  importance  he  contra- 
dicts not  only  Herodian,  but  also  Spartianus.-"  It  is  therefore 
not  improbable  that  Herodian  has  given  with  most  truth  the 
general  outline  of  the  expedition  of  Caracallus,  though,  with 
that  love  of  effect  which  characterizes  him,  he  may  have  un- 
duly embeUished  the  narrative. 

The  advance  of  CaracaUus  was,  if  Spartianus  is  to  be  beheved, 
through  Babylonia.'''  The  return  may  have  been  (as  Dio  seems 
to  indicate  that  it  was")  by  the  way  of  the  Tigris,  through 
Adiabene  and  Upper  Mesopotamia.  It  was  doubtless  on  the 
return  that  Caracallus  committed  a  second  and  wholly  wanton 
outrage  upon  the  feelings  of  his  adversary,  by  violating  the 
sanctity  of  the  Parthian  royal  sepulchres,  and  dispersing  their 
contents  to  the  four  winds.  These  tombs  were  situated  at 
Arbela,  in  Adiabene,  a  place  which  seems  to  have  been  always 
regarded  as  in  some  sort  a  City  of  the  Dead."  The  useless  in- 
sult and  impiety  were  worthy  of  one  who,  like  Caracallus,  was 
"equally  devoid  of  judgment  and  humanity,"  and  who  has 
been  pronounced  by  the  most  unimpassioned  of  historians  to 
have  been  ' '  the  common  enemy  of  mankind. "  "*  A  severe  reck- 
oning was  afterwards  exacted  for  the  indignity,  which  was 
felt  by  the  Parthians  with  all  the  keenness  wherewith  Orientals 
are  wont  to  regard  any  infringement  of  the  sanctity  of  tha 
gi'ave. 

Caracallus  appears  to  have  passed  the  winter  at  Edessa, 


004  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xx-l 

amusing  himself  with  hunting  and  charioteering  after  the 
fatigues  of  his  campaign. " "  In  the  spring  he  threatened  another 
advance  into  Parthian  territory,  and  threw  the  Medes  and 
Parthians  into  great  alarm."  He  had  not,  however,  the  oppor- 
tunity of  renewing  his  attack.  On  April  8,  a.d.  217,  having 
quitted  Edessa  with  a  small  retinue  for  the  purpose  of  visiting 
a  famous  temple  of  the  Moon-G-od  near  Carrhae,  he  was  sur- 
prised and  murdered  on  the  way  by  Julius  Martialis,  one  of  his 
guards."  His  successor,  Macrinus,  though  a  Praetorian  prefect, 
was  no  soldier,  and  would  willingly  have  retired  at  once  from 
the  war.  But  the  passions  of  the  Parthians  had  been  roused. 
Artabanus  possessed  the  energy  and  spii'it  which  most  of  the 
recent  monarchs  had  lacked ;  and  though  defeated  when  taken 
at  disadvantage,  and  unable  for  some  months  to  obtain  any  re- 
venge, had  employed  the  winter  in  the  collection  of  a  vast 
army,  and  was  determined  to  exact  a  heavy  retribution  for  the 
treacherous  massacre  of  Ctesiphon  and  the  wanton  impiety  of 
Arbela.  He  had  already  taken  the  field  and  conducted  his 
troops  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Roman  frontier  when  Cara- 
callus  lost  his  life.  Macrinus  was  scarcely  acknowledged  em- 
peror when  he  found  that  the  Parthians  were  close  at  hand, 
that  the  frontier  was  crossed,  and  that  unless  a  treaty  could  be 
concluded  he  must  risk  a  battle. " 

Under  these  circumstances  the  unwarlike  emperor  hurriedly 
sent  ambassadors  to  the  Parthian  camp,  with  an  offer  to  restore 
all  the  prisoners  made  in  the  late  campaign  as  the  price  of 
jjeace.  Artabanus  unhesitatingly  rejected  the  overture,  but  at 
the  same  time  informed  his  adversary  of  the  terms  on  which 
he  was  willing  to  treat.  Macrinus,  he  said,  must  not  only  re- 
store the  prisoners,  but  must  also  consent  to  rebuild  all  the 
towns  and  castles  which  Caracallus  had  laid  in  ruins,  must 
make  compensation  for  the  injury  done  to  the  tombs  of  the 
kings,  and  further  must  cede  Mesopotamia  to  the  Parthians.^" 
It  was  impossible  for  a  Roman  Emperor  to  consent  to  such  de- 
mands Avithout  first  trying  the  fortune  of  war,  and  Macrinus 
accordingly  made  up  his  mind  to  fight  a  battle.  The  Parthian 
prince  had  by  this  time  advanced  as  far  as  Nisibis,  and  it  was 
in  the  neighborhood  of  that  city  that  the  great  struggle  took 
place. 

The  battle  of  Nisibis,  which  terminated  the  long  contest  be- 
tween Rome  and  Parthia,  was  the  fiercest  and  best-contested 
which  was  ever  fought  between  the  rival  powers.  It  lasted  for 
the  space  of  three  days.  ^^    The  army  of  Artabanus  was  numer 


I 


en.  XXI.]  GREAT  BATTLE  OF  NISIBIS.  205 

ous  and  well-appointed:  like  almost  every  Parthian  force,  it 
was  strong  in  cavalry  and  archers;  and  it  had  moreover  a 
novel  addition  of  considerable  importance,  consisting  of  a  corps 
of  picked  soldiers,  clad  in  complete  armor,  and  carrying  long 
spears  or  lances,  who  were  mounted  on  camels.^'  The  Roman 
legionaries  were  supported  by  numerous  hght-armed  troops, 
and  a  powerful  body  of  Mauritanian  cavalry.^'  According  to 
Dio,  the  first  engagement  was  brought  on  accidentally  by  a 
contest  which  arose  among  the  soldiers  for  the  possession  of  a 
watering-place.  ^^  Herodian  tells  us  that  it  commenced  with  a 
fierce  assault  of  the  Parthian  cavalry,  who  chai'ged  the  Romans 
with  loud  shouts,  and  poured  into  their  ranks  flight  after  flight 
of  arrows.  A  long  struggle  followed.  The  Romans  suffered 
greatly  from  the  bows  of  the  horse-archers,  and  from  the  lances 
of  the  corps  mounted  on  camels ;  and  though,  when  they  could 
reach  their  enemy,  they  had  always  the  superiority  in  close 
combat,  yet  after  a  wliile  their  losses  from  the  cavalry  and 
camels  forced  them  to  retreat.  As  they  retired  they  strewed 
the  ground  with  spiked  balls  and  other  contrivances  for  injur- 
ing the  feet  of  animals ;  and  this  stratagem  was  so  far  success- 
ful that  the  pursuers  soon  found  themselves  in  difficulties,  and 
the  armies  respectively  retired,  without  any  decisive  result,  to 
their  camps. 

The  next  day  there  was  again  a  combat  from  morning  to 
night,  of  which  we  have  no  description,  but  which  equally  ter- 
minated without  any  clear  advantage  to  either  side.^^  The 
fight  was  then  renewed  for  the  third  time  on  the  third  day, 
Avith  the  difference  that  the  Parthians  now  directed  all  their 
efforts  towards  surrounding  the  enemy,  and  thus  capturing 
their  entire  force.  ^^  As  tliey  gi'eatly  outnumbered  the  Romans, 
these  last  found  themselves  compelled  to  extend  their  line  un- 
duly, in  order  to  meet  the  Parthian  tactics ;  and  the  weakness 
of  the  extended  line  seems  to  have  given  the  Parthians  an  op- 
portunity of  throwing  it  into  confusion,  and  thus  causing  the 
Roman  defeat.'"  Macrinus  took  to  flight  among  the  first;  and 
his  hasty  retreat  discouraged  his  troops,"  who  soon  afterwards 
acknowledged  themselves  beaten,  and  retired  within  the  lines 
of  their  camp.  Both  armies  had  suffered  severely.  Herodian 
describes  the  heaps  of  dead  as  piled  to  such  a  height  that  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  troops  were  impeded  by  them,  and  at  last  the 
two  contending  hosts  could  scarcely  see  one  another !  Both 
armies,  therefore,  desired  peace.'*  The  soldiers  of  Macrinus, 
who  had  never  had  much  confidence  in  their  leader,  were  de- 


206  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxi. 

moralized  by  ill  success,  and  showed  themselves  inclined  to 
throw  off  the  restraints  of  discipline.  Those  of  Artabanus,  a 
militia  rather  than  a  standing  force,  were  unaccustomed  to 
sustained  efforts ;  and  having  been  now  for  some  months  in  the 
field,  had  grown  weary,  and  wished  to  return  home.  Macrinus 
under  these  circumstances  re-opened  negotiations  with  liis  ad- 
versary. He  was  prepared  to  concede  something  more  than  he 
,*  had  proposed  originally,  and  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  the 
t  Parthian  monarch,  having  found  the  Roman  resistance  so 
stubborn,  would  be  content  to  insist  on  less.  The  event  justi- 
fied his  expectations.  Artabanus  relinquished  his  demand  for 
the  cession  of  Mesopotamia,  and  accepted  a  pecuniary  compen- 
sation for  his  wrongs.  Besides  restoring  the  captives  and  the 
booty  carried  off  by  Caracallus  in  his  raid,  Macrinus  had  to  pay 
a  sum  exceeding  a  milhon  and  a  half  of  our  money.  Eome 
thus  concluded  her  transactions  with  Parthia,  after  nearly  three 
centuries  of  struggle,  by  ignominiously  purchasing  a  peace.  ^^ 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  glory  of  this  achieve- 
ment woidd  have  brought  the  troubles  of  Artabanus  to  a  close; 
and  if  they  did  not  cause  the  pretender  who  still  disputed  his 
possession  of  the  throne  to  submit,  would  at  any  rate  have  put 
an  end  to  any  disaffection  on  the  part  of  the  subject  nations 
that  the  previous  ill-success  of  Parthia  in  her  Roman  wars 
might  have  provoked.  But  in  the  histories  of  nations  and  em- 
pires we  constantly  find  that  noble  and  gallant  efforts  to  re- 
trieve disaster  and  prevent  the  ruin  consequent  upon  it  come 
too  late.  When  matters  have  gathered  to  a  head,  when  steps 
that  commit  important  persons  have  been  taken,  when  classes 
or  races  have  been  encouraged  to  cherish  hopes,  when  plans 
have  been  formed  and  advanced  to  a  certain  point,  the  course 
of  action  that  has  been  contemplated  and  ari^anged  for  cannot 
suddenly  be  given  up.  The  cause  of  discontent  is  removed,  but 
the  effects  remain.  Affections  have  been  alienated,  and  the 
alienation  still  continues.  A  certain  additional  resentment  is 
even  felt  at  the  tardy  repentance,  or  revival,  which  seems  to 
cheat  the  discontented  of  that  general  sympathy  whereof  with- 
out it  they  would  have  been  secure.  In  default  of  their  original 
grievance,  it  is  easy  for  them  to  discover  minor  ones,  to  exag- 
gerate these  into  importance,  and  to  find  in  them  a  sufficien 
reason  for  persistence  in  the  intended  course.  Hence  revolu 
tions  often  take  place  just  when  the  necessity  for  them  seems 
to  be  past,  and  kingdoms  perish  at  a  time  when  they  have  be- 
gun  to  show  themselves  deserving  of  a  longer  term  of  Ufa. 


CH.  XXI.]  GRIEVANCES  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  207 

It  is  impossible  at  the  present  day  to  form  any  trustworthy 
estimate    of  the  real  value  of  those    grounds  of    compMnt 
which  the  Persians,  in  common  doubtless  with  other  subject 
races,  thought  that  they  had  against  the  Parthian  rule.     We 
can  well  understand  that  the  supremacy  of  any  dominant 
race  is  irksome  to  the  ahens  who  have  to  submit  to  it ;  but 
such  information  as  we  possess  fails  to  show  us  either  any- 
thing seriously  oppressive  in  the  general  system  of  the  Par- 
thian government,  or  any  special  grievance  whereof  the  Per- 
sians had  to  complain.     The  Parthians  were  tolerant;  they 
did  not  interfere  with  the  religious  prejudices  of  their  subjects, 
or  attempt  to  enforce  uniformity  of  creed  or  worship.     Their 
military  system  did  not  press  over-heavily  on  the  subject 
peoples,  nor  is  there  any  reason  to  believe  that  the  scale  of 
their  taxation  was  excessive.      Such  tyranny  as  is  charged 
upon  certain  Parthian  monarchs  is  not  of  a  kind  that  would 
have  been  sensibly  felt  by  the  conquered  nations,  for  it  was 
exercised  upon  none  who  were  not  Parthians.     If  we  endeavor 
to  form  a  distinct  notion  of  the  grievances  under  wlaich  the 
Persians  suffered,  they  seem  to  have  amounted  to  no  more 
than  this:  1.  That  high  offices,  whether  military  or  civil,  were 
for  the  most  part  confined  to  those  of  Parthian  blood,  and  not 
thrown  open   to  Parthian  subjects  generally;    2.    That    the 
priests  of  the  Persian  religion  were  not  held  in  any  special 
honor,"  but  placed  merely  on  a  par  with  the  religious  min- 
isters of  the  other  subject  races ;  3.  That  no  advantage  in  any 
respect  was  allowed'  to  the  Persians  over  the  rest  of  the  con- 
quered peoples,  notwithstanding  that  they  had  for  so  many 
years  exercised  supremacy  over  Western  Asia,  and  given  to 
the  list  of  Asiatic  worthies  such  names  as  those  of  Cyrus  and 
Darius  Hystaspis.     It  must,  however,  be  confessed  that  the 
account  which  has  come  down  to  us  of  the  times  in  question 
is  exceedingly  meagre  and  incomplete;  that  we  cannot  say 
whether  the  Persians  had  not  also  other  grounds  of  complaint 
besides  those  that  are  known  to  us ;  and,  more  especially,  that 
we  have  no  means  of  determining  what  the  actual  pressure  of 
the  grievances  complained  of  was,  or  whether  it  did  not  reach 
to  that    degree  of  severity  which  moderns    mostly  hold  to 
justify  disaffection  and  rebellion.      On  the  whole,  perhaps, 
our  conclusion  must  be,  that  the  best  justification  of  the  out- 
break is  to  be  found  in  its  success.    The  Parthians  had  no 
right  to  their  position  but  such  as  arose  out  of  the  law  of  the 

6t]"onger — 


208  ^-^^  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxi. 

The  ancient  rule,  the  good  old  plan, 

That  those  shall  take  who  have  the  power, 

And  those  shall  keep  who  can — 

when  the  time  came  that  they  had  lost  this  pre-eminence, 
superiority  in  strength  having  passed  from  them  to  a  nation 
liitherto  counted  among  their  subjects,  it  was  natural  and 
right  that  the  seat  of  authority  should  shift  with  the  shift  in 
the  balance  of  power,  and  that  the  leadership  of  the  Persians 
shovild  be  once  more  recognized. 

If  the  motives  which  actuated  the  nation  of  the  Persians  in 
rising  against  their  masters  are  thus  obscure  and  difficult  to 
be  estimated,  still  less  can  we  form  any  decided  judgment 
upon  those  which  caused  their  leader,  Artaxerxes,  to  attempt 
his  perilous  enterprise.  Could  we  trust  imphcitly  the  state- 
ment of  Agathias,  that  Artaxerxes  was  himself  a  Magus, 
initiated  in  the  deepest  mysteries  of  the  Order,*'  we  should 
have  grounds  for  considering  that  rehgious  zeal  was,  at  any 
rate,  a  leading  motive  of  his  conduct.  It  is  certain  that 
among  the  principal  changes  consequent  upon  his  success  was 
a  religious  revolution— the  substitution  for  Parthian  tolerance 
of  all  faiths  and  worships,  of  a  rigidly  enforced  uniformity  in 
religion,  the  establishment  of  the  Magi  in  power,  and  the 
bloody  persecution  of  all  such  as  declined  obedience  to  the 
precepts  of  Zoroaster."  But  the  conjecture  has  been  made, 
and  cannot  be  refuted,  that  the  proceedings  of  Artaxerxes  in 
this  matter  should  be  ascribed  to  policy  rather  than  to 
bigotry,"  and  in  that  case  we  could  not  regard  him  as  origi- 
nally inspired  by  a  religious  sentiment.  Perhaps  it  is  best  to 
suppose  that,  like  most  founders  of  empires,  he  was  mainly 
prompted  by  ambition ;  that  he  saw  in  the  distracted  state  of 
Parthia  and  in  the  awakening  of  hope  among  the  subject  races, 
an  occasion  of  which  he  determined  to  avail  himself  as  far  as 
he  could,  and  that  he  was  gradually  led  on  to  enlarge  his 
views  and  to  effect  the  great  revolution,  which  he  brought 
about,  by  the  force  of  circumstances,  the  wishes  of  others,  and 
the  occurrence  of  opportunities  which  at  first  he  neither  fore- 
saw nor  desired. 

It  has  been  observed,"  that  Parthia  was,  during  the  whole 
reign  of  Artaxerxes,  distracted  by  the  claims  of  a  pretender, 
Volagases  V.  According  to  Moses  of  Chorene,  two  branches 
of  the  Arsacid  family,  both  of  them  settled  in  Bactria,  were  at 
feud  with  the  reigning  prince;  and  these  offended  relatives 
carried  their  enmitv  to  such  a   length  as  to  consider  sub- 


Vol.   I! 


Plate  XVii. 


o 


S 


■< 


Plate    XVII 


*«<BHS!W-r!^^?^i^5P— - 


CH.  XXI.]     TUEIR  REVOLT   UNDER  ARTAXEBXE8.  209 

mission  to  a  foreigner  a  less  evil  than  subjection  to  the  de  facto 
head  of  theii'  house/ ^  The  success  of  Artabanus  in  the  war 
against  Eome  had  no  effect  upon  his  domestic  foes;  and 
Artaxerxes  undoubtedly  knew  that,  if  he  raised  the  standard 
of  revolt,  he  might  count  on  a  certain  amount  of  support  from 
discontented  Arsacids  and  their  followers.  But  his  main  re- 
liance must  have  been  on  the  Persians.  The  Persians  had,  in 
the  original  arrangements  of  the  Parthian  empire,  been 
treated  with  a  certain  amount  of  favor.  They  had  been  al- 
lowed to  retain  their  native  monarchs,"  a  concession  which 
naturally  involved  the  continuance  of  the  nation's  laws, 
customs,  and  traditions.  Their  religion  had  not  been  perse- 
cuted, and  had  even  in  the  early  times  attracted  a  considerable 
amount  of  Court  favor."'  But  it  would  seem  that  latterly  the 
privileges  of  the  nation  had  been  diminished,  while  their  preju- 
dices were  wantonly  shocked.  The  Magi  had  ceased  to  be  re- 
garded as  of  much  account,  "*  and,  if  they  still  formed  nomi- 
nally a  portion  of  the  king's  council,  can  have  had  little 
influence  on  the  conduct  of  affairs  by  the  government.  Such  a 
custom  as  that  of  burning  the  dead,  which  seems  to  have 
been  the  rule  in  the  later  Parthian  times,*"  could  never  have 
maintained  its  ground,  if  the  opinion  of  the  Magi,  or  their  co- 
religionists, had  been  considered  of  much  account. 

Encouraged  by  the  dissensions  prevailing  in  the  Parthian 
royal  house,  strong  in  the  knowledge  of  his  fellow-country- 
men's discontent,  and  perhaps  thinking  that  the  losses  which 
Artabanus  had  sustained  in  his  three  days'  battle  against  the 
Eomans  under  Macrinus  had  seriously  weakened  his  military 
strength,  Artaxerxes,  tributary  king  of  Persia  under  Parthia, '" 
about  A.D.  220,^'  or  a  little  later,  took  up  arms  against  his 
master,  and  in  a  little  time  succeeded  in  establishing  the  in- 
dependence of  Persia  Proper,  or  the  modern  province  of 
Fars. "  Artabanus  is  said  to  have  taken  no  steps  at  first  to 
crush  the  rebellion,  or  to  re-establish  his  authority  over  his 
revolted  vassal. "  Thus  the  Persian  monarch,  finding  liimself 
unmolested,  was  free  to  enlarge  his  plans,  and  having  origi- 
nally, as  is  probable,  designed  only  the  Uberation  of  his  own 
I)eople,  began  to  contemplate  conquests.  Turning  his  arms 
eastwards  against  Carmania  (Kerman),  he  easily  reduced  that 
scantily-peopled  tract  under  his  dominion,  after  which  he 
made  war  towards  the  north,  and  added  to  his  kingdom  some 
of  the  outlying  regions  of  Media.  Artabanus  now  at  length 
resolved  to  bestir  himself,  and  collecting  his  forces,  took  the 


2X0  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch  xxl 

field  in  person.  Invading  Persia  Proper,  he  engaged  in  a 
desperate  struggle  with  his  rival.  Three  great  battles  were 
fought  between  the  contending  powers.'*  In  the  last,  which 
took  place  in  the  plain  of  Hormuz,"  between  Bebahan  and 
Shuster,  on  the  course  of  the  Jerahi  river,  Artabanus  was, 
after  a  desperate  conflict,  completely  defeated, '"  and  not  only- 
defeated  but  slain  (a.d.  226). 

The  victory  of  Hormuz  did  not,  however,  absolutely  decide 
the  contest,  or  determine  at  once  that  the  Parthian  empirt> 
should  fall,  and  the  new  Persian  kingdam  succeed  into  its 
place.  Artabanus  had  left  sons;"  and  there  were  not  wanting 
those  among  the  feudatories  of  the  empire,  and  even  among 
the  neighboring  potentates,  who  were  well  inclined  to  embrace 
their  cause.  A  certain  Artavasdes  seems  to  have  claimed  the 
throne,  and  to  have  been  accepted  as  king,  at  least  by  a  por- 
tion of  the  Parthians,  in  the  year  following  the  death  of  Ar- 
tabanus (a.d.  227),  when  he  certainly  issued  coins. ''^  The 
Armenian  monarch,  who  had  been  set  on  his  throne  by  Arta- 
banus, and  was  uncle  to  the  young  princes,^'  was  especially 
anxious  to  maintain  the  Arsacids  in  power ;  he  gave  them  a 
refuge  in  Armenia,*"  collected  an  army  on  their  behalf,  and 
engaging  Artaxerxes,  is  even  said  to  have  defeated  him  in  a 
battle."'  But  his  efforts,  and  those  of  Artavasdes,  were  un- 
availing. The  arms  of  Artaxerxes  in  the  end  everywhere 
prevailed.  After  a  strviggle,  which  cannot  have  lasted  more 
than  a  few  years,  the  provinces  of  the  old  Parthian  empire 
submitted ;  the  last  Arsacid  prince  f eU  into  the  hands  of  the 
Persian  king;''"  and  the  founder  of  the  new  dynasty  sought 
to  give  legitimacy  to  his  rule  by  taking  to  wife  an  Arsacid 
princess. " 

Thus  perished  the  great  Parthian  monarchy  after  an  ex- 
istence of  nearly  five  centuries.  Its  end  must  be  attributed 
in  the  main  to  internal  decay,  working  itself  out  especially  in 
two  directions.  The  Arsacid  race,  with  which  the  idea  of  the 
empire  was  bound  up,"*  instead  of  clinging  together  with  that 
close  "union"  which  is  "strength,"  allowed  itself  to  be  torn 
to  pieces  by  dissensions,  to  waste  its  force  in  quarrels,  and  to 
be  made  a  handle  of  by  every  foreign  invader,  or  domestic 
rebel,  who  chose  to  use  its  name  in  order  to  cloak  his  own 
selfish  projects.  The  race  itself  does  not  seem  to  have  become 
exhausted.  Its  chiefs,  the  successive  occupants  of  the  throne, 
nG\'Ter  sank  into  mere  weaklings  or  faineants,  never  shut 
themselves  up  in  their  seraglios,  or  ceased  to  take  a  leading 


II 


CH.  XXI.]     END  OF  THE  PARTHIAN  MONARCHY.  21-1 

part,  alike  in  civil  broils,  and  in  struggles  with  foreign  rivals. 
But  the  hold  which  the  race  had  on  the  population,  native  and 
foreign,  was  gradually  weakened  by  the  feuds  which  raged 
within  it,  by  the  profusion  with  which  the  sacred  blood  was 
shed  by  those  in  whose  veins  it  ran,  and  the  difficulty  of 
knowing  which  living  member  of  it  was  its  tru^e  head,  and  so 
entitled  to  the  allegiance  of  those  who  wished  to  be  faithful 
Parthian  subjects.  Further,  the  vigor  of  tlie  Parthian  soldiery 
must  have  gradually  declined,  and  their  superiority  over  the 
mass  of  the  nations  under  their  dominion  have  diminished. 
We  found  reasons  for  believing  that,  as  early  as  a.d.  58, 
Hyrcania  succeeded  in  throwing  off  the  Parthian  yoke,''  and 
thus  setting  an  example  of  successful  rebellion  to  the  subject 
peoples.  The  example  may  have  been  followed  in  cases  of 
which  we  hear  nothing;  for  the  condition  of  the  more  remote 
portions  of  the  empire  was  for  the  most  part  unknown  to  the 
Romans.  When  Persia,  about  a.d.  220,  revolted  from  Arta- 
banus,  it  was  no  doubt  with  a  con  viction  that  the  Parthians 
were  no  longer  the  terrible  warriors  who  under  Mithridates  I. 
had  driven  all  the  armies  of  the  East  before  them  like  chaff, 
or  who  under  Orodes  and  Phraates  IV.  had  gained  signal 
victories  over  the  Romans.  It  is  true  that  Artabanus  had 
contended  not  unsuccessfully  with  Macrinus.  But  the  prestige 
of  Parthia  was  far  from  being  re-established  by  the  result  of 
his  three  days'  battle.  Rome  retained  as  her  own,  notwith- 
standing his  success,  the  old  Parthian  province  of  Mesopotamia, 
and  was  thus,  even  in  the  moment  of  her  weakness,  acknow- 
ledged by  Parthia  to  be  the  stronger.  The  Persians  are  not 
likely  to  have  been  braver  or  more  warlike  at  the  time  of  their 
revolt  from  Artabanus  than  in  the  days  when  they  were  sub- 
jected by  Mithridates.  Any  alteration,  therefore,  in  the  rela- 
tive strength  of  the  two  peoples  must  be  ascribed  to  Parthian 
dechne,  since  it  cannot  have  been  owing  to  Persian  advance 
and  improvement.  To  conclude,  we  may  perhaps  allow  some- 
thing to  the  personal  qualities  of  Artaxerxes,  who  appears  to 
have  possessed  all  the  merits  of  the  typical  Oriental  conqueror. 
Artabanus  was  among  the  most  able  of  the  later  Parthian 
monarchs ;  but  his  antagonist  was  more  than  this,  possessing 
true  military  genius.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  if  the  leaders 
on  the  two  sides  had  changed  places,  the  victory  might  have 
rested,  not  with  the  Persians,  but  with  the  Parthians. 


213  THE  SIXTH  MONARCUr.  [ch.  xxii. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

On  the  Architecture  and  Ornamental  Art  of  the  Parthians. 

The  modern  historian  of  Architecture  observes/  when  he 
reaches  the  period  witli  which  we  have  had  to  deal  in  this 
volume,  that,  with  the  advent  of  Alexander,  Oriental  arclii- 
tecture  disappears,  and  that  its  history  is  an  absolute  blank 
from  the  downfall  of  the  Achsemenians  in  B.C.  331  to  the  rise 
of  the  Sassanians,  about  a.d.  226.  The  statement  made  in- 
volves a  certain  amount  of  exaggeration ;  but  still  it  expresses, 
roughly  and  strongly,  a  curious  and  important  fact.  The  Par- 
thians were  not,  in  any  full  or  pregnant  sense  of  the  word, 
builders.  They  did  not  aim  at  leaving  a  material  mark  upon 
the  world  by  means  of  edifices  or  other  great  works.  They 
lacked  the  spirit  which  had  impelled  successively  the  Assy- 
rians, the  Babylonians,  and  the  Persians  to  cover  Western 
Asia  with  architectural  monuments,  proofs  at  once  of  the 
wealth,  and  the  grand  ideas,  of  those  who  raised  them.  Par- 
thia,  compared  to  these  pretentious  empires,  was  retiring  and 
modest.  The  monarchs,  however  rich  they  may  have  been, 
affected  something  of  primitive  rudeness  and  simplicity  in 
their  habits  and  style  of  Ufe,  their  dwellings  and  temples, 
their  palaces  and  tombs.  It  is  difficult  indeed  to  draw  the 
line  in  every  case  between  pure  Parthian  work  and  Sassanian ; 
but  on  the  whole  there  is.  no  doubt,  reason  to  believe  that  the 
architectural  remains  in  Mesopotamia  and  Persia  which  be- 
long to  the  period  between  Alexander  and  the  Arab  conquest, 
are  mainly  the  work  of  the  Sassanian  or  New  Persian  king- 
dom, and  that  comparatively  few  of  them  can  be  ascribed 
with  confidence  to  a  time  anterior  to  a.d.  227.  Still  a  certain 
number,  which  have  about  them  indications  of  greater  an- 
tiquity than  the  rest,  or  which  belong  to  sites  famous  in  Par- 
thian rather  than  in  Persian  times,  may  reasonably  be  re- 
garded as  in  all  probabiHty  structures  of  the  Arsacid  period ; 
and  from  these  we  may  gather  at  least  the  leading  character- 
istics of  the  Parthian  architecture,  its  aims  and  resources,  its 
style  and  general  effect,  while  from  other  remains — scanty 
indeed,  and  often  mutilated — we  may  obtain  a  tolerable  notion 
of  their  sculpture  and  other  ornamental  art. 


CH.  XXII.]  WALL   OF  HATBA.  213 

The  most  imposing  remains  which  seem  certainly  assignable 
to  the  Parthian  period  are  those  of  Hatra,  or  El-Hadhr,  visited 
hy  Mr.  Layard  in  1846,  and  described  at  length  by  Mr.  Eoss  in 
the  ninth  volume  of  the  "Journal  of  the  Eoyal  Geographi- 
cal Society,"  -  as  well  as  by  Mr.  Fergusson,  in  his  "  History  of 
Architecture."^    Hatra  became  known  as  a  place  of  import- 
ance in  the  early  part  of  the  second  century  after  Christ.*    It 
successfully  resisted  Trajan  in  a.d.  116,  and  Severus  in  a.d. 
198.'    It  is  then  described  as  a  large  and  populous  city,  de- 
fended by  strong  and  extensive  walls, ''  and  containing  within 
it  a  temple  of  the  Sun,  celebrated  for  the  great  value  of  its 
offerings.'    It  enjoyed  its  own  kings  at  this  time,'  who  were 
regarded  as  of  Arabian  stock,  and  were  among  the  more  impor- 
tant of  the  Parthian  tributary  monarchs.     By  the  year  a.d. 
363  Hatra  had  gone  to  ruin,  and  is  then  described  as  "long 
since  deserted."'    Its  flourishing  period  thus  belongs  to  the 
space  between  a.d.  100  and  a.d.  BOO;  and  its  remains,  to  which 
Mr.  Fergusson  assigns  the  date  a.d.  250,  must  be  regarded  as 
probably  at  least  a  century  earher,  and  consequently  as  indi- 
cating the  character  of  the  architecture  which  prevailed  under 
ihe  later  Parthians,  and  which,  if  Sassanian  improvements 
iiad  not  obUterated  them,  we  should  have  found  upon  the  site 
of  Ctesiphon. 

The  city  of  Hatra'"  was  enclosed  by  a  circular  wall  of  great 
thickness, "  built  of  large  sqviare-cut  stones,  and  strengthened 
at  intervals  of  about  170  yards  by  square  towers  or  bastions. 
[PI.  IV.  Fig.  1.]  Its  circumference  considerably  exceeded  three 
miles.  Outside  the  wall  was  a  broad  and  very  deep  ditch, 
and  on  the  further  side  of  the  ditch  was  an  earthen  rampart 
of  considerable  height  and  thickness.  Two  detached  forts, 
situated  on  eminences,  commanded  the  approaches  to  the 
place,  one  towards  the  east,  and  the  other  towards  the  north. 
The  wall  was  pierced  by  four  gateways,  of  which  the  principal 
one  faced  the  east.'" 

The  circular  space  within  the  walls  was  divided  into  two 
portions  by  a  water-course"  passing  across  it  from  north  to 
south,  and  running  somewhat  east  of  the  centre,  which  thus 
divided  the  circle  into  two  unequal  parts.  The  eastern  por- 
tion was  left  comparatively  clear  of  buildings,  and  seems  to 
have  been  used  mainly  as  a  burial-ground;  in  the  western 
were  the  public  edifices  and  the  more  important  houses  of  the 
inhabitants.  Of  the  former  by  far  the  most  remarkable  was 
one  which  stood  nearly  in  the  centre  of  the  city,  and  which 


214  THE  SIXTU  MONARCni  [ch.  xxil 

has  been  called  by  some  a  palace,  by  others  a  temple,  but 
which  may  best  be  regarded  as  combming  both  uses."  [PI. 
IV.  Fig.  2.]  This  building  stood  within  a  walled  enclosure  of 
an  oblong  square  shape,  aboiit  800  feet  long  by  700  broad. '^ 
The  wall  surrounding  it  was  strengthened  with  bastions,  like 
the  wall  around  the  city.  The  enclosure  comprised  two  courts, 
an  inner  and  an  outer.  The  outer  court,  which  lay  towards 
the  east,  and  was  first  entered,  was  entirely  clear  of  buildings, 
while  the  inner  court  contained  two  considerable  edifices.  Of 
these  the  less  important  was  one  which  stretched  from  north 
to  south  across  the  entire  inclosure,  and  abutted  upon  the 
outer  court ;  this  was  confused  in  plan,  and  consisted  chiefly 
of  a  number  of  small  apartments,  which  have  been  regarded 
as  guard-rooms.'"  The  other  was  a  building  of  gi-eater  preten- 
sions. It  was  composed  mainly  of  seven  vaulted  halls,  all  of 
them  parallel  one  to  another,  and  all  facing  eastward,  three 
being  of  superior  and  four  of  inferior  size.  The  smaller  haUs 
(Nos.  I.,  III.,  IV.,  and  VI.,  on  the  plan)  were  about  thirty 
feet  long  by  twenty  wide,  and  had  a  height  of  thirty  feet;'' 
the  larger  ones  measured  ninety  feet  in  length,'*  and  were 
from  thirty-five  to  forty  feet  broad,  "*  with  a  height  of  sixty 
feet."  All  were  upon  the  same  plan.  They  had  semicircular 
vaulted  roofs,  no  windows,  and  received  their  fight  from  the 
archway  at  the  east  end,  which  was  either  left  entfi-ely  open, 
or  perhaps  closed  with  curtains. 

Externally,  the  eastern  fagade  of  the  building,  which  was 
evidently  its  main  front,  had  for  ornament,  besides  the  row  of 
seven  arches,  a  series  of  pillars,  or  rather  pilasters,  from 
which  the  arches  sprang,  some  sculptures  on  the  stones  com- 
posing the  arches,  and  one  or  two  emblematic  figures  in  the 
spaces  left  between  the  pilasters.  The  sculptures  on  the 
stones  of  the  arches  consisted  either  of  human  heads,  or  of 
representations  of  a  female  form,  apparently  floating  in  air.-' 
[PI.  IV.  Fig.  3.]  An  emblematic  sculpture  between  the  fourth 
and  fifth  arch  represented  a  griffin  with  twisted  tail,  raised 
about  5  feet  above  the  ground.  The  entire  length  of  the 
fagade  was  about  300  feet. 

The  interior  of  the  smaller  halls  had  no  ornament ;  but  the 
larger  ones  were  decorated  somewhat  elaborately.  Here  the 
side  walls  were  broken  by  three  squared  pilasters,  rising  to 
the  commencement  of  the  vaulting,  and  terminated  by  a  quasi- 
capital  of  ornamental  work,  consisting  of  a  series  of  ovals, 
each  oval  containing  in  its  centre  a  round  ball  of  dark  stone. 


CTi.  XXII.]  PALACE-TEMPLE  OF  HATRA.  215 

Underneath  these  quasi-capitals,  at  the  distance  of  from  two 
to  three  feet,  ran  a  cornice,  which  crossed  the  pilasters,  and 
extended  the  whole  length  of  the  apartment,  consisting  of 
flowers  and  half -ovals,  each  oval  containing  a  half -ball  of  the 
same  dark  stone  as  the  capitals.  [PI.  IV.  Fig.  4.]  Finally,  on 
the  pilasters,  immediately  below  the  cornice,  were  sculptm*ed 
commonly  either  two  or  three  human  heads,  ^''  the  length  of 
each  head  being  about  two  feet,  and  the  faces  representing 
diverse  types  of  humanity,  some  old  and  some  young,  some 
male  and  some  female,  some  apparently  realistic,  some  ideal- 
ized and  more  or  less  grotesque  in  their  accompaniments.  The 
drawing  of  the  heads  is  said  to  have  been  full  of  spirit,  and 
their  general  effect  is  pronounced  hfe-like  and  striking. 

The  seven  halls,  which  have  been  described,  were  divided 
into  two  groups,  of  three  and  four  respectively,  by  a  low  fence, 
which  ran  from  east  to  west  across  the  inner  court,  from  the 
partition  wall  separating  the  third  and  fourth  halls  to  the 
buildings  which  divided  the  inner  court  from  the  outer.  It  is 
probable  that  this  division  separated  the  male  and  female 
apartments.  The  female  ornamentation"  of  the  large  hall 
(No.  II.)  belonging  to  the  southern  group  is  perhaps  an  indica- 
tion of  the  sex  of  its  inmates;  and  another  sign  that  these 
were  the  female  quarters  is  to  be  found  in  the  direct  commu- 
nication existing  between  this  portion  of  the  building  and  "the 
Temple"  (No.  VIII.),  which  could  not  be  reached  from  the 
male  apartments  except  by  a  long  circuit  round  the  building. 

The  "  Temple"  itself  was  an  apartment  of  a  square  shape, 
each  side  being  about  forty  feet.  It  was  completely  sur- 
rounded by  a  vaulted  passage,  into  which  light  came  from  two 
windows  at  its  south-west  and  north-west  corners.  The  Tem- 
ple was  entered  by  a  single  doorway,  the  position  of  which 
was  directly  opposite  an  opening  leading  into  the  passage  from 
Hall  No.  II.  Above  this  doorway  was  a  magnificent  frieze, 
the  character  of  which  is  thought  to  indicate  the  religious  pur- 
pose of  the  structure.  [PL  V.  Fig.  1.]  The  interior  of  the 
Temple  was  without  ornamentation,  vaulted,  and  except  for 
the  feeble  light  which  entered  by  the  single  doorway,  dark. 
On  the  west  side  a  portal  led  into  the  passage  from  the  outer 
air. 

Besides  these  main  apartments,  the  edifice  which  we  a.re 
describing  contained  a  cei-tain  number  of  small  rooms,  lying 
behind  the  halls,  and  entered  by  doorways  opening  from  them. 
One  or  two  such  rooms  are  found  behind  each  of  the  sniaU^ 


gl6  THE  SIXTH  MONiiUCET.  [ch.  xxii. 

halls ;  and  another  of  somewhat  larger  dimensions  lay  behind 
the  great  hall  (numbered  VII.  in  the  plan),  forming  the  extreme 
north-western  corner  of  the  building.  These  rooms  were 
vaulted  and  had  no  windows,  receiving  their  only  Hght  from 
the  small  doorways  by  which  they  were  entered. 

It  is  believed  that  the  entire  edifice,  or  at  any  rate  the 
greater  portion  of  it,  had  an  upper  story.  Traces  of  such  a 
structure  appear  over  the  halls  numbered  I  and  VI. ;  and  it  is 
thought  that  the  story  extended  over  the  entire  range  of  halls. 
One  traveller,-*  on  conjectural  grounds,  even  assigns  to  the 
building  an  elevation  of  three  stories,  and  ventures  to  restore 
the  second  and  third  in  the  mode  represented  in  the  woodcut. 
[PI.  V.  Fig.  2.]  According  to  this  author  the  upper  portion  ot 
the  edifice  resembled  in  many  respects  the  great  palace  of  the 
Sassanian  monarchs,  of  which  splendid  remains  still  exist  on 
the  site  of  Ctesiphon,  where  they  are  known  as  the  Takht-i- 
Khuzroo,  or  Palace  of  Chosroes.  That  palace  was,  however, 
on  a  very  different  plan  from  the  Hatra  one,  comprising  as  it 
did  one  hall  only,  but  of  a  size  vastly  superior  to  any  of  those 
at  Hatra,  and  two  wings,  one  on  either  side  of  the  hall,  made 
up  of  dwelling  and  sleeping  apartments.'' 

The  few  windows  which  exist  at  Hatra  are  oblong  square  in 
shape,'' as  in  general  are  the  doorways  connecting  one  apart- 
ment with  another.  In  one  case  there  is  an  arched  doorway, 
or  niche,  which  has  been  blocked  up.  There  are  no  passages 
except  the  one  which  surrounds  "  the  Temple,"  the  apartments 
generally  leading  directly  one  into  another.  In  some  cases 
the  Untel  of  a  doorway  is  formed  of  a  single  stone,  and  orna- 
mented with  very  delicate  carving. ''  The  doorways  are  for 
the  most  part  towards  the  comers  of  anartments;  that  of  tho 

,  Temple,  however,  is  in  the  centre  of  its  eastern  wall. 

:  ^  The  general  style  of  the  buildings  at  Hatra  has  been  said  to  be 
•  I  Roman  or  Byzantine;"  audit  has  even  been  supposed  that 
"  m  the  style  of  the  ornaments  and  sculptured  figures  may  be 
traced  the  corrupt  taste  and  feeble  outline  ot  the  artists  of 
Constantinople."'^  But  there  is  abundant  reason  to  beheve 
that  the  Hatra  Palace  was  built  nearly  two  centuries  before 
Constantinople  came  into  existence;  and,  although  the  large 
use  of  the  round  arch  in  vaulting  may  be  due  to  the  spread  of 
Roman  architectural  ideas,  yet  there  are  no  grounds  for  sup- 
posmg  that  any  but  native  artists,  Parthian  subjects,  were 
employed  m  the  work,  or  that  it  is  other  than  a  fair  specimen 
of  what  \va^  achieved  by  tho  Pr.rthian  builders  during  tho 


CH.  xxii.]     RESERVOIRS  AND   TOMBS  AT  HATRA.  217 

later  period  of  the  empire.  The  palace  of  Volagases  III.  at 
Ctesiphon,  which  Avidius  Cassius  destroyed  in  his  invasion,^* 
was  most  likely  of  the  same  general  character— a  combination 
of  lofty  halls  suitable  for  ceremonies  and  audiences  with  small 
and  dark  sleeping  or  living  rooms,  opening  out  of  them,  the 
whole  placed  in  the  middle  of  a  paved  court,  and  the  male 
apartments  carefully  divided  from  those  of  the  women. 

The  remains  at  Hatra  are  further  remarkable  for  a  consider- 
able number  of  reservoirs  and  tombs.  The  open  space  between 
the  town  proper  and  the  eastern  wall  and  gate  is  dotted  with 
edifices  of  a  square  shape,  standing  apart  from  one  another, 
which  are  reasonably  regarded  as  sepulchres.'"  These  are 
built  in  a  solid  way,  of  hewn  stone,  and  consist  either  of  one 
or  two  chambers.  They  vary  in  size  from  twenty  feet  square 
to  forty,  and  are  generally  of  about  the  same  height.  Some 
are  perfectly  plain,  but  the  exteriors  of  others  are  ornamented 
with  pilasters.  The  reservoirs  occur  in  the  paved  court  which 
surrounds  the  main  building ;  they  have  narrow  apertures,  but 
expand  below  the  aperture  into  the  shape  of  a  bell,  and  are 
carefully  constructed  of  well-cut  stones  closely  fitted  together. 

The  material  used  at  Hatra  is  uniformly  a  brownish  gray  lime- 
stone ;  and  the  cutting  is  so  clean  and  smooth  that  it  is  doubted 
whether  the  stones  have  needed  any  cement.  If  cement  has 
been  employed,  at  any  rate  it  cannot  now  be  seen,  the  stones 
everywhere  appearing  to  touch  one  another. 

There  are  several  buildings  remaining  in  Persia,  the  date  of 
which  cannot  be  much  later  than  that  of  the  Hati-a  edifice;" 
but,  as  it  is  on  the  whole  more  probable  that  they  belong  to 
the  Sassanian  than  to  the  Parthian  period,  no  account  of  them 
will  be  given  here.  It  will  be  sufiicient  to  observe  that  their 
architecture  grows  naturally  out  of  that  which  was  in  use  at 
Hatra,  and  that  thus  we  are  entitled  to  ascribe  to  Parthian 
times  and  to  subjects  of  the  Parthian  Empire  that  impulse  to 
Oriental  architecture  which  awoke  it  to  renewed  life  after  a 
sleep  of  ages,  and  which  in  a  short  time  produced  such  impos- 
ing results  as  the  Takht-i-Khuzroo  at  Ctesiphon,  the  rums  of 
Shapur,  and  the  triumphal  arch  at  Takht-i-Bostan. 

The  decorative  and  fictile  art  of  the  Parthians  has  received 
no  inconsiderable  amount  of  illustration  from  remains  discov- 
ered, in  the  years  1850-1852,  in  Babylonia.  In  combination 
with  a  series  of  Parthian  coins  were  found  by  Mr.  Loftus,  on 
the  site  of  the  ancient  Erech  (nowWarka),  a  number  of  objects 
in  clay,  plaster,  and  metal,"  enabUng  us  to  form  a  fair  idea  of 


218  THE  SIXTH  MONAncnr.  [en.  xxn 

the  mode  in  which  purely  Parthian  edifices  were  decorated 
during  the  best  times  of  the  empire,  and  of  the  style  that 
then  prevailed  in  respect  of  personal  ornaments,  domestic 
utensils,  and  other  objects  capable,  more  or  less,  of  aesthetic 
handling.  The  remains  discovered  comprised  numerous  archi- 
tectural fragments  in  plaster  and  brick ;  a  large  number  of  or- 
namental coffins ;  several  statuettes  in  terra-cotta ;  jars,  jugs, 
vases,  and  lamps  in  earthenware;  some  small  glass  bottles; 
and  various  personal  decorations,  such  as  beads,  rings,  and  ear- 
rings. 

The  architectural  fragments  consisted  of  capitals  of  pillars 
[PI.  V.  Fig.  3],  portions  of  cornices,  and  specimens  of  a  sort  of 
diapering  which  seems  to  have  been  applied  to  screens  or  thin 
partitions.  The  capitals  were  somewhat  heavy  in  design,  and 
at  first  sight  struck  the  spectator  as  barbarous ;  but  they  ex- 
hibited a  good  deal  of  ingenious  boldness,  an  absence  of  con- 
ventionality, and  an  occasional  quaintness  of  design  not 
unworthy  of  a  Gothic  decorator.  One  especially,  which  com- 
bines the  upper  portion  of  a  human  figure,  wearing  the  pufted- 
out  hair  or  wig,  which  the  Parthians  affected,  with  an  elegant 
leaf  rising  from  the  neck  of  the  capital,  and  curving  gracefully 
under  the  abacus,  has  decided  merit,  and  is  ' '  suggestive  of  the 
later  Byzantine  style. "  '^  The  cornices  occasionally  reminded 
the  discoverer  of  the  remarkable  frieze  at  El-Hadhr,  ^■'  and  were 
characterized  by  the  same  freedom  and  boldness  of  invention 
as  the  capitals.  But  the  most  curious  remains  were  the  frag- 
ments of  a  sort  of  screen  work,  pieces  of  plaster  covered  with 
geometric  designs  upon  both  sides,  the  patterns  on  the  two 
sides  differing.  [PI.  V.  Fig.  4.]  These  designs,  though  unlike 
in  many  respects  the  arabesques  of  the  Mohammedans,  yet 
seemed  on  the  whole  to  be  their  precursors,  the  "geometric 
curves  and  tracery"  appearing  to  "shadow  forth  the  beauty 
and  richness  of  a  style  which  afterwards  followed  the  tide  of 
Mohammedan  conquest  to  the  remotest  corners  of  the  known 
world."  ^^ 

The  ornamental  coffins  were  of  a  coarse  glazed  earthenware, 
bluish-green  in  hue,  and  belonged  to  the  kind  which  has  been 
called  "sKpper-shaped."'"  [PI.  VI.  Fig.  1.]  They  varied  in 
length  from  three  feet  to  six,  and  had  a  large  aperture  at  their 
upper  end,  by  means  of  which  the  body  was  placed  in  them, 
and  a  flat  lid  to  close  this  aperture,  ornamented  like  the  coffin, 
and  fixed  in  its  place  by  a  fine  lime  cement.  A  second  aperture 
at  the  lower  extremity  of  the  coffin  allowed  for  the  escape  of 


en.  \-xn.]  PAnrnlAy-  VASJ^S  AKD  LAMPS.  glS 

the  gases  disengaged  during  decomposition.  The  ornamenta 
tion  of  the  coiHns  varied,  but  consisted  generally  of  small 
figures  of  men,  about  six  or  seven  inches  in  length,  the  most 
usual  figure  being  a  warrior  with  his  arms  akimbo  and  his  leg 
astride,  wearing  on  his  head  a  coiffure,  like  that  which  is  seen 
on  the  Parthian  coins,  and  having  a  sword  hanging  from  the 
belt.     [PI.  VI.  Fig.  2.] 

Of  the  statuettes  in  terra-cotta,  one  of  the  most  curious  rep- 
resented a  Parthian  warrior,  recumbent,  and  apparently  about 
to  drink  out  of  a  cup  held  in  the  left  hand."  [PI.  VI.  Fig.  3.] 
The  figure  was  clad  in  a  long  coat  of  mail,  with  greaves  on  the 
legs  and  a  helmet  upon  the  head.  Others  represented  females; 
these  had  lofty  head-dresses,  which  sometimes  rose  into  two 
peaks  or  horns,  recalling  the  costume  of  English  ladies  in  the 
time  of  Henry  IV.  These  figures  were  veiled  and  carefully 
draped  about  the  upper  part  of  the  person,  but  showed  the  face, 
and  had  the  legs  bare  from  the  knee  downwards.  ^'^ 

The  jars,  jugs,  vases,  and  lamps  greatly  resembled  those  of 
the  Assyrian  and  Babylonian  periods,  but  were  on  the  whole 
more  elegant  and  artistic.  The  forms  appended  will  give  a 
tolerable  idea  of  the  general  character  of  these  vessels.  [PI.  VI. 
Fig.  4.]  They  were  of  various  sizes,  and  appear  to  have  been 
placed  in  the  tombs,  partly  as  the  offerings  of  friends  and  well- 
wishers,  partly  with  the  more  superstitious  object  of  actually 
supplying  the  deceased  with  the  drink  and  light  needful  for 
him  on  his  passage  from  earth  to  the  realms  of  the  dead. '" 

The  glass  bottles  were,  perhaps,  lachrymatories.""  They  had 
no  peculiar  characteristics,  but  were  almost  exactly  similar  to 
objects  of  the  same  kind  belonging  to  the  times  of  the  Assyrian 
and  Babylonian  Empires."'  They  exhibited  the  same  lovely 
prismatic  colors,  which  have  been  so  admired  in  the  glass  of 
those  kingdoms,  an  effect  of  decomposition,  which,  elsewhere 
generally  disfiguring,  in  the  case  of  this  material  enhances  the 
original  beauty  of  the  object  tenfold  by  clothmg  it  in  hues  of 
the  utmost  brilliance  and  delicacy."- 

The  personal  decorations  consisted  chiefly  of  armlets,  bangles, 
beads,  rings,  and  ear-rings."^  They  were  in  gold,  silver,  copper, 
and  brass.  Some  of  the  smaller  gold  ornanaents,  such  as  ear- 
rings, and  small  plates  or  beads  for  necklaces  and  fillets,  were 
"of  a  tasteful  and  elegant  design."""  The  finger-rings  were 
coarser,  while  the  toe-rings,  armlets,  and  bangles,  were  for  the 
most  part  exceedingly  rude  and  barbarous.  Head-dresses  in 
gold,  tall  and  pointed  are  said  to  liave  been  found  occasionally; 


220  TEE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxil 

but  the  museums  of  Europe  have  not  yet  been  able  to  secure 
any,  as  they  are  usually  melted  dovni  by  the  finders.  Broad 
ribbons  of  gold,  which  may  have  depended  hke  strings  from  a 
cap,  are  commoner,  and  were  seen  by  Mr,  Loftus.  Altogether, 
the  ornaments  indicated  a  strong  love  of  personal  display,  and 
the  possession  of  considerable  wealth,  but  no  general  diffusion 
of  a  correct  taste,  nor  any  very  advanced  skill  in  design  or 
metallurgy. 

Of  purely  aesthetic  art— art,  that  is,  into  which  the  idea  of 
the  useful  does  not  enter  at  all — the  Parthians  appear  scarcely 
to  have  had  an  idea.  During  the  five  centuries  of  their  sway, 
they  seem  to  have  set  up  no  more  than  some  half  dozen  bas-re- 
liefs. There  is,  indeed,  only  one  such  work  which  can  be  posi- 
tively identified  as  belonging  to  the  Parthian  period  by  the  in- 
scription which  accompanies  it.*^  The  other  presumedly  Par- 
thian rehefs  are  adjudged  to  the  people  by  art  critics  merely 
from  tlieir  style  and  their  locality,  occurring  as  they  do  within 
the  hmits  of  the  Parthian  kingdom,  and  lacking  the  character- 
istics which  attach  to  the  art  of  those  who  preceded  and  of 
those  who  followed  the  Parthians  in  these  countries. 

The  one  certainly  Parthian  bas-relief  is  that  which  still 
exists  on  the  great  rock  of  Behistun,  at  the  foot  of  the  moun- 
tain, raised  but  shghtly  above  the  plain. '"'  It  seems  to  have 
contained  a  series  of  tall  figures,  looking  towards  the  right,  and 
apparently  engaged  in  a  march  or  procession,  while  above  and 
between  them  were  smaller  figures  on  horseback,  armed  with 
lances,  and  galloping  in  the  same  direction.  One  of  these  was 
attended  by  a  figure  of  Fame  or  Victory,  flying  in  the  air,  and 
about  to  place  a  diadem  around  his  broAv.  The  present  con- 
dition of  the  sculpture  is  extremely  bad.  Atmospheric  in- 
fluences have  worn  away  the  larger  figures  to  such  an  extent 
that  they  are  discerned  with  difficulty ;  and  a  recent  Governor 
of  Kirmanshah  has  barbarously  inserted  into  the  middle  of  the 
reUef  an  arched  niche,  in  which  he  has  placed  a  worthless 
Ai'abic  inscription.  It  is  with  difficulty  that  we  form  any 
judgment  of  the  original  artistic  merit  of  a  work  which  jsre- 
sents  itself  to  us  in  such  a  worn  and  mutilated  form ;  but,  on 
the  whole,  we  are  perhaps  justified  in  pronouncing  that  it  must 
at  its  best  have  been  one  of  inferior  quality,  even  when  com- 
pared only  with  the  similar  productions  of  Asiatics.  The 
general  character  is  rather  that  of  the  Sassanian  than  of  the 
Assyrian  or  Persian  period.  The  human  figures  have  a  heavy 
clumsiness  about  them  that  is  vmpleasant  to  contemplate ;  the 


CH.  xxn  ]  BAS-BELIEFS.  221 

horses  are  rudely  outlined,  and  are  too  small  for  the  men ;  the 
figure  of  Fame  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  hero  whom  she 
crowns,  and  the  diadem  which  she  places  on  his  head  is  ridicu- 
lous, being  nearly  as  large  as  herself!  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  spirit  in  the  attitudes  of  both  men  and  horses ;  the 
Fame  floats  well  in  air ;  and  the  relief  is  free  from  that  coarse 
grotesqueness  which  offends  us  in  the  productions  of  the  Sas- 
sanian  artists. 

Another  bas-relief,  probably,  b\it  not  quite  certainly  Par- 
thian, exists  in  the  gorge  of  Sir-pul-i-zohab,  and  has  been 
recently  published  in  the  great  work  of  M.  Flandin."'  (PI. 
VIII.)  The  inscription  on  this  monument,  though  it  has  not 
yet  been  deciphered,^*  appears  to  be  written  in  the  alphabet 
found  upon  the  Parthian  coins.  The  monument  seems  to  rep- 
resent a  Parthian  king,  mounted  on  horseback,  and  receiving 
a  chaplet  at  the  hand  of  a  subject.  The  king  wears  a  cap 
bound  round  with  the  diadem,  the  long  ends  of  which  depend 
over  his  shoulder.  He  is  clothed  in  a  close-fitting  tunic  and 
loose  trowsers,  which  hang  down  upon  his  boots,  and  wears 
also  a  short  cloak  fastened  under  the  chin,  and  reaching 
nearly  to  the  knee.  The  horse  which  he  bestrides  is  small,  but 
sti'ongly  made;  the  tail  is  long,  and  the  mane  seems  to  be 
plaited.  Thus  far  the  representation,  though  somewhat  heavy 
and  clumsy,  is  not  ill-drawn;  but  the  remaining  figure— that 
of  the  Parthian  subject— is  wholly  without  merit.  The  back 
of  the  man  is  turned,  but  the  legs  are  in  profile ;  one  arm  is 
ridiculously  short,  and  the  head  is  placed  too  near  the  left 
shoulder.  It  would  seem  that  the  artist,  while  he  took  pains 
with  the  representation  of  the  monarch,  did  not  care  how  ill  he 
rendered  the  subox'dinate  figure,  which  he  left  in  the  unsatis- 
factory condition  that  may  be  seen  in  the  preceding  woodcut. 

A  set  of  reliefs,^"  discovered  by  the  Baron  de  Bode  in  the 
year  1841,  are  also  thought  by  the  best  judges  to  be  Parthian. 
The  most  important  of  them  represents  a  personage  of  conse- 
quence, apparently  a  Magus,  who  seems  to  be  in  the  act  of 
consecrating  a  sacred  cippus,  round  which  have  been  placed 
wreaths  or  chaplets.  (PI.  IX.)  Fifteen  spectators  are  present, 
arranged  in  two  rows,  one  above  the  other,  all  except  the  fii-st 
of  them  standing.  The  first  sits  upon  a  rude  chair  or  stool. 
The  figures  generally  are  in  an  advanced  stage  of  decay ;  but  that 
of  the  Magus  is  tolerably  well  preserved,  and  probably  indi- 
cates with  suflficicnt  accuracy  the  costume  and  appearance  of 
the  great  hierarchs  under  the  Parthians.     The  conical  cap  de- 


§02  flits  SiXTit  MONAncnT.  [CH.  xxrr. 

scribed  by  Strabo""  is  very  conspicuous.  BeloAv  this  the  hair 
is  worn  in  the  puffed-out  fashion  of  the  later  Parthian  period. 
The  upper  hp  is  oi-namented  by  moustaches,  and  the  chin 
covered  by  a  straight  beard.  The  fi^re  is  dressed  in  a  long 
sleeved  tunic,  over  which  is  worn  a  cloak,  fastened  at  the 
neck  by  a  round  brooch,  and  descending  a  Httle  below  the 
knees.  The  legs  are  encased  in  a  longer  and  shorter  pair  of 
trowsers,  the  former  plain,  the  latter  striped  perpendicularly. 
Round  the  neck  is  worn  a  collar  or  necklace ;  and  on  the  right 
arm  are  three  armlets  and  three  bracelets.  The  conical  cap 
appears  to  be  striped  or  fluted. 

On  the  same  rock,  but  in  no  very  evident  connection  with 
the  main  representation,  is  a  second  reMef,  in  which  a  Parthian 
cavalier,  armed  with  a  bow  and  arrows,  and  a  spear,  contends 
with  a  wild  animal,  seemingly  a  bear."  (PI.  X.  Fig.  1.)  A 
long  flowing  robe  here  takes  the  place  of  the  more  ordinary 
tunic  and  trowsers.  On  the  head  is  worn  a  rounded  cap  or 
tiara.  The  hair  has  the  usual  puffed -out  appearance.  The 
bow  is  carried  in  the  left  hand,  and  the  quiver  hangs  from  the 
saddle  behind  the  rider,  "^  while  with  his  right  hand  he  thrusts 
his  spear  into  the  beast's  neck.  The  execution  of  the  whole 
tablet  seems  to  have  been  rude ;  but  it  has  suffered  so  much 
from  time  and  weather,  that  no  very  decided  judgment  can  be 
passed  upon  it. 

Another  still  rvider  representation  occurs  also  on  another  face 
of  the  same  rock.  This  consists  of  a  female  figure  reclining 
upon  a  couch,  and  gviarded  by  three  male  attendants,  one  at 
the  head  of  the  couch  unanned,  and  the  remaining  two  at  its 
foot,  seated,  and  armed  with  spears.  The  female  has  puffed- 
out  hair,  and  carries  in  her  right  hand,  which  is  outstretched,  a 
wreath  or  chaplet.  One  of  the  spearmen  has  a  curious  rayed 
head-dress ;  and  the  other  has  a  short  streamer  attached  to  the 
head  of  his  spear.  Below  the  main  tablet  are  three  rudely 
carved  standing  figures,  representing  probably  other  attend- 
ants. 

This  set  of  reliefs  may  perhaps  be  best  regarded  as  forming  a 
single  series,  the  Parthian  king  being  represented  as  engaged 
in  hunting  the  bear,  while  the  queen  awaits  his  return  upon 
her  couch,  and  the  chief  Magus  attached  to  the  court  makes 
prayer  for  the  monarch's  safety. 

Such  are  the  chief  remains  of  Parthian  aesthetic  art.  They 
convey  an  idea  of  decline  below  the  standard  reached  by  the 
Persians  of  the  Achaemenian  times,  which  was  itself  a  decline 


Vol.   111. 


COINS   OF   SAPOR   II. 


Fig    2. 


Pig.  3. 


COIN    OF    AKTAXERXES    II. 


Fig.    5. 


LATER    SEAL 
OF  VARAUEAN   IV. 


Fig    4. 


COIN    OF   VAUAIIUAN   IV. 


Fig.    6. 


CONIS    OF    SAPOR    III. 


PORTRAIT  or  VARAHRAN  IV.  (from  a  sr;il). 


CH.  xxm.]         RELIGION  OF  THE  PARTUIANS.  223 

from  the  earlier  art  of  the  Assyrians.  Had  they  been  the 
efforts  of  a  race  devoid  of  models,  they  might  fairly  have  been 
regarded  as  not  altogether  without  promise.  But,  considered 
as  the  work  of  a  nation  which  possessed  the  Achsemenian 
sculptures,  and  which  had  moreover,  to  a  certain  extent, 
access  to  Greek  examples, "  they  must  be  pronounced  clumsy, 
coarse,  and  wanting  in  all  the  higher  qualities  of  Fine  Art.  It 
is  no  wonder  that  they  are  scanty  and  exceptional.  The  nation 
which  could  produce  nothing  better  must  have  felt  that  its 
vocation  was  not  towards  the  artistic,  and  that  its  powers  had 
better  be  employed  in  other  directions,  e.g.  in  conquest  and  in 
organization.  It  would  seem  that  the  Parthians  perceived  this, 
and  therefore  devoted  slight  attention  to  the  Fine  Arts,  pre- 
ferring to  occupy  themselves  mainly  with  those  pursuits  in 
which  they  excelled ;  viz.  war,  hunting,  and  government. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


Customs  of  the  Parthians — in  Religion  ;  in  War  ;  in  their  Em- 
bassies and  Dealings  with  Foreign  Nations  ;  at  the  Court ; 
in  Private  Life.  Extent  of  the  Refinement  to  ivhich  they 
reached.     Their  gradual  Decline  in  Taste  and  Knowledge. 

'Efiij  Ix""''''*  foAii  fifv  TO  pdpPapov  /cat  to  ^kvOikov,  nkiov  /oieVToi  to  xprjaifi-ov  Trpbs  rjyi)j.oviar 
KoX  Tiji'  kv  TOis  TToAe'fiot!  KaTopflutnv — Strab.  xi.  9,  §  2. 

Very  little  is  known  as  to  the  religion  of  the  Parthians.  It 
seems  probable  that  during  th»  Persian  period  they  submitted 
to  the  Zoroastrian  system,'  which  was  generally  maintained 
by  the  Achaemenian  kings,  acquiescing,  like  the  great  bulk  of 
the  conquered  nations,  in  the  religious  views  of  their  conquer- 
ors ;  but  as  this  was  not  their  own  religion,  we  may  conclude 
that  they  were  at  no  time  very  zealous  followers  of  the  Bactrian 
prophet,"  and  that  as  age  succeeded  age  they  became  continually 
more  lukewarm  in  their  feelings,  and  more  lax  in  their  reli- 
gious practice.  The  essence  of  Zoroastrian  belief  was  dualism 
— recognition  of  Ormazd  as  the  great  Principle  of  Good,  and  of 
Ahriman  as  the  Principle  of  Evil.  We  need  not  doubt  that,  in 
word,  the  Parthians  from  first  to  last  admitted  this  antagonism, 
and  professed  a  belief  in  Ormazd  as  the'  supi'eme  god,  and  a 


224  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxm. 

dread  of  Ahriman  and  his  ministers.  But  practically,  their 
religious  aspirations  rested,  not  on  these  dim  abstractions,  but 
on  beings  whose  existence  they  could  better  realize,  and  whom 
they  could  feel  to  be  less  remote  from  themselves.  The  actual 
devotion  of  the  Parthians  was  offered  to  the  Sun  and  Moon,  to 
deities  who  were  supposed  to  preside  over  the  royal  house,  and 
to  ancestral  idols  which  each  family  possessed,  and  conveyed 
with  it  from  place  to  place  with  every  change  of  habitation. 
The  Sun  was  saluted  at  his  rising,'  was  worshipped  in  temples, 
under  the  name  of  Mithra,  with  sacrifices  and  offerings  •*  had 
statues  erected  in  his  honor,  and  was  usually  associated  with 
the  lesser  luminary.'  The  deities  of  the  royal  house  were 
probably  either  genii,  ministers  of  Ormazd,  to  whom  was  com- 
mitted the  special  protection  of  the  monarchs  and  their  fami- 
lies, like  the  bagdha  vithiyd  of  the  Persians,'  or  else  the  ances- 
tors of  the  reigning  monarch,  to  whom  a  qualified  divinity 
seems  to  have  been  assigned  in  the  later  times  of  the  empire.' 
The  Parthians  kings  usually  swore  by  these  deities  on  solemn 
occasions  f  and  other  members  of  the  royal  family  made  use  of 
the  same  oath.'  The  main  worship,  however,  of  the  great  mass 
of  the  people,  even  when  they  were  of  the  royal  stock,  was 
concentrated  upon  ancestral  images, '"  which  had  a  place  sacred 
to  them  in  each  house,  and  received  the  constant  adoration  of 
the  household. 

In  the  early  times  of  the  empire  the  Magi  were  held  in  high 
repute,  and  most  of  the  peculiar  tenets  and  rites  of  the  Magian 
religion  were  professed  and  followed  by  the  Parthians.  Ele- 
mental worship  was  practised.  Fire  was,  no  doubt,  held 
sacred,  and  there  was  an  especial  reverence  for  rivers. "  Dead 
bodies  were  not  burned,  but  were  exposed  to  be  devoured  by 
birds  and  beasts  of  prey,  after  which  the  dry  bones  were  col- 
lected and  placed  in  tombs. '"  The  Magi  formed  a  large  portion 
of  the  great  national  council,  which  elected  and,  if  need  were, 
deposed  the  kings. "  But  in  course  of  time  much  laxity  was 
introduced.  The  Arsacid  monarchs  of  Armenia  allowed  the 
Sacred  Fire  of  Ormazd,  which  ought  to  have  been  kept  con- 
tinually burning,  to  go  out;'*  and  we  can  scarcely  suppose  but 
that  the  Parthian  Arsacidse  shared  their  negligence.  Respect 
for  the  element  of  fire  so  entirely  passed  away,  that  we  hear  of 
the  later  Parthians  burning  their  dead.''  The  Magi  fell  into 
disrepute,  and,  if  not  expelled  from  their  place  in  the  council, 
at  any  rate  found  themselves  despised  and  deprived  of  in- 
fluence. "   The  later  Parthian  religion  can  have  been  little  morQ 


CH.  xxiii.]  PARTHIAN  TOLERANCE.  225 

than  a  worship  of  the  Sun  and  Moon,  and  of  the  teraphim,  or 
sacred  images,  which  were  the  most  precious  possession  of  each 
household. 

While  thus  lax  and  changeful  in  their  own  religious  practice, 
the  Parthians  were,  naturally,  tolerant  of  a  variety  of  creeds 
among  their  subjects.  Fire  altars  were  maintained,  and  Zo- 
roastrian  zeal  was  allowed  to  flourish  in  the  dependent  king- 
dom of  Persia.''  In  the  Greek  cities  the  Olympian  gods  were 
permitted  to  receive  the  veneration  of  thousands,'*  while  in 
Babylon,  Nearda,  and  Nisibis  the  Jews  enjoyed  the  free  exer- 
cise of  their  comparatively  pure  and  elevated  religion."  No 
restrictions  seem  to  have  been  placed  on  proselytism,  and 
Judaism  certainly  boasted  many  converts  from  the  heathen  in 
Adiabene,  Charax  Spasini,  and  elsewhere.^"  Christianity  also 
penetrated  the  Parthian  provinces  to  a  considerable  extent, 
and  in  one  Parthian  country,  at  any  rate,  seems  to  have  be- 
come the  state  religion.  The  kings  of  Osrhoene  are  thought  to 
have  been  Christians  from  the  time  of  the  Antonines,^'  if  not 
from  that  of  our  Lord ;"  and  a  flourishing  church  was  certainly 
estabUshed  at  Edessa  befoi'e  the  end  of  the  second  century." 
The  Parthian  Jews  who  were  witnesses  of  the  miraculous 
events  which  signalized  the  day  of  Pentecost"^  may  have,  in 
some  cases,  taken  with  them  the  new  religion  to  the  land  where 
they  had  their  residence ;  or  the  Apostle,  St.  Thomas,  may  (as 
Eusebius  declares"')  have  carried  the  Gospel  into  the  regions 
beyond  the  Euphrates,  and  have  planted  the  Christian  Church 
in  the  countries  out  of  which  the  Jewish  Church  sprang.  Be- 
sides the  flourishing  community  of  Edessa,  which  was  pre- 
dominantly, if  not  wholly,  Chi-istian  from  the  middle  of  the 
second  century,  many  converts  were,  we  ai'e  told,  to  be  found 
among  the  inhabitants  of  Persia,  Media,  Parthia  Proper,  and 
even  Bactria."*  The  infusion,  however,  was  not  sufficient  to 
leaven  to  any  serious  extent  the  corrupt  mass  of  heathenism 
into  A\-hich  it  was  projected ;  and  we  cannot  say  that  the  gene- 
I'al  character  of  the  Parthian  empire,  or  of  the  manners  and 
customs  of  its  subjects,  was  importantly  affected  by  the  new 
religion,  though  it  had  an  extraordinary  influence  over  indi- 
viduals. 

The  Parthians  were  essentially  a  warlike  people;  and  the 
chief  interest  which  attaches  to  them  is  connected  with  their 
military  vigor  and  ability.  It  is  worth  while  to  consider  at 
some  length  the  peculiarities  of  that  military  system  which 
proved  itself  superior  to  the  organization  of  the  Macedonians, 


226  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxni. 

and  able  to  maintain  for  nearly  three  hundred  years  a  doubt- 
ful contest  with  the  otherwise  irresistible  Romans. 

We  are  told  that  the  Parthians  had  no  standing  army.^' 
Wlien  war  was  proclaimed  and  the  monarch  needed  a  force, 
he  made  his  immediate  vassals  acquainted  with  the  fact,  and 
requested  each  of  them  to  marshal  their  troops,  and  bring  them 
to  a  fixed  rendezvous  by  a  certain  day.  "^^  The  troops  thus  sum- 
moned were  of  two  kinds,  Parthian  and  foreign.  The  gover- 
nors of  the  provinces,  whether  tributary  kings  or  satraps,  called 
out  the  military  strength  of  their  respective  districts,  saw  to 
their  arming  and  provisioning,  and,  marching  each  at  the  head 
of  his  contingent,  brought  a  foreign  auxiliary  force  to  the  as- 
sistance of  the  Great  King.-'  But  the  back-bone  of  the  army, 
its  main  strength,  the  portion  on  which  alone  much  reliance 
was  placed,  consisted  of  Parthians.  Each  Parthian  noble  was 
bound  to  call  out  his  slaves  and  his  retainers,  to  arm  and  equip 
them  at  his  own  expense,  and  bring  them  to  the  rendezvous  by 
the  time  named.'"  The  number  of  troops  furnished  by  each 
noble  varied  according  to  his  position  and  his  means ;  we  hear 
in  one  instance  of  their  amounting  to  as  many  as  10,000,"  while 
in  another  recorded  case'-  the  average  number  which  each 
furnished  was  no  more  than  125.  The  various  contingents  had 
their  own  baggage-trains,  consisting  ordinarily  of  camels,  in 
the  proportion  (as  it  would  seem)  of  one  to  every  ten  fighting- 
men.'' 

A  Parthian  army  consisted  usually  of  both  horse  and  foot, 
but  in  proportions  unusual  elsewhere.  The  foot  soldiers  were 
comparatively  few  in  number,  and  were  re^  i,rded  as  of  small 
account.  '^  Every  effort  was  made  to  incref  ,e  the  amount  and 
improve  the  equipment  of  the  horsemen,  wluo  bore  the  brunt  of 
every  fight,  and  from  whose  exertions  alone  victory  was  hoped. 
Sometimes  armies  consisted  of  horsemen  only,  '^  or  rather  of 
horsemen  followed  by  a  baggage  train  composed  of  camels  and 
chariots. 

The  horse  were  of  two  kinds,  heavy  and  light.  The  heavy 
horsemen  {nardq^paHroi)  wore  coats  of  mail,  reaching  to  their 
knees,  composed  of  raw  hide  covered  with  scales  of  iron  or 
steel,"  very  bright,"  and  capable  of  resisting  a  strong  blow." 
They  had  on  their  heads  burnished  helmets  of  Margian  steel, 
whose  glitter  dazzled  the  spectator. '"  Their  legs  seem  not  to 
have  been  greaved,  but  encased  in  a  loose  trouser,  which  hung 
about  the  ankles  and  embarrassed  the  feet,  if  by  any  chance 
the  horseman  was    forced  to  dismount."    They  carried    no 


en.  xxiii.]  CUSTOMS  OF  TUB  PARTHIANS  IN  WAR.  227 

shield/'  being  siifficiently  defended  by  their  coats  of  mail. 
Their  offensive  arms  were  a  long  spear  {xovroi)^  which  was  of 
great  strength  and  thickness,  *°  and  a  bow  and  arrows  of  un- 
usual size."  They  likewise  carried  in  their  girdle  a  short 
sword"  or  knife  (i-idxaipa),  which  might  be  used  in  close  com- 
bat. Their  horses  were,  like  themselves,  protected  by  a  defence 
of  scale  armor, "'^  which  was  either  of  steel  or  bronze." 

The  Hght  horse  was  armed  with  the  same  sort  of  bows  and 
arrows  as  the  heavy,  but  carried  no  spear  and  wore  no  armor. 
It  was  carefully  trained  to  the  management  of  the  horse  and 
the  bow,^'  and  was  unequalled  in  the  rapidity  and  dexterity  of 
its  movements.  The  archer  delivered  his  arrows  with  as  much 
precision  and  force  in  retreat  as  in  advance,  and  was  almost 
more  feared  when  he  retired  than  when  he  charged  his  foe."* 
Besides  his  arrows,  the  light  horseman  seems  to  have  carried  a 
sword,"'  and  he  no  doubt  wore  also  the  customary  knife  in  his 
belt. 

We  are  told  by  one  writer'"  that  it  was  a  practice  of  the  Par- 
thians  to  bring  into  battle  a  number  of  led  horses,  and  that  the 
riders  from  time  to  time  exchanged  their  tired  steeds  for  fresh 
ones,  thus  obtaining  a  great  advantage  over  enemies  who  had 
no  such  practice.  But  the  accounts  which  we  have  of  Parthian 
engagements  make  no  reference  to  this  usage,  which  we  can 
therefore  scarcely  suppose  to  have  been  adopted  to  any  large 
extent.  It  may  be  doubted,  also,  if  the  practice  could  ever  be 
one  of  much  value,  since  the  diflficulty  of  managing  led  horses 
amid  the  tumult  of  a  battle  would  probably  more  than  counter- 
balance the  advantage  derivable  from  relays  of  fresh  steeds. 

During  the  later  period  of  the  monarchy,  the  Parthians,  who 
had  always  employed  camels  largely  in  the  conveyance  of 
stores  and  baggage,"  are  said  to  have  introduced  a  camel  corps 
into  the  army  itself,  and  to  have  derived  considerable  advan- 
tage from  the  new  arm. "  The  camels  could  bear  the  weight  of 
the  mailed  warrior  and  of  their  own  armor  better  than  horses, 
and  their  riders  were  at  once  more  safe  in  their  elevated  posi- 
tion and  more  capable  of  dealing  effective  blows  upon  the 
enemy.  As  a  set-off,  however,  against  these  advantages,  the 
spongy  feet  of  the  camel  were  found  to  be  more  readily  injured 
by  the  fribidus,  or  caltrop,  than  the  harder  feet  of  the  horse, 
and  the  corps  was  thus  more  easily  disabled  than  an  equal  force 
of  cavalry,  if  it  could  be  tempted  to  pass  over  gi-ound  on  which 
caltrops  had  been  previously  scattered.  '^ 

The  Parthian  tactics  were  of  a  simple  kind,  and  differed  little 


228  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xxiit 

from  those  of  other  nations  in  the  same  region,  which  have  de- 
pended mainly  on  their  cavalry.  To  surround  their  foe,  to  in- 
volve him  in  difficulties,  to  cut  off  his  supplies  and  his  strag- 
glers, and  ultimately  to  bring  him  into  a  position  where  he 
might  be  overwhelmed  by  missiles,  was  the  aim  of  all  Parthian 
commanders  of  any  military  capacity.  Their  warfare  was 
suited  for  defence  rather  than  for  attack,  unless  against  con- 
temptible enemies."*  They  were  bad  hands  at  sieges,""  and  sel- 
dom ventured  to  engage  in  them,  though  they  would  do  so  if 
circumstances  required  it.""  They  wearied  of  long  campaigns, 
and  if  they  did  not  find  victory  tolerably  easy,  were  apt  to  retire 
and  allow  their  foe  to  escape, "'  or  baffle  him  by  withdrawing 
their  forces  into  a  distant  and  inaccessible  region.  After  their 
early  victories  over  Crassus  and  Antony,  they  never  succeeded 
in  preventing  the  steady  advance  of  a  Roman  army  into  their 
territory,  or  in  repulsing  a  determined  attack  upon  their  capi- 
tal. Still  they  generally  had  their  revenge  after  a  short  time. 
It  was  easy  for  the  Romans  to  overrun  Mesopotamia,  but  it 
was  not  so  easy  for  them  to  hold  it ;  and  it  was  scarcely  possi- 
ble for  them  to  retire  from  it  after  an  occupation  without  dis- 
aster. The  clouds  of  Parthian  horse  hung  upon  their  retreat- 
ing columns,  straitened  them  for  provisions,  galled  them  with 
missiles,  and  destroyed  those  who  could  not  keep  up  with 
the  main  body.  The  towns  upon  the  line  of  their  retreat  re- 
volted and  shut  their  gates,  defying  even  such  commanders  as 
Severus  and  Trajan.  Of  the  six  great  expeditions  of  Rome 
against  Parthia,  one  only,  that  of  Avidius  Cassius,  was  entirely 
successful.  In  every  other  case  either  the  failure  of  the  ex- 
pedition was  complete,  or  the  glory  of  the  advance  was  tarnished 
by  disaster  and  suffering  during  the  retreat. 

The  results  of  invading  Parthia  would  have  been  even  more 
calamitous  to  an  assailant  but  for  one  weak  point  in  the  mili- 
tary system  of  the  Parthians.  They  were  excessively  unwill- 
ing to  venture  near  an  enemy  at  night,  and  as  a  general  rule 
abstained  from  all  military  movements  during  the  hours  of 
darkness."^  As  evening  approached,  they  drew  off  to  a  con- 
siderable distance  from  their  foe,  and  left  him  unmolested  to 
retreat  in  any  direction  that  he  pleased.  The  reason  of  this 
probably  was,  not  merely  that  they  did  not  fortify  their 
camps;"' but  that,  depending  wholly  on  their  horses,  and  be- 
ing forced  to  hobble  or  tether  them  at  night,  they  could  not 
readily  get  into  fighting  order  on  a  sudden  during  darkness. 
Once  or  twice  in  the  course  of  their  history,  we  find  them  de- 


CH.  xxiii.]         pABfntAK  USE  OF  CffAniOT^.  .  22& 

parting  from  their  policy  of  extreme  precaution,  and  recom- 
mencing the  pursuit  of  a  flying  foe  before  dawn;  but  it  is 
noted  as  an  unusual  occurrence. "" 

It  was  also  a  general  principle  of  Parthian  warfare  to  abstain 
from  campaigning  during  the  winter/'  So  much  depended 
upon  the  tension  of  their  bow-strings,  which  any  dampness  re- 
laxed, that  their  rule  was  to  make  all  their  expeditions  in  the 
dry  time  of  their  year,  which  lasted  from  early  in  the  spring 
until  late  in  the  autumn.  The  rule  was,  however,  transgressed 
upon  occasions.  Phraates  II.  made  his  attack  upon  Antiochus 
Sidetes,  while  the  snow  was  still  upon  the  ground  f'^  and  Vola- 
gases  I.  fell  upon  Psetus  after  the  latter  had  sent  his  troops 
into  winter  quarters. '^  The  Parthians  could  bear  cold  no  less 
than  heat ;  though  it  was  perhaps  rather  in  the  endurance  of 
the  latter  than  of  the  former  that  they  surpassed  the  Romans. 
The  sun's  rays  were  never  too  hot  for  them ;'"'  and  they  did 
not  need  water  frequently  or  in  large  quantities.  The  Romans 
believed  that  they  increased  their  abihty  of  bearing  thirst  by 
means  of  certain  drugs  which  they  consumed ;"  but  it  may  be 
questioned  whether  they  really  employed  any  other  remedies 
than  habit  and  resolution. 

We  find  no  use  of  chariots  among  the  Parthians,  except  for 
the  conveyance  of  the  females,  who  accompanied  the  nobles 
upon  their  expeditions.  The  waves  and  concubines  of  the 
chiefs  followed  the  camp  in  great  numbers  ;**  and  women  of  a 
less  reputable  class,  singers,  dancers,  and  musicians,  swelled 
the  ranks  of  the  supernumeraries."  Many  of  these  were 
Greeks  from  Seleucia  and  other  Macedonian  towns.**  The  com- 
missariat and  transport  departments  are  said  to  have  been 
badly  organized  f  but  some  thousands  of  baggage  camels  al- 
ways accompanied  an  army,"  carrying  stores  and  provisions. 
Of  these  a  considerable  portion  were  laden  with  arrows,"  of 
which  the  supply  was  in  this  way  rendered  inexhaustible. 

The  use  of  the  elephant  in  war  was  still  more  rare  in  Parthia 
than  that  of  the  chariot.  While  the  Seleucid  kings  employed 
the  animal  to  a  large  extent,'"  and  its  use  was  also  probably 
known  to  the  Greek  princes  of  Bactria,"  the  Arsacidse  appear 
to  have  almost  entirely  neglected  it.  On  one  occasion  alone 
do  we  find  their  employment  of  it  mentioned,'^  and  then  we 
hear  of  only  a  single  animal,  which  is  ridden  by  the  monarch. 
Probably  the  unwieldy  creature  was  regarded  by  the  Parthians 
as  too  heavy  and  clumsy  for  the  light  and  rapid  movements  of 
their  armies,   and  was  thus  disused  during  the  period  of  their 


■* 


230  '^SE  SIXTH  MONARCHT.  [ch.  xxni. 

supremacy,  though  again  employed,  after  Parthia  had  fallen, 
by  the  Sassanidae.'^ 

The  Partliians  entered  into  battle  with  much  noise  and  shout- 
mg.'"  They  made  no  use  of  trumpets  or  horns,  but  employed 
instead  the  kettledrum,  which  resounded  from  all  parts  of  the 
field  when  they  made  their  onset."  Their  attack  was  furious. 
The  mailed  horsemen  charged  at  speed,  and  often  drove  their 
spears  through  the  bodies  of  two  enemies  at  a  blow.'^  The 
light  horse  and  the  foot,  when  any  was  present,  delivered  their 
arrows  with  precision  and  with  extraordinary  force.  But 
if  the  assailants  were  met  with  a  stout  resistance,  the  first 
vigor  of  the  attack  was  rarely  long  maintained.  The  Parthian 
warriors  grew  quickly  weary  of  an  equal  contest,  and,  if  they 
coiild  not  force  their  enemy  to  give  way,  soon  changed  their 
tactics.  Pretending  panic,  dispersing,  and  beating  a  hasty  re- 
treat, they  endeavored  to  induce  their  foe  to  pursue  hurriedly 
and  in  disorder,  being  ready  at  any  moment  to  turn  and  take 
advantage  of  the  least  appearance  of  confusion.  If  these  tac- 
tics failed,  as  they  commonly  did  after  they  came  to  be  known, 
the  simulated  flight  was  generally  converted  into  a  real  one ; 
further  conflict  was  avoided,  or  at  any  rate  deferred  to  another 
occasion." 

When  the  Parthians  wished  to  parley  with  an  enemy,  they 
unstrung  their  bows,  ^°  and  advancing  with  the  right  hand  out- 
stretched,^'asked  for  a  conference.  They  are  accused  by  the 
Romans  of  sometimes  using  treachery  on  such  occasions,  but, 
except  in  the  single  case  of  Crassus,  the  charge  of  bad  faith 
cannot  be  sustained  against  them.  On  solemn  occasions,  when 
the  intention  was  to  discuss  grounds  of  complaint  or  to  bring  a 
war  to  an  end  by  the  arrangement  of  terms  of  peace,  a  formal 
meeting  was  arranged  between  their  representatives  and  those 
of  their  enemy,  generally  on  neutral  ground,  as  on  an  island 
in  the  Euphrates,  or  on  a  bridge  constructed  across  it.  *^  Here 
the  chiefs  of  the  respective  nations  met,  accompanied  by  an 
equal  number  of  guards,  while  the  remainder  of  their  forces 
occupied  the  opposite  banks  of  the  river.  Matters  were  dis- 
cussed in  friendly  fashion,  the  Greek  language  being  commonly 
employed  as  the  vehicle  of  communication  f^  after  which  fes- 
tivities usually  took  place,  the  two  chiefs  mutually  entertain- 
ing each  other,  or  accepting  in  common  the  hospitalities  of  a 
third  party."  The  terms  of  peace  agreed  upon  were  reduced 
to  writing;''  hands  were  grasped  as  a  sign  that  faith  was 
pledged;"  and  oaths  having  beeu  interchanged,"  the  confer- 


CH.  xxiii.]  EMBASSIES  ANi)  HOSTAGES  §31 

ence  broke  up,  and  the  chiefs  returned  to  their  respective  resi- 
dences. 

Besides  negotiating  by  means  of  conferences,  the  Parthian 
monarchs  often  sent  out  to  neighboring  states,  and  in  return 
received  from  them  formal  embassies.  The  ambassadors  in 
every  case  conveyed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  gifts  to  the  prince 
to  whom  they  were  accredited,  *"*  which  might  consist  of  articles 
of  value,  or  of  persons.  Augustus  included  an  Italian  slave- 
girl  ^^  among  the  presents  which  he  ti"ansmitted  to  Phraates 
IV. :  and  Ai'tabanus  III.  sent  a  Jewish  giant  to  Tiberius.'"  The 
object  of  an  embassy  was  sometimes  simply  to  congi-atulate; 
but  more  often  the  ambassadors  were  instructed  to  convey 
certain  demands,  or  proposals,  from  their  own  piince  to  the 
head  of  the  other  nation,  whereto  his  assent  was  required,  or 
requested.  These  proposals  were  commonly  formulated  in  a 
letter  from  the  one  prince  to  the  other,"  which  it  was  the  chief 
duty  of  the  ambassadors  to  convey  safely.  Free  powers  to 
conclude  a  treaty  at  their  discretion  were  rarely,  or  never,  en- 
trusted to  them.  Their  task  was  merely  to  deliver  the  royal 
letter,  to  explain  its  terms,  if  they  were  ambiguous,  and  to  carry 
back  to  their  own  monarch  the  reply  of  the  foreign  sovereign. 
The  sanctity  of  the  ambassadorial  character  was  invariably  re- 
spected by  the  Parthians,  who  are  never  even  taxed  with  a 
violation  of  it. 

As  a  security  for  the  performance  of  engagements,  or  for  the 
permanent  maintenance  of  a  friendly  attitude,  it  was  usual  in 
the  East  during  the  Parthian  period  to  require,  and  give,  hos- 
tages. The  princes  who  occupied  the  position  of  Parthian  feu- 
datories gave  hostages  to  their  suzerain,  who  were  frequently 
their  near  relations,  as  sons  or  brothers.  "'^  And  a  practice  grew 
up  of  the  Parthian  monarchs  themselves  depositing  their  own 
sons  or  brothers  with  the  Roman  Emperor,  at  first  perhaps 
merely  for  their  own  security,"'  but  afterwards  as  pledges  for 
their  good  behavior."  Such  hostages  lived  at  the  expense  of 
the  Roman  court,  and  were  usually  treated  with  distinction. 
In  the  event  of  a  rupture  between  their  country  and  Rome, 
they  had  little  to  fear.  Rome  found  her  advantage  in  employ- 
ing them  as  rivals  to  a  monarch  with  whom  she  had  quarrelled, 
and  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  punish  them  for  his  treachery 
or  inconstancy. 

The  magnificence  of  the  Parthian  court  is  celebrated  in  gen- 
eral terms  by  various  writers,  but  not  very  many  particulars 
have  come  down  to  us  respecting  it.    We  know  that  it  was 


g32  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  fcH.  xxiH. 

migratory,  moving  from  one  of  the  chief  cities  of  the  empire  to 
another  at  different  seasons  of  the  year,"^  and  that  owing  to 
the  vast  number  of  the  persons  composing  it,  there  was  a  diflB- 
culty  sometimes  in  pi-oviding  for  their  subsistence  upon  the 
road/"  The  court  comprised  the  usual  extensive  harem  of  an 
Oriental  prince,  consisting  of  a  single  recognized  queen,  and  a 
multitude  of  secondary  wives  or  concubines.  The  legitimate 
wife  of  the  prince  was  commonly  a  native,  and  in  most  cases 
was  selected  from  the  royal  race  of  the  Arsacidae;"  but  some- 
times she  was  the  daughter  of  a  dependent  monarch,""  and  she 
might  even  be  a  slave  raised  by  royal  favor  from  that  humble 
position."'-'  The  concubines  were  frequently  Greeks.'""  Both 
wives  and  concubines  remained  ordinarily  in  close  -seclusion, 
and  we  have  little  mention  of  them  in  the  Parthian  annals. 
But  in  one  instance,  at  any  rate,  a  queen,  brought  up  in  the 
notions  of  the  West,  succeeded  in  setting  Oriental  etiquette  at 
defiance,  took  the  direction  of  affairs  out  of  the  hands  of  her 
husband,  and  subsequently  ruled  the  empire  in  conjunction 
with  her  son. '"  Generally,  however,  the  Parthian  kings  were 
remarkably  free  from  the  weakness  of  subservience  to  women, 
and  managed  their  kingdom  with  a  firm  hand,  without  allow- 
ing either  wives  or  ministers  to  obtain  any  undue  ascendency 
over  them.  In  particular,  we  may  note  that  they  never,  so  far 
as  appears,  fell  under  the  baleful  influence  of  eunuchs,  who, 
from  first  to  last,  play  a  very  subordinate  part  in  the  Parthian 
history.'"'^ 

The  dress  of  the  monarch  was  commonly  the  loose  Median 
robe,  which  had  been  adopted  from  the  Medes  by  the  Persians. 
This  flowed  down  to  the  feet  in  numerous  folds,  enveloping  and 
concealing  the  entire  figure.'"^  Trousers  and  a.  tunic  were 
probably  worn  beneath  it,  the  latter  of  linen,  the  former  of 
silk  or  wool.  As  head-dress,  the  king  wore  either  the  mere 
diadem,  wliich  was  a  band  or  ribbon,  passed  once  or  oftener 
round  the  head,  and  terminating  in  two  long  ends  which  fell 
down  behind,  "^  or  else  a  more  pretentious  cap,  which  in  the 
earlier  times  was  a  sort  of  Scythian  pointed  helmet,'"'  and  in 
the  later  a  rounded  tiara,  sometimes  adorned  with  pearls  or 
gems. ""  His  neck  appears  to  have  been  generally  encircled 
with  two  or  three  collars  or  necklaces,  and  he  frequently  wore 
ear-rings  in  his  ears.  The  beard  was  almost  alway  s  cultivated, 
and,  with  the  hair,  was  worn  variously.  Generally  both  hair 
and  beard  were  carefully  curled ;  but  sometimes  they  depended 
in  long  straight  locks.     Mostly  the  beard  was  pointed,  but  oc« 


m.  xxm.]  PEESS  of  the  MONARCH.  233 

casionally  it  was  worn  square.  In  later  times  a  fashion  arose 
of  puffing  out  the  hair  at  either  side  extravagantly,  so  as  to 
give  it  the  appearance  of  a  large  bushy  wig.  *" 

In  war  the  monarch  seems  to  have  exchanged  his  Median 
robe  for  a  short  cloak,  reaching  half  way  down  the  thigh.  '°* 
His  head  was  protected  by  a  helmet,  and  he  carried  the 
national  arm  of  offence,  the  bow.  He  usually  took  the  field 
on  horseback,  but  was  sometimes  mounted  on  an  elephant,  '°^ 
trained  to  encounter  the  shock  of  battle.  Gold  and  silver 
were  abundantly  used  in  the  trappings  of  his  steed  and  in  his 
arms.  He  generally  took  the  command,  and  mingled  freely  in 
the  fight,  though  he  might  sometimes  shrink  without  re- 
proach from  adventuring  his  own  person.""  His  guards 
fought  about  him;  and  he  was  accompanied  by  attendants, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  assist  him  in  mounting  on  horseback 
and  dismounting.'" 

The  status  of  the  queen  was  not  much  below  that  of  her 
royal  consort.  She  wore  a  tiara  far  more  elaborate  than  his, 
and,  like  him,  exhibited  the  diadem.  Her  neck  was  encircled 
with  several  necklaces.""  As  the  title  of  Theos,  "God,"  was 
often  assumed  by  her  husband,  so  she  was  allowed  the  title  of 
"Goddess"  (©£«'),  or  "Heavenly  Goddess"  {Osd  ovpavia). 

Separate  apartments  were  of  course  assigned  to  the  queen, 
and  to  the  royal  concubines  in  the  various  palaces.  These 
were  buildings  on  a  magnificent  scale,  and  adorned  with  the 
utmost  richness.  Philostratus,  who  wrote  in  Parthian  times, "' 
thus  describes  the  royal  palace  at  Babylon.  "The  palace  is 
roofed  with  brass,  and  a  bright  light  flashes  from  it.  It  has 
chambers  for  the  women,  and  chambers  for  the  men,  and 
porticos,  partly  glittering  with  silver,  partly  with  cloth-of- 
gold  embroideries,  partly  with  solid  slabs  of  gold,  let  into  the 
walls,  like  pictures.  The  subjects  of  the  embroideries  are 
taken  from  the  Greek  mythology,  and  include  representations 
of  Andromeda,  of  Amymone,  and  of  Orpheus,  who  is  frequently 
repeated  ....  Datis  is  moreover  represented,  destroying 
Naxos  with  his  fleet,  and  Artaphernes  besieging  Eretria,  and 
Xerxes  gaining  his  famous  victories.  You  behold  the  occu- 
pation of  Athens,  and  the  battle  of  Thermopylae,  and  other 
points  still  more  characteristic  of  the  gi^eat  Persian  war, 
rivers  drunk  up  and  disappearing  from  the  face  of  the  earth, 
and  a  bridge  stretched  across  the  sea,  and  a  canal  cut  through 
Athos  .  .  .  One  chamber  for  the  men  has  a  roof  fashioned  into 
a  vavilt  Mke  the  heaven,  composed  entirely  of  sapphires,  which 


g34  'i'SE  SIXTH  MONAnCBY.  [cis..  xxiiL 

are  the  bluest  of  stones,  and  resemble  the  sky  in  color.  Gold- 
en images  of  the  gods  whom  they  worship,  are  set  up  about 
the  vault,  and  show  like  stars  in  the  firmament.  This  is  the 
chamber  in  which  the  king  delivers  his  judgments.  Four 
golden  magic-wheels  hang  from  its  roof,  and  threaten  the 
monarch  with  the  Divine  Nemesis,  if  he  exalts  himself  above 
the  condition  of  man.  These  wheels  are  called  '  the  tongues 
of  the  gods,'  and  are  set  in  their  places  by  the  Magi  who 
frequent  the  palace."  "* 

The  state  and  pomp  which  sm^rounded  the  monarch  seem 
scarcely  to  have  fallen  short  of  the  Achaemenian  standard. 
Regarded  as  in  some  sort  divine  during  his  Hfe,  and  always  an 
object  of  national  worship  after  his  death,  the  "Brother  of 
the  Sun  and  Moon"  "'  occupied  a  position  far  above  that  of  the 
most  exalted  of  his  subjects.  Tributary  monarchs  were 
shocked,  when,  in  times  of  misfortune,  the  "Great  King" 
stooped  to  solicit  their  aid,  and  appeared  before  them  in  the 
character  of  a  suppliant,  shorn  of  his  customary  splendor.'" 
Nobles  coveted  the  dignity  of  "  King's  Friend,"  and  were  con- 
tent to  submit  to  blows  and  buffets  at  the  caprice  of  their 
royal  master,  before  whom  they  prostrated  themselves  in  ado- 
ration after  each  castigation.'"  The  Parthian  monarch  dined 
in  solitary  grandeur,  extended  on  his  own  special  couch,  and 
eating  from  his  own  special  table,  which  was  placed  at  a 
greater  elevation  than  those  of  his  guests."'  His  "friend" 
sat  on  the  ground  at  his  feet,  and  was  fed  like  a  dog  by  scraps 
from  his  master's  board.  Guards,  ministers,  and  attendants 
of  various  kinds  surrounded  liim,  and  were  ready  at  the 
slightest  sign  to  do  his  bidding.  Throughout  the  country  he 
had  numerous  "Eyes"  and  "Ears""" — officers  who  watched 
his  interests  and  sent  him  word  of  whatever  touched  liis 
safety.  The  bed  on  which  the  monarch  slept  was  of  gold,  and 
subjects  were  forbidden  to  take  their  repose  on  couches  of  this 
rich  material.'^"  No  stranger  could  obtain  access  to  him 
unless  introduced  by  the  proper  officer ;  and  it  was  expected 
that  all  who  asked  an  audience  would  be  prepared  with  some 
present  of  high  value.'"  For  the  gifts  received  the  monarch 
made  a  suitable  return,  allowing  those  whom  he  especially 
favored  to  choose  the  presents  that  they  preferred.'" 

The  power  and  dignity  of  the  Parthian  nobles  was  greater 
than  that  usually  enjoyed  by  any  subjects  of  an  Oriental  king. 
Rank  in  Parthia  being  hereditary  and  not  simply  official,  the 
"naegistanes"  were  no  mere  creatures  of  the  monarch,  but  a 


ca.  xxni.]         POWSJR  OP  THE  MEQISTANES.  235 

class  which  stood  upon  its  own  indefeasible  rights.  As  they 
had  the  privilege  of  electing  to  the  throne  upon  a  vacancy,  and 
even  that  of  deposing  a  duly  elected  monarch,'-^  the  king  could 
not  but  stand  in  wholesome  awe  of  them,  and  feel  compelled  to 
treat  them  with  considerable  respect  and  deference.  Moreover , 
they  were  not  without  a  material  force  calculated  to  give  pow- 
erful support  to  their  constitutional  privileges.  Each  stood  at 
the  head  of  a  body  of  retainers  accustomed  to  bear  arms  and  to 
serve  in  the  wars  of  the  Empire.  Together  these  bodies  consti- 
tuted the  strength  of  the  army;  and  though  the  royal  body- 
guard might  perhaps  have  been  capable  of  dealing  successfully 
with  each  group  of  retainers  separately,  yet  such  an  esprit  de 
corps  was  sure  to  animate  the  nobles  generally,  that  they  would 
make  common  cause  in  case  one  of  their  number  were  attacked, 
and  would  support  him  against  the  crown  with  the  zeal  in- 
spired by  self-interest.  Thus  the  Parthian  nobility  were  far 
more  powerful  and  independent  than  any  similar  class  under 
the  Achaemenian,  Sassanian,  Modern  Persian,  or  Turkish  sov- 
ereigns. They  exercised  a  real  control  over  the  monarch,  and 
had  a  voice  in  the  direction  of  the  Empire.  Like  the  great 
feudal  vassals  of  the  Middle  Ages,  they  from  time  to  time  quar- 
relled with  their  liege  lord,  and  disturbed  the  tranquillity  of  the 
kingdom  by  prolonged  and  dangerous  civil  wars;  but  these 
contentions  served  to  keep  alive  a  vigor,  a  life,  and  a  spirit  of 
sturdy  independence  very  unusual  in  the  East,  and  gave  a 
stubborn  strength  to  the  Parthian  monarchy,  in  which  Oriental 
governments  have  for  the  most  part  been  wanting. 

There  were  probably  several  grades  of  rank  among  the  nobles. 
The  highest  dignity  in  the  kingdom,  next  to  the  Crown,  was 
that  of  Surena,  or  ' '  Field-Marshal ;"  and  this  position  was  heredi- 
tary in  a  particular  family,  '-*  which  can  have  stood  but  a  little 
below  the  royal  house  in  wealth  and  consequence.  The  head 
of  this  noble  house  is  stated  to  have  at  one  time  brought  into 
the  field  as  many  as  10,000  retainers  and  slaves,  of  whom  a 
thousand  were  heavy-armed. '"  It  was  his  right  to  place  the 
diadem  on  the  king's  brovv  at  his  coronation.  The  other  nobles 
lived  for  the  most  part  on  their  domains,  but  took  the  field  at 
the  head  of  their  retainers  in  case  of  war,  and  in  peace  some- 
times served  the  offices  of  satrap,  vizier,  or  royal  councillor. 
The  wealth  of  the  class  was  great  ;'■"  its  members  were  inclined 
to  be  turbulent,  and,  like  the  barons  of  the  European  kingdoms, 
acted  as  a  constant  check  and  counterpoise  to  the  royal  dignity. 

Next  to  war,  the  favorite  employment  of  the  king  and  of  thg 


236 


Tim  SIXTli  MONAncBY. 


[CH.  XXIII. 


^Vl 


nobles  was  hunting.'-'  The  lion  continued  in  the  wild  state  an 
occupant  of  the  Mesopotamian  river-banks  and  marshes ;'-«  and 
in  other  parts  of  the  empire  bears,  leopards,  and  even  tigers 
abounded.'-'  Thus  the  higher  kinds  of  sport  were  readily  ob- 
tainable. The  ordinary  practice,  however,  of  the  monarch  and 
his  courtiers  seems  to  have  fallen  short  of  the  true  sportsman's 
ideal.  Instead  of  seeking  the  more  dangerous  kinds  of  wild 
beasts  in  their  native  haunts,  and  engaging  with  them  under 
the  conditions  designed  by  nature,  the  Parthians  were  generally 
content  with  a  poorer  and  tamer  method.  They  kept  lions, 
leopards,  and  bears  in  enclosed  parks,  or  "paradises,"  and 
found  pleasure  in  the  pursuit  and  slaughter  of  these  denatural- 
ized and  half -domesticated  animals.""  The  employment  may 
still,  even  under  these  circumstances,  have  contained  an  ele- 
ment of  danger  which  rendered  it  exciting ;  but  it  was  a  poor 
substitute  for  the  true  sport  which  the  "mighty  Hunter  before 
the  Lord  "  '"  had  first  practised  in  these  regions. 

The  ordinary  dress  of  the  Parthian  noble  was  a  long  loose 
robe  reaching  to  the  feet,'"'  under  which  he  wore  a  vest  and 
trousers."'  Bright  and  varied  colors  were  affected,  and  some- 
times dresses  were  interwoven  or  embroidered  with  gold. "'  In 
seasons  of  festivity  garlands  of  fresh  flowers  were  worn  upon 
the  head."'  A  long  knife  or  dagger  was  carried  at  all  times,"" 
which  might  be  used  either  as  an  implement  or  as  a  weapon. 

In  the  earlier  period  of  the  empire  the  Parthian  was  noted  as 
a  spare  liver;"'  but,  as  time  went  on,  he  aped  the  vices  of  more 
civihzed  peoples,  and  became  an  indiscriminate  eater"'  and  a 
hard  drinker."'  Game  formed  a  main  portion  of  his  diet;'*" 
but  he  occasionally  indulged  in  pork,"'  and  probably  in  other 
sorts  of  butcher's  meat.  He  ate  leavened  bread  with  his  meat, 
and  various  kinds  of  vegetables. '''  The  bread,  which  was  par- 
ticularly light  and  porous,  seems  to  have  been  imported  some- 
times by  the  Eomans,  who  knew  it  as  panis  aquaticus  or  pams 
PartJiicus.  '*■'  Dates  were  also  consumed  largely  by  the  Par- 
thians, '"  and  in  some  parts  of  the  country  grew  to  an  extraor- 
dinary size.  A  kind  of  wine  was  made  from  them ;  and  this 
seems  to  have  been  the  intoxicating  drink  in  which  the  nation 
generally  indulged  too  freely. "'  That  made  from  the  dates  of 
Babylon  was  the  most  highly  esteemed,  and  was  reserved  for 
the  use  of  the  king  and  the  higher  order  of  satraps.'" 

Of  the  Parthian  feasts,  music  was  commonly  an  accompani- 
ment. The  flute,  the  pipe,  the  drum,  and  the  instrument  called 
sambuca,  appear  to  have  been  known  to  them;  '*'  and  they  un- 


CB.  XXIII.]  DEGREE  OF  PARTHIAN  REFINEMENT.  237 

derstood  how  to  combine  these  instruments  in  concerted  har- 
mony. They  are  said  to  have  closed  their  feasts  with  dancing 
— an  amusement  of  which  they  were  inordinately  fond  '" — but 
this  was  probably  the  case  only  wdth  the  lower  class  of  people. 
Dancing  in  the  East,  if  not  associated  with  religion,  is  viewed 
as  degrading,  and,  except  as  a  religious  exercise,  is  not  indulged 
in  by  respectable  persons. 

The  separation  of  the  sexes  was  very  decided  in  Parthia. 
The  women  took  their  meals,  and  passed  the  greater  portion  of 
theii-  life,  apart  from  the  men.  '^^  Veils  were  commonly  worn, 
as  in  modern  Mohammedan  countries ;  and  it  was  regarded  as 
essential  to  female  delicacy  that  women,  whether  married  or 
single,  should  converse  freely  with  no  males  but  either  their 
near  relations  or  eunuchs.  Adultery  was  punished  with  gi-eat 
severity;""  but  divorce  was  not  difficult,  and  women  of  rank 
released  themselves  from  the  nuptial  bond  on  light  grounds  of 
complaint,  without  much  trouble.'"  Polygamy  was  the  estab- 
lished law ;  and  every  Parthian  was  entitled,  besides  his  chief 
wife,  to  maintain  as  many  concubines  as  he  thought  desirable.  '^' 
Some  of  the  nobles  supported  an  excessive  number  :'"■'  but  the 
exi)enses  of  the  seraglio  prevented  the  generality  from  taking 
much  advantage  of  the  indulgence  which  the  law  permitted. 

The  degree  of  refinement  and  civilization  which  the  Parthians 
reached  is  difficult  to  determine  with  accuracy.  In  mimetic 
art  their  remains  certainly  do  not  show  much  taste  or  sense  of 
beauty.  '''^  There  is  some  ground  to  believe  that  their  architec- 
ture had  merit ;  but  the  existing  monuments  can  scarcely  be 
taken  as  representations  of  pure  Parthian  work,  and  may  have 
owed  their  excellence  (in  some  measure,  at  any  rate)  to  foreign 
influence.  Still,  the  following  particulars,  for  which  there  is 
good  evidence,  seem  to  imply  that  the  nation  had  risen  in  re- 
ality far  above  that  "barbarism"  which  it  was  the  fashion  of 
the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  to  ascribe  to  it.  In  the  first 
place,  the  Parthians  had  a  considerable  knowledge  of  foreign 
languages.  Plutarch  tells  us  that  Orodes,  the  opponent  of 
Crassus,  was  acquainted  with  the  Greek  language  and  litera- 
ture, and  could  enjoy  the  representation  of  a  play  of  Euri- 
pides.'" The  general  possession  of  such  knowledge,  at  any 
rate  by  the  kings  and  the  upper  classes,  seems  to  be  implied  by 
the  use  of  the  Greek  letters  and  language  in  the  legends  upon 
coins  and  in  inscriptions.  Other  languages  were  also  to  some 
extent  cultivated.  The  later  kings  almost  invai'iably  placed  a 
Semitic  legend  upon  their  coins ;  and  there  is  one  instance  of  ek 


238  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxih 

Parthian  prince  adopting  an  Aryan  legend  of  the  type  known  as 
Bactrian.'"  Josephus,  moreover,  regarded  the  Parthians  as 
familiar  with  Hebrew,  or  Syro-Chaldaic,  and  wrote  his  history 
of  the  Jewish  War  in  his  own  native  tongue,  before  he  put  out 
his  Greek  version,  for  the  benefit  especially  of  the  Parthians, 
among  whom  he  declares  that  he  had  many  readers.'" 

Though  the  Parthians  had,  so  far  as  we  can  tell,  no  native 
literature,  yet  writing  was  familiar  to  them,  and  v/as  widely 
used  in  matters  of  business.  Not  only  were  negotiations  car- 
ried on  with  foreign  powers  by  means  of  despatches,"^*  but  the 
affairs  of  the  empire  generally  were  conducted  by  writing.  A 
custom-house  system  was  established  along  the  frontier,  and 
all  commodities  liable  to  duty  that  entered  the  country  were 
registered  in  a  book'^"  at  the  time  of  entry  by  the  custom-house 
officer.  In  the  great  cities  where  the  Court  passed  a  portion  of 
the  year,  account  was  kept  of  the  arrival  of  strangers,  whose 
names  and  descriptions  were  placed  upon  record  by  the  keep- 
ers of  the  gates.  "^^''  The  orders  of  the  Crown  were  signified  in 
writing  to  the  satraps;'"  and  they  doubtless  corresponded  with 
the  Court  in  the  same  way.  In  the  earlier  times  the  writing 
material  commonly  used  was  linen;  but  shortly  before  the  time 
of  Pliny,  the  Parthians  began  to  make  paper  from  the  papyrus, 
which  grew  in  the  neighborhood  of  Babylon,  though  they  still 
employed  in  preference  the  old  material.  "'^ 

There  was  a  considerable  trade  between  Parthia  and  Rome, 
carried  on  by  means  of  a  class  of  merchants. '"  Parthia  im- 
ported from  Rome  various  metals,  and  numerous  manufactured 
articles  of  a  high  class.  Her  principal  exports  were  textile 
fabrics  and  spices.'"^  The  textOe  fabrics  seem  to  have  been 
produced  chiefly  in  Babylonia,  and  to  have  consisted  of  silks, 
carpets,  and  coverlets.'"  The  silks  were  largely  used  by  the 
Roman  ladies."""  The  coverlets,  which  were  patterned  with 
various  colors,  fetched  enormous  prices,  and  were  regarded  as 
fit  adornments  of  the  Imperial  palace.'"  Among  the  spices 
exported,  the  most  celebrated  were  bdellium,  and  ihejtmcus 
odoratus  or  odoriferous  bulrush.'^* 

The  Partliians  had  many  liberal  usages  which  imply  a  fairly 
advanced  civilization.  Their  tolerance  of  varieties  in  religion 
has  been  already  mentioned.'""  Even  in  political  matters  they 
seem  to  have  been  free  from  the  narrowness  which  generally 
characterizes  barbarous  nations.  They  behaved  well  to  pris- 
oners,"°  admitted  foreigners  freely  to  offices  of  high  trust,'" 
gave  an  asylum  to  refugees,  and  treated  them  with  respect  and 


CH.  xxiii.]     THE  PARTHIANS  LIKE  TEE  TURKS.  239 

kindness, '"  were  scrupulous  observers  of  their  pledged  word,'"' 
and  eminently  faithful  to  their  treaty  obligations."*  On  the 
other  hand,  it  must  be  admitted  that  they  had  some  customs 
which  indicate  a  tinge  of  barbarism.  They  used  torture  for 
the  extraction  of  answers  from  reluctant  persons,'"  employed 
the  scourge  to  punish  trifling  offences,'""  and,  in  certain  cases, 
condescended  to  mutilate  the  bodies  of  their  dead  enemies.'" 
Their  addiction  to  intemperance  is  also  a  barbaric  trait.  They 
were,  no  doubt,  on  the  whole,  less  civilized  than  either  the 
Greeks  or  Romans ;  but  the  difference  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  so  great  as  represented  by  the  classical  writers. 

Speaking  broadly,  the  position  that  they  occupied  was  some- 
what similar  to  that  which  the  Turks  hold  in  the  system  of 
modern  Europe.  They  had  a  military  strength  which  caused 
them  to  be  feared  and  respected,  a  vigor  of  administration"" 
which  was  felt  to  imply  many  sterling  qualities.  A  certain 
coarseness  and  rudeness  attached  to  them  which  they  found  it 
impossible  to  shake  off ;  and  this  drawback  was  exaggerated 
by  their  rivals  into  an  indication  of  irreclaimable  barbarity. 
Except  in  respect  of  their  military  prowess,  it  may  be  doubtful 
if  justice  is  done  them  by  any  classical  writer.  They  were  not 
merely  the  sole  rival  which  dared  to  stand  up  against  Rome  in 
the  interval  between  B.C.  65  and  a.d.  22<o,  but  they  were  a  rival 
falling  in  many  respects  very  little  below  the  great  power 
whose  glories  have  thrown  them  so  much  into  the  shade.  They 
maintained  from  first  to  last  a  freedom  unknown  to  later 
Rome ;  they  excelled  the  Romans  in  toleration  and  in  liberal 
treatment  of  foreigners,  they  equalled  them  in  manufactures 
and  in  material  prosperity,  and  they  fell  but  little  short  of  them 
in  the  extent  and  productiveness  of  their  dominions.  They 
were  the  second  power  in  the  world  for  nearly  three  centuries, 
and  formed  a  counterpoise  to  Rome  which  gi^eatly  checked 
Roman  decline,  and,  by  forcing  the  Empire  to  exert  itself,  pre- 
vented stagnation  and  corruption. 

It  must,  however,  be  confessed,  that  the  tendency  of  the 
Parthians  was  to  degenei'ate.  Although  the  final  blow  was 
struck  in  an  unexpected  quarter,  and  perhaps  surprised  the 
victors  as  much  as  the  vanquished,  still  it  is  apparent  that 
for  a  considerable  space  before  the  revolt  of  Artaxerxes  the 
Partliian  Empire  had  shown  signs  of  failing  strength,  and  had 
tended  I'apidly  towards  decay  and  ruin.  Tlie  constant  quarrels 
among  the  Arsacidse  and  the  incipient  disintegration  of  the 
Empire  have  been  noticed."'    It  may  be  added  here  that  a 


240  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxin. 

growing  barbarism,  a  decline  in  art  and  letters,  is  observable  in 
the  Parthian  remains,  such  as  have  usually  been  found  to 
accompany  the  decrepitude  of  a  nation.  The  coinage  has  from 
first  to  last  a  somewhat  rude  character,  which  indicates  that 
it  is  native,  and  not  the  production  of  Greek  artists.'*"  But 
on  the  earlier  coins  the  type,  though  not  indicative  of  high  art, 
is  respectable,  and  the  legends  are,  with  few  exceptions,"*' 
perfectly  correct  and  classical.  Barbarism  first  creeps  in 
about  the  reign  of  Gotarzes, '^'^  a.d.  42-51.  It  increases  as 
time  goes  on,  until,  from  about  a.d.  133,  the  Greek  legend  upon 
the  coins  becomes  indistinct  and  finally  unintelligible,  the 
letters  being  strewn  about  the  surface  of  the  coin,  like  dead 
soldiers  over  a  field  of  battle.  It  is  clear  that  the  later 
directors  of  the  mint  were  completely  ignorant  of  Greek,  and 
raerely  attempted  to  reproduce  on  the  coin  some  semblance  of 
a  language  which  neither  they  nor  their  countrymen  under- 
stood. Such  a  condition  of  a  coinage  is  almost  without  paral- 
lel, and  indicates  a  want  of  truth  and  honesty  in  the  conduct 
of  affairs  which  implies  deep-seated  corruption.  The  Parthians 
must  have  lost  the  knowledge  of  Greek  about  a.d.  130,  yet  still 
a  pretence  of  using  the  language  was  kept  up.  On  the  tetra- 
drachms — comparatively  rare  coins — no  important  mistake 
was  committed ;  but  on  the  more  usual  drachm,  from  the  time 
of  Gotarzes,  the  most  absurd  errors  were  introduced,  and 
thenceforth  perpetuated.'*"  The  old  inscription  was,  in  a 
certain  sense,  imitated,  but  every  word  of  it  ceased  to  be 
legible :  the  old  figures  disappeared  in  an  indistinct  haze,  and — 
if  we  except  the  head  and  name  of  the  king  (written  now  in  a 
Semitic  character) — the  whole  emblazonment  of  the  coin  be- 
came unmeaning.  A  degeneracy  less  marked,  but  still  suf- 
ficiently clear  to  the  numismatic  critic,  is  observable  in  the 
heads  of  the  kings,  which,  in  the  earlier  times,  if  a  little  coarse, 
are  striking  and  characteristic ;  while  in  the  later  they  sink  to  a 
conventional  type,  rudely  and  poorly  rendered,  and  so  uniform 
that  the  power  of  distinguishing  one  sovereign  from  another 
rests  no  longer  upon  feature,  but  upon  mere  differences  in  the 
arrangement  of  hair,  or  beard,  or  head-dress. 


§     HISTORY  OF  THE  SASSANIAN  OR  NEW 

PERSIAN   EMPIRE. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Condition  of  the  Persians  under  the  Successors  of  Alexander — 
under  the  Arsacidce.  Favor  shoivn  them  by  the  lattei — 
allowed  to  have  Kings  of  their  oivn.  Their  Religion  at  first 
held  in  honor.  Power  of  their  Priests.  Gradual  Change  of 
Policy  on  the  part  of  the  Parthian  Monarchs,  and  final  Op- 
pression of  the  Magi.  Causes  ivhich  produced  the  Insur- 
rection of  Artaxerxes. 

"The  Partliians  had  been  barbarians;  they  had  ruled  over  a  nation  far  more  civi- 
lized than  themselves,  and  had  oppressed  them  and  their  rehgion." 

NiEBUHR,  Lectures  on  Roman  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  276. 

When  the  great  Empire  of  the  Persians,  founded  by  Cyrus, 
collapsed  under  the  attack  of  Alexander  the  Great,  the  domi- 
nant race  of  Western  Asia  did  not  feel  itself  at  the  first  reduced 
to  an  intolerable  condition.  It  was  the  benevolent  design  of 
Alexander  to  fuse  into  one  the  two  leading  peoples  of  Europe 
and  Asia,  and  to  establish  himself  at  the  head  of  a  Perso- 
Hellenic  State,  the  capital  of  which  was  to  have  been  Babylon.' 
Had  this  idea  been  carried  out,  the  Persians  would,  it  is  evi- 
dent, have  lost  but  little  by  their  subjugation.  Placed  on  a 
par  with  the  Greeks,  united  with  them  in  marriage  bonds,  ^ 
and  equally  favored  by  their  common  ruler,  they  could  scarcely 
have  uttei'ed  a  murmur,  or  have  been  seriously  discontented 
with  their  position.  But  when  the  successors  of  the  great 
Macedonian,  unable  to  rise  to  the  height  of  his  grand  concep- 
tion, took  lower  ground,  and,  giving  up  the  idea  of  a  fusion, 
fell  back  upon  the  ordinary  status,  and  proceeded  to  enact  the 
ordinary  role,  of  conquerors,  the  feelings  of  the  late  lords  of 
Asia,  the  countrjrmen  of  Cyrus  and  Darius,  must  have  under- 


242  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  i. 

gone  a  complete  change.  It  had  been  the  intention  of  Alexan- 
der to  conciUate  and  elevate  the  leading  Asiatics  by  uniting 
them  vnih.  the  Macedonians  and  the  Greeks,  by  promoting 
social  intercourse  between  the  two  classes  of  his  subjects  and 
encouraging  them  to  intermarry,  by  opening  his  court  to 
Asiatics,  by  edvicating  then  in  Greek  ideas  and  in  Greek 
schools,  by  promoting  them  to  high  employments,  and  making 
them  feel  that  they  were  as  much  valued  and  as  well  cared  for 
as  the  people  of  the  conquering  race :  it  was  the  plan  of  the 
Seleucidse  to  govern  wholly  by  means  of  European  officials, 
Greek  or  Macedonian,  and  to  regard  and  treat  the  entu-e  mass 
of  their  Asiatic  subjects  as  mere  slaves.  ^  Alexander  had  placed 
Persian  satraps  over  most  of  the  provinces,  attaching  to  them 
Greek  or  Macedonian  commandants  as  checks."  Seleucus 
divided  his  empire  into  seventy-two  satrapies ;  but  among  his 
satraps  not  one  was  an  Asiatic — all  were  either  Macedonians 
or  Greeks.  Asiatics,  indeed,  formed  the  bulk  of  his  standing 
army,  and  so  far  were  admitted  to  employment ;  they  might 
also,  no  doubt,  be  tax-gatherers,  couriers,  scribes,  constables, 
and  officials  of  that  mean  stamp ;  but  they  were  as  carefully 
excluded  from  all  honorable  and  lucrative  offices  as  the  natives ' 
of  Hindustan  under  the  rule  of  the  East  India  Company.  The 
standing  army  of  the  Seleucidse  w^as  wholly  officered,  just  as 
was  that  of  our  own  Sepoys,  by  Europeans ;  Europeans  thronged 
the  court,  and  filled  every  important  post  under  the  govern- 
ment. There  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  such  a  high-spirited  and 
indeed  arrogant  people  as  the  Persians  must  have  fretted  and 
chafed  under  this  treatment,  and  have  detested  the  nation  and 
dynasty  which  had  thrust  them  down  from  their  pre-eminence 
and  converted  them  from  masters  into  slaves.  It  would 
scarcely  much  tend  to  mitigate  the  painf ulness  of  their  feelings 
that  they  could  not  but  confess  their  conquerors  to  be  a  civi- 
lized people— as  civilized,  perhaps  more  civilized  than  them- 
selves— since  the  civilization  was  of  a  type  and  character  which 
did  not  please  them  or  command  their  approval.  There  is  an 
essential  antagonism  between  European  and  Asiatic  ideas  and 
modes  of  thought,  such  as  seemingly  to  preclude  the  possibility 
of  Asiatics  appreciating  a  European  civilization.  The  Persians 
must  have  felt  towards  the  Greco-Macedonians  much  as  the 
Mohammedans  of  India  feel  towards  ourselves— they  may  have 
feared  and  even  respected  them— but  they  must  have  very  bit- 
terly hated  them. 
For  "^as  the  rule  qf  tlie  Seleucidae  such  as  to  overcome  by  its 


CH.  I.]  RULE  OF  TEE  SELEUCID^.  243' 

justice  or  its  wisdom  the  original  antipathy  of  the  dispossessed 
lords  of  Asia  towards  those  by  whom  they  had  been  ousted. 
The  satrapial  system,  which  these  monarchs  lazily  adopted 
from  their  predecessors,  the  Achsemenians,  is  one  alwaj^s  open 
to  great  abuses,  and  needs  the  strictest  superintendence  and 
supervision.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  any  sufficient 
watch  was  kept  over  their  satraps  by  the  Seleucid  kings,  or 
even  any  system  of  checks  established,  such  as  the  Achseme- 
nidae  had,  at  least  in  theory,  set  up  and  maintained.'^  The 
Greco-Macedonian  governors  of  provinces  seem  to  have  been 
left  to  themselves  almost  entirely,  and  to  have  been  only  con- 
trolled in  the  exercise  of  their  authority  by  theu'  own  notions 
of  what  Avas  right  or  expedient.  Under  these  circumstances, 
abuses  Avere  sure  to  creep  in ;  and  it  is  not  improbable  that 
gross  outrages  were  sometimes  perpetrated  by  those  in  power 
—outrages  calculated  to  make  the  blood  of  a  nation  boil,  and 
to  produce  a  keen  longing  for  vengeance.  We  have  no  direct 
evidence  that  the  Persians  of  the  time  did  actually  suffer  from 
such  a  misuse  of  satrapial  authority ;  but  it  is  unlikely  that 
they  entirely  escaped  the  miseries  which  are  incidental  to  the 
system  in  question.  Public  opinion  ascribed  the  grossest  acts 
of  tyranny  and  oppression  to  some  of  the  Seleucid  satraps  ;* 
probably  the  Persians  were  not  exempt  from  the  common  lot 
of  the  subject  races. 

Moreover,  the  Seleucid  monarchs  themselves  were  occasion- 
ally guilty  of  acts  of  tyranny,  which  must  have  intensified  the 
dislike  wherewith  they  were  regarded  by  their  Asiatic  sub- 
jects. The  reckless  conduct  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes  towards 
the  Jews  is  well  known ;  but  it  is  not  perhaps  generally  recog- 
nized that  intolerance  and  impious  cupidity  formed  a  portion 
of  the  system  on  which  he  governed.  There  seems,  however, 
to  be  good  reason  to  believe  that,  having  exhausted  his  treas- 
ury by  his  wars  and  his  extravagances,  Epiphanes  formed  a 
general  design  of  recruiting  it  by  means  of  the  plunder  of  his 
subjects.  The  temples  of  the  Asiatics  had  hitherto  been  for 
the  most  part  respected  by  their  European  conquerors,'  and 
large  stores  of  the  precious  metals  were  accumulated  in  them. 
Epiphanes  saw  in  these  hoards  the  means  of  relieving  his  own 
necessities,  and  determined  to  seize  and  confiscate  them.  Be- 
sides plundering  the  Temple  of  Jeliovah  at  Jerusalem,  he  made 
a  journey  into  the  southeastern  portion  of  his  empire,  about 
B.C.  165,  for  the  express  piu-pose  of  conducting  in  person  the 
collection  of  the  sacred  treasures.    It  was  while  he  was  engaged 


§44  ^SE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  i. 

in  this  unpopular  work  that  a  spirit  of  disaffection  showed 
itself;  the  East  took  arms  no  less  than  the  West;  and  in  Persia, 
or  upon  its  borders,  the  avaricious  monarch  was  forced  to  retire 
before  the  opposition  which  his  Ul-judged  measures  liad  pro- 
voked, and  to  allow  one  of  the  doomed  temples  to  escape  him/ 
When  he  soon  afterwards  sickened  and  died,  the  natives  of 
this  part  of  Asia  saw  in  his  death  a  judgment  upon  him  for  his 
attempted  sacrilege.* 

It  was  within  twenty  years  of  this  unfortunate  attempt  that 
the  dominion  of  the  Seleucidse  over  Persia  and  the  adjacent 
countries  came  to  an  end.  The  Parthian  Empire  had  for' 
nearly  a  century  been  gradually  growing  in  power  and  extend- 
ing itself  at  the  expense  of  the  Syro-Macedonian ;  and,  about 
B.C.  163,  an  energetic  prince,  Mithridates  I.,  commenced  a 
series  of  conquests  towards  the  West,  which  terminated  (about 
B.C.  150)  in  the  transference  from  the  Syro-Macedonian  to  the 
Parthian  rule  of  Media  Magna,  Susiana,  Persia,  Babylonia,  and 
Assyria  Proper.  It  would  seem  that  the  Persians  offered  no 
resistance  to  the  progress  of  the  new  conqueror. '"  The  Seleu- 
cidae  had  not  tried  to  concOiate  their  attachment,  and  it  was 
impossible  that  they  should  dislike  the  rupture  of  ties  which 
had  only  galled  hitherto.  Perhaps  their  feeling,  in  prospect 
of  the  change,  was  one  of  simple  indifference.  Perhaps  it 
was  not  without  some  stir  of  satisfaction  and  complacency  that 
they  saw  the  pride  of  the  hated  Europeans  abased,  and  a  race, 
which,  however  much  it  might  differ  from  their  own,  was  at 
least  Asiatic,  installed  in  power.  The  Parthia  system,  more- 
over, was  one  which  allowed  greater  liberty  to  the  subject 
races  than  the  Macedonian,  as  it  had  been  understood  and 
carried  out  by  the  Seleucidse ;  and  so  far  some  real  gain  was  to 
be  expected  from  the  change.  Eeligious  motives  must  also 
have  conspired  to  make  the  Persians  sympathize  with  the  new 
power,  rather  than  with  that  which  for  centm'ies  had  despised 
their  faith  and  had  recently  insulted  it. 

The  treatment  of  the  Persians  by  their  Parthian  lords  seems, 
on  the  whole,  to  have  been  marked  by  moderation.  Mithri- 
dates indeed,  the  original  conqueror,  is  accused  of  having  alien- 
ated his  new  subjects  by  the  harshness  of  his  rule ;"  and  in  the 
struggle  which  occurred  between  him  and  the  Seleucid  king, 
Demetrius  II.,  Persians,  as  well  as  Elymseans  and  Bactrians, 
are  said  to  have  fought  on  the  side  of  the  Syro-Macedonian. " 
But  this  is  the  only  occasion  in  Parthian  historj^,  between  the 
submission  of  Persia  and  the  great  revolt  under  Artaxerxes, 


6&.  I.]     PARTHIAN  TMATMENT  OF  THE  PERSIANS.     245 

where  there  is  any  appearance  of  the  Persians  regarding  their 
masters  with  hostile  feeHngs.  In  general  they  show  them- 
selves submissive  and  contented  with  their  position,  which 
was  certainly,  on  the  whole,  a  less  irksome  one  than  they  had 
occupied  under  the  Seleucidae. 

It  was  a  principle  of  the  Parthian  governmental  system  to 
allow  the  subject  peoples,  to  a  large  extent,  to  govern  them- 
selves. These  peoples  generally,  and  notably  the  Persians, 
were  ruled  by  native  kings, "  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  by 
hereditary  right,  had  the  full  power  of  life  and  death,  '*  and 
ruled  very  much  as  they  pleased,  so  long  as  they  paid  regularly 
the  tribute  imposed  upon  them  by  the  "King  of  Kings,"  and 
sent  him  a  respectable  contingent  when  he  was  about  to  en- 
gage in  a  military  expedition. '  ^  Such  a  system  implies  that 
the  conquered  peoples  have  the  enjoyment  of  their  own  laws 
and  institutions,  are  exempt  from  troublesome  interference, 
and  possess  a  sort  of  semi-independence.  Oriental  nations, 
having  once  assumed  this  position,  are  usually  contented  with 
it,  and  rarely  make  any  effort  to  better  themselves.  It  would 
seem  that,  thus  far  at  any  rate,  the  Persians  could  not  com- 
plain of  the  Parthian  rule,  but  must  have  been  fairly  satisfied 
with  their  conditton. 

Again,  the  Greco-Macedonians  had  tolerated,  but  they 
had  not  viewed  with  much  respect,  the  religion  which  they 
had  found  established  in  Persia.  Alexander,  indeed,  with  the 
enlightened  curiosity  which  characterised  him,  had  made  in- 
quiries concerning  the  tenets  of  the  Magi,  and  endeavored  to 
collect  in  one  the  writings  of  Zoroaster. '"  But  the  later  mon- 
archs,  and  still  more  their  subjects,  had  held  the  system  in 
contempt,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  Epiphanes  had  openly  in- 
sulted the  religious  feelings  of  his  Asiatic  subjects.  The 
Parthians,  on  the  other  hand,  began  at  any  rate  with  a  treat- 
ment of  the  Persian  religion  which  was  respectful  and  gratify- 
ing. Though  perhaps  at  no  time  very  sincere  Zoroastrians, 
they  had  conformed  to  the  State  religion  under  the  Acheeme- 
nian  kings ;  and  when  the  period  came  that  they  had  themselves 
to  establish  a  system  of  government,  they  gave  to  the  Magian 
hierarchy  a  distinct  and  important  place  in  their  governmental 
machinery.  The  council,  which  advised  the  monarch,  and 
which  helped  to  elect  and  (if  need  were)  depose  him,  was 
composed  of  two  elements— the  Sophi,  or  wise  men,  who  were 
civilians :  and  the  Magi,  or  priests  of  the  Zoroastrian  religion.  '^ 
The  Magi  had  thus  an  important  political  status  in  Parthi^ 


g46  ^-2^  SEVENTH  MONAtlCBf.  [cH.  i 

during  the  early  period  of  the  Empire ;  but  they  seem  gradually 
to  have  declined  in  favor,  and  ultimately  to  have  fallen  into 
disrepute. '®  The  Zoroastrian  creed  was,  little  by  Kttle,  super- 
seded among  the  Parthians  by  a  complex  idolatry,  which,  be- 
ginning with  an  image-worship  of  the  Sun  and  Moon,  proceeded 
to  an  association  with  those  deities  of  the  deceased  kings  of  the 
nation,  and  finally  added  to  both  a  worship  of  ancestral  idols, 
which  formed  the  most  cherished  possession  of  each  family, 
and  practically  monopolized  the  religious  sentiment. '"  All  the 
old  Zoroastrian  practices  were  by  degrees  laid  aside.  In  Arme- 
nia the  Arsacid  monarchs  allowed  the  sacred  fire  of  Ormazd  to 
become  extinguished  ;^"  and  in  their  own  territories  the  Par- 
thian Arsacidse  introduced  the  practice,  hateful  to  Zoroastrians, 
of  burning  the  dead.  ^'  The  ultimate  religion  of  these  monarchs 
seems  in  fact  to  have  been  a  syncretism  wherein  Sabaism,  Con- 
fucianism, Greco-Macedonian  notions,  and  an  inveterate  primi- 
tive idolatry^^  were  mixed  together.  It  is  not  impossible  that 
the  very  names  of  Ormazd  and  Ahriman  had  ceased  to  be 
known  at  the  Parthian  Court,  or  were  regarded  as  those  of  ex- 
ploded deities,  whose  dominion  over  men's  minds  had  passed 
away. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Persia  itself,  and  to  some  extent 
doubtless  among  the  neighboring  countries,  Zoroastrianism 
(or  what  went  by  the  name)  had  a  firm  hold  on  the  religious 
sentiments  of  the  multitude,  who  viewed  with  disfavor  the 
tolerant  and  eclectic  spirit  which  animated  the  Court  of 
Ctesiphon.  The  perpetual  fire,  kindled,  as  it  was,  from 
heaven,  was  carefully  tended  and  preserved  on  the  fire-altars 
of  the  Persian  holy  places;"  the  Magian  hierarchy  was  held  in 
the  highest  repute,  the  kings  themselves  (as  it  would  seem) 
not  disdaining  to  be  Magi ;"  the  ideas— even  perhaps  the 
forms^^ — of  Ormazd  and  Ahriman  were  familiar  to  aU;  image- 
Avorship  was  abhorred ;'"  the  sacred  writings  in  the  Zend  or 
most  ancient  Iranian  language  were  diligently  preserved  and 
midtiplied;  a  pompous  ritual  was  kept  up;  the  old  national 
religion,  the  religion  of  the  A.ch8emenians,  of  the  glorious 
period  of  Persian  ascendency  in  Asia,  was  with  the  utmost 
strictness  maintained,  probably  the  more  zealously  as  it  feU 
more  and  more  into  disfavor  with  the  Parthians. 

The  consequence  of  this  divergence  of  religious  opinion  be- 
tween the  Persians  and  their  feudal  lords  must  undoubtedly 
have  been  a  certain  amount  of  alienation  and  discontent.  The 
Persian  ]\Iagi  must  have  been  especially  dissatisfied  with  the 


CH.  I.]  THEIR  GRADUAL  DEGENERACY.  '^47 

position  of  their  brethren  at  Court ;  and  they  would  doubtless 
use  their  influence  to  arouse  the  indignation  of  their  country- 
men generally.  But  it  is  scarcely  probable  that  this  cause 
alone  would  have  produced  any  striking  result.  Religious 
sympathy  rarely  leads  men  to  engage  in  important  wars,  un- 
less it  has  the  support  of  other  concurrent  motives.  To  ac- 
count for  the  revolt  of  the  Persians  against  their  Parthian 
lords  under  Artaxerxes,  something  more  is  needed  than  the 
consideration  of  the  religious  differences  which  separated  the 
two  peoples. 

First,  then,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Parthian 
rule  must  have  been  from  the  beginning  distasteful  to  the  Per- 
sians, owing  to  the  rude  and  coarse  character  of  the  people. 
At  the  moment  of  Mithridates's  successes,  the  Persians  might 
experience  a  sentiment  of  satisfaction"  that  the  European 
invader  was  at  last  thrust  back,  and  that  Asia  had  re-asserted 
herself ;  but  a  very  little  experience  of  Parthian  rule  was  suf- 
ficient to  call  forth  different  feelings.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  Parthians,  whether  they  were  actually  Turanians  or 
no,-"  were,  in  comparison  with  the  Persians,  unpolished  and 
uncivilized.  They  showed  their  own  sense  of  this  inferiority 
by  an  affectation  of  Persian  manners."'  But  this  affectation 
was  not  very  successful.  It  is  evident  that  in  art,  in  archi- 
tecture, in  manners,  in  habits  of  life,  the  Parthian  race 
reached  only  a  low  standard ;  they  stood  to  their  Hellenic  and 
Iranian  subjects  in  much  the  same  relation  that  the  Turks  of 
the  present  day  stand  to  the  modern  Greeks;  they  made 
themselves  respected  by  their  strenJ2;th  and  their  talent  for 
organization;  but  in  all  that  adorns  and  beautifies  life  they 
were  deficient.^"  The  Persians  must,  during  the  whole  time  of 
their  subjection  to  Parthia,  have  been  sensible  of  a  feeling  of 
shame  at  the  want  of  refinement  and  of  a  high  type  of  civiliza- 
tion in  their  masters. 

Again,  the  later  sovereigns  of  the  Ar^acid  dynasty  were  for 
the  most  part  of  weak  and  contemptible  character.  From  the 
time  of  Volagases  I.  to  that  of  Artabaniis  IV.,  the  last  king, 
the  military  reputation  of  Parthia  had  declined.  Foreign 
enemies  ravaged  the  territories  of  ParthiDJi  vassal  kings,  and 
retired  when  they  chose,  unpunished.^'  Provinces  revolted 
and  established  their  independence.^^  Rome  was  entreated  to 
lend  assistance  to  her  distressed  and  afflicted  rival,  and  met 
the  entreaties  with  a  refusal."^  In  the  wars  which  still  from 
time  to  time  were  waged  between  the  two  empires  Parthia 


248  THB  SEVENTH  MONAttCHY.  [ch.  t 

was  almost  uniformly  worsted.  Three  times  her  capital  was 
occupied,^*  and  once  her  monarch's  summer  palace  was 
burned. ^^  Province  after  province  had  to  be  ceded  to  Rome." 
The  golden  throne  which  symbolized  her  glory  and  magnifi- 
cence was  carried  off. "  Meanwhile  feuds  raged  between  the 
different  branches  of  the  Arsacid  family ;  civil  wars  were  fre- 
quent ;  two  or  three  monarchs  at  a  time  claimed  the  throne, 
or  actually  ruled  in  different  portions  of  the  Empire.  ^*  It  is 
not  surprising  that  under  these  circumstances  the  bonds  were 
loosened  between  Parthia  and  her  vassal  kingdoms,  or  that 
the  Persian  tributary  monarchs  began  to  despise  their  suze- 
rains, and  to  contemplate  without  alarm  the  prospect  of  a  re- 
bellion which  should  place  them  in  an  independent  position. 

While  the  general  weakness  of  the  Arsacid  monarchs  was 
thus  a  cause  naturally  leading  to  a  renunciation  of  their  allegi- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  Persians,  a  special  influence  upon  the 
decision  taken  by  Artaxerxes  is  probably  to  be  assigned  to 
one,  in  particular,  of  the  results  of  that  weakness.  When 
pi'ovinces  long  subject  to  Parthian  rule  revolted,  and  revolted 
successfully,  as  seems  to  have  been  the  case  with  Hyrcania, 
and  partially  with  Bactria,  '^  Persia  could  scarcely  for  very 
shame  continue  submissive.  Of  all  the  races  subject  to  Par- 
thia, the  Persians  were  the  one  which  had  held  the  most  bril- 
liant position  in  the  past,  and  which  retained  the  liveliest  re- 
membrance of  its  ancient  glories.  This  is  evidenced  not  only 
by  the  grand  claims  which  Artaxerxes  put  forward  in  his 
early  negotiations  with  the  Romans,^"  but  by  the  whole  course 
of  Persian  literature,  which  has  fundamentally  an  historic 
character,  and  exhibits  the  people  as  attached,  almost  more 
than  any  other  Oriental  nation,  to  the  memory  of  its  great 
men  and  of  their  noble  achievements.*'  The  countrymen  of 
Jyrus,  of  Darius,  of  Xerxes,  of  Ochus,  of  the  conquerors  of 
Media,  Bactria,  Babylon,  Syria,  Asia  Minor,  Egypt,  of  the  in- 
vaders of  Scythia  and  Greece,  aware  that  they  had  once  borne 
sway  over  the  whole  region  between  Tunis  and  the  Indian 
Desert,  between  the  Caucasus  and  the  Cataracts,  when  they 
saw  a  petty  mountain  clan,  like  the  Hyrcanians,  establish  and 
maintain  their  independence  despite  the  efforts  of  Parthia  to 
coerce  them,  covdd  not  very  well  remain  quiet.  If  so  weak 
and  small  a  race  could  defy  the  power  of  the  Arsacid  mon- 
archs, much  more  might  the  far  more  numerous  and  at  least 
equally  courageous  Persians  expect  to  succeed,  if  they  made  a 
resolute  attempt  to  recover  their  freedom. 


Ctt.  I.]  CAUSES  OF  ARTAXEBXE8'  INSURRECTION.         24(i 

It  is  probable  that  Artaxerxes,  in  his  capacity  of  vassal, 
served  personally  in  the  army  with  which  the  Partliian  mon- 
arch Artabanus  carried  on  the  struggle  against  Rome,  and 
thus  acquired  the  power  of  estimating  correctly  the  military 
strength  still  possessed  by  the  Arsacidse,  and  of  measuring  it 
against  that  which  he  knew  to  belong  to  his  nation.     It  is  not 
unlikely  that  he  formed  his  plans  during  the  earlier  period  of 
Artabanus's  reign,  when  that  monarch  allowed  himself  to  be 
imposed  upon  by  CaracaUus,  and  suffered  calamities  and  in- 
dignities in  consequence  of  his  folly/*    When  the  Parthian 
monarch  atoned  for  his  indiscretion  and  wiped  out  the  mem- 
ory of  his  disgraces  by  the  brilliant  victory  of  Nisibis  and  the 
glorious  peace  which  he  made  with  Macrinus,  Artaxerxes  may 
have  found  that  he  had  gone  too  far  to  recede ;  or,  undazzled 
by  the  splendor  of  these  successes,  he  may  still  have  judged 
that  he  might  with  prudence  persevere  in  his  enterprise.     Ar- 
tabanus had  suffered  great  losses  in  his  two  campaigns  against 
Rome,  and  especially  in  the  three  days'  battle  of  Nisibis.     Ho 
was  at  variance  with  several  princes  of  his  family,  one  of 
whom  certainly  maintained  himself  during  his  whole  reign 
with  the  State  and  title  of  "  King  of  Parthia.""    Though  he 
had  fought  well  at  Nisibis,  he  had  not  given  any  indications  of 
remarkable  military  talent.      Artaxerxes,  having  taken  the 
measure  of  his  antagonist  during  the  course  of  the  Roman  war, 
having  estimated  his  resources  and  formed  a  decided  opinion 
on  the  relative  strength  of  Persia  and  Parthia,  deliberately 
resolved,  a  few  years  after  the  Roman  war  had  come  to  an 
end,"  to  revolt  and  accept  the  consequences.      He  was  no 
doubt  convinced  that  his  nation  would  throw  itself  enthusias- 
tically into  the  struggle,  and  he  believed  that  he  could  con- 
duct it  to  a  successful  issue.     He  felt  himself  the  champion  of 
a  depressed,  if  not  an  oppressed,"  nationality,  and  had  faith 
in  his  power  to  raise  it  into  a  lofty  position.     Iran,  at  any  rate, 
should  no  longer,  he  resolved,  submit  patiently  to  be  the  slave 
of  Turan;  the  keen,  intelligent,  art-loving  Aryan  people  should 
no  longer  bear  submissively  the  yoke  of  the  rude,   coarse, 
clumsy  Scyths.     An  effort  after  freedom  should  be  made.     He 
had  little  doubt  of  the  result.     The  Persians,  by  the  strength 
of  their  own  right  arms  and  the  blessing  of  Ahuramazda,  the 
"All-bounteous,"*'  would  triumph  over  their  impious  masters, 
and  become  once  more  a  great  and  independent  people.     At 
the  worst,  if  he  had  miscalculated,  there  would  be  the  alter- 
native of  a  glorious  death  wx-tn  the  battle-field  in  one  of  the 
noblest  of  all  causes,  the  asjSCi'Uon  of  a  nation's  freedom/' 


i^gO  THE  SEVENTH  MOiS! Alien Y.  [ca.  ft. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Situation  and  Size  of  Persia.  General  Character  of  the  Coun- 
try and  Climate.  Chief  Products.  Characteristics  of  the 
Persian  People,  physical  and  moral.  Differences  observ- 
able in  the  Race  at  different  periods. 

'H  IXepffi?  e(7Tt  ttoAAt)  ixiv  iv  Trj  ■napaXia     •     .     .     ttoAu  5e  fiei'^tDv  iv  rfj  fiecroyaici. — StrabO, 

Strabo,  XV.  3,  §  1. 

Persia  Proper  was  a  tract  of  country  lying  on  the  Gulf  to 
which  it  has  given  name,  and  extending  about  450  miles  from 
noi-th-west  to  south-east,  with  an  average  breadth  of  about 
250  miles.  Its  entire  area  may  be  estimated  at  about  a  hun- 
dred thousand  square  miles.  It  was  thus  larger  than  Great 
Britain,  about  the  size  of  Italy,  and  rather  less  than  half  the 
size  of  France.'  The  boundaries  were,  on  the  west,  Elymais 
or  Susiana  (which,  however,  was  sometimes  reckoned  a  part 
of  Persia)  f  on  the  north,  Media ;  on  the  east,  Carmania ;'  and 
on  the  south,  the  sea.  It  is  nearly  represented  in  modern 
times  by  the  two  Persian  provinces  of  Farsistan  and  Laristan, 
the  former  of  which  retains,  but  slightly  changed,  the  ancient 
appellation.  The  Hindyan  or  Tab  (ancient  Oroatis)  seems 
towards  its  mouth  to  have  formed  the  western  limit.*  East- 
ward, Persia  extended  to  about  the  site  of  the  mordern  Bunder 
Kongo. "  Inland,  the  northern  boundary  ran  probably  a  little 
south  of  the  thirty-second  parallel,  from  long.  50°  to  55°.  The 
line  dividing  Persia  Proper  from  Carmania  (now  Kerman)  was 
somewhat  uncertain. 

The  character  of  the  tract  is  extremely  diversified.  Ancient 
writers  divided  the  country  into  three  strongly  contrasted 
regions.  The  first,  or  coast  tract,  was  (they  said)  a  sandy 
desert,  producing  nothing  but  a  few  dates,  owing  to  the  inten- 
sity of  the  heat.  Above  this  was  a  fertile  region,  grassy,  with 
well-watered  meadows  and  numerous  vineyards,  enjoying  a 
delicious  climate,  producing  almost  every  fruit  but  the  olive, 
containing  pleasant  parks  or  "paradises,"  watered  by  a 
number  of  limpid  streams  and  clear  lakes,  well  wooded  in 
places,  affording  an  excellent  pasture  for  horses  and  for  all 
sorts  of  cattle,  abounding  in  water-fowl  and  game  of  every 


* 


tm  II.]  l)^SCniPflON  OF  PERSIA  PhOPM.  2.M 

kind,  and  altogether  a  most  delightful  abode.  Beyond  tliis 
fertile  region,  towards  the  north,  was  a  rugged  mountain 
tract,  cold  and  mostly  covered  with  snow,  of  which  they  did 
not  profess  to  know  much. " 

In  this  description  there  is  no  doubt  a.  certain  amount  of 
truth ;  but  it  is  mixed  probably  with  a  good  deal  of  exaggera- 
tion. There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  climate  or  charac- 
ter of  the  country  has  undergone  any  important  alteration 
between  the  time  of  Nearchus  or  Strabo  and  the  present  day. 
At  present  it  is  certain  that  the  tract  in  question  answers  but 
very  incompletely  to  the  description  which  those  writers  give 
of  it.  Three  regions  may  indeed  be  distinguished,  though  the 
natives  seem  now  to  speak  of  only  two ;'  but  none  of  them 
corresponds  at  all  exactly  to  the  accounts  of  the  Greeks.  The 
coast  tract  is  represented  with  the  nearest  approach  to  correct- 
ness. This  is,  in  fact,  a  region  of  arid  plain,  often  impregna- 
ted with  salt,  ill-watered,  with  a  poor  soil,  consisting  either 
of  sand  or  clay,  and  productive  of  little  besides  dates  and  a 
few  other  fruits.*  A  modern  historian^  says  of  it  that  "it 
bears  a  greater  resemblance  in  soil  and  climate  to  Arabia  than 
to  the  rest  of  Persia."  It  is  very  hot  and  unhealthy,  and  can 
at  no  time  have  supported  more  than  a  sparse  and  scanty 
population.  Above  this,  towards  the  north,  is  the  best  and 
most  fertile  portion  of  the  territory.  A  mountain  tract, '"  the 
continuation  of  Zagros,  succeeds  to  the  flat  and  sandy  coast 
region,  occupying  the  greater  portion  of  Persia  Proper.  It  is 
about  two  hundred  miles  in  width,  and  consists  of  an  alterna- 
tion of  mountain,  plain,  and  narrow  valley,  curiously  inter- 
mixed, and  hitherto  mapped  very  imperfectly."  In  places 
this  district  answers  fully  to  the  description  of  Nearchus, 
being,  "richly  fertile,  picturesque,  and  romantic  almost 
beyond  imagination,  with  lovely  wooded  dells,  green  mountain 
sides,  and  broad  plains,  suited  for  the  production  of  ahnost 
any  crops."  '^  But  it  is  only  to  the  smaller  moiety  of  the 
region  that  such  a  character  attaches;  more  than  half  the 
mountain  tract  is  sterile  and  barren;"  the  supply  of  water  is 
almost  everywhere  scanty ;  the  rivers  are  few,  and  have  not 
much  volume ;  many  of  them,  after  short  courses,  end  in  the 
sand,  or  in  small  salt  lakes,  from  which  the  superfluous  water 
is  evaporated.  Much  of  the  country  is  absolutely  without 
streams,  and  would  be  uninhabitable  were  it  not  for  the  kanafs 
or  kareezes^* — subterranean  channels  made  by  art  for  the  con- 
.  veyance  of  spring  water  to  be  used  in  irrigation.     The  most 


252  "THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cu.  it 

desolate  portion  of  the  mountain  tract  is  towards  the  north 
and  north-east,  where  it  adjoins  upon  the  third  region,  which 
is  the  worst  of  the  three.  This  is  a  portion  of  the  high  table- 
land of  Iran,  the  gi'eat  desert  which  stretches  from  the  eastern 
skirts  of  Zagros  to  the  Hamoon,  the  Helmend,  and  the  river  of 
Subzawur.  It  is  a  dry  and  hard  plain,  intersected  at  intervals 
by  ranges  of  rocky  hills,  '^  with  a  climate  extremely  hot  in 
summer  and  extremely  cold  in  winter,  incapable  of  cidtiva- 
tion,  excepting  so  far  as  water  can  be  conveyed  by  Jcanats, 
which  is,  of  course,  only  a  short  distance.  The  fox,  the 
jackal,  the  antelope,  and  the  wild  ass  possess  tliia  sterile  and 
desolate  tract,  where  "  aU  is  dry  and  cheerless,'""  and  verdure 
is  almost  unknown. 

Perhaps  the  two  most  peculiar  districts  of  Persia  are  the 
lake  basins  of  Neyriz  and  Deriah-i-Nemek.  The  rivers  given 
off  from  the  northern  side  of  the  great  mountain  chain 
between  the  twenty-ninth  and  thirty-first  parallels,  being  un- 
able to  penetrate  the  mountains,  flow  eastward  towards  the 
desert ;  and  their  waters  gradually  collect  into  two  streams, 
which  end  in  two  lakes,  the  Deriah-i-Nemek  and  that  of  Ney- 
riz, or  Lake  Bakhtigan."  The  basin  of  Lake  Neyriz  lies 
towards  the  north.  Here  the  famous  "  Bendamir, '*  and  the 
Pulwar  or  Kur-ab,  flowing  respectively  from  the  north-east 
and  the  north,  unite  in  one  near  the  ruins  of  the  ancient 
Persepolis,  and,  after  fertihzing  the  plain  of  Merdasht, "  run 
eastward  down  a  rich  vale  for  a  distance  of  some  forty  miles 
into  the  salt  lake  which  swallows  them  up.  This  lake,  when 
full,  has  a  length  of  fifty  or  sixty  miles,  with  a  breadth  of 
from  three  to  six.^"  In  summer,  however,  it  is  often  quite 
dry,-'  the  water  of  the  Bendamir  being  expended  in  irrigation 
before  reaching  its  natural  terminus.  The  vafley  and  plain  of 
the  Bendamir,  and  its  tributaries,  are  among  the  most  fertile 
portions  of  Persia,  as  well  as  among  those  of  most  historic 
interest.  "^ 

The  basin  of  the  Deriah-i-Nemek  is  smaller  than  that  of  the 
Neyriz,  but  it  is  even  more  productive.  Numerous  brooks  and 
streams,  rising  not  far  from  Shiraz,  run  on  all  sides  into  the 
Nemek  lake,  which  has  a  length  of  about  fifteen  and  a  breadth 
of  three  or  three  and  a  half  miles.''  Among  the  streams  is  the 
celebrated  brook  of  Hafiz,  the  Rocknabad,  which  still  retains 
"its  singular  transparency  and  softness  to  the  taste," "  Other 
rills  and  fountains  of  extreme  clearness  abound, "  and  a  verdure 
is  the  result,  very  unusual  in  Persia.     The  vines  grown  in  the 


CH.  II.]  PRODUCTS.  253 

basin  produce  the  famous  Shiraz  wine,  the  only  good  wine 
which  is  manufactured  in  the  East.  The  orchards  are  magnifi- 
cent. In  the  autumn  "the  earth  is  covered  with  the  gathered 
harvest,  flowers,  and  fruits ;  melons,  peaches,  pears,  nectarines, 
cherries,  grapes,  pomegranates;  all  is  a  garden,  abundant  in 
sweets  and  refreshment."  ""^ 

But,  notwithstanding  the  exceptional  fertility  of  the  Shiraz 
plain  and  of  a  few  other  places,  Persia  Proper  seems  to  have 
been  rightly  characterized  in  ancient  times  as  "a  scant  land 
and  a  rugged."  "  Its  area  was  less  than  a  fifth  of  the  area  of 
modern  Persia ;  and  of  this  space  nearly  one  half  was  uninhab- 
itable, consisting  either  of  barren  stony  mountain  or  of  scorch- 
ing sandy  plain,  iU  supplied  with  water  and  often  impregnated 
with  salt.  Its  products,  consequently,  can  have  been  at  no 
time  either  very  abundant  or  very  varied.  Anciently,  the  low 
coast  tract  seems  to  have  been  cultivated  to  a  small  extent  in 
corn,"  and  to  have  produced  good  dates  and  a  few  other 
fruits.-''  The  mountain  region  was,  as  we  have  seen,'"  cel- 
ebrated for  its  excellent  pastures,  for  its  abundant  fruits,  and 
especially  for  its  grapes.  Within  the  mountains,  on  the  high 
plateau,  assafoetida  (silphium)  was  found,^'and  probably  some 
other  medicinal  herbs.''  Corn,  no  doubt,  could  be  grown 
largely  in  the  plains  and  valleys  of  the  mountain  tract,  as  well 
as  on  the  plateau,  so  far  as  the  Jcanats  carried  the  water. 
There  must  have  been,  on  the  whole,  a  deficiency  of  timber, 
though  the  palms  of  the  low  tract,  and  the  oaks,  planes,  chenars 
or  sycamores,  poplars,  and  willows"'  of  the  mountain  regions 
sufficed  for  the  wants  of  the  natives.  Not  much  fuel  was  re- 
quired, and  stone  was  the  general  material  used  for  building. 
Among  the  fruits  for  which  Persia  was  famous  are  especially 
noted  the  peach,"  the  walnut,  and  the  citron.''  The  walnut 
bore  among  the  Romans  the  appellation  of  "  royal." '" 

Persia,  like  Media,  was  a  good  nursery  for  horses."  Fine 
grazing  grounds  existed  in  many  parts  of  the  mountain  region, 
and  for  horses  of  the  Arab  breed  even  the  Deshtistan  was  not 
imsuited.''  Camels  were  reared  in  some  places,'''  and  sheep 
and  goats  were  numerous.'"  Horned  cattle  were  probably  not 
so  abundant,  as  the  cljaracter  of  the  country  is  not  favorable 
for  them."  Game  existed  in  large  quantities,''  the  lakes 
abounding  with  water-fowl,"  such  as  ducks,  teal,  heron, 
snipe,  etc. ;  and  the  wooded  portions  of  the  mountain  tract 
giving  shelter  to  the  stag,  the  wild  goat,  the  wild  boar,  the 
hare,  the  pheasant,  and  the  heathcock,"    Fish  Avere  also  plen- 


254  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ir. 

tiful.  Whales  visited  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  were  sometimes 
stranded  upon  the  shores,  where  their  carcases  furnished  a 
mine  of  wealth  to  the  inhabitants."  Dolphins  abounded,  as 
well  as  many  smaller  kinds;  and  shell-fish,  particularly  oys- 
^rs,  could  always  be  obtained  without  difficulty."'^  The  rivers, 
too,  were  capable  of  furnishing  fresh-water  fish  in  good  quan- 
tity,^' though  we  cannot  say  if  this  source  of  supply  was  util- 
ized in  antiquity. 

The  mineral  treasures  of  Persia  were  fairly  numerous. 
Good  salt  was  yielded  by  the  lakes  of  the  middle  region,  and 
was  also  obtainable  upon  the  plateau.  Bitumen  and  naphtha 
were  produced  by  sources  in  the  low  country."*  The  mountains 
contained  most  of  the  important  metals  and  a  certain  number 
of  valuable  gems."'  The  pearls  of  the  Gulf  acquired  early  a 
great  reputation,  and  a  regular  fishery  was  established  for 
them  before  the  time  of  Alexander.  ^^ 

But  the  most  celebrated  of  all  the  products  of  Persia  were  its 
men.  The  "scant  and  rugged  country"  gave  birth,  as  Cyrus 
the  Great  is  said  to  have  observed,^'  to  a  race  brave,  hardy, 
and  endui'ing,  calculated  not  only  to  hold  its  own  against  ag- 
gressors, but  to  extend  its  sway  and  exercise  dominion  over 
the  Western  Asiatics  generally.  The  Aryan  family  is  the  one 
which,  of  all  the  races  of  mankind,  is  the  most  self -asserting, 
and  has  the  greatest  strength,  physical,  moral,  and  intellectual. 
The  Iranian  branch  of  it,  whereto  the  Persians  belonged,  is  not 
perhaps  so  gifted  as  some  others ;  but  it  has  qualities  which 
place  it  above  most  of  those  by  which  Western  Asia  was  an- 
ciently peopled.  In  the  primitive  times,  from  Cyrus  the  Great 
to  Darius  Hystaspis,  the  Persians  seem  to  have  been  rude 
mountaineers,  probably  not  very  unlike  the  modern  Kurds 
and  Lurs,  who  inhabit  portions  of  the  same  chain  which  forms 
the  heart  of  the  Persian  country.  Their  physiognomy  was 
handsome. '^^  A  high  sti'aight  forehead,  a  long  shghtly  aquUine 
nose,  a  short  and  curved  upper  lip,  a  well-rounded  chin,  char- 
acterized the  Persian.  The  expression  of  his  face  was  grave 
and  noble.  He  had  abundant  hair,  which  he  wore  very  arti- 
ficially arranged.  Above  and  round  the  brow  it  was  made  to 
stand  away  from  the  face  in  short  crisp,  curls;  on  the  top  of 
the  head  it  was  worn  smooth ;  at  the  back  of  the  head  it  was 
again  trained  into  curls,  which  followed  each  other  in  several 
rows  from  the  level  of  the  forehead  to  the  nape  of  the  neck. 
The  moustache  was  always  cultivated,  and  curved  in  a  gentle 
sweep.    A  beard  and  whiskers  were  worn,  the  former  sojne^ 


Vol.  III... 


Plate  XXI. 


71 


Fig    1. 


COIN    OF    JSPIGEED    I. 


Fig.    2. 


Fig.  3. 


COIN.  OF   ISDIGEED    II, 


COIN    OF    VARAHBAN    V. 


Fitr.     4 


Fig.  5. 


COIN    OF    HORMISDAS    III. 

(doubtful). 


^'ig.  ,6. 


COIN    OF    BAIAS. 


COIN    OF    TEKOZES. 


Plate  XXlli 


Vol,  III, 


COIN    OF    ZAMASP. 


COIX   OP    CHOSROES    I. 

Fig    4, 


COIK    OF    CHOSEOES    I. 

I  11  II  iwi^Maaiip— — 


en.  n.]        CIIAUACTEBISTICS  OF  THE  PERSIANS.  265 

times  long  and  pendent,  like  the  Assyrian,  but  more  oTten  clus- 
tering around  the  chin  in  short  close  curls.  The  figure  was 
well-formed,  but  somewhat  stout ;  the  carriage  was  dignified 
and  simple.     [PL  XI.,  Fig.  1.] 

Simplicity  of  manners  prevailed  during  this  period.  At  the 
court  there  was  some  luxury ;  but  the  bidk  of  the  nation,  living 
in  their  mountain  territory,  and  attached  to  agriculture  and 
hunting,  maintained  the  habits  of  their  ancestors,  and  were  a 
somewhat  rude  though  not  a  coarse  people.  The  dress  com- 
monly worn  was  a  close-fitting  shirt  or  tunic  of  leather,  '^  de- 
scending to  the  knee,  and  with  sleeves  that  reached  down  to 
the  wrist.  Round  the  tunic  was  worn  a  belt  or  sash,  which 
was  tied  in  front.  The  head  was  protected  by  a  loose  felt 
cap,"  and  the  feet  by  a  sort  of  high  shoe  or  low  boot.  The 
ordinary  diet  was  bread  and  cress-seed, "  while  the  sole  bever- 
age was  water.  ^^  In  the  higher  ranks,  of  course,  a  different 
style  of  living  prevailed ;  the  elegant  and  flowing  ' '  Median 
robe"  was  worn;"  flesh  of  various  kinds  was  eaten;'*"  much 
wine  was  consumed;'"  and  meals  were  extended  to  a  great 
length;™  The  Persians,  however,  maintained  during  this  period 
a  general  hardihood  and  bravery  which  made  them  the  most 
dreaded  adversaries  of  the  Greeks,^'  and  enabled  them  to  main- 
tain an  unquestioned  dominion  over  the  other  native  races  of 
Western  Asia. 

As  time  went  on,  and  their  monarchs  became  less  warlike, 
and  wealth  accumulated,  and  national  spirit  decayed,  the  Per- 
sian character  by  degrees  deteriorated,  and  sank,  even  under 
the  Achsemenian  kings,  to  a  level  not  much  superior  to  that  of 
the  ordinary  Asiatic.  The  Persian  antagonists  of  Alexander 
were  pretty  nearly  upon  a  par  with  the  races  which  in  Hindu- 
stan have  yielded  to  the  British  power;  they  occasionally 
fought  with  gallantry,  ^-  but  they  were  deficient  in  resolution, 
in  endurance,  in  all  the  elements  of  solid  strength ;  and  they 
were  quite  unable  to  stand  their  ground  against  the  vigor  and 
dash  of  the  Macedonians  and  the  Greeks.  Whether  physically 
they  were  very  different  from  the  soldiers  of  Cyrus  may  be 
doubted,  but  morally  they  had  fallen  far  below  the  ancient 
standard ;  their  self-respect  their  love  of  country,  their  attach- 
ment to  their  monarch  had  diminished;  no  one  showed  any 
great  devotion  to  the  cause  for  which  he  fought ;  after  two  de- 
feats"' the  empire  wholly  collapsed ;  and  the  Persians  submitted, 
apparently  without  much  reluctance,  to  the  Helleno-Macedoniau 
yoke. 


256  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ii. 

Five  centuries  and  a  half  of  servitude  could  not  much  im- 
prove or  elevate  the  character  of  the  people.  Their  fall  from 
power,  their  loss  of  wealth  and  of  dominion  did  indeed  advan- 
tage them  in  one  way :  it  but  an  end  to  that  continually  ad- 
vancing sloth  and  luxury  which  had  sapped  the  virtue  of  the 
nation,  depriving  it  of  energy,  endurance,  and  almost  every 
manly  excellence.  It  dashed  the  Persians  back  upon  the  ground 
whence  they  had  sprung,  and  whence,  Antaeus-like,  they  pro- 
ceeded to  derive  fresh  vigor  and  vital  force.  In  their  ' '  scant 
and  rugged"  fatherland,  the  people  of  Cyrus  once  more  recov- 
ered to  a  great  extent  their  ancient  prowess  and  hardihood— 
their  habits  became  simpKfied,  their  old  patriotism  revived, 
their  self-respect  grew  greater.  But  while  adversity  thus  in 
some  respects  proved  its  "sweet  uses"  upon  them,  there  were 
other  respects  in  which  submission  to  the  yoke  of  the  Greeks, 
and  still  more  to  that  of  the  Parthians,  seems  to  have  altered 
them  for  the  worse  rather  than  for  the  better.  There  is  a  coarse- 
ness and  rudeness  about  the  Sassanian  Persians  which  we  do 
not  observe  in  Achaemenian  times.  The  physique  of  the  na- 
tion is  not  indeed  much  altered.  Nearly  the  same  countenance 
meets  us  in  the  sculptures  of  Artaxerxes,  the  son  of  Babek,  of 
Sapor,  and  of  their  successors,"  with  which  we  are  familiar 
from  the  bas-reliefs  of  Darius  Hystapis  and  Xerxes.  There  is 
the  same  straight  forehead,  the  same  aquihne  nose,  the  same 
well-shaped  mouth,  the  same  abundant  hair.  The  form  is, 
however,  coarser  and  clumsier ;  the  expression  is  less  refined ; 
and  the  general  effect  produced  is  that  the  people  have,  even 
physically,  deteriorated.  The  mental  and  aesthetic  standard 
seems  stUl  more  to  have  sunk.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the 
Persians  of  Sassanian  times  possessed  the  governmental  and 
administrative  ability  of  Darius  Hystapis  or  Artaxerxes  Ochus. 
Their  art,  though  remarkable,  considering  the  almost  entire 
disappearance  of  art  from  Western  Asia  under  the  Parthians,""" 
is,  compared  with  that  of  Achaemenian  times,  rude  and  gro- 
tesque. In  architecture,  indeed,  they  are  not  without  merit, 
though  even  here  the  extent  to  which  they  were  indebted  to 
the  Parthians,  which  cannot  be  exactly  determined,  must  lessen 
our  estimation  of  them;  but  their  mimetic  art,  while  not  want- 
ing in  spirit,  is  remarkably  coarse  and  unrefined.  As  a  later 
chapter  will  be  devoted  to  this  subject,  no  more  need  be  said 
upon  it  here.  It  is  sufficient  for  our  present  purpose  to  note 
that  the  impression  which  we  obtain  from  the  monumental  re- 
mains of  the  Sassanian  Persians  accords  with  what  is  to  be 


I 


EMPIRE 

41. 


60 


en.  HI.]         STORIES  TOLD   OF  ARTAXEBXES  I.  267 

gathered  of  them  from  the  accounts  of  the  Eomans  and  the 
Greeks.  The  great  Asiatic  revohition  of  the  year  a.d.  22Q 
marks  a  revival  of  the  Iranic  nationality  from  the  depressed 
state  into  which  it  had  sunk  for  more  than  five  hundred  years ; 
but  the  revival  is  not  full  or  complete.  The  Persians  of  the 
Sassanian  kingdom  are  not  equal  to  those  of  the  time  between 
Cyrus  the  Great  and  Darius  Codomannus;  they  have  ruder 
manners,  a  grosser  taste,  less  capacity  for  government  and 
organization ;  they  have,  in  fact,  been  coarsened  by  centuries 
of  Tartar  rule ;  they  are  vigorous,  active,  energetic,  proud,  brave ; 
but  in  civilization  and  refinement  they  do  not  rank  much  above 
their  Parthian  predecessors.  Western  Asia  gained,  perhaps, 
something,  but  it  did  not  gain  much,  from  the  substitution  of 
the  Persians  for  the  Parthians  as  the  dominant  power.  The 
change  is  the  least  marked  among  the  revohitions  which  the 
East  underwent  between  the  accession  of  Cyrus  and  the  con- 
quests of  Timour.  But  it  is  a  change,  on  the  whole,  for  the  bet- 
ter. It  is  accompanied  by  a  revival  of  art,  by  improvements  in 
architecture ;  it  inaugurates  a  religious  revolution  which  has 
advantages.  Above  all,  it  saves  the  East  from  stagnation.  It 
is  one  among  many  of  those  salutary  shocks  which,  in  the 
pohtical  as  in  the  natural  world,  are  needed  from  time  to  time 
to  stimulate  action  and  prevent  torpor  and  apathy. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Reign  of  Artaxerxes  I.  Stories  told  of  him.  Most  probable  ac- 
count of  his  Descent,  Rank,  and  Parentage.  His  Contest 
ivith  Artabanus.  First  War  with  Chosroes  of  Armenia. 
Contest  with  Alexander  Severus.  Second  War  ivith  Chosroes 
and  conquest  of  Armenia.  Religious  Reforms.  Internal 
Administration  and  Government.  Art.  Coinage.  In- 
scriptions. 

XOv  SC.  'ApraPayov)  'Apxafe'pfijs  anoKTeCva.';,  Ile'pcran  tyjv  ap;^T)f  aveKTrjaaTo'  to  t«  yetTi'ioii' 
Ta  t9vr]  pap^apa  ;(eipwo-a/ii6vo?,  paSCmi  ^5t)  Kal  Tj7  'Pio/uiaiwi'  apxjj  eTre^ovKevo'ei'. — Hero- 
DiAN.  vi.  2,  ad  fin. 

Around  the  cradle  of  an  Oriental  sovereign  who  founds  a 
dynasty  there  cluster  commonly  a  number  of  traditions,  which 
have,  more  or  less,  a  mythical  character.  The  tales  told  of 
Cyrus  the  Great,  which  even  Herodotus  set  aside  as  incredible/ 


258  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCIIT.  [ch.  ni 

have  their  parallels  in  narratives  that  were  current  within 
one  or  two  centuries^  with  respect  to  the  founder  of  the  Second 
Persian  Empire,  which  would  not  have  disgraced  the  mytholo- 
gers  of  Achsemenian  times.     Artaxerxes,  according  to  some/ 
was  the  son  of  a  common  soldier  who  had  an  illicit  connection 
with  the  wife  of  a  Persian  cobbler^  and  astrologer,  a  certain 
Babek  or  Papak,  an  inhabitant  of  the  Cadusian  country^  and  a 
man  of  the  lowest  class. "    Papak,  knowing  by  his  art  that  the 
soldier's  son  would  attain  a  lofty  position,  voluntarily  ceded 
his  rights  as  husband  to  the  favorite  of  fortune,  and  bred  up  as 
his  own  the  issue  of  this  illegitimate  commerce,  who,  when  he 
attained  to  manhood,  justified  Papak's  foresight  by  successful- 
ly revolting  from  Artabanus  and  establishing  the  new  Persian 
monarchy.     Others'  said  that  the  founder  of  the  new  kingdom 
was  a  Parthian  satrap,  the  son  of  a  noble,  and  that,  having 
long  meditated  revolt,  he  took  the  final  plunge  in  consequence 
of  a  prophecy  uttered  by  Artabanus,  who  was  well  skilled  in 
magical  arts,  and  saw  in  the  stars  that  the  Parthian  empire 
was  threatened  with  destruction.     Artabanus,  on  a  certain  oc- 
cosion,  when  he  communicated  this  prophetic  knowledge  to  his 
wife,  was  overheard  by  one  of  her  attendants,  a  noble  damsel 
named  Artaducta,  already  affianced  to  Artaxerxes  and  a  sharer 
in  his  secret  counsels.     At  her  instigation  he  hastened  his 
plans,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt,  and  upon  the  successful 
issue  of  his  enterprise  made  her  his   queen.     Miraculous  cir- 
cumstances were  freely  interwoven  with  these  narratives,^  and 
a  result  was  produced  which  staggered  the  faith  even  of  such  a 
writer  as  Moses  of  Chorene,  who,  desiring  to  confine  himself 
to  what  was  strictly  true  and  certain,  could  find  no  more  to 
say  of  Artaxerxes' s  birth  and  origin  than  that  he  was  the  son  of 
a  certain  Sasan,  and  a  native  of  Istakr,  or  Pei'sepolis. 

Even,  however,  the  two  facts  thus  selected  as  beyond  criti- 
cism by  Moses  are  far  from  being  entitled  to  implicit  credence. 
Artaxerxes,  the  son  of  Sasan  according  to  Agathangelus  and 
Moses,"  is  the  same  as  Papak  (or  Babek)  in  his  own'"  and  his 
son's  inscriptions.  The  Persian  writers  generally  take  the 
same  view,  and  declare  that  Sasan  was  a  remoter  ancestor  of 
Artaxerxes,  the  acknowledged  founder  of  the  family,  and  not 
Artaxerxes'  father. "  In  the  extant  records  of  the  new  Persian 
Kingdom,  the  coins  and  the  inscriptions,  neither  Sasan  nor  the 
gentilitial  term  derived  from  it,  Sasanidae,  has  any  place ;  and 
though  it  would  perhaps  be  rash  to  question  on  this  account 
the  employment  of  the  term  Sasanidae  by  the  dynasty. '^- yet 


en.  HI.]        mS  PARENTAGE  AND  BIRTIirLACE.  0;-)9 

we  may  regard  it  as  really  "certain"  that  the  father  of  Arta- 
xerxes  was  named,  not  Sasan,  but  Papak ;  and  that,  if  the  term 
Sasanian  was  in  reality  a  patronymic,  it  was  derived,  like  the 
term  "  Acheemenian,"  "  from  some  remote  progenitor'*  whom 
the  royal  family  of  the  new  empire  believed  to  have  been  their 
founder. 

The  native  country  of  Artaxerxes  is  also  variously  stated  by 
the  authorities.  Agathangelus  calls  him  an  Assyrian,'^  and 
makes  the  Assyrians  play  an  important  part  in  his  rebelhon.  '* 
Agathias  says  that  he  was  born  in  the  Cadusian  country, "  or 
the  low  tract  south-west  of  the  Caspian,  which  belonged  to 
Media  rather  than  to  Assyria  or  Persia.  Dio  Cassius'"  and 
Herodian, '"  the  contemporaries  of  Artaxerxes,  call  him  a  Per- 
sian ;  and  there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  they  are  cor- 
rect in  so  doing.  Agathangelus  allows  the  predominantly  Per- 
sian character  of  his  revolt,  and  Agathias  is  apparently  un- 
aware that  the  Cadusian  country  was  no  part  of  Persia.  The 
statement  that  he  was  a  native  of  Persepolis  (Istakr)is  first  found 
in  Moses  of  Chorene.'-"  It  maybe  true,  but  it  is  uncertain;  for 
it  may  have  grown  out  of  the  earlier  statement  of  Agathange- 
lus, that  he  held  the  government  of  the  province  of  Istakr." 
We  can  only  affirm  with  confidence  that  the  founder  of  the 
new  Persian  monarchy  was  a  genuine  Persian,  without  attempt- 
ing to  determine  positively  what  Persian  city  or  province  had 
the  honor  of  producing  him.^" 

A  more  interesting  question,  and  one  which  will  be  found 
perhaps  to  admit  of  a  more  definite  answer,  is  that  of  the  rank 
and  station  in  which  Artaxerxes  was  born.  We  have  seen" 
that  Agathias  (writing  ab.  a.d.  580)  called  him  the  suppositi- 
tious son  of  a  cobbler.  Others"^  spoke  of  him  as  the  child  of  a 
shepherd;  while  some  said  that  his  father  was  "an  inferior 
officer  in  the  service  of  the  government.""  But  on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  inscriptions  wliich  Artaxerxes  himself  setup  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Persepolis,""  he  gives  his  father,  Papak, 
the  title  of  "  King."  Agathangelus  calls  him  a  "noble"  "  and 
"satrap  of  Persepolitan  government;""*  while  Herodian  seema 
to  speak  of  him  as  "king  of  the  Persians,"  before  his  victories 
over  Artabanus.""  On  the  whole,  it  is  perhaps  most  probable 
that,  like  Cyrus,  he  was  the  hereditary  monarch  of  the  subject 
kingdom  of  Persia,  which  had  always  its  own  princes  under 
the  Parthians,'"  and  that  thus  he  naturally  and  without  effort 
took  the  leadership  of  the  revolt  when  circumstances  induced 
his  nation  to  rebel  and  seek  to  establish  its  independence.    The 


200  THE  8EVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch  itr. 

stories  told  of  his  humble  origin,  which  are  contradictory  and 
improbable,  are  to  be  paralleled  with  those  which  made  Cyrus 
the  son  of  a  Persian  of  moderate  rank,'' and  the  foster-child 
of  a  herdsman.'^  There  is  always  in  the  East  a  tendency  to- 
wards romance  and  exaggeration ;  and  when  a  great  monarch 
emerges  from  a  comparatively  humble  position,  the  humihty 
and  obscurity  of  his  first  condition  are  intensified,  to  make  the 
contrast  more  striking  between  his  original  low  estate  and 
Lis  ultimate  splendor  and  dignity. 

The  circmnstances  of  the  struggle  between  Artaxerxes  and 
Artabanus  are  briefly  sketched  by  Dio  Cassius  ^'  and  Agath- 
angelus,'*  while  they  are  related  more  at  large  by  the  Persian 
writers.^*  It  is  probable  that  the  contest  occupied  a  space  of 
four  or  five  years.  At  first,  we  are  told, '"  Artabanus  neglected 
to  arouse  himself,  and  took  no  steps  towards  crushing  the  re- 
bellion, which  was  limited  to  an  assertion  of  the  independence 
of  Persia  Proper,  or  the  province  of  Fars.  After  a  time  the 
revolted  vassal,  finding  liimself  unmolested,  was  induced  to 
raise  his  thoughts  higher,  and  commenced  a  career  of  conquest. 
Turning  his  arms  eastward,  he  attacked  Kerman  (Carmania), 
and  easily  succeeded  in  reducing  that  scantily -peopled  tract 
under  his  dominion. ''  He  then  proceeded  to  menace  the  north, 
and,  making  war  in  that  quarter,  overran  and  attached  to  his 
kingdom  some  of  the  outlying  provinces  of  Media.  Roused  by 
these  aggressions,  the  Parthian  monarch  at  length  took  the 
field,  collected  an  army  consisting  in  part  of  Parthians,  in  part 
of  the  Persians  who  continued  faithful  to  him,  '*  against  his 
vassal,  and,  invading  Persia,  soon  brought  his  adversary  to  a 
battle.  A  long  and  bloody  contest  followed,  both  sides  suffer- 
ing great  losses ;  but  victory  finally  declared  itself  in  favor  of 
Artaxerxes,  through  the  desertion  to  him,  during  the  engage- 
ment, of  a  portion  of  his  enemy 's  forces. '*  A  second  conflict 
ensued  within  a  short  period,  in  which  the  insurgents  were 
even  more  completely  successful ;  the  carnage  on  the  side  of 
the  Parthians  was  great,  the  loss  of  the  Persians  small ;  and 
the  great  king  fled  precipitately  from  the  field.  Still  the  re- 
sources of  Parthia  were  equal  to  a  third  trial  of  arms.  After  a 
brief  pause,  Artabanus  made  a  final  effort  to  reduce  his  re- 
volted vassal ;  and  a  last  engagement  took  place  in  the  plain  of 
Hormuz,*"  which  was  a  portion  of  the  Jerahi  valley,  in  the 
beautiful  country  between  Bebahan  and  Shuster.  Here,  after 
a  desperate  conflict,  the  Parthian  monarch  suffered  a  third  and 
signal  defeat ;  his  army  was  scattered ;  and  he  himself  lost  his 


en.  m.]  Iim  CONTEST  WITH  ARTABANUS.  261 

life  in  the  combat.  According  to  some,  his  death  was  the  re- 
sult of  a  hand  to-hand  conflict  with  his  great  antagonist,'"  who, 
pretending  to  fly,  drew  him  on,  and  then  pierced  his  heart 
with  an  arrow. 

The  victory  of  Hormiiz  gave  to  Artaxerxes  the  dominion  of 
the  East ;  but  it  did  not  secure  him  this  result  at  once,  or  with- 
out further  struggle.  Artabanus  had  left  sons ;  *-  and  both  in 
Bactria  and  Armenia  there  were  powerful  branches  of  the 
Arsacid  family,"  which  could  not  see  unmoved  the  doAvnfall 
of  their  kindred  in  Parthia.  Chosroes,  the  Armenian  mon- 
arch, was  a  prince  of  considerable  abihty,  and  is  said  to  have 
been  set  upon  his  throne  by  Artabanus,  whose  brother  he  was, 
according  to  some  writers."  At  any  rate  he  was  an  Arsacid; 
and  he  felt  keenly  the  diminution  of  his  own  influence  involved 
in  the  transfer  to  an  alien  race  of  the  sovereignty  wielded  for 
five  centuries  by  the  descendants  of  the  first  Arsaces.  He  had 
set  his  forces  in  motion,  while  the  contest  between  Artabanus 
and  Artaxerxes  was  still  in  progress,  in  the  hope  of  affording 
substantial  help  to  his  relative.*^  But  the  march  of  events  was 
too  rapid  for  him ;  and,  ere  he  could  strike  a  blow,  he  found 
that  the  time  for  effectual  action  had  gone  by,  that  Artabanus 
was  no  more,  and  that  the  dominion  of  Artaxerxes  was  estab- 
lished over  most  of  the  countries  which  had  previously  formed 
portions  of  the  Parthian  Empire.  Still,  he  resolved  to  continue 
the  struggle;  he  was  on  friendly  terms  with  Eome,"  and 
might  count  on  an  imperial  contingent;  he  had  some  hope  that 
the  Bactrian  Arsacidse  would  join  him ;  "  at  the  worst,  he  re- 
garded his  own  power  as  firmly  fixed  and  as  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  maintain  an  equal  contest  wdth  the  new  monarchy. 
Accordingly  he  took  the  Parthian  Arsacids  under  his  protec- 
tion, and  gave  them  a  refuge  in  the  Armenian  territory."^  At 
the  same  time  he  negotiated  with  both  Balkh  and  Rome,  made 
arrangements  with  the  barbarians  upon  his  northern  frontier 
to  lend  him  aid,''"  and,  having  collected  a  large  army,  invaded 
the  new  kingdom  on  the  north-west,  ^°  and  gained  certain  not 
unimportant  successes.  According  to  the  Armenian  historians, 
Artaxerxes  lost  Assyria  and  the  adjacent  regions;  Bactria 
wavered ;  and,  after  the  struggle  had  continued  for  a  year  or 
two,  the  founder  of  the  second  Persian  empire  w^as  obliged  to 
fly  ignominiously  to  India!  ^'  But  this  entire  narrative  seems 
to  be  deeply  tinged  with  the  vitiating  stain  of  intense  national 
vanity,  a  fault  which  markedly  characterizes  the  Armenian 
writers,  and  renders  them,  when  unconfirmed  by  other  author- 


252  THE  SEVENTH  MONAJtCHY.  [ch.  hi. 

ities,  almost  worthless.  The  general  course  of  events,  and  the 
position  which  Artaxerxes  takes  in  his  dealings  with  Eome 
(A.D,  229 — 230),  sufficiently  indicate  that  any  reverses  which 
he  sustained  at  this  time  in  his  struggle  with  Chosroes  and  the 
unsuhmitted  Arsacidse  "  must  have  been  trivial,  and  that  they 
certainly  had  no  greater  result  than  to  estabhsh  the  independ- 
ence of  Armenia,  which,  by  dint  of  leaning  upon  Rome,^^  was 
able  to  maintain  itself  against  the  Persian  monarch  and  to 
check  the  advance  of  the  Persians  in  North-Western  Asia. 

Artaxerxes,  however,  resisted  in  this  quarter,  and  unable  to 
overcome  the  resistance,  which  he  may  have  regarded  as 
deriving  its  effectiveness  (in  part  at  least)  from  the  support  lent 
it  by  Rome,  determined  (ab.  A.D.  229)  to  challenge  the  empire  to 
an  encounter.  Aware  that  Artabanus,  his  late  rival,  against 
whom  he  had  measured  himself,  and  whose  power  he  had 
completely  overthrown,  had  been  successful  in  his  war  with 
Macrinus,  had  gained  the  great  battle  of  Nisibis,  and  forced 
the  Impei-ial  State  to  purchase  an  ignominious  peace  by  a  pay- 
ment equal  to  nearly  two  millions  of  our  money, "he  may 
naturally  have  thought  that  a  facile  triumph  was  open  to  his 
arms  in  this  direction.  Alexander  Severus,  the  occupant  of 
the  imperial  throne,  was  a  young  man  of  a  weak  character, 
controlled  in  a  gi-eat  measure  by  his  mother,  Julia  Mamsea, 
and  as  yet  quite  undistinguished  as  a  general.  The  Roman 
forces  in  the  East  were  known  to  be  licentious  and  insuboi'di- 
nate  \^^  corrupted  by  the  softness  of  the  climate  and  the 
seductions  of  Oriental  manners,  they  disregarded  the  restraints 
of  discipline,  indulged  in  the  vices  which  at  once  enervate  the 
frame  and  lower  the  moral  character,  had  scant  respect  for 
their  leaders,  and  seemed  a  defence  which  it  would  be  easy  to 
overpower  and  sweep  away.  Artaxerxes,  like  other  founders 
of  great  empires,  entertained  lofty  views  of  his  abilities  and 
his  destinies ;  the  monarchy  which  he  had  built  up  in  the  space 
of  some  five  or  six  years  was  far  from  contenting  him ;  well 
read  in  the  ancient  history  of  his  nation,  he  sighed  after  the 
glorious  days  of  Cyrus  the  Great  and  Darius  Hystaspis,  when 
all  Western  Asia  from  the  shores  of  the  ^gean  to  the  Indian 
desert,  and  portions  of  Europe  and  Africa,  had  acknowledged 
the  sway  of  the  Persian  king.  The  territories  wliich  these 
princes  had  ruled  he  regarded  as  his  own  by  right  of  inherit- 
ance ;  and  we  are  told  that  he  not  only  entertained,  but  boldly 
published,  these  views.'"'  His  emissaries  everywhere  declared 
that  their  master  claimed  the  dominion  of  Asia  as  far  as  the 


CH.  m.]  NEGOTTATIONS  WITH  ROME.  263 

^gean  Sea  and  the  Propontis.  It  was  his  duty  and  his 
mission  to  recover  to  the  Persians  their  pristine  empire.  What 
Cyrus  had  conquered,  what  the  Persian  kings  had  held  from 
that  time  until  the  defeat  of  Codomannus  by  Alexander,  was 
his  by  indefeasible  right,  and  he  was  about  to  take  possession 
of  it. 

Nor  were  these  brave  words  a  mere  6rtt^M?n/i/Z?nen.  Simul- 
taneously with  the  putting  forth  of  such  lofty  pretensions  the 
troops  of  the  Persian  monarch  crossed  the  Tigris  and  spread 
themselves  over  the  entire  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia,"'  if' 
which  was  rapidly  overrun  and  offered  scarcely  any  resistance. 
Severus  learned  at  the  same  moment  the  demands  of  his 
adversary  and  the  loss  of  one  of  his  best  provinces.  He  heard 
that  his  strong  posts  upon  the  Euphrates,  the  old  defences  of 
the  empire  in  this  quarter,  were  being  attacked,  "**  and  that 
Syria  daily  expected  the  passage  of  the  invaders.  The  crisis 
was  one  requiring  prompt  action ;  but  the  weak  and  inexperi- 
enced youth  was  content  to  meet  it  with  diplomacy,  and, 
instead  of  sending  an  army  to  the  East,  despatched  ambassa- 
dors to  his  rival  with  a  letter.  "  Artaxerxes, ''  he  said,  "  ought 
to  confine  himself  to  his  own  territories  and  not  seek  to 
revolutionize  Asia;  it  was  unsafe,  on  the  strength  of  mere 
unsubstantial  hopes,  to  commence  a  great  war.  Every  one 
should  be  content  with  keeping  what  belonged  to  him. 
Artaxerxes  would  find  war  with  Rome  a  very  different  thing 
from  the  contests  in  which  he  had  been  hitherto  engaged  witli 
barbarous  races  like  his  own.  He  should  call  to  mind  the 
succes'=ses  of  AugustxiK  and  Trajan,  and  the  trophies  carried  ofl^ 
from  the  East  by  Lucius  Verus  and  by  Septimius  Severus." 

The  counsels  of  moderation  have  rarely  much  effect  in 
restraining  princely  ambition.  Artaxerxes  replied  by  an 
embassy  in  which  he  ostentatiously  displayed  the  wealth  and 
magnificence  of  Persia  i^**  but,  so  far  from  making  any  deduc- 
tion from  his  original  demands,  he  now  distinctly  formulated 
them,  and  required  their  immediate  acceptance.  '  'Artaxerxes, 
the  Great  King,"  he  said,  "ordered''"  the  Romans  and  their 
ruler  to  take  their  departure  forthwith  from  Syria  and  the  rest 
of  Western  Asia,  and  to  allow  the  Persians  to  exercise  domin- 
ion over  Ionia  and  Caria  and  the  other  countries  within  the 
.^gean  and  the  Euxine,  since  these  countries  belonged  to 
Persia  by  right  of  inheritance.""'  A  Roman  emperor  had 
seldom  received  such  a  message;  and  Alexander,  mild  and 
g-^ntle  as  he  was  by  nature,  seems  to  have  had  his  equanimity 


2G4 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  HI. 


disturbed  by  the  insolence  of  the  mandate.  Disregarding  the 
sacredness  of  the  ambassadorial  character,  he  stripped  the 
envoys  of  their  splendid  apparel,  treated  them  as  prisoners  of 
war,  and  settled  them  as  agricultural  colonists  in  Phrygia.  If 
we  may  believe  Herodian,  he  even  took  credit  to  himself  for 
sparing  their  lives,  which  he  regarded  as  justly  forfeit  to  the 
offended  majesty  of  the  empire. 

Meantime  the  angry  prince,  convinced  at  last  against  his 
will  that  negotiations  with  such  an  enemy  were  futile,  col- 
lected an  army  and  began  his  march  towards  the  East.  Tak- 
ing troops  from  the  various  provinces  through  which  he 
passed,"'  he  conducted  to  Aiitioch,  in  the  autumn  of  a.d. 
231,''  a  considerable  force,  which  was  there  augmented  by  the 
legions  of  the  East  and  by  troops  drawn  from  Egypt  *'  and 
other  quarters.  Artaxerxes,  on  his  part,  was  not  idle.  Ac- 
cording to  Severus  himself,"  the  army  brought  into  the  field 
by  the  Persian  monarch  consisted  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  mailed  horsemen,  of  eighteen  hundred  scythed 
chariots,  and  of  seven  hundred  trained  elephants,  bearing  on 
their  backs  towers  filled  with  archers ;  and  though  this  pre- 
tended host  has  been  truly  characterized  as  one  "theUke  of 
which  is  not  to  be  found  in  Eastern  history,  and  has  scarcely 
been  imagined  in  Eastern  romance, '"''' yet,  allowing  much  for 
exaggeration,  we  may  still  safely  conclude  that  great  exer- 
tions had  been  made  on  the  Persian  side,  that  their  forces  con- 
sisted of  the  three  arms  mentioned,  and  that  the  numbers  of 
each  were  large  beyond  ordinary  precedent.  The  two  adver- 
saries were  thus  not  ill-matched ;  each  brought  the  flc  'ver  of 
his  troops  to  the  conflict;  each  commanded  the  army,  on 
which  his  dependence  was  placed,  in  person;  each  looked  to 
obtain  from  the  contest  not  only  an  increase  of  military  glory, 
but  substantial  fruits  of  victory  in  the  shape  of  plunder  or 
territory. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  Persian  monarch,  after 
the  high  tone  which  he  had  taken,  would  have  maintained  an 
aggressive  attitude,  have  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and  spread 
the  hordes  at  his  disposal  over  Syria,  Cappadocia,  and  Asia 
Minor.  But  it  seems  to  be  certain  that  he  did  not  do  so,  and 
that  the  initiative  was  taken  by  the  other  side.  Probably  the 
Persian  arms,  as  inefficient  in  sieges  as  the  Parthian,"  were 
unable  to  overcome  the  resistance  offered  by  the  Eoman  forts 
upon  the  great  river ;  and  Artaxerxes  was  too  good  a  general 
to  throw  his  forces  into  the  heart  of  an  enemy's  country  with* 


en.  III.]  PLANS  OF  AL^XANDEU  SlSVBRVS.  ^65 

out  having  first  secured  a  safe  retreat.  The  Euphrates  was 
therefore  crossed  by  his  adversary"'  in  the  spring  of  a.d.  233; 
the  Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia  was  easily  recovered ;°' 
and  arrangements  were  made  by  which  it  was  hoped  to  deal 
the  new  monarchy  a  heavy  blow,  if  not  actually  to  ci-ush 
and  conquer  it." 

Alexander  divided  his  troops  into  three  bodies.  One  division 
was  to  act  towards  the  north,  to  take  advantage  of  the  friendly 
disposition  of  Chosroes,  king  of  Armenia,  and,  traversing  his 
strong  mountain  territory,  to  direct  its  attack  upon  Media, 
into  which  Armenia  gave  a  ready  entrance.  Another  was  to 
take  a  southern  line, ' '  and  to  threaten  Persia  Proper  from  the 
marshy  tract  about  the  junction  of  the  Euphrates  with  the 
Tigris,  a  portion  of  the  Babylonian  territory.  The  third  and 
main  division,  which  was  to  be  cormnanded  by  the  emperor  in 
person,  was  to  act  on  a  line  intermediate  between  the  other 
two,  which  would  conduct  it  to  the  very  heart  of  the  enemy's 
territory,  and  at  the  same  time  allow  of  its  giving  effective 
support  to  either  of  the  two  other  divisions  if  they  should  need 
it. 

The  plan  of  operations  appears  to  have  been  judiciously  con- 
structed, and  should  perhaps  be  ascribed  rather  to  the  friends 
whom  the  youthfid  emperor  consulted"  than  to  liis  own  un- 
assisted wisdom.  But  the  best  designed  plans  may  be  frus- 
trated by  unskilfulness  or  timidity  in  the  execution;  and  it 
was  here,  if  we  may  trust  the  author  who  alone  gives  us  any 
detailed  account  of  the  campaign,''  that  the  weakness  of  Alex- 
ander's character  showed  itself.  The  northern  army  success- 
fully traversed  Armenia,  and,  invading  Media,  proved  itself  in 
numerous  small  actions  superior  to  the  Persian  force  opposed 
to  it,  and  was  able  to  plunder  and  ravage  the  entire  country  at 
its  pleasure.  The  southern  division  crossed  Mesopotamia  in 
safety,  and  threatened  to  invade  Persia  Proper.'^  Had  Alex- 
ander with  the  third  and  main  division  kept  faith  with  the  two 
secondary  armies,  had  he  marched  briskly  and  combined  his 
movements  with  theirs,  the  triumph  of  the  Roman  arms 
would  have  been  assured.  But,  either  from  personal  timidity 
or  from  an  amiable  regard  for  the  anxieties  of  his  mother 
Mamsea,  he  hung  back  while  his  right  and  left  wings  made 
their  advance,  and  so  allowed  the  enemy  to  concentrate  their 
efforts  on  these  two  isolated  bodies.  The  army  in  Media, 
favored  by  the  iiigged  character  of  the  country,  was  able  to 
maintain  its  ground  without  much  diflSculty ;  but  that  which 


2G6  THE  8EVENTB  MONAliCJlT.  [ch.  iii: 

had  advanced  by  the  Hne  of  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  and 
which  was  still  marching  through  the  boundless  plains  of 
the  great  alluvium,  found  itself  suddenly  beset  by  a  countless 
host,  commanded  by  Artaxerxes  in  person,  and,  though  it 
struggled  gallantly,  was  overwhelmed  and  utterly  destroyed 
by  the  arrows  of  the  terrible  Persian  bowmen.  Herodian 
says,  no  doubt  with  some  exaggeration,  that  this  was  the 
greatest  calamity  which  had  ever  befallen  the  Romans."  It 
certainly  cannot  compare  with  Cannae,  with  the  disaster  of 
Varus,  or  even  with  the  similar  defeat  of  Crassus  in  a  not  very 
distant  region.  But  it  was  (if  rightly  represented  by  Hero- 
dian) a  terrible  blow.  It  absolutely  determined  the  campaign. 
A  Csesar  or  a  Trajan  might  have  retrieved  such  a  loss.  An 
Alexander  Severus  was  not  hkely  even  to  make  an  attempt 
to  do  so.  Already  weakened  in  body  by  the  heat  of  the 
climate  and  the  unwonted  fatigues  of  war,"  he  was  utterly 
prostrated  in  spirit  by  the  inteUigence  when  it  reached  him. 
The  signal  was  at  once  given  for  retreat.  Orders  were  sent  to 
the  corps  cf  armee  which  occupied  Media  to  evacuate  its  con- 
quests and  to  retire  forthwith  upon  the  Euphrates.  These 
orders  were  executed,  but  with  difficulty.  Winter  had  already 
set  in  throughout  the  high  regions;  and  in  its  retreat  the 
army  of  Media  suffered  great  losses  through  the  inclemency 
of  the  climate,  so  that  those  who  reached  Syria  were  but  a 
small  proportion  of  the  original  force.  Alexander  himself, 
and  the  army  which  he  led,  experienced  less  difficulty;  but 
disease  dogged  the  steps  of  this  di\'ision,  and  when  its  columns 
reached  Antioch  it  was  found  to  be  greatly  reduced  in  num- 
bers by  sickness,  though  it  had  never  confronted  an  enemy. 
The  three  armies  of  Severus  suffered  not  indeed  equally,  but 
still  in  every  case  considerably,  from  three  distinct  causes — 
sickness,  severe  weather,  and  marked  inferiority  to  the 
enemy. '^  The  last-named  cause  had  annihilated  the  southern 
division;  the  northern  had  succumbed  to  climate;  the  main 
army,  led  by  Severus  himself,  was  (comparatively  speaking) 
intact,  but  even  this  had  been  decimated  by  sickness,  and  was 
not  in  a  condition  to  carry  on  the  war  with  vigor.  The  result 
of  the  campaign  had  thus  been  altogether  favorable  to  the 
Persians,"  but  yet  it  had  convinced  Artaxerxes  that  Rome 
was  more  powerful  than  he  had  thought.  It  had  shown  him 
that  in  imagining  the  time  had  arrived  when  they  might  be 
easily  driven  out  of  Asia  he  had  made  a  mistake.  The  im- 
perial power  had  proved  itself  strong  enough  to  penetrate 


cir.  III.]  RESULTS  OF  THE  ROMAN  WAR.  267 

deeply  within  his  territory,  to  ravage  some  of  his  best  prov- 
inces, and  to  threaten  his  capital.''*  The  grand  ideas  with 
which  he  had  entered  upon  the  contest  had  consequently  to  be 
abandoned ;  and  it  had  to  be  recognized  that  the  struggle  with 
Rome  was  one  in  which  the  two  parties  were  very  evenly 
matched,  one  in  which  it  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  either 
side  would  very  soon  obtain  any  decided  preponderance. 
"  Under  these  circumstances  the  grand  ideas  were  quietly 
dropped;  the  army  which  had  been  gathered  together  to  en- 
force them  was  allowed  to  disperse,  and  was  not  required 
within  any  given  time  to  reassemble  ;  it  is  not  unlikely  that 
(as  Niebuhr  conjectures^")  a  peace  was  made,  though  whether 
Rome  ceded  any  of  her  territory*'  by  its  terms  is  exceedingly 
doubtful.  Probably  the  general  principle  of  the  arrangement 
was  a  return  to  ihestatus  quo  ante  helium,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  acceptance  by  either  side,  as  the  true  territorial  limits- 
between  Rome  and  Persia,  of  those  boundaries  which  had  been 
previously  held  to  divide  the  imperial  possessions  from  the 
dominions  of  the  Arsacidae. 

The  issue  of  the  struggle  was  no  doubt  disappointing  to 
Artaxerxes ;  but  if,  on  the  one  hand,  it  dispelled  some  illusions 
and  proved  to  him  that  the  Roman  State,  though  verging  to 
its  decline,  nevertheless  still  possessed  a  vigor  and  a  life  which 
he  had  been  far  from  anticipating,  on  the  other  hand  it  left 
him  free  to  concentrate  his  efforts  on  the  reduction  of  Armenia, 
which  was  really  of  more  importance  to  him,  from  Armenia 
being  the  great  stronghold  of  the  Arsacid  power,  than  the 
nominal  attachment  to  the  empire  of  half-a-dozen  Roman 
provinces.  So  long  as  Arsacidae  maintained  themselves  in  a 
position  of  independence  and  substantial  power  so  near  the 
Persian  borders,  and  in  a  country  of  such  extent  and  such 
vast  natural  strength  as  Armenia,  there  could  not  but  be  a 
danger  of  reaction,  of  the  nations  again  reverting  to  the  yoke 
whereto  they  had  by  long  use  become  accustomed,  and  of  the 
star  of  the  Sasanidae  paling  before  that  of  the  former  masters 
of  Asia.  It  was  essential  to  the  consolidation  of  the  new  Per- 
sian Empire  that  Armenia  should  be  subjugated,  or  at  any 
rate  that  Arsacidse  should  cease  to  govern  it ;  and  the  fact  that 
the  peace  which  appears  to  have  been  made  between  Rome 
and  Persia,  a.d.  232,  set  Artaxerxes  at  liberty  to  direct  all  his 
endeavors  to  the  establishment  of  such  relations  between  his 
own  state  and  Armenia  as  l.o  doomed  required  by  public  policy 
and  necessary  for  the  security  of  his  own  power,  must  be  re- 


2C8  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  in. 

garded  as  one  of  paramount  importance,  and  as  probably  one 
of  the  causes  mainly  actuating  him  in  the  negotiations  and  in- 
clining him  to  consent  to  peace  on  any  fair  and  eqviitable  terms. 
Consequently,  the  immediate  result  of  hostihties  ceasing  be- 
tween Persia  and  Rome  was  their  renewal  between  Persia  and 
Armenia.  The  war  had  indeed,  in  one  sense,  never  ceased; 
for  Chosroes  had  been  an  ally  of  the  Romans  during  the  cam- 
paign of  Severus,*"  and  had  no  doubt  played  a  part  in  the  in- 
vasion and  devastation  of  Media  which  have  been  described 
above."  But,  the  Romans  having  withdrawn,  he  was  left 
wholly  dependent  on  his  own  resources ;  and  the  entire  strength 
of  Persia  was  now  doubtless  brought  into  the  field  against  him. 
Still  he  defended  himself  with  such  success,  and  caused  Arta- 
xerxes  so  much  alarm,  that  after  a  time  that  monarch  began  to 
despair  of  ever  conquering  his  adversary  by  fair  means,  and 
cast  about  for  some  other  mode  of  accompHshing  his  purpose. 
Summoning  an  assembly  of  all  the  vassal  kings,  the  governors, 
and  the  commandants  throughout  the  empire,  he  besought 
them  to  find  some  cure  for  the  existing  distress,  at  the  same 
time  promising  a  rich  reward  to  the  man  who  should  contrive 
an  effectual  remedy.  The  second  place  in  the  kingdom  should 
be  his ;  he  should  have  dominion  over  one  half  of  the  Arians  \^* 
nay,  he  should  share  the  Persian  throne  with  Artaxerxes  him- 
self, and  hold  a  rank  and  dignity  only  slightly  inferior.  We 
are  told  that  these  offers  prevailed  with  a  noble  of  the  empire, 
named  Anak,**^  a  man  who  had  Arsacid  blood  in  his  veins,  and 
belonged  to  that  one  of  the  three  branches  of  the  old  royal 
stock  which  had  long  been  settled  at  Bactria  (Balkh),  and  that 
he  was  induced  thereby  to  come  forward  and  undertake  the 
assassination  of  Chosroes,  who  was  his  near  relative  and  would 
not  be  likely  to  suspect  him  of  an  ill  intent.  Artaxerxes 
warmly  encouraged  him  in  his  design,  and  in  a  little  time  it 
was  successfully  carried  out.  Anak,  with  his  wife,  his  chil- 
dren, his  brother,  and  a  train  of  attendants,  pretended  to  take 
refuge  in  Armenia  from  the  threatened  vengeance  of  his  sov- 
ereign, who  caused  his  troops  to  pursue  him,  as  a  rebel  and 
deserter,  to  the  very  borders  of  Armenia.  Unsuspicious  of 
any  evil  design,  Chosroes  received  the  exiles  with  favor,  dis- 
cussed with  them  his  plans  for  the  subjugation  of  Persia,  and, 
having  sheltered  them  during  the  whole  of  the  autumn  and 
winter,  proposed  to  them  in  the  spring  that  they  should  ac- 
company him  and  take  part  in  the  year's  campaign. "  Anak, 
forced  by  this  proposal  to  precipitate  his  designs,  contrived  a 


en.  HI.]  ARMENIA  SUBJUGATED.  269 

meeting  between  himself,  his  brother,  and  Chosroes,  without 
attendants,  on  the  pretext  of  discussing  plans  of  attack,  and, 
having  thus  got  the  Armenian  monarch  at  a  disadvantage, 
drew  sword  upon  him,  together  with  his  brother,  and  easily 
put  him  to  death.  The  crime  which  he  had  undertaken  was 
thus  accomplished ;  but  he  did  not  live  to  receive  the  reward 
promised  him  for  it.  Armenia  rose  in  arms  on  learning  the 
foul  deed  wrought  upon  its  king;  the  bridges  and  the  few 
practicable  outlets  by  which  the  capital  could  be  quitted  were 
occupied  by  armed  men ;  and  the  murderers,  driven  to  despe- 
ration, lost  their  lives  in  an  attempt  to  make  their  escape  by 
swimming  the  river  Araxes. "  Thus  Artaxerxes  obtained  his 
object  without  having  to  pay  the  price  that  he  had  agreed 
upon;  his  dreaded  rival  was  removed;  Armenia  lay  at  his 
mercy ;  and  he  had  not  to  weaken  his  power  at  home  by  shar- 
ing it  with  an  Arsacid  partner. 

The  Persian  monarch  allowed  the  Armenians  no  time  to 
recover  from  the  blow  which  he  had  treacherously  dealt  them. 
His  armies  at  once  entered  their  territory^**  and  carried  every- 
thing before  them.  Chosroes  seems  to  have  had  no  son  of 
sufficient  age  to  succeed  him,  and  the  defence  of  the  country 
fell  upon  the  satraps,  or  governors  of  the  several  provinces. 
These  chiefs  implored  the  aid  of  the  Roman  emperor,*'^  and  re- 
ceived a  contingent ;  but  neither  were  their  own  exertions  nor 
was  the  valor  of  their  allies  of  any  avail.  Artaxerxes  easily 
defeated  the  confederate  army,  and  forced  the  satraps  to  take 
refuge  in  Roman  territory.  Armenia  submitted  to  his  arms, 
and  became  an  integral  portion  of  his  empire.""  It  probably 
did  not  greatly  trouble  him  that  Artavasdes,  one  of  the  satraps, 
succeeded  in  carrying  off  one  of  the  sons  of  Chosroes,  a  boy 
named  Tiridates,  whom  he  conveyed  to  Rome,  and  placed  un- 
der the  protection  of  the  reigning  emperor."' 

Such  were  the  chief  military  successes  of  Artaxerxes.  The 
greatest  of  our  historians,  Gibbon,  ventures  indeed  to  assign 
to  him,  in  addition,  "some  easy  victories  over  the  wild  Scyth- 
ians and  the  effeminate  Indians."'  But  there  is  no  good 
authority  for  this  statement ;  and  on  the  whole  it  is  unlikely 
that  he  came  into  contact  with  either  nation.  His  coins  are 
not  found  in  Afghanistan ;"'  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
he  ever  made  any  eastern  expedition.  His  reign  was  not  long ; 
and  it  was  sufficiently  occupied  by  the  Roinan  and  Ai*menian 
wars,  and  by  the  greatest  of  all  his  works,  the  reformation  of 
religion. 


270  TUB  SEVENTH  3I0NABCHY.  [cii.  iii. 

The  religious  aspect  of  the  insurrection  which  transferred 
the  headship  of  Western  Asia  from  the  Parthians  to  the 
Persians,  from  Artabanus  to  Ai'taxerxes,  has  been  already 
noticed  ;"*  but  we  have  now  to  trace,  so  far  as  we  can,  the 
steps  by  which  the  religious  revolution  was  accomplished,  and 
the  faith  of  Zoroaster,  or  what  was  believed  to  be  such,  estab- 
lished as  the  religion  of  the  State  throughout  the  new  empire. 
Artaxerxes,  himself  (if  we  may  believe  Agathias"^)  a  Magus, 
was  resolved  from  the  first  that,  if  liis  efforts  to  shake  off  the 
Parthian  y^oke  succeeded,  he  would  use  his  best  endeavors  to 
overthrow  the  Parthian  idolatry  and  install  in  its  stead  the 
ancestral  religion  of  the  Persians.  This  religion  consisted  of  a 
combination  of  Dualism  with  a  qualified  creature -worship,  and 
a  special  reverence  for  the  elements,  earth,  air,  water,  and 
fire.  Zoroastrianism,  in  the  earliest  form  which  is  historically 
known  to  us,°°  postulated  two  independent  and  contending 
principles — a  principle  of  good,  Ahura-Mazda,  and  a  principle 
of  evil,  Angro-Mainyus.  These  beings,  who  were  coeternal 
and  coequal,  were  engaged  in  a  perpetual  struggle  for  su- 
premacy ;  and  the  world  was  the  battle-field  wherein  the  strife 
was  carried  on.  Each  had  called  into  existence  numerous 
inferior  beings,  through  whose  agency  they  waged  their 
interminable  conflict.  Ahura-Mazda  (Oromazdes,  Ormazd) 
had  created  thousands  of  angelic  beings  to  perform  his  will 
and  fight  on  his  side  against  the  Evil  One ;  and  Angro-Main- 
yus (Arimanius,  Ahriman)  had  equally  on  his  part  called  into 
being  thousands  of  malignant  spirits  to  be  his  emissaries  in  the 
world,  to  do  his  work,  and  fight  his  battles.  The  gi-eater  of 
the  powers  called  into  being  by  Ahura-Mazda  were  proper 
objects  of  the  worship  of  man,"  though,  of  course,  his  main 
worship  was  to  be  given  to  Ahura-Mazda.  Angro-Mainyus 
was  not  to  be  worshipped,  but  to  be  hated  and  feared.  With 
this  dualistic  belief  had  been  combined,  at  a  time  not  much 
later  than  that  of  Darius  Hystaspis,  an  entirely  separate 
system,"^  the  worship  of  the  elements.  Fire,  air,  earth,  and 
water  were  regarded  as  essentially  ho,ly,  and  to  pollute  any  of 
them  was  a  crime.  Fire  was  especially  to  be  held  in  honor ; 
and  it  became  an  essential  part  of  the  Persian  religion  to  main- 
tain perpetually  upon  the  fire-altars  the  sacred  flame,  supposed 
to  have  been  originally  kindled  from  heaven,  and  to  see  that 
it  never  went  out."'  Together  with  this  elemental  worship 
was  introduced  into  the  religion  a  profound  regard  for  an 
order  of  priests    called  Magians,   who  interposed  themselves 


CH.  III.]  ARTAXERXES  RESTORES  ZOUOASTRIANISM.       271 

between  the  deity  and  the  worshipper,""  and  claimed  to 
possess  prophetic  powers. ""  This  ]\Iagian  order  was  a  priest- 
caste,  and  exercised  vast  influence,  being  internally  organized 
into  a  hierarchy  containing  many  ranks,  and  claiming  a 
sanctity  far  above  that  of  the  best  laymen. 

Artaxerxes  found  the  Magian  order  depressed  by  the  syste- 
matic action  of  the  later  Parthian  princes, '"-  who  had  practi- 
cally fallen  away  from  the  Zoroastrian  faith  and  become  mere 
idolaters.  He  found  the  fire-altars  in  ruins,  the  sacred  flame 
extinguished,""  the  most  essential  of  the  Magian  ceremonies 
and  practices  disregarded.""  Everywhere,  except  perhaps  in 
his  own  province  of  Persia  Proper,  he  found  idolatry  estab- 
lished. Temples  of  the  sun  abounded,  where  images  of  Mithra 
were  the  object  of  worship,""  and  the  Mitlii'aic  cult  was 
carried  out  with  a  variety  of  imposing  ceremonies.  Similar 
temples  to  the  moon  existed  in  many  places ;  and  the  images 
of  the  Arsacidee  were  associated  with  those  of  the  sun  and 
moon  gods  in  the  sanctuaries  dedicated  to  them. '""  The  pre- 
cepts of  Zoroaster  were  forgotten.  The  sacred  compositions 
which  bore  that  sage's  name,  and  had  been  handed  down  from 
a  remote  antiquity,  were  still  indeed  preserved,  if  not  in  a 
written  form, '"  yet  in  the  memory  of  the  faithful  few  who 
clung  to  the  old  creed ;  but  they  had  ceased  to  be  regarded  as 
binding  upon  their  consciences  by  the  great  mass  of  the 
Western  Asiatics.  Western  Asia  was  a  seething-pot,  in  which 
were  mixed  up  a  score  of  contradictory  creeds,  old  and  new, 
rational  and  irrational,  Sabaism,  Magism,  Zoroastrianism, 
Grecian  polytheism,  teraphim- worship,  Judaism,  Chaldee 
mysticism,  Christianity.  Artaxerxes  conceived  it  to  be  his 
mission  to  evoke  order  out  of  this  confusion,  to  establish  in 
lieu  of  this  extreme  diversity  an  absolute  uniformity  of  re- 
ligion. 

The  steps  which  he  took  to  effect  his  purpose  seem  to  have 
been  the  following.  He  put  down  idolatry  by  a  general 
destruction  of  the  images,  which  he  overthrew  and  broke  to 
pieces.""  He  raised  the  Magian  hierarchy  to  a  position  of 
honor  and  dignity  such  as  they  had  scarcely  enjoyed  even 
under  the  later  Achsemenian  princes, "''  securing  them  in  a  con- 
dition of  pecuniary  independence  by  assignments  of  lands,"" 
and  also  by  allowing  their  title  to  claim  from  the  faithful  the 
tithe  of  all  their  possessions.'"  He  caused  the  sacred  fire  to  be 
rekindled  on  the  altars  where  it  was  extinguished,""  and 
assigned  to  certain  bodies  of  priests  the  charge  of  paaintainin;; 


272  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  hi. 

the  fire  in  each  locality.  He  then  proceeded  to  collect  the  sup- 
posed precepts  of  Zoroaster  into  a  volume,  in  order  to  estab- 
lish a  standard  of  orthodoxy  whereto  he  might  require  all  to 
conform.  He  found  the  Zoroastrians  themselves  divided  into 
a  number  of  sects.  "^  Among  these  he  established  uniformity 
by  means  of  a  "general  council,"  which  was  attended  by  Magi 
from  all  parts  of  the  empire,  and  which  settled,  what  was  to  be 
regarded  as  the  true  Zoroastrian  faith.  According  to  the  Ori- 
ental writers,  this  was  effected  in  the  following  way:  Forty 
thousand,  or,  according  to  others,  eighty  thousand  Magi  hav- 
ing assembled,  they  were  successively  reduced  by  their  own 
act  to  four  thousand,  to  four  hundred,  to  forty,  and  finally  to 
seven,  the  most  higlily  respected  for  their  piety  and  learning. 
Of  these  seven  there  was  one,  a  young  but  holy  priest,  whom 
the  universal  consent  of  his  brethren  recognized  as  pre-emi- 
nent. His  name  was  Arda-Viraf .  ' '  Having  passed  through 
the  strictest  ablutions,  and  drunk  a  powerful  opiate,  he  was 
covered  with  a  white  linen  and  laid  to  sleep.  Watched  by 
seven  of  the  nobles,  including  the  king,  he  slept  for  seven  days 
and  nights ;  and,  on  his  reawaking,  the  whole  nation  listened 
with  believing  wonder  to  his  exposition  of  the  faith  of  Ormazd, 
which  was  carefully  written  down  by  an  attendant  scribe  for 
the  benefit  of  posterity."  ''* 

The  result,  however  brought  about,  which  must  always  re- 
main doubtful,  was  the  authoritative  issue  of  a  volume  wliich 
the  learned  of  Europe  have  now  possessed  for  some  quarter  of 
a  century,  "^  and  which  has  recently  been  made  accessible  to 
the  general  reader  by  the  labors  of  Spiegel.  '"^  This  work,  the 
Zendavesta,  while  it  may  contain  fragments  of  a  very  ancient 
literature, '"  took  its  present  shape  in  the  time  of  Artaxerxes, 
and  was  probably  then  first  collected  from  the  mouths  of  the 
Zoroastrian  priests  and  pubhshed  by  Arda-Viraf.  Certain  ad- 
ditions may  since  have  been  made  to  it ;  but  we  are  assured 
that  "  their  number  is  small,"  and  that  we  "have  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  the  text  of  the  Avesta,  in  the  days  of  Arda-Viraf, 
was  on  the  whole  exactly  the  same  as  at  present.  "*  The  re- 
ligious system  of  the  new  Persian  monarchy  is  thus  com- 
pletely known  to  us,  and  will  be  described  minutely  in  a  later 
chapter.  At  present  we  have  to  consider,  not  what  the  exact 
tenets  of  the  Zoroastrians  were,  but  only  the  mode  in  which 
Artaxerxes  imposed  them  upon  his  subjects. 

The  next  step,  after  settling  the  true  text  of  the  sacred  vol- 
ume, was  to  agree  upon  its  interpretation.     The  language  of 


VoL  HI. 


Plate.  XXIII. 


COIN   OF   HOEHISDAS    IV. 


EAHLY    COIN    OF   VAEAHHAN   VI. 


J^TB   COIN  05  VAEAHHAN   VI, 


COIN    OP    CHOSriOES    II. 


•■I 


Plate  XXIV. 


Vol.   111. 


Fig.   /. 


HARE    COIN    OF    CHOSEOES    II. 


Fig     2. 


COIN    OF    BIROES    OR    KOBAD    II. 


Fig.  3. 


COIN    OF    ARTAJtERXBS    III. 


ig    4. 


Coin  (Jf  Isdigerd  III. 


CH.  III.]  ABMINISTRATION  OF  AUrAXETtXES  273 

the  Avosta,  though  pure  Pei*sian, '"  was  of  so  archaic  a  tj^^e 
that  none  but  the  most  learned  of  the  Magi  understood  it; 
f  to  the  common  people,   even  to  the  ordinary  priest,   it  was 

a  dead  letter.  Artaxerxes  seems  to  have  recognized  the 
necessity  of  accompanying  the  Zend  text  with  a  translation 
and  a  commentary  in  the  language  of  his  own  time,  thff 
Pehlevi  or  Huzvaresh.  Such  a  translation  and  commentary 
exist ;  and  though  in  part  belonging  to  later  Sassanian  times, 
they  reach  back  probably  in  their  earlier  portions  to  the  era  of 
Artaxerxes,  who  may  fairly  be  credited  with  the  desii-e  to  make 
the  sacred  book  ''  understanded  of  the  people." 

Further,  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to  secure  permanent  uni- 
formity of  belief,  to  give  to  the  Magian  priesthood,  the  keepers 
and  interpreters  of  the  sacred  book,  very  extensive  powers. 
The  Magian  hierarchy  was  therefore  associated  with  the  mon- 
arch in  the  government  and  administration  of  the  State.  It 
was  declared  that  the  altar  and  the  throne  were  inseparable, 
and  must  always  sustain  each  other. ''"  The  Magi  were  made 
to  form  the  great  council  of  the  nation.'"  While  they  lent 
their  support  to  the  crown,  the  crown  upheld  them  against  all 
impugners,  and  enforced  by  pains  and  penalities  their  deci- 
sions. Persecution  was  adopted  and  asserted  as  a  principle  of 
action  without  any  disguise.  By  an  edict  of  Artaxerxes,  all 
places  of  worsliip  were  closed  except  the  temples  of  the  fire- 
worshippers.  '"  If  no  violent  outbreak  of  fanaticism  followed, 
it  was  because  the  various  sectaries  and  schismatics  succumbed 
to  the  decree  without  resistance.  Christian,  and  Jew,  and 
Greek,  and  Parthian,  and  Arab  allowed  their  sanctuaries  to  be 
closed  without  striking  a  blow  to  prevent  it;  and  the  non- 
Zoroastrians  of  the  empire,  the  votaries  of  foreign  religions, 
were  shortly  reckoned  at  the  insignificant  number  of  80,000.  "^ 

Of  the  internal  administration  and  government  of  his  ex- 
tensive empire  by  Artaxerxes,  but  little  is  known. '""  That  lit- 
tle seems,  however,  to  show  that  while  in  general  type  and 
character  it  conformed  to  the  usual  Oriential  model,  in  its 
practical  working  it  was  such  as  to  obtain  the  approval  of  the 
bulk  of  his  subjects.  Artaxerxes  governed  his  provinces 
either  through  native  kings,  or  else  through  Persian  satraps.'" 
At  the  same  time,  like  the  Achaemenian  monarchs,  he  kept  the 
armed  force  under  his  own  control  by  the  appointment  of 
"generals"  or  "commandants"  distinct  from  the  satraps.'" 
Discarding  the  Parthian  plan  of  intrusting  the  military  de- 
fence of  the  empire  and  the  preservation  of  domestic  order  to  a 


274  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  iii. 

mere  militift,  he  maintained  on  a  war  footing  a  considerable 
force,  regularly  paid  and  drilled.  "  There  can  be  no  power," 
he  remarked,  ' '  without  an  army,  no  army  without  money,  no 
money  without  agriculture,  and  no  agriculture  without  jus- 
tice." '-'  To  administer  strict  justice  was  therefore  among  his 
chief  endeavors.  Daily  reports  were  made  to  him  of  all  that 
passed  not  only  in  his  capital,  but  in  every  province  of  his  vast 
empire;  and  his  knowledge  extended  even  to  the  private 
actions  of  his  subjects.  "^  It  was  his  earnest  desire  that  all 
well-deposed  persons  should  feel  an  absolute  assurance  of 
security  with  respect  to  their  lives,  their  property,  and  their 
honor.  '^^  At  the  same  time  he  punished  crimes  with  severity, 
and  even  visited  upon  entire  families  the  transgression  of  one 
of  their  members.  It  is  said  to  have  been  one  of  his  maxims, 
that  "  kings  should  never  use  the  sword  where  the  cane  would 
answer ;"  ''"  but,  if  the  Armenian  historians  are  to  be  trusted, 
in  practice  he  certainly  did  not  err  on  the  side  of  clemeny.  '^' 

Artaxerxes  was,  of  course,  an  absolute  monarch,  having  the 
entire  power  of  Hfe  or  death,  and  entitled,  if  he  chose,  to  decide 
all  matters  at  his  own  mere  wUl  and  pleasure.  But,  in  prac- 
tice, he,  like  most  Oriental  despots,  was  wont  to  summon  and 
take  the  advice  of  counsellors.  It  is  perhaps  doubtful  whether 
any  regular  "Council  of  State"  existed  under  him.  Such  an 
institution  had  prevailed  under  the  Parthians,  where  the  mon- 
archs  were  elected  and  might  be  deposed  by  the  Megistanes;'''' 
but  there  is  no  evidence  that  Artaxerxes  continued  it,  or  did 
more  than  call  on  each  occasion  for  the  advice  of  such  persons 
among  his  subjects  as  he  thought  most  capable.  In  matters 
affecting  his  relations  towards  foreign  powers  he  consulted 
with  the  subject  kings,  the  satraps,  and  the  generals ; '"  in  re- 
.  ligious  affairs  he  no  doubt  took  counsel  with  the  chief  Magi."* 
The  general  principles  which  guided  his  conduct  both  in  re- 
ligious and  other  matters  may  perhaps  be  best  gathered  from 
the  words  of  that  "testament,"  or  "dying  speech,"  which  he 
is  said  to  have  addressed  to  his  son  Sapor.  "  Never  forget, " 
he  said,  "that,  as  a  king,  you  are  at  once  the  protector  of  re- 
ligion and  of  your  country.  Consider  the  altar  and  the  throne 
as  inseparable ;  they  must  always  sustain  each  other.  A  sover- 
eign without  religion  is  a  tyrant ;  and  a  people  who  have  none 
may  be  deemed  the  most  monstrous  of  all  societies.  Religion 
may  exist  without  a  state ;  but  a  state  cannot  exist  without 
religion ;  and  it  is  by  holy  laws  that  a  political  association  can 
alone  be  bound.     You  should  be  to  your  people  an  example  of 


CH.  in.]  HIS  "TESTAMENT."  275 

piety  and  of  virtue,  but  without  pride  or  ostentation 

Remember,  my  son,  that  it  is  the  prosperity  or  adversity  of  the 
f  ruler  which  forms  the  happiness  or  misery  of  his  subjects,  and 
that  the  fate  of  the  nation  depends  on  the  conduct  of  the  in- 
dividual who  fills  the  throne.  The  world  is  exposed  to  constant 
vicissitudes;  learn,  therefore,  to  meet  the  frowns  of  fortune 
with  courage  and  fortitude,  and  to  receive  her  smiles  with 
moderation  and  wisdom.  To  sum  up  all— may  your  admin- 
istration be  such  as  to  bring,  at  a  future  day,  the  blessings  of 
those  whom  God  hg,s  confided  to  our  parental  care  upon  both 
your  memory  and  mine !"  '^^ 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Artaxerxes,  some  short  time 
before  his  death,  invested  Sapor  with  the  emblems  of  sover- 
eignty, and  either  associated  him  in  the  empire,  or  wholly 
ceded  to  him  his  own  place.  The  Arabian  writer,  Magoudi, 
declares  that,  sated  with  glory  and  with  power,  he  withdrew 
altogether  from  the  government,  and,  making  over  the  ad- 
ministration of  affairs  to  his  favorite  son,  devoted  himself  to 
religious  contemplation.  '^^  Tabari  knows  nothing  of  the  reli- 
gious motive,  but  relates  that  towards  the  close  of  his  life  Ar- 
taxerxes ' '  made  Sapor  regent,  appointed  him  formally  to  be 
his  successor,  and  with  his  own  hands  placed  the  crown  on  his 
head."  "'  [PI.  XII.]  These  notices  would,  by  themselves,  have 
been  of  small  importance ;  but  force  is  lent  to  them  by  the  facts 
that  Artaxerxes  is  found  to  have  placed  the  effigy  of  Sapor  on 
his  later  coins,  '^"  and  that  in  one  of  his  bas-reliefs  he  seems  to 
be  represented  as  investing  Sapor  with  the  diadem.'**  This 
tablet,  which  is  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  has  been  variously  ex- 
plained, '"  and,  as  it  is  unaccompanied  by  any  inscription,  no 
certain  account  can  be  given  of  it ;  but,  on  the  whole  the  opin- 
ion of  those  most  competent  to  judge  seems  to  be  that  the  in- 
tention of  the  artist  was  k)  represent  Artaxerxes  (who  wears 
the  cap  and  inflated  ball)  as  handing  the  diadem  to  Sapor^ 
distinguished  by  the  mural  crown  of  his  own  tablets  and 
coins"' — while  Ormazd,  marked  by  his  customary  bdton,  and 
further  indicated  by  a  halo  of  glory  around  his  head,  looks  on, 
sanctioning  and  approving  the  transaction.  A  prostrate  figure 
under  the  feet  of  the  two  Sassanian  kings  represents  either 
Artabanus  or  the  extinct  Parthian  monarchy,  probably  the 
former;  while  the  sunflower  upon  which  Ormazd  stands,  to- 
gether with  the  rays  that  stream  from  his  head,  denote  an  in- 
tention to  present  him  under  a  Mithraitic  aspect,  suggestive 
to  the  beholder  of  a  real  latent  identity  between  the  two  great 
objects  of  Persian  worshiji     .... 


j276  "^HK  SEVENTH  MONARCUT,  [cH.  iii. 

The  coins  of  Artaxerxos  present  five  different  types. ''^  [PI. 
XI.,  Fig.  1.]  In  the  earhcst  his  effigy  appears  on  the  obverse, 
front-faced,  with  the  simple  legend  ARTaHSHaTR  (Artaxerxes), 
or  sometimes  with  the  longer  one,  Baoi  ARTaHSHaxR  MaLKA, 
"  Divine  Artaxerxes,  King;"  while  the  reverse  bears  the  profile 
of  his  father,  Papak,  looking  to  the  left,  with  the  legend  Baoi 
PAPaKi  MaLKA,  "Divine  Papak,  King;"  or  BaRi  BaGi  PAPaia 
MaLKA,  "Son  of  Divine  Papak,  King."  Both  heads  wear  the 
ordinary  Parthian  diadem  and  tiara ;  and  the  head  of  Arta- 
xerxes much  resembles  that  of  Volagases  V.,  oiae  of  the  later 
Parthian  kings. '"  The  coins  of  the  next  period  have  a  head 
on  one  side  only.  This  is  in  profile,  looking  to  the  right,  and 
bears  a  highly  ornamental  tiara,  exactly  like  that  of  Mithri- 
dates  I.  of  Parthia, '"  the  great  conqueror.  It  is  usually  accom- 
panied by  the  legend  MazDiSN  Baai  ARTaHSHaTR  MaLKA  (or 
MaLKAN  MaLKA)  AIRAN,  i.e.  "The  Ormazd-worshipping  Divine 
Artaxerxes,  King  of  Iran,"  or  "King  of  the  Kings  of  Iran." 
The  reverse  of  these  coins  bears  a  fire-altar,  with  the  legend 
ARTaHSHaTR  NUVAZi,  a  phrase  of  doubtful  import.'"  In  the 
third  period,  whUe  the  reverse  remains  unchanged,  on  the  ob- 
verse the  Parthian  costume  is  entirely  given  up ;  and  the  king 
takes,  instead  of  the  Parthian  tiara,  a  low  cap  surmounted  by 
the  inflated  ball,  which  thenceforth  becomes  the  almost  uni- 
versal badge  of  a  Sassanian  monarch.  The  legend  is  now 
longer,  being  commonly  MazDiSN  BaGi  ARTaHSHaTR  MaLKAN 
MaLKA  AIRAN  MiNUCHiTRi  mIn  YazDAN,  or  "  The  Ormazd-worship- 
ping Divine  Artaxerxes,  King  of  the  Kings  of  Iran,  heaven- 
descended  of  (the  race  of)  the  Gods."  The  fourth  period  is 
marked  by  the  assumption  of  the  mural  crown,'*"  which  in  the 
sculptures  of  Artaxerxes  is  given  only  to  Ormazd,  but  which 
was  afterwards  adopted  by  Sapor  I.  and  many  later  kings, '" 
in  combination  with  the  ball,  as  their  usual  head-dress.  The 
legend  on  these  coins  remains  as  in  the  third  period,  and  the 
reverse  is  likewise  unchanged.  Finally,  there  are  a  few  coins 
of  Artaxerxes,  belonging  to  the  very  close  of  his  reign,  where 
he  is  represented  with  the  tiara  of  the  third  period,  looking  to 
the  right ;  while  in  front  of  him,  and  looking  towards  him,  is 
another  profile,  that  of  a  boy,  in  whom  numismatists  recognize 
liis  eldest  son  and  successor.  Sapor.'"  [PI.  XV.,  Fig.  1]. 

It  is  remarkable  that  with  the  accession  of  Artaxerxes  there 
is  at  once  a  revival  of  art.  Art  had  sunk  under  the  Parthians, 
despite  their  Grecian  leanings,  to  the  lowest  ebb  which  it  had 
known  in  Western  Asia  since  the  accession  of  Asshur-izir-pal 


Ctt.  m.]  BASTS  OF  Tim  COINAGE.  <211 

to  the  throne  of  Assyi^ia  (B.C.  886).  Parthian  attempts  at  art 
were  few  and  far  between,  and  when  made  were  unhappy,  not 
to  say  ridiculous. '"  The  coins  of  Artaxerxes,  compared  with 
those  of  the  later  Parthian  monarchs,  show  at  once  a  renais- 
sance.'^" The  head  is  well  cut;  the  features  have  individuality 
and  expression ;  the  epigraph  is  sufficiently  legible.  Still  more 
is  his  sculpture  calculated  to  surprise  us.  Artaxerxes  repre- 
sents himself  as  receiving  the  Persian  diadem  from  the  hands 
of  Ormazd;  both  he  and  the  god  are  mounted  upon  chargers  of 
a  stout  breed,  which  are  spiritedly  portrayed ;  Artabanus  lies 
prostrate  under  the  feet  of  the  king's  steed,  wliile  under  those 
of  the  deity's  we  observe  the  form  of  Ahriman,  also  prostrate, 
and  indeed  seemingly  dead."^'  Though  the  tablet  has  not 
really  any  great  artistic  merit,  it  is  far  better  than  anything 
that  remains  to  us  of  the  Parthians ;  it  has  energy  and  vigor ; 
the  physiognomies  are  carefully  rendered ;  and  the  only  fla- 
grant fault  is  a  certain  over-robustness  in  the  figures,  which 
has  an  effect  that  is  not  altogether  pleasing.  Still,  we  cannot 
but  see  in  the  new  Persian  art — even  at  its  very  beginning— a 
movement  towards  life  after  a  long  period  of  stagnation;  an 
evidence  of  that  general  stir  of  mind  which  the  downfall  of 
Tartar  oppression  rendered  possible ;  a  token  that  Aryan  intel- 
ligence was  beginning  to  recover  and  reassert  itself  in  all  the 
various  fields  in  which  it  had  formerly  won  its  triumphs.  '^'' 

The  coinage  of  Artaxerxes,  and  of  the  other  Sassanian  mon- 
archs, is  based,  in  part  upon  Roman,  in  part  upon  Parthian, 
models.  The  Roman  aureus  furnishes  the  type  which  is  repro- 
duced in  the  Sassanian  gold  coins, '"  while  the  silver  coins  fol- 
low the  standard  long  established  in  Western  Asia,  first  under 
the  Seleucid,  and  then  under  the  Arsacid  princes.  This  stand- 
ard is  based  vipon  the  Attic  drachm,  which  was  adopted  by 
Alexander  as  the  basis  of  his  monetary  system.  The  curious 
occurrence  of  a  completely  different  standard  for  gold  and  sil- 
ver in  Persia  during  this  period  is  accounted  for  by  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  time  at  which  the  coinage  took  its  rise. 
The  Arsacidae  had  employed  no  gold  coins,''''  but  had  been 
content  with  a  silver  currency ;  any  gold  coin  that  may  have 
been  in  use  among  their  subjects  for  purposes  of  trade  during 
the  continuance  of  their  empire  must  have  been  foreign  money 
— Roman,  Bactrian,  or  Indian  ;'•'•'  but  the  quantity  liad  proba- 
bly for  the  most  part  been  very  small.  But,  about  ten  years 
before  the  accession  of  Artaxerxes  there  had  been  a  sudden 
influx  into  Western  Asia  of  Roman  gold,  in  consequence  of  the 


278  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  m. 

terms  of  the  treaty  concluded  between  Artabanus  and  Macri- 
nus  (A.D.  217),  whereby  Rome  undertook  to  pay  to  Parthia  an 
indenmity  of  above  a  miUion  and  a  half  of  our  money.'**  It  is 
probable  that  the  payment  was  mostly  made  in  aiirei.  Arta- 
xerxes  thus  found  current  in  the  countries,  which  he  overran 
and  formed  into  an  empire,  two  coinages— a  gold  and  a  silver 
— coming  from  different  sources  and  possessing  no  common 
measure.  It  was  simpler  and  easier  to  retain  what  existed, 
and  what  had  sufficiently  adjusted  itself  through  the  working 
of  commercial  needs,  than  to  invent  somethmg  new;  and 
hence  the  anomalous  character  of  the  New  Persian  monetary 
system. 

The  remarkable  bas-relief  of  Artaxerxes  described  above. '" 
and  figured  below  in  the  chapter  on  the  Art  of  the  Sassanians, 
is  accompanied  by  a  bilingual  inscription,'"  or  perhaps  we 
should  say  by  two  bilingual  inscriptions,  which  possess  much 
antiquarian  and  some  historic  interest.  The  longer  of  the  two 
runs  as  follows:— "Paf7iA;ar  zant  mazdisn  hagi  Arfahshatr, 
malJcan  malica  Airan,  minuchitri  min  Ydztan,  hari  hagi  Pap- 
dki  malJca;'^  while  the  Greek  version  of  it  is— 

TOYTOTOilPOCOnONMACAACNOY 

e60YAPTA*£AP0YBACIA€t)uCBACIAEWN 

APIANtON£:KrENCVCe€WNYIOY 

e€OYnAnAKOYBAC=A€WC* 

The  shorter  inscription  runs — '■^  Patlikar  zani  Ahuramazda 
hagi,  the  Greek  being 

TorroTonPOCwnoNAioc0€OY. 

The  inscriptions  are  interesting,  first,  as  proving  the  continued 
use  of  the  Greek  character  and  language  by  a  dynasty  that 
was  intensely  national  and  that  wished  to  drive  the  Greeks 
out  of  Asia.  Secondly,  they  are  interesting  as  showing  the 
character  of  the  native  language,  and  letters,  employed  by  the 
Persians,  when  they  came  suddenly  into  notice  as  the  ruling 
people  of  Western  Asia.  Thirdly,  they  have  an  historic  inter- 
est in  what  they  tell  us  of  the  relationship  of  Artaxerxes  to 
Babek  (Papak),  of  the  rank  of  Babek,  and  of  the  religious 
sympathies  of  the  Sassanians.  In  this  last  respect  they  do  in- 
deed, in  themselves,  little  but  confirm  the  evidence  of  the  coins 


en.  IV.]  REIOK  OF  SAPOR  L  079 

and  the  general  voice  of  antiquity  on  the  subject.  Coupled, 
however,  with  the  reliefs  to  which  they  are  appended,  they  do 
more.  They  prove  to  us  that  the  Persians  of  the  earliest  Sas- 
sanian  times  were  not  averse  to  exhibiting  the  gi'eat  person- 
ages of  their  theology  in  sculptured  forms;  nay,  they  reveal 
to  us  the  actual  forms  then  considered  appropriate  to  Ahura- 
Mazda  (Orniazd)  and  Angro-Mainyus  (Ahriman) ;  for  we  can 
scarcely  be  mistaken  in  regarding  the  prostrate  figure  under 
the  hoofs  of  Ahura-Mazda's  steed  as  the  antagonist  Spirit  of 
'Evil.'^"  Finally,  the  inscriptions  show  that,  from  the  com- 
mencement of  their  sovereignty,  the  Sassanian  princes  claimed 
for  themselves  a  qualified  divinity,  assuming  the  title  of  bag,  ""' 
or  Alha,""  "god,"  and  taking,  in  the  Greek  version  of  their 
legends,  the  correspondent  epithet  of  0EO2. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Death  of  Artaxerxes  I.  and  Accession  of  Sapor  I.  War  of 
Sapor  with  Manizen.  His  first  War  with  Rome.  Invasion 
of  Mesopotamia,  a.d.  241.  Occupation  of  Antioch.  Expe- 
dition of  Gordian  to  the  East.  Recovery  by  Rome  of  her 
lost  Territory.  Peace  made  between  Rome  and  Persia. 
Obscure  Interval.  Second  War  with  Rome.  Mesopotamia 
again  invaded,  a.d.  258.  Valerian  takes  the  Command  in 
the  East.  Struggle  between  him  and  Sapor.  Defeat  and 
Capture  of  Valerian,  a.d.  200.  Sapor  invests  Miriades  with 
the  Purple.  He  takes  Syria  and  Southern  Cappadocia,  but 
is  shortly  afterivards  attacked  by  Odenathus.  Successes  of 
Odenathus.  Treatment  of  Valerian.  Further  successes  of 
Odenathus.  Period  of  Tranquillity.  Ch'eat  Works  of 
Sapor.  His  Scidptures.  His  Dyke.  His  Inscriptions. 
His  Coins.  His  Religion.  Religious  Condition  of  the  East 
in  his  Time.  Rise  into  Notice  of  Mani.  His  Rejection  by 
Sapor.     Sapor^s  Death.    His  Character. 

Ata6«'x"'ai-  to  icpaTO?  SaTruJprjs  eKeivo';  b  iuayeaTaroi,  Koi  Sie/Si'cu  Trpos  tuI  ivl  Tpiaxo^Ta  Tovij 
ndvTai  tVtauTous,  wAeKTra  oera  Tou9'Pu)p.alous  Av/xaii'Ofiei'os. — AgatHIAS,  iv.  p.  134,  B. 

Artaxerxes  appears  to  have  died  in  a.d.  240.'  He  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  son,  Shahpuhri,'^  or  Sapor,  the  first  Sassanian 
prince  of  that  name.     According  to  the  Persian  historians,  the 


280  THE  SSVJ^NTH  MOKAMClir.  [ch.  iv. 

mother  of  Sapor  was  a  daiigliter  of  the  last  Parthian  king,  Ar- 
tabanus/  whom  Artaxerxes  had  taken  to  wife  after  his  con- 
quest of  her  father.  But  the  facts  known  of  Sapor  throw  doubt 
on  this  story/  which  has  too  many  parallels  in  Oriental  romance 
to  claim  implicit  credence. "  Nothing  authentic  has  come  down 
to  us  respecting  Sapor  during  his  father's  lifetime ;"  but  from 
the  moment  that  he  mounted  the  throne,  we  find  him  engaged 
in  a  series  of  wars,  which  show  him  to  have  been  of  a  most 
active  and  energetic  character.  Armenia,  which  Artaxerxes 
had  subjected,  attempted  (it  would  seem)  to  regain  its  independ- 
ence at  the  commencement  of  the  new  reign;  but  Sapor  easily 
crushed  the  nascent  insurrection, '  and  the  Armenians  made  no 
further  effort  to  free  themselves  till  several  years  after  his 
death.  Contemporaneously  with  this  revolt  in  the  mountain 
i-egion  of  the  north,  a  danger  showed  itself  in  the  plain  country 
uf  the  south,  where  Manizen,*  king  of  Hatra,  or  El  Hadhr,  not 
only  declared  himself  independent,  but  assumed  dominion  over 
the  entire  tract  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  the 
Jezireh  of  the  Arabian  geographers.  The  strength  of  Hatra 
was  great,  as  had  been  proved  by  Trajan  and  Severus;"  its 
thick  walls  and.  valiant  inhabitants  would  probably  have  defied 
every  attempt  of  the  Persian  prince  to  make  himself  master  of 
it  by  force.  He  therefore  condescended  to  stratagem.  Mani- 
zen  had  a  daughter  who  cherished  ambitious  views.  On  ob- 
taining a  promise  from  Sapor  that  if  she  gave  Hatra  into  his 
power  he  would  make  her  his  queen,  this  unnatural  child 
turned  against  her  father,  betrayed  him  into  Sapor's  hands,  and 
thus  brought  the  war  to  an  end.  Sapor  recovered  his  lost  ter- 
ritory ;  but  he  did  not  fulfil  his  bargain.  Instead  of  marrying 
the  traitress,  he  handed  her  over  to  an  executioner,  to  receive 
the  death  that  she  had  deserved,  though  scarcely  at  his  hands. '" 
Encouraged  by  his  success  in  these  two  lesser  contests, 
Sapor  resolved  (apparently  in  a.d.  241")  to  resume  the  bold 
projects  of  his  father,  and  engage  in  a  great  war  with  Rome. 
The  confusion  and  troubles  which  afflicted  the  Eoman  Empire 
at  this  time  were  such  as  might  well  give  him  hopes  of  obtain- 
ing a  decided  advantage.  Alexander,  his  father's  adversary, 
had  been  murdered  in  a.d.  235  by  Maximin,'^  who  from  the 
condition  of  a  Thracian  peasant  had  risen  into  the  higher  ranks 
of  the  army.  The  upstart  had  ruled  hke  the  savage  that  he 
was ;  and,  after  three  years  of  misery,  the  whole  Roman  world 
had  risen  against  him.  Two  emperors  had  been  proclaimed  in 
Africa;"^  on  then-  fall,  two  others  had  been  elected  by  the  Sen' 


CH.  IV.]  SAPOR  INVADES  SYRIA.  281 

ate;"  a  third,  a  mere  boy,'*  had  been  added  at  the  demand  of 
the  Roman  populace.  All  the  pretenders  except  the  last  had 
met  with  violent  deaths ;  and,  after  the  shocks  of  a  year  un- 
paralleled since  a.d.  69,  the  administration  of  the  greatest  king- 
dom in  the  world  was  in  the  hands  of  a  youth  of  fifteen.  Sa- 
por, no  doubt,  thought  he  saw  in  this  condition  of  tilings  an 
opportunity  that  he  ought  not  to  miss,  and  rapidly  matured  his 
plans  lest  the  favorable  moment  should  pass  away. 

Crossing  the  middle  Tigris  into  Mesopotamia,  the  bands  of 
Sapor  first  attacked  the  important  city  of  Nisibis.  Nisibis,  at 
this  time  a  Roman  colony,"^  was  strongly  situated  on  the  out- 
skirts of  the  mountain  range  which  traverses  Northern  Meso- 
potamia between  the  37th  and  38th  parallels.  The  place  was 
well  fortified  and  well  defended ;  it  offered  a  prolonged  resist- 
ance; but  at  last  the  walls  were  breached,  and  it  was  forced  to 
yield  itself. "  The  advance  was  then  made  along  the  southern 
flank  of  the  mountains,  by  Carrhae  (Harran)  and  Edessa  to  the 
Euphrates,  which  was  probably  reached  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Birehjik.  The  hordes  then  poured  into  Syria,  and,  spread- 
ing themselves  over  that  fertile  region,  surprised  and  took  the 
metropolis  of  the  Roman  East,  the  rich  and  luxurious  city  of 
Antioch.'**  But  meantime  the  Romans  had  shown  a  spirit 
which  had  not  been  expected  from  them.  Gordian,  young  as 
he  was,  had  quitted  Rome  and  marched  through  Moesia  and 
Thrace  into  Asia,'"  accompanied  by  a  formidable  army,  and  by 
at  least  one  good  general.  Timesitheus,^"  whose  daughter  Gor- 
dian had  recently  married,  though  his  life  had  hitherto  been 
that  of  a  civilian,^'  exhibited,  on  his  elevation  to  the  dignity  of 
Praetorian  prefect,  considerable  military  ability.  The  army, 
nominally  commanded  by  Gordian,  really  acted  under  his 
orders.  With  it  Timesitheus  attacked  and  beat  the  bands  of 
Sapor  in  a  number  of  engagements,"  recovered  Antioch,  crossed 
the  Euphrates,  retook  Carrhae,  defeated  the  Persian  monarch 
in  a  pitched  battle  near  Resaina'"'^  (Ras-el-Ain),  recovered  Nisi- 
bis, and  once  more  planted  the  Roman  standards  on  the  banks 
of  the  Tigris.  Sapor  hastily  evacuated  most  of  his  conquests,^* 
and  retired  first  across  the  Euphrates  and  then  across  the  more 
eastern  river;  wliile  the  Romans  advanced  as  he  retreated, 
placed  garrisons  in  the  various  Mesopotamian  towns,  and  even 
threatened  the  great  city  of  Ctesiplion.  '•"  Gordian  was  confident 
that  his  general  would  gain  further  triumphs,  and  wrote  to  the 
Senate  to  that  effect ;  but  either  disease  or  the  arts  of  a  rival 
cut  short  the  career  of  the  victor,'-"  and  from  the  time  of  his 


282  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  \cn.  rr. 

death  the  Romans  ceased  to  be  successful.  The  legions  had,  it 
would  seem,  invaded  Southern  Mesopotamia"  when  the  Prge- 
torian  prefect  who  had  succeeded  Timesitheus  brought  thorn 
intentionally  into  difficulties  by  his  mismanagement  of  the 
commissariat  ;^®  and  at  last  retreat  was  determined  on.  The 
young  emperor  was  approaching  the  Khabour,  and  had  almost 
reached  his  own  frontier,  when  the  discontent  of  the  army,  fo- 
mented by  the  prefect,  Philip,  came  to  a  head.  Gordian  was 
murdered  at  a  place  called  Zaitha,  about  twenty  miles  south  of 
C'ircesium,  and  was  buried  where  he  fell,  the  soldiers  raising  a 
tumulus  in  his  honor.  His  successor,  PhUip,  was  glad  to  make 
peace  on  any  tolerable  terms  with  the  Persians ;  he  felt  himself 
insecure  upon  his  throne,  and  was  anxious  to  obtain  the  Sen- 
ate's sanction  of  his  usurpation.  He  therefore  quitted  the  East 
in  A.D.  244,  having  concluded  a  treaty  with  Sapor,  by  which 
Armenia  seems  to  have  been  left  to  the  Persians,  while  Meso- 
potamia returned  to  its  old  condition  of  a  Roman  province.'" 

The  peace  made  between  Philip  and  Sapor  was  followed  by 
an  interval  of  fourteen  years,  ^''  during  which  scarcely  anything 
is  known  of  the  condition  of  Persia.  We  may  suspect  that 
troubles  in  the  north-east  of  his  empire  occupied  Sapor  during 
this  period,  for  at  the  end  of  it  we  find  Bactria,  which  was 
certainly  subject  to  Persia  during  the  earlier  years  of  the 
monarchy,  °'  occupying  an  independent  position,  and  even  as- 
suming an  attitude  of  hostility  towards  the  Persian  monarch.'^ 
Bactria  had,  from  a  remote  antiquity,  claims  to  pre-eminence 
among  the  Aryan  nations.  '^  She  was  more  than  once  inclined 
to  revolt  from  the  Achaemenidse  ;^*  and  during  the  later  Par- 
thian period  she  had  enjoyed  a  sort  of  semi-independence.^^  It 
would  seem  that  she  now  succeeded  in  detaching  herseK  alto- 
gether from  her  southern  neighbor,  and  becoming  a  distinct 
and  separate  power.  To  strengthen  her  position  she  entered 
into  relations  with  Rome,  which  gladly  welcomed  any  ad- 
hesions to  her  cause  in  this  remote  region. 

Sapor's  second  war  with  Rome  was,  like  liis  first,  provoked 
by  himself.  After  concluding  his  peace  with  Philip,  he  had 
seen  the  Roman  world  governed  successively  by  six  weak  em- 
perors,"'of  whom  four  had  died  violent  deaths,  while  at  the 
same  time  there  had  been  a  continued  series  of  attacks  upon 
the  northern  frontiers  of  the  empire  by  Alemanni,  Goths,  and 
Franks,  who  had  ravaged  at  their  will  a  number  of  the  finest 
provinces,  and  threatened  the  absolute  destruction  of  the  great 
monarchy  of  the  West."    It  was  natural  that  the  chief  king- 


CH.  IV.]        SECO^ID  WAR   OF  SAPOR  WITH  ROME.  283 

dom  of  Western  Asia  should  note  these  events,  and  should  seek 
to  promote  its  own  interests  by  taking  advantage  of  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  time.  Sapor,  in  a.d.  258,  determined  on  a 
fresh  invasion  of  the  Roman  provmces,  and,  once  more  enter- 
ing Mesopotamia,  carried  all  before  him,  became  master  of 
Nisibis,  Carrhse,  and  Edessa,  and,  crossing  the  Euphrates,  sur- 
prised Antioch,  which  was  wrapped  in  the  enjoyment  of 
theatrical  and  other  representations,  and  only  knew  its  fate  on 
the  exclamation  of  a  couple  of  actors  ' '  that  the  Persians  were 
in  possession  of  the  town."  '^  The  aged  emperor.  Valerian, 
hastened  to  the  protection  of  his  more  eastern  territories,  and 
at  first  gained  some  successes,  retaking  Antioch,  and  making 
that  city  his  headquarters  during  his  stay  in  the  East.  ^^  But, 
after  this,  the  tide  turned.  Valerian  entrusted  the  whole  con- 
duct of  the  war  to  Macrianus,  his  Praetorian  prefect,  whose 
talents  he  admired,  and  of  whose  fidelity  he  did  not  entertain 
a  suspicion."  Macrianus,  however,  aspired  to  the  empire,  and 
intentionally  brought  Valerian  into  difficulties,^'  in  the  hope 
of  disgracing  or  removing  him.  His  tactics  were  successful. 
The  Roman  army  in  Mesopotamia  was  betrayed  into  a  situation 
whence  escape  was  impossible,  and  where  its  capitulation  was 
only  a  question  of  time.  A  bold  attempt  made  to  force  a  way 
through  the  enemy's  lines  faded  utterly,"  after  which  famine 
and  pestilence  began  to  do  their  work.  In  vain  did  the  aged 
emperor  send  envoys  to  propose  a  peace,  and  offer  to  purchase 
escape  by  the  payment  of  an  immense  sum  in  gold."  Sapor, 
confident  of  victory,  refused  the  overture,  and,  waiting 
patiently  till  his  adversary  was  at  the  last  gasp,  invited  him  to 
a  conference,  and  then  treacherously  seized  his  person."  The 
army  surrendered  or  dispersed.  ^^  Macrianus,  the  Praetorian 
prefect,  shortly  assumed  the  title  of  emperor,  and  marched 
against  Gallienus,  the  son  and  colleague  of  Valerian,  who  had 
been  left  to  direct  affairs  in  the  West.  But  another  rival 
, started  up  in  the  East.  Sapor  conceived  the  idea  of  complicat- 
ing the  Roman  affairs  by  himself  putting  forward  a  pretender ; 
and  an  obscure  citizen  of  Antioch,  a  certain  Miriades  or  Cyri- 
ades,"  a  refugee  in  his  camp,  Avas  invested  with  the  purple,  and 
assumed  the  title  of  Caesar."    [PI.  XIII.] 

The  blow  struck  at  Edessa  laid  the  whole  of  Roman  Asia 
open  to  attack,  and  the  Persian  monarch  was  not  slow  to  seize' 
the  occasion.     His  troops  crossed  the  Euphrates  in  force,  and, 
marching  on  Antioch,  once  more  captured  that  unfortunate 
town,  from  which  the  more  prudent  citizens  had  withdrawn^ 


284  27/ A'  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cii.  iv. 

but  where  the  bulk  of  the  people,  not  displeased  at  the  turn  of 
affairs,  remained  and  welcomed  the  conqueror. "  Miriades  was 
installed  in  jjower,  while  Sapor  himself,  at  the  head  of  his  irre- 
sistible squadrons,  pressed  forward,  bursting  ' '  like  a  mountain 
torrent""  into  Cilicia  and  thence  into  Cappadocia.  Tarsus,  the 
birthplace  of  St,  Paul,  at  once  a  famous  seat  of  learning  and  a 
great  emporium  of  commerce,  fell;  Cilicia  Campestris  was 
overrun ;  and  the  passes  of  Taurus,  deserted  or  weakly  de- 
fended by  the  Eomans,  came  into  Sapor's  hands.  Penetrating 
through  them  and  entering  the  champaign  country  beyond, 
his  bands  soon  formed  the  siege  of  Csesarea  Mazaca,  the  great- 
est city  of  these  parts,  estimated  at  this  time  to  have  contained 
a  population  of  four  hundred  thousand  souls.  Demosthenes, 
the  governor  of  Csesarea,  defended  it  bravely,  and,  had  force 
only  been  used  against  him,  might  have  prevailed;  but  Sapor 
found  friends  within  the  walls,  and  by  their  help  made  himself 
master  of  the  place,  while  its  bold  defender  was  obliged  to  con- 
tent himself  with  escaping  by  cutting  his  way  through  the 
victorious  host.  ^^  All  Asia  Minor  now  seemed  open  to  the  con- 
queror ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  he  did  not  at  any 
rate  attempt  a  permanent  occupation  of  the  territory  which  he 
had  so  easily  overrun.  But  it  seems  certain  that  he  entertained 
no  such  idea."  Devastation  and  plunder,  revenge  and  gain, 
not  permanent  conquest,  were  his  objects ;  and  hence  his  course 
was  everywhere  marked  by  ruin  and  carnage,  by  smoking 
towns,  ravaged  fields,  and  heaps  of  slain.  His  cruelties  have 
no  doubt  been  exaggerated ;  but  when  we  hear  that  he  filled 
the  ravines  and  valleys  of  Cappadocia  with  dead  bodies,  and 
so  led  his  cavalry  across  them;^^  that  he  depopulated  Antioch, 
killing  or  carrying  off  into  slavery  almost  the  whole  popula- 
tion ;  that  he  suffered  his  prisoners  in  many  cases  to  perish  of 
hunger,  and  that  he  drove  them  to  water  once  a  day  like 
beasts, "  we  may  be  sure  that  the  guise  in  which  he  showed 
himself  to  the  Romans  was  that  of  a  merciless  scourge— an 
avenger  bent  on  spreading  the  terror  of  his  name— not  of  one 
who  really  sought  to  enlarge  the  limits  of  his  empire. 

During  the  whole  course  of  tliis  plundering  expedition,  until 
the  retreat  began,  we  hear  but  of  one  check  that  the  bands  of 
Sapor  received.  It  had  been  determined  to  attack  Emesa  (now 
Hems),  one  of  the  most  important  of  the  Syrian  towns,  where 
the  temple  of  Venus  was  known  to  contain  a  vast  treasure. 
The  invaders  approached,  scarcely  expecting  to  be  resisted ;  but 
the  high  priest  of  the  temple,  having  collected  a  large  body  ot 


CH.  IV.]        SAPOR  ATTACKED  BY  ODENATUUS.  285 

peasants,  appeared,  in  his  sacerdotal  robes,  at  the  head  of  a 
fanatic  multitude  armed  with  shngs,  and  succeeded  in  beating 
off  the  assailants. "  Emesa,  its  temple,  and  its  treasure,  escaped 
the  rapacity  of  the  Persians ;  and  an  example  of  resistance  was 
set,  which  was  not  perhaps  without  important  consequences. 

For  it  seems  certain  that  the  return  of  Sapor  across  the  Eu- 
phrates was  not  effected  without  considerable  loss  and  difficul- 
ty. On  his  advance  into  Syria  he  had  received  an  embassy  from 
a  certain  Odenathus,  a  Syrian  or  Arab  chief,  who  occupied  a 
position  of  semi-independence  at  Palmyra,  which,  through  the 
advantages  of  its  situation,  had  lately  become  a  flourishing 
commercial  town.  Odenathus  sent  a  long  train  of  camels  laden 
with  gifts,  consisting  in  part  of  rare  and  precious  merchandise, 
to  the  Persian  monarch,  begging  him  to  accept  them,  and  claim- 
ing his  favorable  regard  on  the  ground  that  he  had  hitherto  re- 
frained from  all  acts  of  hostility  against  the  Persians.  It  ap- 
pears that  Sapor  took  offence  at  the  tone  of  the  communication, 
which  was  not  sufficiently  humble  to  plc«use  him.  Tearing  the 
letter  to  fragments  and  trampling  it  beneath  his  feet,  he  ex- 
claimed— ''Who  is  this  Odenathus,  and  of  what  country,  that 
he  ventures  thus  to  address  his  lord  ?  Let  him  now,  if  he 
would  lighten  his  punishment,  come  here  and  fall  prostrate  be- 
fore me  with  his  hands  tied  behind  his  back.  Should  he  refuse, 
let  him  be  well  assured  that  I  will  destroy  himself ,  his  race,  and 
his  land."  At  the  same  time  he  ordered  his  servants  to  cast 
the  costly  presents  of  the  Palmyrenc  prince  into  the  Eu- 
phrates. " 

This  arrogant  and  offensive  behavior  naturally  turned  the 
willing  friend  into  an  enemy.""  Odenathus,  finding  himself 
forced  into  a  hostile  position,  took  arms  and  watched  his  op- 
portunity. So  long  as  Sapor  continued  to  advance,  he  kept 
aloof.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  retreat  commenced,  and  the 
Persian  army,  encumbered  with  its  spoil  and  captives,  pro- 
ceeded to  make  its  way  back  slowly  and  painfully  to  the  Eu- 
phrates, Odenathus,  who  had  collected  a  large  force,  in  part 
from  the  Syrian  villages, "  in  part  from  the  wild  tribes  of  Ara- 
bia, '*  made  his  appearance  in  the  field.  His  light  and  agile  horse- 
men hovered  about  the  Persian  hosb,  cut  off  their  stragglers, 
made  prize  of  much  of  their  spoil,  and  even  captured  a  portion  of 
the  seraglio  of  the  Great  King. "  The  harassed  troops  were  glad 
when  they  had  placed  the  Euphrates  between  themselves  and 
their  pursuer,  and  congratulated  each  other  on  their  escape."" 
So  much  had  they  suffered,  and  so  little  did  they  feel  equal  to 


286  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  iv. 

further  conflicts,  that  on  their  march  through  Mesopotamia 
they  consented  to  purchase  the  neutrality  of  the  people  of  Edessa 
by  making  over  to  them  all  the  coined  money  that  they  had 
carried  off  in  their  Syrian  raid."  After  this  it  would  seem  that 
the  retreat  was  unmolested,  and  Sapor  succeeded  in  conveying 
the  greater  part  of  his  army,  together  with  his  illustrious  pris- 
oner, to  his  own  coimtry. 

With  regard  to  the  treatment  that  Valerian  received  at  the 
hands  of  his  conqueror,  it  is  difficult  to  form  a  decided  opinion. 
The  writers  nearest  to  the  time  speak  vaguely  and  moderately, 
merely  telling  us  that  he  grew  old  in  his  captivity,*^  and  was 
kept  in  the  condition  of  a  slave.  ^'  It  is  reserved  for  authors  of 
the  next  generation"^  to  inform  us  that  he  was  exposed  to  the 
constant  gaze  of  the  multitude,  fettered,  but  clad  in  the  im- 
perial purple;"^  and  that  Sapor,  whenever  he  mounted  on  horse- 
back, placed  his  foot  upon  his  prisoner's  neck.""  Some  add 
that,  when  the  unhappy  captive  died,  about  the  year  a.d.  265 
or  266,  his  body  was  flayed,  and  the  skin  inflated  and  himg  up 
to  view  in  one  of  the  most  frequented  temples  of  Persia,  where 
it  was  seen  by  Roman  envoys  on  their  visits  to  the  Great  King's 
court. " 

It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  Oriental  barbarism  may  con- 
ceivably have  gone  to  these  lengths ;  and  it  is  in  favor  of  the 
truth  of  the  details  that  Roman  vanity  would  naturally  have 
been  opposed  to  their  invention.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
have  to  remember  that  in  the  East  the  person  of  a  king  is 
generally  regarded  as  sacred,  and  that  self-interest  restrains 
the  conquering  monarch  from  dishonoring  one  of  his  own  class. 
We  have  also  to  give  due  weight  to  the  fact  that  the  earlier 
authorities  are  silent  with  respect  to  any  such  atrocities,  and 
that  they  are  first  related  half  a  century  after  the  time  when 
they  are  said  to  have  occurred.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  scepticism  of  Gibbon  with  respect  to  them"*  is  perhaps  more 
worthy  of  commendation  than  the  ready  faith  of  a  recent 
French  writer.  "^ 

It  may  be  added  that  Oriental  monarchs,  when  they  are 
cruel,  do  not  show  themselves  ashamed  of  their  cruelties,  but 
usually  relate  them  openly  in  their  inscriptions,  or  represent 
them  in  their  bas-reliefs.'"'  The  remains  ascribed  on  good 
grounds  to  Sapor  do  not,  however,  contain  anything  confirma- 
tory of  the  stories  which  we  are  considering.  Valerian  is  rep- 
resented on  them  in  a  humble  attitude,"  but  not  fettered,"  and 
aever  in  the  posture  of  extreme  degradation  commonly  associ- 


Vol    111 


Pfafe.  XX\A 


Fig     1. 


Gbounu  PukN  OF  THE  Serbistan  Palace  (after  Flandin). 
N.B. — The  diraeosions  are  given  in  English  yards. 

AAA    Porches.  C  C     Pillared  Hallg. 

B  B         Domed  Ealls.         1)         Court. 


Front  View  of  SEaoisTAx  Palace.  RESTonED  (after  Flandin). 


Plate  XXVf. 


Vol. 


Ghound  "Plak  of  the  Palace,  at  Fibuzabad  (after  Fkndin). 
N.B, — Tho  dimensions  are  in  Englisji  yards. 


£H.  IV.]  Ot)ENATiniS  ATTACKS  CTESiPllOK.  287 

ated  with  his  name.  He  bends  his  knee,  as  no  doubt  he  would 
be  required  to  do,  on  being  brought  into  the  Great  King's 
presence ;  but  otherwise  he  does  not  appear  to  be  subjected  to 
any  indignity.  It  seems  thus  to  be  on  the  whole  most  proba- 
ble that  the  Roman  emjieror  was  not  more  severely  treated  than 
the  generalty  of  captive  princes,  and  that  Sapor  has  been  un- 
justly taxed  with  abusing  the  rights  of  conquest." 

The  hostile  feeling  of  Odenatlius  against  Sapor  did  not  cease 
with  the  retreat  of  the  latter  across  the  Euphrates.  The 
Palmyrene  prince  was  bent  on  taking  advantage  of  the  gen- 
eral confusion  of  the  times  to  carve  out  for  himself  a  consider- 
able kingdom,  of  which  Palmyra  should  be  the  capital.  Syria 
and  Palestine  on  the  one  hand,  Mesopotamia  on  the  other,  were 
the  provinces  that  lay  most  conveniently  near  to  him,  and 
that  he  especially  coveted.  But  Mesopotamia  had  remained  in 
the  possession  of  the  Persians  as  the  prize  of  their  victory  over 
Valerian,  and  could  only  be  obtained  by  wresting  it  from  the 
hands  into  which  it  had  fallen.  Odenathus  did  liot  shrink 
from  this  contest.  It  is  had  been  with  some  reason  conjec- 
tured'* that  Sapor  must  have  been  at  this  time  occupied  with 
troubles  which  had  broken  out  on  the  eastern  side  of  his  em- 
pire. At  any  rate,  it  appears  that  Odenathus,  after  a  short 
contest  with  Macrianus  and  his  son,  Quietus,'^  turned  his  arms 
once  more,  about  a.d.  263,  against  the  Persians,  crossed  the 
Euphrates  into  Mesopotamia,  took  Carrhae  and  Nisibis,  de- 
feated Sapor  and  some  of  his  sons  in  a  battle,'"  and  drove  the 
entire  Persian  host  in  confusion  to  the  gates  of  Ctesiphon,  He 
even  ventured  to  form  the  siege  of  that  city ;"  but  it  was  not 
long  before  effectual  relief  arrived;  from  all  the  provinces 
flocked  in  contingents  for  the  defence  of  the  Western  capital ; 
several  engagements  were  fought,  in  some  of  which  Odenathus 
was  defeated;'"  and  at  last  he  found  himself  involved  in  diffi- 
culties through  his  ignorance  of  the  localities, '"  and  so  thought 
it  best  to  retire.  Apparently  his  retreat  was  undisturbed ;  he 
succeeded  in  carrying  off  his  booty  and  his  prisoners,  among 
whom  were  several  satraps,®"  and  he  retained  possession  of 
Mesopotamia,  which  continued  to  form  a  part  of  the  Palmy- 
rene kingdom  until  the  capture  of  Zenobia  by  Aurelian  (a.d. 
273). 

The  successes  of  Odenathus  in  a.d.  263  were  followed  by  a 
period  of  comparative  tranquillity.  That  ambitious  prince 
seems  to  have  been  content  with  ruling  from  the  Tigris  to  the 
Mediterranean,  and  with  the  titles  of  ' '  Augustus, "  which  he 


288  THE  SEVENTH  MOKARCIlY.  [ch.  iv. 

received  from  the  Roman  em^peror,  Gallienus,"  and  "king  of 
kings,"  which  he  assumed  upon  his  coins.'"  He  did  not  press 
further  upon  Sapor ;  nor  did  the  Roman  emperor  make  any 
serious  attempt  to  recover  his  father's  person  or  revenge  his 
defeat  upon  the  Persians.  An  expedition  which  he  sent  out  to 
the  East,  professedly  with  this  object,  in  the  year  a.d.  267, 
failed  utterly,  its  commander,  Heraclianus,  being  completely 
defeated  by  Zenobia,  the  widow  and  successor  of  Odenathus.*' 
Odenathus  himself  w^as  murdered  by  a  kinsman  three  or  four 
years  after  his  great  successes ;  and,  though  Zenobia  ruled  his 
kingdom  almost  with  a  man's  vigor,  ^^  the  removal  of  his 
powerful  adversary  must  have  been  felt  as  a  relief  by  the 
Persian  monarch.  It  is  evident,  too,  that  from  the  time  of 
the  accession  of  Zenobia,  the  relations  between  Rome  and 
Palmyra  had  become  unfriendly  f^  the  old  empire  grew  jealous 
of  the  new  kingdom  which  had  sprung  up  upon  its  borders ; 
and  the  efEect  of  this  jealousy,  while  it  lasted,  was  to  secure 
Persia  from  any  attack  on  the  part  of  either. 

It  appears  that  Sapor,  relieved  from  any  further  necessity 
of  defending  his  empire  in  arms,  employed  the  remaining  years 
of  his  hfe  in  the  construction  of  great  works,  and  especially 
in  the  erection  and  ornamentation  of  a  new  capital.  The  ruins 
of  Shahpur,  which  still  exist  near  Kazerun,  in  the  province  of 
Fars,^^  commemorate  the  name,  and  afford  some  indication  of 
the  grandeur,  of  the  second  Persian  monarch.  Besides  re- 
mains of  buildings,  they  comprise  a  number  of  bas-reliefs  and 
rock  inscriptions,  some  of  which  were  beyond  a  doubt  set  up 
by  Sapor  I."  In  one  of  the  most  remarkable  the  Persian  mon- 
arch is  represented  on  horseback,  wearing  the  crown  usual 
upon  his  coins,  and  holding  by  the  hand  a  tunicked  figure, 
probably  Miriades,  whom  he  is  presenting  to  the  captured 
Romans  as  their  sovereign.  Foremost  to  do  him  homage  is 
the  kneeling  figure  of  a  chieftain,  probably  Valerian,  behind 
whom  are  arranged  in  a  double  line  seventeen  persons,  repre- 
senting appasently  the  different  corps  of  the  Roman  army. 
[PI.  XIV.]  All  these  persons  are  on  foot,  while  in  contrast 
with  them  are  arranged  behind  Sapor  ten  guards  on  horseback, 
who  represent  his  irresistible  cavalry.''  Another  bas-relief  at 
the  same  place*"  gives  us  a  general  view  of  the  triumph  of 
Sapor  on  his  return  to  Persia  with  his  illustrious  prisoner. 
Here  fifty-seven  guards  are  ranged  behind  him,  while  in  front 
are  thirty-three  tribute-bearers,  having  with  them  an  elephant 
and  a  chariot.     In  the  centre  is  a  group  of  seven  figures,  com- 


CH.  IV.]  ms  imcniPTioNS.  289 

prising  Sapor,  who  is  on  horseback  in  his  usual  costume; 
Valerian,  Avho  is  under  the  horse's  feet;  Miriades,  who  stands 
by  Sapor's  side ;  three  principal  tribute-bearers  in  front  of  the 
main  figure ;  and  a  Victory  which  floats  in  the  sky. 

Another  important  work,  assigned  by  tradition  to  Sapor  I., 
is  the  great  dyke  at  Shuster.  This  is  a  dam  across  the  river 
Karun,  formed  of  cut  stones,  cemented  by  lime,  and  fastened 
together  by  clamps  of  iron ;  it  is  twenty  feet  broad,  and  no  less 
than  twelve  hundred  feet  in  length.  The  whole  is  a  solid  mass 
excepting  in  the  centre,  where  two  smaU  arches  have  been  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  allowing  a  part  of  the  stream  to 
flow  in  its  natural  bed.  The  greater  portion  of  the  water  is 
directed  eastward  into  a  canal  cut  for  it;  and  the  town  of 
Shuster  is  thus  defended  on  both  sides  by  a  water  barrier, 
whereby  the  position  becomes  one  of  great  strength.**"  Tradi- 
tion says  that  Sapor  used  liis  power  over  Valerian  to  obtain 
Roman  engineers  for  this  work;"'  and  the  great  dam  is  still 
known  as  the  Bund-i-Kaisar,"'^  or  "dam  of  Csesar,"  to  the  in- 
habitants of  the  neighboring  country. 

Besides  his  works  at  Shahpur  and  Shuster,  Sapor  set  up 
memorials  of  himself  at  Haji-abad,  Nakhsh-i-Rajab,  and  Nakhsh- 
i-Rustam,  near  Persepolis,  at  Darabgerd  in  South-eastern 
Persia,  and  elsewhere ;  most  of  which  still  exist  and  have  been 
described  by  various  travellers."  At  Nakhsh-i-Rustam  Vale- 
rian is  seen  making  his  submission  in  one  tablet,"  while  an- 
other exhibits  the  glories  of  Sapor's  court.''  The  sculptures  are 
in  some  instances  accompanied  by  inscriptions.  One  of  these 
is,  like  those  of  Artaxerxes,  bilingual,  Greek  and  Persian. 
The  Greek  inscription  runs  as  follows : 

TOnPOCOnONTOYTOMACAACNOY0€OY 

CAntOPOYBACIA€WCBACIA€lO.\'APlANWN 

KAIANAPIANU)N€Kr€N'OYC0€tONY[OY 
MACAACNOY0€OYAPTA".APOYBACfA£WO 

BACIA€U)NAPIANtON€Kr€NOYC0€aJf5l 

€KrONOY©€OYnAnAKOYBACIA€10C 

Its  Persian  transcript  is  read  thus:  '■'' Patlikar  (?)  zani  maZ' 
di'tn  hag  Shnhpuhri,  mcdlcan  mallca  Airnn  re  Aniran  minu- 
chitri  mill  yaztan,  hart  mazdian  hag  Artahshetr  malhan  malka 


290  TEE  SEVENTH  MONABCnY.  [ch.  iv. 

Airan,  minuchitri  min  yaztan,  napi  bag  PapaJci  malJca.'''' ^' 
In  the  main,  Sapor,  it  will  be  seen,  follows  the  phrases  of  his 
father  Artaxerxes;  but  he  claims  a  wider  dominion.  Arta- 
xerxes  is  content  to  rule  over  Ariana  (or  Iran)  only ;  his  son 
calls  himseK  lord  both  of  the  Arians  and  the  non-Arians,  or  of 
Iran  and  Turan.  We  may  conclude  from  this  as  probable  that 
he  held  some  Scythic  tribes  under  his  sway,  probably  in 
Segestan,  or  Seistan,  the  country  south  and  east  of  the  Hamoon, 
or  lake  in  which  the  Helmend  is  swallowed  up.  Scythians  had 
been  settled  in  these  parts,  and  in  portions  of  Afghanistan  and 
India,  since  the  great  invasion  of  the  Yue-chi,"  about  B.C.  200; 
and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  some  of  them  may  have  passed 
under  the  Persian  rule  during  the  reign  of  Sapor,  but  we  have 
no  particulars  of  these  conquests. 

Sapor's  coins  resemble  those  of  Artaxerxes  in  general  type,'* 
but  may  be  distinguished  from  them,  first,  by  the  head-dress, 
which  is  either  a  cap  terminating  in  the  head  of  an  eagle,  or 
else  a  mural  crown  surmounted  by  an  inflated  ball;  and, 
secondly,  by  the  emblem  on  the  reverse,  which  is  almost 
always  a  fire-altar  between  tivo  supporters.^^  [PI.  XV.,  Fig.  2.] 
The  ordinary  legend  on  the  coins  is  ''  Mazdisn  bag  Shahpuhri, 
malJcan  malka  Airan,  minuchitri  min yazdan,^'  on  the  obverse; 
and  on  the  reverse  "  Shahpuhri  nuvazi.'''' "" 

It  appears  from  these  legends,  and  from  the  inscription  above 
given,  that  Sapor  was,  Hke  his  father,  a  zealous  Zoroastrian. 
His  faith  was  exposed  to  considerable  trial.  Never  was  there 
a  time  of  greater  religious  ferment  in  the  East,  or  a  crisis  which 
more  shook  men's  belief  in  ancestral  creeds.  The  absurd 
idolatry  which  had  generally  prevailed  through  Western  Asia 
for  two  thousand  years — a  nature-worship  which  gave  the 
sanction  of  religion  to  the  gratification  of  men's  lowest  pro- 
pensities— was  shaken  to  its  foundation ;  and  everywhere  men 
were  striving  after  something  higher,  nobler,  and  truer  than 
had  satisfied  previous  generations  for  twenty  centuries.  The 
sudden  revivification  of  Zoroastrianism,  after  it  had  been  de- 
pressed and  ahiiost  forgotten  for  five  hundred  years,  was  one 
result  of  this  stir  of  men's  minds.  Another  result  was  the 
rapid  progress  of  Christianity,  which  in  the  course  of  the  third 
century  overspread  large  portions  of  the  East,  rooting  itself 
with  great  firmness  in  Armenia,  and  obtaining  a  hold  to  some 
extent  on  Babylonia,  Bactria,  and  perhaps  even  on  India."' 
Judaism,  also,  which  had  long  had  a  footing  in  Mesopotamia, 
and  which  after  the  time  of  Hadrian  may  be  regarded  as  hav- 


CH.  IV.]  nETJGtOVS  STJR—EISE  OP  MANES.  291 

ing  its  headquarters  at  Babylon — Judaism  itself,  usually  so 
immovable,  at  this  time  showed  signs  of  life  and  change,  taking 
something  like  a  new  form  in  the  schools  wherein  was  com- 
piled the  vast  and  strange  work  known  as  ' '  the  Babylonian 

Talmud.'""^ 

Amid  the  strife  and  jar  of  so  many  conflicting  systems,  each 
having  a  root  in  the  past,  and  each  able  to  appeal  with  more 
or  less  of  force  to  noble  examples  of  virtue  and  constancy 
among  its  prof essors  in  the  present,  we  cannot  be  surprised  that 
in  some  minds  the  idea  grew  up  that,  while  all  the  systems  pos- 1-- 
sessed  some  truth,  no  one  of  them  was  perfect  or  indeed  much 
superior  to  its  fellows.  Eclectic  "or  syncretic  views  are  always 
congenial  to  some  mtellects;  and  in  tunes  when  religious 
thought  is  deeply  stirred,  and  antagonistic  creeds  are  brought 
into  direct  colhsion,  the  amiable  feeling  of  a  desire  for  peace 
comes  in  to  strengthen  the  inclination  for  reconciling  opponents 
by  means  of  a  fusion,  and  producing  harmony  by  a  happy 
combination  of  discords.  It  was  in  Persia,  and  in  the  reign  of 
Sapor,  that  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  these  well-meaning 
attempts  at  fusion  and  reconciliation  that  the  whole  of  history 
can  show  was  made,  and  with  results  which  ought  to  be  a  lasting 
warning  to  the  apostles  of  comprehension.  A  certain  Mani  (or 
Manes,  as  the  ecclesiastical  writers  call  him"°),  born  in  Persia 
about  A.D.  240,'°^  grew  to  manhood  under  Sapor,  exposed  to  the 
various  religious  influences  of  which  we  have  spoken.  With  a 
mind  free  from  prejudice  and  open  to  conviction,  he  studied 
the  various  systems  of  belief  which  he  found  established  in 
Western  Asia— the  Cabalism  of  the  Babylonian  Jews,  the 
Duahsm  of  the  Magi,  the  mysterious  doctrines  of  the  Chris- 
tians, and  even  the  Buddhism  of  India.  '"*  At  first  he  inclined 
to  Christianity,  and  is  said  to  have  been  admitted  to  priest's 
orders  and  to  have  ministered  to  a  congregation ;  '"'^  but  after  a 
time  he  thought  that  he  saw  his  way  to  the  formation  of  a  new 
creed,  which  should  combine  all  that  was  best  in  the  religious 
systems  which  he  was  acquainted  with,  and  omit  what  was 
superfluous  or  objectionable.  He  adopted  the  Dualism  of  the 
Zoroastrians,  the  metempsychosis  of  India,  the  angelism  and 
demonism  of  the  Talmud,  and  the  Trinitarianism  of  the  Gospel 
of  Christ.  Christ  himself  he  identified  with  Mithra,  and  gave 
Him  liis  dwelling  in  the  sun.  He  assumed  to  be  the  Paraclete 
promised  by  Christ,  who  shoidd  guide  men  into  all  truth,  and 
claimed  that  his  "Ertang,"a  sacred  book  illustrated  by  pic- 
tures of  his  own  painting,  should  supersede  the  New  Testa- 


292  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  iv. 

mcnt. '"'  Such  pretensions  were  not  likely  to  be  tolerated  by 
the  Christian  community ;  and  Manes  had  not  put  them  for- 
ward very  long  when  he  was  expelled  from  the  church  ""**  and 
forced  to  carry  his  teaching  elsewhere.  Under  these  circum- 
stances he  is  said  to  have  addressed  himself  to  Sapor,  who  was 
at  first  inclined  to  show  him  some  favor ; ""  but  when  he  found 
out  what  the  doctrines  of  the  new  teacher  actually  were,  his 
feelings  underwent  a  change,  and  Manes,  proscribed,  or  at  any 
rate  threatened  with  penalties,  had  to  retire  into  a  foreign 
country."" 

The  Zoroastrian  faith  was  thus  maintained  in  its  purity  by 
the  Persian  monarch,  who  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  imposed 
upon  by  the  specious  eloquence  of  the  new  teacher,  but  ulti- 
mately rejected  the  strange  amalgamation  that  was  offered  to 
his  acceptance.  It  is  scarcely  to  be  regretted  that  he  so  deter- 
mined. Though  the  morality  of  the  Manichees  was  pure,'"  and 
though  their  reUgion  is  regarded  by  some  as  a  sort  of  Chris- 
tianity, there  were  but  few  points  in  which  it  was  an  improve- 
ment on  Zoroastrianism.  Its  Dualism  was  pronounced  and  de- 
cided; its  Trinitarianism  was  questionable;  its  teaching  with 
respect  to  Christ  destroyed  the  doctrines  of  the  incarnation  and 
atonement;  its  "  Ertang  "  was  a  poor  substitute  for  Holy  Scrip- 
ture. Even  its  morality,  being  deeply  penetrated  with  asceti- 
cism, was  of  a  wrong  type  and  inferior  to  that  preached  by 
Zoroaster.  Had  the  creed  of  Manes  been  accepted  by  the  Per- 
sian monarch,  the  progress  of  real  Christianity  in  the  East 
would,  it  is  probable,  have  been  impeded  rather  than  forwarded 
—the  general  currency  of  the  debased  amalgam  would  have 
checked  the  introduction  of  the  pure  metal. 

It  must  have  been  shortly  after  his  rejection  of  the  teaching 
of  Manes  that  Sapor  died,  having  reigned  thirty-one  years,  from 
A.D.  240  to  A.D.  271.  He  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable princes  of  the  Sassanian  series.  In  military  talent, 
indeed,  he  may  not  have  equalled  his  father ;  for  though  he  de- 
feated Valerian,  he  had  to  confess  himself  inferior  to  Odena- 
thus.  But  in  general  governmental  ability  he  is  among  the 
foremost  of  the  Neo-Persian  monarchs,  and  may  compare  fa- 
vorably with  ahnost  any  prince  of  the  series.  He  baffled  Odena- 
thus,  when  he  was  not  able  to  defeat  him,  by  placing  himself 
behind  walls,  and  by  bringing  into  play  those  advantages  which 
naturally  belonged  to  the  position  of  a  monarch  attacked  in  his 
own  country."^  He  maintained,  if  he  did  not  permanently 
advance,  the  power  of  Persia  in  the  west ;  while  in  the  east  it  b* 


CH.  v.]  BEION  OF  nOUMlSDAS  I.  293 

probable  that  he  considerably  extended  the  bounds  of  his  do- 
minion.'" In  tlie  internal  administration  of  his  empire  he 
united  works  of  usefulness"*  with  the  construction  of  memorials 
which  had  only  a  sentimental  and  aesthetic  value.  He  was  a 
liberal  patron  of  art,  and  is  thought  not  to  have  confined  his 
patronage  to  the  encouragement  of  native  talent."'  On  the 
subject  of  religion  he  did  not  suffer  himself  to  be  permanently 
led  away  by  the  enthusiasm  of  a  young  and  bold  freethinker. 
He  decided  to  maintain  the  religious  system  that  had  descended 
to  him  from  his  ancestors,  and  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  persuasions 
that  would  have  led  him  to  revolutionize  the  religious  opinion 
of  the  East  without  placing  it  upon  a  satisfactory  footing.  The 
Orientals  add  to  these  commendable  features  of  character,  that 
he  was  a  man  of  remarkable  beauty, ""  of  great  personal  cour- 
age, and  of  a  noble  and  princely  liberality.  According  to  them, 
"  he  only  desired  wealth  that  he  might  use  it  for  good  and  gi-eat 
purposes.'" 


CHAPTER  V. 


Short  Reign  of  Hormisdas  I.  His  dealings  with  Manes. 
Accession  of  Varahran  I.  He  puts  Manes  to  Death. 
Persecutes  the  Manichceans  and  the  Christians.  His  Re- 
lations with  Zenobia.  He  is  threatened  by  Aurelian.  His 
Death.  Reign  of  Varahran  II.  His  Tyrannical  Conduct. 
His  Conquest  of  Seistan,  and  War  with  India.  His  war 
with  the  Roman  Emperors  Cams  and  Diocletian.  His 
Loss  of  Armenia.  His  Death.  Short  Reign  of  Varahran 
III. 

Tefli/ij/coTO?  ToG  SaTTupov,  'OpjiiiuSaTjjs,   o  tovtov  iraii,  Ttji'  /Sao'iAetac  irapaAa/i^avei. 

Agath.  iv.  p.  134,  C. 

The  first  and  second  kings  of  the  Neo-Persian  Empire  were 
men  of  mark  and  renown.  Their  successors  for  several 
generations  were,  comparatively  speaking,  feeble  and  insig- 
nificant. The  first  burst  of  vigor  and  freshness  which 
commonly  attends  the  advent  to  power  of  a  new  race  in  the 
East,  or  the  recovery  of  its  former  position  by  an  old  one,  had 
passed  away,  and  was  succeeded,  as  so  often  happens,  by 
reaction  and  exhaustion,  the  monarchs  bei'oming  luxurious 


294  tsp:  seventh  monarchy.  [ch.  v. 

and  inert,  while  the  people  willingly  acquiesced  in  a  policy  of 
which  the  principle  was  "Rest  and  be  thankful."  It  helped  to 
keep  matters  in  this  quiescent  state,  that  the  kings  who  ruled 
during  this  period  had,  in  almost  every  instance,  short  reigns, 
four  monarchs  coming  to  the  throne  and  dying  within  the 
space  of  a  little  more  than  twenty-one  years.'  The  first  of 
these  four  was  Hormisdates,  Hormisdas,  or  Honnuz,^  the  son 
of  Sapor,  who  succeeded  his  father  in  a.d.  271.  His  reign 
lasted  no  more  than  a  year  and  ten  days,^  and  was  dis- 
tinguished by  only  a  single  event  of  any  importance.  Mani, 
who  had  fled  from  Sapor,  ventured  to  return  to  Persia  on  the 
accession  of  his  son,"  and  was  received  with  respect  and  favor. 
"Whether  Hormisdas  was  inclined  to  accept  his  rehgious 
teaching  or  no,  we  are  not  told ;  but  at  any  rate  he  treated  him 
kindly,  allowed  him  to  propagate  his  doctrines,  and  even 
assigned  him  as  his  residence  a  castle  named  Arabion.  From 
this  place  Mani  proceeded  to  spread  his  views  among  the 
Christians  of  Mesopotamia,  and  in  a  short  time  succeeded  in 
founding  the  sect  which,  under  the  name  of  Manichseans  or 
Manichees,  gave  so  much  trouble  to  the  Church  for  several 
centuries.  Hormisdas,  who,  according  to  some,  ^  founded  the 
city  of  Ram-Hormuz  in  Eastern  Persia,  died  in  a.d. 272,  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  son  or  brother,"  Vararanes  or  Varahran.' 
He  left  no  inscriptions,  and  it  is  doubted  whether  we  possess 
any  of  his  coins.  * 

Varahran  I.,  whose  reign  lasted  three  years  only,^  from  a.d. 
272  to  275,  is  declared  by  the  native  historians  to  have  been  a 
mild  and  amiable  prince;'"  but  the  little  that  is  positively 
known  of  him  does  not  bear  out  this  testimony.  It  seems 
certain  that  he  put  Mani  to  death,  and  probable  that  he  en- 
ticed him  to  leave  the  shelter  of  his  castle  by  artifice, "  thus 
showing  himself  not  only  harsh  but  treacherous  towards  the 
unfortunate  heresiarch.  If  it  be  true  that  he  caused  him  to  be 
flayed  ahve, '"  we  can  scarcely  exonerate  him  from  the  charge 
of  actual  cruelty,  unless  indeed  we  regard  the  punishment  as 
an  ordinary  mode  of  execution  in  Persia.  '^  Perhaps,  however, 
in  this  case,  as  in  other  similar  ones,  there  is  no  sufficient 
evidence  that  the  process  of  flaying  took  place  until  the  culprit 
was  dead, '"  the  real  object  of  the  excoriation  being,  not  the 
infliction  of  pain,  but  the  preservation  of  a  memorial  which 
coiild  be  used  as  a  warning  and  a  terror  to  others.  The  skin 
of  Mani,  stuffed  with  straw,  was  no  doubt  suspended  for  some 
time  after  his  execution  over  one  of  tlie  gates  of  the  great  city 


CH.  v.]  WAES  OF  VABAURAN  I.  295 

of  Shahpur;'°  and  it  is  possible  that  this  fact  may  have  been 
the  sole  ground  of  the  belief  (wliich,  it  is  to  be  remembered, 
was  not  universal '")  that  he  actually  suffered  death  by  flaying. 

The  death  of  the  leader  was  followed  by  the  persecution  of 
his  disciples.  Mani  had  organized  a  hierarchy,  consisting  of 
twelve  apostles,  seventy -two  bishops,  and  a  numerous  priest- 
hood;'^ and  his  sect  was  widely  established  at  the  time  of  his 
execution.  Varahran  handed  over  these  unfortunates,  or  at 
any  rate  such  of  them  as  he  was  able  to  seize,  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  the  Magians,  who  put  to  death  great  numbers  of 
Manicheeans.  Many  Christians  at  the  same  time  perished, 
either  because  they  were  confounded  with  the  followers  of 
Mani,  or  because  the  spirit  of  persecution,  once  let  loose,  could 
not  be  restrained,  but  passed  on  from  victims  of  one  class  to 
those  of  another,  the  Magian  priesthood  seizing  the  opportu- 
nity of  devoting  all  heretics  to  a  common  desti-uction. 

Thus  unhappy  in  liis  domestic  administration,  Varahran  was 
not  much  more  fortunate  in  his  wars.  Zenobia,  the  queen  of 
the  East,  held  for  some  time  to  the  policy  of  her  illustrious 
husband,  maintaining  a  position  inimical  alike  to  Rome  and 
Persia  from  the  death  of  Odenathus  in  a.d.  267  to  Aurelian's 
expedition  against  her  in  a.d.  272.  When,  however,  in  this 
year,  Aurelian  marched  to  attack  her  with  the  full  forces  of 
the  empire,  she  recognized  the  necessity  of  calling  to  her  aid 
other  troops  besides  her  own.  It  was  at  this  time  that  she 
made  overtures  to  the  Persians,  which  were  favorably  re- 
ceived;'* and,  in  the  year  a.d.  273,  Persian  troops  are  men- 
tioned among  those  with  whom  Aurelian  contended  in  the 
vicinity  of  Palmyra.'"  But  the  succors  sent  were  inconsid- 
erable, and  were  easily  overpowered  by  the  arts  or  arms  of 
the  emperor.  The  young  king  had  not  the  courage  to  throw 
himself  boldly  into  the  war.  He  allowed  Zenobia  to  be  defeated 
and  reduced  to  extremities  without  making  anything  like  an 
earnest  or  determined  effort  to  save  her.  He  continued  her 
ally,  indeed,  to  the  end,  and  probably  offered  her  an  asylum  at 
his  court,  if  she  were  compelled  to  quit  her  capital ;  but  even 
this  poor  boon  he  was  prevented  from  conferring  by  the  capt- 
ure of  the  unfortunate  princess  just  as  she  reached  the  banks 
of  the  Euphrates."" 

In  the  aid  which  he  lent  Zenobia,  Varahran,  while  he  had 
done  too  little  to  affect  in  any  degree  the  issue  of  the  struggle, 
had  done  quite  enough  to  pi'ovoke  Rome  and  draw  down  ui)on 
him  the  vengeance  of  the  Empire.     It  seems  that  he  quite  re' 


29(3  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  v- 

alized  the  position  in  which  circumstances  had  placed  him. 
Feehng  that  he  had  thrown  out  a  challenge  to  Rome,  and  yet 
shrinking  from  the  impending  conflict,  he  sent  an  embassy  to 
the  conqueror,  deprecating  his  anger  and  seeking  to  propitiate 
him  by  rare  and  costly  gifts.  Among  these  were  a  purple  robe" 
from  Cashmere,  or  some  other  remote  province  of  India,  of  so 
brilliant  a  hue  that  the  ordinary  purple  of  the  imperial  robes 
could  not  compare  with  it,  and  a  chariot  like  to  those  in  which 
the  Persian  monarch  was  himself  wont  to  be  carried."  Aure- 
lian  accepted  these  gifts ;  and  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  he 
condoned  Varahran's  conduct,  and  gi-anted  him  terms  of  peace. 
Hence,  in  the  triumph  which  Aurehan  celebrated  at  Rome  in 
the  year  a.d.  274,  no  Persian  captives  appeared  in  the  proces- 
sion, but  Persian  envoys"  were  exhibited  instead,  who  bore 
with  them  the  presents  wherewith  their  master  had  appeased 
the  anger  of  the  emperor. 

A  full  year,  however,  had  not  elapsed  from  the  time  of  the 
triumph  when  the  master  of  the  Roman  world  thought  fit  to 
change  his  policy,  and,  suddenly  declaring  war  against  the 
Persians,'*  commenced  his  march  towards  the  East.  We  are 
not  told  that  he  discovered,  or  even  sought  to  discover,  any 
fresh  ground  of  complaint.  His  talents  were  best  suited  for 
employment  in  the  field,  and  he  regarded  it  as  expedient  to 
"exercise  the  restless  temper  of  the  legions  in  some  foreign 
war."  "  Thus  it  was  desirable  to  find  or  make  an  enemy ;  and 
the  Persians  presented  themselves  as  the  foe  which  could  be 
attacked  most  conveniently.  There  was  no  doubt  a  general 
desire  to  efface  the  memory  of  Valerian's  disaster  by  some 
considerable  success ;  and  war  with  Persia  was  therefore  likely 
to  be  popular  at  once  with  the  Senate,  with  the  ai-my,  and  with 
the  mixed  multitude  which  was  dignified  with  the  title  of 
"the  Roman  people." 

Aurelian,  therefore,  set  out  for  Persia  at  the  head  of  a  nu- 
merous, but  still  a  manageable,  force."  He  proceeded  through 
Illyricum  and  Macedonia  towards  Byzantium,  and  had  almost 
reached  the  straits,  when  a  conspiracy,  fomented  by  one  of  his 
secretaries,  cut  short  his  career,  and  saved  the  Persian  empire 
from  invasion.  Aurehan  was  murdered  in  the  spring  of  a.d. 
275,  at  Coenophrurimn,  a  small  station  between  Heraclea  (Pe- 
rinthus)  and  Byzantium."  The  adversary  with  whom  he  had 
hoped  to  contend,  Varahran,  cannot  have  survived  him  long, 
since  he  died  (of  disease  as  it  would  seem)  in  the  course  of  the 
year,  leaving  his  crown  to  a  young  son  who  bore  the  samo 


CH.  v.]  REION  OF  VARAIIRAN  II.  297 

name  with  himself,  and  is  known  in  history  as  Varahran  the 
Second.'' 

Varahran  II.  is  said  to  have  ruled  at  first  tyrannically,'"  and 
to  have  greatly  disgusted  all  his  principal  nobles,  who  went  so 
far  as  to  form  a  conspiracy  against  him,  aud  intended  to  put 
him  to  death.  The  chief  of  the  Magians,  however,  interposed, 
and,  having  effectually  alarmed  the  king,  brought  him  to  ac- 
knowledge himself  wrong  and  to  promise  an  entire  change  of 
conduct.^"  The  nobles  upon  this  returned  to  their  allegiance; 
and  Varahran,  during  the  remainder  of  his  reign,  is  said  to 
have  been  distinguished  for  wisdom  and  moderation,  and  to 
have  rendered  himself  popular  with  every  class  of  his  subjects. 

It  appears  that  this  prince  Avas  not  without  miUtary  ambi- 
tion. He  engaged  in  a  war  with  the  Segestani^'  (or  Sacastani), 
the  inhabitants  of  Segestan  or  Seistan,  a  people  of  Scythic  ori- 
gin," and  after  a  time  reduced  them  to  subjection"  [PI.  XVII]. 
He  then  became  involved  in  a  quarrel  with  some  of  the  natives 
of  Afghanistan,  who  were  at  this  time  regarded  as  "  Indians." 
A  long  and  desultory  contest  followed  without  definite  result, 
which  was  not  concluded  by  the  year  a.d.  283,  when  he  found 
himself  suddenly  engaged  in  hostilities  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  empire.  ^^ 

Rome,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  third  century,  had  experienced 
one  of  those  reactions  which  mark  her  later  history,  and  which 
alone  enabled  her  to  complete  her  predestined  term  of  twelve 
centuries.  Between  the  years  a.d.  274 and  282,  under  AureHan, 
Tacitus,  Probus,  and  Carus,  she  showed  herself  once  more  veiy 
decidedly  the  first  military  power  in  the  world,  drove  back  the 
barbarians  on  all  sides,  and  even  ventured  to  indulge  in  an  ag- 
gi'essive  policy.  Aurelian,  as  we  have  seen,  was  on  the  point 
of  invading  Persia  when  a  domestic  conspiracy  brought  his 
reign  and  life  to  an  end.  Tacitus,  his  successor,  scarcely  ob- 
tained such  a  firm  hold  upon  the  throne  as  to  feel  that  he  could 
with  any  prudence  provoke  a  war.  But  Probus,  the  next  em- 
peror, revived  the  project  of  a  Persian  expedition,"  and  would 
probably  have  led  the  Roman  armies  into  Mesopotamia,  had 
not  his  career  been  cut  short  by  the  revolt  of  the  legions  in 
Illyria  (a.d.  282).  Carus,  who  had  been  his  praetorian  prefect, 
and  who  became  emperor  at  his  death,  adhered  steadily  to  his 
policy.  It  was  the  first  act  of  his  reign  to  march  the  forces  of 
the  empire  to  the  extreme  east,  and  to  commence  in  earnest 
the  war  which  had  so  long  been  threatened.  Led  by  the  Em- 
peror in  person,  the  legions  once  more  crossed  the  Euphrates. 


298  TUE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  v. 

Mesopotamia  was  rapidly  overrun,  since  the  Persians  (we  are 
told)  were  at  variance  among  themselves,  and  a  civil  Avar  was 
raging.  ^"  The  bulk  of  their  forces,  moreover,  were  engaged  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  empire  in  a  struggle  with  the  Indians," 
probably  those  of  Afghanistan.  Under  these  circumstances, 
no  effectual  resistance  was  possible ;  and,  if  we  may  believe  the 
Roman  writers,  not  only  was  the  Roman  province  of  Mesopo- 
tamia recovered,  but  the  entire  tract  between  the  rivers  as  far 
south  as  the  latitude  of  Bagdad  was  ravaged,  and  even  the 
two  great  cities  of  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon  were  taken  without 
the  slightest  difficulty.^**  Persia  Proper  seemed  to  lie  open  to 
the  invader,  and  Carus  was  preparing  to  penetrate  still  further 
to  the  east,  when  again  an  opportune  death  checked  the  pro- 
gress of  the  Roman  arms,  and  perhaps  saved  the  Persian  mon- 
archy from  destruction.  Carus  had  announced  his  intention 
of  continuing  his  march ;  some  discontent  had  shown  itself;  and 
an  oracle  had  been  quoted  which  declared  that  a  Roman  em- 
peror would  never  proceed  victoriously  beyond  Ctesiphon. 
Carus  was  not  convinced,  but  he  fell  sick,  and  his  projects  were 
delayed;  he  was  still  in  his  camp  near  Ctesiphon,  when  a  ter- 
rible thunderstorm  broke  over  the  ground  occupied  by  the 
Roman  army.  A  weird  darkness  was  spread  around,  amid 
which  flash  followed  flash  at  brief  intervals,  and  peal  upon  peal 
terrified  the  superstitious  soldiery.  Suddenly,  after  the  most 
violent  clap  of  all,  the  cry  arose  that  the  Emperor  was  dead.  ^'^ 
Some  said  that  his  tent  had  been  struck  by  lightning,  and  that 
his  death  was  owing  to  this  cause;  others  beheved  that  he  had 
simply  happened  to  succumb  to  his  malady  at  the  exact  mo- 
ment of  the  last  thunder-clap ;  a  third  theory  was  that  his  at- 
tendants had  taken  advantage  of  the  general  confusion  to  assas- 
sinate him,  and  that  he  merely  added  another  to  the  long  list 
of  Roman  emperors  murdered  by  those  who  hoped  to  profit  by 
their  removal.  It  is  not  Hkely  that  the  problem  of  what  reaUy 
caused  the  death  of  Carus  will  ever  be  solved.^"  That  he  died 
very  late  in  a.d.  283,  or  within  the  first  fortnight  of  a.d.  284, 
is  certain;"  and  it  is  no  less  certain  that  his  death  was  most 
fortunate  for  Persia,  since  it  brought  the  war  to  an  end  when 
it  had  reached  a  point  at  which  any  further  reverses  would 
have  been  disastrous,  and  gave  the  Persians  a  breathing-space 
during  which  they  might,  at  least  partially,  recover  from  their 
prostration. 

Upon  the  death  of  Carus,  the  Romans  at  once  determined  on 
retreat.     It  was  generally  believed  that  the  imperial  tent  had 


CH.  v.]  REVOLT  OF  AUMKyiA.  299 

been  struck  by  lightning ;  and  it  was  concluded  that  the  de- 
cision of  the  gods  against  the  further  advance  of  the  invading 
army  had  been  thereby  unmistakably  declared."-  The  army 
considered  that  it  had  done  enough,  and  was  anxious  to  return 
home ;  the  feeble  successor  of  Oarus,  his  son  Numerian,  if  he 
possessed  the  will,  was  at  any  rate  without  the  power  to  resist 
the  wishes  of  the  troops ;  and  the  result  was  that  the  legions 
quitted  the  East  without  further  fighting,""  and  without  secur- 
ing, by  the  conclusion  of  formal  terms  of  peace,  any  permanent 
advantage  from  their  victories. 

A  pause  of  two  years  now  occurred,  during  which  Varahran 
had  the  opportunity  of  strengthening  his  position  while  Rome 
was  occupied  by  civil  wars  and  distracted  between  the  claims 
of  pretenders.""  No  great  use  seems,  however,  to  have  been 
made  of  this  interval.  When,  in  a.d.  286,  the  celebrated  Dio- 
cletian determined  to  resume  the  war  with  Persia,  and,  em- 
bracing the  cause  of  Tiridates,  son  of  Chosroes,  directed  his 
efforts  to  the  establishment  of  tliat  prince,  as  a  Roman  feudatory, 
on  his  father's  throne,  Varahran  foimd  himself  once  moi^e  over- 
matched, and  could  offer  no  effectual  resistance.  Armenia 
had  now  been  a  province  of  Persia  for  the  space  of  twenty-six 
(or  perhaps  forty-six)  years;"'*  but  it  had  in  no  degree  been  con- 
ciliated or  united  with  the  rest  of  the  empire.  The  people  had 
been  distrusted  and  oppressed ;  the  nobles  had  been  deprived 
of  employment ;  a  heavy  tribute  had  been  laid  on  the  land ;  and 
a  religiovis  revolution  had  been  violently  effected.""  It  is  not 
surprising  that  when  Tiridates,  supported  by  a  Roman  corps 
d'armee,*''  appeared  upon  the  frontiers,  the  whole  population 
received  him  with  transports  of  loyalty  and  joy.  All  the 
nobles  flocked  to  his  standard,  and  at  once  acknowledged  him 
for  their  king."*  The  people  everywhere  welcomed  him  with 
acclamations.  A  native  prince  of  the  Arsacid  dynasty  united 
the  suffrages  of  all ;  and  the  nation  threw  itself  with  enthusi- 
astic zeal  into  a  struggle  which  was  viewed  as  a  war  of  inde- 
pendence. It  was  forgotten  that  Tiridates  was  in  fact  only  a 
puppet  in  the  hand  of  the  Roman  emperor,  and  that,  whatever 
the  result  of  the  contest,  Armenia  would  remain  at  its  close,  as 
she  had  been  at  its  commencement,  a  dependant  upon  a  foreign 
power. 

The  success  of  Tiridates  at  the  first  was  such  as  might  have 
been  expected  from  the  forces  arrayed  in  his  favor.  He  de- 
feated two  Persian  armies  in  the  open  field,  drove  out  the  gar- 
risons which  held  the  more  important  of  the  fortified  towns, 


goo  THE  SEVENTH  3I0NARUUY.  [ch.  v. 

and  became  undisputed  master  of  Armenia/'  He  even  crossed 
the  border  which  separated  Armenia  from  Persia,  and  gained 
signal  victories  on  admitted  Persian  ground. ""  According  to 
the  native  writers,  his  personal  exploits  were  extraordinary ;  he 
defeated  singly  a  corps  of  giants,  and  routed  on  foot  a  large 
detachment  mounted  on  elephants!^'  The  narrative  is  here, 
no  doubt,  tinged  with  exaggeration ;  but  the  general  result  is 
correctly  stated.  Tiridates,  within  a  year  of  his  invasion,  was 
complete  master  of  the  entire  Armenian  highland,  and  was  in 
a  position  to  carry  his  arms  beyond  his  own  frontiers. 

Such  seems  to  have  been  the  position  of  things,  when 
Varahran  II.  suddenly  died,  after  a  reign  of  seventeen  years," 
A.D.  292.  He  is  generally  said  to  have  left  behind  him  two 
sons, "  Varahran  and  Narsehi,  or  Narses,  of  whom  the  elder, 
Varahran,  was  proclauned  king.  This  prince  was  of  an  amia- 
ble temper,  but  apparently  of  a  weakly  constitution.  He  was 
with  diflBculty  persuaded  to  accept  the  throne,^*  and  anticipated 
from  the  first  an  early  demise.  ^^  No  events  are  assigned  to 
his  short  reign,  which  (according  to  the  best  authorities)  did 
not  exceed  the  length  of  four  months.  ^^  It  is  evident  that  he 
must  have  been  powerless  to  offer  any  effectual  opposition  to 
Tiridates,  whose  forces  continued  to  ravage,  year  after  year,  the 
north-western  provinces  of  the  Persian  empire."  Had  Tiri- 
dates been  a  prince  of  real  mihtary  talent,  it  could  scarcely 
have  been  difficult  for  him  to  obtain  still  greater  advantages. 
But  he  was  content  with  annual  raids,  Avhich  left  the  substantial 
power  of  Persia  untouched.  He  allowed  the  occasion  of  the 
throne's  being  occupied  by  a  weak  and  invalid  prince  to  slip 
by.  The  consequences  of  this  negligence  will  appear  in  the 
next  chapter.  Persia,  permitted  to  escape  serious  attack  in 
her  time  of  weakness,  was  able  shortly  to  take  the  offensive  and 
to  make  the  Armenian  prince  regret  his  indolence  or  want  of 
ambition.  The  son  of  Chosroes  became  a  second  time  a  fugi- 
tive ;  and  once  more  the  Eomans  were  called  in  to  settle  the 
affairs  of  the  East.  We  have  now  to  trace  the  circumstances 
of  this  struggle,  and  to  show  how  Eome  under  able  leaders 
succeeded  in  revenging  the  defeat  and  captivity  of  Valerian, 
and  in  inflicting,  in  her  turn,  a  gi'ievous  humiliation  upon  her 
adversary. 


CH.  VI.J  ACCESSION  OF  N ARSES.  301 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Civil  War  of  Narses  and  his  Brother  Hormisdas.  Narses 
victorious.  He  attacks  and  expels  Tiridates.  War  de- 
clared against  him  by  Diocletian.  First  Campaign  of 
Galerius,  a.d.  297.  Second  Campaign,  a.d.  298.  Defeat 
suffered  by  Narses.  Negotiations.  Conditions  of  Peace. 
Abdication  and  Death  of  Narses. 

Nnpcr^s  e/35o|iii05  ava.ypa.(})erai  jSatriAeOcrai  Ilepo-aii'  airb  'ApTofe'pfou. — ZoNORAS,  xii.  31. 

It  appears  that  on  the  death  ofVarahran  III.,  probably 
without  issue,  there  was  a  contention  for  the  crown  between 
two  brothers, '  Narses  and  Hormisdas.  ^  "We  are  not  informed 
which  of  them  was  the  elder,  nor  on  what  grounds  they  re- 
spectively rested  their  claims ;  but  it  seems  that  Narses  was 
from  the  first  preferred  by  the  Persians,  and  that  his  rival  re- 
lied mainly  for  success  on  the  arms  of  foreign  barbarians. 
Worsted  in  encounters  wherein  none  but  Persians  fought  on 
either  side,  Hormisdas  summoned  to  his  aid  the  hordes  of  the 
north ' — Gelli  from  the  shores  of  the  Caspian,  Scyths  from  the 
Oxus  or  the  regions  beyond,  and  Russians,  now  first  men- 
tioned by  a  classical  writer.  But  the  perilous  attempt  to  settle 
a  domestic  struggle  by  the  swords  of  foreigners  was  not  des- 
tined on  this  occasion  to  prosper.  Hormisdas  failed  in  his 
endeavor  to  obtain  the  throne;  and,  as  we  hear  no  more  of 
him,  we  may  regard  it  as  probable  that  he  was  defeated  and 
slain.  At  any  rate  Narses  was,  within  a  year  or  two  of  his 
accession,  so  firmly  settled  in  his  kingdom  that  he  was  able  to 
turn  his  thoughts  to  the  external  affairs  of  the  empire,  and  to 
engage  in  a  great  war.  All  danger  from  internal  disorder 
must  have  been  pretty  certainly  removed  before  Narses  could 
veuture  to  affront,  as  he  did,  the  strongest  of  existing  military 
powers.     [PI.  XVIII.] 

Narses  ascended  the  throne  in  a.d.  292  or  293.  It  was  at 
least  as  early  as  a.d.  296  that  he  challenged  Rome  to  an  en- 
counter by  attacking  in  force  the  vassal  monarch  whom  her 
arms  had  established  in  Armenia."  Tiridates  had,  it  is  evi- 
dent, done  much  to  provoke  the  attack  by  his  constant  raids 
into  Persian  territory,''  which  were  sometimes  carried  even  to 
the  south  of  Ctesiphon."    He  was  probably  surprised  by  the 


302  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vl 

sudden  march  and  vigorous  assault  of  an  enemy  whom  he  had 
learned  to  despise ;  and,  feeling  himself  unable  to  organize  an 
effectual  resistance,  he  had  recourse  to  flight,  gave  up  Armenia 
to  the  Persians, '  and  for  a  second  time  placed  himself  under 
the  protection  of  the  Eoman  emperor.  The  monarch  who  held 
this  proud  position  was  still  Diocletian,  the  greatest  emperor 
that  had  occupied  the  Eoman  throne  since  Trajan,  and  the 
prince  to  whom  Tiridates  was  indebted  for  his  restoration  to 
his  kingdom.  It  was  impossible  that  Diocletian  should  submit 
to  the  affront  put  upon  him  wathout  an  earnest  effort  to 
avenge  it.  His  own  power  rested,  in  a  great  measure,  on  his 
military  prestige ;  and  the  unpunished  insolence  of  a  foreign 
king  would  have  seriously  endangered  an  authority  not  very 
firmly  established.  The  position  of  Diocletian  compelled  him 
to  declare  war  against  Narses*  in  the  year  a.d.  296,  and  to  ad- 
dress himself  to  a  struggle  of  which  he  is  not  likely  to  have 
misconceived  the  importance.  It  might  have  been  expected 
that  he  would  have  undertaken  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  per- 
son; but  the  internal  condition  of  the  empire  was  far  from 
satisfactory,  and  the  chief  of  the  State  seems  to  have  felt  that 
he  could  not  conveniently  quit  his  dominions  to  engage  in  war 
beyond  his  borders.  He  therefore  committed  the  task  of  re- 
instating Tiridates  and  punishing  Narses  to  his  favorite  and 
son-in-law,  Galerius,^  while  he  himself  took  up  a  position  with- 
in the  limits  of  the  empire,'"  which  at  once  enabled  him  to 
overawe  his  domestic  adversaries  and  to  support  and  coun- 
tenance his  lieutenant. 

The  first  attempts  of  Galerius  were  unfortunate.  Summoned 
suddenly  from  the  Danube  to  the  Euphrates,  and  placed  at  the 
head  of  an  army  composed  chiefly  of  the  levies  of  Asia,  Ul-dis- 
ciplined,  and  unacquainted  with  their  commander,  he  had  to 
meet  an  adversary  of  whom  he  knew  little  or  nothing,  in  a 
region  the  character  of  which  was  adverse  to  his  own  troops 
and  favorable  to  those  of  the  enemy.  Narses  had  invaded  the 
Roman  province  of  Mesopotamia,  had  penetrated  to  the  Kha- 
bour,  and  was  threatening  to  cross  the  Euphrates  into  Syria. ' ' 
Galerius  had  no  choice  but  to  encounter  him  on  the  ground 
which  he  had  chosen.  Now,  though  Western  Mesopotamia  is 
ill-described  as  "  a  smooth  and  barren  surface  of  sandy  desert, 
without  a  hillock,  without  a  tree,  and  without  a  spring  of 
iresh  water, '"Mt  is  tmdoubtedly  an  open  country,  possessing 
numerous  plains,  where,  in  a  battle,  the  advantage  of  numbers 
is  likely  to  be  felt,  and  where  there  is  abundant  room  for  the 


CH  VI.]  777.?  VICTORY  OVER  GALERItlS.  303 

evolutions  of  cavalry.  The  Persians,  like  their  predecessors 
the  Parthians,  were  especially  strong  in  hoi-se;  and  the  host 
which  Narses  had  brought  into  the  field  greatly  outnumbered 
the  troops  which  Diocletian  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
Galerius.  Yet  Galerius  took  the  offensive.  Fighting  under 
the  eye  of  a  somewhat  stern  master,  he  was  scarcely  free  to 
choose  his  plan  of  campaign.  Diocletian  expected  him  to  drive 
the  Persians  from  Mesopotamia,  '^  and  he  was  therefore  bound 
to  make  the  attempt.  He  accordingly  sought  out  his  adversary 
in  this  region,  and  engaged  him  in  three  great  battles.  '*  The 
first  and  second  appear  to  have  been  indecisive;  but  in  the 
third  the  Roman  general  suffered  a  complete  defeat.'^  The 
catastrophe  of  Crassus  was  repeated  almost  upon  the  same  bat- 
tle-field, and  probably  almost  by  the  same  means. '°  But, 
personally,  Galerius  was  more  fortunate  than  his  predecessor. 
He  escaped  from  the  carnage,  and,  recrossing  the  Euphrates, 
rejoined  his  father-in-law  in  Syria.  A  conjecture,  not  al- 
together destitute  of  probability, "  makes  Tiridates  share  both 
the  calamity  and  the  good  fortune  of  the  Roman  Caesar.  Like 
Galerius,  he  escaped  fi'om  the  battle-field,  and  reached  the 
banks  of  the  Euphrates.  But  his  horse,  which  had  received  a 
wound,  could  not  be  trusted  to  pass  the  river.  In  this  emer- 
gency the  Armenian  prince  dismounted,  and,  armed  as  he  was, 
plunged  into  the  stream.  The  river  was  both  wide  and  deep ; 
the  current  was  rapid ;  but  the  hardy  adventurer,  inured  to 
danger  and  accustomed  to  every  athletic  exercise,  swam  across 
and  reached  the  opposite  bank  in  safety. '® 

Thus,  while  the  rank  and  file  perished  ignominiously,  the 
two  personages  of  most  importance  on  the  Roman  side  were 
saved.  Galerius  hastened  towards  Antioch,  to  rejoin  his  col- 
league and  sovereign.  The  latter  came  out  to  meet  him,  but, 
instead  of  congratulating  him  on  his  escape,  assumed  the  air 
of  an  offended  master,  and,  declining  to  speak  to  hmi  or  to  stop 
his  chariot,  forced  the  Caesar  to  follow  him  on  foot  for  nearly 
a  mile  before  he  would  condescend  to  receive  his  explanations 
and  apologies  for  defeat.'"  The  disgrace  was  keenly  felt,  and 
was  ultimately  revenged  upon  the  prince  who  had  contrived 
it.  But,  at  the  time,  its  main  effect  doubtless  was  to  awake  in 
the  young  Caesar  the  strongest  desire  of  retrieving  his  honor, 
and  wiping  out  the  memory  of  his  gi-eat  reverse  by  a  yet  more 
signal  victory.  Galerius  did  not  cease  through  the  winter  of 
A.D.  297  to  importune  his  father-in-law  for  an  opportunity  of 
redeeming  the  past  and  recovering  his  lost  laurels. 


g04  5W.e  SEVENTH  MONARCnT.  [ch.  vi. 

The  emperor,  having  sufficiently  indulged  his  resentment, 
acceded  to  the  wishes  of  his  favorite.  Galerius  was  continued 
in  his  command.  A  new  army  was  collected  during  the  win- 
ter, to  replace  that  which  had  been  lost :  and  the  greatest  care 
was  taken  that  its  material  should  be  of  good  quahty,  and  that 
it  should  be  employed  where  it  had  the  best  chance  of  success. 
The  veterans  of  Illyria  and  Moesia  constituted  the  flower  of  the 
force  now  enrolled  ;^°  and  it  was  further  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  a  body  of  Gothic  auxiliaries."'  It  was  determined, 
moreover,  that  the  attack  should  this  time  be  made  on  the  side 
of  Armenia,  where  it  was  felt  that  the  Romans  would  have  the 
double  advantage  of  a  friendly  country,  and  of  one  far  more 
favorable  for  the  movements  of  infantry  than  for  those  of  an 
army  whose  strength  lay  in  its  horse.""  The  number  of  the 
troops  employed  was  still  small.  Galerius  entered  Armenia 
at  the  head  of  only  25,000  men;"  but  they  were  a  picked  force, 
and  they  might  be  augmented,  almost  to  any  extent,  by  the 
national  militia  of  the  Armenians.  He  was  now,  moreover,  as 
cautious  as  he  had  previously  been  rash ;  he  advanced  slowly, 
feeling  his  way;  he  even  personally  made  reconnaissances, 
accompanied  by  only  one  or  two  horsemen,  and,  imder  the 
shelter  of  a  flag  of  truce,  explored  the  position  of  his  adver- 
sary.''* Narses  found  himself  overmatched  alike  in  art  and  in 
force.  He  allowed  hunself  to  be  surprised  in  bis  camp  by  his 
active  enemy, "  and  suffered  a  defeat  by  which  he  more  than  lost 
all  the  fruits  of  his  former  victory.  Most  of  his  army  was 
destroyed;  he  himself  received  a  wound,-"  and  with  difficulty 
escaped  by  a  hasty  flight.  Galerius  pursued,  and,  though  he 
did  not  succeed  in  taking  the  monarch  himself,  made  prize  of 
his  wives,  his  sisters,  and  a  number  of  his  children,"  besides 
capturing  his  military  chest.  He  also  took  many  of  the  most 
illustrious  Persians  prisoners,  ^'^  How  far  he  followed  his  flying 
adversary  is  uncertain ;""  but  it  is  scarcely  probable  that  he 
proceeded  much  southward  of  the  Armenian  frontier.  He  had 
to  reinstate  Tiridates  in  his  dominions,  to  recover  Eastern 
Mesopotamia,  and  to  lay  his  laurels  at  the  feet  of  his  colleague 
and  master.  It  seems  probable  that  having  driven  Narses  from 
Armenia,  and  left  Tiridates  there  to  administer  the  govern- 
ment, he  hastened  to  rejoin  Diocletian  before  attempting  any 
further  conquests. 

The  Persian  monarch,  on  his  side,  having  recovered  from  his 
wound,'"  which  could  have  been  but  slight,  set  himself  to  col- 
lect another  army,  but  at  the  same  time  sent  an  ambassador  to 


CH.  VT.]  PERSIAN  EMBASSY  TO   OALERIUS.  305 

to  the  camp  of  Galerius,  requesting  to  know  the  terms  on 
which  Rome  would  consent  to  make  peace.  A  writer  of  good 
authority^'  has  left  us  an  account  of  the  interview  which  fol- 
lowed between  the  envoy  of  the  Persian  monarch  and  the 
victorious  Roman.  Apharban  (so  was  the  envoy  named) 
opened  the  negotiations  with  the  following  speech^- : 

"The  whole  human  race  knows,"  he  said,  "  that  the  Roman 
and  Persian  kingdoms  resemble  two  great  luminaries,  and  that, 
like  a  man's  two  eyes,  they  ought  mutally  to  adorn  and 
illustrate  each  of  her,  and  not  in  the  extremity  of  their  wrath 
to  seek  rather  each  other's  destruction.  So  to  act  is  not  to  act 
manfully,  but  is  indicative  rather  of  levity  and  weakness ;  for 
it  is  to  suppose  that  our  inferiors  can  never  be  of  any  service  to 
us,  and  that  therefore  we  had  better  get  rid  of  them.  Narses, 
moreover,  ought  not  to  be  accounted  a  weaker  prince  than 
other  Persian  kings ;  thou  hast  indeed  conquered  him,  but  then 
thou  surpassest  all  other  monarchs ;  and  thus  Narses  ha.s  of 
course  been  worsted  by  thee,  though  he  is  no  whit  inferior  in 
merit  to  the  best  of  his  ancestors.  The  orders  which  my  master 
has  given  me  are  to  entrust  all  the  rights  of  Persia  to  the 
clemency  of  Rome ;  and  I  therefore  do  not  even  bring  Avith  me 
any  conditions  of  peace,  since  it  is  for  the  emperor  to  deter- 
mine everything.  I  have  only  to  pray,  on  my  master's  behalf, 
for  the  restoration  of  his  wives  and  m.ale  children ;  if  he  re- 
ceives them  at  your  hands,  he  will  be  forever  beholden  to  you, 
and  will  be  better  pleased  than  if  he  recoverd  them  by  force  of 
arms.  Even  now  my  master  cannot  sufficiently  thank  you  for 
the  kind  treatment  which  he  hears  you  have  vouchsafed  them, 
in  that  you  have  offered  them  no  insult,  but  have  behaved  to- 
wards them  as  though  on  the  point  of  giving  them  back  to 
their  kith  and  kin.  He  sees  herein  that  you  bear  in  mind  the 
changes  of  fortune  and  the  instability  of  all  human  affairs." 

At  this  point  Galerius,  who  had  listened  with  impatience  to 
the  long  harangue,  burst  in  with  a  movement  of  anger  that 
shook  his  whole  frame — "  What?  Do  the  Persians  dare  to  re- 
mind us  of  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  as  though  we  could  for- 
get how  they  behave  when  victory  inclines  to  them?  Is  it 
not  their  wont  to  push  their  advantage  to  the  uttermost  and 
press  as  heavily  as  may  be  on  the  unfortunate?  How  charm- 
ingly they  showed  the  moderation  that  becomes  a  victor  in 
Valerian's  time !  They  vanquished  him  by  fraud ;  they  kept 
him  a  prisoner  to  advanced  old  age ;  they  let  him  die  in  dis- 
honor ;  and  then  when  he  was  dead  they  stripped  off  his  skin, 


306  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vi. 

and  with  diabolical  ingenuity  made  of  a  perishable  human 
body  an  imperishable  monument  of  our  shame."  Verily,  if  v/e 
follow  this  envoy's  advice,  and  look  to  the  changes  of  human 
affairs,  we  shall  not  be  moved  to  clemency,  but  to  anger,  when 
we  consider  the  past  conduct  of  the  Persians.  If  pity  be  shown 
them,  if  their  requests  be  granted,  it  will  not  be  for  what  they 
have  urged,  but  because  it  is  a  principle  of  action  with  us — a 
a  principle  handed  down  to  us  from  our  ancestors — '  to  spare 
the  humble  and  chastise  the  proud.'"  Apharban,  therefore, 
was  dismissed  with  no  definite  answer  to  his  question,  what 
terms  of  peace  Rome  would  require ;  but  he  was  told  to  assure 
his  master  that  Rome's  clemency  equalled  her  valor,  and  that 
it  would  not  be  long  before  he  would  receive  a  Roman  envoy 
authorized  to  signify  the  Imperial  pleasure,  and  to  conclude  a 
treaty  with  him. 

Having  held  this  interview  with  Apharban,  Galerius  hastened 
to  meet  and  consult  his  colleague.  ^*  Diocletian  had  remained 
in  Syria,  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  observation,^^  while  Galerius 
penetrated  into  Armenia  and  engaged  the  forces  of  Persia. 
When  he  heard  of  his  son-in-law's  great  victory  he  crossed  the 
Euphrates,  and  advancing  through  Western  Mesopotamia, 
from  which  the  Persians  probably  retired,  took  up  his  residence 
atNisibis,'"  now  the  chief  town  of  these  parts.  It  is  perhaps 
true  that  his  object  was  ' '  to  moderate,  by  his  presence  and 
counsels,  the  pride  of  Galerius.""  That  prince  was  bold  to 
rashness,  and  nourished  an  excessive  ambition.  He  is  said  to 
have  at  this  time  entertained  a  design  of  grasping  at  the  con- 
quest of  the  East,  and  to  have  even  proposed  to  himself  to  re- 
duce the  Persian  Empire  into  the  form  of  a  Roman  province.  '* 
But  the  views  of  Diocletian  were  humbler  and  more  prudent. 
He  held  to  the  opinion  of  Augustus  and  Hadrian,  that  Rome 
did  not  need  any  enlargement  of  her  territory,  and  that  the 
absorption  of  the  East  was  especially  undesirable.  When  he 
and  his  son-in-law  met  and  interchanged  ideas  at  Nisibis,  the 
views  of  the  elder  ruler  naturally  prevailed ;  and  it  was  resolved 
to  offer  to  the  Persians  tolerable  terms  of  peace.  A  civilian  of 
importance,'^  Sicorius  Probus,  was  selected  for  the  delicate 
office  of  envoy,  and  was  sent,  with  a  train  of  attendants,  into 
Media,  where  Narses  had  fixed  his  headquarters.  We  are  told 
that  the  Persian  monarch  received  him  with  all  honor,  but, 
imder  pretence  of  allowing  him  to  rest  and  refresh  himself  after 
his  long  journey,  deferred  his  audience  from  day  to  day ;  while 
he  employed  the  time  thus  gained  in  collecting  from  various 


CH.  VI.]  ROME  CONSENTS  TO  PEACE.  807 

quarters  such  a  number  of  detachments  and  garrisons  as  might 
constitute  a  respectable  army.  He  had  no  intention  of  renew- 
ing the  war,  but  he  knew  the  weight  wliich  miUtary  prepara- 
tion ever  lends  to  the  representations  of  diplomacy.  Accord- 
ingly it  was  not  until  he  had  brought  under  the  notice  of  Sico- 
rius  a  force  of  no  inconsiderable  size  that  he  at  last  admitted 
him  to  an  interview.  The  Roman  ambassador  was  introduced 
into  an  inner  chamber  of  the  royal  x^alace  in  Media,'"  where  he 
found  only  the  king  and  three  others— Apharban,  the  envoy 
sent  to  Galerius,  Archapetes,  the  captain  of  the  guard,  and 
Barsaborsus,  the  governor  of  a  province  on  the  Armenian  fron- 
tier."' He  was  asked  to  unfold  the  particulars  of  his  messsage, 
and  say  what  were  the  terms  on  which  Rome  would  make 
peace.  Sicorius  complied.  The  emperors,  he  said,  reqviired 
five  tilings:  — (i.)  The  cession  to  Rome  of  five  provinces  beyond 
the  river  Tigris,  which  are  given  by  one  writer"-  as  laitilene, 
Sophene,  Arzanene,  Carduene,  and  Zabdicene ;  by  another"^  as 
Arzanene,  Moxoene,  Zabdicene,  Rehunene,  and  Corduene;  (ii.) 
the  recognition  of  the  Tigris,  as  the  general  boundary  between 
the  two  empires;  (iii.)  the  extension  of  Ai-menia  to  the  fortress 
of  Zintha,  in  Media ;  (iv.)  the  relinquishment  by  Persia  to  Rome 
of  her  protectorate  over  Iberia,  including  the  right  of  giving 
investiture  to  the  Iberian  kings;  and  (v.)  the  recognition  of 
Nisibis  as  the  place  at  which  alone  commercial  dealings  could 
take  place  between  the  tAvo  nations. 

It  would  seem  that  the  Persians  were  surprised  at  the  moder- 
ation of  these  demands.  Their  exact  value  and  force  will  re- 
quire some  discussion ;  but  at  any  rate  it  is  clear  that,  under 
the  circumstances,  they  were  not  felt  to  be  excessive.  Narses 
did  not  dispute  any  of  them  except  the  last :  and  it  seems  to 
have  been  rather  because  he  did  not  wish  it  to  be  said  that  he 
had  yielded  everything,  than  because  the  condition  was  really 
very  onerous,  that  he  made  objection  in  this  instance."  Sico- 
rius was  fortunately  at  hberty  to  yield  the  point.  He  at  once 
withdrew  the  fifth  article  of  the  treaty,  and,  the  other  four  be- 
ing accepted,  a  formal  peace  was  concluded  between  the  two 
nations. 

To  understand  the  real  character  of  the  peace  now  made,  and 
to  appreciate  properly  the  relations  thereby  established  between 
Rome  and  Persia,  it  will  be  necessary  to  examine  at  some 
length  the  several  conditions  of  the  treaty,  and  to  see  exactly 
what  was  imported  by  each  of  them.  There  is  scarcely  one 
out  of  the  whole  number  that  carries  its  meaning  plauily  upon 


808  2'-^^'  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  vl 

its  face ;  and  on  the  more  important  very  various  interpretations 
have  been  put,  so  that  a  discussion  and  settlement  of  some 
rather  intricate  points  is  here  necessary. 

(i.)  There  is  a  considerable  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  five 
provinces  ceded  to  Rome  by  the  first  article  of  the  treaty,  as  to 
their  position  and  extent,  and  consequently  as  to  their  impor- 
tance. By  some  they  are  put  on  the  right,  ^^  by  others  on  the 
left,  bank  of  the  Tigris ;  while  of  those  who  assign  them  this 
latter  position  some  place  them  in  a  cluster  about  the  sources 
of  the  river,"  while  others  extend  them  very  much  further  to 
the  southward."  Of  the  five  provinces  three  only  can  be  cer- 
tainly named,  since  the  authorities  differ  as  to  the  two  others.  * 
These  three  are  Arzanene,  Cordyene,  and  Zabdicene,  which 
occur  in  that  order  in  Patricius.  If  we  can  determine  the  posi- 
tion of  these  three,  that  of  the  others  will  follow,  at  least  within 
certain  limits. 

Now  Arzanene  was  certainly  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris. 
It  adjoined  Armenia,^"  and  is  reasonably  identified  with  the 
modern  district  of  Kherzan,  which  lies  between  Lake  Van  and 
the  Tigris,  to  the  west  of  the  Bitlis  river.  ^"  All  the  notices  of 
Arzanene"  suit  this  locality;  and  the  name  "  Kherzan" may  be 
regarded  as  representing  the  ancient  appellation. " 

Zabdicene  was  a  little  south  and  a  little  east  of  this  position. 
It  was  the  tract  about  a  town  known  as  Bezabda  (perhaps  a 
corruption  of  Beit-Zabda),  which  had  been  anciently  called 
Phoenica.  ^^  This  town  is  almost  certainly  represented  by  the 
modern  Pynyk,  "^  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  a  little  above 
Jezireh.  The  province  whereof  it  was  the  capital  may  perhaps 
have  adjoined  Arzanene,  reaching  as  far  north  as  the  Bitlis 
river. 

If  these  two  tracts  are  rightly  placed,  Cordyene  must  also  be 
sought  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris.  The  word  is  no  doubt 
the  ancient  representative  of  the  modern  Kurdistan,  and 
means  a  country  in  wMch  Kurds  dwelt.  Now  Kurds  seem  to 
have  been  at  one  time  the  chief  inhabitants  of  the  Mons  Masius, 
the  modern  Jebel  Karajah  Dagh  and  Jebel  Tur,  which  was 
thence  called  Cordyene,  Gordyene,  or  the  Gordiaean  mountain 
chain.  ^^  But  there  was  another  and  a  more  important  Cor- 
dyene on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river.  The  tract  to  this  day 
known  as  Kurdistan,  the  high  mountain  region  south  and 
south-east  of  Lake  Van  between  Persia  and  Mesopotamia,  was 
in  the  possession  of  Kurds  from  before  the  time  of  Xenophon, 
and  Niras  known  as  the  country  of  the  Carduchi,  as  Cardyene, 


en.  vi.J     POSITION  OF  THE  CEDED  PH0VINGE8.  309 

and  as  Cordyene.  '**'  This  tract,  which  was  contiguous  to  Ap- 
zanene  and  Zabdicene,  if  we  have  rightly  placed  those  regions, 
must  almost  certainly  have  been  the  Cordyene  of  the  treaty, 
which,  if  it  corresponded  at  all  nearly  in  extent  with  the  modern 
Kurdistan,  must  have  been  by  far  the  largest  and  most  impor- 
tant of  the  five  provinces. 

The  two  remaining  tracts,  whatever  their  names, "  must  un- 
doubtedly have  lain  on  the  same  side  of  the  Tigris  with  these 
three.  As  they  are  otherwise  unknown  to  us  (for  Sophene, 
which  had  long  been  Roman,  cannot  have  been  one  of  them), 
it  is  impossible  that  they  should  have  been  of  much  importance. 
No  doubt  they  helped  to  round  off  the  Roman  dominion  in  this 
quarter;  but  the  great  value  of  the  entire  cession  lay  in  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  large  and  fruitful"*  province  of  Cordyene,  in- 
habited by  a  brave  and  hardy  population,  and  afterwards  the 
seat  of  fifteen  fortresses^"  which  brought  the  Roman  dominion 
to  the  very  edge  of  Adiabene,  made  them  masters  of  the  passes 
into  Media,  and  laid  the  whole  of  Southern  Mesopotamia  open 
to  their  incursions.  It  is  probable  that  the  hold  of  Persia  on 
the  territory  had  never  been  strong ;  and  in  relinquishing  it  she 
may  have  imagined  that  she  gave  up  no  very  great  advantage ; 
but  in  the  hands  of  Rome  Kurdistan  became  a  standing  menace 
to  the  Persian  power,  and  we  shall  find  that  on  the  first  oppor- 
tunity the  false  step  now  taken  was  retrieved,  Cordyene  with 
its  adjoining  districts  was  pertinaciously  demanded  of  the  Ro- 
mans,"" was  grudgingly  surrendered,  and  was  then  firmly  re- 
attached to  the  Sassanian  dominions, 

(ii.)  The  Tigris  is  said  by  Patricius  and  Festus'*  to  have  been 
made  the  boundary  of  the  two  empires.  Gibbon  here  boldly 
substitutes  the  Western  Khabour  and  maintains  that  "the  Ro- 
man frontier  traversed,  but  never  followed,  the  course  of  the 
Tigris.""^  He  appears  not  to  be  able  to  understand  how  the 
Tigris  could  be  the  frontier,  when  five  provinces  across  the 
Tigris  were  Roman.  But  the  intention  of  the  article  probably 
was,  first,  to  mark  the  complete  cession  to  Rome  of  Eastern 
as  well  as  Western  Mesopotamia,  and,  secondly,  to  establish 
the  Tigi'is  as  the  line  separating  the  empires  below  the  point 
down  to  which  the  Romans  held  both  banks.  Cordyene  may 
not  have  touch  the  Tigris  at  all,  or  may  have  touched  it  only 
about  the  87th  parallel.  From  this  point  southwards,  as  far  as 
Mosul,  or  Nimrud,  or  possibly  Kileh  Sherghat,  the  Tigris  was 
probably  now  recogmzed  as  the  dividing  line  between  the  em- 
pires.   By  the  letter  of  the  treaty  the  whole  Euphrates  valley 


gl()  THE  SEVENTH  MONABCHT.  [ch.  vt 

might  indeed  have  been  claimed  by  Rome;  but  practically  she 
did  not  push  her  occupation  of  Mesopotamia  below  Circesium. 
The  real  frontier  from  this  point  was  the  Mesopotamian  desert, 
which  extends  from  Kerkesiyeh  to  Nimrud,  a  distance  of  150 
miles.  Above  this  it  was  the  Tigris,  as  far  probably  as  Fesha- 
poor ;  after  which  it  followed  the  line,  whatever  it  was,  which 
divided  Cordyene  from  Assyria  and  Media. 

(iii.)  The  extension  of  Armenia  to  the  fortress  of  Zintha,  in 
Media,  seems  to  have  iinported  much  more  than  would  at  first 
sight  appear  froixi  the  words.  Gibbon  interprets  it  as  imply- 
ing the  cession  of  all  Media  Atropatene,  "^  which  certainly  ap- 
pears a  little  later  to  be  in  the  possession  of  the  Armenian 
monarch,  Tiridates.  "*  A  large  addition  to  the  Armenian  terri- 
tory out  of  the  Median  is  doubtless  intended ;  but  it  is  quite 
impossible  to  determine  definitely  the  extent  or  exact  charac- 
ter of  the  cession."^ 

(iv.)  The  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  is  sufficiently  intelli- 
gible. So  long  as  Armenia  had  been  a  fief  of  the  Persian  em- 
pire, it  naturally  belonged  to  Persia  to  exercise  influence  over 
the  neighboring  Iberia,  which  corresponded  closely  to  the  modern 
Georgia,  intervening  between  Armenia  and  the  Caucasus. 
Now,  when  Armenia  had  become  a  dependency  of  Rome,  the 
protectorate  hitherto  exercised  by  the  Sassanian  princes  passed 
naturally  to  the  Caesars ;  and  with  the  protectorate  was  bound  1 

up  the  right  of  granting  investiture  to  the  kingdom,  whereby 
the  protecting  power  was  secured  against  the  estabhshment  on 
the  throne  of  an  unfriendly  person.  Iberia  was  not  herself  a 
state  of  much  strength ;  but  her  power  of  opening  or  shutting 
the  passes  of  the  Caucasus  gave  her  considerable  importance, 
since  by  the  admission  of  the  Tatar  hordes,  which  were  always 
ready  to  pour  in  from  the  plains  of  the  North,  she  could  sud- 
denly change  the  whole  face  of  affairs  in  North -Western  Asia, 
and  inflict  a  terrible  revenge  on  any  enemy  that  had  provoked 
her.  It  is  true  that  she  might  also  bring  suffering  on  her 
friends,  or  even  on  herself,  for  the  hordes,  once  admitted,  were 
apt  to  make  little  distinction  between  friend  and  foe;  but 
prudential  considerations  did  not  always  prevail  over  the 
promptings  of  passion,  and  there  had  been  occasions  when,  in 
spite  of  them,  the  gates  had  been  thrown  open  and  the  bar- 
barians invited  t©  enter. "  It  was  well  for  Rome  to  have  it  in 
her  power  to  check  this  peril.  Her  own  strength  and  the 
tranquillity  of  her  eastern  provinces  were  confirmed  and  secured 
by  the  right  which  she  (practically)  obtained  of  nominating  the 
Iberian  monarchs. 


CH.  VI.]        IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  ROMAN  GAINS.  311 

(v.)  The  fifth  article  of  the  treaty,  having  been  rejected  by 
Narses  and  then  withdrawn  by  Sicorius,  need  not  detain  us 
long.  By  liiniting  the  commercial  intercourse  of  the  two 
nations  to  a  single  city,  and  that  a  city  within  their  own 
dominions,  the  Romans  wovdd  have  obtained  enormous  com- 
mercial advantages.  While  their  own  merchants  remained 
quietly  at  home,  the  foreign  merchants  would  have  had  the 
trouble  and  expense  of  bringing  their  commodities  to  market  a 
distance  of  sixty  miles  from  the  Persian  frontier  and  of  above 
a  hundred  from  any  considerable  town ; "  they  would  of  course 
have  been  liable  to  market  dues,  which  would  have  fallen 
wholly  into  Roman  hands ;  and  they  would  further  have  been 
chargeable  with  any  duty,  protective  or  even  prohibitive,  which 
Rome  chose  to  impose.  It  is  not  surprising  that  Narses  here 
made  a  stand,  and  insisted  on  commerce  being  left  to  flow  in 
the  broader  channels  which  it  had  formed  for  itself  in  the 
course  of  ages.** 

Rome  thus  terminated  her  first  period  of  struggle  with  the 
newly  revived  monarchy  of  Persia  by  a  great  victory  and  a  gi-eat 
diplomatic  success.  If  Narses  regarded  the  terms— and  by  his 
conduct  he  would  seem  to  have  done  so — as  moderate  under  the 
circumstances,*^"  our  conclusion  must  be  that  the  disaster  which 
he  had  suffered  was  extreme,  and  that  he  knew  the  strength  of 
Persia  to  be,  for  the  time,  exhausted.  Forced  to  relinquish  his 
suzerainty  over  Armenia  and  Iberia,  he  saw  those  countries 
not  merely  wrested  from  himself,  but  placed  under  the  pro- 
tectorate, and  so  made  to  minister  to  the  strength,  of  his  rival. 
Nor  was  this  all.  Rome  had  gradually  been  advancing  across 
Mesopotamia  and  working  her  way  from  the  Euphrates  to  the 
Tigris.  Narses  had  to  acknowledge,  in  so  many  words,  that  the 
Tigris,  and  not  the  Euphrates,  was  to  be  regarded  as  her  true 
boundary,  and  that  nothing  consequently  was  to  be  considered 
as  Persian  beyond  the  more  eastern  of  the  two  rivers.  Even 
this  concession  was  not  the  last  or  the  worst.  Narses  had 
finally  to  submit  to  see  his  empire  dismembered,  a  portion  of 
Media  attached  to  Armenia,  and  five  provinces,  never  hitherto 
in  dispute,  torn  from  Persia  and  added  to  the  dominion  of 
Rome.  He  had  to  allow  Rome  to  establish  herself  in  force  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  so  to  lay  open  to  her  assaults  a 
great  portion  of  his  northern  besides  all  his  western  frontier. 
He  had  to  see  her  brought  to  the  very  edge  of  the  Iranic  pla- 
teau, and  within  a  fortnight's  march  of  Persia  Propei\  Tiie 
ambition  to  rival  his  ancestor  Sapor,  if  really  entertained,'"  waa 


312  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHT.  [ch.  vi. 

severely  punished ;  and  the  defeated  prince  must  have  felt  that 
he  had  been  most  ill-advised  in  making  the  venture. 

Narses  did  not  long  continue  on  the  throne  after  the  con- 
clusion of  this  disgraceful,  though,  it  may  be,  necessary,  treaty. 
It  was  made  in  a.d.  297.  He  abdicated  in  a.d.  301.  It  may 
have  been  disgust  at  his  ill-success,  it  may  have  been  mere 
weariness  of  absolute  power,  which  caused  him  to  descend  from 
his  high  position  and  retire  into  private  hfe."  He  was  so  for- 
tunate as  to  have  a  son  of  full  age  in  whose  favor  he  could  re- 
sign, so  that  there  was  no  diflSculty  about  the  succession. 
His  ministers  seem  to  have  thought  it  necessary  to  offer  some 
opposition  to  his  project; "  but  their  resistance  was  feeble,  per- 
haps because  they  hoped  that  a  young  prince  would  be  more 
entirely  guided  by  their  counsels.  Narses  was  allowed  to  com- 
plete his  act  of  self-renunciation,  and,  after  crowning  his  son 
Hormisdas  with  his  own  hand,  to  spend  the  remainder  of  his  . 

days  in  retirement.    According  to  the  native  writers,  his  main         ■| 
object  was  to  contemplate  death  and  prepare  himself  for  it.  fI 

In  his  youth  he  had  evinced  some  levity  of  character,  and  had  1 

been  noted  for  his  devotion  to  games  and  to  the  chase ; "  in  his  * ' 

middle  age  he  laid  aside  these  pursuits,  and,  applying  himself 
actively  to  business,  was  a  good  administrator,  as  well  as  a 
brave  soldier.  But  at  last  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  onlj^  life 
worth  living  was  the  contemplative,  and  that  the  happiness  of 
the  hunter  and  the  statesman  must  yield  to  that  of  the  philoso- 
pher. It  is  doubtful  how  long  he  survived  his  resignation  of 
the  throne,'^  but  tolerably  certain  that  he  did  not  outhve  hia 
Bon  and  successor,  who  reigned  less  than  eight  years. 


1 


l\ 


CH.  VII.1  EEIGN  OF  EOBMISDAS  II.  313 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Reign  of  Hormi'sdas  II.  His  Disjjosition.  General  Charac- 
ter of  his  Reign.  His  Taste  for  Building.  His  new  Court 
of  Justice.  His  Marriage  icith  a  Princess  of  Cabul. 
Story  of  his  Son  Hormisdas.  Death  of  Horniisdas  II., 
and  Imprisonment  of  his  Son  Hormisdas.  Interregnum. 
Croivn  assigned  to  Sapor  II.  before  his  Birth.  Long 
Reign  of  Sapor.  First  Period  of  his  Reign,  from  a.d. 
309  to  A.D.  337.  Persia  plundered  by  the  Arabs  and  the 
Turks.  Victories  of  Sapor  over  the  Arabs.  Persecution 
of  the  Christians.  Escape  of  Hormisdas.  Feelings  and 
Conduct  of  Sapor. 

"Regnum  in  Persas  obtinuit  Hormoz,  Narsis  Alius."— Eutych,  vol.  i.  p.  396. 

Hormisdas  II.,  who  became  king  on  the  abdication  of  his 
father,  Narses,  had,  like  his  father,  a  short  reign.  He  ascend- 
ed the  throne  a.d.  301;  he  died  a.d.  309,  not  quite  eight  years 
later.'  To  this  period  historians  assign  scarcely  any  events. 
The  personal  appearance  of  Hormisdas,  if  we  may  judge  by  a 
gem,  was  pleasing;  [PI.  XVIII.,  Fig.  4.]  he  is  said,  however,  to 
have  been  of  a  harsh  temper  by  nature,  but  to  have  controlled 
his  evil  inclinations  after  he  became  king,  and  in  fact  to  have 
then  neglected  nothing  that  could  contribute  to  the  welfare  of 
his  subjects.''  He  engaged  in  no  wars;  and  his  reign  was  thus 
one  of  those  quiet  and  uneventful  intei-vals  which,  furnishing 
no  materials  for  history,  indicate  thereby  the  happiness  of  a 
nation.^  We  are  told  that  he  had  a  strong  taste  for  building,* 
and  could  never  see  a  crumbling  edifice  withovit  instantly  set- 
ting to  work  to  restore  it.  Euined  towns  and  villages,  so  com- 
mon throughout  the  East  in  all  ages,  ceased  to  be  seen  in 
Persia  while  he  filled  the  throne.  An  army  of  masons  always 
followed  him  in  his  frequent  journeys  throughout  his  empire, 
and  repaired  dilapidated  homesteads  and  cottages  with  as  much 
care  and  diligence  as  edifices  of  a  public  character.  According 
to  some  writers  he  founded  several  entirely  new  towns  in 
Khuzistan  or  Susiana,^  while,  according  to  others,  °  he  built  the 
important  city  of  Hormuz,  or  (ae  it  is  sometimes  called)  Raii;i- 
Aormuz,  in  the  province  of  "Kcrman,  which  is  stiUa  flouiishing 


314  rilE  SKVENTE  MONARCHY.  [CH.  vn. 

place.  Other  authorities '  ascribe  this  city,  however,  to  the 
first  Hormisdas,  the  son  of  Sapor  I.  and  grandson  of  Artaxer- 
xes. 

Among  the  means  devised  by  Hormisdas  II.  for  bettering 
the  condition  of  his  people  the  most  remarkable  was  his  es- 
tablishment of  a  new  Court  of  Justice.  In  the  East  the  op- 
pression of  the  weak  by  the  powerfvd  is  the  most  inveterate 
and  univei'sal  of  all  evils,  and  the  one  that  well-intentioned 
monarchs  have  to  be  most  careful  in  checking  and  repressing. 
Hormisdas,  in  his  anxiety  to  root  out  this  evil,  is  said  to  have 
set  up  a  court  expressly  for  the  hearing  of  causes  where  com- 
plaint was  made  by  the  poor  of  wrongs  done  to  them  by  the 
rich.*  The  duty  of  the  judges  was  at  once  to  punish  the  op- 
pressors, and  to  see  that  ample  reparation  was  made  to  those 
whom  they  had  wronged.  To  increase  the  authority  of  the 
court,  and  to  secure  the  impartiality  of  its  sentences,  the 
monarch  made  a  point  of  often  presiding  over  it  himself,  of 
hearing  the  causes,  and  nronouncing  the  judgments  in  person. 
The  most  powerful  nobles  were  thus  made  to  feel  that,  if 
they  offended,  they  would  be  likely  to  receive  adequate  pun- 
ishment; and  the  weakest  and  poorest  of  the  people  were 
encouraged  to  come  forward  and  make  complaint  if  they  had 
suffered  injury. 

Among  his  other  wives,  Hormisdas,  we  are  told,  married  a 
daughter  of  the  king  of  Cabul.''  It  was  natural  that,  after  the 
conquest  of  Seistan'"  by  Varahran  II.,  about  a.d.  280,  the 
Persian  monarchs  should  estabhsh  relations  with  the  chief- 
tains ruling  in  Afghanistan.  That  country  seems,  from  the 
first  to  the  fourth  century  of  our  era,  to  have  been  under  the 
government  of  princes  of  Scythian  descent  and  of  considerable 
wealth  and  power."  Kadphises,  Kanerki,  Kenorano,  Ooerki, 
Baraoro,  had  the  main  seat  of  their  empire  in  the  region  about 
Cabul  and  Jellalabad ;  but  from  this  centre  they  exercised  an 
extensive  sway,  which  at  times  probably  reached  Candahar  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  Punjab  region  on  the  other.  Their  large 
gold  coinage  proves  them  to  have  been  monarchs  of  great 
wealth,  while  their  use  of  the  Greek  letters  and  language  in- 
dicates a  certain  amount  of  civilization.  The  marriage  of 
Hormisdas  with  a  princess  of  Cabul  imphes  that  the  hostile 
relations  existing  under  Varahran  II.  had  been  superseded  by 
friendly  ones.''  Persian  aggression  had  ceased  to  be  feared. 
The  reigning  Iiido-Scythic  monarch  felt  no  reluctance  to  give 
his  daughter  in  marriage  to  his  Western  neighbor,  and  sent 


in.  VII. J  ms  llELATIOIiS  WITH  CABUL.  Big 

her  to  his  court  (we  are  told)  with  a  wardrobe  and  ornaments 
of  the  utmost  magnificence  and  costliness.  '^ 

Hormisdas  II.  appears  to  have  had  a  son,  of  the  same  name 
with  himself,  who  attained  to  manhood  while  his  father  was 
still  reigning.  '^  This  prince,  who  was  generally  regarded,  and 
who,  of  course,  viewed  himself,  as  the  heir-apparent,  was  no 
favorite  with  the  Persian  nobles,  whom  he  had  perhaps  of- 
fended by  an  inclination  towards  the  literature  and  civiliza- 
tion of  the  Greeks.  '^  It  must  have  been  upon  previous  con- 
sultation and  agreeement  that  the  entire  body  of  the  chief 
men  resolved  to  vent  their  spite  by  insulting  the  prince  in 
the  most  open  and  public  way  at  the  table  of  his  father.  The 
king  was  keeping  his  birthday,  which  was  always,  in  Persia, 
the  gi'eatest  festival  of  the  year,  "^  and  so  the  most  public  occa- 
sion possible.  All  the  nobles  of  the  realm  were  invited  to  the 
banquet ;  and  all  came  and  took  their  several  places.  The 
prince  was  absent  at  the  first,  but  shortly  arrived,  bringing 
with  him,  as  the  excuse  for  his  late  appearance,  a  quantity  of 
game,  the  produce  of  the  morning's  chase.  Such  an  entrance 
must  have  created  some  disturbance  and  have  drawn  general 
attention ;  but  the  nobles,  who  were  bound  by  etiquette  to  rise 
from  their  seats,  remained  firmly  fixed  in  them,  and  took  not 
the  slightest  notice  of  the  prince's  arrival. "  This  behavior  was 
an  indignity  which  naturally  aroused  his  resentment.  In  the 
heat  of  the  moment  he  exclaimed  aloud  that  "those  who  had 
insulted  him  should  one  day  suffer  for  it — their  fate  should  be 
the  fate  of  Marsyas."  At  first  the  threat  was  not  understood ; 
but  one  chieftain,  more  learned  than  his  fellows,  explained  to 
the  rest  that,  according  to  the  Greek  myth,  Marsyas  was  flayed 
alive.  Now,  flaying  alive  was  a  punishment  not  unknown  to 
the  Persian  law;'*  and  the  nobles,  fearing  that  the  prince  really 
entertained  the  intention  which  he  had  expressed,  became 
thoroughly  alienated  from  him,  and  made  up  their  minds  that 
they  would  not  allow  him  to  reign.  During  his  father's  life- 
time, they  could,  of  coui'se,  do  nothing ;  but  they  laid  up  the 
dread  threat  in  their  memory,  and  patiently  waited  for  the 
moment  when  the  throne  would  become  vacant,  and  their 
enemy  would  assert  his  right  to  it. 

Apparently,  their  patience  was  not  very  severely  taxed. 
Hormisdas  II.  died  within  a  few  years ;  and  Prince  Hormisdas, 
as  the  only  son  whom  he  had  left  behind  him,"  thought  to  suc- 
ceed as  a  matter  of  course.  But  the  nobles  rose  in  insurrection, 
seized  his  person,  and  thx'ew  him  into  a  dungeon,  intending 


t{l(5  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHT.  [cBt.  Vti 

that  he  should  remain  there  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  They  them- 
selves  took  the  direction  of  affairs,  and  finding  that,  though 
King  Hormisdas  had  left  behind  him  no  other  son,  yet  one  of 
his  wives  was  pregnant,  they  proclaimed  the  unborn  infant 
king,  and  even  with  the  utmost  ceremony  proceeded  to  crown 
tiie  embryo  by  suspending  the  royal  diadem  over  the  womb  of 
the  mother."  A  real  interregnum  must  have  followed;  but  it 
did  not  extend  beyond  a  few  months.  The  pregnant  widow  of 
Hormisdas  fortunately  gave  birth  to  a  boy,  and  the  difficulties 
of  the  succession  were  thereby  ended.  All  classes  acquiesced 
in  the  rule  of  the  infant  monarch,  who  received  the  name  of 
Sapor — whether  simply  to  mark  the  fact  that  he  was  believed 
to  be  the  late  king's  son,^'  or  in  the  hope  that  he  would  rival 
the  glories  of  the  first  Sapor,  is  uncertain. 

The  reign  of  Sapor  II.  is  estimated  variously,  at  69,  70,  71, 
and  72  years;"  but  the  balance  of  authority  is  in  favor  of  sev- 
enty. He  was  born  in  the  course  of  the  year  a.d.  309,  and  he 
seems  to  have  died  in  the  year  after  the  Roman  emperor 
Valens,'^^  or  a.d.  379.  He  thus  reigned  nearly  three-quarters  of 
a  century,  "being  contemporary  with  the  Roman  emperors, 
Galerius,  Constantine,  Constantius  and  Constans,  Julian,  Jo- 
vian, Valentinian  I.,  Valens,  Gratian,  and  Valentinian  II. 

This  long  reign  is  best  divided  into  periods.  The  first  period 
of  it  extended  from  a.d.  309  to  a,d.  337,  or  a  space  of  twenty- 
eight  years.  This  was  the  time  anterior  to  Sapor's  wars  with 
the  Romans.  It  included  the  sixteen  years  of  his  minority''* 
and  a  space  of  twelve  years  during  which  he  waged  successful 
wars  with  the  Arabs.  The  minority  of  Sapor  was  a  period  of 
severe  trial  to  Persia.  On  every  side  the  bordering  nations  en- 
deavored to  take  advantage  of  the  weakness  incident  to  the 
I'ule  of  a  minor,  and  attacked  and  ravaged  the  empire  at  their 
pleasure. ^^  The  Arabs  were  especially  aggressive,  and  made 
continual  raids  into  Babylonia,  Khiizistan,  and  the  adjoining 
regions,  which  desolated  these  provinces  and  carried  the  hor- 
rors of  war  into  the  very  heart  of  the  empire.  The  tribes  of 
Beni-Ayar  and  Abdul-Kais,  which  dwelt  on  the  southern  shores 
of  the  Persian  Gulf,  took  the  lead  in  these  incursions,  and 
though  not  attempting  any  permanent  conquests,  inflicted  ter- 
rible sufferings  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  tracts  which  they  in- 
vaded. At  the  same  time  a  Mesopotamian  chieftain,  called 
Tayer  or  Thair,""  made  an  attack  upon  Ctesiphon,  took  the  city 
by  storm,  and  captured  a  sister  or  aunt  of  the  Persian  monarch , 
The  nobles,  who,  during  Sapor's  minority,  guided  the  helm  of 


CH.  xn.]  MINORITT  OF  SAPOR  II.  31? 

the  State,  were  quite  incompetent  to  make  head  against  these 
numerous  enemies.  For  sixteen  years  the  marauding  bands 
had  the  advantage,  and  Persia  found  herself  continually  weak- 
er, more  impoverished,  and  less  able  to  recover  herself.  The 
young  prince  is  said  to  have  shown  extraordinary  discretion 
and  intelligence. "  He  diligently  trained  hnnself  in  all  manly  ex- 
ercises, and  prepared  both  his  mind  and  body  for  the  important 
duties  of  his  station.  But  his  tender  years  forbade  him  as  yet 
taking  the  field;  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  his  ministers  pro- 
longed the  period  of  his  tutelage  in  order  to  retain,  to  the  latest 
possible  moment,  the  power  whereto  they  had  become  accus- 
tomed. At  any  rate,  ifc  was  not  till  he  was  sixteen,  a  later  age 
than  Oriental  ideas  require,''  that  Sapor's  minority  ceased — 
that  he  asserted  his  manhood,  and,  placing  himself  at  the  head 
of  his  army,  took  the  entire  direction  of  affairs,  civil  and  mili- 
tary, into  his  own  hands.** 

From  this  moment  the  fortunes  of  Persia  began  to  rise.  Con- 
tent at  first  to  meet  and  chastise  the  marauding  bands  on  his 
own  territory,  Sapor,  after  a  time,  grew  bolder,  and  ventured 
to  take  the  offensive.  Having  collected  a  fleet  of  considerable 
size, '°  he  placed  his  troops  on  board,  and  conveyed  them  to  the 
city  of  El-Katif,  an  important  place  on  the  south  coast  of  the 
Persian  Gulf,  where  he  disembarked  and  proceeded  to  carry 
fire  and  sword  through  the  adjacent  region.  Either  on  this  oc- 
casion, or  more  probably  in  a  long  series  of  expeditions,  he  rav- 
aged the  whole  district  of  the  Hejer,  gaining  numerous  victories 
over  the  tribes  of  the  Temanites,  the  Beni-Waiel,  the  Abdul- 
Kais,  and  others,  which  had  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  inva- 
sion of  Persia.  His  mOitary  genius  and  his  valor  were  every 
where  conspicuous ;  but  unfortunately  these  excellent  qualities 
were  unaccompanied  by  the  humanity  which  has  been  the 
crowning  virtue  of  many  a  conqueror.  Sapor,  exasperated  by 
the  sufferings  of  his  countrymen  during  so  many  years,  thought 
that  he  could  not  too  severely  punish  those  who  had  inflicted 
them.  He  put  to  the  sword  the  greater  part  of  every  tribe  that 
he  conquered;  and,  when  his  soldiers  were  weary  of  slaying, 
he  made  them  pierce  the  shoulders  of  their  prisoners,  and  in- 
sert in  the  woimd  a  string  or  thong  by  which  to  drag  them  into 
captivity,"  The  barbarity  of  the  age  and  nation  approved 
these  atrocities ;  and  the  monarch  who  had  commanded  them 
was,  in  consequence,  saluted  as  DhouJacta,  or  "Lord  of  the 
Shoulders,"  by  an  admiring  people.'^ 

Cnielties  nlmost  as  great,  but  of  a  different  character,  were 


818  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  vii 

at  the  same  time  sanctioned  by  Sapor  in  regard  to  one  class  of 
his  own  subjects— viz.,  those  who  had  made  profession  of 
Christianity.  The  Zoroastrian  zeal  of  this  king  was  great, 
and  he  regarded  it  as  incumbent  on  him  to  check  the  advance 
■which  Christianity  was  now  making  in  his  territories.  He  is- 
sued severe  edicts  against  the  Christians  soon  after  attaining 
his  majority  ;^^  and  when  they  sought  the  protection  of  the 
-Roman  emperor,  he  punished  their  disloyalty  by  imposing 
upon  them  a.  fresh  tax,  the  weight  of  which  was  oppressive. 
When  Symeon,  Archbishop  of  Seleucia,  complained  of  this  ad- 
ditional burden  in  an  offensive  manner,  Sapor  retaliated  by 
closing  the  Christian  chiirches,  confiscating  the  ecclesiastical 
property,  and  putting  the  complainant  to  death.  Accounts  of 
these  severities  reached  Constantine,  the  Roman  emperor,  who 
had  recently  embraced  the  new  religion  (which,  in  spite  of 
constant  persecution,  had  gradually  overspread  the  empire), 
and  had  assumed  the  character  of  a  sort  of  general  protector 
of  the  Christians  throughout  the  world.  ^^  He  remonstrated 
with  Sapor,  bvit  to  no  purpose.'^  Sapor  had  formed  the  reso- 
lution to  renew  the  contest  terminated  so  unfavorably  forty 
years  earlier  by  his  grandfather.  He  made  the  emperor's  in- 
terference with  Persian  affairs,  and  encouragement  of  his 
Christian  subjects  in  their  perversity,  a  ground  of  complaint, 
and  began  to  threaten  hostiUties.'"  Some  negotiations,  which 
are  not  very  clearly  narrated,"  followed.  Both  sides,  appar- 
ently, had  determined  on  war,  but  both  wished  to  gain  time. 
It  is  uncertain  what  would  have  been  the  result  had  Constan- 
tine lived.  But  the  death  of  that  monarch  in  the  early  sum- 
mer of  A.D.  337,  on  his  way  to  the  eastern  frontier,  dispelled 
the  last  chance  of  peace  by  relieving  Sapor  from  the  whole- 
some fear  which  had  hitherto  restrained  his  ambition.  The 
military  fame  of  Constantine  was  great,  and  naturally  inspired 
respect;  his  power  was  firmly  fixed,  and  he  was  without  com- 
petitor or  rival.  By  his  removal  the  whole  face  of  affairs  was 
changed ;  and  Sapor,  who  had  almost  brought  himself  to  ven- 
ture on  a  rupture  with  Rome  during  Constantine's  Hfe,  no 
longer  hesitated  on  receiving  news  of  his  death,  but  at  once 
commenced  hostilities.  '* 

It  is  probable  that  among  the  motives  which  determined  the 
somewhat  wavering  conduct  of  Sapor  at  this  juncture'^  was  a 
reasonable  fear  of  the  internal  troubles  which  it  seemed  to  be 
in  the  power  of  the  Romans  to  excite  among  the  Persians,  if 
from  friends  they  became  enemies.    Having  tested  his  own 


en.  vir.]    HIS  GROUNDS  OF  QUARREL  WITH  ROME.  3x9 

I 
military  capacity  in  his  Aran  wars,  and  formed  an  army  on 
whose  courage,  endurance,  and  attachment  he  could  rely,  he 
\  was  not  afraid  of  measuring  his  strength  with  that  of  Rome  in 

'  the  open  field ;  but  he  may  well  have  dreaded  the  arts  which 

[  the  Imperial  State  was  in  the  habit  of  employing,^"  to  supple- 

ment her  military  shortcomings,  in  wars  with  her  neighbors. 
There  was  now  at  the  court  of  Constantinople  a  Persian  refu» 
gee  of  such  rank  and  importance  that  Constantino  had,  as  it 
were,  a  pretender  ready  made  to  his  hand,  and  could  reckon 
'  on    creating    dissension    among    the    Persians    whenever    he' 

pleased,  by  simply  proclaiming  himself  this  person's  ally  and 
patron.  Prince  Hormisdas,  the  elder  brother  of  Sapor,  and 
rightful  king  of  Persia,  had,  after  a  long  unprisonment,^'  con- 
trived, by  the  help  of  his  wife,  to  escape  from  his  dungeon 
and  had  fled  to  the  court  of  Constantino  as  early  as  a.d,  323 
He  had  been  received  by  the  emperor  witli  every  mark  of 
honor  and  distinction,  had  been  given  a  maintenance  suited 
to  his  rank,  and  had  enjoyed  other  favors."  Sapor  must  have 
felt  himself  deeply  aggrieved  by  the  undue  attention  paid  to 
his  rival ;  and  though  he  pretended  to  make  light  of  the  mat- 
ter, and  even  generously  sent  Hormisdas  the  wife  to  whom  his 
escape  was  due,"^  he  cannot  but  have  been  uneasy  at  the  pos- 
session, by  the  Roman  emperor,  of  his  brother's  person.  In 
weighing  the  reasons  for  and  against  war  he  cannot  but  have 
assigned  considerable  importance  to  this  circumstance.  It  did 
not  ultimately  prevent  him  from  challenging  Rome  to  the 
combat;  but  it  may  help  to  account  for  the  hesitation,  the 
delay,  and  the  fluctuations  of  purpose,  which  we  remark  in  his 
conduct  during  the  four  or  five  years*^  which  immediately  pre- 
ceded the  death  of  Constantiue. 


43 


320  THE  SEVE^TU  Mu2iABCUT.  [ch.  viu 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Death  of  Constantine.  First  Wai 
of  Sapor  zcith  Rome,  a.  d.  337-350.  First  Siege  of  Nisibis. 
Obscure  Interval.  Troubles  in  Armenia,  and  Recovery  of 
Armenia  by  the  Persians.  Sax)or^s  Second  Siege  of  Nisibis. 
Its  Failure.  Great  Battle  of  Singara.  Sapor^s  Son  made 
Prisoner  and  murdered  in  cold  blood.  Third  Siege  of 
Nisibis.  Sapor  called  aivay  by  an  Invasion  of  the  Mas' 
sagetce. 

*  Constantius  adversus  Persas  et  Saporem,  qui  Mesopotamiam  vastaverant,  novem 
praeliis  parum  prospere  decertavit. " — Orosius,  Hist.  vii.  29. 

The  death  of  Constantine  was  followed  by  the  division  of  the 
Roman  world  among  his  sons.  The  vast  empii'e  with  which 
Sapor  had  almost  made  up  his  mind  to  contend  was  partitioned 
out  into  three  moderate-sized  kingdoms. '  In  place  of  the  late 
brave  and  experienced  emperor,  a  raw  youth,"  who  had  given 
no  signs  of  superior  ability,  had  the  government  of  the  Roman 
provinces  of  the  East,  of  Thrace,  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  Egypt.  Master  of  one  third  of  the  empire  only, 
and  of  the  least  warhke  portion,^  Constantius  was  a  foe  whom 
the  Persian  monarch  might  well  despise,  and  whom  he  might 
expect  to  defeat  without  much  difficulty.  Moreover,  there 
Avas  much  in  the  circumstances  of  the  time  that  seemed  to 
promise  success  to  the  Persian  arms  in  a  struggle  with  Rome. 
The  removal  of  Constantine  had  been  followed  by  an  outburst 
of  licentiousness  and  violence  among  the  Roman  soldiery  in 
the  capital  ;*  and  throughout  the  East  the  army  had  cast  off 
the  restraints  of  discipline,  and  given  indications  of  a  turbu- 
lent and  seditious  spirit. '  The  condition  of  Armenia  was  also 
such  as  to  encourage  Sapor  in  his  ambitious  projects.  Tiri- 
dates,  though  a  persecutor  of  the  Christians  in  the  early  part 
of  his  reign,  had  been  converted  by  Gregory  the  Illuminator, ' 
and  had  then  enforced  Christianity  on  his  subjects  by  fire  and 
sword.  A  sanguinary  conflict  had  followed.  A  large  portion 
of  the  Armenians,  firmly  attached  to  the  old  national  idolatry, 
had  resisted  determinedly.'  Nobles,  priests,  and  people  had 
fought  desperately  in  defence  of  their  temples,  images.,  aud 


CH  vin.l       SAPOR  II.  ATTACKS  CONSTANTIUS.  821 

altars ;  and,  though  the  persistent  will  of  the  king  overbore  all 
opposition,  yet  the  result  was  the  formation  of  a  discontented 
faction,  which  rose  up  from  time  to  time  against  its  rulers,  and 
was  constantly  tempted  to  ally  itself  with  any  foreign  power 
from  which  it  could  hope  the  re-establishment  of  the  old  relig- 
ion. Armenia  had  also,  after  the  death  of  Tiridates  (in  a.d. 
314),  fallen  under  the  government  of  weak  princes.*  Persia 
had  recovered  from  it  the  portion  of  Media  Atropatene  ceded 
by  the  treaty  between  Galerius  and  Narses."  Sapor,  therefore, 
f  had  nothing  to  fear  on  this  side ;  and  he  might  reasonably  ex- 
I  pect  to  find  friends  among  the  Armenians  themselves,  should 

the  general  position  of  his  affairs  allow  him  to  make  an  effort 
to  extend  Persian  influence  once  more  over  the  Armenian 
highland. 

The  bands  of  Sapor  crossed  the  Roman  frontier  soon  after,  if 
not  even  before, '"  the  death  of  Constantine ;  and  after  an  inter- 
val of  forty  years  the  two  great  powers  of  the  world  were  once 
more  engaged  in  a  bloody  conflict.  Constantius,  having  paid 
the  last  honors  to  his  father's  remains, "  hastened  to  the  eastern 
frontier,  where  he  found  the  Roman  army  weak  in  numbers, 
badly  armed  and  badly  provided,  ill-disposed  towards  himself, 
and  almost  ready  to  mutiny,  '^  It  was  necessary,  before  any- 
thing could  be  done  to  resist  the  advance  of  Sapor,  that  the  in- 
subordination of  the  troops  should  be  checked,  their  wants  sup- 
plied, and  their  good-will  conciliated.  Constantius  applied  him- 
self to  effect  these  changes.  '^  Meanwhile  Sapor  set  the  Arabs 
and  Armenians  in  motion,  inducing  the  Pagan  party  among 
the  latter  to  rise  in  insurrection,  deliver  their  king,  Tiranus, 
into  his  power,  '^  and  make  incursions  into  the  Roman  territory, 
while  the  latter  infested  with  their  armed  bands  the  provinces 
of  Mesopotamia  and  Syria.  "^'  He  himself  was  content,  during 
the  first  year  of  the  war,  a.d.  337,  with  moderate  successes,  and 
appeared  to  <"he  Romans  to  avoid  rather  than  seek  a  pitched 
battle. '"  Constantius  was  able,  under  these  circumstances,  not 
only  to  maintain,  his  ground,  but  to  gain  certain  advantages. 
He  restored  the  direction  of  affairs  in  Armenia  to  the  Roman 
party, "  detached  some  of  the  Mesopotamian  Arabs  from  the  side 
of  his  adversary,  and  attached  them  to  his  own,'^  and  even 
built  forts  in  the  Persian  territory  on  the  further  side  of  the 
Tigris.'"  But  the  gains  made  were  sHght;  and  in  the  ensuing 
year  (a.d.  338;  Sapor  took  the  field  in  greater  force  than  before, 
and  addressed  himself  to  an  important  enterprise.  He  aimed 
it  is  evident,  from  the  first,  at  tjie  recovery  of  Mesopotamia, 


322  THE  SEVENTH  MONAIWHY.  [ch.  vut 

and  at  tlirusting  back  the  Romans  from  the  Tigris  to  the  Eu- 
phrates. He  found  it  easy  to  overrun  the  open  country,  to 
ravage  the  crops,  drive  off  the  cattle,  and  burn  the  villages  and 
homesteads.  But  the  region  could  not  be  regarded  as  conquered, 
it  could  not  be  permanently  held,  unless  the  strongly  fortified 
posts  which  commanded  it,  and  which  were  in  the  hands  of 
Rome,  could  be  captured.^"  Of  all  these  the  most  important 
was  Nisibis.  This  ancient  town,  known  to  the  Assyrians  as 
Nazibina,^'  was,  at  any  rate  from  the  time  of  Lucullus,"  the 
most  important  city  of  Mesopotamia.  It  was  situated  at  the 
distance  of  about  sixty  miles  from  the  Tigris,  at  the  edge  of  the 
Mons  Masius,  in  a  broad  and  fertile  plain,  watered  by  one  of 
the  affluents-^  of  the  river  Khabour,  or  Aborrhas.  The  Romans, 
after  their  occupation  of  Mesopotamia,  had  raised  it  to  the  rank 
of  a  colony  -j^*  and  its  defences,  which  were  of  great  strength, 
had  always  been  maintained  by  the  emperors  in  a  state  of  effi- 
ciency. Sapor  regarded  it  as  the  key  of  the  Roman  position  in 
the  tract  between  the  rivers,"  and,  as  early  as  a.d.  338,  sought 
to  make  himself  master  of  it." 

The  first  siege  of  Nisibis  by  Sapor  lasted,  we  are  told,  sixty- 
three  days."  Few  particulars  of  it  have  come  down  to  us. 
Sapor  had  attacked  the  city,  apparently,  in  the  absence  of  con- 
stantius,'*  who  had  been  called  off  to  Pannonia  to  hold  a  confer- 
ence with  his  brothers.  It  was  defended,  not  only  by  its  gar- 
rison and  inhabitants,  but  by  the  prayers  and  exhortations  of 
its  bishop,"  St.  James,  who,  if  he  did  not  work  miracles  for 
the  deliverance  of  his  countrymen,  at  any  rate  sustained  and 
Animated  their  resistance.  The  result  was  that  the  bands  of 
Sapor  were  repelled  with  loss,  and  he  was  forced,  after  wasting 
two  months  before  the  walls,  to  raise  the  siege  and  own  himself 
baffled.  =» 

After  this,  for  some  years  the  Persian  war  with  Rome  lan- 
guished. It  is  difficult  to  extract  from  the  brief  statements  of 
epitomizers,  ^'  and  the  loose  invectives  or  panegyrics  of  orators, " 
the  real  circumstances  of  the  struggle ;  but  apparently  the  gen- 
eral condition  of  things  was  this.  The  Persians  were  constantly 
victorious  in  the  open  field ;  Constantius  was  again  and  again 
defeated;"  but  no  permanent  gain  was  effected  by  these  suc- 
cesses. A  weakness  inherited  by  the  Persians  from  the  Par- 
thians'^ — an  inability  to  conduct  sieges  to  a  prosperous  issue- 
showed  itself;  and  their  failures  against  the  fortified  posts 
which  Rome  had  taken  care  to  establish  in  the  disputed  regions 
were  continual.    Up  to  the  close  of  ad.  340  Sapor  had  made 


Vol.  itr. 


Plate  XXVII. 


rig.  ♦ 


Sassanian  Chakiot  (from  the  bas-reliefs). 

^  ■■'■  -  ■     ;7« 


A  PiauiK  GrABDSMAK  (from  the  'bBS-rcliefs'; 

III  HI  ■   I      !■  ii''"ffl  ■ii|_ 


■Witt    A»4 


Vol  in 


Plate   XXVIII 


Dletation  awd  GEotWD  Pla'k  op  thb  Paiacb  at  CTEsrpHOK  (after 
Flandin).     Scale.  1  inch  to  100  feet. 


General  View  of  JIashita  Palace  ifrom  a  Phatograpli). 


en.  VIII.]  SETTLEMENT  OF  ARMENIA.  323 

no  important  gain,  had  struck  no  decisive  blow,  but  stood  nearl;y 
ill  the  same  position  wliich  he  had  occupied  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  conflict. 

But  the  year  a.d.  341  saw  a  change.  Sapor,  after  obtaining 
possession  of  the  person  of  Tiranus,  had  sought  to  make  himself 
master  of  Armenia,  and  had  even  attempted  to  set  up  one  of 
his  own  relatives  as  king.  '^  But  the  indomitable  spirit  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  their  firm  attachment  to  their  Arsacid  princes, 
caused  his  attempts  to  fail  of  any  good  result,  and  tended  on 
the  whole  to  throw  Armenia  into  tlie  arms  of  Rome.  Sapor, 
after  a  while,  became  convinced  of  the  folly  of  liis  proceedings, 
and  resolved  on  the  adoption  of  a  wholly  new  policy.  He  would 
relinquish  the  idea  of  conquering,  and  would  endeavor  instead 
to  conciliate  the  Armenians,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  from  their 
gratitude  what  he  had  been  unable  to  extort  from  their  fears. 
Tiranus  was  still  living ;  and  Sapor,  we  are  told,  offered  to  re- 
place him  upon  the  Armenian  throne ;'''  but,  as  he  had  been 
blinded  by  his  captors,  and  as  Oriental  notions  did  not  allow  a 
person  thus  mutilated  to  exercise  royal  power,"  Tiranus  de- 
clined the  offer  made  him,  and  suggested  the  substitution  of  his 
son,  Arsaces,  who  was,  like  himself,  a  prisoner  in  Persia.  Sa- 
por readily  consented ;  and  the  young  prince,  released  from 
captivity,  returned  to  his  country,  and  was  installed  as  king 
by  the  Persians,''^  with  the  good- will  of  the  natives,  who  were 
satisfied  so  long  as  they  could  feel  that  they  had  at  their  head 
a  monarch  of  the  ancient  stock.  The  arrangement,  of  course, 
placed  Armenia  on  the  Persian  side,  and  gave  Sapor  for  many 
years  a  povverful  ally  in  his  struggle  with  Rome.''' 

Thus  Sapor  had,  by  the  year  a.d.  341,  made  a  very  consider- 
able gain.  He  had  placed  a  friendly  sovereign  on  the  Arme- 
nian throne,  had  bound  him  to  his  cause  by  oaths,  and  had 
thereby  established  liis  influence,  not  only  over  Armenia  itself, 
but  over  the  whole  tract  which  lay  between  Armenia  and  the 
Caucasus.  But  he  was  far  from  content  with  these  successes. 
It  was  still  his  great  object  to  drive  the  Romans  from  Mesopo- 
tamia; and  with  that  object  in  view  it  continued  to  be  his 
first  wish  to  obtain  possession  of  Nisibis.  Accordingly,  having 
settled  Armeniaxi  affaii-s  to  his  liking,  he  made,  in  a.d.  346,  a 
second  attack  on  the  great  city  of  Northern  Mesopotamia, 
again  investing  it  Avith  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  this  time 
pressing  the  siege  during  the  space  of  nearly  three  months. " 
Again,  however,  the  strength  of  the  walls  and  the  endurance 
pf  the  garrison  baffled  him.    Sapor  was  once  more  obliged  to 


324  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  viii. 

withdraw  from  before  the  place,  having  suffered  greater  loss 
than  those  whom  he  had  assailed,  and  forfeited  much  of  the 
prestige  which  he  had  acquired  by  his  many  victories. 

It  was,  perhaps,  on  account  of  the  repulse  from  Nisibis,  and 
in  the  hope  of  recovering  his  lost  laurels,  that  Sapor,  in  the 
next  year  but  one,  a.d.  348,  made  an  unusual  efiort.  Calling 
out  the  entire  militarj^  force  of  the  empire,  and  augmenting  it 
by  large  bodies  of  allies  and  mercenaries,*' the  Persian  king, 
towards  the  middle  of  summer,  crossed  the  Tigris  by  three 
bridges,"  and  with  a  numerous  and  well-appointed  army  in- 
vaded Central  Mesopotamia,  probably  from  Adiabene,  or  the 
region  near  and  a  little  south  of  Nineveh.  Constantius,  with 
the  Roman  army,  was  posted  on  and  about  the  Sin  jar  range 
of  hills,  in  the  vicinity  of  the  town  of  Singara,  which  is  repre- 
sented by  the  modern  village  of  Sin  jar."  The  Roman  emperor 
did  not  venture  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  river,  or  to  meet 
his  adversary  in  the  broad  plain  which  intervenes  between  the 
Tigris  and  the  mountain  range,  but  clung  to  the  skirts  of  the 
hills,  and  commanded  his  troops  to  remain  wholly  on  the  de- 
fensive." Sapor  was  thus  enafeled  to  choose  his  position,  to 
establish  a  fortified  camp  at  a  convenient  distance  from  the 
enemy,  and  to  occupy  the  hills  in  its  vicinity — some  portion  of 
the  Sinjar  range — with  his  archers.  It  is  iincertain  whether, 
in  making  these  dispositions,  he  was  merely  providing  for  his 
own  safety,  or  whether  he  was  laying  a  trap  into  which  he 
hoped  to  entice  the  Roman  army.*"  Perhaps  his  mind  was 
wide  enough  to  embrace  both  contingencies.  At  any  rate, 
having  thus  established  a  point  cfappui  in  his  rear,  he  ad- 
vanced boldly  and  challenged  the  legions  to  an  encounter. 
The  challenge  was  at  once  accepted,  and  the  battle  commenced 
about  midday,"  but  now  the  Persians,  having  just  crossed 
swords  with  the  enemy,  almost  immediately  began  to  give 
ground,  and  retreating  hastily  drew  their  adversaries  along, 
across  the  thirsty  plain,  to  the  vicinity  of  their  fortified  camp, 
where  a  strong  body  of  horse  and  the  flower  of  the  Persian 
archers  were  posted.  The  horse  charged,  but  the  legionaries 
easily  defeated  them,*'  and  elated  with  their  success  burst  into 
the  camp,  despite  the  warnings  of  their  leader,  who  strove 
vainly  to  check  their  ardor  and  to  induce  them  to  put  off  the 
completion  of  their  victory  till  the  next  day."'  A  small  de- 
tachment found  within  the  ramparts  was  put  to  the  sword ; 
and  the  soldiers  scattered  themselves  among  the  tents,  some 
in  quest  of  booty,  others  only  anxious  for  some  means  of 


\ 


fcH.  Viii.]  miBD  SIEGE  OF  NISIBIS.  g^g 

quenching  their  raging  thirst/^  Meantime  the  sun  had  gone 
down,  and  the  shades  of  night  fell  rapidly.  Regarding  the 
battle  as  over,  and  the  victory  as  assured,  the  Romans  gave 
themselves  up  to  sleep  or  feasting.  But  now  Sapor  saw  his 
opportunity — the  opportunity  for  which  he  had  perhaps 
planned  and  waited.  His  light  troops  on  the  adjacent  hills 
commanded  the  camp,  and,  advancing  on  every  side,  sur- 
rounded it.  They  were  fresh  and  eager  for  the  fray ;  they 
fought  in  the  security  afforded  by  the  darkness;  while  the 
fires  of  the  camp  showed  them  their  enemies,  worn  out  with 
fatigue,  sleepy,  or  drunken. '"  The  result,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  was  a  terrible  carnage."  The  Persians  overwhelmed 
the  legionaries  with  showers  of  darts  and  arrows;  flight, 
under  the  circumstances,  was  impossible;  and  the  Roman 
soldiers  mostly  perished  where  they  stood.  They  took,  how- 
ever, ere  they  died,  an  atrocious  revenge.  Sapor's  son  had 
been  made  prisoner  in  the  course  of  the  day ;  in  their  despera- 
tion the  legionaries  turned  their  fury  against  this  innocent 
youth;  they  beat  him  with  whips,  wounded  him  with  the 
points  of  their  weapons,  and  finally  rushed  upon  him  and 
killed  him  with  a  hundi-ed  blows. ''^ 

The  battle  of  Singara,  though  thus  disastrous  to  the  Romans, 
had  not  any  great  effect  in  determining  the  course  or  issue  of 
the  war.  Sapor  did  not  take  advantage  of  his  victory  to  at- 
tack the  rest  of  the  Roman  forces  in  Mesopotamia,  or  even  to 
attempt  the  siege  of  any  lai-ge  town.  "^  Perhaps  he  had  really 
suffered  large  losses  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  day  ;'^  perhaps  he 
was  too  much  affected  by  the  miserable  death  of  his  son  to 
care,  till  time  had  dulled  the  edge  of  his  grief,  for  military 
glory. '"  At  any  rate,  we  hear  of  his  undertaking  no  further 
enterprise  till  the  second  year  after  the  battle,'^''  a.d.  350,  when 
he  made  his  third  and  most  desperate  attempt  to  capture  Nisi- 
bis. 

The  rise  of  a  civil  war  in  the  West,  and  the  departure  of 
Constantius  for  Europe  with  the  flower  of  his  troops  early  in 
the  year, " '  no  doubt  encouraged  the  Persian  monarch  to  make 
one  more  effort  against  the  place  which  had  twice  repulsed  him 
with  ignominy.  '"*  He  collected  a  numerous  native  army,  and 
strengthened  it  by  the  addition  of  a  body  of  Indian  allies, " 
who  brought  a  large  ti'oop  of  elephants  into  tlie  field.""  With 
this  force  he  crossed  the  Tigris  in  the  eai'ly  summer,  and, 
after  taking  sevoi'al  fortified  posts,  march  northwards  and  in- 
vested Nisibis.    The  Roman  commander  in  the  place  was  the 


326  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cit.  ttti. 

Count  Lucilianvis,  afterwards  the  father-in-law  of  Jovian,  a  man 
of  resource  and  determination.  He  is  said  to  have  taken  the 
best  advantage  of  every  favorable  turn  of  fortune  in  the  course 
of  the  siege,  and  to  have  prolonged  the  resistance  by  various 
subtle  stratagems."  But  the  real  animating  spirit  of  the  de- 
fence was  once  more  the  bishop,  St.  James,  who  roused  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  inhabitants  to  the  highest  pitch  by  his  ex- 
hortations, guided  them  by  his  counsels,  and  was  thought  to 

■'  work  miracles  for  them  by  his  prayers.  °^  Sapor  tried  at  first 
the  ordinary  methods  of  attack ;  he  battered  the  walls  with 
his  rams,  and  sapped  them  with  mines.  But  finding  that  by 
these  means  he  made  no  satisfactory  progress,  he  had  recourse 
shortly  to  wholly  novel  proceedings.  The  river  Mygdonius 
(now  the  Jerujer),  swollen  by  the  melting  of  the  snows  in  the 
Mons  Masius,  had  overflowed  its  banks  and  covered  with  an 
inundation  the  plain  in  which  Nisibis  stands.  Sapor  saw  that 
the  forces  of  nature  might  be  employed  to  advance  his  ends, 
and  so  embanked  the  lower  part  of  the  plain  that  the  water 
could  not  run  off,  but  formed  a  deep  lake  round  the  town, 
gradually  creeping  up  the  walls  till  it  had  almost  reached  the 
battlements.  '^^  Having  thus  created  an  artificial  sea,  the  en- 
ergetic monarch  rapidly  collected,  or  constructed,"^  a  fleet  of 
vessels,  and,  placing  his  military  engines  on  board,  launched 
the  ships  upon  the  waters,  and  so  attacked  the  walls  of  the 
city  at  great  advantage.  But  the  defenders  resisted  stoutly, 
setting  the  engines  on  fire  with  torches,  and  either  lifting  the 
ships  from  the  water  by  means  of  cranes,  or  else  shattering 
them  wdth  the  huge  stones  which  they  could  discharge  from 
their  balistce.^^  Still,  therefore,  no  impression  was  made ;  but 
at  last  an  unforeseen  circumstance  brought  the  besieged  into 
the  greatest  peril,  and  almost  gave  Nisibis  into   the  enemy's 

'  hands.  The  immdation,  confined  by  the  mounds  of  the  Per- 
sians, which  prevented  it  from  running  off,  pressed  with  con- 
tinually increasing  force  against  the  defences  of  the  city,  till 
at  last  the  wall,  in  one  part,  proved  too  weak  to  withstand  the 
tremendous  weight  which  bore  upon  it,  and  gave  way  suddenly 
for  the  space  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  feet.""  What  further 
damage  was  done  to  the  town  we  know  not ;  but  a  breach  was 
opened  through  which  the  Persians  at  once  made  ready  to 
pour  into  the  place,  regarding  it  as  impossible  that  so  huge  a 
gap  should  be  either  repaired  or  effectually  defended.  Sapor 
took  up  his  position  on  an  artificial  eminence,  while  his  troops 
rushed  to  the  assaxilt. "    First  of  all  marched  the  heavy  cav- 


f 


ta.  vin.]  TmnD  SIEGE  OF  MSIBIS.  831 

airy,  accompanied  by  the  horse-archers;  next  came  the  ele 
phants,  bearing  iron  towers  upon  their  backs,  and  in  each 
tower  a  number  of  bowmen;  intermixed  with  the  elephants 
!^  Avere  a  certain  amount  of  heavy-armed  foot/'*  It  was  a 
strange  column  with  which  to  attack  a  breach;  and  its  compo- 
sition does  not  say  much  for  Persian  siege  tactics,  which  were 
always  poor  and  ineffective, "'  and  which  now,  as  usually,  re- 
sulted in  failure.  The  horses  became  quickly  entangled  in  the 
ooze  and  mud  which  the  waters  had  left  behind  them  as  they 
subsided ;  the  elephants  were  even  less  able  to  overcome  these 
difficulties,  and  as  soon  as  they  received  a  wound  sank  down 
— never  to  rise  again — in  the  swamp/"  Sapor  hastily  gave 
orders  for  the  assailing  column  to  i-etreat  and  seek  the  friendly 
shelter  of  the  Persian  camp,  while  he  essayed  to  maintain  his 
advantage  in  a  different  way.  His  light  archers  were  ordered 
to  the  front,  and,  being  formed  into  divisions  which  were  to 
act  as  reliefs,  received  orders  to  prevent  the  restoration  of  the 
ruined  wall  by  directing  an  incessant  storm  of  arrows  into  the 
gap  made  by  the  waters.  But  the  firmness  and  activity  of  the 
garrison  and  inhabitants  defeated  this  well-imagmed  proceed- 
ing. While  the  heavy-armed  troops  stood  in  the  gap  receivmg 
the  fhghts  of  arrows  and  defending  themselves  as  they  best 
could,  the  unarmed  multitude  raised  a  new  wall  in  their  rear, 
which,  by  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  was  six  feet  in  height.'" 
This  last  proof  of  his  enemies'  resolution  and  resource  seems  to 
have  finally  convinced  Sapor  of  the  hopelessness  of  his  enter- 
prise. Though  he  still  continued  the  siege  for  a  while,  he  made 
no  other  grand  attack,  and  at  length  drew  off  his  forces,  hav- 
ing lost  twenty  thousand  men  before  the  walls,"  and  wasted  a 
hundred  days,  or  more  than  three  months." 

Perhaps  he  would  not  have  departed  so  soon,  but  would 
have  turned  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  and  endeavored  to  starve 
the  garrison  into  submission,  had  not  alarming  tidings  reached 
him  from  his  north-eastern  frontier.  Then,  as  now,  the  low 
fiat  sandy  region  east  of  the  Caspian  was  in  the  possession  of 
nomadic  hordes,  whose  whole  life  was  spent  jn  war  and  plun- 
der. The  Oxus  might  be  nominally  the  boundary  of  the  em- 
pire in  this  quarter ;  but  the  nomads  were  really  dominant  over 
the  entire  desert  to  the  foot  of  the  Hyrcanian  and  Parthian 
hills.''*  Petty  phmdering  forays  into  the  fertile  region  south 
and  east  of  the  desert  were  no  doubt  constant,  and  were  not 
greatly  regarded ;  but  from  time  to  time  some  tribe  or  chieftain 
bolder  than  the  rest  made  a  deeper  inroad  and  a  more  sustained 


'^2^  TilE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ix 


attack  than  usual,  spreading  consternation  around,  and  terrify- 
ing the  court  for  its  safety.  Such  an  attack  seems  to  have  oc- 
curred towards  the  autumn  of  a.d.  350.  The  invading  horde  is 
said  to  have  consisted  of  Massagatse ;"  but  we  can  hardly  he 
mistaken  in  regarding  them  as,  in  the  main,  of  Tatar,  or  Tur- 
koman blood,  akin  to  the  Usbegs  and  other  Turanian  tribes 
which  still  inhabit  the  sandy  steppe.  Sapor  considered  the  cri- 
sis such  as  to  require  his  own  presence ;  and  thus,  wliile  civil 
war  summoned  one  of  the  two  rivals  from  Mesopotamia  to  the 
far  West,  where  he  had  to  contend  with  the  self-styled  emper- 
ors, Magnentius  and  Vetranio,  the  other  was  called  away  to 
the  extreme  East  to  repel  a  Tatar  invasion.  A  tacit  truce  was 
thus  established  between  the  great  beUigerents'"— a  truce  which 
lasted  for  seven  or  eight  years.  The  unfortunate  Mesopota- 
mians,  harassed  by  constant  war  for  above  twenty  years,  had 
now  a  breathing-space  during  which  to  recover  from  the  ruin 
and  desolation  that  had  overwhelmed  them.  Eome  and  Per- 
sia for  a  time  suspended  their  conflict.  Rivalry,  indeed,  did 
not  cease ;  but  it  was  transferred  from  the  battlefield  to  the 
cabinet,  and  the  Roman  emperor  sought  and  found  in  diplo- 
matic triumphs  a  compensation  for  the  ill-success  which  had 
attended  his  efforts  in  the  field. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


Bevolt  of  Armenia  and  Acceptance  by  Arsaces  of  the  Position 
of  a  Roman  Feudatory.  Character  and  Issue  of  Sapor''s 
JEastern  Wars.  His  negotiations  ivith  Constantius.  His 
Extreme  Demands.  Circumstances  under  tvhich  he  deter- 
mines  to  reneiv  the  War.  His  Preparations.  Desertion  to 
him  of  Antoninus.  Great  Invasion  of  Sapor.  Siege  of 
Amida.  Sapofs  Severities.  Siege  and  Capture  of  Sin- 
gara;  of  Bezabde.  Attach  on  Virta  fails.  Aggressive 
Movement  of  Constantius.  He  attacks  Bezabde,  but  fails. 
Campaign  of  a.d.  361.    DeoJh  of  Constantius. 

?!venerat  .  .  .  quasi  fatali  constellatione  .  .  .  ut  Constantium  dimicantem  cum 
k-  ffsis  fortuna  semper  sequeretur  afflictior.— Amm.  Marc.  xx.  9,  ad  fin. 

It  seems  to  have  been  soon  after  the  close  of  Sapor's  first 
war  with  Constantius  that  events  took  place  in  Armenia  Avhich 


CH.  ix.j  HASTEiRN  WARS  OF  SAPOH  II  329 

once  more  replaced  that  country  under  Roman  influence.  Ar- 
saces,  the  son  of  Tiranus,  had  been,  as  we  have  seen, '  estab- 
lished as  monarch,  by  Sapor,  in  the  year  a.d.  341,  under  the 
notion  that,  in  return  for  the  favor  shown  him,  he  would  ad- 
minister Armenia  in  the  Persian  interest.  But  gi'atitude  is  an 
unsafe  basis  for  the  friendships  of  monarchs.  Arsaces,  after  a 
time,  began  to  chafe  against  the  obligations  under  which  Sapor 
had  laid  him,  and  to  wish,  by  taking  independent  action,  to 
show  himself  a  real  king,  and  not  a  mere  feudatory.  He  was 
also,  perhaps,  tired  of  aiding  Sapor  in  his  Roman  war,  and  may 
have  found  that  he  suffered  more  than  he  gained  by  having 
Rome  for  an  enemy.  At  any  rate,  in  the  intervaP  between 
A.D.  351  and  359,  probably  while  Sapor  was  engaged  in  the  far 
East,'  Arsaces  sent  envoys  to  Constantinople  with  a  request  to 
Constantius  that  he  would  give  him  in  marriage  a  member  of 
the  Imperial  house.*  Constantius  was  charmed  with  the  appli- 
cation made  to  him,  and  at  once  accepted  the  proposal.  He 
selected  for  the  proffered  honor  a  certain  Olympias,  the  daugh- 
ter of  Ablabius,  a  Praetorian  prefect,  and  lately  the  betrothed 
bride  of  his  own  brother,  Constans;  and  sent  her  to  Armenia,* 
where  Arsaces  welcomed  her,  and  made  her  (as  it  would  seem) 
his  chief  wife,  provoking  thereby  the  jealousy  and  aversion  of 
his  previous  sultana,  a  native  Armenian,  named  Pharandzem.* 
The  engagement  thus  entered  into  led  on,  naturally,  to  the  con- 
clusion of  a  formal  alliance  between  Rome  and  Armenia— an 
alliance  which  Sapor  made  fruitless  efforts  to  disturb,'  and 
which  continued  unimpaired  down  to  the  time  Ca.d.  359)  when 
hostilities  once  more  broke  out  between  Rome  and  Persia. 

Of  Sapor's  Eastern  wars  we  have  no  detailed  account.  They 
seem  to  have  occupied  him  from  a.d.  350  to  a.d.  357,  and  to 
have  been,  on  the  whole,  successful.  They  were  certainly  ter- 
minated by  a  peace  in  the  last-named  year' — a  peace  of  which 
it  must  have  been  a  condition  that  his  late  enemies  should  lend 
him  aid  in  the  struggle  which  he  was  about  to  renew  with 
Rome.  Who  these  enemies  exactly  were,  and  what  exact  re- 
gion they  inhabited,  is  doubtful.  They  comprised  certainly  the 
Chionites  and  Gelani,  probably  the  Euseni  and  the  Vertae." 
The  Chionites  are  thought  to  have  been  Hiongnu  or  Huns ;" 
and  the  Euseni  are  probably  the  U-siun,  who,  as  early  as  B.C. 
300,  are  found  among  the  nomadic  hordes  pressing  towards  the 
Oxus."  The  Vertae  are  wholly  unknown.  The  Gelani  should, 
by  their  name,  be  the  inhabitants  of  Ghilan,  or  the  coast  tract 
eouth-west  of  the  Caspian ;  but  this  locality  seems  too  remote 


g30  THE  SEVENTH  MOKARCHf.  [CH.  dt 

from  the  probable  seats  of  the  Chionites  and  Euseni  to  be  the 
one  intended.  The  general  scene  of  the  wars  was  undoubtedly 
east  of  the  Caspian,  either  in  the  Oxus  region,  or  still  further 
eastward,  on  the  confines  of  India  and  Scythia.  ^"'  The  result  of 
the  wars,  though  not  a  conquest,  was  an  extension  of  Persian 
influence  and  power.  Troublesome  enemies  were  converted 
into  friends  and  allies.  The  loss  of  a  predominating  influence 
over  Armenia  was  thus  compensated,  or  more  than  compen- 
sated, within  a  few  years,  by  a  gain  of  a  similar  kind  in  an- 
other quarter. 

While  Sapor  was  thus  engaged  in  the  far  East,  he  received 
letters  from  the  officer  whom  he  had  left  in  charge  of  his 
western  frontier,  '^  informing  him  that  the  Romans  were  anxious 
to  exchange  the  precarious  truce  which  Mesopotamia  had  been 
allowed  to  enjoy  during  the  last  five  or  six  years  for  a  more 
settled  and  formal  peace.     Two  great  Roman  ofiicials,  Cas- 
Bianus,  duke  of  Mesopotamia,  and  Musonianus,  Praetorian  pre- 
fect, understanding  that  Sapor  was  entangled  in  a  bloody  and 
difficult  war  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  his  empire,  and  know- 
ing that  Constantius  was    fully  occupied  with  the  troubles 
caused  by  the  inroads  of  the  barbarians  into  the  more  western 
of  the  Roman  provinces,  had  thought  that  the  time  was  favor- 
able for  terminating  the  provisional  state  of  affairs  in  the 
Mesopotamian  region  by  an  actual  treaty. "    They  had  accord- 
ingly opened  negotiations  with  Tamsapor,  satrap  of  Adiabene, 
and  suggested  to  him  that  he  should  sound  his  master  on  the 
subject  of  making  peace  with  Rome.     Tamsapor  appears  to 
have  misunderstood  the  character  of  these  overtures,  or  to 
have  misrepresented  them  to  Sapor ;  in  his  despatch  he  made 
Constantius  himself  the  mover  in  the  matter,  and  spoke  of  him 
as  humbly  supplicating  the  great  king  to  grant  him  condi- 
tions.'^   It  happened  that  the  message  reached  Sapor  just  as  he 
had  come  to  terms  with  his  eastern  enemies,  and  had  succeeded 
in  inducmg  them  to  become  his  allies.    He  w^as  naturally  elated 
at  his  success,  and  regarded  the  Roman  overture  as  a  simple 
acknowledgment  of  weakness.     Accordingly  he  answered  in 
the  most  haughty  style.     His  letter,  which  was  conveyed  to 
the  Roman  emperor  at  Sirmium  by  an  ambassador  named 
Narses,'"  was  conceived  in  the  following  terms:" 

"Sapor,  king  of  kings,  brother  of  the  sun  and  moon,  and 
companion  of  the  stars,  sends  salutation  to  his  brother,  Con- 
stantius Caesar.  It  glads  me  to  poe  that  thou  art  at  last  re- 
turned to  the  right  way,  and  ai '      ody  to  do  what  is  just  and 


Vol.  III. 


Plate   XXIX.      1 


Fie.  I. 


<,.•  f a e_ 


Gbounu-i'Lim  op  Pauc-b  at  SIashita  (after  Trfstram.  , 

||'A« 'Sculptured  fdf^ade.      b  b  b  8,  Pillared  eotraactg.     c,  Well  or  10tBitl3^ 
P,  Tower  it  ith  btaircase.      b  k  e  b,  HaiQ  building  of  Palace 


Fig.  2. 


I.sxER  Gatkway  of  .Mashita  Pai.ack  (fi'om  .a  Plioto.!>riiph). 


Plate,   XXX. 


Vol.  m 


ELABOnATK    OliNAMENTATIOK    OK    pAI.ACK    AT    MaSHITA. 


-J. 


ra.  rx.]        LETTER  OF  SAPOR  TO  G0N8TANTIU8.  331 

fair,  having  learned  by  experience  that  inordinate  greed  is  oft- 
times  punished  by  defeat  and  disaster.  As  then  the  voice  of 
truth  ought  to  speak  with  all  openness,  and  the  more  illustrious 
of  mankind  should  make  their  words  mirror  their  thoughts,  I 
will  briefly  declare  to  thee  what  I  propose,  not  forgetting  that 
I  have  often  said  the  same  things  before.  Your  own  authors 
are  witness  that  the  entire  tract  within  the  river  Strymon  and 
the  borders  of  Macedon  was  once  held  by  my  ancestors ;  if  1 
required  you  to  restore  all  this,  it  would  not  ill  become  me  (ex- 
cuse the  boast) ,  inasmuch  as  I  excel  in  virtue  and  in  the  splen- 
dor of  my  achievements  the  whole  line  of  our  ancient  monarchs. 
But  as  moderation  delights  me,  and  has  always  been  the  rule 
of  my  conduct — wherefore  from  my  youth  up  I  have  had  no 
occasion  to  repent  of  any  action — I  will  be  content  to  receive 
Mesopotamia  and  Armenia,  which  was  fraudulently  extorted 
from  my  grandfather.  We  Persians  have  never  admitted  the 
principle,  which  you  proclaim  with  such  effrontery,  that  success 
in  war  is  always  glorious,  whether  it  be  the  fruit  of  courage  or 
trickery.  In  conclusion,  if  you  will  take  the  advice  of  one  who 
speaks  for  your  good,  sacrifice  a  small  tract  of  territory,  one 
always  in  dispute  and  causing  continual  bloodshed,  in  order 
that  you  may  rule  the  remainder  securely.  Physicians,  re- 
member, often  cut  and  burn,  and  even  amputate  portions  of 
the  body,  that  the  patient  may  have  the  healthy  use  of  what  is 
left  to  him ;  and  there  are  animals  which,  understanding  why 
the  himters  chase  them,  deprive  themselves  of  the  thing  coveted, 
to  live  thenceforth  without  fear.  I  warn  you,  that,  if  my  am- 
bassador returns  in  vain,  I  will  take  the  field  against  you,  so 
soon  as  the  winter  is  past,  with  all  my  forces,  confiding  in  my 
good  fortune  and  in  the  fairness  of  the  conditions  which  I  have 
now  offered." 

It  must  have  been  a  severe  blow  to  Imperial  pride  to  receive 
such  a  letter :  and  the  sense  of  insult  can  scarcely  have  been 
much  mitigated  by  the  fact  that  the  missive  was  enveloped  in 
a  silken  covering,  '*  or  by  the  circumstance  that  the  bearer, 
Narses,  endeavored  by  his  conciliating  manners  to  atone  for  his 
master's  rudeness. '"  Constantius  replied,  however,  in  a  digni- 
fied and  calm  tone.""  "The  Roman  emperor,"  he  said,  "  victo- 
rious by  land  and  sea,  saluted  his  brother.  King  Sapor.  Hi» 
lieutenant  in  Mesopotamia  had  meant  well  in  opening  a  nego- 
tiation Avith  a  Persian  governor;  but  he  had  acted  without 
orders,  and  could  not  bind  his  master.  Nevertheless,  he  (Con- 
stantius) would  not  disclaim  what  had  been  done,  since  he  did 


332  'J'ilE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ix, 

not  object  to  a  peace,  provided  it  were  fair  and  honorable.  But 
to  ask  the  master  of  the  whole  Roman  world  to  surrender  ter- 
ritories which  he  had  successfully  defended  when  he  ruled  only 
over  the  provinces  of  the  East  was  plainly  indecent  and  ab- 
surd. He  must  add  that  the  employment  of  threats  was  futile, 
and  too  common  an  artifice ;  more  especially  as  the  Persians 
themselves  must  know  that  Rome  always  defended  herself 
when  attacked,  and  that,  if  occasionaUy  she  Avas  vanquished 
in  a  battle,  yet  she  never  failed  to  have  the  advantage  in  the 
event  of  every  war."  Three  envoys  were  entrusted  with  the 
delivery  of  tliis  reply"' — Prosper,  a  count  of  the  empire;  Spec- 
tatus,  a  tribune  and  notary;  and  Eustathius,  an  orator  and 
philosopher,  a  pupU  of  the  celebrated  Neo-Platonist,  Jam- 
blichus,"^  and  a  friend  of  St.  Basil."  Constantius  was  most 
anxious  for  peace,  as  a  dangerous  war  threatened  with  the 
Alemanni,  one  of  the  most  powerful  tribes  of  Germany.  °*  He 
seems  to  have  hoped  that,  if  the  unadorned  language  of  the 
two  statesmen  failed  to  move  Sapor,  he  might  be  won  over  by 
the  persuasive  eloquence  of  the  professor  of  rhetoric. 

But  Sapor  was  bent  on  war.  He  had  concluded  arrange- 
ments with  the  natives  so  long  his  adversaries  in  the  East,  by 
which  they  had  pledged  themselves  to  join  liis  standard  with 
all  their  forces  in  the  ensuing  spring."  He  was  well  aware  of 
the  position  of  Constantius  in  the  West,  of  the  internal  cor- 
ruption of  his  court,  and  of  the  perils  constantly  threatening 
him  from  external  enemies.  A  Roman  official  of  importance, 
bearing  the  once  honored  name  of  Antoninus,  had  recently 
taken  refuge  Avith  him  from  the  claims  of  pretended  creditors, 
and  had  been  received  into  high  favor  on  account  of  the  infor- 
mation which  he  was  able  to  communicate  with  respect  to  the 
disposition  of  the  Roman  forces  and  the  condition  of  their 
magazines.  "^  This  individual,  ennobled  by  the  royal  authority, 
and  given  a  place  at  the  royal  table,  gained  great  influence 
over  his  new  master,  w^liom  he  stimulated  by  alternately  re- 
proaching him  with  his  backwardness  in  the  past,  and  putting 
before  him  the  prospect  of  easy  triumphs  over  Rome  in  the  fu- 
ture. He  pointed  out  that  the  emperor,  with  the  bulk  of  his 
troops  and  treasures,  was  detained  in  the  regions  adjoining  the 
Danube,  and  that  the  East  was  left  almost  undefended;  he 
magnified  the  services  which  he  was  himself  competent  to  ren- 
der;" he  exhorted  Sapor  to  bestir  hirrself,  and  to  put  confidence 
in  his  good  fortune.  He  recommended  that  the  old  plan  of 
sitting  down  before  walled  towns  should  be  given  up,  and  that 


CH.  IX.]  GREAT  INVASION  OF  SAPOR  333 

the  Persian  monarch,  leaving  the  strongholds  of  Mesopotamia 
in  his  rear,  should  press  forward  to  the  Euphrates,  ^^  pour  hig 
troops  across  it,  and  overrun  the  rich  province  of  Syria,  which 
he  would  find  unguarded,  and  which  had  not  been  invaded  by 
an  enemy  for  nearly  a  century.  The  views  of  Antoninus  were 
adopted ;  but,  in  practice,  they  were  overruled  by  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  situation.  A  Eoman  army  occupied  Mesopotamia, 
and  advanced  to  the  baiaks  of  the  Tigris.  When  the  Persians 
in  full  force  crossed  the  river,  accompanied  by  Chionite  and 
Albanian  allies,""  they  found  a  considerable  body  of  troops  pre- 
pared to  resist  them.  Their  opponents  did  not,  indeed  offer 
battle,  but  they  laid  waste  the  country  as  the  Persians  took 
possession  of  it ;  they  destroyed  the  forage,  evacuated  the  in- 
defensible towns^"  (which  fell,  of  course,  into  the  enemy's 
hands),  and  fortified  the  line  of  the  Euphrates  with  castles, 
military  engines,  and  palisades.''  Still  the  programme  of  An- 
toninus would  probably  have  been  carried  out,  had  not  the 
swell  of  the  Euphrates  exceeded  the  average,  and  rendered  it 
impossible  for  the  Persian  troops  to  ford  the  river  at  the  usual 
point  of  passage  into  Syria.  On  discovering  this  obstacle,  An- 
toninus suggested  that,  by  a  march  to  the  north-east  through 
a  fertile  coimtry,  the  Upper  Euphrates  might  be  reached,  and 
easily  crossed,  before  its  waters  had  attained  any  considerable 
volume.  Sapor  agreed  to  adopt  this  suggestion.  He  marched 
from  Zeugma  across  the  Mons  Masius  towards  the  Upper  Eu- 
phrates, defeated  the  Romans  in  an  imj)ortant  battle  near 
Amida,'^  took,  by  a  sudden  assault,  two  castles  which  defended 
the  town,"  and  then  somewhat  hastily  resolved  that  he  would 
attack  the  place,  which  he  did  not  imagine  capable  of  making 
much  resistance. 

Amida,  now  Diarbekr,  was  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Upper  Tigris,  in  a  fertile  plain,  and  was  Avashed  along  the  whole 
of  its  western  side  by  a  semi-circular  bend  of  the  river.  ^^  It 
had  been  a  place  of  considerable  importance  from  a  very  an- 
cient date,"  and  had  recently  been  much  sti-engthened  by  Con- 
stantius,  who  had  made  it  an  arsenal  for  military  engines,  and 
had  repaired  its  towers  and  walls.  ^^  The  town  contained  within 
it  a  copious  fountain  of  water,  which  was  liable,  hoAvever,  to 
acquire  a  disagi'eeable  odor  in  the  summer  time.  Seven  le- 
gions, of  the  moderate  strength  to  which  legions  had  been  re- 
duced by  Constantine,^'  defended  it;  and  the  garrison  included 
also  a  body  of  horse-archers,  composed  chiefly  or  entirely  of 
noble  foreigners.'"    Sapor  hoped  in  ths  first  instance  to  terrify 


m 


334  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCUY.  [ch.  ix. 

it  into  submission  by  his  mere  appearance,  and  boldly  rode  up 
to  the  gates  with  a  small  body  of  his  followers,  expecting  that 
they  would  be  opened  to  him.  But  the  defenders  were  more 
courageous  than  he  had  imagined.  They  received  him  with  a 
shower  of  darts  and  arrows  that  were  directed  specially 
against  his  person,  which  was  conspicuous  from  its  ornaments; 
and  they  aimed  their  weapons  so  well  that  one  of  them  passed 
through  a  portion  of  his  dress  and  was  nearly  wounding  him.'' 
Persuaded  by  his  followers,  Sapor  upon  this  withdrew,  and 
committed  the  further  prosecution  of  the  attack  to  Grumbates, 
the  king  of  the  Chionites,  who  assaulted  the  walls  on  the  next 
day  with  a  body  of  picked  troops,  but  was  repulsed  with  great 
loss,  his  only  son,  a  youth  of  great  promise,  being  killed  at  his 
side  by  a  dart  from  a  balista/"  The  death  of  this  prince  spread 
dismay  through  the  camp,  and  was  followed  by  a  general 
mourning;  but  it  now  became  a  point  of  honor  to  take  the 
town  which  had  so  injured  one  of  the  great  king's  royal  aUies ; 
and  Grumbates  was  promised  that  Amida  should  become  the 
funeral  pile  of  his  lost  darhng.*' 

The  town  was  now  regiQarly  invested.  Each  nation  was  as- 
signed its  place.  The  Chionites,  burning  with  the  desire  to 
avenge  their  late  defeat,  were  on  the  east ;  the  Vertae  on  the 
south ;  the  Albanians,  warriors  from  the  Caspian  region,  on  the 
north;  the  Segestans,*^  who  were  reckoned  the  bravest  soldiers 
of  all,  and  who  brought  into  the  field  a  large  body  of  elephants, 
held  the  west.  A  continuous  line  of  Persians,  five  ranks  deep, 
surrounded  the  entire  city,  and  supported  the  auxiliary  detach- 
ments. The  entire  besieging  army  was  estimated  at  a  hundred 
thousand  men  ;^'  the  besieged,  including  the  unarmed  multitude, 
were  under  30,000.^^  After  the  pause  of  an  entire  day,  the  first 
general  attack  was  made.  Grumbates  gave  the  signal  for  the 
assault  by  hurling  a  bloody  spear  into  the  space  before  the 
walls,  after  the  fashion  of  a  Ttouian  fetialis.^^  A  cloud  of  darts 
and  arrows  from  every  side  followed  the  flight  of  this  .weapon, 
and  did  severe  damage  to  the  besieged,  who  were  at  the  same 
time  galled  with  discharges  from  Roman  military  engines, 
taken  by  the  Persians  in  some  capture  of  Singara,  and  now  em- 
ployed against  their  former  owners."  Still  a  vigorous  resist- 
ance continued  to  be  made,  and  the  besiegers,  in  their  exposed 
positions,  suffered  even  more  than  the  garrison;  so  that  after 
two  days  the  attempt  to  carry  the  city  by  general  assault  was 
abandoned,  and  the  slow  process  of  a  regular  siege  was  adopted. 
Trenches  were  opened  at  the  usual  distance  from  the  walla. 


en.  IX.]  SIEGE  OF  AMIDA.  335 

along  which  the  troops  advanced  under  the  cover  of  hurdles 
towards  the  ditch,  which  they  proceeded  to  fill  up  in  places. 
Mounds  were  then  thrown  up  against  the  walls ;  and  movable 
towers  were  constructed  and  brought  into  play,  guarded  exter- 
nally with  iron,  and  each  mounting  a  balista.*'  It  was  impos- 
sible long  to  withstand  these  various  weapons  of  attack.  The 
hopes  of  the  besieged  lay,  primarily,  in  their  receiving  relief 
from  without  by  the  advance  of  an  army  capable  of  engaging 
their  assailants  and  harassing  them  or  driving  them  off ;  sec- 
ondardy,  in  successful  sallies,  by  means  of  which  they  might 
destroy  the  enemy's  works  and  induce  him  to  retire  from  be- 
fore the  place. 

There  existed,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Amida,  the  elements  of 
a  relieving  army,  under  the  command  of  the  new  prefect  of  the 
East,  Sabinianus.  Had  this  officer  possessed  an  energetic  and 
enterprising  character,  he  might,  without  much  difficulty,  have 
collected  a  force  of  light  and  active  soldiers,  which  might  have 
hung  upon  the  rear  of  the  Persians,  intercepted  their  convoys, 
cut  off  their  stragglers,  and  have  even  made  an  occasional  dash 
upon  their  lines.  Such  was  the  course  of  conduct  recommend- 
ed by  Ursicinus,  the  second  in  command,  whom  Sabinianus  had 
recently  superseded ;  but  the  latter  was  jealous  of  liis  subordi- 
nate, and  had  orders  from  the  Byzantine  court  to  keep  him  un- 
employed."* He  was  himself  old  and  rich,  alike  disinclined  to 
and  unfit  for  military  enterprise ;""  he  therefore  absolutely  re- 
jected the  advice  of  Ursicinus,  and  determined  on  making  no 
effort.  He  had  positive  orders,  he  said,  from  the  court  to  keep 
on  the  defensive  and  not  endanger  his  troops  by  engaging  them 
in  hazardous  adventures.  Amida  must  protect  itself,  or  at  any 
rate  not  look  to  him  for  succor.  Ursicinus  chafed  terribly,  it 
it  said,  against  this  decision,  ^"  but  was  forced  to  submit  to  it. 
His  messengers  conveyed  the  dispiriting  intelligence  to  the  de- 
voted city,  which  learned  thereby  that  it  must  rely  wholly 
upon  its  own  exertions. 

Nothing  now  remained  but  to  organize  sallies  on  a  large  scale 
and  attack  the  besieger's  works.  Such  attempts  were  made 
from  time  to  time  with  some  success ;  and  on  one  occasion  two 
Gaulish  legions,  banished  to  the  East  for  their  adherence  to 
the  cause  of  Magnentius,  penetrated,  by  night,  into  the  heart 
of  the  besieging  camp,  and  brought  the  person  of  the  monarch 
into  danger.  This  peril  was,  however,  escaped;  the  legions 
vere  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  a  sixth  of  their  number;"  and 
nothing  was  gained  by  tlie  audacious  enterprise  beyond  atinice 


386  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ix 

of  three  days,  during  which  each  side  mourned  its  dead,  and 
sought  to  repair  its  losses. 

The  fate  of  the  doomed  city  drew  on.  Pestilence  was  added 
to  the  calamities  which  the  besieged  had  to  endure. "  Desertion 
and  treachery  were  arrayed  against  them.  One  of  the  natives 
of  Amida,  going  over  to  the  Persians,  informed  them  that  on. 
the  southern  side  of  the  city  a  neglected  staircase  led  up  froni 
the  margin  of  the  Tigris  through  underground  corridors  to  one  of 
the  principal  bastions ;  and  under  his  guidance  seventy  archers 
of  the  Persian  guard,  picked  men,  ascended  the  dark  passage  at 
dead  of  night,  occupied  the  tower,  and  when  morning  broke  dis- 
played from  it  a  scarlet  flag,  as  a  sign  to  their  countrymen  that 
a  portion  of  the  wall  was  taken.  The  Persians  were  upon  the 
alert,  and  an  instant  assault  was  made.  But  the  garrison,  by 
extraordinary  efforts,  succeeded  in  recapturing  the  tower  be- 
fore any  support  reached  its  occupants;  and  then,  directing 
their  artillery  and  missiles  against  the  assailing  columns,  in- 
flicted on  them  tremendous  losses,  and  soon  compelled  them  to 
return  hastily  to  the  shelter  of  their  camp.  The  Vertae,  who 
maintained  the  siege  on  the  south  side  of  the  city,  were  the 
chief  sufferers  in  this  abortive  attempt.  ^^ 

Sapor  had  now  spent  seventy  days  before  the  place,  and  had 
made  no  perceptible  impression.  Autumn  was  already  far  ad- 
vanced, ^*  and  the  season  for  military  operations  would  soon  be 
over.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  either  to  take  the  city 
speedily  or  to  give  up  the  siege  and  retire.  Under  these  circum- 
stances Sapor  resolved  on  a  last  effort.  He  had  constructed 
towers  of  such  a  height  that  they  overtopped  the  wall,  and 
poured  their  discharges  on  the  defenders  from  a  superior 
elevation.  He  had  brought  his  mounds  in  places  to  a  level 
with  the  ramparts,  and  had  compelled  the  garrison  to  raise 
countermounds  within  the  walls  for  their  protection.  He  now 
determined  on  pressing  the  assault  day  after  day,  until  he 
either  carried  the  town  or  found  all  his  resources  exhausted. 
His  artillery,  his  foot,  and  his  elephants  were  all  employed  in 
turn  or  together;  he  allowed  the  garrison  no  rest.^^  Not  con- 
tent with  directing  the  operations,  he  himself  took  part  in  the 
supreme  struggle,  exposing  his  own  person  freely  to  the  enemy's 
weapons,  and  losing  many  of  liis  attendants. ""  After  the  con- 
test had  lasted  three  continuous  days  from  morn  to  night,  for- 
tune at  last  favored  him.  One  of  the  inner  mounds,  raised  by 
the  besieged  behind  their  wall,  suddenly  gave  way,  involving 
its  defenders  in  its  fall,  and  at  the  same  time  fiUing  up  the 


OH.  DC]  FALL  OF  AMIDA.  337 

entire  space  between  the  wall  and  the  mound  "raised  outside 
]  by  the  Persians.    A  way  into  the  town  was  thus  laid  open," 

and  the  besiegers  instantly  occupied  it.  It  was  in  vain  that 
the  flower  of  the  garrison  threw  itself  across  the  path  of  the 
entering  columns — nothing  could  withstand  the  ardor  of  the 
Persian  troops.  In  a  little  time  all  resistance  was  at  an  end ; 
those  who  could  quitted  the  city  and  fled — the  remainder, 
whatever  their  sex,  age,  or  calling,  whether  armed  or  un- 
armed, were  slaughtered  like  sheep  by  the  conquerors.  ^* 

Thus  fell  Amida  after  a  siege  of  seventy-three  days.^"  Sapor, 
who  on  other  occasions  showed  hunself  not  deficient  in  clem- 
ency,"" was  exasperated  by  the  prolonged  resistance  and  the 
losses  which  he  had  sustained  in  the  course  of  it.  Thirty 
thousand  of  his  best  soldiers  had  fallen ; "'  the  son  of  his  chiefly 
ally  had  perished ;°'  he  himself  had  been  brought  into  im- 
minent danger.  Such  audacity  on  the  part  of  a  petty  town 
seemed  no  doubt  to  him  to  deserve  a  severe  retribution.  The 
place  was  therefore  given  over  to  the  infuriated  soldiery,  who 
were  allowed  to  slay  and  plunder  at  their  pleasure.  Of  the 
captives  taken,  all  belonging  to  the  five  provinces  across  the 
Tigris,  claimed  as  his  own  by  Sapor,  though  ceded  to  Rome  by 
his  grandfather,  were  massacred  in  cold  blood.  The  Count 
^lian,  aiul  the  commanders  of  the  legions  who  had  conducted 
the  gallant  defence,  were  barbarously  crucified.  Many  other 
Eomans  of  high  rank  were  subjected  to  the  indignity  of  being 
manacled,  and  were  dragged  into  Persia  as  slaves  rather  than 
as  prisoners.  "^ 

The  campaign  of  a.d.  359  terminated  with  this  dearly  bought 
victory.  The  season  was  too  far  advanced  for  any  fresh  enter- 
prise of  importance ;  and  Sapor  was  probably  glad  to  give  his 
army  a  rest  after  the  toils  and  perils  of  the  last  three  months. 
Accordingly  he  retired  across  the  Tigris,  without  leaving  (so 
far  as  appears)  any  garrisons  in  Mesopotamia,  and  began  pre- 
parations for  the  campaign  of  a.d.  360.  Stores  of  all  kinds 
were  accumulated  during  the  winter;  and,  when  the  spring 
came,  the  indefatigable  monarch  once  more  invaded  the 
enemy's  country,  poiiring  into  Mesopotamia  an  army  even 
more  numerous  and  better  appointed  than  that  which  he  had 
led  against  Amida  in  the  preceding  year."'  His  first  object 
now  was  to  capture  Singara,  a  town  of  some  consequence, 
which  was,  however,  defended  by  only  two  Roman  legions  and 
a  cei'tain  number  of  native  soldiers.  After  a  vain  attempt  to 
persuade  the  garrison  to  a  surrender,  the  attack  was  made  in 


338  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  ix; 

the  usual  way,  chiefly  by  scaling  parties  with  ladders,  and  by 
battering  parties  which  shook  the  walls  with  the  ram.  The 
defenders  kept  the  scalers  at  bay  by  a  constant  discharge  of 
stones  and  darts  from  their  artillery,  arrows  from  their  bows, 
and  leaden  bullets  ^^  from  their  slings.  They  met  the  assaults 
of  the  ram  by  attempts  to  fire  the  wooden  covering  which  pro- 
tected it  and  those  who  worked  it.  For  some  days  these 
eiforts  sufficed ;  but  after  a  while  the  besiegers  found  a  weak 
point  in  the  defences  of  the  place — a  tower  so  recently  built 
that  the  mortar  in  which  the  stones  were  laid  was  still  moist, 
and  which  consequently  crumbled  rapidly  before  the  blows  of 
a  strong  and  heavy  battering-ram,  and  in  a  short  time  fell  to 
the  ground.  The  Persians  povired  in  through  the  gap,  and 
were  at  once  masters  of  the  entire  town,  which  ceased  to  re- 
sist after  the  catastrophe.  This  easy  victory  allowed  Sapor  to 
exhibit  the  better  side  of  his  character ;  he  forbade  the  further 
shedding  of  blood,  and  ordered  that  as  many  as  possible  of  the 
garrisons  and  citizens  should  be  taken  alive.  Reviving  a 
favorite  policy  of  Oriental  rulers  from  very  remote  times,""  he 
transported  these  captives  to  the  extreme  eastern  parts  of  his 
empu-e,"  where  they  might  be  of  the  greatest  service  to  him  in 
defending  his  frontier  against  the  Scythians  and  Indians. 

It  is  not  really  surprising,  though  the  historian  of  the  war 
regards  it  as  needing  explanation, ""  that  no  attempt  was  made 
to  relieve  Singara  by  the  Romans.  The  siege  was  short ;  th-e 
place  was  considered  strong;  the  nearest  point  held  by  a 
powerful  Roman  force  was  Nisibis,  which  was  at  least  sixty 
miles  distant  from  Singara.  The  neighborhood  of  Singara  was, 
moreover,  ill  supplied  with  water ;  and  a  relieving  army  would 
probably  have  soon  found  itself  in  difficulties.  Singara,  on  the 
verge  of  the  desert,  was  always  perilously  situated.  Rome 
valued  it  as  an  outpost  from  which  her  enemy  might  be 
watched,  and  which  might  advertise  her  of  a  sudden  danger, 
but  could  not  venture  to  undertake  its  defence  in  case  of  an 
attack  in  force,  and  was  prepared  to  hear  of  its  capture  with 
equanimity. 

From  Singara  Sapor  directed  his  march  almost  due  north- 
wards, and,  leaving  Nisibis  unassailed  upon  his  left,  proceeded 
to  attack  the  strong  fort  known  indifferently  as  Phoenica  or 
Bezabde."  This  was  a  position  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tigris, 
near  the  point  where  that  river  quits  the  mountains  and  de 
bouches  upon  the  yjlain; '°  though  not  on  the  site,"  it  may  be 
considered  the  representative  of  the  modern  Jezireh,  which 


tn.  ix.j  Jf*ALL   OF  BEZABDE.  339 

commands  the  passes  from  the  low  country  into  the  Kurdish 
mountains.  Bezabde  was  the  chief  city  of  the  province,  called 
after  it  Zabdicene,  one  of  the  five  ceded  by  Narses  and  greatly 
coveted  by  his  gi'andson.  It  was  much  valued  by  Rome,  was 
fortified  in  places  with  a  double  wall,  and  was  guarded  by 
three  legions  and  a  large  body  of  Kurdish  archers.''^  Sapor, 
having  reconnoitred  the  place,  and,  with  his  usual  hardi- 
hood, exposed  himself  to  danger  in  doing  so,  sent  a  flag  of  truce 
to  demand  a  surrender,  joining  with  the  messengers  some 
prisoners  of  high  rank  taken  at  Singara,  lest  the  enemy  should 
open  fire  upon  his  envoys.  The  device  was  successful ;  but  the 
garrison  proved  stanch,  and  determined  on  resisting  to  the 
last.  Once  more  all  the  known  resources  of  attack  and  de- 
fence were  brought  into  play ;  and  after  a  long  siege,  of  which 
the  most  important  incident  was  an  attempt  made  by  the 
bishop  of  the  place  to  induce  Sapor  to  withdraw,"  the  wall  was 
at  last  breached,  the  city  taken,  and  its  defenders  indiscrimi- 
nately massacred.  Regarding  the  position  as  one  of  first-rate 
importance,  Sapor,  who  had  destroyed  Singara,  carefully  re- 
ptared  the  defences  of  Bezabde,  provisioned  it  abundantly,  and 
gari'isoned  it  with  some  of  his  best  troops.  He  was  well  aware 
that  the  Romans  would  feel  keenly  the  loss  of  so  important  a 
post,  and  expected  that  it  would  not  be  long  before  they  made 
an  effort  to  recover  possession  of  it. 

The  winter  was  now  approaching,  but  the  Persian  monarch 
still  kept  the  field.  The  capture  of  Bezabde  was  followed  by 
that  of  many  other  less  important  strongholds,'^  which  offered 
little  resistance.  At  last,  towards  the  close  of  the  year,  an  at- 
tack was  made  upon  a  place  called  Virta,  said  to  have  been  a 
fortress  of  great  strength,  and  by  some  moderns"  identified 
with  Tekrit,  an  important  city  upon  the  Tigris  betweeen  Mosul 
and  Bagdad.  Here  the  career  of  the  conqueror  was  at  last 
arrested.  Persuasion  and  force  proved  alike  unavailing  to  in- 
duce or  compel  a  surrender ;  and,  after  wasting  the  small  re- 
mainder of  the  year,  and  suffering  considerable  loss,  the  Per- 
sian monarch  reluctantly  gave  up  the  siege,  and  returned  to 
his  own  country.'' 

Meanwhile  the  movements  of  the  Roman  emperor  had  been 
slow  and  uncertain.  Distracted  between  a  jealous  fear  of  his 
cousin  Julian's  proceedings  in  the  West,  and  a  desire  of  check- 
ing the  advance  of  his  rival  Sapor  in  the  East,  he  had  left 
Constantinople  in  the  early  spring, "  but  had  journeyed  leisurely 
through  Cappadocia  and  Armenia  Minor  to  Samosata,  whence^ 


S40  ^^^  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [tu.  ix. 

after  crossing  the  Euphrates,  he  had  proceeded  to  Edessa, 
and  there  fixed  himself.'*  While  in  Cappadocia  he  had  suni- 
nioned  to  his  presence  Arsaces,  the  tributary  king  of  Armenia, 
had  reminded  him  of  his  engagements,  and  had  endeavored  to 
quicken  his  gratitude  by  bestowing  on  him  liberal  presents." 
At  Edessa  he  employed  hmiself  during  the  whole  of  the  sum- 
mer in  collecting  troops  and  stores ;  nor  was  it  till  the  autum- 
nal equinox  was  past""  that  he  took  the  field,  and,  after  weep- 
ing over  the  smoking  ruins  of  Amida,  marched  to  Bezabde, 
and,  when  the  defenders  rejected  his  overtures  of  peace, 
formed  the  siege  of  the  place.  Sapor  was,  we  must  suppose, 
now  engaged  before  Virta,  and  it  is  probable  that  he  thought 
Bezabde  strong  enough  to  defend  itself.  At  any  rate,  he  made 
no  effort  to  afford  it  any  relief ;  and  the  Roman  emperor  was 
allowed  to  employ  all  the  resources  at  his  disposal  in  reiterated 
assaults  upon  the  walls.  The  defence,  however,  proved 
stronger  than  the  attack.  Time  after  time  the  bold  sallies  of 
the  besieged  destroyed  the  Roman  works.  At  last  the  rainy 
season  set  in,  and  the  low  ground  outside  the  town  became  a 
glutinous  and  adhesive  marsh.*'  It  was  no  longer  possible  to 
continue  the  siege ;  and  the  disappointed  emperor  reluctantly 
drew  off  his  troops,  recrossed  the  Euphrates,  and  retired  into 
winter  quarters  at  Antioch. 

The  successes  of  Sapor  in  the  campaigns  of  a.d.  359  and  360, 
his  captures  of  Amida,  Singara,  and  Bezabde,  together  with 
the  unfortunate  issue  of  the  expedition  made  by  Constantius 
against  the  last-named  place,  had  a  tendency  to  shake  the 
fidelity  of  the  Roman  vassal-kings,  Arsaces*''  of  Armenia,  and 
Meribanes  of  Iberia.  Constantius,  therefore,  during  the  win- 
ter of  A.D.  360-1,  which  he  passed  at  Antioch,  sent  emissaries 
to  the  courts  of  these  monarchs,  and  endeavored  to  secure  their 
fidelity  by  loading  them  with  costly  presents.*'  His  policy 
seems  to  have  been  so  far  successfid  that  no  revolt  of  these 
kingdoms  took  place ;  they  did  not  as  yet  desert  the  Romans 
or  make  their  submission  to  Sapor.  Their  monarchs  seem  to 
have  simply  watched  events,  prepared  to  declare  themselves 
distinctly  on  the  winning  side  so  soon  as  fortune  should  incline 
unmistakably  to  one  or  the  other  combatant.  Meanwhile  they 
maintained  the  fiction  of  a  nominal  dependence  upon  Rome.** 

It  might  have  been  exjDected  that  the  year  a.d.  361  would 
"have  been  a  turning-point  in  the  war,  and  that,  if  Rome  did 
not  by  a  great  effort  assert  herself  and  recover  her  prestige, 
the  advance  of  Persia  would  have  been  marked  and  rapid.    But 


1 


ea.  IX. 5  INACTION  OF  SAPOlt  IN  A.DA^i.  S4l 

the  actual  course  of  events  was  far  different.  Hesitation  and 
diffidence  characterize  the  movements  of  both  parties  to  the 
I  contest,  and  the  year  is  signahzed  by  no  important  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  either  monarch.  Constantius  reoccupied 
Edessa/^  and  had  (we  are  told)**"  some  thoughts  of  renewing 
the  siege  of  Bezabde ;  actually,  however,  he  did  not  advance 
further,  but  contented  himself  with  sending  a  part  of  his  army 
to  watch  Sapor,  giving  them  strict  orders  not  to  risk  an  en- 
gagement." Sapor,  on  his  side,  began  the  year  with  demon- 
strations which  were  taken  to  mean  that  he  was  about  to  pass 
the  Euphrates;'*'*  but  in  reality  he  never  even  brought  his 
troops  across  the  Tigris,  or  once  set  foot  in  Mesopotamia. 
After  wasting  weeks  or  months  in  a  futile  display  of  his  armed 
strength  upon  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river,  and  violently 
alarming  the  officers  sent  by  Constantius  to  observe  his  move- 
ments,'*'' he  suddenly,  towards  autumn,  withdrew  his  ti'oops, 
having  attempted  nothing,  and  quietly  returned  to  his  capital ! 
It  is  by  no  means  difficult  to  understand  the  motives  which 
actuated  Constantius.  He  was,  month  after  month,  receiving 
intelligence  from  the  West  of  stejDS  taken  by  Julian  which 
amounted  to  open  rebellion,  and  challenged  him  to  engage  in 
civil  war.""  So  long  as  Sapor  threatened  invasion  he  did  not 
like  to  quit  Mesopotamia,  lest  he  might  appear  to  have  sacri- 
ficed the  interests  of  his  country  to  his  own  private  quarrels; 
but  he  must  have  been  anxious  to  return  to  the  seat  of  empire 
from  the  first  moment  that  intelligence  reached  him  of  Julian's 
assumption  of  the  imperial  name  and  dignity;  and  when 
Sapor's  retreat  was  announced  he  naturally  made  all  haste  to 
reach  his  capital.  Meanwhile  the  desire  of  keeping  his  army 
intact  caused  him  to  refrain  from  any  movement  which  in- 
volved the  slightest  risk  of  bringing  on  a  battle,  and,  in  fact, 
reduced  him  to  inaction.  So  much  is  readily  intelligible.  But 
what  at  this  tiuie  withheld  Sapor,  when  he  had  so  grand  an 
opportunity  of  making  an  impression  upon  Rome — what  par- 
alyzed his  arm  when  it  might  have  struck  with  such  effect  it 
is  far  from  easy  to  understand,  though  perhaps  not  impossible 
to  conjecture.  The  historian  of  the  war  ascribes  his  absti- 
nence to  a  religious  motive,  teUing  us  that  the  auguries  were 
not  favorable  for  the  Persians  crossing  the  Tigris."'  But 
there  is  no  other  evidence  that  the  Persians  of  this  period  were 
the  slaves  of  any  such  superstition  as  that  noted  by  Ammianus, 
nor  any  probability  that  a  monarch  of  Sapor's  force  of  char- 
acter would  have  suffered  his  military  policy  to  be  affected  by 


342  "Ttll^  8EVmm  MONABOHT.  [ch.  ix 

omens.  "We  must  therefore  ascribe  the  conduct  of  the  Persian 
king  to  some  cause  not  recorded  by  the  historian— same  failure 
of  healtli.  or  some  peril  from,  internal  or  external  enemies 
which  called  him  away  from  the  scene  of  his  recent  exploits, 
just  at  the  time  when  his  continued  presence  there  was  most 
important.  Once  before  in  his  lifetime,  an  invasion  of  his 
eastern  provinces  had  required  his  immediate  presence,  and 
allowed  his  adversary  to  quit  Mesopotamia  and  march  against 
Magnentius.""  It  is  not  improbable  that  a  fresh  attack  of  the 
same  or  some  other  barbarians  now  again  happened  oppor- 
tunely for  the  Eomans,  calling  Sapor  away,  and  thus  enabling 
Constantius  to  turn  his  back  upon  the  East,  and  set  out  for 
Europe  in  order  to  meet  Julian. 

The  meeting,  however,  was  not  destined  to  take  place.  On 
his  way  from  Antioch  to  Constantinople  the  unfortunate  Con- 
stantius, anxious  and  perhaps  over-fatigued,  fell  sick  at  Mop- 
sucrene,  in  Cilicia,  and  died  there,  after  a  short  illness,"^  to- 
wards the  close  of  a.d.  361.  Julian  the  Apostate  succeeded 
peacefully  to  the  empire  whereto  he  was  about  to  assert  his 
right  by  force  of  arms ;  and  Sapor  found  that  the  war  which 
he  had  provoked  with  Rome,  in  reliance  upon  his  adversary's 
weakness  and  incapacity,  had  to  be  carried  on  with  a  prince  of 
far  greater  natural  powers  and  of  much  superior  military 
training. 


CH.  X.  JULIAN  iSUGCEEDH  C0JS8TAJSTIUS.  343 


CHAPTER  X. 

Julian  becomes  Emperor  of  Rome.  His  Resolution  to  invade 
Persia.  His  Vieics  and  Motives.  His  Proceedings.  Pro- 
posals of  Sapor  rejected.  Other  Embassies.  Relations  of 
Julian  2vith  Armenia.  Strength  of  his  Army.  His  inva- 
sion of  Mesopotamia.  His  Line  of  March.  Siege  of  Peri- 
sabor ;  of  Maogamalcha.  Battle  of  the  Tigris.  Further 
Progress  of  Julian  checked  by  his  Inability  to  invest  Ctesi- 
phon.  His  Retreat.  His  Death.  Retreat  continued  by 
Jovian.  Sapor  offers  Terms  of  Peace.  Peace  made  by 
Jovian.  Its  Conditions.  Reflections  on  the  Peace  and  on 
the  Termination  of  the  Second  Period  of  Struggle  between 
Rome  and  Persia. 

"  Julianus,  redacta  ad  unum  se  orbis  Romani  curatione,  gloriae  nimis  cupidus,  in 
Persas  proflciscitur." — Aurel.  Vict.  Epit.  §  43. 

The  prince  on  whom  the  government  of  the  Roman  empire, 
and  consequently  the  direction  of  the  Persian  war,  devolved 
by  the  death  of  Constantius,  was  in  the  flower  of  his  age,' 
proud,  self-confident,  and  full  of  energy.  He  had  been  en- 
gaged for  a  period  of  four  years"  in  a  struggle  with  the  rude 
and  warlike  tribes  of  Germany,  had  freed  the  whole  country 
west  of  the  Rhine  from  the  presence  of  those  terrible  warriors, 
and  had  even  carried  fire  and  sword  far  into  the  wild  and 
savage  districts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  compelled 
the  Alemanni  and  other  powerful  German  tribes  to  make  their 
submission  to  the  majesty  of  Rome.  Personally  brave,  by 
temperament  restless,  and  inspired  with  an  ardent  desire  to 
rival  or  eclipse  the  glorious  deeds  of  those  heroes  of  former 
times  who  had  made  themselves  a  name  in  history,  he  viewed 
the  disturbed  condition  of  the  East  at  the  time  of  his  accession 
not  as  a  trouble,  not  as  a  drawback  upon  the  delights  of  em- 
pire, but  as  a  happy  circumstance,  a  fortunate  opportunity 
for  distinguishing  himself  by  some  great  achievement.  Of  all 
the  Greeks,  Alexander  appeared  to  him  the  most  illustrious;' 
of  all  his  predecessors  on  the  imperial  thone,  Trajan  and  Mar' 
cus  Aurelius  were  those  whom  he  most  wished  to  emulate.* 
But  all  these  princes  had  either  led  or  sent^  expeditions  inta 


344  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  x. 

the  far  East,  and  had  aimed  at  uniting  in  one  the  fairest  prov- 
inces of  Europe  and  Asia.  Julian  appears,  from  the  first  mo- 
ment that  he  found  himself  peaceably  established  upon  the 
throne,^  to  have  resolved  on  undertaking  in  person  a  great  ex- 
pedition against  Sapor,  with  the  object  of  avenging  upon 
Persia  the  ravages  and  defeats  of  the  last  sixty  years,  or  at 
any  rate  of  obtaining  such  successes  as  might  justify  his  as- 
stuning  the  title  of  "Persicus."'  Whether  he  really  enter- 
tained any  hope  of  rivalling  Alexander,  or  supposed  it  possible 
that  he  should  effect  "the  final  conquest  of  Persia, ""  may  be 
doubted.  Acquainted,  as  he  must  have  been,"  with  the  entire 
course  of  Roman  warfare  in  these  parts  from  the  attack  of 
Crassus  to  the  last  defeat  of  his  own  immediate  predecessor, 
he  can  scarcely  have  regarded  the  subjugation  of  Persia  as  an 
easy  matter,  or  have  expected  to  do  much  more  than  strike 
terror  into  the  "barbarians"  of  the  East,  or  perhaps  obtain 
from  them  the  cession  of  another  province.  The  sensible 
officer,  who,  after  accompanying  him  in  his  expedition,  wrote 
the  history  of  the  campaign,  regarded  his  actuating  motives  as 
the  delight  that  he  took  in  war,  and  the  desire  of  a  new  title. '" 
Confident  in  his  own  mUitary  talent,  in  his  training,  and  in  his  Si 
power  to  inspire  enthusiasm  in  an  army,  he  no  doubt  looked  to 
reap  laurels  sufficient  to  justify  him  in  making  his  attack ;  but 
the  wild  schemes  ascribed  to  him,  the  conquest  of  the  Sas- 
sanian  kingdom,  and  the  subjugation  of  Hyrcania  and  India," 
are  figments  (probably)  of  the  imagination  of  his  historians. 

Julian  entered  Constantinople  on  the  11th  of  December,  a.d. 
361;  he  quitted  it  towards  the  end  of  May,'^  a.d.  362,  after  re-  1|j 
siding  there  less  than  six  months.  During  this  period,  not- 
withstanding the  various  important  matters  in  which  he  was 
engaged,  the  purifying  of  the  court,  the  depression  of  the  Chris- 
tians, the  restoration  and  revivification  of  Paganism,  he  found 
time  to  form  plans  and  make  preparations  for  his  intended 
eastern  expedition,  in  which  he  was  anxious  to  engage  as  soon 
as  possible.  Having  designated  for  the  war  such  troops  as 
could  be  spared  from  the  West,  he  committed  them  and  their 
officers  to  the  charge  of  two  generals,  carefully  chosen,  Victor, 
a  Roman  of  distinction,  and  the  Persian  refugee,  Prince  Hor- 
misdas,'^  who  conducted  the  legions  without  difficulty  to 
Antioch.  There  Julian  himself  arrived  in  June  or  July,  ^  after 
having  made  a  stately  progress  through  Asia  Minor;  and  it 
would  seem  that  he  would  at  once  have  marched  against  the 
enemy,  had  not  his  counsellors  strongly  urged  the  necessity  of 


CH.  X.]  PROPOSALS  MADE  BY  SAPOR.  345 

a  short  delay, '^  during  which  the  European  troops  might  be 
rested,  and  adequate  preparations  made  for  the  intended  inva- 
sion. It  was  especially  necessary  to  provide  stores  and  ships,  '* 
since  the  new  emperor  had  resolved  not  to  content  himself 
with  an  ordinary  campaign  upon  the  frontier,  but  rather  to 
imitate  the  examples  of  Trajan  and  Severus,  who  had  carried 
the  Eoman  eagles  to  the  extreme  south  of  Mesopotamia." 
Ships,  accordingly,  were  collected,  and  probably  built, '^  during 
the  winter  of  a.d.  362-3 ;  provisions  were  laid  in ;  warlike  stores, 
military  engines,  and  the  like  accumulated;  while  the  impa- 
tient monarch,  galled  hj  the  wit  and  raillery  of  the  gay  Antio- 
chenes, '''  chafed  at  his  compelled  inaction,  and  longed  to  ex- 
change the  war  of  words  in  which  he  was  engaged  with  his 
subjects  for  the  ruder  contests  of  arms  wherewith  use  had 
made  him  more  familiar. 

It  m.ust  have  been  during  the  emperor's  stay  at  Antioch 
that  he  received  an  embassy  from  the  court  of  Persia,  com- 
missioned to  sound  his  inclinations  with  regard  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  peace.  Sapor  had  seen,  with  some  disquiet,  the 
sceptre  of  the  Roman  world  assumed  by  an  enterprising  and 
courageous  youth,  inured  to  warfare  and  ambitious  of  military 
glory.  He  was  probably  very  well  informed  as  to  the  general 
condition  of  the  Roman  State""  and  the  personal  character  of 
its  administrator ;  and  the  tidings  which  he  received  concern- 
ing the  intentions  and  preparations  of  the  new  prince  were 
such  as  caused  him  some  apprehension,  if  not  actual  alarm. 
Under  these  circumstance  she  sent  an  embassy  with  over- 
tures, the  exact  nature  of  which  is  not  known,  but  which,  it 
is  probable,  took  for  their  basis  the  existing  territorial  limits 
of  the  two  countries.  At  least,  we  hear  of  no  offer  of  sur- 
render or  submission  on  Sapor's  part;  and  we  can  scarcely 
suppose  that,  had  such  offers  been  made,  the  Roman  writers 
would  have  passed  them  over  in  silence.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  Julian  lent  no  favorable  ear  to  the  envoys,  if  these  were 
their  instructions ;  but  it  woidd  have  been  better  for  his  repu- 
tation had  he  replied  to  them  with  less  of  haughtiness  and 
rudeness.  According  to  one  authority, ''  he  tore  up  before 
their  faces  the  autograph  letter  of  their  master ;  while,  accord- 
ing to  another,"  he  responded,  with  a  contemptuous  smile, 
that  "there  was  no  occasion  for  an  exchange  of  thought  be- 
tween him  and  the  Persian  king  by  messengers,  since  he  in- 
tended very  shortly  to  treat  with  him  in  person."  Having 
received  this  rebuff,  the  envoys  of  Sapor  took  their  departure, 


346  THE  SEVENTH  MONABCHT.  [ch.  x. 

and  conveyed  to  their  sovereign  the  intelligence  that  he  must 
prepare  himseK  to  resist  a  serious  invasion. 

About  the  same  time  various  offers  of  assistance  reached 
the  Eoman  emperor  from  the  independent  or  semi-independent 
princes  and  chieftains  of  the  regions  adjacent  to  Mesopotamia." 
Such  overtures  were  sure  to  be  made  by  the  heads  of  the  plun- 
dering desert  tribes  to  any  powerful  mvader,  since  it  would  be 
hoped  that  a  share  in  the  booty  might  be  obtained  without 
much  participation  in  the  danger.  We  are  told  that  Juhan 
promptly  rejected  these  offers,  grandly  saying  that  it  was  for 
Rome  rather  to  give  aid  to  her  aUies  than  to  receive  assistance 
from  them.^^  It  appears,  however,  that  at  least  two  excep- 
tions were  made  to  the  general  principle  thus  magniloquently 
asserted.  Julian  had  taken  into  his  service,  ere  he  quitted 
Europe,  a  strong  body  of  Gothic  auxiliaries;"  and,  while  at 
Antioch,  he  sent  to  the  Saracens,  reminding  them  of  theu' 
promise  to  lend  him  troops,  and  calling  upon  them  to  fulfil 
it."  If  the  advance  on  Persia  was  to  be  made  by  the  line  of 
the  Euphrates,  an  alliance  with  these  agile  sons  of  the  desert 
was  of  first-rate  importance,  since  the  assistance  which  they 
could  render  as  friends  was  considerable,  and  the  injury  which 
they  could  inflict  as  enemies  was  almost  beyond  calculation. 
It  is  among  the  faults  of  Juhan  in  this  campaign  that  he  did 
not  set  more  store  by  the  Saracen  aUiance,  and  make  greater 
efforts  to  maintain  it;  we  shall  find  that  after  a  while  he 
allowed  the  brave  nomads  to  become  disaffected,  and  to  ex- 
change their  friendship  with  him  for  hostihty.^'  Had  he  taken 
more  care  to  attach  them  cordially  to  the  side  of  Eome,  it  is 
quite  possible  that  his  expedition  might  have  had  a  prosperous 
issue. 

There  was  another  ally,  whose  services  Julian  regarded  him- 
self as  entitled  not  to  request,  but  to  command.  Arsaces,  king 
of  Armenia,  though  placed  on  his  throne  by  Sapor,  had  (as  we 
have  seen)  transferred  his  allegiance  to  Constantius,  and  volun- 
tarily taken  up  the  position  of  a  Roman  feudatory.'^'  Constan- 
tius had  of  late  suspected  his  fidelity ;  but  Arsaces  had  not  as 
yet,  by  any  overt  act,  justified  these  suspicions,  and  Jidian 
seems  to  have  regarded  him  as  an  assured  friend  and  ally. 
Early  in  A. D.  363  he  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Armenian  mon- 
arch, requiring  him  to  levy  a  considerable  force,  and  hold  him- 
self in  readiness  to  execute  such  orders  as  he  would  receive 
within  a  short  time,"  The  style,  address,  and  purport  of  thi:s 
letter  were  equally  distasteful  to  Arsaces,  whose  pride  was  ou.t 


I 


CH.  X.]  JULIAN  MARCHES  TUROUOH  MESOPOTAMIA.     347 

raged,  and  whose  indolence  was  disturbed,  by  the  call  thus 
suddenly  made  upon  him.  His  own  desire  was  probably  to  re- 
main neutral;  he  felt  no  interest  in  the  standing  quarrel  be- 
tween his  two  powerful  neighbors ;  he  was  under  obligations  to 
both  of  them ;  and  it  was  for  his  advantage  that  they  should 
remain  evenly  balanced.  We  cannot  ascribe  to  him  any  earnest 
religious  feeling;^"  but,  as  one  who  kept  up  the  profession  of 
Christianity,  he  could  not  but  regard  with  aversion  the  Apos- 
tate, who  had  given  no  obscure  intimation  of  his  intention  to 
use  his  power  to  the  utmost  in  order  to  sweep  the  Christian 
religion  from  the  face  of  the  earth.  The  disinchnation  of  their 
monarch  to  observe  the  designs  of  Julian  was  shared,  or  rathei" 
surpassed,  by  his  people,  the  more  educated  portion  of  whom 
were  strongly  attached  to  the  new  faith  and  worship."  If  the 
great  historian  of  Ai'menia  is  right  in  stating  that  Julian  at 
this  time  offered  an  open  insult  to  the  Armenian  religion,  ^'^  wo 
must  pronounce  him  strangely  imprudent.  The  alliance  of 
Armenia  was  always  of  the  utmost  importance  to  Rome  m  any 
attack  upon  the  East.  Julian  seems  to  have  gone  out  of  his 
way  to  ci'eate  offence  in  this  quarter,"  where  his  interests  re- 
quired that  he  should  exercise  all  his  powers  of  conciliation. 

The  forces  which  the  emperor  regarded  as  at  his  disposal,  and 
with  which  he  expected  to  take  the  field,  were  the  following. 
His  own  troops  amounted  to  83,000  or  (according  to  another 
account)  to  95,000  men.^*  They  consisted  chiefly  of  Roman 
legionaries,  horse  and  foot,  but  included  a  strong  body  of  Gothic 
auxiliaries.  Armenia  was  expected  to  furnish  a  considerable 
force,  probably  not  less  than  20,000  men;''^  and  the  light  horse 
of  the  Saracens  would,  it  was  thought,  be  tolerably  numerous. 
Altogether,  an  army  of  above  a  hundred  thousand  men  was 
about  to  be  launched  on  the  devoted  Persia,  wliich  was  believed 
imhkely  to  offer  any  effectual,  if  even  any  serious,  resistance. 

The  impatience  of  Julian  scarcely  allowed  him  to  await  the* 
conclusion  of  the  winter.  With  the  first  breath  of  spring  he 
put  his  forces  in  motion,-"'  and,  quitting  Antioch,  marched  with 
all  speed  to  the  Euphrates.  Passing  Litarbi,  and  thea  Hie^ap- 
olis,  he  crossed  the  I'iver  by  a  bridge  of  boats  in  the  vicinity  ol 
that  place,  and  proceeded  by  Batnpe  to  the  important  city  of 
Carrhee,''  once  the  home  of  Abraham.^"  Here  he  halted  for  a 
few  days  and  finally  fixed  his  plans.  It  was  by  this  time  well 
known  to  the  Romans  that  there  were  two,  and  two  only,  con- 
venient roads  whereby  Southern  Mesopotamia  was  to  be 
reached,  one  along  tlw  line  of  the  Mons  Masius  t*    f.Iie  Tigris, 


348  TEE  SEVENTH  MONAUCIIT.  [ch.  x. 

and  then  along  the  banks  of  that  stream,  the  other  down  the 
valley  of  the  Euphrates  to  the  great  alluvial  plain  on  the  lower 
course  of  the  rivers.  Juhan  had,  perhaps,  hitherto  doubted 
which  line  he  should  follow  in  person."^  The  first  had  been  pre- 
ferred by  Alexander  and  by  Trajan,  the  second  by  the  younger 
Cyrus,  by  Avidius  Cassius,  and  by  Severus.  Both  lines  were 
fairly  practicable ;  but  that  of  the  Tigris  was  circuitous,  and  its 
free  employment  was  only  possible  under  the  condition  of  Ar- 
menia being  certainly  friendly.  If  Julian  had  cause  to  suspect, 
as  it  is  probable  that  he  had,  the  fidehty  of  the  Armenians,  he 
may  have  felt  that  there  was  one  line  only  which  he  could  with 
prudence  pursue.  He  might  send  a  subsidiary  force  by  the 
doubtful  route  which  could  advance  to  his  aid  if  matters  went 
favorably,  or  remain  on  the  defensive  if  they  assumed  a  threat- 
ening aspect ;  but  his  own  grand  attack  must  be  by  the  other. 
Accordingly  he  divided  his  forces.  Committing  a  body  of 
troops,  which  is  variously  estimated  at  from  18,000  to  30,000," 
into  the  hands  of  Procopius,  a  connection  of  his  own,  and  Se- 
bastian, Duke  of  Egypt,  with  orders  that  they  should  proceed 
by  way  of  the  Mons  Masius  to  Armenia,  and,  uniting  themselves 
with  the  forces  of  Arsaces,  invade  Northern  Media,  ravage  it, 
and  then  join  him  before  Ctesiphon  by  the  line  of  the  Tigris,^' 
he  reserved  for  himself  and  for  his  main  army  the  shorter  and 
more  open  route  down  the  vaUey  of  the  Eu^Dhrates.  Leaving 
Carrhse  on  the  26th  of  March,  after  about  a  week's  stay,  he 
marched  southward,  at  the  head  of  65,000  men,  by  Davana  and 
along  the  course  of  the  Behk.  to  Callinicus  or  Nicephorium, 
near  the  junction  of  the  BeUk  with  the  Euphrates.  Here  the 
Saracen  chiefs  came  and  made  theii*  submission,  and  were  gra- 
ciously received  by  the  emperor,  to  whom  they  presented  a 
crown  of  gold.^^  At  the  same  time  the  fleet  made  its  appear- 
ance, numbering  at  least  1100  vessels,"  of  which  fifty  were 
ships  of  war,  fifty  prepared  to  serve  as  pontoons,  and  the  re- 
maining thousand  transports  laden  with  provisions,  weapons, 
and  mihtary  engines. 

From  Calhnicus  the  emperor  marched  along  the  course  of 
the  Euphi-ates  to  Circusium,  or  Circesium,"  at  the  junction  of 
\he  Khabour  with  the  Euphrates,  arriving  at  this  place  early 
In  April.  ■•^  Thus  far  he  had  been  marching  through  his  own 
dominions,  and  had  had  no  hostility  to  dread.  Being  now 
about  to  enter  the  enemy's  country,  he  made  arrangements  for 
the  march  which  seem  to  have  been  extremely  judicious.  The 
cavalry  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Arintheeus  and 


CH.  X.]  SURRENDER  OF  AN  ATE  AN.  349 

Prince  Honnisdas,  and  was  stationed  at  the  extreme  left,  with 
orders  to  advance  on  a  line  parallel  with  the  general  course  of 

f  the  river.  Some  picked  legions  under  the  command  of  Nevitta 
formed  the  right  wing,  and,  resting  on  the  Euphrates,  main- 

'  tained  communication  with  the  fleet.  Julian,  with  the  main 
part  of  his  troops,  occupied  the  space  intermediate  between 
these  two  extremes,  marching  in  a  loose  column  which  from 
front  to  rear  covered  a  distance  of  above  nine  miles.  A  fly- 
ing corps  of  fifteen  hundred  men  acted  as  an  avant-guard 
under  Count  LuciHanus,  and  explored  the  country  in  advance, 
feeling  on  all  sides  for  the  enemy.  The  rear  was  covered  by 
a  detachment  undex"  Secundinus,  Duke  of  Osrhoene,  Dagalai- 
phus,  and  Victor." 

Having  made  his  dispositions,  and  crossed  the  broad  stream 
of  the  Khabour,  on  the  7th  of  April,  by  a  bridge  of  boats,  which 
he  immediately  broke  up,*'  Julian  continued  his  advance 
along  the  course  of  the  Euphrates,  supported  by  his  fleet, 
which  was  not  allowed  either  to  outstrip  or  to  lag  behind  the 
army.''*  The  first  halt  was  at  Zaitha,"''  famous  as  the  scene  of 
the  murder  of  Gordian,  whose  tomb  was  in  its  vicinity.^" 
Here  Julian  encoui-aged  his  soldiers  by  an  eloquent  speech,^'  in 
which  he  recounted  the  past  successes  of  the  Roman  arms, 
and  promised  them  an  easy  victory  over  their  present  adver- 
sary. He  then,  in  a  two  days'  march,  reached  Dura,'*"  a 
ruined  city,  destitute  of  inhabitants,  on  the  banks  of  the 
river ;  from  which  a  march  of  four  days  more  brought  him 
to  Anathan,  '"^  the  modern  Anah,  a  strong  fortress  on  an  island 
in  the  mid-stream,  which  was  held  by  a  Persian  garrison.  An 
attempt  to  surprise  the  place  by  a  night  attack  having  failed, 
Julian  had  recourse  to  persuasion,  and  by  the  representations 
of  Prince  Hormisdas  induced  its  defenders  to  surrender  the 
fort  and  place  themselves  at  his  mercy.  ^*  It  was,  perha])S,  to 
gall  the  Antiochenes  with  an  indication  of  his  victorious 
progress  that  he  sent  his  prisonei's  under  escort  into  Syria, 
and  settled  them  in  the  territory  of  Chalcis,  at  no  great  dis- 
tance from  the  city  of  his  aversion.  Unwilling  further  to 
weaken  his  army  by  detaching  a  garrison  to  hold  his  conquest, 
he  committed  Anathan  to  the  flames  before  proceeding  further 
down  the  river. " 

About  eight  miles  below  Anathan,  another  island  and  ano- 
ther fortress  were  held  by  the  enemy.  Thilutha  is  described 
as  stronger  than  Anathan,  and  indeed  as  almost  impregna- 
ble. ^''    Julian  felt  that  he  could  not  attack  it  with  any  hope 


350  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  x 

of  success,  and  therefore  once  more  submitted  to  use  persua- 
sion. But  the  garrison,  feehng  themselves  secure,  rejected 
his  overtures;  they  would  wait,  they  said,  and  see  which 
party  was  superior  in  the  approaching  conflict,  and  would 
then  attach  themselves  to  the  victors.  Meanwhile,  if  unmo- 
lested by  the  invader,  they  would  not  interfere  with  his 
advance,  but  would  maintain  a  neutral  attitude.  Julian  had 
to  determine  whether  he  would  act  in  the  spirit  of  an  Alexan- 
der," and,  rejecting  with  disdain  all  compromise,  compel  by 
force  of  arms  an  entire  submission,  or  whether  he  would  take 
lower  ground,  accept  the  offer  made  to  him,  and  be  content  to 
leave  in  his  rear  a  certain  number  of  unconquered  fortresses- 
He  decided  that  prudence  required  him  to  take  the  latter 
course,  and  left  Thilutha  unassailed.  It  is  not  surprising  that, 
having  admitted  the  assumption  of  a  neutral  position  by  one 
town,  he  was  forced  to  extend  the  permission  to  others,  ^^  and 
so  to  allow  the  Euphrates  route  to  remain,  practically,  in  the 
hands  of  the  Persians. 

A  five  days'  march  from  Thilutha  brought  the  army  to  a 
point  opposite  Diacira,  or  Hit,^"  a  town  of  ancient  repute,"" 
and  one  which  happened  to  be  well  provided  with  stores  and 
provisions.  Though  the  place  lay  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  it  was  still  exposed  to  attack,  as  the  fleet  could  convey 
any  number  of  troops  from  one  shore  to  the  other.  Being 
considered  untenable,  it  was  deserted  by  the  male  inhabitants, 
who,  however,  left  some  of  their  women  behind  them.  We 
obtain  an  unpleasant  idea  of  the  state  of  discipline  which  the 
philosophic  empei'or  allowed  to  prevail,  when  we  find  that  his 
soldiers,  "without  remorse  and  without  punishment,  massa- 
cred these  defenceless  persons."  "  The  historian  of  the  war 
records  this  act  without  any  appearance  of  shame,  as  if  it 
were  a  usual  occurrence,  and  no  more  important  than  the 
burning  of  the  plundered  city  which  followed.  '^ 

From  Hit  the  army  pursued  its  march,  through  Sitha  and 
Megia,"  to  Zaragardia  or  Ozogardana,  where  the  memory  of 
Trajan's  expedition  still  lingered,  a  certain  pedestal  or  pulpit 
of  stone  being  known  to  the  natives  as  "Trajan's  tribunal." 
Up  to  this  time  nothing  had  been  seen  or  heard  of  any  Per- 
sian opposing  army,"*  one  man  only  on  the  Roman  side,  so 
far  as  we  hear,  had  been  killed."^  No  systematic  method  of 
checking  the  advance  had  been  adopted ;  the  corn  was  every- 
where found  standing ;  forage  was  plentiful ;  and  there  were 
magazines  of  grain  in  the  towns.     No  difficulties  had  delayed 


Vol     III. 


'Plate  X-XXI 


AECiiivourE  AT  Takht-i-Uostan- (afrLTriamliii). 


Fig.  2. 


FtdWEiiED  Tanel  at  Takht-i-Bosias  (after  Flandin). 


I 


Plate.   XXXII. 


Vol.  111.. 


/ 


Sassakuh.  jDAPiTAis'(»fterFlanaiH)> 


CH.  X.]  TUE  ROMANS  ENTER  HABTIONIA.  351 

the  invaders  but  such  as  Nature  had  interposed  to  thwart 
them,  as  when  a  violent  storm  on  one  occasion  shattered  the 
tents,  and  on  another  a  sudden  swell  of  the  Euphrates 
wrecked  some  of  the  corn  transports,  and  interrupted  the 
right  wing's  hne  of  march/"  But  this  pleasant  condition  of 
tilings  was  not  to  continue.  At  Hit  the  rolling  Assyrian  plain 
had  come  to  an  end,  and  the  invading  army  had  entei  ed  upon 
the  low  alluvium  of  Babylonia,"  a  region  of  great  fertUity, 
intersected  by  numerous  canals,  which  in  some  places  were 
carried  the  entire  distance  from  the  one  river  to  the  other.  "* 
The  change  in  the  character  of  the  country  encouraged  the 
Persians  to  make  a  change  in  their  tactics.  Hitherto  they 
had  been  absolutely  passive ;  now  at  last  they  showed  them- 
selves, and  commenced  the  active  system  of  perpetual  harass- 
ing warfare  in  which  they  were  adepts.  A  surena,  or  general 
of  the  first  rank,"*  appeared  in  the  field,  at  the  head  of  a 
strong  body  of  Persian  horse,  and  accompanied  by  a  sheikh  o^f 
the  Saracenic  Arabs,'"  known  as  Malik  (or  "King")  Eodosaces. 
Retreating  as  Julian  advanced,  but  continually  delaying  liis 
progress,  hanging  on  the  skirts  of  his  army,  cutting  ofi:  his 
stragglers,  and  threatening  every  unsupported  detachment, 
this  active  force  changed  all  the  conditions  of  the  march, 
rendering  it  slow  and  pamfiU,  and  sometimes  stopping  it 
altogether.  We  are  told  that  on  one  occasion  Prince  Hormis- 
das  narrowly  escaped  falling  into  the  surena's  hands."  On 
another,  the  Persian  force,  having  allowed  the  Roman  van- 
guard to  proceed  unmolested,  suddenly  showed  itself  on  the 
southern  bank  of  one  of  the  great  canals  connecting  the 
Euphrates  with  the  Tigris,  and  forbade  the  passage  of  Julian's 
main  army."-  It  was  only  after  a  day  and  a  night's  delay 
that  the  emperor,  by  detaching  troops  under  Victor  to  make 
a  long  circuit,  cross  the  canal  far  to  the  east,  recall  Lucihanus 
with  the  vanguard,  and  then  attack  the  surena's  troops  in  the 
i"ear,  was  able  to  overcome  the  resistance  in  his  front,  and 
carry  his  army  across  the  cutting. 

Having  in  this  way  effected  the  passage,  Juhan  continued 
his  march  along  the  Euphrates,  and  in  a  short  time  came  to  the 
city  of  Perisabor"  (Firuz  Shapur),  the  most  important  that  he 
had  yet  reached,  and  reckoned  not  much  inferior  to  Ctesi- 
phon.'^  As  the  inhabitants  steadily  refused  all  accommoda- 
tion, and  insulted  Hormisdas,  who  was  sent  to  treat  with  them, 
by  the  reproach  that  he  was  a  deserter  and  a  traitor,  the  em- 
peror determined  to  form  the  siege  of  the  place  and  see  if  he 


352  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  X. 

could  not  compel  it  to  a  surrender.  Situated  between  the  Eu- 
pln-ates  and  one  of  the  numerous  canals  derived  from  it,  and 
further  protected  by  a  trench  drawn  across  from  the  canal  to 
the  river,  Perisabor  occupied  a  sort  of  island,  while  at  the  same 
time  it  was  completely  surrounded  with  a  double  wall.  The 
citadel,  which  lay  towards  the  north,  and  overhung  the  Eu- 
phrates, was  especially  strong;  and  the  garrison  was  brave, 
numerous,  and  full  of  confidence.  The  walls,  however,  com- 
posed in  part  of  brick  laid  in  bitumen,  were  not  of  much 
strength ;"  and  the  Roman  soldiers  found  Uttle  difficulty  in 
shattering  with  the  ram  one  of  the  corner  towei-s,  and  so  mak- 
ing an  entrance  into  the  place.  But  the  real  struggle  now 
began.  The  brave  defenders  retreated  into  the  citadal,  which 
was  of  imposing  height,  and  from  this  vantage-ground  gallei 
the  Romans  in  the  town  with  an  incessant  shower  of  arrows, 
darts,  and  stones.  The  ordinary  catapults  an  d  bahstse  of  tho 
Romans  were  no  match  for  such  a  storm  descending  from  such 
a  height ;  and  it  was  plainly  necessary,  if  the  place  was  to  be 
taken,  to  have  recourse  to  some  other  device.  Julian,  there- 
fore, who  was  never  sparing  of  his  own  person,  took  the  reso- 
lution, on  the  second  day  of  the  siege,  of  attempting  to  burst 
open  one  of  the  gates.  Accompanied  by  a  small  band,  who 
formed  a  roof  over  his  head  with  theii^  shields,  and  by  a  few 
sappers  with  their  tools,  he  approached  the  gate-tower,  and 
made  his  men  commence  their  operations.  The  doors,  how- 
ever, were  found  to  be  protected  with  iron,  and  the  fastenings 
to  be  so  strong  that  no  immediate  impression  could  be  made ; 
while  the  alarmed  garrison,  concentrating  its  attention  on  the 
threatened  spot,  kept  up  a  furious  discharge  of  missiles  on 
their  daring  assailants.  Prudence  counselled  retreat  from  the 
dangerous  position  which  had  been  taken  up ;  and  the  emperor, 
though  he  felt  acutely  the  shame  of  having  faUed,'^  retired. 
But  his  mind,  fertile  in  resource,  soon  foi-med  a  new  plan. 
He  remembered  that  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  had  acquired  his 
svirname  by  the  invention  and  use  of  the  "  Helepolis,"  a  mova- 
ble tower  of  vast  height,  which  placed  the  assailants  on  a  level 
with  the  defenders  even  of  the  loftiest  ramparts.  He  at  once 
ordered  the  constraction  of  such  a  machine ;  and,  the  abUity 
of  his  engineers  being  equal  to  the  task,  it  rapidly  grew  before 
his  eyes.  The  garrison  saw  its  growth  with  feehngs  very 
opposite  to  those  of  theii*  assailant ;  they  felt  that  they  could 
not  resist  the  new  creation,  and  anticipated  its  employment  by 
a  surrender."    JuUan  agreed  to  sj^are  their  lives,  and  allowed 


CH.  X.]  MARCH  ALO^'O   THE  NAUR-MA LCII A.  353 

them  to  withdraw  and  join  their  countrymen,  each  man  taking 
with  him  a  spare  garment  and  a  certain  sum  of  money.  The 
other  stores  contained  within  the  walls  fell  to  the  conquerors, 
who  found  them  to  comprise  a  vast  quantity  of  com,  arms, 
and  other  valuables.  Julian  distributed  among  his  troops 
whatever  was  likely  to  be  serviceable ;  the  remainder,  of  which 
he  could  make  no  use,  was  either  burned  or  thrown  into  the 
Euphrates. 

The  latitude  of  Ctesiphon  was  now  nearly  reached,  but  JuHan 
still  continued  to  descend  the  Euphrates,  while  the  Persian 
cavalry  made  occasional  dashes  upon  his  extended  line,  and 
sometimes  caused  him  a  sensible  loss.'®  At  length  he  came  to 
the  point  where  the  Nahr-Malcha,  or  "Eoyal  river,"  the  chief 
of  the  canals  connecting  the  Euphrates  with  the  Tigris,  branched 
off  from  the  more  western  stream,  and  ran  nearly  due  east  to 
the  vicinity  of  the  capital.  The  canal  was  navigable  by  his 
ships,  and  he  therefore  at  this  point  quitted  the  Euphrates,  and 
directed  his  march  eastward  along  the  course  of  the  cutting, 
following  in  the  footsteps  of  Severus,  and  no  doubt  expecting, 
like  hmi,  to  capture  easily  the  great  metropoUtan  city.  But 
his  advance  across  the  neck  of  land  which  here  separates  the 
Tigris  from  the  Euphrates'"  was  painful  and  difficult,  since  the 
enemy  laid  the  coimtry  under  water,  and  at  every  favorable 
point  disputed  his  progress.  Julian,  however,  still  pressed 
forward,  and  advanced,  though  slowly.  By  felling  the  palms 
which  grew  abundantly  in  this  region,  and  forming  with  them 
rafts  supported  by  inflated  skins,  he  was  able  to  pass  the  inun- 
dated district,  and  to  approach  within  about  eleven  miles  of 
Ctesiphon.  Here  his  further  march  was  obstructed  by  a 
fortress,  built  (as  it  would  seem)  to  defend  the  capital,  and 
fortified  with  especial  care.  Ammianus  calls  this  place  Maoga- 
malcha,*"  while  Zosimus  gives  it  the  name  of  Besuchis;"  but 
both  agree  that  it  was  a  large  town,  commanded  by  a  strong 
citadel,  and  held  by  a  brave  and  numerous  gan-ison.  Julian 
might  perhaps  have  left  it  unassailed,  as  he  had  left  already 
several  towns  upon  his  line  of  march ;  but  a  daring  attempt 
made  against  himself  by  a  portion  of  the  garrison  caused  him 
to  feel  his  honor  concerned  in  taking  the  place ;  and  the  result 
was  that  he  once  more  arrested  his  steps,  and,  sitting  down 
before  the  walls,  commenced  a  formal  siege.  All  the  usual 
arts  of  attack  and  defence  were  employed  on  either  side  for 
several  days,  the  chief  nov(^l  feature  in  the  warfare  being  the 
use  by  the  besieged  of  blazing  balls  of  bitumen,''  which  they 


354  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  x. 

shot  from  their  lofty  towers  against  the  besiegers'  works  and 
persons.  Julian,  however,  met  this  novelty  by  a  device  on  his 
side  which  was  uncommon ;  he  continued  openly  to  assault  the 
walls  and  gates  with  his  battering  rams,  but  he  secretly  gave 
orders  that  the  chief  efforts  of  his  men  should  be  directed  to 
the  formation  of  a  mine,"  which  should  be  carried  under  both 
the  walls  that  defended  the  place,  and  enable  him  to  introduce 
suddenly  a  body  of  troops  into  the  very  heart  of  the  city.  His 
orders  were  successfully  executed;  and  while  a  general  attack 
upon  the  defences  occupied  the  attention  of  the  besieged,  three 
corps"  introduced  through  the  mine  suddenly  showed  them- 
selves in  the  town  itself,  and  rendered  further  resistance  hope- 
less. Maogamalcha,  which  a  Httle  before  had  boasted  of  being 
impregnable,  and  had  laughed  to  scorn  the  vain  efforts  of  the 
emperor,  ^^  suddenly  found  itself  taken  by  assault  and  under- 
going the  extremities  of  sack  and  pillage.  Julian  made  no 
efforts  to  prevent  a  general  massacre,  *"  and  the  entire  popula- 
tion, without  distinction  of  age  or  sex,  seems  to  have  been  put 
to  the  sword."  The  commandant  of  the  fortress,  though  he 
was  at  first  spared,  suffered  death  shortly  after  on  a  frivolous 
charge."  Even  a  miserable  remnant,  which  had  concealed 
itself  in  caves  and  cellars,  was  hunted  out,  smoke  and  fire  being 
used  to  force  the  fugitives  from  their  hiding-places,  or  else 
cause  them  to  perish  in  the  darksome  dens  by  suffocation.*^ 
Thus  there  was  no  extremity  of  savage  warfare  which  was  not 
used,  the  fourth  century  anticipating  some  of  the  horrors  which 
have  most  disgraced  the  nineteenth."" 

Notliing  now  but  the  river  Tigi'is  intervened  between  JuHan 
and  the  great  city  of  Ctesiphon,  which  was  plainly  the  special 
object  of  the  expedition.  Ctesiphon,  indeed,  was  not  to  Persia 
what  it  had  been  to  Parthia ;  but  still  it  might  fairly  be  looked 
upon  as  a  prize  of  considerable  importance.  Of  Parthia  it  had 
been  the  main,  in  later  times  perhaps  the  sole,  capital ;  to  Per- 
sia it  was  a  secondary  rather  than  a  primary  city,  the  ordinary 
residence  of  the  court  being  Istakr,  or  Persepolis.  StiU  the 
Persian  kings  seem  occasionally  to  have  resided  at  Ctesiphon; 
and  among  the  secondary  cities  of  the  empire  it  undoubtedly 
held  a  high  rank.  In  the  neighborhood  were  various  royal 
hunting-seats,  surrounded  by  shady  gardens,  and  adorned  with 
paintings  or  bas-reliefs;'"  while  near  them  were  parks  or  "para- 
dises," containing  the  game  kept  for  the  prince's  sport,  which 
included  lions,  wOd  boars,  and  bears  of  remarkable  fierce- 
ness.'°    As  Julian  advanced,  these  pleasaunces  fell,  one  after 


i 


I 


CH.  X.]  JULIAN  REACHES  COCH&.  355 

another,  into  his  hands,  and  were  delivered  over  to  the  rude 
soldiery,  who  trampled  the  flowers  and  shrubs  under  foot, 
destroyed  the  wild  beasts,  and  burned  the  residences.  No 
serious  resistance  was  as  yet  made  by  any  Persian  force  to  the 
progress  of  the  Romans,  who  pressed  steadily  forward,  occasion- 
ally losing  a  few  men  or  a  few  baggage  animals,"  but  drawing 
daily  nearer  to  the  great  city,  and  on  their  way  spreading  ruin 
and  desolation  over  a  most  fertile  district,  from  which  they 
drew  abundant  supplies  as  they  passed  through  it,  while  they 
left  it  behind  them  blackened,  wasted,  and  almost  without  in- 
habitant. The  Persians  seem  to  have  had  orders  not  to  make, 
as  yet,  any  firm  stand.  One  of  the  sons  of  Sapor  was  now  at 
their  head,  but  no  change  of  tactics  occurred.  As  Julian  drew 
near,  this  prince  indeed  quitted  the  shelter  of  Ctesiphon,  and 
made  a  reconnaissance  in  force ;  but  when  he  fell  in  with  the 
Roman  advanced  guard  under  Victor,  and  saw  its  strength, 
he  declined  an  engagement,  and  retired  without  coming  to 
blows. '^ 

Juhan  had  noAv  reached  the  western  suburb  of  Ctesiphon, 
which  had  lost  its  old  namie  of  Seleucia  and  was  known  as 
Coche."^  The  capture  of  this  place  would,  perhaps,  not  have 
been  difficult ;  but,  as  the  broad  and  deep  stream  of  the  Tigris 
flowed  between  it  and  the  main  town,  little  would  have  been 
gained  by  the  occupation.  Julian  felt  that,  to  attack  Ctesiphon 
with  success,  he  must,  hke  Trajan  and  Severus,  transport  his 
army  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  deliver  liis  assault 
upon  the  defences  that  lay  beyond  that  river.  For  the  safe 
transport  of  his  army  he  trusted  to  his  fleet,  which  he  had  there- 
fore caused  to  enter  the  Nahr-Malcha,  and  to  accompany  his 
troops  thus  far.  But  at  Coche  he  found  that  the  Nahr-Malcha, 
instead  of  joining  the  Tigins,  as  he  had  expected,  above  Cte- 
siphon, ran  into  it  at  some  distance  below.""  To  have  pursued 
this  line  with  both  fleet  and  army  would  have  carried  him  too 
far  into  the  enemy's  country,  have  endangered  his  communi- 
cations, and  especially  have  cut  him  off  from  the  Armenian 
army  under  Procopius  and  Sebastian,  with  which  he  was  at 
this  time  looking  to  effect  a  junction.  To  have  sent  the  fleet 
into  the  Tigris  below  Coche,  while  the  army  occupied  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  above  it,  would,  in  the  first  place,  have  sep- 
arated the  two,  and  would  further  have  been  useless,  un- 
less the  fleet  could  force  its  way  against  the  strong  current 
through  the  whole  length  of  the  hostile  city.  In  this  difficulty 
Julian's  book-knowledge  was  found  of  service.   He  had  studied 


356  THE  SEVENTH  MOyARCHY.  [ch.  x. 

■with  care  the  campaigns  of  his  predecessors  in  these  regions, 
and  recollected  that  one  of  them"  at  any  rate  had  made  a  cut- 
ting from  the  Nahr-Malcha,  by  which  he  had  brought  his  fleet 
into  the  Tigris  above  Ctesiphon.  If  this  work  could  be  dis- 
covered, it  might,  he  thought,  in  all  probability  be  restored. 
Some  of  the  country  people  were  therefore  seized,  and,  inquiry 
being  made  of  them,  the  hne  of  the  canal  was  pointed  out,  and 
the  place  shown  at  which  it  had  been  derived  from  the  Nahr- 
Malcha.  Here  the  Persians  had  erected  a  strong  dam,  with 
sluices,  by  means  of  which  a  portion  of  the  water  could  occa- 
sionally be  turned  into  the  Roman  cutting."*  Julian  had  the 
cutting  cleared  out,  and  the  dam  torn  down;  whereupon  the 
main  portion  of  the  stream  rushed  at  once  into  the  old  channel, 
which  rapidly  filled,  and  was  found  to  be  navigable  by  the 
Roman  vessels.  The  fleet  was  thus  brought  into  the  Tigris 
above  Coche ;  and  the  army  advancing  with  it  encamped  upon 
the  right  bank  of  the  river. 

The  Persians  now  for  the  first  time  appeared  in  force. ""  As 
Julian  drew  near  the  great  stream,  he  perceived  that  his  pas- 
sage of  it  would  not  be  unopposed.  Along  the  left  bank, 
which  was  at  tliis  point  naturally  higher  than  the  right,  and 
which  was  further  crowned  by  a  wall  built  originally  to  fence 
in  one  of  the  royal  parks, ""  could  be  seen  the  dense  masses  of 
the  enemy's  horse  and  foot,  stretching  away  to  right  and  left, 
the  former  encased  in  glittering  armor, "'  the  latter  protected 
by  huge  Avattled  shields.'"^  Behind  these  troops  were  dis- 
cernible the  vast  forms  of  elephants,  looking  (says  the  his- 
torian) like  moving  mountains,  '"'^  and  regarded  by  the  legion- 
aries with  extreme  dread.  Julian  felt  that  he  could  not  ask 
his  army  to  cross  the  stream  openly  in  the  face  of  a  foe  thus 
advantageously  posted.  He  therefore  waited  the  approach  of 
night.  When  darkness  had  closed  in,  he  made  his  dispositions ; 
divided  his  fleet  into  portions;  embarked  a  number  of  his 
troops ;  and,  despite  the  dissuasions  of  his  oflicers,  '"*  gave  the 
signal  for  the  passage  to  commence.  Five  ships,  each  of  them 
conveying  eighty  soldiers,  led  the  way,  and  reached  the  op- 
posite shore  without  accident.  Here,  however,  the  enemy 
received  them  with  a  sharp  fire  of  burning  darts,  and  the  two 
foremost  were  soon  in  flames.'"^  At  the  ominous  sight  the 
rest  of  the  fleet  wavered,  and  might  have  refused  to  proceed 
further,  had  not  Julian,  with  admirable  presence  of  mind,  ex- 
claimed aloud—"  Our  men  have  crossed  and  are  masters  of  the 
bank — that  fire  is  the  signal  which  I  bade  them  make  if  they 


CH.  X.]  PASSAGE  OF  THE  TIGRIS.  357 

were  victorious."  Thus  encouraged,  the  crews  plied  their  oars 
with  vigor,  and  impelled  the  remaining  vessels  rapidly  across 
the  stream.  At  the  same  time,  some  of  the  soldiers  who  had 
not  been  put  on  board,  impatient  to  assist  their  comrades, 
plunged  into  the  stream,  and  swam  across  supported  by  their 
shields.'"*  Though  a  stout  resistance  was  offered  by  the  Per- 
sians, it  was  found  impossible  to  withstand  the  impetuosity  of 
the  Roman  attack.  Not  only  were  the  half-burned  vessels 
saved,  the  flames  extinguished,  and  the  men  on  board  rescued 
from  their  perilous  position,  but  everywhere  the  Roman  troops 
made  good  their  landing,  fought  their  way  up  the  bank  against 
a  storm  of  missile  weapons,  and  drew  up  in  good  order  upon 
its  summit.  A  pause  probably  now  occurred,  as  the  armies 
could  not  see  each  other  in  the  darkness;  but,  at  dawn  of 
day, ""  Julian,  having  made  a  fresh  arrangement  of  his  troops, 
led  them  against  the  dense  array  of  the  enemy,  and  engaged 
in  a  hand-to-hand  combat,  which  lasted  from  morning  to  mid- 
day, when  it  was  terminated  by  the  flight  of  the  Persians. 
Their  leaders,  Tigranes,  Narseus,  and  the  Surena, '°*  are  said'"" 
to  have  been  the  first  to  quit  the  field  and  take  refuge  within 
the  defences  of  Ctesiphon.  The  example  thus  set  was  univer- 
sally followed;  and  the  entire  Persian  army,  abandoning  its 
camp  and  baggage,  rushed  in  the  wildest  confusion  across  the 
plain  to  the  nearest  of  the  city  gates,  closely  pursued  by  its 
active  foe  up  to  the  very  foot  of  the  walls.  The  Roman  writers 
assert  that  Ctesiphon  might  have  been  entered  and  taken,  had 
not  the  general,  Victor,  who  was  wounded  by  a  dart  from  a 
catapult,  recalled  his  men  as  they  were  about  to  rush  in 
through  the  open  gateway.""  It  is  perhaps  doubtful  whether 
success  would  really  have  crowned  such  audacity.  At  any  rate 
the  opportunity  passed — the  runaways  entered  the  town— the 
gate  closed  upon  them ;  and  Ctesiphon  was  safe  unless  it  were 
reduced  by  the  operations  of  a  regular  siege. 

But  the  fruits  of  the  victory  were  still  considerable.  The 
entire  Persian  army  collected  hitherto  for  the  defence  of 
Ctesiphon  had  been  defeated  by  one-thii-d  of  the  Roman  force 
under  Julian.'"  The  vanquished  had  left  2,500  men  dead  upon 
the  field,  while  the  victors  had  lost  no  more  than  seventy- 
five."'  A  rich  spoil  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans, 
who  found  in  the  abandoned  camp  couches  and  tables  of  mas- 
sive silver,  and  on  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  both  men  and 
horses,  a  profiision  of  gold  and  silver  ornaments,  besides  trap- 
pings and  apparel  of  great  magnificence. "'    A  welcome  supply 


358  THE  SEVENTH  MONAliCllT.  [CH.  x; 

of  provisions  Avas  also  furnished  by  the  lands  and  houses  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Ctesiphon ;  and  the  troops  passed  from  a 
state  of  privation  to  one  of  extreme  abundance,  so  that  it  was 
feared  lest  they  might  suffer  from  excess.  "* 

Affairs  had  now  reached  a  point  when  it  was  necessary  to 
form  a  definite  resolution  as  to  what  should  be  the  further  aim 
and  course  of  the  expedition.  Hitherto  all  had  indicated  an 
intention  on  the  part  of  Julian  to  occupy  Ctesiphon,  and 
thence  dictate  a  peace.  His  long  march,  his  toilsome  canal- 
cutting,  his  orders  to  his  second  army,  "^  his  crossing  of  the 
Tigris,  his  engagement  with  the  Persians  in  the  plain  before 
Ctesiphon,  were  the  natural  steps  conducting  to  such  a  result, 
and  are  explicable  on  one  hypothesis  and  one  hypothesis  only. 
He  must  up  to  this  time  have  designed  to  make  liimself  master 
of  the  great  city,  which  had  been  the  goal  of  so  many  previous 
invasions,  and  had  always  fallen  whenever  Rome  attacked  it. 
But,  having  overcome  all  the  obstacles  in  his  path,  and  having 
it  in  his  power  at  once  to  commence  the  siege,  a  sudden  doubt 
appears  to  have  assaUed  him  as  to  the  practicability  of  the 
undertaking.  It  can  scarcely  be  supposed  that  the  city  was 
really  stronger  now  than  it  had  been  imder  the  Parthians;'" 
much  less  can  it  be  argued  that  Julian's  army  was  insufficient 
for  the  investment  of  such  a  place.  It  was  probably  the  most 
powerful  army  with  which  the  Romans  had  as  yet  invaded 
Southern  Mesopotamia;  and  it  was  amply  provided  with  all 
the  appurtenances  of  war.  If  Julian  did  not  venture  to  at- 
tempt what  Trajan  and  Avidius  Cassius  and  Septimius  Severus 
had  achieved  without  difficulty,  it  must  have  been  because  the 
circumstances  under  which  he  would  have  had  to  make  the 
attack  were  different  from  those  under  which  they  had  ven- 
tured and  succeeded.  And  the  difference — a  most  momentous 
one — was  this.  They  besieged  and  captured  the  place  after 
defeating  the  greatest  force  that  Parthia  could  bring  into  the 
field  against  them.  Julian  found  liimself  in  front  of  Ctesiphon 
before  he  had  crossed  swords  with  the  Persian  king,  or  so 
much  as  set  eyes  on  the  grand  army  which  Sapor  was  known 
to  have  collected.  To  have  sat  down  before  Ctesiphon  under 
such  circumstances  would  have  been  to  expose  himself  to  great 
peril;  while  he  was  intent  upon  the  siege,  he  might  at  any 
time  have  been  attacked  by  a  relieving  army  under  the  Great 
Eang,  have  been  placed  between  two  fires,  and  compelled  to 
engage  at  extreme  disadvantage.'"  It  was  a  consideration  of 
this  danger  that  impelled  the  council  of  war,  whereto  he  sub- 


CH.  X,]  JULIAN  DETERMINES  ON  RETREAT.  359 

mitted  the  question,  to  pronounce  the  siege  of  Ctesiphon  too 
hazardous  an  operation,  and  to  dissuade  the  emperor  from. 
attempting  it. 

But,  if  the  city  were  not  to  be  besieged,  what  course  could 
with  any  prudence  be  adopted?  It  would  have  been  madness 
to  leave  Ctesiphon  unassailed,  and  to  press  forward  against 
Susa  and  Persepohs.  It  would  have  been  futile  to  remain  en- 
camped before  the  walls  without  commencing  a  siege.  The 
heats  of  summer  had  arrived,"^ and  the  malaria  of  autumn  was 
not  far  off.  The  stores  brought  by  the  fleet  were  exhausted;"* 
and  there  was  a  great  risk  in  the  army's  depending  wholly  for 
its  subsistence  on  the  supplies  that  it  might  be  able  to  obtain 
from  the  enemy's  country.  Julian  and  his  advisers  must  have 
seen  at  a  glance  that  if  the  Romans  were  not  to  attack  Ctesi- 
phon, they  must  retreat.  And  accordingly  retreat  seems  to 
have  been  at  once  determined  on.  As  a  first  step,  the  whole 
fleet,  except  some  dozen  vessels, '"  was  burned,  since  twelve 
was  a  sufficient  number  to  serve  as  pontoons,  and  it  was  not 
worth  the  army's  while  to  encumber  itself  with  the  remainder. 
They  could  only  have  been  tracked  up  the  strong  stream  of 
the  Tigris  by  devoting  to  the  work  some  20,000  men  ;'^' thus 
greatly  weakening  the  strength  of  the  armed  force,  and  at  the 
same  time  hampering  its  movements.  Julian,  in  sacrificing 
his  ships,  suffered  simply  a  pecuniary  loss — they  could  not 
possibly  have  been  of  any  further  service  to  him  in  the  cam- 
paign. 

Retreat  being  resolved  upon,  it  only  remained  to  determine 
what  route  should  be  followed,  and  on  what  portion  of  the 
Roman  territory  the  march  should  be  directed.  The  soldiers 
clamored  for  a  return  by  the  way  whereby  they  had  come;'" 
but  many  vaUd  objections  to  this  course  presented  themselves 
to  their  commanders.  The  country  along  the  Hue  of  the  Eu- 
phrates had  been  exhausted  of  its  stores  by  the  troops  in  their 
advance ;  the  forage  had  been  consumed,  the  towns  and  vil- 
lages desolated.  There  would  be  neither  food  nor  shelter  for 
the  men  along  this  route ;  the  season  was  also  unsuitable  for 
it,  since  the  Eupliratcs  was  in  full  flood,  and  the  moist  atmos- 
phere would  be  sure  to  breed  swarms  of  flies  and  mosquitoes. 
Jiflian  saw  that  by  far  the  best  line  of  retreat  was  along  the 
Tigris,  which  had  higher  banks  than  the  Euphrates,  which  was 
no  longer  in  flood,  '-^  and  which  ran  through  a  tract  that  was 
highly  productive  and  that  had  for  many  years  not  been 
visited  by  an  enemy.    The  army,  therefore,  was  ordered  to 


360  THE  SEVENTH  MONAliCUY.  [ch.  x. 

• 

commence  its  retreat  through  the  country  lying  on  ihe  left 
bank  of  the  Tigris,  and  to  spread  itself  over  the  fertile  region, 
in  the  hope  of  obtaining  ample  supplies.  The  march  was  im- 
derstood  to  be  directed  on  Cordyene  (Kurdistan),  a  province 
now  in  the  possession  of  Rome,  a  rich  tract,  and  not  more  than 
about  250  miles  distant  from  Ctesiphon. '-" 

Before,  however,  the  retreat  commenced,  while  Juhan  and 
his  victorious  army  were  still  encamped  in  sight  of  Ctesiphon, 
the  Persian  king,  according  to  some  writers,'"  sent  an  em- 
bassy proposing  terms  of  peace.     Juhan's  successes  are  repre- 
sented as  having  driven  Sapor  to  despair — ''the  pride  of  his 
royalty  was  humbled  in  the  dust ;  he  took  his  repasts  on  the 
ground ;  and  the  grief  and  anxiety  of  his  mind  were  expressed 
by  the  disorder  of  his  hair." '-''    He  would,  it  is  suggested, 
have  been  willing  ' '  to  purchase,  with  one  half  of  his  kingdom, 
the  safety  of  the  remainder,  and  would  have  gladly  subscribed 
himself,  in  a  treaty  of  peace,  the  faithful  and  dependent  ally 
of  the  Roman  conqueror.'""''    Such  are  the  pleasing  fictions 
Wherewith  the  rhetorician  of  Antioch,  faithful  to  the  memory 
of  his  friend  and  master,  consoled  himself  and  his  readers 
after  Julian's  death.     It  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  there 
underlies  them  any  substratum  of  truth.     Neither  Ammianus 
nor  Zosimus  makes  the  shghtest  allusion  to  any  negotiations 
at  all  at  tliis  period ;  and  it  is  thus  open  to  doubt  whether  the 
entire  story  told  by  Libanius  is  not  the  product  of  his  imagina- 
tion.    But  at  any  rate  it  is  quite  impossible  that  the  Persian 
king  can  have  made  any  abject  offers  of  submission,  or  have 
been  in  a  state  of  mind  at  all  akin  to  despair.     His  great  army, 
collected  from  all  quarters,  '"**  was  intact ;  he  had  not  yet  con- 
descended to  take  the  field  in  person ;  he  had  lost  no  unportant 
town,  and  his  adversary  had  tacitly  confessed  his  inability  to 
form  the  siege  of  a  city  which  was  far  from  being  the  greatest 
in  the  empire.     If  Sapor,  therefore,  really  made  at  this  time 
overtures  of  peace,  it  must  have  been  either  with  the  intention 
of  amusing  Julian,  and  increasing  his  difficulties  by  delaying 
his  retreat,  or  because  he  thought  that  Julian's  consciousness 
of  his  difficulties  would  induce  him  to  offer  terms  which  he 
might  accept. 

The  retreat  commenced  on  June  16.'"  Scarcely  were  the 
troops  set  in  motion,  when  an  ominous  cloud  of  dust  appeared 
on  the  southern  horizon,  which  grew  larger  as  the  day  ad- 
vanced; and,  though  some  suggested  that  the  appearance  was 
produced  by  a  herd  of  wild  asses,  and  others  ventured  the  con- 


CH.  X.]  JULIAN  m  DIFFICULTIES.  361 

JGcture  that  it  was  caused  by  the  approach  of  a  body  of  Julian's 
Saracenic  allies,  the  emperor  himself  was  not  deceived,  bvit, 
understanding  that  the  Persians  had  set  out  in  pursuit,  he 
called  in  his  stragglers,  massed  his  troops,  and  pitched  his 
camp  in  a  strong  position.'^"  Day-dawn  showed  that  he  had 
judged  aright,  for  the  earliest  rays  of  the  sun  were  reflected 
from  the  polished  breastplates  and  cuirasses  of  the  Persians, 
who  had  drawn  up  at  no  great  distance  during  the  night. '^'  A 
combat  followed  in  which  the  Persian  and  Saracenic  horse  at- 
tacked the  Romans  vigorously,  and  especially  threatened  the 
baggage,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  firmness  and  valor  of  the 
Roman  foot.  Julian  was  able  to  continue  his  retreat  after  a 
whOe,  but  found  himself  surrounded  by  enemies,  some  of 
whom,  keeping  in  advance  of  his  troops,  or  hanging  upon  his 
flanks,  destroyed  the  corn  and  forage  that  his  men  so  much 
needed;  while  others,  pressing  upon  his  rear,  retarded  his 
march,  and  caused  him  from  time  to  time  no  inconsiderable 
losses."^  The  retreat  under  these  circumstances  was  slow; 
the  army  had  to  be  rested  and  recruited  when  it  fell  in  with 
any  accumulation  of  provisions;  and  the  average  progress 
made  seems  to  have  been  not  much  more  than  ten  miles  a 
day.'"  This  tardy  advance  allowed  the  more  slow-moving 
portion  of  the  Persian  army  to  close  in  upon  the  retiring  Ro- 
mans; and  Julian  soon  found  himself  closely  followed  by 
dense  masses  of  the  enemy's  troops,  by  the  heavy  cavalry  clad 
m  steel  panoplies,  and  armed  with  long  spears,  by  large  bodies 
of  archers,  and  even  by  a  powerful  corps  of  elephants.  ''^  This 
grand  army  was  under  the  command  of  a  general  whom  the 
Roman  writers  call  Meranes,'''*  and  of  two  sons  of  Sapor.  It 
pressed  heavily  upon  the  Roman  rearguard ;  and  Julian,  after 
a  little  while,  found  it  necessary  to  stop  his  march,  confront 
his  pursuers,  and  offer  them  battle.  The  offer  was  accepted, 
and  an  engagement  took  place  in  a  tract  called  Maranga. '" 
The  enemy  advanced  in  two  lines— the  first  composed  of  the 
maUed  horsemen  and  the  archers  intermixed,  the  second  of 
the  elephants.  Julian  prepared  his  army  to  receive  the  attack 
by  disposing  it  in  the  form  of  a  ci'esent,  with  the  centre  dra\\'Ti 
back  considerably ;  but  as  the  Persians  advanced  into  the  hol- 
low space,  he  suddenly  led  his  troops  forward  at  speed,  allow- 
ing the  archers  scarcely  time  to  discharge  their  arrows  before 
he  engaged  them  and  the  horse  in  close  combat.  A  long  and 
bloody  struggle  followed ;  but  the  Persians  were  unaccustomed 
to  hand-to-hand  fighting  and  disliked  it ;  they  gradually  gave 


369  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  x 

ground,  and  at  last  broke  up  and  fled,  covering  their  letreat, 
however,  with  the  clouds  of  arrows  which  they  knew  well  how 
to  discharge  as  they  retired.  The  weight  of  their  arms,  and 
the  fiery  heat  of  the  summer  sun,  prevented  the  Eomans 
from  carrying  the  pursuit  very  far.  Juhan  recalled  them 
quickly  to  the  protection  of  the  camp,  and  suspended  his  march 
for  some  days'''  while  the  wounded  had  their  hurts  attended 
to. 

The  Persian  troops,  having  suffered  heavily  in  the  battle, 
made  no  attempt  to  storm  the  Roman  camp.  They  were  con- 
tent to  spread  themselves  on  all  sides,  to  destroy  or  carry  off 
all  the  forage  and  provisions,  and  to  make  the  country, 
through  which  the  Roman  army  must  retire,  a  desert.  Juhan's 
forces  were  already  suffering  severely  from  scarcity  of  food  •, 
and  the  general  want  was  but  very  slightly  relieved  by  a  dis- 
tribution of  the  stores  set  apart  for  the  oflBcers  and  for  the 
members  of  the  imperial  household.  Under  these  circum- 
stances it  is  not  surprising  that  Julian's  firmness  deserted  him, 
and  that  he  began  to  give  way  to  melancholy  forebodings,  and 
to  see  visions  and  omens  which  portended  disaster  and  death. 
In  the  silence  of  his  tent,  as  he  studied  a  favorite  philosopher 
during  the  dead  of  night,  he  thought  he  saw  the  Genius  of  the 
State,  with  veiled  head  and  cornucopia,  stealing  away  through 
the  hangings  slowly  and  sadly.  "^  Soon  afterwards,  when  he 
had  just  gone  forth  into  the  open  air  to  perform  averting  sacri- 
fices, the  faU  of  a  shooting  star  seemed  to  him  a  direct  threat 
from  Mars,  with  whom  he  had  recently  quarrelled.""  The 
soothsayers  were  consulted,  and  counselled  abstinence  from  all 
military  movement ;  but  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  caused 
their  advice  to  be  for  once  contemned.  It  was  only  by  change 
of  place  that  there  was  any  chance  of  obtaining  supplies  of 
food ;  and  ultimate  extrication  from  the  perils  that  surrounded 
the  army  depended  on  a  steady  persistence  in  retreat. 

At  dawn  of  day, ""  therefore,  on  the  memorable  26th  of  June, 
A.D.  3G3,  the  tents  were  struck,  and  the  Roman  army  continued 
its  march  across  the  wasted  plain,  having  the  Tigris  at  some 
little  distance  on  its  left,  and  some  low  hills  upon  its  right. " ' 
The  enemy  did  not  anywhere  appear ;  and  the  troops  advanced 
for  a  time  without  encountering  opposition.  But,  as  they  drew 
near  the  skirts  of  the  hills,  not  far  from  Samarah,  suddenly  an 
attack  was  made  upon  them.  The  rearguard  found  itself  vio- 
lently assailed ;  and  when  Julian  hastened  to  its  relief,  news 
came  that  the  van  was  also  engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  was 


CH.  X.]  BATTLE  OF  SAMARAH.  363 

already  in  difficulties.  The  active  commander  now  hurried 
towards  the  front,  and  had  accomplished  half  the  distance, 
when  the  main  Persian  attack  was  delivered  upon  his  right 
centre,  '*'■'  and  to  his  dismay  he  found  himself  entangled  amid 
the  masses  of  heavy  horse  and  elephants,  which  had  thrown 
his  columns  into  confusion.  The  suddenness  of  the  enemy's 
appearance  had  prevented  him  from  donning  his  complete 
armor ;  and  as  he  fought  without  a  breastplate,  and  with  the 
aid  of  his  light-armed  troops  restored  the  day,  falling  on  the 
\  foe  from  behind  and  striking  the  backs  and  houghs  of  the 
horses  and  elephants,  the  javelin  of  a  horseman,  after  grazing 
the  flesh  of  his  arm,  fixed  itself  in  his  right  side,  penetrating 
through  the  ribs  to  the  liver. '"  Julian,  grasping  the  head  of 
the  weapon,  attempted  to  draw  it  forth,  but  in  vain — the  sharp 
steel  cut  his  fingers,  and  the  pain  and  loss  of  blood  caused  him 
to  fall  fainting  from  his  steed.  His  guards,  who  had  closed 
around  him,  carefully  raised  him  up,  and  conveyed  him  to  the 
camp,  where  the  surgeons  at  once  declared  the  wound  mortal. 
The  sad  news  spread  rapidly  among  the  soldiery,  and  nerved 
them  to  desperate  efforts — if  they  must  lose  their  general,  he 
should,  they  determined,  be  avenged.  Striking  their  shields 
with  their  spears, '"  they  everywhere  rushed  upon  the  enemy 
with  incredible  ardor,  careless  whether  they  Hved  or  died,  and 
only  seeking  to  inflict  the  greatest  possible  loss  on  those  op- 
posed to  them.  But  the  Persians,  who  had  regarded  the  day 
as  theirs,  resisted  strenuously,  and  maintained  the  fight  with 
obstinacy  till  evening  closed  in  and  darkness  put  a  stop  to  the 
engagement.  The  losses  were  large  on  both  sides ;  the  Roman 
right  wing  had  suffered  greatly;  its  commander,  Anatolius, 
master  of  the  offices,  was  among  the  slain,  and  the  prefect  Sal- 
lust  was  with  difficulty  saved  by  an  attendant. '^'^  The  Per- 
sians, too,  lost  their  generals  Meranes  and  Nohodares ;  and  with 
them  no  fewer  than  fifty  satraps  and  great  nobles  are  said  to 
have  perished. '"  The  rank  and  file  no  doubt  suffered  in  pro- 
portion; and  the  Romans  were  perhaps  justified  in  claiming 
that  the  balance  of  advantage  upon  the  day  rested  with  them. 
But  such  advantage  as  they  coifld  reasonably  assert  was  far 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  loss  of  their  commander, 
who  died  in  his  tent  towards  midnight  on  the  day  of  the 
battle.  '*'  Wliatever  we  may  think  of  the  general  character  of 
Julian,  or  of  the  degree  of  his  intellectual  capacity,  there  can 
be  no  question  as  to  his  excellence  as  a  soldier,  or  his  ability  as 
a  commander  in  the  field.     If  the  expedition  wliich  he  had  led 


364  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  x. 

into  Persia  was  to  some  extent  rash— if  his  preparations  for  it 
had  been  insufficient,  and  his  conduct  of  it  not  wholly  faultless 
—if  consequently  he  had  brought  the  army  of  the  East  into  a 
situation  of  great  peril  and  difficulty— yet  candor  requires  us 
to  acknowledge  that  of  all  the  men  collected  in  the  Roman 
camp  he  was  the  fittest  to  have  extricated  the  army  from  its 
embarrassments,  and  have  conducted  it,  without  serious  disas- 
ter or  loss  of  honor,  into  a  position  of  safety.     No  one,  Uke  Ju- 
lian, possessed  the  confidence  of  the  troops;  no  one  so  com- 
bined experience  in  command  with  the  personal  activity  and 
vigor  that  was  needed  under  the  circumstances.    When  the 
leaders  met  to  consult  about  the  appointment  of  a  successor  to 
the  dead  prince,  it  was  at  once  apparent  how  irreparable  was 
their  loss.     The    prefect  Sallust,    whose    superior    rank    and 
length  of  service  pointed  him  out  for  promotion  to  the  vacant 
post,  excused  himself  on  account  of  his  age  aiid  infirmities.  '*' 
The  generals  of  the  second  grade  ~ Arintheeus,  Victor,  Nevitta, 
Dagalaiphus— had  each  their  party  among  the  soldiers,  but 
were  unacceptable  to  the  army  generally.     None  could  claim 
any  superior  merit  which  might  clearly  place  him  above  the 
rest ;  and  a  discord  that  might  have  led  to  open  strife  seemed 
impending,  when  a  casual  voice  pronounced  the  name  of  Jovian, 
and,  some  applause  following  the  suggestion,  the  rival  generals 
acquiesced  in  the  choice ;  and  this  hitherto  insignificant  officer 
was  suddenly  invested  with  the  purple  and  saluted  as  "Augus- 
tus" and  "  Emperor."  ""    Had  there  been  any  one  really  fit  to 
take  the  command,  such  an  appointment  could  not  have  been 
made;    but,  in  the  evident  dearth  of  warhke  genius,  it  was 
thought  best  that  one  whose  rank  was  civil  rather  than  mih- 
tary"'"  should  be  preferred,  for  the  avoidance  of  jealousies  and 
contentions,     A  deserter  carried  the  news  to  Sapor,  who  was 
not  now  very  far  distant,  and  described  the  new  emperor  to  him 
as  effeminate  and  slothful. "'    A  fresh  impulse  was  given  to  the 
pursuit  by  the  intelligence  thus  conveyed ;  the  army  engaged 
in  disputing  the  Eoman  retreat  was  reinforced  by  a  strong 
body  of  cavalry ;  and  Sapor  himself  pressed  forward  with  all 
haste,  resolved  to  hurl  his  main  force  on  the  rear  of  the  re- 
treating columns. ''- 

It  was  with  reluctance  that  Jovian,  on  the  day  of  his  eleva- 
tion to  the  supreme  power  (June  27,  a.d.  363),  quitted  the 
protection  of  the  camp,'"  and  proceeded  to  conduct  liis  army 
over  the  open  plain,  where  the  Persians  were  now  collected  in 
great  force,  prepared  to  dispute  the  ground  with  him  inch  by 


CH.  X.]    DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  nOMAX  RETRJUAT.         365 

inch.  Their  horse  and  elephants  again  fell  upon  the  right  wing 
of  the  Eomans,  where  the  Jovians  and  Herculians  were  now 
posted,  and,  throwing  those  renowned  corps'^*  into  disorder, 
pressed  on,  driving  them  across  the  plain  in  headlong  flight  and 
slaying  vast  numbers  of  them.  The  corps  would  probably 
have  been  annihilated,  had  they  not  in  their  flight  ]-eached  a 
hill  occupied  by  the  baggage  train,  which  gallantly  came  to 
their  aid,  and,  attacking  the  horse  and  elephants  from  higher 
ground,  gained  a  signal  success.'"  The  elephants,  wounded 
by  the  javelins  hurled  down  upon  them  from  above,  and  mad- 
f  dened  with  the  pain,  turned  upon  their  own  side,  and,  roaring 
frightfully,  '^^  carried  confusion  among  the  ranks  of  the  horse, 
which  broke  up  and  fled.  Many  of  the  frantic  animals  were 
kiUed  by  their  own  riders  or  by  the  Persians  on  whom  they 
were  tramphng,  while  others  succumbed  to  the  blows  dealt 
them  by  the  enemy.  There  was  a  frightful  carnage,  ending  in 
the  repulse  of  the  Persians  and  the  resumption  of  the  Roman 
march.  Shortly  before  night  fell,  Jovian  and  his  army  reached 
Samarah,'"  then  a  fort  of  no  groat  size  upon  the  Tigris,"**  and, 
encamping  in  its  vicinity,  passed  the  hours  of  rest  unmolested. 
The  retreat  now  continued  for  four  days  along  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tigris,  '"^  the  progress  made  each  day  being  small, '""  since 
the  enemy  incessantly  obstructed  the  march,  pressing  on  the 
columns  as  they  retired,  but  when  they  stopped  drawing  off, 
and  declining  an  engagement  at  close  quarters.  On  one  occa- 
sion they  even  attacked  the  Roman  camp,  and,  after  insulting 
the  legions  with  their  cries,  forced  their  way  through  the  prae- 
torian gate,  and  had  nearly  penetrated  to  the  royal  tent,  when 
they  were  met  and  defeated  by  the  legionaries. ""  The  Sara- 
cenic Arabs  were  especially  troublesome.  Offended  by  the  re- 
fusal of  Julian  to  continue  their  subsidies, '""  they  had  trans- 
ferred their  services  wholly  to  the  other  side,  and  pursued  the 
Romans  with  a  hostility  that  was  sharpened  by  indignation  and 
resentment.  It  was  with  difficulty  that  tlie  Roman  army,  at 
the  close  of  the  fourth  day,  reached  Dura,  a  small  place  upon 
the  Tigris,  about  eighteen  mfles  north  of  Samarah.'"^  Here  a 
new  idea  seized  the  soldiers.  As  the  Persian  forces  were 
massed  chiefly  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigi-is,  and  might  find  it 
difficult  to  transfer  themselves  to  the  other  side,  it  seemed  to 
the  legionaries  that  they  would  escape  half  their  difficulties  if 
they  could  themselves  cross  the  river,  and  place  it  between 
them  and  their  foes.  They  had  also  a  notion  that  on  the  west 
side  of  the  stream  the  Roman  frontier  was  not  far  distant,  but 


(^GQ  THE  SEVENTH  MONAIiCirY.  [ch.  x. 

might  be  reached  by  forced  marches  in  a  few  days."*  They 
therefore  begged  Jovian  to  allow  them  to  swim  the  stream.  It 
was  in  vain  that  he  and  his  officers  opposed  the  project ;  muti- 
nous cries  arose ;  and,  to  avoid  worse  evils,  he  was  compelled 
to  consent  that  five  hundred  Gauls  and  Sarmatians,  known  to 
be  expert  swimmers,  should  make  the  attempt.  It  succeeded 
beyond  his  hopes.  The  corps  crossed  at  night,  surprised  the 
Persians  who  held  the  opposite  bank,  and  established  them- 
selves in  a  safe  position  before  the  dawn  of  day.  By  this  bold 
exploit  the  passage  of  the  other  troops,  many  of  whom  could 
not  swim,  was  rendered  feasible,  and  Jovian  proceeded  to  col- 
lect timber,  brushwood,  and  skins  for  the  formation  of  large 
rafts  on  which  he  might  transport  the  rest  of  his  army.'" 

These  movements  were  seen  with  no  small  disquietude  by  the 
Persian  king.  The  army  which  he  had*  regarded  as  almost  a 
certain  prey  seemed  about  to  escape  him.  He  knew  that  his 
troops  coidd  not  pass  the  Tigris  by  swimming ;  he  had,  it  is 
probable,  brought  with  him  no  boats,  and  the  country  about 
Dura  could  not  supply  many ;  to  follow  the  Romans,  if  they 
crossed  the  stream,  he  must  construct  a  bridge,  and  the  con- 
struction of  a  bridge  was,  to  such  unskilful  engineers  as  the 
Persians,  a  work  of  time.  Before  it  was  finished  the  legions 
might  be  beyond  his  reach,  and  so  the  campaign  would  end, 
and  he  would  have  gained  no  advantage  from  it.  Under  these 
circumstances  he  determined  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
Romans,  and  to  see  if  he  could  not  extract  from  their  fears 
some  important  concessions.  They  were  still  in  a  position  of 
great  peril,  since  they  could  not  expect  to  embark  and  cross 
the  stream  without  suffering  tremendous  loss  from  the  enemy 
before  whom  they  would  be  flying.  And  it  was  uncertain  what 
perils  they  might  not  encounter  beyond  the  river  in  traversing 
the  two  hundred  miles  that  still  separated  them  from  Roman 
territory. ""'  The  Saracenic  allies  of  Persia  were  in  force  on  the 
further  side  of  the  stream;'"  and  a  portion  of  Sapor's  army 
might  be  conveyed  across  in  time  to  hang  on  the  rear  of  the  le- 
gions and  add  largely  to  their  difficvdties.  At  any  rate,  it  was 
worth  while  to  make  overtures  and  see  what  answer  would  be 
returned.  If  the  idea  of  negotiating  were  entertained  at  aU, 
something  would  be  gained ;  for  each  additional  day  of  suffer- 
ing and  privation  diminished  the  Roman  strength,  and  brought 
nearer  the  moment  of  absolute  and  complete  exhaustion. 
Moreover,  a  bridge  might  be  at  once  commenced  at  some  little 
distance, ""  and  might  be  pushed  forward,  so  that,  if  the  nego- 


Cfl.  X.]  THE  TERMS  OF  PEACE.  367 

tiatioiis  failed,  there  shoiild  be  no  great  delay  in  following  the 
Romans  across  the  river. 

Such  were  probably  the  considerations"'"  which  led  Sapor  to 
send  as  envoys  to  the  Roman  camp  at  Dura  the  Surena  and 
another  great  noble,  who  announced  that  they  came  to  offer 
terms  of  peace.""  The  great  king,  they  said,  having  respect 
to  the  mutabihty  of  human  affairs,  was  desirous  of  dealing 
,  mercifully  with  the  Romans,  and  would  allow  the  escape  of  the 
.  remnant  which  was  left  of  their  army,  if  the  Caesar  and  his 
i  advisers  accepted  the  conditions  that  he  required.'"  These 
conditions  would  be  explained  to  any  envoys  whom  Jovian 
might  empower  to  discuss  them  with  the  Persian  plenipoten- 
tiaries. The  Roman  emperor  and  his  councU  gladly  caught  at 
the  offer ;  and  two  officers  of  high  rank,  the  general  Arinthseus 
and  the  prefect  Sallust,  were  at  once  appointed  to  confer  with 
Sapor's  envoys,  and  ascertain  the  terms  on  which  peace  would 
be  granted.  They  proved  to  be  such  as  Roman  pride  felt  to  be 
almost  intolerable;  and  great  efforts  were  made  to  induce 
Sapor  to  be  content  with  less.  The  negotiations  lasted  for  four 
days;'"  but  the  Persian  monarch  was  inexorable;  each  day  di- 
minished his  adversary's  strength  and  bettered  his  own  posi- 
tion ;  there  was  no  reason  why  he  should  make  any  concession 
at  all ;  and  he  seems,  in  fact,  to  have  yielded  nothing  of  his 
original  demands,  except  points  of  such  exceedingly  slight  mo- 
ment that  to  insist  on  them  would  have  been  folly.'" 

The  following  were  the  terms  of  peace  to  which  Jovian  con- 
sented. First,  the  five  provinces  east  of  the  Tigris,  which  had 
been  ceded  to  Rome  by  Narses,  the  grandfather  of  Sapor,  after 
his  defeat  by  Galerius,"*  were  to  be  given  back  to  Persia,  with 
their  fortifications,  their  inhabitants,  and  all  that  they  con- 
'  tauied  of  value.  The  Romans  in  the  territory  were,  however, 
to  be  allowed  to  withdraw  and  join  their  countrymen.  Sec- 
ondly, three  places  in  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  Nisibis,  Singara, 
and  a  fort  called  "  the  Camp  of  the  Moors,"  were  to  be  surren- 
dered, but  with  the  condition  that  not  only  the  Romans,  but 
the  inhabitants  generally,  might  retire  ere  the  Persians  took 
possession,  and  carry  with  them  such  of  their  effects  as  were 
movable. "'"  The  surrender  of  these  places  necessarily  involved 
that  of  the  country  which  they  commanded,  and  can  scarcely 
imply  lees  than  the  withdrawal  of  Rome  from  any  claim  to  do- 
minion over  the  region  between  the  Tigris  and  the  Khabour. "" 
Tliirdly,  all  connection  between  Armenia  and  Rome  was  to  be 
broken  off ;  Arsaces  was  to  be  left  to  his  own  resources ;  and  in 


TlIE  SEVl^NTH  MOXAUCnY.  [ch.  s. 

any  quai*rcl  between  him  and  Persia  Roino  was  precluded  from 
lending  him  aid.  On  these  conditions  a  peace  was  concluded 
for  thirty  years-/"  oaths  to  observe  it  faithfully  were  inter^ 
changed ;  and  hostages  were  given  and  received  on  either  side, 
to  be  retained  until  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  were  executed. 

The  Roman  historian  who  exclaims  that  it  would  have  been 
better  to  have  fought  ten  battles  than  to  have  conceded  a  single 
one  of  these  shameful  terms,'"  commands  the  sympathy  of 
every  reader,  who  cannot  fail  to  recognize  in  his  utterance  the 
natural  feeling  of  a  patriot.  And  it  is  possible  that  Julian,  had 
ho  hved,  would  have  rejected  so  inglorious  a  peace,  and  have 
preferred  to  run  all  risks  rather  than  sign  it.  But  in  that  case 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  army  would  have  been 
absolutely  destroyed,  and  a  few  stragglers  only  have  returned 
to  tell  the  tale  of  disaster. '"  The  alternative  which  Ammianus 
suggests — that  Jovian,  instead  of  negotiating,  should  have 
pushed  on  to  Cordyene,  which  he  might  have  reached  in  four 
days — is  absiu'd;'**"  for  Cordyene  was  at  least  a  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  distant  from  Dura,  and,  at  the  rate  of  retreat  which 
Jovian  had  found  possible  (four  and  a  half  miles  a  day),  would 
have  been  reached  in  three  days  over  a  month !  The  judgment 
of  Eutropius,  who,  like  Ammianus,  shared  in  the  expedition,  is 
probably  correct— that  the  peace,  though  disgraceful,  was 
necessary.  ^®'  Unless  Jovian  was  prepared  to  risk  not  only  his 
own  life,  but  the  lives  of  all  his  soldiers,  it  was  essential  that 
he  should  come  to  terms ;  and  the  best  terms  that  he  could  ob- 
tain were  those  which  he  has  been  blamed  for  accepting. 

It  is  creditable  to  both  parties  that  the  peace,  once  made, 
was  faithfully  observed,  all  its  stipulations  being  honestly  and 
speedily  executed.  The  Romans  were  allowed  to  pass  the 
river  without  molestation  from  Sapor's  army, '*'^  and,  though 
they  suffered  somewhat  from  the  Saracens  when  landing  on 
the  other  side,  ^^^  were  unpursued  in  their  retreat,  '^^  and  were 
perhaps  even,  at  first,  supplied  to  some  extent  with  pro- 
visions.'^^ Afterwards,  no  doubt,  they  endured  for  some  days 
great  privations;  but  a  convoy  with  stores  was  allowed  to 
advance  from  Roman  Mesopotamia  into  Persian  territory, '"' 
which  met  the  famished  soldiers  at  a  Persian  military  post, 
called  Ur  or  Adur, '"  and  relieved  their  most  pressing  necessi- 
ties. On  the  Roman  side,  the  ceded  provinces  and  towns 
were  quietly  surrendered ;  offers  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants 
to  hold  their  own  against  the  Persians  without  Roman  aid 
were  refused;""  the  Roman  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the 


CH.  X.]  GE:NERAL  results  of  the  war.  369 

fortresses;  and  the  Armenians  were  told  that  they  must 
henceforth  rely  upon  themselves,  and  not  look  to  Eome  for 
help  or  protection.  Thus  Jovian,  though  strongly  urged  to 
follow  ancient  precedent,'^"  and  refuse  to  fulfil  the  engage- 
ments contracted  under  the  pressure  of  imminent  perU,  stood 
firm,  and  honorably  performed  all  the  conditions  of  the  treaty. 
The  second  period  of  struggle  between  Rome  and  Persia  had 
thus  a  termination  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  first.  Eome 
ended  the  first  period  by  a  great  victory  and  a  great  diplomatic 
success.  '•"'  At  the  close  of  the  second  she  had  to  relinquish  all 
her  gains,  and  to  draw  back  even  behind  the  line  which  she 
occupied  when  hostilities  first  broke  out.  Nisibis,  the  great 
stronghold  of  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  had  been  in  her  posses- 
sion ever  since  the  time  of  Verus.""  Repeatedly  attacked  by 
Parthia  and  Persia,  it  had  never  fallen ;  but  once,  after  which 
it  had  been  soon  recovered ;  and  now  for  many  years  it  had 
come  to  be  regarded  as  the  bulwark  of  the  Roman  power  in 
the  East,  and  as  carrying  with  it  the  dominion  of  Western 
Asia. '"^  A  fatal  blow  was  dealt  to  Roman  prestige  when  a 
city  held  for  near  two  hundred  years,  and  one  honored  with 
the  name  of  "colony,"  was  wrested  from  the  empire  and 
occupied  by  the  most  powerful  of  its  adversaries.  Not  only 
Amida  and  Carrhae,  but  Antioch  itself,  trembled  at  a  loss 
which  was  felt  to  lay  open  the  whole  eastern  frontier  to 
attack,'"  and  which  seemed  ominous  of  further  retrogression. 
Although  the  fear  generally  felt  proved  to  be  groundless,  and 
the  Roman  possessions  in  the  East  were  not,  for  200  years, 
further  curtailed  by  the  Persians,  yet  Roman  influence  in 
"Western  Asia  from  this  time  steadily  declined,  and  Persia 
came  to  be  regarded  as  the  first  power  in  these  regions.  Much 
credit  is  due  to  Sapor  II.  for  his  entire  conduct  of  the  war 
with  Constantius,  Julian,  and  Jo^aan.  He  knew  when  to 
attack  and  when  to  remain  upon  the  defensive,  when  to  press 
on  the  enemy  and  when  to  hold  hmiself  in  reserve  and  let 
the  enemy  follow  his  own  devices.  He  rightly  conceived 
from  the  first  the  importance  of  Nisibis,  and  resolutely  per- 
sisted in  his  determination  to  acquire  possession  of  it,  until  at 
last  he  succeeded.  When,  in  B.C.  837,  he  challenged  Rome  to 
a  trial  of  strength,  he  might  have  seemed  rash  and  presimiptu- 
ous.  But  the  event  justified  him.  In  a  war  which  lasted 
twenty-seven  years,  he  fought  numerous  pitched  battles  with 
the  R(imans,  and  was  never  once  defeated.  Ho  proved  him- 
self greatly  superior  as  a  general  to  Constantius  and  Jovian^ 


370  "  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  '  [ch.  il 

and  not  unequal  to  Julian.  By  a  combination  of  courage, 
perseverance,  and  promptness,  he  brought  the  entire  contest 
to  a  favoi-able  issue,  and  restored  Persia,  in  a.d.  363,  to  a 
higher  position  than  that  from  which  she  had  descended  two 
generations  earlier.  If  he  had  done  nothing  more  than  has 
already  come  under  our  notice,  he  would  still  have  amply 
deserved  that  epithet  of  ' '  G-reat "  which,  by  the  general  con- 
sent of  historians,  has  been  assigned  to  him.  He  was  un- 
doubtedly among  the  greatest  of  the  Sassanian  monarchs,  and 
may  properly  be  placed  above  all  his  predecessors,  and  above 
all  but  one'"*  of  those  who  succeeded  him. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Attitude  of  Armenia  during  the  War  between  Sapor  and 
Julian.  Sapor^s  Ti^eacliery  towards  Arsaces.  Sapor  con- 
quers Armenia.  He  attacks  Iberia,  deposes  Sauromaces, 
and  sets  up  a  new  King.  Resistance  and  Capture  of  Arto- 
gerassa.  Difficulties  of  Sapor.  Division  of  Iberia  betimen 
the  Roman  and  Persian  Pretenders.  Renewal  of  Hostili- 
ties between  Rome  and  Persia.  Peace  made  with  Valens. 
Death  of  Sapor.     His  Coins. 

"Rex  Persidis,  longgsvus  ille  Sapor,  post  imperatoris  Jullani  excessum  et 
pudendee  pacis  icta  fcedera  .  .  .  injectabat  ArmeniaB  manum." — Amm.  Marc. 
xxvii.  13. 

The  successful  issue  of  Sapor's  war  with  Julian  and  Jovian 
resulted  in  no  small  degree  from  the  attitude  which  was 
assumed  by  Armenia  soon  after  Julian  commenced  his  inva- 
sion. We  have  seen  that  the  emperor,  when  he  set  out  upon  « 
his  expedition,  regarded  Armenia  as  an  ally,  and  in  forming  * 
his  plans  placed  considerable  dependence  on  the  contingent 
which  he  expected  from  Arsaces,  the  Armenian  monarch. '  It 
was  his  intention  to  attack  Ctesiphon  with  two  separate 
armies,  acting  upon  two  converging  lines.  While  he  himself 
advanced  with  his  main  force  by  way  of  the  Euphrates  valley 
and  the  Nahr-Malcha,  he  had  arranged  that  his  two  generals, 
Procopius  and  Sebastian,  should  unite  their  troops  with  those 
of  the  Armenian  king,  and,  after  ravaging  a  fertile  district  of 
Media,   make  their    way    towards    the   great    city,   through 


^ 


CH.  XL]  SAPORS  PROCEEDINGS  AGAINST  ABSACES       371 

Assyria  and  Adiabene,'  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris.  It 
was  a  bitter  disappointment  to  him  when,  on  nearmg  Ctesi- 
phon,  he  could  see  no  signs  and  hear  no  tidings  of  the  northern 
army,  from  which  he  had  looked  for  effectual  aid  at  tliis  crisis 
of  the  campaign. '  We  have  now  to  consider  how  this  failure 
came  about,  what  circumstances  induced  that  hesitation  and 
delay  on  the  part  of  Sebastian  and  Procopius  which  had  at 
any  rate  a  large  share  in  frustrating  Juhan's  plans  and  causing 
the  ill-success  of  his  expedition. 

It  appears  that  the  Roman  generals,  in  pursuance  of  the 
orders  given  them,  marched  across  Northern  Mesopotamia  to 
the  Armenian  borders,  and  were  there  joined  by  an  Armenian 
contingent  which  Arsaces  sent  to  their  assistance.^  The  aUies 
marched  together  into  Media,  and  carried  fire  and  sword 
through  the  fruitful  district  known  as  Chiliacomus,  or  "the 
district  of  the  Thousand  Villages. "  ^  They  might  easily  have 
advanced  further;  but  the  Armenians  suddenly  and  without 
warning  drew  off  and  fell  back  towards  theii*  own  country. 
According  to  Moses  of  Chorene,  their  general,  Zureeus,  was 
actuated  by  a  religious  motive;  it  seemed  to  him  monstrous 
that  Armenia,  a  Christian  countrj^,  should  embrace  the  cause 
of  an  apostate,  and  he  was  prepared  to  risk  offending  his  own 
sovereign  rather  than  lend  help  to  one  whom  he  regarded  as 
the  enemy  of  his  faith."  The  Roman  generals,  thus  deserted 
by  their  alhes,  differed  as  to  the  proper  course  to  pursue. 
While  one  was  still  desirous  of  descending  the  course  of  the 
Tigris,  and  making  at  least  an  attempt  to  effect  a  junction 
with  Juhan,  the  other  forbade  his  soldiers  to  join  in  the 
march,  and  insisted  on  falling  back  and  re-entering  Mesopo- 
tamia.' As  usual  in  such  cases,  the  difference  of  opinion  re- 
sulted in  a  policy  of  inaction.  The  attempt  to  join  Julian  was 
given  up ;  and  the  second  army,  from  which  he  had  hoped  so 
much,  played  no  further  part  in  the  campaign  of  a.d.  363. 

We  are  told®  that  Juhan  heard  of  the  defection  of  the  Arme- 
nians while  he  was  still  on  his  way  to  Ctesiphon,  and  immedi- 
ately sent  a  letter  to  Ai-saces,  complaining  of  his  general's  con- 
duct, and  threatening  to  exact  a  heavy  retribution  on  his  re- 
turn from  the  Persian  war,  if  the  offence  of  Zurseus  were  not 
visited  at  once  with  condign  punishment.  Arsaces  was  great- 
ly alarmed  at  the  message;  and,  though  he  made  no  effort  to 
supply  the  shortcomings  of  his  officer  by  leadmg  or  sending 
fresh  troops  to  Julian's  assistance,  yet  he  hastened  to  acquit 
himself  of  complicity  in  the  misconduct  of  Zurseus  by  execut- 


372  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xi. 

ing  him,  together  with  his  whole  family."  Having  thus,  as  he 
supposed,  secured  himself  against  Julian's  anger,  he  took  no 
further  steps,  but  indulged  his  love  of  ease  and  his  distaste  for 
the  Roman  alliance  by  remaining  wholly  passive  during  the 
rest  of  the  year. 

But  though  the  attitude  taken  by  Armenia  was  thus,  on  the 
whole,  favorable  to  the  Persians,  and  undoubtedly  contributed 
to  Sapor's  success,  he  was  himself  so  far  from  satisfied  with 
the  conduct  of  Arsaces  that  he  resolved  at  once  to  invade 
his  country  and  endeavor  to  strip  him  of  his  crown.  As  Rome 
had  by  the  recent  treaty  relinquished  her  protectorate  over 
Armenia,  and  bound  herself  not  to  interfere  in  any  quarrel  be- 
tween the  Armenians  and  the  Persians,  an  opportunity  was 
afforded  for  bringing  Armenia*  into  subjection  which  an  ambi- 
tious monarch  like  Sapor  was  not  hkely  to  let  slip.  He  had 
only  to  consider  whether  he  would  employ  art  or  violence,  or 
whether  he  would  rather  prefer  a  judicious  admixture  of  the 
two.  Adopting  the  last-named  course  as  the  most  prudent,  he 
proceeded  to  intrigue  with  a  portion  of  the  Armenian  satraps, 
while  he  made  armed  incursions  on  the  territories  of  others, 
and  so  harassed  the  country  that  after  a  wliile  the  satraps 
generally  went  over  to  his  side,  and  represented  to  Arsaces 
that  no  course  was  open  to  him  but  to  make  his  submission. 
Having  brought  matters  to  this  point.  Sapor  had  only  further 
to  persuade  Arsaces  to  surrender  himself,  in  order  to  obtain 
the  province  which  he  coveted,  almost  without  striking  a  blow. 
He  therefore  addressed  Arsaces  a  letter  which,  according  to 
the  only  waiter  who  professes  to  give  its  terms, ""  was  expressed 
as  follows : 

"Sapor,  the  offspring  of  Ormazd,  comrade  of  the  sun,  king  of 
kings,  sends  greeting  to  his  dear  brother,  Arsaces,  king  of 
Armenia,  whom  he  holds  in  affectionate  remembrance.  It  has 
come  to  our  knowledge  that  thou  hast  approved  thyself  our 
faithful  friend,  since  not  only  didst  thou  decline  to  invade  Per- 
sia with  Caesar,  but  when  he  took  a  contingent  from  thee  thou 
didst  send  messengers  and  withdraw  it.''  Moreover,  we  have 
not  forgotten  how  thou  actedst  at  the  first,  when  thou  didst 
prevent  him  from  passing  through  thy  territories,  as  he  wished. 
Our  soldiers,  indeed,  who  quitted  their  post,  sought  to  cast  on 
thee  the  blame  due  to  their  own  cow^ardice.  But  we  have  not 
listened  to  them:  their  leader  we  punished  with  death,  and  to 
thy  realm,  I  swear  by  Mithra,  we  have  done  no  hurt.  Arrange 
matters  then  so  that  thou  mayest  come  to  us  with  all  speed, 


! 


en.  XI.]  ABSACES  SEIZED  AND  BLINDED.  873 

and  consult  with  us  concerning  our  common  advantage.  Then 
thou  canst  return  home." 

Arsaces,  on  receiving  this  missive,  whatever  suspicions  he 
may  have  felt,  saw  no  course  open  to  him  but  to  accept  the  in- 
vitation. He  accordingly  quitted  Armenia  and  made  his  way 
to  the  court  of  Sapor,  where  he  was  immediately  seized  and 
blinded. "  He  was  then  fettered  with  chains  of  silver,  accord- 
ing to  a  common  practice  of  the  Persians  with  prisoners  of  dis- 
tinction, '^  and  was  placed  in  strict  confinement  in  a  place  called 
"the  Castle  of  Oblivion."  '* 

But  the  removal  of  their  head  did  not  at  once  produce  the 
submission  of  the  people.  A  national  party  declared  itself  un- 
der Pharandzem,  the  wife,  and  Bab  (or  Para),  the  son  of 
Arsaces,  who  threw  themselves  into  the  strong  fortress  of 
Artogerassa  (Ardakers),  and  there  offered  to  Sapor  a  de- 
termined resistance.  '^  Sapor  committed  the  siege  of  this  place 
to  two  renegade  Armenians,  Cy laces  and  Artabannes,  whUe  at 
the  same  time  he  proceeded  to  extend  his  influence  beyond  the 
hmits  of  Armenia  into  the  neighboring  country  of  Iberia, 
which  was  closely  connected  with  Armenia,  and  for  the  most 
part  followed  its  fortunes. 

Iberia  was  at  this  time  under  the  government  of  a  king  bear- 
ing the  name  of  Sauromaces,  who  had  received  his  investiture 
from  Eome,  and  was  consequently  likely  to  uphold  Eoman 
interests.  Sapor  invaded  Iberia,  drove  Sauromaces  from  his 
kingdom,  and  set  up  a  new  monarch  in  the  person  of  a  certain 
Aspacures,  on  whose  brow  he  placed  the  coveted  diadem.'" 
He  then  withdrew  to  his  own  country,  leaving  the  complete 
subjection  of  Armenia  to  be  accomplished  by  his  oflScers, 
Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  or,  as  the  Armenian  historians  call 
them,  Zig  and  Garen. " 

Cylaces  and  Artabannes  commenced  the  siege  of  Artogerassa, 
and  for  a  time  pressed  it  with  vigor,  while  they  strongly  urged 
the  garrison  to  make  their  submission.  But,  having  entered 
within  the  walls  to  negotiate,  they  were  won  over  by  the  oppo- 
site side,  and  joined  in  planning  a  treachorous  attack  on  the 
besieging  force,  which  was  surprised  at  night  and  compelled  to 
retire.  Para  took  advantage  of  their  retreat  to  quit  the  toAvn 
and  throw  himself  on  the  protection  of  Valens,  the  Eoman 
emperor,  who  permitted  him  to  reside  in  regal  state  at  Neocae- 
sarea.  Shortly  afterwards,  however,  by  the  advice  of  Cylaces 
and  Artabannes,  he  returned  into  Armenia,  and  was  accepted 
by  the  patriotic  party  as  their  king,  Eome  secretly  countcnanc- 


874  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xt 

ing  his  proceedings."  Under  these  circumstances  the  Persian 
monarch  once  more  took  the  field,  and,  entering  Armenia  at 
the  head  of  a  large  army,  drove  Para,  with  his  counsellors 
Cylaces  and  Artabannes,  to  the  mountains,  renewed  the  siege 
of  Artogerassa,  and  forced  it  to  submit,  captured  the  queen 
Pharandzem,  together  with  the  treasure  of  Arsaces, ''  and 
finally  induced  Para  to  come  to  terms,  and  to  send  him  the 
heads  of  the  two  arch-traitors.  The  resistance  of  Armenia 
would  probably  now  have  ceased,  had  Rome  been  content  to 
see  her  old  enemy  so  aggrandized,  or  felt  her  hands  absolutely 
tied  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Dura. 

But  the  success  of  Sapor  thus  far  only  brought  him  into 
greater  difficulties.  The  Armenians  and  Iberians,  who  desired 
above  all  things  liberty  and  independence,  were  always  especi- 
ally hostile  to  the  power  from  which  they  felt  that  they  had  for 
the  time  being  most  to  fear.  As  Christian  nations,  they  had 
also  at  this  period  an  additional  ground  of  sympathy  with 
Rome,  and  of  aversion  from  the  Persians,  who  were  at  once 
heathens  and  intolerant.^"  The  patriotic  party  in  both  coun- 
tries was  thus  violently  opposed  to  the  establishment  of  Sapor's 
authority  over  them,  and  cared  little  for  the  artifices  by  which 
he  sought  to  make  it  appear  that  they  still  enjoyed  freedom 
and  autonomy.  Above  all,  Rome,  being  ruled  by  monarchs" 
who  had  had  no  hand  in  making  the  disgraceful  peace  of  a.d. 
3()3,  and  who  had  no  strong  feehng  of  honor  or  religious  obliga- 
tion in  the  matter  of  treaties  with  hai'harians,  was  preparing 
herself  to  fly  in  the  face  of  her  engagements,  and,  regarding 
her  own  interest  as  her  highest  law,  to  interfere  effectually  in 
order  to  check  the  progress  of  Persia  in  North- Western  Asia. 

Rome's  first  open  interference  was  in  Ibera.  Iberia  had  per- 
haps not  been  expressly  named  in  the  treaty,  and  support 
might  consequently  be  given  to  the  expelled  Sauromaces  with- 
out any  clear  infi-action  of  its  conditions.  The  duke  Terentius 
was  ordered,  therefore,  towards  the  close  of  a.d.  370,  to  enter 
Tberia  with  twelve  legions  and  replace  upon  his  throne  the  old 
Roinan  feudatory. '^^  Accordingly  he  invaded  the  country  from 
Lazica,  which  bordered  it  upon  the  north,  and  found  no  diffi- 
culty in  conquering  it  as  far  as  the  river  Cyrus.  On  the  Cj^rus, 
however,  he  was  met  by  Aspacures,  the  king  of  Sapor's  choice, 
who  made  proposals  for  an  accommodation.  Representing 
himself  as  really  well-inchned  to  Rome,  and  only  prevented 
from  declaring  himself  by  the  fact  that  Sapor  held  his  son  as  a 
hostage,  he  asked  Terentius'  consent  to  a  division  of  Iberia  be- 


OH.  XI.]        WAE  BETWEEN  SAPOR  AND   VALEN8.  375 

tween  himself  and  his  rival,  the  tract  north  of  the  Cyrus  being 
assigned  to  the  Roman  claimant,  and  that  south  of  the  river 
remaining  under  his  own  government.  Terentius,  to  escape 
further  trouble,  consented  to  the  arrangement ;  and  the  double 
kingdom  was  established.  The  northern  and  western  portions 
of  Iberia  were  made  over  to  Sauromaces ;  the  southern  and 
eastern  continued  to  be  ruled  by  Aspacures. 

When  the  Persian  king  received  inteUigence  of  these  trans- 
actions he  was  greatly  excited.'^'  To  him  it  appeared  clear  that 
by  the  spirit,  if  not  by  the  letter,  of  the  treaty  of  Dura,  Rome 
had  rehnquished  Iberia  equally  with  Armenia  ;-^  and  he  com- 
plained bitterly  of  the  division  which  had  been  made  of  the 
Iberian  territory,  not  only  without  his  consent,  but  without 
his  knowledge.  He  was  no  doubt  aware  that  Rome  had  not 
really  confined  her  interference  to  the  region  with  which  she  had 
.some  excuse  for  intermeddling,  but  had  already  secretly  in- 
tervened in  Armenia,  and  Avas  intending  further  intervention. 
The  count  Arinthaeus  had  been  sent  with  an  army  to  the  Arme- 
nian frontier  about  the  same  time  that  Terentius  had  invaded 
Iberia,  and  had  received  positive  instructions  to  help  the 
Armenians  if  Sapor  molested  them.  It  was  in  vain  that  the 
Persian  monarch  appealed  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Dura — 
Rome  dismissed  his  ambassadors  witli  contempt,  and  made  no 
change  in  her  line  of  procedure.  Upon  this  Sapor  saw  that 
war  was  unavoidable;  and  accordingly  he  wasted  no  more 
time  in  embassies,  but  employed  himself  during  the  winter, 
which  had  now  begun,  in  collecting  as  large  a  force  as  he  could, 
in  part  from  his  allies,  in  part  from  his  own  subjects,  resolving 
to  take  the  field  in  the  spring,  and  to  do  his  best  to  punish 
Rome  for  her  faithlessness.  ^^ 

Rome  on  her  part  made  ready  to  resist  the  invasion  which 
she  knew  to  be  impending.  A  powerful  army  was  sent  to 
guard  the  East  under  count  Trajan,  and  Vadomair,  ex-king  of 
the  Alemanni ;  ^^  but  so  much  regard  for  the  terms  of  the  re- 
cent treaty  was  still  felt,  or  pretended,  that  the  generals  re- 
ceived orders  to  be  careful  not  to  commence  hostilities,  but  to 
wait  till  an  attack  was  made  on  them.  They  Avere  not  kept 
long  in  expectation.  As  soon  as  winter  was  over,  Sapor  cross- 
ed the  frontier  (a.d.  371)  with  a  large  force  of  native  cavalry 
and  archers,  supported  by  numerous  auxiliaries, "  and  attacked 
the  Romans  near  a  place  called  Vagabanta.  The  Roman  com- 
mander gave  his  troops  the  order  to  retire ;  and  accordingly 
they  fell  back  under  a  shower  of  Persian  arrows,  until,  several 


376  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  Tt. 

having  been  wounded,  they  felt  that  they  could  with  a  good 
face  declare  that  the  rupture  of  the  peace  was  the  act  of  the 
Persians.  The  retreat  was  then  exchanged  for  an  advance, 
and  after  a  brief  engagement  the  Romans  were  victorious,  and 
inflicted  a  severe  loss  upon  their  adversaries.^*  But  the  suc- 
cess was  not  followed  by  results  of  any  importance.  Neither 
side  seems  to  have  been  anxious  for  another  general  encounter; 
and  the  season  for  hostilities  was  occupied  by  a  sort  of  guerilla 
warfare,  in  which  the  advantage  rested  alternately  with  the 
Persians  and  the  Romans.^'  At  length,  when  the  summer  was 
ended,  the  commanders  on  either  side  entered  into  negotia- 
tions ;  and  a  truce  was  made  which  allowed  Sapor  to  retire  to 
Ctesiphon,  and  the  Roman  emperor,  who  was  now  personally 
directing  the  war,  to  go  into  winter  quarters  at  Antioch.'" 

After  this  the  war  languished  for  two  or  three  years.  ^'  Va- 
lens  was  wholly  deficient  in  military  genius,  and  was  quite  con- 
tent if  he  cotdd  maintain  a  certain  amount  of  Roman  influence 
in  Armenia  and  Iberia,  while  at  the  same  time  he  protected 
the  Roman  frontier  against  Persian  invasion.  Sapor  was  ad- 
vanced in  years,  and  might  naturally  desire  repose,  having 
been  almost  constantly  engaged  in  military  expeditions  since 
he  reached  the  age  of  sixteen.  Negotiations  seem  to  have 
alternated  with  hostilities''  during  the  interval  between  a. D. 
371  and  376 ;  but  they  resulted  in  nothing,  until,  in  this  last- 
named  year,  a  peace  was  made,''  which  gave  tranquillity  to 
the  East  during  the  remainder  of  the  reign  of  Sapor, 

The  terms  upon  which  this  peace  was  concluded  are  obscure. 
It  is  perhaps  most  probable  that  the  two  contracting  powers 
agreed  to  abstain  from  further  interference  with  Iberia  and 
Armenia,  and  to  leave  those  countries  to  follow  their  own  in- 
chnations.  Armenia  seems  by  the  native  accounts  to  have 
gravitated  towards  Rome  under  these  circumstances,"  and 
Iberia  is  likely  to  have  followed  her  example.  The  tie  of 
Christianity  attached  these  countries  to  the  great  power  of  the 
West ;  and,  except  under  compulsion,  they  were  not  likely  at 
tliis  time  to  tolerate  the  yoke  of  Persia  for  a  day.  When 
Jovian  withdrew  the  Roman  protection  from  them,  they  were 
forced  for  a  while  to  submit  to  the  power  which  they  disliked ; 
but  no  sooner  did  his  successors  reverse  his  policy,  and  show 
themselves  ready  to  uphold  the  Armenians  and  Iberians  against 
Persia,  than  they  naturally  reverted  to  the  Roman  side,  and 
formed  an  important  support  to  the  empire  against  its  Eastern 
rival. 


t!H.  XI.]  COINS  OF  SAPOR  If.  377 

The  death  of  Sapor  followed  the  peace  of  a.d.  376  within  a 
few  years.  He  died^^  a.d.  379  or  380,  after  having  reigned 
seventy  years.  It  is  curious  that,  although  possessing  the 
crown  for  so  long  a  term,  and  enjoying  a  more  brilUant  reign 
than  any  preceding  monarch,  he  neither  left  behind  him  any 
inscriptions,  nor  any  sculptured  memorials.  The  only  material 
evidences  that  we  possess  of  his  reign  are  his  coins,  which  are 
exceedingly  numerous.  According  to  Mordtmann, '"  they  may 
be  divided  into  three  classes,  corresponding  to  three  periods  in 
his  life.  The  earhest  have  on  the  reverse  the  fire-altar,  with 
two  priests,  or  guards,  looking  towards  the  altar,  and  with  the 
flame  rising  from  the  altar  in  the  usual  way.  The  head  on  the 
obverse  is  archaic  in  type,  and  very  much  resembles  that  of 
Sapor  I.  The  crown  has  attached  to  it,  in  many  cases,  that 
"cheek-piece"  which  is  otherwise  confined  to  the  first  three 
monarchs  of  the  Hne.  These  coins  are  the  best  from  an  artistic 
point  of  view ;  they  greatly  resemble  those  of  the  first  Sapor, 
but  are  distinguishable  from  them,  first,  by  the  guards  looking 
towards  the  altar  instead  of  away  from  it ;  and,  secondly,  by  a 
greater  profusion  of  pearls  about  the  king's  person.  The  coins 
of  the  second  period  lack  the  "  cheek-piece, "  and  have  on  the 
reverse  the  fire-altar  without  supporters ;  they  are  inferior  as 
works  of  art  to  those  of  the  first  period,  but  much  superior 
to  those  of  the  third.  These  last,  which  exhibit  a  marked 
degeneracy,"  are  especially  distinguished  by  having  a  human 
head  in  the  middle  of  the  flames  that  rise  from  the  altar. 
Otherwise  they  much  resemble  in  their  emblems  the  early 
coins,  only  differing  from  them  in  being  artistically  inferior. 
The  ordinary  legends  upon  the  coins  are  in  no  respect  remark- 
able ;  '*  but  occasionally  we  find  the  inonarch  taking  the  new 
and  expressive  epithet  of  Toham,  "  the  Strong. " ''  [PI.  XIX., 
Fig.  1.] 


378  ^^-^  SEVENTH  MONAUGllt.  [cH.  xtt 


CHAPTER  Xn. 

Short  Reigns  of  Artaxerxes  II.  and  Sapor  III.  Obscurity 
of  their  History.  Their  Relations  icith  Armenia.  Monu- 
ment of  Sajyor  III.  at  Takht-i-Bostan.  Coins  of  Arta- 
xerxes II.  and  Sapor  III.  Reign  of  Varahran  IV.  His 
Signets.     His  D&alings  with  Armenia.     His  Death. 

'Apraf  rjp  erij  &'  •  Xa^uip,  vios  'Apra^rip,   exj)  e  •  Ovapapavrj?  errj  la. 

Syncellus,  Chronographia,  p.  360,  C. 

The  glorious  reign  of  Sapor  II. ,  which  carried  the  New  Per- 
sian Empire  to  the  highest  point  whereto  it  had  yet  attained, 
is  folloAved  by  a  time  which  offers  to  that  remarkable  reign  a 
most  complete  contrast.  Sapor  had  occupied  the  Persian 
throne  for  a  space  approaching  nearly  to  three-quarters  of  a 
century ;  the  reigns  of  his  next  three  successors  amounted  to 
no  more  than  twenty  years  in  the  aggregate. '  Sapor  had  been 
engaged  in  perpetual  wars,  had  spread  the  terror  of  the  Per- 
sian arms  on  all  sides,  and  ruled  more  gloriously  than  any  of 
his  predecessors.  The  kings  who  followed  him  were  pacific 
and  unenterprising;  they  were  almost  unknown  to  their 
neighbors,^  and  are  among  the  least  distinguished  of  the  Sas- 
sanian  monarchs.  More  especially  does  this  character  attach 
to  the  two  immediate  successors  of  Sapor  II.,  viz.  Artaxerxes 
II.  and  Sapor  III.  Thoy  reigned  respectively  four  and  five 
years ;'  and  their  annals  during  this  period  are  almost  a  blank. 
Ai'taxerxes  II.,  who  is  called  by  some  the  brother  of  Sapor  II., 
was  more  probably  his  son.^  He  succeeded  liis  father  in  a.d, 
879,  and  died  at  Ctesiphon^  in  a.d.  383.  He  left  a  character 
for  kindness  and  amiabUity  behind  him,  and  is  known  to  the 
Persians  as  NiTcoukar,^  or  "the  Beneficent,"  and  to  the  Arabs 
as  Al  Djemil,''  "the  Virtuous."  According  to  the  "  Modjmel- 
al-Tewarikh,"  he  took  no  taxes  from  his  subjects  during  the 
four  years  of  his  reign,  and  thereby  secured  to  himself  their 
affection  and  gratitude.  He  seems  to  have  received  overtures 
from  the  Armenians  soon  after  his  accession, "  and  for  a  time 
to  have  been  acknowledged  by  tlie  turbulent  mountaineers  as 
their  sovereign.  After  the  murder  of  Bab,  or  Para,  the  Ro- 
mans had  set  up,  as  king  over  Armenia,  a  certain  Varaztad 


I 


<JH.  xii.]  FRESH  TROUBLES  IN  ARMENIA.  379 

(Pharasdates),  a  member  of  the  Arsacid  family,  but  no  near 
relation  of  the  recent  monarchs,  assigning  at  the  same  time  the 
real  dii-ection  of  affairs  to  an  Armenian  noble  named  Mou- 
shegh,  who  belonged  to  the  illustrious  family  of  the  Mamigo- 
nians.-'  Moushegh  ruled  Armenia  with  vigor,  but  was  sus- 
pected of  maintaining  over-friendly  relations  with  the  Roman 
emperor,  Valens,  and  of  designing  to  undermine  and  supplant 
his  master.  Varaztad,  after  a  while,  having  been  worked  on 
by  his  counsellors,  grew  suspicious  of  him,  and  caused  him  to 
be  executed  at  a  bamiuot. '"  This  treachery  roused  the  indigna- 
tion of  Moushegh's  brother  Manuel,  who  raised  a  rebellion 
against  Varaztad,  defeated  him  in  open  fight,  and  drove  hmi 
from  his  kingdom."  Manuel  then  brought  forward  the  prin- 
cess Zei-manducht,  widow  of  the  late  king  Para,  together  with 
her  two  young  sons,  Arsaces  and  Valarsaces,  and,  surrounding 
all  three  with  royal  pomp,  gave  to  the  two  princes  the  name  of 
king,  while  he  took  care  to  retain  in  his  own  hands  the  real 
government  of  the  country.  Under  these  circumstances  he 
naturally  dreaded  the  hostility  of  the  Roman  emperor,  who 
was  not  likely  to  see  with  patience  a  monarch,  whom  he  had 
set  upon  the  thi'one,  deprived  of  his  kingdom  by  a  subject.  To 
maintain  the  position  which  he  had  assumed,  it  was  necessary 
that  he  should  contract  some  important  alliance ;  and  the  alli- 
ance always  open  to  Armenia  when  she  had  quarrelled  with 
Rome  was  with  the  Persians.  It  seems  to  have  been  soon 
after  Artaxerxes  II.  succeeded  his  father,  that  Manuel  sent  an 
embassy  to  him,  with  letters  and  rich  gifts,  offering,  in  return 
for  his  protection,  to  acknowledge  him  as  lord-paramount  of 
Armenia,  and  promising  him  unshakable  fidelity.  ''^  The  offer 
Was,  of  course,  received  with  extreme  satisfaction ;  and  terms 
were  speedily  arranged.  Armenia  was  to  pay  a  fixed  tribute. 
to  receive  a  garrison  of  ten  thousand  Persians  and  to  provide 
adequately  for  their  support,  to  allow  a  Persian  satrap  to 
divide  with  Manuel  the  actual  government  of  the  country,  and 
to  furnish  him  with  all  that  was  necessary  for  his  court  and 
table.  On  the  other  hand,  Arsaces  and  Valarsaces,  together 
(apparently)  with  their  mother,  Zermanducht,  were  to  be  al- 
lowed the  royal  title  and  honors ;  Armenia  was  to  be  protected 
in  case  of  invasion ;  and  Manuel  was  to  be  maintained  in  his 
oflBce  of  Sparapet  or  generalissimo  of  the  Ai-menian  forces." 
We  cannot  say  with  certainty  how  long  this  arrangement  re- 
mained undisturbed ;  most  probably,  however,  it  did  not  con- 
tinue in  force  more  than  a  few  years.'*    It  was  most  likely 


380  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  \cn.  xit 

while  Artaxerxes  still  ruled  Persia,  that  the  rupture  described 
by  Faustus  occurred.'^  A  certain  Meroujan,  an  Armenian 
noble,  jealous  of  the  power  and  prosperity  of  Manuel,  per- 
suaded him  that  the  Persian  commandant  in  Armenia  was 
about  to  seize  his  person,  and  either  to  send  him  a  prisoner  to 
Artaxerxes,  or  else  to  put  him  to  death.  Manuel,  who  was  so 
credulous  as  to  believe  the  information,  thought  it  necessary 
for  his  own  safety  to  anticipate  the  designs  of  his  enemies,  and, 
falling  upon  the  ten  thousand  Persians  with  the  whole  of  the 
Armenian  army,  succeeded  in  putting  them  all  to  the  sword, 
except  their  commander,  whoin  he  allowed  to  escape. '°  War 
followed  between  Persia  and  Armenia  with  varied  success,  but 
on  the  whole  Manuel  had  the  advantage ;  he  repulsed  several 
Persian  invasions,  and  maintained  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Armenia  till  his  death,  without  calling  in  the  aid  of 
Eome."  When,  however,  Manuel  died,  about  a.  d.  383,  Arme- 
nian affairs  fell  into  confusion ;  the  Eomans  were  summoned 
to  give  help  to  one  party,  the  Persians  to  render  assistance  to 
the  other ;  '^  Armenia  became  once  more  the  battle-ground 
between  the  two  great  powers,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the  old  con- 
test, fraught  with  so  many  calamities,  was  to  be  at  once 
renewed.  But  the  circumstances  of  the  time  were  such  that 
neither  Rome  nor  Persia  now  desired  to  reopen  the  contest. 
Persia  was  in  the  hands  of  weak  and  unwarUke  sovereigns, 
and  was  perhaps  already  threatened  by  Scythic  hordes  upon 
the  east."  Rome  was  in  the  agonies  of  a  struggle  with  the 
ever-increasing  power  of  the  Goths ;  and  though,  in  the  course  of 
the  years  a.d,  379-382,  the  Great  Theodosius  had  established 
peace  in  the  tract  under  his  rule,  and  delivered  the  central 
provinces  of  Macedonia  and  Thrace  from  the  intolerable 
ravages  of  the  barbaric  invaders,^"  yet  the  deliverance  had 
been  effected  at  the  cost  of  introducing  large  bodies  of  Goths 
into  the  heart  of  the  empire,  '^ '  while  still  along  the  northern 
frontier  lay  a  threatening  cloud,  from  which  devastation  and 
ruin  might  at  any  time  burst  forth  and  overspread  the  pro- 
vinces upon  the  Lower  Danube.  Thus  both  the  Roman  em- 
peror and  the  Persian  king  were  well  disposed  towards  peace. 
An  arrangement  was  consequently  made,  and  in  a.d.  384,  five 
years  after  he  had  ascended  the  throne,  Theodosius  gave 
audience  in  Constantinople"  to  envoys  from  the  court  of 
Persepolis,  and  concluded  with  them  a  treaty  whereby  matters 
in  Armenia  were  placed  on  a  footing  which  fairly  satisfied 
both  sides,  and  the  tranquillity  of  the  East  was  assured."    Th© 


CH.  XII,]  ARMENIA  DIVIDED  BY  ROME  AND  PERSIA.    3Sl 

high  contracting  powers  agreed  that  Armenia  should  be  parti- 
)  tioned  between  them.  After  detaching  from  the  kingdom 
various  outlying  districts,  which  could  be  conveniently  ab- 
sorbed into  their  own  territories,  they  divided  the  rest  of  the 
country  into  two  unequal  portions.  The  smaller  of  these, 
which  comprised  the  more  western  districts,  was  placed 
under  the  protection  of  Rome,  and  was  committed  by  Theo- 
dosius  to  the  Arsaces  who  had  been  made  king  by  Manuel, 
the  son  of  the  unfortunate  Bab,  or  Para,  and  the  grandson  of 
the  Arsaces  contemporary  with  Julian.  The  larger  portion, 
which  consisted  of  the  regions  lying  towards  the  east,  passed 
under  the  suzerainty  of  Persia,  and  was  confided  by  Sapor  III. , 
who  had  succeeded  Artaxerxes  II.,  to  an  Arsacid,  named 
Chosroes,  a  Christian,  who  was  given  the  title  of  king,  and  re- 
ceived in  marriage  at  the  same  time  one  of  Sapor's  sisters. 
Such  were  the  terms  on  which  Rome  and  Persia  brought  their 
contention  respecting  Armenia  to  a  conclusion.  Friendly 
relations  were  in  this  way  established  between  the  two  crowns, 
which  continued  undisturbed  for  the  long  space  of  thirty-six 
years  (a.d.  384-420). "■' 

Sapor  III.  appears  to  have  succeeded  his  brother  Artaxerxes 
in  A.D.  383,  the  year  before  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty.  It  is 
uncertain  whether  Artaxerxes  vacated  the  throne  by  death,  or 
was  deposed  in  consequence  of  cruelties  whereof  he  was  guilty 
towards  the  priests  and  nobles.  Tabari  and  Magoudi,  who  re- 
late his  deposition,"  are  authors  on  whom  much  reliance  can- 
not be  placed;  and  the  cruelties  reported  accord  but  ill 
with  the  epithets  of  "the  Beneficent"  and  "the  Virtuous," 
assigned  to  this  monarch  by  others."  Perhaps  it  is  most 
probable  that  he  held  the  throne  till  his  death,  according  to  the 
statements  of  Agathias  and  Eutychius."  Of  Sapor  III.,  his 
brother  and  successor,  two  facts  only  are  recorded— his  con- 
clusion of  the  treaty  with  the  Romans  in  B.C.  384,  and  his  war 
with  the  Arabs  of  the  tribe  of  Yad,''  which  must  have  followed 
shortly  afterwards.  It  must  have  been  in  consequence  of  his 
contest  with  the  latter,  whom  he  attacked  in  their  own  coun- 
try, that  he  received  from  his  countrymen  the  appellation  of 
"the  Warlike,"'^''  an  appellation  better  deserved  by  either  of 
the  other  monarchs  w^ho  had  borne  the  same  name. 

Sapor  III.  left  behind  him  a  sculptured  memorial,  which  is 
still  to  be  seen  in  the  vicinity  of  Kermanshah.  [PI.  XX.\ 
It  consists  of  two  very  similar  figures,  looking  towards  each 
other,  and  standing  in  an  arched  frame.     On  either  side  of  the 


582  THE  SEVBNrH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xil 

figures  are  inscriptions  in  the  Old  Pehlevi  character,  whereby 
we  are  enabled  to  identify  the  individuals  represented  with  the 
second  and  the  third  Sapor. ^''  The  inscriptions  run  thus: — 
' '  Pathkeli zant mazdisn  shahia  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka  Allan 
ve  Anilan,  minuchitli  min  yazclan,  hart  mazdisn  shahia  Auhr- 
mazdi,  malkan  malka  Ailanve  Anilan,  minuchitli  minyazdan, 
napi  shahia  Narshehi  malkan  malka  f  ^^  and  "  Pathkeli  maz- 
disn shahia  Shahpuhri,  malkan  malka  Ailan  ve  Anilan,  minu- 
chitli min  yazclan,  hart  mazdisn  shahia  Shalipuhri,  malkan 
malka  Ailan  ve  Anilan,  minuchitli  min  yazdan,  napi  shahia 
Auhrmazdi,  malkan  malka.''''  Thfey  are,  it  will  be  seen,  iden- 
tical in  form,  with  the  exception  that  the  names  in  the  right- 
hand  inscription  are  "Sapor,  Hormisdas,  Narses,"  while  those 
in  the  left-hand  one  are  ' '  Sapor,  Sapor,  Hormisdas. "  It  has 
been  supposed^"  that  the  right-hand  figure  was  erected  by 
Sapor  II.,  and  the  other  afterwards  added  by  Sapor  III. ;  but 
the  unity  of  the  whole  sculpture,  and  its  inclusion  under  a 
single  arch,  seem  to  indicate  that  it  was  set  up  by  a  single  sov- 
ereign, and  was  the  fruit  of  a  single  conception.  If  this  be  so, 
we  must  necessarily  ascribe  it  to  the  later  of  the  two  monarchs 
commemorated,  i.e.  to  Sapor  III.,  who  must  be  supposed  to 
have  possessed  more  than  usual  filial  piety,  since  the  com- 
memoration of  their  predecessors  upon  the  throne  is  very 
rare  among  the  Sassanians. 

The  taste  of  the  monviment  is  questionable.  An  elaborate 
finish  of  all  the  details  of  the  costtune  compensates  but  ill  for 
a  clumsiness  of  contour  and  a  want  of  contrast  and  variety, 
which  indicate  a  low  condition  of  art,  and  compare  unfavorably 
with  the  earlier  performances  of  the  Neo-Persian  sculptors.  It 
may  be  doubted  whether,  among  aU  the  reliefs  of  the  Sassani- 
ans, there  is  one  which  is  so  entirely  devoid  of  artistic  merit  as 
this  coarse  and  dull  production. 

The  coins  of  Sapor  III.  and  his  predecessor,  Artaxerxes  II., 
have  little  about  them  that  is  remarkable.  Those  of  Artaxerxes 
bear  a  head  wliich  is  surmounted  with  the  usual  inflated  baU, 
and  has  the  diadem,  but  is  without  a  crown— a  deficiency  in 
which  some  see  an  indication  that  the  prince  thus  represented 
was  regent  rather  than  monarch  of  Persia."  [PI.  XIX.  Fig.  2.] 
The  legends  upon  the  coins  are,  however,  in  ttie  usual  style  of 
royal  epigraphs,  running  commonly" —  ^''Mazdisn  bag  Artah- 
shetri  malkan  malka  Airan  ve  Aniran,  "or  "  the  Ormazd- wor- 
shipping divine  Artaxerxes,  king  of  the  kings  of  Iran  and 
Turan."    They  are  easily  distinguishable  from  those  of  Arta- 


CB.  XII.]      COINS  OP  ARTAXERXBS  tt.  AND  SAPOR  II.      38^ 

xerxes  I. ,  both  by  the  profile,  which  is  far  less  marked,  and  bj^ 
the  fire-altar  on  the  reverse,  which  has  always  two  supporters, 
looking  towards  the  altar.  The  coins  of  Sapor  III.  present  some 
miusual  types.  [PI.  XIX.  Fig.  6.]  On  some  of  them  the  king  has 
his  hair  bound  with  a  simple  diadem,  without  crown  or  cap  of 
any  kind.  ^'''  On  others  he  wears  a  cap  of  a  very  peculiar  character, 
which  has  been  compared  to  a  biretta,  ■"'  but  is  really  altogether 
sui  generis.  The  cap  is  surmounted  by  the  ordinary  inflated 
ball,  is  ornamented  with  jewels,  and  is  bound  round  at  bottom 
with  the  usual  diadem."  The  legend  upon  the  obverse  of  Sa- 
por's coins  is  of  the  customary  character;  but  the  reverse 
bears  usually,  besides  the  name  of  the  king,  the  word  atur., 
which  has  been  supposed  to  stand  for  Aturia  or  Assyria  ;"*  this 
explanation,  however,  is  very  doubtful.  ^^ 

The  coins  of  both  kings  exhibit  marks  of  decKne,  especially 
on  the  reverse,  where  the  drawing  of  the  figures  that  support 
the  altar  is  very  inferior  to  that  which  we  observe  on  the  coins 
of  the  kings  from  Sapor  I.  to  Sapor  II.  The  characters  on  both 
obverse  and  reverse  are  also  carelessly  rendered,  and  can  only 
with  much  difficulty  be  deciphered. 

Sapor  III.  died  a.d.  388,  after  reigning  a  little  more  than  five 
years."".  He  was  a  man  of  simple  tastes,^'  and  is  said  to  have 
been  fond  of  exchanging  the  magnificence  and  dreary  etiquette 
of  the  court  for  the  freedom  and  ease  of  a  life  under  tents.  On 
an  occasion  when  he  was  thus  enjoying  himself,  it  happened 
that  one  of  those  violent  hurricanes,  to  which  Persia  is  subject, 
arose,  and,  falling  in  full  force  on  the  royal  encampment,  blew 
down  the  tent  wherein  he  was  sitting.  It  happened  unfortu- 
nately that  the  main  tent-pole  struck  him,  as  it  fell,  in  a  vital 
part,  and  Sapor  died  from  the  blow."'^  Such  at  least  was  the 
account  given  by  those  who  had  accompanied  him,  and  gener- 
ally believed  by  his  subjects.  There  were  not,  however,  want- 
ing persons  to  whisper  that  the  story  was  untrue — that  the  real 
cause  of  the  catastrophe  which  had  overtaken  the  unhappy 
monarch  was  a  conspiracy  of  his  nobles,  or  his  guards,  who 
had  overthrown  his  tent  purposely,  and  murdered  him  ere  he 
could  escape  from  them. 

The  successor  of  Sapor  III.  was  Varahran  IV.,  whom  some 
authorities  call  his  brother  and  othere  his  son."  This  prince  is 
known  to  the  oriental  writers  as  "  Varahi'an  Kerman-shah, "  or 
' '  Varahran,  king  of  Carmania. "  Agathias  tells  us"  that  during 
the  lifetime  of  his  father  he  was  established  as  governor  over 
Kerman  or  Carmania,  and  thus  obtained  the  appellation  which 


i 


384  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xil 

pertinaciously  adhered  to  hira.  A  curious  relic  of  antiquity, 
fortunately  preserved  to  modern  times  amid  so  much  that  has 
been  lost,  confirms  this  statement.  It  is  the  seal  of  Varahran 
before  he  ascended  the  Persian  throne,  and  contains,  besides  his 
portrait,  beautifully  cut,  an  inscription,  which  is  read  as  fol- 
lows :^^ — "  Varahran  Kerman  malka,  hart  mazdisn  bag  Shahpuh- 
ri  malkan  malka  Airan  ve  Aniran,  minuchitri  min  yazdan,'''' 
or  "Varahran,  king  of  Kerman,  son  of  the  Ormazd-worshipping 
divine  Sapor,  king  of  the  king^  of  Iran  and  Turan,  heaven-de- 
scended of  the  race  of  the  gods."  [PI.  XIX.  Fig.  5.]  Another 
seal,  belonging  to  him  probably  after  he  had  become  monarch 
of  Persia,  contains  his  full-length  portrait,'"  and  exhibits  him 
as  tramphng  under  foot  a  prostrate  figure,  supposed  to  repre- 
sent a  Eoman,''  by  which  it  would  appear  that  he  claimed  to 
have  gained  victories  or  advantages  over  Rome.  [PI.  XIX.  Figs. 
3  and  4.]  It  is  not  altogether  easy  to  understand  how  tliis 
coxild  have  been.  Not  only  do  the  Roman  writers  mention  no 
war  between  the  Romans  and  Persians  at  this  time,  but  t\\ej 
expressly  declare  that  the  East  remained  in  profound  repose 
during  the  entire  reign  of  Varahran,  and  that  Rome  and  Persia 
continued  to  be  friends.'*  The  difficulty  may,  however,  be  per- 
haps explained  by  a  consideration  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in 
Armenia  at  this  time ;  for  in  Armenia  Rome  and  Persia  had 
still  conflicting  interests,  and,  without  having  recourse  to  anns, 
triumphs  might  be  obtained  in  this  quarter  by  the  one  over  the 
other. 

On  the  division  of  Armenia  between  Arsaces  and  Ghosroes, 
a  really  good  understanding  had  been  established,  which  had 
lasted  for  about  six  years.  Arsaces  had  died  two  years  after 
he  became  a  Roman  feudatory ;"  and,  at  his  death,  Rome  had 
absorbed  his  territories  into  her  empire,  and  placed  the  new 
province  under  the  government  of  a  count.  ^"  No  objection  to 
the  arrangement  had  been  made  by  Persia,  and  the  whole  of 
Armenia  had  remained  for  four  years  tranquil  and  without 
disturbance.  But,  about  a.d.  390,  Ghosroes  became  dis- 
satisfied with  his  position,  and  entered  into  relations  with 
Rome  which  greatly  displeased  the  Armenian  monarch," 
Ghosroes  obtained  from  Theodosius  his  own  appointment  to 
the  Armenian  countship,  and  thus  succeeded  in  uniting  both 
Roman  and  Persian  Armenia  under  his  government.  Elated 
with  this  success,  he  proceeded  further  to  venture  on  admin- 
istrative acts  which  trenched,  according  to  Persian  views,  on 
the  rights  of  the  lord  paramount."    Finally,  when  Varahi-au 


M        III; 


Plate.  XXXII 


Sassaitiak  Capital?  (after  Flandin) 


^ 


Plate  XXXIV. 


Vol. 


Fig    1 


Akcs  oi- 


Choskoes  II.  AT  TAiiHT-.-BosTAN  (after  Flandin^. 


J  Fit3URE  OF  VicTor.7.  FRoji  z'AZ  AECH  AT  TAKaTri-EosTAS'^after  Flandin),. 


CH.  xiii.]  ACCESSION  OF  ISDIOERD  I.  385 

addressed  to  him  a  remonstrance,  he  rephed  in  insulting  terms, 
and,  renouncing  his  authority,  placed  the  whole  Armenian 
kingdom  under  the  suzerainty  and  protection  of  Rome/' 
War  between  the  two  great  powers  must  now  have  seemed 
imminent,  and  could  indeed  only  have  been  avoided  by  great 
moderation  and  self-restraint  on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  was  Rome  that  drcAv  back. 
Theodosius  declined  to  receive  the  submission  which  Chosroes 
tendered,  and  refused  to  hft  a  finger  in  his  defence.  The 
j  unfortunate  prince  was  forced  to  give  himself  up  to  Varaban, 

\  who  consigned  him  to  the  Castle  of  Oblivion,  and  placed  his 

brother,  Varahran-Sapor,  upon  the  Armenian  throne.''*  These 
events  seem  to  have  fallen  into  the  year  a.d.  391,  the 
third  year  of  Varahran,"  who  may  well  have  felt  proud  of 
them,  and  have  thought  that  they  formed  a  trimnph  over 
Rome  which  deserved  to  be  commemorated. 

The  character  of  Varahran  IV.  is  represented  variously  by 
the  native  authorities.  According  to  some  of  them,  his 
temper  was  mild,  and  his  conduct  irreproachable."''  Others 
say  that  he  was  a  hard  man,  and  so  neglected  the  duties  of 
his  station  that  he  would  not  even  read  the  petitions  or  com- 
plaints which  were  addressed  to  him."  It  would  seem  that 
there  must  have  been  some  ground  for  these  latter  representa- 
tions, since  it  is  generally  agreed"*  that  the  cause  of  his  death 
was  a  revolt  of  his  troops,  who  surrounded  him  and  shot  at 
him  with  arrows.  One  shaft,  better  directed  than  the  rest, 
struck  hiin  in  a  vital  part,  and  he  fell  and  instantly  expired. 
Thus  perished,  in  a.d,  399,  the  third  son  of  the  'Great  Sapor, 
after  a  reign  of  eleven  years. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


Accession  of  Isdigerd  I.  Peaceful  Character  of  his  Reign.  His 
Alleged  Guardianship  of  Theodosins  II.  His  leaning  to- 
ivards  Christianity,  and  consequent  Unpopularity  icith  his 
Subjects.  His  Change  of  uiew  and  Persecidion  of  the 
Christians.  His  relations  ivith  Armenia.  His  Coins. 
His  Personal  Character.     His  Death. 

Eiri  TouToi?  '\c5iyip5y\';  .    .  .  rrjc  nepfftKrjv  riye/j-oviav  itapa^afipdvei,  6  ttoAuj  Tropa  "Pw/uaiots 
KoX  nepi\a\rjTo<;. — Agathias,  iv.  £6;  p.  130,  C. 

Varahran    IV.    was    succeeded     (a.d.    399)    by    his    son, 
Izdikerti,'   or  Isdigerd  I.,^  whom  tlie  soldiers,  though  they 


386  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  xin. 

had  murdered  his  father,'  permitted  to  ascend  the  thronB 
ivithout  difficulty.  He  ic  said,  at  his  accession,  to  have  borne 
a  good  character  for  prudence  and  moderation,^  a  character 
which  he  sought  to  confirm  by  the  utterance  on  various  oc- 
casions of  high-sounding  moral  sentiments/  The  general 
tenor  of  his  reign  was  peaceful;'  and  we  may  conclude  there- 
fore that  he  was  of  an  unwarlike  temper,  since  the  circum- 
stances of  the  time  were  such  as  would  naturally  have  induced 
a  prince  of  any  military  capacity  to  resume  hostilities  against 
the  Romans.  After  the  arrangement  made  with  Rome  by 
Sapor  III.  in  a.  d.  384,  a  terrible  series  of  calamities  had  be- 
fallen the  empire.'  Invasions  of  Ostrogoths  and  Franks  sig- 
nalized the  years  a.  d.  386  and  388 ;  in  A.  D.  387  the  revolt  of 
Maximus  seriously  endangered  the  western  moiety  of  the 
Roman  state;  in  the  same  year  occurred  an  outburst  of 
sedition  at  Antioch,  which  was  followed  shortly  by  the  more 
dangerous  sedition,  and  the  terrible  massacre  of  Thessalonica ; 
Argobastes  and  Eugenius  headed  a  rebellion  in  a.d.  392; 
Gildo  the  Moor  detached  Africa  from  the  empire  in  a.d. 
386,  and  maintained  a  separate  dominion  on  the  southern 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean  for  twelve  years,  from  a.d. 
386  to  398;  in  A.D.  395  the  Gothic  warriors  within  and 
without  the  Roman  frontier  took  arms,  and  under  the  re- 
doubtable Alaric  threatened  at  once  the  East  and  the  West, 
ravaged  Greece,  captured  Corinth,  Argos,  and  Sparta,  and 
from  the  coasts  of  the  Adriatic  already  marked  for  their  prey 
the  smiling  fields  of  Italy.  The  rulers  of  the  East  and  West, 
Arcadius  and  Honorius,  were  alike  weak  and  unenterprising ; 
and  further,  they  were  not  even  on  good  terms,  nor  was  either 
likely  to  trouble  himself  very  greatly  about  attacks  upon  the 
territories  of  the  other.  Isdigerd  might  have  crossed  the 
Euphrates,  and  overrun  or  conquered  the  Asiatic  provinces  of 
the  Eastern  Empire,  without  causing  Honorious  a  pang,  or  in- 
ducing him  to  stir  from  Milan.  It  is  true  that  Western  Rome 
possessed  at  this  time  the  rare  treasure  of  a  capable  general ; 
but  Stilicho  was  looked  upon  with  fear  and  aversion  by  the 
emperor  of  the  East,*  and  was  moreover  fully  occupied  with 
the  defence  of  his  own  master's  territories.  Had  Isdigerd,  on 
ascending  the  throne  in  a.d.  399,  unsheathed  the  sword  and 
resumed  the  bold  designs  of  his  grandfather.  Sapor  II.,  he 
could  scarcely  have  met  with  any  serious  or  prolonged  resis- 
tance. He  would  have  found  the  East  governed  practically  by 
the  eunuch  Eutropius,  a  plunderer  and  oppressor,  universally 


CH.  XIII.]    COi\DITION  OF  ROME  AT  THIS  PERIOD.  387 

hated  and  feared  f  he  would  have  had  opposed  to  him  nothing 
but  distracted  counsels  and  disorganized  forces;  Asia  Minor 
was  in  possession  of  the  Ostrogoths,  who,  under  the  leadership 
of  Tribigild,  were  ravaging  and  destroying  far  and  wide;'"  the 
armies  of  the  State  were  commanded  by  Gainas,  the  Goth,  and 
Leo,  the  wool-comber,  of  whom  the  one  was  incompetent,  and 
the  other  unfaithful;"  there  was  nothing,  apparently,  that 
could  have  prevented  him  from  overrunning  Roman  Armenia, 
Mesopotamia,  and  Syria,  or  even  from  extending  his  ravages, 
or  his  dominion,  to  the  shores  of  the  ^gean.  But  the  opportu- 
nity was  either  not  seen,  or  was  not  regarded  as  having  any 
attractions.  Isdigerd  remained  tranquil  and  at  rest  within  the 
walls  of  his  capital.  Assuming  as  his  special  title  the  charac- 
teristic epithet "  of  "Eamashtras,"  "the  most  quiet,"  or  "the 
most  firm,"  he  justified  his  assumption  of  it  by  a  complete 
abstinence  from  all  military  expeditions. 

When  Isdigerd  had  reigned  peaceably  for  the  space  of  nine 
years,  he  is  said  to  have  received  a  compliment  of  an  unusual 
character.  Arcadius,  the  emperor  of  the  East,  finding  his  end 
approaching,  and  anxious  to  secure  a  protector  for  his  son 
Theodosius,  a  boy  of  tender  age,  instead  of  comjnitting  him  to 
the  charge  of  his  uncle  Honorius,  or  selecting  a  guardian  for 
him  from  among  his  own  subjects,  by  a  formal  testamentary 
act,  we  are  told, "  placed  his  child  under  the  protection  of  the 
Persian  monarch.  He  accompanied  the  appointment  by  a  sol- 
emn appeal  to  the  magnanimity  of  Isdigerd,  whom  he  exhorted 
at  some  lengtli  to  defend  with  all  his  force,  and  guide  Avith  his 
best  wisdom,  the  young  king  and  1  is  'dngdom. "  According  to 
one  writer,"  he  further  appended  to  this  trust  a  valuable  legacy 
—no  less  than  a  thousand  pounds  weight  of  pure  gold,  which 
he  begged  his  Persian  brother  to  accept  as  a  token  of  his  good- 
will. When  Arcadius  died,  and  the  testament  was  opened, 
information  of  its  contents  was  sent  to  Isdigerd,  who  at  once 
accepted  the  charge  assigned  to  him,  and  addressed  a  letter 
to  the  Senate  of  Constantinople, '» in  which  he  declared  his  de- 
termination to  punish  any  attempt  against  his  ward  with  the 
extremest  severity.  Unable  to  watch  over  his  charge  in  per- 
son, he  selected  for  his  guide  and  instructor  a  learned  eunuch 
of  his  court,  by  name  Antiochus,  and  sent  him  to  Constantino- 
ple, "  where  for  several  years  he  was  the  young  prince's  con- 
stant companion.  Even  after  his  death  or  expulsion, "  which 
took  place  in  consequence  of  the  intrigues  of  Pulcheria,  Theo- 
dosius's  elder  sister,  the  Persian  monarch  continued  faithful  to 


388  ^m^  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xiii. 

his  engagements.  During  the  whole  of  his  reign  he  not  only 
remained  at  peace  with  the  Romans,  but  avoided  every  act 
that  they  could  have  regarded  as  in  the  least  degree  un- 
friendly. '" 

Such  is  the  narrative  which  has  come  down  to  us  on  the  au- 
thority of  historians,  the  earliest  of  whom  wrote  a  century  and 
a  half  after  Arcadius  s  death.""  Modern  criticism  has,  in  gen- 
eral, rejected  the  entire  story,  on  this  account,  regarding  the 
sUence  of  the  earUer  writers  as  outweighing  the  positive  state- 
ments of  the  later  ones."'  It  should,  however,  be  borne  in 
mind,  first  that  the  earlier  writers  are  few  in  number,"  and 
that  theii*  histories  are  very  meagre  and  scanty ;  secondly,  that 
the  fact,  if  act  it  were,  was  one  not  very  palatable  to  Chris- 
tians; and  thirdly,  that,  as  the  results,  so  far  as  Rome  was 
concerned,  were  negative,  the  event  might  not  have  seemed 
to  be  one  of  much  importance,  or  that  required  notice.  The 
character  of  Procopius,  with  whom  the  story  originates,  should 
also  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  special  credit  allowed 
him  by  Agathias  for  careful  and  diligent  research."  It  may 
be  added,  that  one  of  the  main  points  of  the  narrative — the 
position  of  Antiochus  at  Constantinople  during  the  early  years 
of  Theodosius — is  corroborated  by  the  testimony  of  a  contem- 
porary, the  bishop  Synesius,^*  who  speaks  of  a  man  of  this 
name,  recently  in  the  service  of  a  Persian,"^"  as  all-powerful 
with  the  Eastern  emperor.  It  has  been  supposed  by  one 
writer""  that  the  whole  story  grew  out  of  this  fact;  but  the 
basis  scarcely  seems  to  be  sufficient;  and  it  is  perhaps  most 
probable  that  Arcadius  did  really  by  his  will  commend  his  son 
to  the  kind  consideration  of  the  Persian  monarch,  and  that 
that  monarch  in  consequence  sent  him  an  adviser,  though  the 
formal  character  of  the  testamentary  act,  and  the  power  and 
position  of  Antiochus  at  the  court  of  Constantinople,  may  have 
been  overstated.  Theodosius  no  doubt  owed  his  quiet  posses- 
sion of  the  throne  rather  to  the  good  disposition  towards  him 
of  his  own  subjects  than  to  the  protection  of  a  foreigner ;  and 
Isdigerd  refrained  from  aU  attack  on  the  territories  of  the 
young  prince,  rather  by  reason  of  his  own  pacific  temper  than 
in  consequence  of  the  will  of  Arcadius. 

The  friendly  relations  estabhshed,  vmder  whatever  circimi- 
stances,  between  Isdigerd  and  the  Roman  empire  of  the  East 
seemed  to  have  inclined  the  Persian  monarch,  during  a  portion 
of  his  reigii,  to  take  the  Christians  into  his  favor,  and  even  to 
have  induced  him  to  contemplate  seeking  admission  into  t^li^ 


CH.  xiii.]  ISDIQERD'S  PERSECUTIONS.  389 

Church  by  the  door  of  baptism."    Antiochus,  his  representa- 
tive at  the  Court  of  Arcadius,  openly  "wrote  in  favor  of  the 
persecuted  sect;^'  and  the  encouragement  received  from  this 
high  quarter  rapidly  increased  the  number  of  professing  Chris- 
tians in  the  Persian  territories."^    The  sectaries,  though  op- 
pressed, had  long  been  allowed  to  have  their  bishops ;  and  Is- 
digerd  is  said  to  have  listened  with  approval  to  the  teaching 
of  two  of  them,  Marutha,  bishop  of  Mesopotamia,  and  Abdaas 
bishop  of  Ctesiphon.'"    Convinced  of  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
but  unhappily  an  ahen  from  its  spirit,  he  commenced  a  perse- 
cution of  the  Magians  and  their  most  powerful  adherents,'^ 
which  caused  him  to  be  held  in  detestation  by  his  subjects, 
and  has  helped  to  attach  to  his  name  the  epithets  of   "Al- 
Khasha,"  "the Harsh," and  " Al-Athim,"  "the  Wicked.'"'  But 
the  persecution  did  not  continue  long.     The  excessive  zeal  of 
Abdaas  after  a  while  provoked  a  reaction;  and  Isdigerd,  de- 
serting the  cause  which  he  had  for  a  time  espoused,  threw 
himself  (with  all  the  zeal  of  one  who,  after  nearly  embrac- 
ing truth,  relapses  into  error)  into  the  arms  of  the  opposite 
party.     Abdaas  had  ventured  to  burn  down  the  great  Fire- 
Temple  of  Ctesiphon,  and  had  then  refused  to  rebuild  it."    Is- 
digerd authorized  the  Magian  hierarchy  to  retaliate  by  a  gen- 
eral destruction  of  the  Christian  churches  throughout  the  Per- 
sian dominions,  and  by  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  all  those 
who  acknowledged  themselves  to  believe  the  Gospel.  °*    A  fear- 
ful slaughter  of  the  Christians  in  Persia  followed  during  five 
years;''  some,  eager  for  the  eartlily  glory  and  the  heavenly  re- 
wards of  martyrdom,  were  forward  to  proclaim  themselves 
members  of  the  obnoxious  sect ;  others,  less  courageous  or  less 
inclined  to  self-assertion,  sought  rather  to  conceal  their  creed ; 
but  these  latter  were  carefully  sought  out,  both  in  the  towns 
and  in  the  country  districts, '"  and  when  convicted  were  relent- 
lessly put  to  death.    Nor  was  mere  dea,th  regarded  as  enough. 
The  victims  were  subjected,  besides,  to  cruel  sufferings  of  vai*i- 
ous  kinds,"  and  the  greater  number  of  them  expired  under 
torture.'"    Thus  Isdigerd  alternately  oppressed  the  two  relig- 
ious professions,  to  one  or  other  of  which  belonged  the  great 
mass  of  his  subjects;  and,  having  in  this  way  given  both 
parties  reason  to  hate  him,  earned  and  acquired  a  unanimity 
of  execration  which  has  but  seldom  been  the  lot  of  persecuting 
monarchs. 

At  the  same  time  that  Isdigerd  alloAved  this  violent  persecu- 
tion of  the  Christians  in  his  own  kingdom  of  Persia,  he  als9 


390  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xin,' 

sanctioned  an  attempt  to  extirpate  Christianity  in  the  de^ 
pendent  country  of  Armenia.  Varahran-Sapor,  the  successor 
of  Chosroes,  had  mled  the  territory  quietly  and  peaceably  for 
twenty -one  years/'  He  died  a.d.  412,  leaving  behind  him  a 
single  son,  Artases,  who  was  at  his  father's  death  aged  no 
more  than  ten  years. ^°  Under  these  circumstances,  Isaac,  the 
Metropolitan  of  Armenia,  proceeded  to  the  court  of  Ctesiphon, 
and  petitioned  Isdigerd  to  replace  on  the  Armenian  throne  the 
prince  who  had  been  deposed  twenty-one  years  earlier,  and 
who  was  still  a  prisoner  on  parole*'  in  the  "Castle  of  ObHvion" 
— viz.  Chosroes.  Isdigerd  acceded  to  the  request;  and  Chos- 
roes was  released  from  confinement  and  restored  to  the  throne 
from  which  he  had  been  expelled  by  Varahran  IV.  in  A.D, 
391.  He,  however,  survived  his  elevation  only  a  year.  Upon 
his  decease,  a.d.  413,  Isdigerd  selected  for  the  viceroyship,  not 
an  Arsacid,  not  even  an  Armenian,  but  his  own  son.  Sapor, 
whom  he  forced  upon  the  reluctant  provincials,  compelling 
them  to  acknowledge  him  as  monarch  (a.d.  413-414).  Sapor 
was  instructed  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the  Armenian  no- 
bles, by  inviting  them  to  visit  him,  by  feasting  them,  making 
them  presents,  holding  friendly  converse  with  them,  hunting 
with  them ;  and  was  bidden  to  use  such  influence  as  he  might 
obtain  to  convert  the  chiefs  from  Christianity  to  Zoroastrian- 
ism.  The  young  prince  appears  to  have  done  his  best;  but 
the  Armenians  were  obstinate,  resisted  his  blandishments,  and 
remained  Christians  in  spite  of  all  his  efforts.  He  reigned" 
from  a.d.  414  to  418,  at  the  end  of  which  time,  learning  that 
his  father  had  fallen  into  ill  health,  he  quitted  Armenia  and 
returned  to  the  Persian  court,  in  order  to  press  his  claims  to 
the  succession.  Isdigerd  died  soon  afterwards"  (a.d.  419  or 
420) ;  and  Sapor  made  an  attempt  to  seize  the  throne ;  but 
there  was  another  pretender  whose  partisans  had  more 
strength,  and  the  viceroy  of  Armenia  was  treacherously  as- 
sassinated in  the  palace  of  his  father."  Armenia  remained 
for  three  years  in  a  state  of  anarchy ;  and  it  was  not  till  Va- 
rahran V.  had  been  for  some  time  established  upon  the  Persian 
throne  that  Artases  was  made  viceroy,  under  the  name  of 
Artasiris  or  Artaxerxes."^ 

The  coins  of  Isdigerd  I.  are  not  remarkable  as  works  of  art ; 
but  they  possess  some  features  of  interest.  They  are  numerous, 
and  appear  to  have  been  issued  from  various  mints,"  but  all 
bear  ahead  of  the  same  type.  [PI.  XXI.,  Fig.  1.]  It  is  that 
of  a  middle-aged  man,  with  a  short  beard  and  hair  gathered 


cii.  xm.J  Mis  VHARACTmi  §01 

behind  the  head  in  a  cluster  of  curls.  The  distinguishing  mark 
is  the  head-dress,  which  has  the  usual  inflated  ball  above  a 
fragment  of  the  old  mural  crown,  and  further  bears  a  crescent 
in  front.  The  reverse  has  the  usual  fire-altar  with  supporters, 
and  is  for  the  most  part  very  rudely  executed."  The  ordinary 
legend  is,  on  the  obverse,  Mazdisn  hag  ramashtras  Izdikerti, 
malkan  malka  Airan,  or  "the  Ormazd-worshipping  divine 
most  peaceful  Isdigerd,  king  of  the  kings  of  Iran;"  and  on 
the  reverse,  Ramashtras  Izdikerti,  "the  most  peaceful  Isdi- 
gerd." In  some  cases,  there  is  a  second  name,  associated  with 
that  of  the  monarch,  on  the  reverse,  a  name  which  reads 
either  "Ardashatri"  (Artaxerxes)**  or,  "Varahran.""  It  has 
been  conjectured  that,  where  the  name  of  "Artaxerxes"  oc- 
curs, the  reference  is  to  the  founder  of  the  empire ;""  while  it 
is  admitted  that  the  "  Varahran"  intended  is  almost  certainly 
Isdigerd's  son  and  successor,^'  Varahran  V.,  the  "Bahram- 
Gur"  of  the  modern  Persians.  Perhaps  a  more  reasonable  ac- 
count of  the  matter  would  be  that  Isdigerd  had  originally  a 
son  Artaxerxes,  whom  he  intended  to  make  his  successor,  but 
that  this  son  died  or  offended  him,  and  that  then  he  gave  his 
place  to  Varahran. 

The  character  of  Isdigerd  is  variously  represented.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Oriental  writers,  he  had  by  nature  an  excellent  dis- 
position, and  at  the  time  of  his  accession  was  generally  re- 
garded as  eminently  sage,  prudent,  and  virtuous;  but  his 
conduct  after  he  became  king  disappointed  all  the  hopes  that 
had  been  entertained  of  him.  He  was  violent,  cruel,  and  pleas- 
ure-seeking; he  broke  all  laws  human  and  divine;  he  plun- 
dered the  rich,  ill-used  the  poor,  despised  learning,  left  those 
who  did  him  a  service  unrewarded,  suspected  everybody." 
He  wandered  continually  about  his  vast  empire,  not  to  benefit 
his  subjects,  but  to  make  them  all  suffer  equally."  In  curious 
contrast  with  these  accounts  is  the  picture  drawn  of  him  by 
the  Western  authors,  who  celebrate  his  magnanimity  and  his 
virtue/*  his  peaceful  temper,  his  faithful  guardianship  of  Theo- 
dosius,  and  even  his  exemplary  piety.  ^*  A  modern  writer" 
has  suggested  that  he  was  in  fact  a  wise  and  tolerant  prince, 
whose  very  mildness  and  indulgence  offended  the  bigots  of  his 
own  country,  and  caused  them  to  represent  his  character  in 
the  most  odious  light,  and  do  their  utmost  to  blacken  his 
memory.  But  this  can  scarcely  be  accepted  as  the  true  ex- 
planation of  the  discrepancy.  It  appears  from  the  ecclesiasti- 
cal laistorians"  that,  whatever  other  good  qualities  Isdigerd 


g92 


TBti  SEVENTH  MONARGBt. 


tcfl.  xiit 


may  have  possessed,  tolerance  at  any  rate  was  not  among  his 
virtues.  Induced  at  one  time  by  Christian  bishops  almost  to 
embrace  Christianity,  he  violently  persecuted  the  professors 
of  the  old  Persian  religion.  Alarmed  at  a  later  period  by  the 
excessive  zeal  of  his  Christian  preceptors,  and  probably  fearful 
of  provoking  rebellion  among  his  Zoroastrian  subjects,  he 
turned  around  upon  his  late  friends,  and  treated  them  with 
a  cruelty  even  exceeding  that  previously  exhibited  towards 
their  adversaries.  It  was  probably  this  twofold  persecution 
that,  offending  both  professions,  attached  to  Isdigerd  in  his 
own  country  the  character  of  a  harsh  and  bad  monarch.  For- 
eigners, who  did  not  suffer  from  his  caprices  or  his  violence, 
might  deem  him  magnanimous  and  a  model  of  virtue.  His 
own  subjects  Avith  reason  detested  his  rule,  and  branded  his 
memory  with  the  well-deserved  epithet  of  Al-Athim,  "the 
Wicked." 

A  curious  tale  is  told  as  to  the  death  of  Isdigerd.  He  was 
stUl  in  the  full  vigor  of  manhood  when  one  day  a  horse  of  rare 
beauty,  without  bridle  or  caparison,  came  of  its  own  accord 
and  stopped  before  the  gate  of  his  palace.  The  news  was  told 
to  the  king,  who  gave  orders  that  the  strange  steed  should  be 
saddled  and  bridled,  and  prepared  to  mount  it.  But  the  animal 
reared  and  kicked,  and  would  not  allow  any  one  to  come  near, 
till  the  king  hiaiself  approached,  when  the  creature  totally 
changed  its  mood,  appeared  gentle  and  docile,  stood  perfectly 
stin,  and  allowed  both  saddle  and  bridle  to  be  put  on.  The 
crupper,  however,  needed  some  arrangement,  and  Isdigerd  in 
full  confidence  proceeded  to  complete  his  task,  when  su'^denly 
the  horse  lashed  out  with  one  of  his  hind  legs,  and  dealt  the 
imfortunate  prince  a  blow  which  killed  him  on  the  spot.  The 
animal  then  set  off  at  speed,  disembarrassed  itself  of  its  ac- 
coutrements, and  galloping  away  was  never  seen  any  more.  ^^ 
The  modern  historian  of  Persia  compresses  the  tale  into  a 
single  phrase, "  and  tells  us  that  ' '  Isdigerd  died  from  the  kick 
of  a  horse :"  but  the  Persians  of  the  time  regarded  the  occur- 
rence as  an  answer  to  their  prayers,  and  saw  in  the  wild  steed 
an  angel  sent  by  God/* 


I 


Off.  xrv.]  VAlLillliA^''  r.  BECOMES  KlKG.  393 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Internal  Troubles  on  the  Death  of  Isdigerd  I.  Accession  of 
Varahran  V.  His  Persecution  of  the  Christians.  His 
War  with  Rome.  His  Relations  with  Armenia  from  a.d. 
422  to  A.D.  428.  His  Wars  ivith  the  Scythic  Tribes  or* 
his  Eastern  Frontier.  His  Strange  Death.  His  Coins. 
His  Character. 

ETrel  'Icr6tye'pS7)S  voaJjaa?  t'f  avOpioTriov  r)(f)dvi<TTO,  inriXdev  es  'Fiofiaiiai'  rrjv  yrfv  OvapapavTji  6 
rifpcruii'  ^ao-iAeiis  crrpaTip  /ueyaAo). — Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2. 

It  would  seem  that  at  the  death  of  Isdigerd  there  was  some 
difficulty  as  to  the  succession.  Varahran,  whom  he  had  des- 
ignated as  his  heir, '  appears  to  have  been  absent  from  the  capi- 
tal at  the  time;  while  another  son,  Sapor,  who  had  held  the 
Armenian  throne  from  a.d.  414  to  418,  Avas  present  at  the  seat 
of  government,  and  bent  on  pushing  his  claims.^  Varahran,  if 
we  may  believe  the  Oriental  writers,  who  are  here  unanimous,' 
had  been  educated  among  the  Arab  tribes  dependent  on  Persia, 
who  now  occupied  the  greater  portion  of  Mesopotamia.  His 
training  had  made  him  an  Arab  rather  than  a  Persian ;  and  he 
was  believed  to  have  inherited  the  violence,  the  pride,  and  the 
cruelty  of  his  father.*  His  countrymen  were  thererore  re- 
solved that  they  would  not  allow  him  to  be  king.  Neither 
were  they  inclined  to  admit  the  claims  of  Sapor,  whose 
government  of  Armenia  had  not  been  particularly  success- 
ful,^ and  whose  recent  desertion  of  his  proper  post  for  the 
advancement  of  his  own  private  interests  was  a  crime  against 
his  country  which  deserved  punishment  rather  than  reward. 
Armenia,  had  actually  revolted  as  soon  as  he  quitted  it,  had 
iriven  out  the  Persian  garrison,"  and  was  a  prey  to  rapine  and 
disorder.  We  cannot  be  surprised  that,  under  these  circum- 
stances, Sapor's  machinations  and  hopes  were  abruptly  termi- 
nated, soon  after  liis  father's  demise,  by  his  own  murder.  The 
nobles  and  chief  Magi  took  affairs  into  their  own  hands.'  In- 
stead of  sending  for  Varahran,  or  aAvaiting  his  arrival,  they 
selected  for  king  a  descendant  of  Artaxerxes  I.  only  remotely 
related  to  Isdigerd— a  prince  of  the  nnnie  of  Chosroes — and 
formally  placed  him  upon  the  throne.  But  Varahran  was  not 
willing  to  cede  his  rights.     Havmg  persuaded  the  Arabs  to 


394  Tli^  SEVENTH  MONAiiCHT.  [en.  %vf. 

embrace  his  cause,  he  inarched  upon  Ctesiphon  at  the  head  of 
a  large  force,  and  by  some  means  or  other,  most  probably  by 
the  terror  of  his  arms,*  prevailed  upon  Chosroes,  the  nobles, 
and  the  Magi,  to  submit  to  him.  The  people  readily  acquiesced 
in  the  change  of  masters;  Chosroes  descended  into  a  private 
station,  and  Varahran,  son  of  Isdigerd,  became  king. 

Varahran  seems  to  have  ascended  the  throne  in  a.d.  420.® 
He  at  once  threw  himself  into  the  hands  of  the  priestly  party, 
and,  resuming  the  persecution  of  the  Christians  which  his 
father  had  carried  on  during  liis  later  years,  showed  himself, 
to  one  moiety  of  his  subjects  at  any  rate,  as  bloody  and  cruel 
as  the  late  monarch. '"  Tortures  of  various  descriptions  were 
employed;"  and  so  grievous  was  the  pressure  put  upon  the 
followers  of  Christ  that  in  a  short  time  large  numbers  of  the 
persecuted  sect  quitted  the  country,  and  placed  themselves 
under  the  protection  of  the  Romans.  Varahran  had  to  con- 
sider whether  he  would  quietly  allow  the  escape  of  these 
criminals,  or  would  seek  to  enforce  his  will  upon  them  at  the 
risk  of  a  riipture  with  Rome.  He  preferred  the  bolder  line  of 
conduct.  His  ambassadors  were  instructed  to  require  the  sur- 
render of  the  refugees  at  the  court  of  Constantinople;'^  and 
when  Theodosius,  to  his  honor,  indignantly  rejected  the 
demand,  they  had  orders  to  protest  against  the  emperor's 
decision,  and  to  threaten  him  with  their  master's  vengeance. 

It  happened  that  at  the  time  there  were  some  other  out- 
standing disputes,  which  caused  the  relations  of  the  two  em- 
pires to  be  less  amicable  than  was  to  be  desired.  The  Persians 
had  recently  begun  to  work  their  gold  mines,  and  had  hired 
experienced  persons  from  the  Romans,  whose  services  they 
found  so  valuable  that  when  the  period  of  the  hiring  was  ex- 
pired they  would  not  suffer  the  miners  to  quit  Persia  and 
return  to  their  homes.  They  are  also  said  to  have  ill-used  the 
Roman  merchants  who  traded  in  the  Persian  territories,  and 
to  have  actually  robbed  them  of  their  merchandise. " 

These  causes  of  complaint  were  not,  however,  it  would 
seem,  brought  forward  by  the  Romans,  who  contented  them- 
selves with  simply  refusing  the  demand  for  the  extradition  of 
the  Christian  fugitives,  and  refrained  from  making  any 
counter-claims.  But  their  moderation  was  not  appreciated-, 
and  the  Persian  monarch,  on  learning  that  Rome  would  not 
restore  the  refugees,  declared  the  peace  to  be  at  an  end,  and 
immediately  made  preparations  for  war.  The  Romans  had, 
however,  anticipated  his  decision,  and  took  the  field  in  force 


CH.  xtv.]  WAIi  REis^EWED    WITH  ROME.  395 

before  the  Persians  were  ready.  The  command  was  entrusted 
to  a  general  bearing  the  strange  name  of  Ardaburius,  '*  who 
marched  his  troops  through  Armenia  into  the  fertile  province 
of  Arzanene,  '^  and  there  defeated  Narses, '"  the  leader  whom 
Varahran  had  sent  against  him.  Proceeding  to  plunder 
Arzanene,  Ardaburius  suddenly  heard  that  his  adversary  was 
about  to  enter  the  Eoman  province  of  Mesopotamia,  which 
was  denuded  of  troops,  and  seemed  to  invite  attack.  Hastily 
concluding  his  raid,  he  passed  from  Arzanene  into  the  threat- 
ened district,  and  was  in  time  to  prevent  the  invasion  intended 
by  Narses,  who,  when  he  found  his  designs  forestalled,  threw 
himself  into  the  fortress  of  Nisibis,  and  there  stood  on  the 
defensive.  Ardaburius  did  not  feel  himself  strong  enough  to 
invest  the  town;  and  for  some  time  the  two  adversaries  re- 
mained inactive,  each  watching  the  other.  It  was  during  this 
interval  that  (if  we  may  credit  Socrates)  the  Persian  general 
sent  a  challenge  to  the  Roman,  inviting  him  to  fix  time  and 
place  for  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  two  armies.  Arda- 
burius prudently  declined  the  overture,  remarking  that  the 
Rojnans  were  not  accustomed  to  fight  battles  when  their 
enemies  wished,  but  when  it  suited  themselves.  Soon  after- 
wards he  found  himself  able  to  illustrate  his  meaning  by  his 
actions.  Having  carefully  abstained  from  attacking  Nisibis 
while  his  strength  seemed  to  liim  insufficient,  he  suddenly, 
upon  receiving  large  reinforcements  from  Theodosius,  changed 
his  tactics,  and,  invading  Persian  Mesopotamia,  marched  upon 
the  stronghold  held  by  Narses,  and  formally  commenced  its 
siege. 

Hitherto  Varahran,  confident  in  his  troops  or  his  good 
fortune,  had  left  the  entire  conduct  of  the  military  operations 
to  his  general ;  but  the  danger  of  Nisibis— that  dearly  won  and 
liighly  prized  possession"— seriously  alarmed  bun,  and  made 
him  resolve  to  take  the  field  in  person  with  all  his  forces.  En- 
listing on  his  side  the  services  of  his  friends  the  Arabs,  under 
their  great  sheikh,  Al-Amundarus  (Moundsir),"  and  collecting 
together  a  strong  body  of  elephants,  '^  he  advanced  to  the  re- 
lief of  the  beleaguered  town.  Ardaburius  drew  off  on  his  ap- 
proach, burned  his  seige  artillery,  and  retired  from  before  the 
place.  Nisibis  was  preserved ;  but  soon  afterwards  a  disaster 
is  said  to  have  befallen  the  Arabs,  who,  believing  themselves 
about  to  be  attacked  by  the  Roman  force,  were  sei^ied  with  a 
sudden  panic,  and,  rushing  in  headlong  flight  to  the  Eu- 
phrates ( !)  threw  themselves_into  its  waters,  encumbered  with 


SOB  i'nE  BBVEKTn  MONARCH  f.  [cs.  xiV, 

their  clothes  cincl  arms,  and  there  perished  to  the  numher  of  a 
hundred  thousand." 

The  remaining  circumstances  of  the  war  are  not  related  by 
our  authorities  in  chronological  sequence.  But  as  it  is  certain 
that  the  war  lasted  only  two  years,"'  and  as  the  events  above 
narrated  certainly  belong  to  the  earlier  portion  of  it,  and 
seem  sufficient  for  one  campaign,  we  may  perhaps  be  justified 
in  assigning  to  the  second  year,  a.d.  421,  the  other  details 
-.  recorded — viz.,  the  siege  of  Theodosiopolis,  the  combat  be- 
tween Areobindus  and  Ardazanes,  the  second  victory  of  Arda- 
burius,  and  the  destruction  of  the  remnant  of  the  Arabs  by 
Vitianus. 

TheodosiopoHs  was  a  city  built  by  the  reigning  emperor, 
Theodosius  II.,  in  the  Roman  portion  of  Armenia,  near  the 
sources  of  the  Euphrates."  It  was  defended  by  strong  walls, 
lofty  towers,  and  a  deep  ditch."  Hidden  channels  conducted 
an  unfailing  supply  of  water  into  the  heart  of  "the  place,  and 
the  public  granaries  were  large  and  generally  well  stocked 
with  provisions."  This  town,  recently  built  for  the  defence  of 
the  Roman  Armenia,  was  (it  would  seem)  attacked  in  a.d.  431 
by  Varahran  in  person."  He  besieged  it  for  above  thirty 
days,  and  employed  against  it  all  the  means  of  capture  which 
were  known  to  the  military  art  of  the  period.  But  the  de- 
fence was  ably  conducted  by  the  bishop  of  the  city,  a  certain 
Eunomius,  who  was  resolved  that,  if  he  could  prevent  it,  an 
infidel  and  persecuting  monarch  should  never  lord  it  over  his 
see.  Eunomius  not  merely  animated  the  defenders,  but  took 
part  personally  in  the  defence,  and  even  on  one  occasion  dis- 
charged a  stone  from  a  balista  with  his  own  hand,  and  killed 
a  prince  who  had  not  confined  himself  to  his  military  duties, 
but  had  insulted  the  faith  of  the  besieged.  The  death  of  this 
^  ofiicer  is  said  to  have  induced  Varahran  to  retire,  and  not 
further  molest  Theodosiopolis." 

While  the  fortified  towns  on  either  side  thus  maintained 
themselves  against  the  attacks  made  on  them,  Theodosius,  we 
are  told,"  gave  an  independent  command  to  the  patrician 
Procopius,  and  sent  him  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  troops  to  op- 
pose Varahran.  The  armies  met,  and  were  on  the  point  of 
engaging  when  the  Persian  monarch  made  a  proposition  to 
decide  the  war,  not  by  a  general  battle,  but  by  a  single  combat. 
Procopius  assented ;  and  a  warrior  was  selected  on  either  side, 
the  Persians  choosing  for  their  champion  a  certain  Ardazanes, 
and    the    Romans     "Areobindus    the    Goth,"    count    of   tha 


ca.  XIV.]    VAUAHRAN  MAKES  PEACE   WTTH  ROME.        397 

"FcBderati."  In  the  conflict  which  followed  the  Persian 
charged  his  adversary  with  his  spear,  but  the  nimble  Goth 
avoided  the  thrust  by  leaning  to  one  side,  after  which  he  en- 
tangled Ardazanes  in  a  net,  and  then  despatched  him  with  his 
sword."  The  result  was  accepted  by  Varahran  as  decisive  of 
the  war,  and  he  desisted  from  any  further  hostilities.  Areo- 
bindus"  received  the  thanks  of  the  emperor  for  his  victory, 
and  twelve  years  later  was  rewarded  with  the  consulship. 

But  meanwhile,  in  other  portions  of  the  wide  field  over  which 
the  war  was  raging,  Rome  had  obtained  additional  successes, 
Ardaburius,  who  probably  still  commanded  in  Mesopotamia, 
had  drawn  the  Persian  force  opposed  to  him  into  an  ambus- 
cade, and  had  destroyed  it,  together  with  its  seven  generals.'" 
Vitianus,  an  officer  of  Avhom  nothing  more  is  known,  had  ex- 
terminated the  remnant  of  the  Arabs  not  drowned  in  the 
Euphrates. ''  The  war  had  gone  everywhere  against  the  Per- 
sians ;  and  it  is  not  imjirobable  that  Varahran,  before  the  close 
of  A.D.  421,  proposed  terms  of  peace.  ^^ 

Peace,  however,  was  not  exactly  made  till  the  next  year. 
Early  in  a.d.  422,  a  Homan  envoy,  byname  Maximus,  appeared 
in  the  camp  of  Varahran, '^  and,  when  taken  into  the  presence 
of  the  great  king,  stated  that  he  was  empowered  by  the  Ro- 
man generals  to  enter  into  negotiations,  but  had  had  no  com- 
munication Avith  the  Roman  emperor,  who  dwelt  so  far  off  that 
he  had  not  heard  of  the  war,  and  was  so  powerful  that,  if  he 
knew  of  it,  he  would  regard  it  as  a  matter  of  small  account. 
It  is  not  likely  that  Varahran  was  much  impressed  by  these 
falsehoods;  but  he  was  tired  of  the  war;  he  had  found  that 
Rome  could  hold  her  own,  and  that  he  was  not  likely  to  gain 
anything  by  prolonging  it;  and  he  was  in  difficulties  as  to 
provisions,'^  whereof  his  supply  had  run  short.  He  was  there- 
fore well  inclined  to  entertain  Maximus's  proposals  favorably. 
The  corps  of  the  "Immortals,"  however,  which  was  in  his 
camp,  took  a  different  view,  and  entreated  to  be  allowed  an 
opportunity  of  attacking  the  Romans  unawares,  while  they 
believed  negotiations  to  be  going  on,  considering  that  under 
such  circumstances  they  would  be  certain  of  victory.  Varah- 
ran, according  to  the  Roman  writer  who  is  here  our  sole 
authority,'''  consented.  The  Immortals  made  their  attack,  and 
the  Romans  were  at  first  in  some  danger ;  but  the  unexpected 
arrival  of  a  reinforcement  saved  them,  and  the  Immortals 
were  defeated  and  cut  off  to  a  man.  After  this,  Varahran 
made  peace  with  Rome  through  the  instrumentality  of  Maxi- 


8^8  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  Jtiv. 

mus,^' consenting,  it  would  seem,  not  merely  that  Rome  should 
harbor  the  Persian  Christians,  if  she  pleased,  but  also  that  all 
persecution  of  Christians  should  henceforth  cease  throughout 
his  own  empire." 

The  formal  conclusion  of  peace  was  accompanied,  and  per- 
haps helped  forward,  by  the  well-judging  charity  of  an  ad- 
mirable prelate.  Acacius,  bishop  of  Amida,  pitying  the  con- 
dition of  the  Persian  prisoners  whom  the  Romans  had  captured 
during  their  raid  into  Arzanene,  and  were  dragging  off  into 
slavery,  interposed  to  save  them  ;  and,  em^Dloying  for  the  pur- 
pose all  the  gold  and  silver  jDlate  that  he  could  find  in  the 
churches  of  his  diocese,  ransomed  as  many  as  seven  thousand 
captives,  supplied  their  immediate  wants  with  the  utmost  ten- 
derness, and  sent  them  to  Varahran,  ^^  who  can  scarcely  have 
failed  to  be  impressed  by  an  act  so  unusual  in  ancient  times. 
Our  sceptical  historian  remarks,  with  more  apparent  sincerity 
than  usual,  that  this  act  was  calculated  "to  inform  the  Per- 
sian king  of  the  true  spirit  of  the  religion  which  he  perse- 
cuted," and  that  the  name  of  the  doer  might  well  "have 
dignified  the  saintly  calendar.'"'*  These  remarks  are  just; 
and  it  is  certainly  to  be  regretted  that,  among  the  many  un- 
known or  doubtful  names  of  canonized  Christians  to  which 
the  Church  has  given  her  sanction,  there  is  no  mention  made 
of  Acacius  of  Amida. 

Varahran  was  perhaps  the  more  disposed  to  conclude  his 
war  with  Eome  from  the  troubled  condition  of  liis  own  portion 
of  Armenia,  which  imperatively  required  his  attention.  Since 
the  withdrawal  from  that  region  of  his  brother  Sapor*"  in  a.d. 
418  or  419,  the  country  had  had  no  king.  It  had  fallen  into  a 
state  of  complete  anarchy  and  wretchedness;  no  taxes  were 
collected ;  the  roads  were  not  safe ;  the  strong  robbed  and  op- 
pressed the  weak  at  their  pleasure.*'  Isaac,  the  Armenian 
patriarch,  and  the  other  bishops,  had  quitted  their  sees  and 
taken  refuge  in  Roman  Armenia,  *^  where  they  were  received 
favorably  by  the  prefect  of  the  East,  AnatoHus,  who  no  doubt 
hoped  by  their  aid  to  win  over  to  his  master  the  Persian  divis- 
ion of  the  country.  Varahran's  attack  on  Theodosiopolis  had 
been  a  counter  movement,  and  had  been  designed  to  make  the 
Romans  tremble  for  their  own  possessions,  and  throw  them 
back  on  the  defensive.  But  the  attack  had  failed;  and  on  its 
failure  the  complete  loss  of  Armenia  probably  seemed  immi- 
nent. Varahran  therefore  hastened  to  make  peace  with  Rome, 
and,  having  so  done,  proceeded  to  give  his  attention  to  Arme- 


Vol.  Ill 


Plate  XXXV 


Umt- 


Statuf.  of  Sapor  I.  at  SiiAri-H  (BKSTonEnY 


...i 


PJaU  XXXVI 


Vol. 


HEAD-DEESS  OF  AN  UNKNO'WN  KING  Cafter  Tesier). 


CE.  XIV.]     PEB6ARMENIA  ABSORBED  INTO  PERSIA.  399 

nia,  with  the  view  of  placing  matters  there  on  a  satisfactory 
footing.  Convinced  that  he  could  not  retain  Armenia  unless 
with  the  good- will  of  the  nobles,"  and  believing  them  to  be 
deeply  attached  to  the  royal  stock  of  the  Arsacids,  he  brought 
forward  a  prince  of  that  noble  house,  named  Artases,  a  son  of 
Varahran-Sapor,  and,  investing  him  with  the  ensigns  of  royalty, 
made  him  take  the  illustrious  name  of  Artaxerxes,  and  de- 
livered into  his  hands  the  entire  government  of  the  country. 
These  proceedings  are  assigned  to  the  year  a.d.  422,^*  the  year 
of  the  peace  with  Rome,  and  must  have  followed  very  shortly 
after  the  signature  of  the  treaty. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  this  arrangement  would 
have  satisfied  the  nobles  of  Armenia,  and  have  given  that  un- 
happy country  a  prolonged  period  of  repose.  But  the  personal 
character  of  Artaxerxes  was,  unfortunately,  bad;  the  Arme- 
nian nobles  were,  perhaps,  capricious ;  and  after  a  trial  of  six 
years  it  was  resolved  that  the  rule  of  the  Arsacid  monarch 
could  not  be  endured,  and  that  Varahran  should  be  requested 
to  make  Armenia  a  province  of  his  empire,  and  to  place  it 
under  the  government  of  a  Persian  satrap."  The  movement 
was  resisted  with  all  his  force  by  Isaac,  the  patriarch,  who  ad  ■ 
niitted  the  profligacy  of  Artaxerxes  and  deplored  it,  but  held 
that  the  role  of  a  Christian,  however  lax  he  might  be,  was  to 
be  preferred  to  that  of  a  heathen,  however  virtuous.^"  The 
nobles,  however,  were  determined ;  and  the  opposition  of  Isaac 
had  no  other  result  than  to  involve  him  in  the  fall  of  his  sov- 
ereign. Appeal  was  made  to  the  Persian  king  ;*'  and  Varahran, 
in  solemn  state,  heard  the  charges  made  against  Artaxerxes 
by  his  subjects,  and  listened  to  his  reply  to  them.  At  the  end 
he  gave  his  decision.  Artaxerxes  was  pronounced  to  have 
forfeited  his  crown,  and  was  deposed ;  his  property  was  confis- 
cated, and  his  person  committed  to  safe  custody.  The  mon- 
archy was  declared  to  be  at  an  end ;  and  Persarmenia  was  de- 
livered into  the  hands  of  a  Persian  governor."  The  patriarch 
Isaac  was  at  the  same  time  degraded  from  his  office  and  de- 
tained in  Persia  as  a  prisoner.  It  was  not  till  some  years  later 
that  he  was  released,  allowed  to  return  into  Armenia,  and  to 
resume,  under  certain  restrictions,  his  episcopal  functions.*' 

The  remaining  circumstances  of  the  reign  of  Varahran  V. 
come  to  us  wholly  through  the  Oriental  writers,  amid  whose 
exaggerations  and  fables  it  is  very  dilRcult  to  discern  the 
truth.  There  can,  however,  be  little  doubt  that  it  was  during 
lh«  reign  of  this  prince  that  those  terrible  struggles  commenced 


400  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  XTV. 

between  tlie  Persians  and  their  neighbors  upon  the  north-east 
which  continued,  from  the  early  part  of  the  fifth  till  the  mid- 
dle of  the  sixth  century,  to  endanger  the  very  existence  of  the 
empire.  Various  names  are  given  to  the  people  with  whom 
Persia  waged  her  wars  during  this  period.  They  are  called 
Turks,"  Huns,^'  sometimes  even  Chinese, ^^  but  these  terms 
seem  to  be  used  in  a  vague  way,  as  "  Scythian"  was  by  the 
ancients;  and  the  special  ethnic  designation  of  the  people 
appears  to  be  quite  a  different  name  from  any  of  them.  It  is 
a  name  the  Persian  form  of  which  is  Ha'ithal  or  Ha'iatheleh,^^ 
the  Armenian  Hephthagh,^*  and  the  Greek  "  Ephthalites, "  or 
sometimes  "  Nephthahtes. "  "  Different  conjectures  have  been 
fonned  as  to  its  origin :  but  none  of  them  can  be  regarded  as 
more  than  an  ingenious  theory.^"  All  that  we  knoiv  of  the 
EphthaUtes  is  that  they  were  established  in  force,  during  the 
fifth  and  sixth  centuries  of  our  era,  in  the  regions  east  of  the 
Caspian,  especially  in  those  beyond  the  Oxus  river,  and  that 
they  were  generally  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  Scythic  or 
Finno-Turkic  population,  which,  at  any  rate  from  B.C.  200, 
had  become  powerful  in  that  region.  They  were  called 
"White  Huns"  by  some  of  the  Greeks;"  but  it  is  admitted 
that  they  were  quite  distinct  from  the  Huns  who  invaded 
Europe  under  Attila;'*  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the 
term  "Hun"  is  more  appropriate  to  them  than  that  of  Turk  or 
even  of  Chinese.  The  description  of  their  physical  character 
and  habits  left  us  by  Procopius,  wiio  wrote  when  they  were  at 
the  height  of  their  power,  is  decidedly  adverse  to  the  view  that 
they  were  really  Huns.  They  were  a  light-complexioned  race, 
whereas  the  Huns  were  decidedly  swart  f^  they  were  not  ill- 
looking,  whereas  the  Huns  were  hideous ;  they  were  an  agri- 
cultural people,  while  the  Huns  were  nomads ;  they  had  good 
laws,  and  were  tolerably  well  civilized,  but  the  Huns  were 
savages.  It  is  probable  that  they  belonged  to  the  Thibetic  or 
Turkish  stock,  which  has  always  been  in  advance  of  the  Fin- 
nic, and  has  shown  a  greater  aptitude  for  political  organiza- 
tion and  social  progress. 

We  are  told  that  the  war  of  Varahran  V.  with  this  people 
commenced  with  an  invasion  of  his  kingdom  by  their  Ehacan, 
or  Kahn,""  who  crossed  the  Oxus  with  an  army  of  25,000  (or, 
according  to  others,  of  250,000)  men,"'  and  carried  fire  and 
sword  into  some  of  the  most  fertile  provinces  of  Persia.  The 
rich  oasis,  known  as  Meru  or  Merv,  the  ancient  Margiana,  is 
especially  mentioned  as  overrun  by  his  troops,  ^'  which  are  said 


CH.  XIV.]  COMMENCEMENT  OF  EPIITIIALITE  WARS.  401 

by  some  to  have  crossed  the  Elburz  range  into  Khorassan  and 
to  have  proceeded  westward  as  far  as  Eei,  or  Rhages."  When 
news  of  the  hivasion  reached  the  Persian  court,  the  alarm  felt 
was  great ;  Varahran  was  pressed  to  assemble  liis  forces  at 
once  and  encounter  the  unknown  enemy;  he,  however,  pro- 
fessed complete  indifference,  said  that  the  Almighty  would  pre- 
serve the  empire,  and  that,  for  his  own  part,  he  Avas  going  to 
hunt  in  Azerbijan, "  or  Media  Atropatene.  During  his  absence 
the  government  could  be  conducted  by  Narses,  his  brother. 
All  Persia  was  now  thrown  into  consternation;  Varahran  was 
believed  to  have  lost  his  senses ;  and  it  was  thought  that  the 
only  prudent  course  was  to  despatch  an  embassy  to  the  Khacan, 
and  make  an  arrangement  with  him  by  which  Persia  should 
acknowledge  his  suzerainty  and  consent  to  pay  him  a  tribute."* 
Ambassadors  accordingly  were  sent ;  and  the  invaders,  satisfied 
with  the  offer  of  submission,  remained  in  the  position  which 
they  had  taken  up,  waiting  for  the  tribute,  and  keeping  slack 
guard,  since  they  considered  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear. 
Varahran,  however,  was  all  the  while  preparing  to  fall  upon 
them  imawares.  He  had  started  for  Azerbijan  with  a  small 
body  of  picked  warriors;"^  he  had  drawn  some  further  strength 
from  Armenia;"  he  proceeded  along  the  mountain  line 
through  Taberistan,  Hyrcania,  and  Nissa  (Nishapur),""  march- 
ing only  by  night,  and  carefully  masking  his  movements.  In 
this  way  he  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Merv  unobserved.  He 
then  planned  and  executed  a  night  attack  on  the  invading  army 
which  was  completely  successful.  Attacking  his  adversaries 
suddenly  and  in  the  dark — alarming  them,  moreover,  with 
strange  noises, ""  and  at  the  same  time  assaulting  them  with  the 
utmost  vigor — he  put  to  flight  the  entire  Tatar  army.  The 
Khan  himself  was  killed ;"  and  the  flying  host  was  pursued  to 
the  banks  of  the  Oxus.  The  whole  of  the  camp  equipage  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  victors ;  and  Khatoun,  the  wife  of  the 
great  Khan,  was  taken."'  The  plunder  was  of  enormous  value, 
and  comprised  the  royal  crown  with  its  rich  setting  of  pearls.  '* 
After  this  success,  Varahran,  to  complete  his  victory,  sent 
one  of  his  generals  across  the  Oxus  at  the  head  of  a  large  force, 
and  falling  upon  the  Tatars  in  their  own  country  defeated 
them  a  second  time  with  great  slaughter."  The  enemy  then 
prayed  for  peace,  which  was  gi-anted  them  by  the  victorious 
Varahran,  who  at  the  same  time  erected  a  column  to  mark  the 
boundary  of  his  empire  in  this  quarter,'''  and,  appointing  his 
brother  Narses  governor  of  Khorassan,  ordered  him  to  fix  his 


402  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  xiv. 

residence  at  Balkh,  and  to  prevent  the  Tatars  from  making 
incursions  across  the  Oxus."  It  appears  that  these  precautions 
were  successful,  for  we  hear  nothing  of  any  further  hostilities 
in  this  quarter  during  the  remainder  of  Varahran's  reign. 

The  adventures  of  Varahran  in  India,  and  the  enlargement 
of  his  dominions  in  that  direction  by  the  act  of  the  Indian  king, 
who  is  said  so  have  voluntarily  ceded  to  him  Mekran  and  Scinde 
in  return  for  his  services  against  the  Emperor  of  China, ^°  can- 
not be  regarded  as  historical.  Scarcely  more  so  is  the  story 
that  Persia  had  no  musicians  in  his  day,  for  which  reason  he 
apphed  to  the  Indian  monarch,  and  obtained  from  him  twelve 
thousand  performers,  who  became  the  ancestors  of  the  Lurs." 

After  a  reign  which  is  variously  estimated  at  nineteen, 
twenty,  twenty-one,  and  twenty-three  years, '^  Varahran  died 
by  a  death  which  would  have  been  thought  incredible,  had  not 
a  repetition  of  the  disaster,  on  the  traditional  site,  been  wit- 
nessed by  an  English  traveller  in  comparatively  recent  times. 
The  Persian  writers  state  that  Varahran  was  engaged  in  the 
hunt  of  the  wUd  ass,  when  his  horse  came  suddenly  upon  a  deep 
pool,  or  spring  of  water,  and  either  plunged  into  it  or  threw 
his  rider  into  it,  with  the  result  that  Varahran  sank  and  never 
reappeared. "  The  supposed  scene  of  the  incident  is  a  valley 
between  Ispahan  and  Shiraz.  Here,  in  1810,  an  English  soldier 
lost  his  life  through  bathing  in  the  spring  traditionally  declared 
to  be  that  which  proved  fatal  to  Varahran. ""  The  coincidence 
has  caused  the  general  acceptance  of  a  tale  which  would  prob- 
ably have  been  otherwise  regarded  as  altogether  romantic  and 
mythical. 

The  coins  of  Varahran  V.  are  chiefly  remarkable  for  their 
rude  and  coarse  workmanship  and  for  the  number  of  the  mintsf 
from  which  they  were  issued.  The  mint-marks  include  Ctesi- 
phon,  Ecbatana,  Isaphan,  Arbela,  Ledan,  Nehavend,  Assyria, 
Chuzistan,  Media,  and  Kerman,  or  Carmania.*'  The  ordinary 
legend  is,  upon  the  obverse,  Mazdisn  hag  Varahran  malka,  or 
Mazdisn  hag  Varahran  rasti  malJca,  and  on  the  reverse,  ' '  Var- 
ahran, "together  with  a  mint-mark.  The  head-dress  has  the 
mural  crown  in  front  and  behind,  but  interposes  between  these 
two  detached  fragments  a  crescent  and  a  circle,  emblems,  no 
doubt,  of  the  sun  and  moon  gods.  The  reverse  shows  the  usual 
fire-altar,  with  guards,  or  attendants,  watching  it.  The  king's 
head  appears  in  the  flame  upon  the  altar.     (PI.  xxi.  Fig.  2). 

According  to  the  Oriental  writers,  Varahran  V.  was  one  of 
the  best  of  the  Sassanian  princes.    He  carefully  administered 


CH.  XV.]  ACCESSION  OF  ISDIGERD  II.  403 

justice  among  his  numerous  subjects,  remitted  arrears  of  tax- 
ation, gave  pensions  to  men  of  science  and  letters,  encouraged 
agricultui^e,  and  was  extremely  liberal  in  the  relief  of  poverty 
and  distress/'  His  faults  were,  that  he  was  over-generous  and 
over-fond  of  amusements,  especially  of  the  chase.  The  nick- 
name of  "  Bahram-Gur,"  by  which  he  is  known  to  the  Orientals, 
marks  this  last-named  predilection,  transferring  to  him,  as  it 
does,  the  name  of  the  animal  which  was  the  especial  object  of 
his  pursuit."  But  he  was  almost  equally  fond  of  dancing  and 
of  games.'*  Still  it  does  not  appear  that  his  inclination  for 
amusements  rendered  Mm  neglectful  of  public  affairs,  or  at  all 
interfered  witn  his  administration  of  the  State.  Persia  is  said 
to  have  been  m  a  most  flourishing  condition  during  his  reign.  ^"^ 
He  may  not  have  gained  all  the  successes  that  are  ascribed  to 
him ;  but  he  was  undoubtedly  an  active  prince,  brave,  ener- 
getic, and  clear-sighted.  He  judiciously  brought  the  Eoman 
war  to  a  close  when  a  new  and  formidable  enemy  appeared  on 
his  north-eastern  frontier ;  he  wisely  got  rid  of  the  Armenian 
difficulty,  which  had  been  a  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  his 
predecessors  for  two  hundred  years ;  he  inflicted  a  check  on  the 
aggressive  Tatars,  which  indisposed  them  to  renew  hostilities 
with  Persia  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  It  would  seem  that  h^ 
did  not  much  appreciate  art ;""  but  he  encouraged  learning,  an^ 
did  his  best  to  advance  science. " 


CHAPTER  XV. 


.Eeign  of  Isdlgerd  II.  His  War  luith  Borne.  His  Nine  Years' 
War  ivith  the  Ephthalites.  His  Policy  toicards  Armenia. 
His  Second  Ephthalite  War.     His  Character.     His  Coins. 

Ovapapavrfs  .  .  .   napaSiSuxri  tiji'  ^aaiXeiau  'IcrSiyepSfi  Baripui  tu  olxeiio  irai.SC. — Agathias, 

iv.  37;  p.  137,  U. 

The  successor  of  Varahan  V.  was  his  son,  Isdigerd  the 
Second,  who  ascended  the  Persian  throne  without  opposition 
in  the  year  a.d.  440.'  His  first  act  was  to  declare  war  against 
Rome.  The  Roman  forces  were,  it  would  seem,  concentrated 
in  the  vicinity  of  Nisibis ;'  and  Isdigerd  may  have  feared  that 
they  would  make  an  attack  upon  the  place.  He  therefore 
anticipated  them,  and  invaded  the  empire  with  an  army  com- 


404  THE  SEVENTH  MONAllCHY.  [ch.  xv. 

posed  in  part  of  his  own  subjects,  but  in  part  also  of  troops 
from  the  surrounding  nations.  Saracens,  Tzani,  Isaurians, 
and  Huns  (EphthaHtes?)  served  under  his  standard;^  and  a 
sudden  incursion  was  made  into  the  Roman  territory,  for 
which  the  imperial  officers  were  wholly  unprepared.  A.  con- 
siderable impression  would  probably  have  been  produced,  had 
not  the  weather  proved  exceedingly  unpropitious.  Storms  of 
rain  and  haU  hindered  the  advance  of  the  Persian  troops,  and 
allowed  the  Roman  generals  a  breathing  space,  during  which 
they  collected  an  army."  But  the  Emperor  Theodosius  was 
anxious  that  the  flames  of  war  should  not  be  rehghted  in  this 
quarter;  and  his  instructions  to  the  prefect  of  the  East,  the 
Count  Anatohus,  ^  were  such  as  speedily  led  to  the  conclusion, 
first  of  a  truce  for  a  year,  and  then  of  a  lasting  treaty.  Ana- 
tolius  repaired  as  ambassador  to  the  Persian  camp,  on  foot 
and  alone,  so  as  to  place  himself  completely  in  Isdigerd's 
power — an  act  which  so  impressed  the  latter  that  (we  are  told) 
he  at  once  agreed  to  make  peace  on  the  terms  which  Anato- 
hus suggested.  °  The  exact  nature  of  these  terms  is  not  re- 
corded; but  they  contained  at  least  one  unusual  condition. 
The  Romans  and  Persians  agreed  that  neither  party  shovQd 
construct  any  new  fortified  post  in  the  vicinity  of  the  other's 
territory — a  loose  phrase  which  was  likely  to  be  variously 
interpreted,  and  might  easUy  lead  to  serious  complications. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  this  sudden  conclusion  of  peace 
by  a  young  prince,  evidently  anxious  to  reap  laurels,  who  in 
the  first  year  of  his  reign  had,  at  the  head  of  a  large  army, 
invaded  the  dominions  of  a  neighbor.  The  Roman  account, 
that  he  invaded,  that  he  was  practically  imopposed,  and  that 
then,  out  of  politeness  towards  the  prefect  of  the  East,  he 
voluntarily  retired  wdthin  his  own  frontier,  "having  done 
nothing  disagreeable,'"  is  as  improbable  a  narrative  as  we 
often  meet  with,  even  in  the  pages  of  the  Byzantine  historians. 
Something  has  evidently  been  kept  back.  If  Isdigerd  re- 
turned, as  Procopius  declares,  without  effecting  anything,  he 
must  have  been  recalled  by  the  occurrence  of  troubles  in  some 
other  part  of  his  empire.*  But  it  is,  perhaps,  as  likely  that  he 
retired,  simply  because  he  had  effected  the  object  with  which 
he  engaged  in  the  war.  It  was  a  constant  practice  of  the 
Romans  to  advance  their  frontier  by  building  strong  towns 
on  or  near  a  debatable  border,  which  attracted  to  them  the 
submission  of  the  neighboring  district.  The  recent  building  of 
TheodosiopoLLs^  in  the  eastern  part  of  Roman  Armenia  had 


( 


CH.  XV.]  BIS  ROMAN  WAR.,  405 

been  an  instance  of  this  practice.  It  was  perhaps  being  pur- 
sued elsewhere  along  the  Persian  border,  and  the  invasion  of 
Isdigerd  may  have  been  intended  to  check  it.  .  If  so,  the 
proviso  of  the  treaty  recorded  by  Procopius  would  have 
afforded  him  the  security  which  he  required,  and  have  ren- 
dered it  unnecessary  for  him  to  continue  the  war  any  longer. 

His  arms  shortly  afterward3  found  employment  in  another 
quarter.  The  Tatars  of  the  Transoxianian  regions  were  once 
more  troublesome;  and  in  order  to  check  or  prevent  the 
incursions  Avhich  they  were  always  ready  tg  make,  if  they 
were  unmolested,  Isdigerd  undertook  a  long  war  on  his  north- 
eastern frontier,  which  he  conducted  with  a  resolution  and 
perseverance  not  very  common  in  the  East.  Leaving  his 
vizier,  Mihr-Narses,  to  represent  him  at  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, he  transferred  his  own  residence  to  Nishapur, '"  in  the 
mountain  region  between  the  Persian  and  Kharesmian  deserts, 
and  from  that  convenient  post  of  observation  directed  the 
military  operations  against  his  active  enemies,  making  a 
campaign  against  them  regularly  every  year  from  A.  D.  443  to 
451.  In  the  year  last  mentioned  he  crossed  the  Oxus,  and, 
attacking  the  Ephthalites  in  their  own  territory,  obtained  a 
complete  success,  driving  the  monarch  from  the  cultivated 
portion  of  the  country,  and  forcing  him  to  take  refuge  in  the 
desert."  So  complete  was  his  victory  that  he  seems  to  have 
been  satisfied  with  the  result,  and,  regarding  the  war  as 
terminated,  to  have  thought  the  time  was  come  for  taking  in 
hand  an  arduous  task,  long  contemplated,  but  not  liitherto 
actually  attempted. 

This  was  no  less  a  matter  than  the  forcible  conversion  of 
Armenia  to  the  faith  of  Zoroaster.  It  has  been  already 
noted '^  that  the  religious  differences  which — fi-om  the  time 
when  the  Armenians,  anticipating  Constantine,  adopted  as 
the  religion  of  their  state  and  nation  the  Christian  faith  (ab. 
A.D.  300) — separated  the  Armenians  from  the  Persians,  were  a 
cause  of  weakness  to  the  latter,  more  especially  in  their 
contests  with  Rome.  Armenia  was  always,  natvirally,  upon 
the  Roman  side,  since  a  religious  sympathy  united  it  with  the 
the  court  of  Constantinople,  and  an  exactly  opposite  feeling 
tended  to  detach  it  from  the  court  of  Ctesiphon.  The  aliena- 
tion would  have  been,  comparatively  speaking,  unimportant, 
after  the  division  of  Armenia  between  the  two  powers,  had 
that  division  been  regarded  by  either  pai'ty  as  final,  or  as 
precluding  the  formation  of  designs  upon  tlie  territory  which 


406  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xy 

each  had  agreed  should  be  held  by  the  other.  But  ther© 
never  yet  had  been  a  time  when  such  designs  had  ceased  to  be 
entertained ;  and  in  the  war  which  Isdigerd  had  waged  with 
Theodosius  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign,  Eoman  intrigues  in 
Persarmenia  had  forced  him  to  send  an  army  into  that  covm- 
try. "  The  Persians  felt,  and  felt  with  reason,  that  so  long  as 
Armenia  remained  Christian  and  Persia  held  to  the  faith  of 
Zoroaster,  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  could  never  be 
really  friendly;  Persia  woidd  always  have  a  traitor  in  her 
own  camp;  and  in  any  time  of  difficulty — especially  in  any 
difficulty  with  Pome— might  look  to  see  this  portion  of  her 
territory  go  over  to  the  enemy.  We  cannot  be  surprised  if 
Persian  statesmen  were  anxious  to  terminate  so  unsatisfactory 
a  state  of  things,  and  cast  about  for  a  means  whereby  Arme- 
nia might  be  won  over,  and  made  a  real  friend  instead  of  a 
concealed  enemy. 

The  means  which  suggested  itself  to  Isdigerd  as  the  simplest 
and  most  natural  was,  as  above  observed,  the  conversion  of 
the  Armenians  to  the  Zoroastrian  religion.  In  the  early  part 
of  his  reign  he  entertained  a  hope  of  effecting  his  purpose  by 
persuasion,  and  sent  his  vizier,  Mihr-Narses,  into  the  country, 
with  orders  to  use  all  possible  peaceful  means — gifts,  blandish- 
ments, promises,  threats,  removal  of  malignant  chiefs— to 
induce  Armenia  to  consent  to  a  change  of  religion.'*  Mihr- 
Narses  did  his  best,  but  failed  signally.  He  carried  off  the 
chiefs  of  the  Christian  party,  not  only  from  Armenia,  but 
from  Iberia  and  Albania,  telling  them  that  Isdigerd  required 
their  services  against  the  Tatars,  and  forced  them  with  their 
followers  to  take  part  in  the  Eastern  war. '^  He  committed 
Armenia  to  the  care  of  the  Margrave,  Vasag,  a  native  prince 
who  was  well  inclined  to  the  Persian  cause,  and  gave  him 
instructions  to  bring  about  the  change  of  religion  by  a  policy 
of  conciliation.  But  the  Armenians  were  obstinate.  Neither 
throats,  nor  promises,  nor  persuasions  had  any  effect.  It  was 
in  vain  that  a  manifesto  was  issued,  painting  the  religion  of 
Zoroaster  in  the  brightest  colors,  and  requiring  aU  persons  to 
conform  to  it.  It  was  to  no  purpose  that  arrests  were  made, 
and  punishments  threatened.  The  Armenians  dechned  to 
yield  either  to  argument  or  to  menace ;  and  no  progress  at  all 
"was  made  in  the  direction  of  the  desired  conversion. 

In  the  year  a.d.  450,  the  patriarch  Joseph,  by  the  general 
desire  of  the  Armenians,  held  a  great  assembly,  at  which  it 
was  carried  by  acclamation  that  the  Armenians  were  Chris^ 


CH.  XV.]  ARMENIAN  WAR  OF  RELIGION.  407 

tians,  and  would  continue  such,  whatever  it  might  cost  them. 
If  it  was  hoped  by  this  to  induce  Isdigerd  to  lay  aside  his 
proselytizing  schemes,  the  hope  was  a  delusion.  Isdigerd 
retahated  by  summoning  to  his  presence  the  principal  cliiefs, 
viz.,  Vasag,  the  Margrave;"  the  Sparapet,  or  commander-in- 
chief,  Vartan,  the  Mamigonian;  Vazten,  prince  of  Iberia; 
Vatche,  king  of  Albania,  etc. ;  and  having  got  them  into  his 
power,  threatened  them  with  immediate  death,  unless  they  at 
once  renounced  Christianity  and  made  profession  of  Zoroastri- 
anism.  The  chiefs,  not  having  the  spirit  of  martyrs,  un- 
happily yielded,  and  declared  themselves  converts;  where- 
upon Isdigerd  sent  them  back  to  their  respective  countries, 
with  orders  to  force  everywhere  on  their  feUow-countrymen  a 
similar  change  of  religion. 

Upon  this,  the  Armenians  and  Iberians  broke  out  in  open 
revolt.  Vartan,  the  Mamigonian,  repenting  of  his  weakness, 
abjured  his  new  creed,  resumed  the  profession  of  Christianity, 
and  made  his  peace  with  Joseph,  the  patriarch."  He  then 
called  the  people  to  arms,  and  in  a  short  time  collected  a  force 
of  a  himdred  thousand  men.  Three  armies  were  formed,  to  act 
separately  under  different  generals.  One  watched  Azerbijan, 
or  Media  Atropatene,  whence  it  was  expected  that  their  main 
attack  would  be  made  by  the  Persians ;  another,  under  Var- 
tan, proceeded  to  the  relief  of  Albania,  where  proceedings 
were  going  on  similar  to  those  which  had  driven  Armenia 
into  rebellion;  the  third,  under  Vasag,  occupied  a  central 
position  in  Armenia,  and  was  intended  to  move  wherever 
danger  should  threaten.  '*  An  attempt  was  at  the  same  time 
made  to  induce  the  Eoman  emperor,  Marcian,  to  espouse  the 
cause  of  the  rebels,  and  send  troops  to  their  assistance;  but 
this  attempt  was  unsuccessful.  Marcian  had  but  recently 
ascended  the  throne,'*  and  was,  perhaps,  scarcely  fixed  in  his 
seat.  He  was  advanced  in  years,  and  naturally  unenterpris- 
ing. Moreover,  the  position  of  affairs  in  Western  Europe 
was  such  that  Marcian  might  expect  at  any  moment  to  be 
attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force  of  northern  barbarians, 
cruel,  warlike,  and  unsparing.  Attila  was  in  a.d.  451  at  the 
height  of  his  power;  he  had  not  yet  been  worsted  at  Cha- 
lons ; "  and  the  terrible  Huns,  whom  he  led,  might  in  a  few 
months  destroy  the  Western,  and  be  ready  to  fall  upon  the 
Eastern  empire.  Armenia,  consequently,  was  left  to  hor  own 
resources,  and  had  to  combat  the  Persians  single-handed. 
Even  so,  she  might  probably  have  succeeded,  have  maintained 


408  HTL  LLVENTB  MOj\'ALCIir.  [ch.  xv. 

her  Cliristianity,  or  even  recovered  her  independence,  had  her 
people  been  of  one  mind,  and  had  no  defection  from  the 
national  cause  manifested  itself.  But  Vasag,  the  Marzpan, 
had  always  been  half-hearted  in  the  quarrel;  and,  now  that 
the  crisis  was  come,  he  determined  on  going  wholly  over  to 
the  Persians.  He  was  able  to  carry  with  him  the  army  which 
he  commanded ;  and  thus  Armenia  was  divided  against  itself ; 
and  the  chance  of  victory  was  well-nigh  lost  before  the 
struggle  had  begun.  When  the  Persians  took  the  field  they 
found  half  Armenia  ranged  upon  their  side;  and,  though  a 
long  and  bloody  contest  followed,  the  end  was  certain  from 
the  beginning.  After  much  desultory  warfare,  a  great  battle 
was  fought  in  the  sixteenth  year  of  Isdigerd  (a.d.  455  or  456) 
between  the  Christian  Armenians  on  the  one  side,  and  the 
Persians,  with  their  Armenian  abettors,  on  the  other.  The 
Persians  were  victorious ;  Vartan,  and  his  brother,  Hemaiag, 
were  among  the  slain ;  and  the  patriotic  party  f oiuid  that  no 
further  resistance  was  possible."  The  patriarch,  Joseph,  and 
the  other  bishops,  were  seized,  carried  off  to  Persia,  and 
martyred.  Zoroastrianism  was  enforced  upon  the  Armenian 
nation.  AU  accepted  it,  except  a  few,  who  either  took  refuge 
in  the  dominions  of  Eome,  or  fled  to  the  mountain  fastnesses 
of  Kurdistan.-^ 

The  resistance  of  Armenia  was  scarcely  overborne,  when 
war  once  more  broke  out  in  the  East,  and  Isdigerd  was  forced 
to  turn  his  attention  to  the  defence  of  his  frontier  against  the 
aggressive  Ephthalites,  who,  after  remaining  quiet  for  three 
or  four  years,  had  again  flown  to  arms,  had  crossed  the  Oxus, 
and  invaded  Khorassan  in  force."  On  his  firet  advance  the 
Persian  monarch  was  so  far  successful  that  the  invading 
hordes  seems  to  have  retired,  and  left  Persia  to  itself;  but 
when  Isdigerd,  having  resolved  to  retaliate,  led  his  own  forces 
into  the  Ephthahte  country,  they  took  heart,  resisted  him, 
and,  having  tempted  him  into  an  ambuscade,  succeeded  in 
inflicting  upon  him  a  severe  defeat.  Isdigerd  was  forced  to 
retire  hastily  within  liis  own  borders,  and  to  leave  the  honors 
of  victory  to  his  assailants,  whose  triumph  must  have  en- 
couraged them  to  continue  year  after  year  their  destructive 
inroads  into  the  north-eastern  provinces  of  the  empire. 

It  was  not  long  after  the  defeat  which  he  stiffered  in  this 
quarter  that  Isdigerd's  reign  came  to  an  end.  He  died  a.d. 
457,  after  having  held  the  throne  for  seventeen  or  (according 
to    some)    for  nineteen  years. -^     He  was    a    prince  of   con- 


CH.  XV. J  COIXS  OF  ISDIOERD  II.  409 

siderable  ability,  determination,  and  courage.  That  his  sub- 
jects called  him  "the  Clement  ""is  at  first  sight  surprising, 
since  clemency  is  certainly  not  the  virtue  that  any  modern 
writer  would  think  of  associating  with  his  name.  But 
we  may  assume  from  the  application  of  the  terra  that,  where 
religious  considerations  did  not  come  into  play,  he  was 
fair  and  equitable,  mild-tempered,  and  disinclined  to  harsh 
punishments.  Unfortunately,  experience  tells  us  that  natural 
mildness  is  no  security  against  the  acceptance  of  a  bigot's 
creed;  and,  when  a  policy  of  persecution  has  once  been 
adopted,  a  Trajan  or  a  Valerian  will  be  as  unsparing  as  a 
Maximin  or  a  Galerius.  Isdigerd  was  a  bitter  and  successful 
persecutor  of  Christianity,  which  he — for  a  time  at  any  rate — 
stamped  out,  both  from  his  own  proper  dominions,  and  from 
the  newly-acquired  province  of  Armenia.  He  would  have  pre- 
ferred less  violent  means;  but,  when  they  failed,  he  felt  no 
scruples  in  employing  the  extremest  and  severest  coercion.  He 
was  determined  on  uniformity;  and  vmiformity  he  secured, 
but  at  the  cost  of  crushing  a  people,  and  so  alienating  them  as 
to  make  it  certain  that  they  would,  on  the  first  convenient 
occasion,  throw  off  the  Persian  yoke  altogether. 

The  coins  of  Isdigerd  II.  nearly  resemble  those  of  his  father, 
Varahran  V.,  differing  only  in  the  legend,  and  in  the  fact  that 
the  mural  crown  of  Isdigerd  is  complete."  The  legend  is  re- 
markably short,  being  either  Masdisn  kadi  Yezdikerti,  or 
merely  i^adi  Yezdikerti — i.e.  "the  Ormazd- worshipping  great 
Isdigerd;"  or  "Isdigerd  the  Great."  The  coins  are  not  very 
numerous,  and  have  three  mint-marks  only,  which  are  inter- 
preted to  mean  "Khuzistan,"  "Cte8iphon,"and  "Nehavend."" 
[PI.  XXI.,  Fig.  3.] 


410  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvt 


CHAPTER  XYT. 

Right  of  Succession  disputed  between  the  two  Sons  of  Is- 
>  digerd  II. ,  Perozes  (or  Firuz)  and  Hormisdas.  Civil  War 
i  for  two  years.     Success  of  Perozes,  through  aid  given  him 

by  the  Ephthalites.  Great  Famine.  Perozes  declares 
War  against  the  Ephthalites,  and  tnakes  an  Expedition 
into  their  Country.  His  ill  success.  Conditions  of  Peace 
granted  him.  Armenian  Revolt  and  War.  Perozes,  after 
some  years,  resumes  the  Ephthalite  War.  His  attach 
fails,  and  he  is  slain  in  battle.  Summary  of  his  Charac- 
ter. Coins  of  Hormisdas  III.  and  Perozes.  Vase  of 
Perozes. 

'Yazdejerdo  e  medio  sublato.  de  regno  contenderunt  duo  ipsius  fllii,  Phiruz  et 
Hormoz,  aliis  a  partibus  Firuzi,  aliis  ab  Hormozi  stantibus."— Eutych.  vol.  i. 
p.  100. 

On  the  death  of  Isdigerd  II.  (a.d.  457)  the  throne  was  seized 
by  his  younger  son, '  Hormisdas,  who  appears  to  have  owed 
his  elevation,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  partiality  of  his  father. 
That  monarch,  preferring  his  younger  son  above  his  elder,  had 
made  the  latter  governor  of  the  distant  Seistan,  and  had  thus 
removed  him  far  from  the  court,  while  he  retained  Hormisdas 
about  his  own  person.''    The  advantage  thus  secured  to  Hor- 
misdas enabled  him  when  his  father  died  to  make  himself 
king;  and  Perozes  was  forced,  we  are  told,  to  fly  the  country, 
and  place  himself  under  the  protection  of  the  Ephthalite  mon- 
arch, who  ruled  in  the  valley  of  the  Oxus,  over  Bactria,  Toka- 
ristan,   Badakshan,   and  other  neighboring  districts.*     This 
king,   who  bore  the  name  of  Khush-newaz,*  received  him 
favorably,  and  though  at  first,  out  of  fear  for  the  power  of  Per- 
sia, he  declined  to  lend  him  troops,  was  induced  after  a  whUe 
to  adopt  a  bolder  policy.     Hormisdas,  despite  his  epithet  of 
Ferzan,  "  the  Wise,"  ^  was  soon  at  varian6e  with  his  subjects, 
many  of  Avhom  gathered  about  Perozes  at  the  court  which  he 
was  allowed  to  maintain  in  Taleqan,  one  of  the  Ephthalite 
cities.     Supported  by  this  body  of  refugees,  and  by  an  Ephtha- 
lite contingent,^  Perozes  ventured    to    advance   against  his 
brother.     His  army,   which  was    commanded    by  a   certain 


CH.  XVI.]    HORMISDAS  III.  SUCCEEDED  BY  PEROZES.    411 

Raham,  or  Ram,  a  noble  of  the  Mihran  family,  attacked  the 
forces  of  Hormisdas,  defeated  them,  and  made  Hormisdas 
himself  a  prisoner. '  The  troops  of  the  defeated  monarch,  con- 
vinced by  the  logic  of  success,  deserted  their  late  leader's 
cause,  and  went  over  in  a  body  to  the  conqueror.  Perozes, 
after  somewhat  more  than  two  vears  of  exile,  was  acknowl- 
edged  as  king  by  the  whole  Persian  people,  and,  quittmg 
Taleqan,  estabhshed  himself  at  Ctesiphon,  or  Al  Modain, 
which  had  now  become  the  main  seat  of  government.  It  is 
uncertain  what  became  of  Hormisdas.  According  to  the 
Armenian  writers,*  Raham,  after  defeating  him,  caused  him  to 
be  put  to  death ;  but  the  native  historian,  Mirkhond,  declares 
that,  on  the  contrary,  Perozes  forgave  him  for  having  disputed 
the  succession,  and  amiably  spared  his  life. " 

The  civil  war  between  the  two  brothers,  short  as  it  was,  had 
lasted  long  enough  to  cost  Persia  a  province.  Vatche,  king  of 
Aghouank  (Albania)'"  took  advantage  of  the  time  of  disturb- 
ance to  throw  off  his  allegiance,  and  succeeded  in  making  him- 
self independent."  It  was  the  first  object  of  Perozes,  after 
establishing  himself  upon  the  throne,  to  recover  this  valuable 
territory.  He  therefore  made  war  upon  Vatche,  thought  that 
prince  was  the  son  of  his  sister,  and  with  the  help  of  his 
Ephthalite  allies,  and  of  a  body  of  Alans  whom  he  took  into 
his  service,  defeated  the  rebellious  Albanians  and  completely 
subjugated  the  revolted  country.  '^ 

A  time  of  prosperity  now  ensued.  Perozes  ruled  with  mode- 
ration and  justice. '^  He  dismissed  his  Ephthalite  allies  with 
presents  that  amply  contented  them, "  and  lived  for  five  years 
in  great  peace  and  honor.  But  in  the  seventh  year, "  from  the 
death  of  his  father,  the  prosperity  of  Persia  was  suddenly  and 
grievously  interrupted  by  a  terrible  drought,  a  calamity  where- 
t©  Asia  has  in  all  ages  been  subject,  and  which  often  produces 
the  most  frightful  consequences.  The  crops  fail ;  the  earth  be- 
comes parched  and  burnt  up ;  smiling  districts  are  change  into 
wildernesses;  fountains  and  brooks  cease  to  flow;  then  the 
wells  have  no  water ;  finally  even  the  great  rivers  are  reduced 
to  threads,  and  contain  only  the  scantiest  supply  of  the  life- 
giving  fluid  in  their  channels.  Famine  under  these  circum- 
stances of  necessity  sets  in ;  the  poor  die  by  hundreds ;  even 
the  rich  have  a  difficulty  in  sustaining  life  by  means  of  food 
imported  from  a  distance.  We  are  told  '°  that  the  drought  in 
the  reign  of  Perozes  was  such  that  at  last  there  was  not  a  drop 
of  water  either  in  the  Tigris  or  the  Oxus ;  all  the  sources  and 


412  TltJ^.  SliJVENTlt  MONARCnT.  [ch.  xyi. 

fountains,  all  the  streams  and  brooks  failed ;  vegetation  alto- 
gether ceased ;  the  beasts  of  the  field  and  the  fowls  of  the  air 
perished ;  nowhere  through  the  whole  empire  was  a  bird  to  be 
seen;  the  wild  animals,  even  the  reptiles,  disappeared  alto- 
gether. The  dreadful  calamity  lasted  for  seven  years,"  and 
under  ordinary  circumstances  the  bulk  of  the  population  would 
have  been  swept  off ;  but  such  were  the  wisdom  and  the  bene- 
ficence of  the  Persian  monarch,  that  during  the  entire  duration 
of  the  scourge  not  a  single  person,  or,  according  to  another 
account,  but  one  person, '"  perished  of  hunger.  Perezes  began . 
by  issuing  general  orders  that  the  rich  should  come  to  the  re- 
lief of  their  poorer  brethren;  he  required  the  governors  of 
towns,  and  the  head-men  of  villages,  to  see  that  food  was  sup- 
phed  to  those  in  need,  and  threatened  that  for  each  poor  man 
in  a  town  or  village  who  died  of  want  he  would  put  a  rich  man 
to  death.  At  the  end  of  two  years,  finding  that  the  drought 
(!ontinued,  he  declined  to  take  any  revenue  from  his  subjects, 
remitting  taxes  of  all  kinds,  whether  they  were  money  imposts 
c»r  contributions  in  kind.  In  the  fourth  year,  not  content  with 
these  measures,  he  went  further:  opened  the  treasury  doors 
and  made  distributions  of  money  from  his  own  stores  to  those 
in  need.  At  the  same  time  he  imported  corn  from  Greece, 
from  India,  from  the  valley  of  the  Oxus,  and  from  Abyssinia, 
obtaining  by  these  means  such  ample  supplies  that  he  was  able 
to  furnish  an  adequate  sustenance  to  all  his  subjects. "  The  re- 
sult was  that  not  only  did  the  famine  cause  no  mortality 
among  the  poorer  classes,  but  no  one  was  even  driven  to  quit 
the  countiy  in  order  to  escape  the  pressure  of  the  calamity. 

Such  is  the  account  which  is  given  by  the  Oriental  authors 
of  the  terrible  famine  which  they  ascribe  to  the  early  part  of 
the  reign  of  Perozes.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  suppose  that 
the  matter  has  not  been  very  much  exaggerated,  since  we  find 
that,  as  early  as  a.d.  464-5,  when  the  famine  should  have  been 
at  its  height,  Perozes  had  entered  upon  a  great  war  and  was 
hotly  engaged  in  it,  his  ambassadors  at  the  same  time  being 
sent  to  the  Greek  court,  nt)t  to  ask  supplies  of  food,  but  to  re- 
■^uest  a  subsidy  on  account  of  his  military  operations.""  The 
enemy  which  had  provoked  his  hostility  was  the  powerful 
nation  of  the  Ephthahtes,  by  whose  aid  he  had  so  recently 
obtained  the  Persian  crown.  According  to  a  contemporary 
Greek  avithority,  more  worthy  of  trust  than  most  writers  of 
his  age  and  nation, ""  the  origin  of  the  war  was  a  refusal  on  the 
part  of  the  Ephthalites  to  mako  certain  customary  payments 


CH.  XVI.]     EPUTIIALITE  EXPEDITION  OF  FEllOZES.        413 

which  the  Persians  viewed  in  the  light  of  a  tribute."  Perozes 
determined  to  enforce  his  just  rights,  and  marched  his  troops 
against  the  defaulters  with  this  object.  But  in  his  first  opera- 
tions he  was  unsuccessful,  and  after  a  time  he  thought  it  best 
to  conclude  the  war,  and  content  himself  with  taking  a  secret 
revenge  upon  his  enemy,  by  means  of  an  occult  insult.  He 
proposed  to  Khush-newaz  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  to 
strengthen  the  compact  by  adding  to  it  a  matrimonial  alliance. 
Khush-newaz  should  take  to  wife  one  of  his  daughters,  and  thus 
unite  the  interests  of  the  two  reigning  families.  The  proposal 
was  accepted  by  the  Ephthalite  monarch;  and  he  readily 
espoused  the  young  lady  who  was  sent  to  his  court  apparelled 
as  became  a  daughter  of  Persia.  In  a  little  time,  however,  ho 
found  that  he  had  been  tricked :  Perozes  had  not  sent  him  his 
daughter,  but  one  of  his  female  slaves;"  and  the  royal  race  of 
the  Ephthalite  kings  had  been  disgraced  by  a  matrimonial 
union  with  a  person  of  servile  condition.  Khush-newaz  was 
justly  indignant ;  but  dissembled  his  feelings,  and  resolved  to 
repay  guile  with  guile.  He  wrote  to  Perozes  that  it  was  his 
intention  to  make  war  upon  a  neighboring  tribe,  and  that  he 
wanted  officers  of  experience  to  conduct  the  military  opera- 
tions. The  Persian  monarch,  suspecting  nothing,  complied 
with  the  request,  and  sent  three  hundred  of  Ms  chief  officers 
to  Khush-newaz,  who  immediately  seized  them,  put  some  to 
death,  and,  mutilating  the  remainder,  commanded  them  to  re- 
turn to  their  sovereign,  and  inform  him  that  the  king  of  the 
Ephthalites  now  felt  that  he  had  sufficiently  avenged  the  trick 
of  which  he  had  been  the  victim.'^"  On  receiving  this  message 
Perozes  renewed  the  war,  advanced  towards  the  Ephthalite 
country,  and  fixed  his  head-quarters  in  Hyrcania,  at  the  city 
of  Gurgan,"  He  was  accompanied  by  a  Greek  of  the  name  of 
Eusebius,'"  an  ambassador  from  the  Emperor  Zeno,  who  took 
back  to  Constantinople  the  following  account  of  the  cam- 
paign. 

When  Perozes,  having  invaded  the  Ephthalite  territory,  fell 
in  with  the  army  of  the  enemy,  the  latter  pretended  to  be  seized 
with  a  panic,  and  at  once  took  to  flight.  The  retreat  was  di- 
rected upon  a  portion  of  the  mountain  region,  where  a  broad 
and  good  road  led  into  a  spacious  plain,  surrovmded  on  all  sides 
by  wooded  hills,  steep  and  in  places  precipitous.  Here  the  mass 
of  the  Ephthalite  troops  was  cunningly  concealed  amid  the 
folingo  of  tho  woods,  while  n  small  number,  remaining  visible, 
led  the  Fersiaj;s  into  the  cul-de-sac^  the  whole  army-  unsuspect- 


1 


414  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvi. 

ingly  entering,  and  only  learning  their  danger  when  they  saw 
the  road  whereby  they  had  entered  blocked  up  by  the  troops 
from  the  hills.  The  oflQcers  then  apprehended  the  true  state  of 
the  ease,  and  perceived  that  they  had  been  cleverly  entrapped ; 
but  none  of  them,  it  would  seem,  dared  to  inform  the  monarch 
that  he  had  been  deceived  by  a  stratagem.  Application  was 
made  to  Eusebius,  whose  ambassadorial  character  would  pro- 
tect him  from  an  outbreak,  and  he  was  requested  to  let  Perozes 
know  how  he  was  situated,  and  exhort  him  to  endeavor  to  ex- 
tricate himself  by  counsel  rather  than  by  a  desperate  act. 
Eusebius  upon  this  employed  the  Oriental  method  of  apologue, 
relating  to  Perozes  how  a  Hon  in  pursuit  of  a  goat  got  himself 
into  difficulties,  from  which  all  his  strength  could  not  enable 
him  to  make  his  escape.  Perozes  apprehended  his  meaning, 
understood  the  situation,  and,  desisting  from  the  pursuit,  pre- 
pared to  give  battle  where  he  stood.  But  the  Ephthalite  mon- 
arch had  no  wish  to  push  matters  to  extremities.  Instead  of 
falhng  on  the  Persians  from  every  side,  he  sent  an  embassy  to 
Perozes  and  offered  to  release  him  from  his  perilous  situation, 
and  allow  him  to  return  with  all  his  troops  to  Persia,  if  he 
would  swear  a  perpetual  peace  with  the  Ephthalites  and  do 
homage  to  himself  as  his  lord  and  master,  by  prostration. 
Perozes  felt  that  he  had  no  choice  but  to  accept  these  terms, 
hard  as  he  might  think  them.  Instructed  by  the  Magi,  he 
made  the  required  prostration  at  the  moment  of  sunrise,  with 
his  face  turned  to  the  east,  and  thought  thus  to  escape  the 
humiliation  of  abasing  himself  before  a  mortal  by  the  mental 
reservation  that  the  intention  of  his  act  was  to  adore  the  great 
Persian  divinity.  He  then  swore  to  the  peace,  and  was  allowed 
to  return  with  his  armv  intact  into  Persia." 

It  seems  to  have  been  soon  after  the  conclusion  of  his  dis- 
graceful treaty"  that  serious  troubles  once  more  broke  out  in 
Armenia.  Perozes,  following  out  the  pohcy  of  his  father, 
Isdigerd,"  incessantly  persecuted  the  Christians  of  his  north- 
ern provinces,  especially  those  of  Armenia,  Georgia,  and  Al- 
bania. '"  So  severe  were  his  measures  that  vast  numbers  of  the 
Armenians  quitted  their  country,  and,  placing  themselves  under 
the  protection  of  the  Greek  Emperor,  became  his  subjects,  and 
entered  into  his  service.^'  Armenia  was  governed  by  Persian 
officials,  and  by  apostate  natives  who  treated  their  Christian 
fellow-countrymen  with  extreme  rudeness,  insolence,  and  in- 
justice. Their  efforts  were  especially  directed  against  the  few 
iiob]e  faniilie§  who  stiU  clung  to  the  faith  of  Christ,  and  had 


CH.  XVI.]  FBESU  TROUBLES  IN  ARMENIA.  415 

not  chosen  to  expatriate  themselves.  Among  these  the  most 
i  important  was  that  of  the  Mamigonians,  long  celebrated  in  Ar- 
menian history,  ^^  and  at  this  time  reckoned  chief  among  the 
i^  nobility.  The  renegades  sought  to  discredit  this  family  with 
the  Persians;  and  Vahan,  son  of  Hemaiag,  its  head,  found 
himself  compelled  to  visit,  once  and  again,  the  court  of  Persia, 
in  order  to  meet  the  charges  of  his  enemies  and  covmteract  the 
effect  of  their  calumnies.  Successful  in  vindicating  himself, 
and  received  into  high  favor  by  Perozes,  he  allowed  the  sun- 
shine of  prosperity  to  extort  from  him  what  he  had  guarded 
firmly  against  all  the  blasts  of  persecution— to  please  his  sov- 
ereign, he  formally  abjured  the  Christian  faith,  and  professed 
himself  a  disciple  of  Zoroaster."  The  triumph  of  the  anti- 
Christian  party  seemed  now  secured ;  but  exactly  at  this  point 
a  reaction  set  in.  Vahan  became  a  prey  to  remorse,  returned 
secretly  to  his  old  creed."  and  longed  for  an  opportunity  of 
wiping  out  the  shame  of  his  apostasy  by  perilling  his  life  for 
the  Christian  cause.  The  opportunity  was  not  long  in  pre- 
senting itself.  In  A.D.  481  Perozes  suffered  a  defeat  at  the  hand 
of  the  barbarous  Koushans,  who  held  at  this  time  the  low 
Caspian  tract  extending  from  Asterabad  to  Derbend.  Iberia  at 
once  revolted,  slew  its  Zoroastrian  king,  Vazken,  and  placed  a 
Christian,  Vakhtang,  upon  the  throne.  The  Persian  governor 
of  Armenia,  having  received  orders  to  quell  the  Iberian  rebel- 
lion, marched  with  all  the  troops  that  he  could  muster  into  the 
northern  province,  and  left  the  Armenians  free  to  foUow  their 
own  devices.  A  rising  immediately  took  place.  Vahan  at  first 
endeavored  to  check  the  movement,  being  doubtful  of  the 
power  of  Armenia  to  cope  with  Persia,  and  feeling  sure  that 
the  aid  of  the  Greek  emperor  could  not  be  counted  on.  But  the 
the  popular  enthusiasm  overleaped  all  resistance;  everywhere 
the  Christian  party  rushed  to  arms,  and  sworo  to  free  itself ; 
the  Persians  with  their  adherents  fled  the  country ;  Artaxata, 
the  capital,  was  besieged  and  taken ;  the  Christians  were  com- 
pletely victorious,  and,  having  made  themselves  masters  of  all 
Persarmenia,  proceeded  to  establish  a  national  government, 
placing  at  their  head  as  king,  Sahag,  the  Bagratide,  and  ap- 
pointing Vahan,  the  Mamigonian,  to  be  Sparapet,  or  "Com- 
mander-in-Chief." '^ 

Intelligence  of  these  events  recalled  the  Persian  governor, 
Ador-Veshnasp,  from  Iberia.  Peturning  into  his  province  at 
the  head  of  an  army  of  no  great  size,  composed  of  Atropa- 
tenians,  Medes,  and  Cadusians,  he  was  encountered  by  Vasag, 


416  '     THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvl 

a  brother  of  Vahan,  on  the  river  Araxes,  with  a  small  force, 
and  was  completely  defeated  and  slain.. ^^ 

Thus  ended  the  campaign  of  a.d.  481.  In  a.d.  482  the 
Persians  made  a  vigorous  attempt  to  recover  their  lost  ground 
by  sending  two  armies,  one  under  Ader-Nerseh  against  Ar- 
menia, and  the  other  under  Mihran"  into  Iberia.  Vahan  met 
the  army  of  Ader-Nerseh  in  the  plain  of  Ardaz,  engaged  it, 
and  defeated  it  after  a  sharp  struggle,  in  which  the  king, 
Sahag,  particularly  distinguished  himself.  Mihran  was  op- 
posed by  Vakhtang,  the  Iberian  king,  who,  however,  soon 
found  himself  overmatched,  and  was  forced  to  apply  to  Ar- 
menia for  assistance.  The  Armenians  came  to  his  aid  in  full 
force ;  but  their  generosity  was  ill  rewarded.  Vakhtang  plot- 
ted to  make  Ms  peace  with  Persia  by  treacherously  betraying 
his  alHes  into  their  enemies'  hands ;  and  the  Armenians,  forced 
to  fight  at  tremendous  disadvantage,  suffered  a  severe  defeat. 
Sahag,  the  king,  and  Vasag,  one  of  the  brothers  of  Vahan, 
were  slain ;  Vahan  himself  escaped,  but  at  the  head  of  only  a 
few  followers,  with  whom  he  fled  to  the  highland  district  of 
Daik,  on  the  borders  of  Rome  and  Iberia.  Here  he  was 
"  hunted  upon  the  mountains"  by  Mihran,  and  would  probably 
have  been  forced  to  succumb  before  the  year  was  out,  had  not 
the  Persian  general  suddenly  received  a  summons  from  his 
sovereign,  who  needed  his  aid  against  the  Koushans  of  the 
low  Caspian  region.  Mihran,  compelled  to  obey  this  call,  had 
to  evacuate  Armenia,  and  Vahan  in  a  few  weeks  recovered 
possession  of  the  whole  country.^' 

The  year  a.d.  483  now  arrived,  and  another  desperate  at- 
tempt was  made  to  crush  the  Armenian  revolt.  Early  in  the 
spring  a  Persian  army  invaded  Armenia,  under  a  general 
called  Hazaravougd.  Vahan  allowed  himself  to  be  surprised, 
to  be  shut  up  in  the  city  of  Dovin,  and  to  be  there  besieged. 
After  a  while  he  made  his  escape,  and  renewed  the  guerilla 
warfare  in  which  he  was  an  adept ;  but  the  Persians  recovered 
most  of  the  country,  and  he  was  himself,  on  more  than  one 
occasion,  driven  across  the  border  and  obliged  to  seek  refuge 
in  Roman  Armenia,  whither  his  adversary  had  no  right  to 
follow  him.  Even  here,  however,  he  was  not  safe.  Hazara- 
vougd, at  the  risk  of  a  rupture  with  Rome,  pursued  his  flying 
foe  across  the  frontier;''  and  Vahan  was  for  some  time  in  the 
greatest  danger.  But  the  Persian  system  of  constantly  chang- 
ing the  commands  of  their  chief  officers  saved  him.  Hazara- 
vougd received  orders  from  the  court  to  deliver  up  Armenia 


I 


CH.  XVI.]  SECOND   EVUTnALITE   WAU   OF  VER0ZE8.        417 

to  a  newly  appointed  governor,  named  Sapor,*'  and  to  direct 
his  own  efforts  to  the  recovery  of  Ihevia,  which  was  still  in 
insurrection.  In  this  latter  enterprise  he  was  successful; 
Iberia  submitted  to  him ;  and  Vakhtang  fled  to  Colchis.  But 
in  Armenia  the  substitution  of  Sapor  for  Hazaravougd  led  to 
disaster.  After  a  vain  attempt  to  procure  the  assassination  of 
Vahan  by  two  of  his  officers,  whose  wives  were  Eoman  pris- 
oners, Sapor  moved  against  him  with  a  strong  body  of  troops;*' 
but  the  brave  Mamigonian,  falling  upon  his  assailant  unawares, 
defeated  him  with  great  loss,  and  dispersed  his  army.*^  A 
second  battle  was  fought  with  a  similar  result ;  and  the  Per- 
sian force,  being  demoralized,  had  to  retreat;  while  Vahan, 
taking  the  offensive,  established  himself  in  Dovin,  and  once 
more  rallied  to  his  side  the  great  mass  of  the  nation. "  Affairs 
were  in  this  state,  when  suddenly  there  arrived  from  the  east 
intelligence  of  the  most  supreme  importance,  which  produced 
a  pause  in  the  Armenian  conflict  and  led  to  the  placing  of 
Armenian  affairs  on  a  new  footing. 

Perozes  had,  from  the  conclusion  of  his  treaty  with  the 
Ephthalite  monarch  (ab.  a.d.  470),  been  tormented  with  the 
feeling  that  he  had  suffered  degradation  and  disgrace."  He 
had,  perhaps,  plunged  into  the  Armenian  and  other  wars^Mn  the 
hope  of  drowning  the  recollection  of  his  shame,  in  his  own 
mind  as  well  as  in  the  minds  of  others.  But  fortune  had  not 
greatly  smiled  on  hun  in  these  struggles ;  and  any  credit  that 
he  obtained  from  them  was  quite  insufficient  to  produce  for- 
getfulnees  of  his  great  disaster.  Hence,  as  time  went  on,  he 
became  more  and  more  anxious  to  wipe  out  the  memory  of  the 
past  by  a  great  and  signal  victory  over  his  conquerors.  He 
therefore  after  some  years*"  determined  to  renew  the  war.  It 
was  in  vain  that  the  chief  Mobed  opposed  hunself  to  this  in- 
tention;*' it  was  in  vain  that  his  other  counsellors  sought  to 
dissuade  him,  that  his  general,  Bahram,  declared  against  the 
infraction  of  the  treaty,*"  and  that  the  soldiers  showed  them- 
selves reluctant  to  fight.  Perozes  had  resolved,  and  Avas  not 
to  be  turned  from  his  resolution.  He  collected  from  aU  parts 
of  the  empire  a  veteran  force,*"  amounting,  it  is  said, ^^  to 
100,000  men,  and  500  elephants,  placed  the  direction  of  affairs 
at  the  court  in  the  hands  of  Balas  (Palash),  his  son  or  brother," 
and  then  marched  upon  the  north-eastern  frontier,  with  the 
determination  to  attack  a7id  defeat  the  Ephthalites  or  perish 
in  the  attempt.  According  to  some  Oriental  writers"  he  en 
deavored  to  escape  the  charge  of  having  falsified  his  engage- 


418  Tim  SEVENTH  MONAECnY.  [cH.  xvi. 

ments  by  a  curious  subterfuge.  The  exact  terms  of  his  oath 
to  Khush-newaz,  the  Ephthahte  king,  had  been  that  he  woul^] 
never  march  his  forces  past  a  certain  pillar  which  that  mon- 
arch had  erected  to  mark  the  boundary  hne  between  the  Per- 
sian and  Ephthahte  dominions.  Perozes  persuaded  himself 
that  he  would  sufficiently  observe  his  engagement  if  he  kept 
its  letter ;  and  accordingly  he  lowered  the  pillar,  and  placed  it 
upon  a  number  of  cars,  which  were  attached  together  and 
drawn  by  a  train  of  fifty  elephants,  in  front  of  his  army. 
Thus,  however  deeply  he  invaded  the  Ephthahte  country,  he 
never  "passed  beyond"  the  pillar  which  he  had  sworn  not  to 
pass.  In  his  own  judgment  he  kept  his  vow,  but  not  in  that 
of  his  natural  advisers.  It  is  satisfactory  to  find  that  the 
Zoroastrian  priesthood,  speaking  by  the  mouth  of  the  chief 
Mobed,  disclaimed  and  exposed  the  fallacy  of  this  wretched 
casuistry. " 

The  Ephthahte  monarch,  on  learning  the  intention  of  Perozes, 
prepared  to  meet  his  attack  by  stratagem.  He  had  taken  up 
his  position  in  the  plain  near  Balkh,  and  had  there  established 
his  camp,  resolved  to  await  the  coming  of  the  enemy.  During 
the  interval  he  proceeded  to  dig  a  deep  and  broad  trench^^  in 
front  of  his  whole  position,  leaving  only  a  space  of  some  twenty 
or  thirty  yards,  midway  in  the  work,  untouched.  Having  ex- 
cavated the  trench,  he  caused  it  to  be  filled  with  water/*  and 
covered  carefully  with  boughs  of  trees,  reeds,  and  earth,  so  as 
to  be  undistinguishable  from  the  general  surface  of  the  plain 
on  which  he  was  encamped.  On  the  arrival  of  the  Persians  in 
his  front,  he  first  of  all  held  a  parley  with  Perozes,  in  which, 
after  reproaching  him  with  his  ingratitude  and  breach  of  faith, 
he  concluded  by  offering  to  renew  the  peace.  Perozes  scorn- 
fully refused ;  whereupon  the  Ephthahte  prince  hung  on  the 
point  of  a  lance  the  broken  treaty,  ^^  and,  parading  it  in  front 
of  the  Persian  troops,  exhorted  them  to  avoid  the  vengeance 
which  was  sure  to  fall  on  the  perjured  by  deserting  their 
doomed  monarch.  Upon  this,  half  the  army,  we  are  told," 
retired ;  and  Khush-neAvaz  proceeded  to  effect  the  destructioi 
of  the  remainder  by  means  of  the  plan  which  he  had  so  care 
ftdly  prepared  beforehand.  He  sent  a  portion  of  his  troop? 
across  the  ditch,  with  orders  to  challenge  the  Persians  to  an 
engagement,  and,  when  the  fight  began,  to  fly  hastily,  and, 
returning  within  the  dit?h  by  the  sound  passage,  unite  them- 
selves with  the  main  army.  The  entire  Persian  host,  as  ho 
expected,  pursued  the  fugitives,  and  coming  unawares  upo?? 


en.  xvi.J    DEATH   OF  PEROZKS—BIS   UHARACTER.  419 

the  concealed  trench  plunged  into  it,  was  inextricably  entan- 
gled, and  easily  destroyed.  Perezes  himself,  several  of  his 
sons,''*  and  most  of  his  army  pei'ished.  Firuz-docht,  his 
daughter,  the  chief  Mobed,  and  great  numbers  of  the  rank 
and  file  were  made  prisoners.  A  vast  booty  was  taken." 
Khush-newaz  did  not  tarnish  the  glory  of  his  victory  by  any 
cruelties ;  he  treated  the  captives  tenderly,  and  caused  search 
to  be  made  for  the  body  of  Perezes,  which  was  found  and 
honorably  interred. 
I'  Thus  perished  Perezes,  after  a  reign  of  (probably)  twenty -six 

'  years.""  He  was  undoubtedly  a  brave  prince,  and  entitled  to 
the  epithet  of  AZ  Merdaneh,  "the  Courageous,"  wlaich  he  re- 
ceived from  his  subjects."  But  his  bravery,  unfortunately, 
verged  upon  rashness, "  and  was  unaccompanied  (so  far  as  ap- 
pears) by  any  other  military  quality.  Perezes  had  neither  the 
sagacity  to  form  a  good  plan  of  campaign,  nor  the  abihty  to 
conduct  a  battle.  In  all  the  wars  wherein  he  was  personally 
engaged  he  was  unsuccessful,  and  the  only  triumphs  which 
gilded  his  arms  were  gained  by  his  generals.  In  his  civil 
administration,  on  the  contrary,  he  obtained  a  character  for 
humanity  and  justice;"^  and,  if  the  Oriental  accounts  of  liis 
proceedings  during  the  great  faixdne"*  are  to  be  regarded  as 
trustworthy,  we  must  admit  that  his  wisdom  and  benevolence 
were  such  as  are  not  commonly  found  in  those  who  bear  rule 
in  the  East.  His  conduct  towards  Khush-newaz  has  generally 
been  regarded  as  the  great  blot  upon  Iris  good  fame  f  and  it  is 
certainly  impossible  to  justify  the  paltry  casuistry  by  which 
he  endeavored  to  reconcile  his  actions  with  his  words  at  the 
time  of  his  second  invasion.  But  his  persistent  hostility  to- 
wards the  Ephthalites  is  far  from  inexcusable,  and  its  motive 
may  have  been  patriotic  rather  than  personal.  He  probably 
felt  that  the  Ephthalite  power  was  among  those  from  which 
Persia  had  most  to  fear,  and  that  it  would  have  been  weak  in 
him  to  allow  gratitude  for  a  favor  conferred  upon  himself  to 
tie  his  hands  in  a  matter  where  the  interests  of  liis  country 
Were  vitally  concerned.  The  Ephthalites  continued  for  nearly 
a  century  more  to  be  among  the  most  dangerous  of  her  neigh- 
bors to  Persia ;  and  it  was  oidy  by  frequent  attacks  upon  them 
in  their  own  homes  that  Persia  could  reasonably  hope  to  ward 
off  their  ravages  from  her  territory. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  we  possess  any  coins  of  Hormisdas 
III.,  the  brother  and  predecessor  of  Perezes.  Those  which  are 
assigned  to  him  by  Mordtmann''"  bear  a  name  which  has  no  re* 


4^0  I^SE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvt 

semblance  to  Ms;  and  those  bearing  the  name  of  Ram,  which 
Mr.  Taylor  considers  to  be  coins  of  Hormisdas,"  cannot  have 
been  issued  under  his  authority,  since  Ram  was  the  guardian 
and  general,  not  of  Hormisdas,  but  of  his  brother.  ^^  Perhaps 
the  remarkable  specimen  figured  by  M.  Longperier  in  his  valu- 
able work, "'  which  shows  a  bull's  head  in  place  of  the  usual  in- 
flated ball,  may  really  belong  to  this  prince.  The  legend  upon 
it  is  read  without  any  doubt  as  Auhrimazd,  or  ' '  Hormisdas ;" 
and  in  general  character  it  is  certainly  Sassanian,"  and  of 
about  this  period.     [PI.  XXI.,  Fig.  5.] 

The  coins  of  Perozes  are  undoubted,  and  are  very  numerous. 
They  are  distinguished  generally  by  the  addition  to  the  ordi- 
nary crown  of  two  wings,  one  in  front  of  the  crown,  and  the 
other  behind  it,"  and  bear  the  legend.  Kadi  Piruzi,''"  or  Maz- 
disn  Kadi  Piruzi,  i.e.,  "  King  Perozes,"  or  "the  Ormazd-wor- 
shipping  king  Perozes."  The  earring  of  the  monarch  is  a  triple 
pendant."  On  the  reverse,  besides  the  usual  fire-altar  and  sup- 
porters, we  see  on  either  side  of  the  altar-flame  a  star  and  a 
crescent.  The  legend  here  is  M— probably  for  malJca,  "  king" 
— or  else  Kadi,  together  with  a  mint-mark.  The  mints  named 
are  numerous,  comprising  (according  to  Mordtmann)'^  Perse- 
poHs,  Ispahan,  Rhages,  Nehavend,  Darabgherd,  Zadracarta, 
Nissa,  Behistun,  Chuzistan,  Media,  Kerman,  and  Azerbijan; 
or  (according  to  Mr.  Thomas)"  Persepolis,  Rasht,  Nehavend, 
Darabgherd,  Baiza,  Modain,  Merv,  Shiz,  Iran,  Kerman,  Yezd, 
and  fifteen  others.  The  general  character  of  the  coinage  is 
rude  and  coarse,  the  reverse  of  the  coins  showing  especial 
signs  of  degradation.     [PI.  XXI.,  Fig.  6.] 

Besides  his  coins,  one  other  memorial  of  the  reign  of  Perozes 
has  escaped  the  ravages  of  time.  This  is  a  cvip  or  vase,  of  an- 
tique and  elegant  form,  engraved  with  a  hunting-scene,  which 
has  been  thus  described  by  a  recent  writer:  "This  cup,  which 
comes  from  Russia,  has  a  diameter  of  thirty-one  centimetres, 
and  is  shaped  like  a  ewer  without  handles.  At  the  bottom 
there  stands  out  in  relief  the  figure  of  a  monarch  on  horseback, 
pursuing  at  full  speed  various  wild  animals ;  before  him  fly  a 
wild  boar  and  wild  sow,  together  with  their  young,  an  ibex,  an 
antelope,  and  a  buffalo.  Two  other  boars,  an  ibex,  a  buffalo, 
and  an  antelope  are  strewn  on  the  ground,  pierced  with  arrows 
....  The  king  has  an  aquihne  nose,  an  eye  which  is  very 
wide  open,  a  short  beard,  horizontal  moustaches  of  considerable 
length,  the  hair  gathered  behind  the  head  in  quite  a  small  knot, 
and  the  ear  ornamented  with  a  double  pendant,  pear-shaped; 


^1 


4 


CH.  XVII. J  ACCESSION  OF  BALAS  421 

the  head  of  the  monarch  supports  a  crown,  which  is  mural  at 
the  side  and  back,  while  it  bears  a  crescent  in  front ;  two  wings 
surmounting  a  globe  within  a  crescent  form  the  upper  part  of 
the  head-dress.  .  .  .  On  Ms  right  the  king  carries  a  short  dag- 
ger and  a  quiver  full  of  arrows,  on  his  left  a  sword.  .  .  .  Firuz, 
who  has  the  finger-guard  of  an  archer  on  his  right  hand,  is 
represented  in  the  act  of  bending  a  large  bow  made  of  horn."  '' 
There  would  seem  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  work  thus  described 
is  rightly  assigned  to  Perozes. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


Accession  of  Balas  or  Palash.  His  Relationship  to  Perozes. 
Peace  made  with  the  Ephthalites.  Pacification  of  Armenia 
and  General  Edict  of  Toleration.  Revolt  of  Zareh,  Son  of 
Perozes,  and  Supj^ression  of  the  Revolt  ivith  the  help  of  the 
Armenians.  Flight  of  Kobad  to  the  Ephthalites.  Further 
Changes  in  Armenia.  Vahan  made  Governor.  Death  of 
Balas;  his  Character.     Coins  ascribed  to  him. 

BaAat  .   .   .   eTri  Tr\v  a.pxr\v  a.va^a<;,  ovSiv  Ti  </)ai'i'6Tai  df  lat^ijyTjTov  Spdca^  7roAe'/i(i»'  cWxa  koI 
iraparafcco;'.— Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  137,  D. 

Perozes  was  succeeded  by  a  prince  whom  the  Greeks  call 
Balas,  the  Arabs  and  later  Persians  Palash,  but  whose  real 
name  appears  to  have  been  Valakhesh'  or  Volagases.  Different 
accounts  are  given  of  his  relationship  to  his  predecessor,  the 
native  writers  unanimously  representing  him  as  the  son  of 
Perozes  and  brother  of  Kobad,"  while  the  Greeks'  and  the  con- 
temporary Armenians^  declare  with  one  voice  that  he  was 
Kobad's  uncle  and  Perozes's  brother.  It  seems  on  the  whole 
most  probable  that  the  Greeks  and  Armenians  are  right;*  and 
we  may  suppose  that  Perozes,  having  no  son  whom  he  could 
trust  to  take  his  place"  when  he  quitted  his  capital  in  order  to 
take  the  management  of  the  Ephthalite  war,  put  the  regency 
and  the  guardianship  of  his  children  into  the  hands  of  his 
brother,  Valakhesh,  who  thus,  not  xmnaturally,  became  king 
when  it  was  found  that  Perozes  had  fallen. 

The  first  efforts  of  the  new  monarch  were  of  necessity  di- 
rected towards  an  arrangement  with  the  Ephthalites,  whose 
signal  victory  over  Perozes  had  laid  the  north-eastern  frontier 


422  'PHE  SEVENTH  MONARCllt.  [cfi.  xvit 

of  Persia  open  to  tlieir  attack.  Balas,  we  are  told,'  employed 
on  this  service  the  arms  and  arts  of  an  officer  named  Sukhra  or 
Sufrai,  who  was  at  the  time  governor  of  Seistan.  Sukhra  col- 
lected an  imposing  force,  and  conducted  it  to  the  Ephthalite 
border,  where  he  alarmed  Khush-newaz  by  a  display  of  his 
own  skill  with  the  bow.**  He  then  entered  into  negotiations 
and  obtained  the  release  of  Firuz-docht,  of  the  Grand  Mobed, 
and  of  the  other  hnportant  prisoners,  together  with  the  restora- 
tion of  a  large  portion  of  the  captured  booty,  but  was  probably 
compelled  to  accept  on  the  part  of  his  sovereign  some  humilia- . 
ting  conditions.  Procopius  informs  ns  that,  in  consequence  of 
the  defeat  of  Perozes,  Persia  became  subject  to  the  Ephthalites 
and  paid  them  tribute  for  two  years;'  and  this  is  so  probable 
a  result,  and  one  so  likely  to  have  been  concealed  by  the  native 
writers,  that  his  authority  must  be  regarded  as  outweighing 
the  silence  of  Mirkhond  and  Tabari.  Balas,  we  must  suppose, 
consented  to  become  an  EphthaHte  tributary,  rather  than  re- 
new the  war  which  had  proved  fatal  to  his  brother.  If  he  ac- 
cepted this  position,  we  can  well  understand  that  Ehush-newaz 
would  grant  him  the  small  concessions  of  which  the  Persian 
writers  boast ;  while  otherwise  the  restoration  of  the  booty  and 
the  prisoners  without  a  battle  is  quite  inconceivable. 

Secure,  so  long  as  he  fulfilled  his  engagements,  from  any  mo- 
lestation in  this  quarter,  Balas  was  able  to  turn  his  attention 
to  the  north-western  portion  of  his  dominions,  and  address  him- 
self to  the  difficult  task  of  pacifying  Armenia,  and  bringing  to 
an  end  the  troubles  which  had  now  for  several  years  afflicted 
that  unhappy  province.  His  first  step  was  to  noixdnate  as 
Marzpan,  or  governor,  of  Armenia,  a  Persian  who  bore  the 
name  of  Nikhor,  a  man  eminent  for  justice  and  moderation. '" 
Nikhor,  instead  of  attacking  Vahan,  who  held  almost  the  whole 
of  the  country,  since  the  Persian  troops  had  been  withdrawn 
on  the  news  of  the  death  of  Perozes,"  proposed  to  the  Arme-' 
nian  prince  that  they  should  discuss  amicably  the  terms  upon 
which  his  nation  would  be  content  to  end  the  war  and  resume 
its  old  position  of  dependence  upon  Persia.  Vahan  expressed 
his  willingness  to  terminate  the  struggle  by  an  arrangement, 
and  suggested  the  following  as  the  terms  on  which  he  and  his 
adherents  would  be  willing  to  lay  down  their  arms : 

(1)  The  existing  fire-altars  should  be  destroyed,  and  no  others 
should  be  erected  in  Armenia. 

(2)  The  Armenians  should  be  allowed  the  full  and  free  exer- 
cise of  the  Christian  religion,  and  no  Armenians  should  be  in 


I 


CH.  xvn.]  PACIFICATION  OF  ARMENIA.  403 

future  tempted  or  bribed  to  declare  themselves  disciples  of  Zo- 
roaster. 

(3)  If  converts  were  nevertheless  made  from  Christianity  to 
Zoroastrianism,  places  should  not  be  given  to  them. 

(4)  The  Persian  king  should  in  person,  and  not  by  deputy, 
adnunister  the  affairs  of  Armenia.  '^  Nikhor  expressed  himself 
favorable  to  the  acceptance  of  these  terms ;  and,  after  an  ex- 
change of  hostages,  Vahan  visited  his  camp  and  made  arrange- 
ments with  him  for  the  solemn  ratification  of  peace  on  the 
aforesaid  conditions.  An  edict  of  toleration  was  issued,  and  it 
was  formally  declared  that  "every  one  should  be  at  liberty  to 
adhere  to  his  own  religion,  and  that  no  one  should  be  driven  to 
apostatize."  "  Upon  these  terms  peace  was  concluded  between 
Vahan  and  Nikhor,  '*  and  it  was  only  necessary  that  the  Persian 
monarch  should  ratify  the  terms  for  them  to  become  formally 
binding. 

While  matters  were  in  this  state,  and  the  consent  of  Balas  to 
the  terms  agreed  upon  had  not  yet  been  positively  signified,  an 
important  revolution  took  place  at  the  court  of  Persia.  Zareh, 
a  son  of  Perozes,  preferred  a  claim  to  the  crown,  and  was  sup- 
ported in  his  attempt  by  a  considerable  section  of  the  people.  "* 
A  civil  war  followed ;  and  among  the  officers  employed  to  sup- 
press it  was  Nikhor,  the  governor  of  Armenia.  On  his  appoint- 
ment he  suggested  to  Vahan  that  it  would  lend  great  force  to 
the  Armenian  claims  if  under  the  existing  circumstances  the 
Armenians  would  furnish  effective  aid  to  Balas,  and  so  enable 
him  to  suppress  the  rebellion.  Vahan  saw  the  importance  of 
the  conjuncture,  and  immediately  sent  to  Nikhor's  aid  a  pow- 
erful body  of  cavalry  under  the  command  of  his  own  nephew, 
Gregory.  Zareh  was  defeated,  mainly  in  consequence  of  the 
great  valor  and  excellent  conduct  of  the  Armenian  contingent. 
He  fled  to  the  mountains,  but  was  pursued,  and  was  very 
shortly  afterwards  made  prisoner  and  slain.""' 

Soon  after  this,  Kobad,  son  of  Perozes,  regarding  the  crown 
as  rightfidly  his,  put  forward  a  claim  to  it,  but,  meeting  with 
no  success,  was  compelled  to  quit  Persia  and  throw  himself 
upon  the  kind  protection  of  the  Ephthalites, "  who  were  always 
glad  to  count  among  their  refugees  a  Persian  pretender.  The 
Ephthalites,  however,  made  no  immediate  stir— it  would  seem 
that  so  long  as  Balas  paid  his  tribute  they  were  content,  and 
felt  no  inclination  to  disturb  what  seemed  to  them  a  satisfac- 
tory arrangement. 

The  death  of  Zareh  and  the  flight  of  Kobad  left  Balas  at 


424  THE  SEVENTH  MOKAnCUY.  [ch.  xvii. 

liberty  to  resume  the  work  which  their  rebellions  had  inter- 
rupted—the complete  pacification  of  Armenia.  Knowing  how 
much  depended  upon  Vahan,  he  suimnoned  him  to  his  court, 
received  him  with  the  highest  honors,  listened  attentively  to 
his  representations,  and  finally  agreed  to  the  terms  which 
Vahan  had  formulated. '"  At  the  same  time  he  replaced  Nikhor 
by  a  governor  named  Antegan,  a  worthy  successor,  "mild, 
prudent,  and  equitable ;"  "  and,  to  show  his  confidence  in  the 
Mamigonian  prince,  appointed  him  to  the  high  office  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, or  '' Sparapet."  This  arrangement  did  not, 
however,  last  long.  Antegan,  after  ruling  Armenia  for  a  few 
months,  represented  to  his  royal  master  that  it  would  be  the 
wisest  course  to  entrust  Vahan  with  the  government,^"  that  the 
same  head  wliich  had  conceived  the  terms  of  the  pacification 
might  watch  over  and  ensure  their  execution.  Antegan's  re- 
commendation approved  itself  to  the  Persian  monarch,  who 
proceeded  to  recall  his  self-denying  councillor,  and  to  install 
Vahan  in  the  vacant  office.  The  post  of  Sparapet  was  assigned 
to  Vart,  Vahan's  brother.  Christianity  was  then  formally  re- 
estabhshed  as  the  State  religion  of  Armenia;  the  fire-altars 
were  destroyed ;  the  churches  reclaimed  and  purified ;  the  hie- 
rarchy restored  to  its  former  position  and  powers.  A  reconver- 
sion of  almost  the  whole  nation  to  the  Christian  faith  was  the 
immediate  result ;  the  apostate  Armenians  recanted  their  errors, 
and  abjured  Zoroastvianism ;  Armenia,  and  with  it  Iberia,  were 
pacified;'''  and  the  two  provinces  which  had  been  so  long  a 
cause  of  weakness  to  Persia  grew  rapidly  into  main  sources  of 
her  strength  and  prosperity. 

The  new  arrangement  had  not  been  long  completed  when 
Balas  died  (a.d.  487).  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  he  held  the 
throne  for  no  more  than  four  years,"  and  generally  allowed 
that  he  died  peaceably  by  a  natural  death."  He  was  a  wise 
and  just  prince,""  mild  in  his  temper,"  averse  to  military  enter- 
prises," and  inclined  to  expect  better  results  from  pacific  ar- 
rangements than  from  wars  and  expeditions.  His  internal  ad- 
ministration of  the  empire  gave  general  satisfaction  to  his 
subjects ;  he  protected  and  relieved  the  poor,  extended  cultiva- 
tion, and  punished  governors  who  allowed  any  men  in  their 
province  to  fall  into  indigence."  His  prudence  and  modera- 
tion are  especially  conspicuous  in  his  arrangement  of  the  Ar- 
menian difficulty,  whereby  he  healed  a  chronic  sore  that  had 
long  drained  the  resources  of  his  country.  His  submission  to 
pay  tribute  to  the  Ephthalites  may  be  thought  to  indicate  9 


CH.  xviT.]  corns  OF  BA  LAS.  425 

want  of  courage  or  of  patriotism ;  but  there  are  times  when  the 
purchase  of  a  peace  is  a  necessity ;  and  it  is  not  clear  that  Balas 
was  minded  to  bear  the  obhgation  imposed  on  him  a  moment 
longer  than  was  necessary.  The  writers  who  record  the  fact 
that  Persia  submitted  for  a  time  to  pay  a  tribute  limit  the  in- 
terval during  which  the  obligation  held  to  a  couple  of  years.''* 
It  wovild  seem,  therefore,  that  Balas,  who  reigned  four  years, 
.,  nuist,  a  year  at  least  before  liis  demise,  have  shaken  off  the 
.  Ephthalite  yoke  and  ceased  to  make  any  acknowledgment  of 
dependence.  Probably  it  was  owing  to  the  new  attitude  as- 
sumed by  him  that  the  Ephthahtes,  after  refusing  to  give 
Kobad  any  material  support  for  the  space  of  three  years, 
adopted  a  new  policy  in  the  year  of  Balas's  death  (a.d.  487),  and 
lent  the  pretender  a  force^"  with  which  he  was  about  to  attack 
his  uncle  when  news  reached  him  that  attack  was  needless, 
since  Balas  was  dead  and  his  own  claim  to  the  succession  un- 
disputed. Balas  nominated  no  successor  upon  his  death-bed, 
thus  giving  in  his  last  moments  an  additional  proof  of  that 
moderation  and  love  of  peace  which  had  characterized  his 
reign. 

Coins,  which  possess  several  points  of  interest,  are  assigned 
to  Balas  by  the  best  authorities. '°  They  bear  on  the  obverse 
the  head  of  the  king  with  the  usual  mural  crown  surmounted 
hj  a  crescent  and  inflated  ball.  The  beard  is  short  and  curled. 
The  hair  falls  behind  the  head,  also  in  curls.  The  earring, 
wherewith  the  ear  is  ornamented,  has  a  double  pendent. 
Flames  issue  from  the  left  shoulder,  an  exceptional  peculiarity 
in  the  Sassanian  series,  but  one  which  is  found  also  among  the 
Indo-Scythian  kings  with  whom  Balas  was  so  closely  connected. 
The  full  legend  upon  the  coins  appears  to  be  Hur  Kadi  Valak- 
dshi,  "Volagases,  the  Fire  King."  The  reverse  exhibits  the 
usual  fire-altar,  but  with  the  king's  head  in  the  flames,  and 
with  the  star  and  crescent  on  either  side,  as  introduced  by  Pe- 
rezes. It  bears  commonly  the  legend,  ValalcdsJii,  with  a  mint' 
mark.  The  mints  employed  are  those  of  Iran,  Kerman,  Ispa- 
han, Nisa,  Ledan,  Shiz,  Zadracarta,  and  one  or  two  others. 
[Plate  XXI.,  Fig.  4]. 


426  ^BE  SEVENTH  MONARCHT.  [cs.  miL 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

First  reign  of  Kdbad.  His  Favorites,  Sufra'i  and  Sapor.  His 
Khazar  War.  Rise,  Teaching,  and  influence  of  Mazdak. 
His  Claim  to  Miraculous  Powers.  Kobad  adojjts  the  neiv 
Religion,  and  attempts  to  imjyose  it  on  the  Armenians.  Re- 
volt of  Armenia  under  Vahan,  successful.  Kobad  yields. 
General  Rebellion  in  Persia,  and  DejMsition  of  Kobad.  Es- 
cape of  Mazdak.    Short  Reign  of  Zamasp.     His  Coins. 

Kaj3a5>)?  06  6  toO  Ilepd^ou  varraTa^  v'i6%,  t^;  (SaaiAeia!  Spafa/ueco;,  eirl  to  ^iaiortpov  rrj  apxjj 
i\pa.To  Kai  KOini?  rds  yvfaiKa^  evoiJ.oBiTrfmi'  ex^"'- — CedrenuS,  p.  356,  B,  C. 

When  Kobad  fled  to  the  Ephthalites  on  the  failure  of  his  at- 
tempt to  seize  the  crown,  he  was  received,  we  are  told, '  with 
open  arms ;  but  no  material  aid  was  given  to  him  for  the  space 
of  three  years.  However,  in  the  fourth  year  of  his  exile,  a 
change  came  over  the  Ephthahte  pohcy,  and  he  returned  to  his 
capital  at  the  head  of  an  army,  with  which  Khush-newaz  had 
furnished  him.  The  change  is  reasonably  connected  with  the 
withholding  of  his  tribute  by  Balasr  and  it  is  difficult  to  sup- 
pose that  Kobad,  when  he  accepted  Ephthalite  aid,  did  not 
pledge  himself  to  resume  the  subordinate  position  which  his 
uncle  had  been  content  to  hold  for  two  years.  It  seems  certain 
that  he  was  accompanied  to  his  capital  by  an  Ephthalite  con- 
tingent,' which  he  richly  rewarded  before  dismissing  it.  Owing 
his  throne  to  the  aid  thus  afforded  him,  he  can  scarcely  have 
refused  to  make  the  expected  acknowledgment.  Distinct  evi- 
dence on  the  point  is  wanting ;  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
for  some  years  Kobad  held  the  Persian  throne  on  the  condition 
of  paying  tribute  to  Khush-newaz,  and  recognizing  him  as  his 
lord  paramount. 

During  the  early  portion  of  his  first  reign,  which  extended 
from  A.D.  487  to  498,  we  are  told  that  he  entrusted  the  entire 
administration  of  affairs  to  Sukhra,  or  Suf rai,  *  who  had  been 
the  chief  minister  of  his  uncle.  Sufrai's  son,  Zer-Mihr,  had 
faithfully  adhered  to  liim  throughout  the  whole  period  of  his 
exile,  ^  and  Kobad  did  not  regard  it  as  a  crime  that  the  father 
had  opposed  his  ambition,  and  thrown  the  weight  of  his  au- 
thority into  the  scale  against  him.     He  recognized  fidelity  as  a 


CH.  xvTir.]    KOBAD'S   WAli   WITH  TEE  KHAZAR8.  427 

quality  that  deserved  reward,  and  was  suflSciently  magnani- 
mous to  forgive  an  opposition  that  had  sprung  from  a  virtuous 
motive,  and,  moreover,  had  not  succeeded.  Sufrai  accordingly 
governed  Persia  for  some  years ;  the  army  obeyed  him,  and  the 
civil  administration  Avas  completely  in  his  hands.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  Kobad  after  a  while  grew 
jealous  of  his  subordinate,  and  Avas  anxious  to  strip  him  of  the 
quasi-regal  authority  which  he  exercised  and  assert  his  own 
right  to  direct  affairs.  But,  alone,  he  felt  unequal  to  such  a 
task.  He  therefore  called  in  the  assistance  of  an  officer  who 
bore  the  name  of  Sapor,  and  had  a  command  in  the  district  of 
Rhages.  °  Sapor  undertook  to  rid  his  sovereign  of  the  incubus 
whereof  he  complained,  and,  Avith  the  tacit  sanction  of  the 
monarch,  he  contrived  to  fasten  a  quarrel  on  Sufrai  which  he 
pushed  to  such  an  extremity  that,  at  the  end  of  it,  he  dragged 
the  minister  from  the  royal  apartment  to  a  prison,  had  him 
hea\^ily  ironed,  and  in  a  few  days  caused  him  to  be  put  to  death. 
Sapor,  upon  this,  took  the  place  previously  occupied  by  Sufrai ; 
he  Avas  recognized  at  once  as  Prime  Minister,  and  Sipehbed,  or 
commander-in  chief  of  the  troops.'  Kobad,  content  to  have 
vindicated  his  royal  poAver  by  the  removal  of  Sufrai,  conceded 
to  the  second  favorite  as  much  as  he  had  alloAved  to  the  first, 
and  once  more  suffered  the  management  of  affairs  to  pass 
wholly  into  the  hands  of  a  subject. 

The  only  war  in  which  Persia  seems  to  have  been  engaged 
during  the  first  reign  of  Kobad  Avas  one  with  the  Khazars. 
This  important  people,  noAV  heard  of  for  the  first  time  in  Per- 
sian history,  appears  to  have  occupied,  in  the  reign  of  Kobad, 
the  steppe  country  between  the  Wolga  and  the  Don,^  whence 
they  made  raids  through  the  passes  of  the  Caucasus  into  the 
fertile  provinces  of  Iberia,  Albania,  and  Armenia.  Whether 
they  were  Turks,  as  is  generally  believed,"  or  Circassians,  as 
has  been  ingeniously  argued  by  a  living  writer, '"  is  doubtful ; 
but  we  cannot  be  mistaken  in  regarding  them  as  at  this  time  a 
race  of  fierce  and  terrible  barbarians,  nomadic  in  their  habits, 
ruthless  in  their  Avars,  cruel  and  uncivilized  in  their  customs,  a 
fearful  curse  to  the  regions  Avhich  they  overrun  and  desolated. 
We  shall  meet  with  them  again,  more  than  once,  in  the  later 
history,  and  shall  haA^e  to  trace  to  their  hostihty  some  of  the 
Avorst  disasters  that  befel  the  Persian  arms.  On  this  occasion 
it  is  remarkable  that  they  were  repulsed  with  apparent  ease. 
Kobad  marched  against  their  Khan  in  p(>rsnn,  at  tlie  hca<l  of  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  defeated  liim  in  a  battle,  destroyed  the 


428  TILE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xviii. 

greater  portion  of  his  army,  and  returned  to  his  capital  with  rji 
enormous  booty. "  To  check  their  incursions,  he  is  said  to  have 
built  on  the  Armenian  frontier  a  town  called  Amid,  '^  by  which 
we  are  probably  to  understand,  not  the  ancient  Amida  (or 
Diarbekr),  but  a  second  city  of  the  name,  further  to  the  east 
and  also  further  to  the  north,  on  the  border  hne  which  sepa- 
rated Armenia  from  Iberia. 

The  triumphant  return  of  Kobad  from  his  Khazar  war  might 
have  seemed  likely  to  secure  him  a  long  and  prosperous  reign; 
but  at  the  moment  when  fortune  appeared  most  to  smile  upon 
him,  an  insidious  evil,  which  had  been  gradually  but  secretly 
sapping  the  vitals  of  his  empire,  made  itself  apparent,  and, 
drawing  the  monarch  within  the  sphere  of  its  influence,  in- 
volved him  speedily  in  difficulties  which  led  to  the  loss  of  his 
crown.  Mazdak,  a  native  of  Persepohs, "  or,  according  to 
others,  of  Nishapur,  in  Khorassan,'*  and  an  Archimagus,  or 
High  Priest  of  the  Zoroastrian  religion,  announced  himself, 
early  in  the  reign  of  Kobad,  as  a  reformer  of  Zoroastrianism, 
and  began  to  make  proselytes  to  the  new  doctrines  which  he 
declared  himself  commissioned  to  unfold.  All  men,  he  said, were, 
by  God's  providence,  born  equal — none  brought  into  the  world 
any  property,  or  any  natural  right  to  possess  more  than 
another.  Property  and  marriage  were  mere  human  inventions, 
contrary  to  the  wUl  of  God,  which  required  an  equal  division 
of  the  good  things  of  this  world  among  all,  and  forbade  the  ap- 
propriation of  particular  women  by  individual  men.  In  com- 
munities based  upon  property  and  marriage,  men  might  law- 
fully vindicate  their  natural  rights  by  taking  their  fair  share  of 
the  good  things  wrongfully  appropriated  by  their  fellows 
Adultery,  incest,  theft,  were  not  really  crimes,  but  necessarj 
steps  towards  re-establishing  the  laws  of  nature  in  such  soci 
eties.'^  To  these  communistic  views,  which  seem  to  have  been 
the  original  speculations  of  his  own  mind,  the  Magian  reformer 
added  tenets  borrowed  from  the  Brahmins  or  from  some  other 
Oriental  ascetics,  such  as  the  sacredness  of  animal  life,  the 
necessity  of  abstaining  from  animal  food,  other  than  milk, 
cheese,  or  eggs,  the  propriety  of  simplicity  in  apparel,  and  the 
need  of  abstemiousness  and  devotion.'"  He  thus  presented 
the  spectacle  of  an  enthusiast  who  preached  a  doctrine  of  laxity 
and  self-indulgence,  not  from  any  base  or  selfish  motive,  but 
simply  from  a  conviction  of  its  ti'uth.'''  We  learn  without  sur- 
prise that  the  doctrines  of  the  new  teacher  were  embraced  with 
ardor  by  large  classes  among  the  Persians,  by  the  young  of  all 


CH.  XVIII.]  MAZDAK  CONVERTS  KOBAD.  429 

ranks,  by  the  lovers  of  pleasure,  by  the  great  bulk  of  the  lower 
orders.  '*  But  it  naturally  moves  our  wonder  that  among  the 
proselytes  to  the  new  religion  was  the  king.  Kobad,  who  had 
nothing  to  gain  from  embracing  a  creed  which  levelled  him 
with  his  subjects,  and  was  scarcely  compatible  with  the  con- 
tinuance of  monarchical  rule,  must  have  been  sincere  in  his 
profession ;  and  we  inquire  with  interest,  what  were  the  cir- 
cumstances which  enabled  Mazdak  to  attach  to  his  cause  so  im- 
portant and  so  unlikely  a  convert. 

The  explanation  wherewith  we  are  furnished  by  our  authori- 
ties is,  that  Mazdak  claimed  to  authenticate  his  mission  by  the 
possession  and  exhibition  of  miraculous  powers.  In  order  to  im- 
pose on  the  weak  mind  of  Kobad  he  arranged  and  carried  into 
act  an  elaborate  and  clever  imposture.  "*  He  excavated  a  cave 
below  the  fire-altar,  on  which  he  was  in  the  habit  of  offering, 
and  contrived  to  pass  a  tube  from  the  cavern  to  the  upper  sur- 
face of  the  altar,  where  the  sacred  flame  was  maintained  per- 
petually. Having  then  placed  a  confederate  in  the  cavern,  he 
invited  the  attendance  of  Kobad,  and  in  his  presence  appeared 
to  hold  converse  with  the  fire  itself,  which  the  Persians  viewed 
as  the  symbol  and  embodiment  of  divinity.  The  king  accepted 
the  miracle  as  an  absolute  proof  of  the  divine  authority  of  the 
new  teacher,  and  became  thenceforth  his  zealous  adherent  and 
follower. 

It  may  be  readily  imagined  that  the  conversion  of  the  mon- 
arch to  such  a  creed  was,  under  a  despotic  government,  the 
prelude  to  disorders,  which  soon  became  intolerable.  Not  con- 
tent with  establishing  community  of  property  and  of  women 
among  themselves,  the  sectaries  claimed  the  right  to  plunder 
the  rich  at  their  pleasure,  and  to  carry  off  for  the  gratification 
of  their  own  passions  the  inmates  of  the  most  illustrious 
harems.^"  In  vain  did  the  Mobeds  declare  that  the  new  re- 
ligion was  false,  was  monstrous,  ought  not  to  be  tolerated  for 
an  hour.  The  followers  of  Mazdak  had  the  support  of  the 
naonarch,  and  tliis  protection  secured  them  complete  impunity. 
Each  day  they  grew  bolder  and  more  numerous.  Persia  be- 
came too  narrow  a  field  for  their  ambition,  and  they  insisted 
on  spreading  their  doctrines  into  the  neighboring  countries. 
We  find  traces  of  the  accei)tance  of  their  views  in  the  distant 
West;"'  and  the  historians  of  Armenia  relate  that  in  that  un- 
happy country  they  so  pressed  their  i-eligion  upon  tlie  people 
that  an  insurrection  broke  out,  ■  ■  and  Persia  was  in  danger  of 
Offing,  by  intolerance,  one  of  her  most  valued  dependencies. 


430  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xvni. 

Vahan,  the  Mamigonian,  who  had  been  superseded  in  his  office 
by  a  fresh  Marzpan,  bent  on  forcing  the  Armenians  to  adopt 
the  new  creed,  once  more  put  himself  forward  as  his  country's 
champion,  took  arms  in  defence  of  the  Christian  faith,  and 
endeavored  to  induce  the  Greek  emperor,  Anastasius,  to  accept 
the  sovereignty  of  Persarmenia,  together  with  the  duty  of  pro- 
tecting it  against  its  late  masters.  Fear  of  the  consequences, 
if  he  provoked  the  hostility  of  Persia,  caused  Anastasius  to 
hesitate;  and  things  might  have  gone  hardly  with  the  un- 
fortunate Armenians,"  had  not  affairs  in  Persia  itself  come 
about  this  time  to  a  crisis. 

The  Mobeds  and  the  principal  nobles  had  in  vain  protested 
against  the  spread  of  the  new  religion  and  the  patronage  lent 
it  by  the  Court.  At  length  appeal  was  made  to  the  chief 
Mobed,  and  he  was  requested  to  devise  a  remedy  for  the  exist- 
ing evils,  which  were  generally  felt  to  have  passed  the  limits 
of  endurance.  The  chief  Mobed  decided  that,  under  the  circmn- 
stances  of  the  time,  no  remedy  could  be  effectual  but  the  depo- 
sition of  the  head  of  the  State,  through  whose  culpable  con- 
nivance the  disorders  had  attained  their  height. "  His  decision 
was  received  with  general  acquiescence.  The  Persian  nobles 
agreed  with  absolute  unanimity  to  depose  Kobad,  and  to  place 
upon  the  throne  another  member  of  the  royal  house.  Their 
choice  fell  upon  Zamasp,"  a  brother  of  Kobad,  who  was  noted 
for  his  love  of  justice  and  for  the  mildness  of  his  disposition." 
The  necessary  arrangements  having  been  made,  they  broke 
out  into  universal  insurrection,  arrested  Kobad,  and  committed 
him  to  safe  custody  in  the  "Castle  of  Oblivion,""  proclaimed 
Zamasp,  and  crowned  him  king  with  all  the  usual  formalities. 

An  attempt  was  then  made  to  deal  the  new  religion  a  fatal 
blow  by  the  seizure  and  execution  of  the  heresiarch,  Mazdak. 
But  here  the  counter-revolution  failed.  Mazdak  was  seized  in- 
deed and  imprisoned ;  but  his  followers  rose  at  once,  broke  open 
his  prison  doors,  and  set  him  at  liberty.  The  government  felt 
itself  too  weak  to  insist  on  its  intended  pohcy  of  coercion. 
Mazdak  was  allowed  to  live  in  retirement  unmolested,  and  to 
increase  the  number  of  his  disciples. 

The  reign  of  Zamasp  appears  to  have  lasted  from  a.d.  498  to 
A.  D.  501,  or  between  two  and  three  years.  "*  He  was  urged  by  the 
army  to  put  Kobad  to  death, ''''  but  hesitated  to  adopt  so  extreme 
a  course,  and  preferred  retaining  his  rival  as  a  prisorier.  The 
"  Castle  of  Oblivion"  was  regarded  as  a  place  of  safe  custody; 
but  the  ex-king  contrived  in  a  short  time  to  put  a  cheat  on  his 


CH.  xviii.]  COINS  OF  ZAMASP.  431 

guards '"  and  effect  his  escape  from  confinement.  Like  other 
claimants  of  the  Persian  throne,"  he  at  once  took  refuge  with 
the  Ephthalites,  and  sought  to  persuade  the  Great  Khan  to  em- 
brace his  cause  and  place  an  army  at  his  disposal.  The  Khan 
showed  himself  more  than  ordinarily  complaisant.  He  can 
scarcely  have  sympathized  with  the  religious  leanings  of  his 
suppliant ;  but  he  remembered  that  he  had  placed  him  upon 
the  throne,  and  had  found  him  a  faithful  feudatory  and  a  quiet 
neighbor.  He  therefore  received  him  with  every  mark  of 
honor,  betrothed  him  to  one  of  his  own  daughters,  '^  and  lent 
him  an  army  of  30,000  men."  With  this  force  Kobad  returned 
to  Persia,  and  offered  battle  to  Zamasp.  Zamasp  declined  the' 
conflict.  He  had  not  succeeded  in  making  himself  popular 
with  his  subjects,  and  knew  that  a  large  party  desired  the  re- 
turn of  his  brother.  '*  It  is  probable  that  he  did  not  greatly 
desire  a  throne.  At  any  rate,  when  his  brother  reached  the 
neighborhood  of  the  capital,  at  the  head  of  the  30,000  Eph- 
thahtes  and  of  a  strong  body  of  Persian  adherents,  Zamasp 
deternnned  upon  submission.  He  vacated  the  throne  in  favor 
of  Kobad,  without  risking  the  chance  of  a  battle,  and  descended 
voluntarily  into  a  private  station."  Different  stories  are  told 
of  his  treatment  by  the  restored  monarch.  According  to  Pro- 
copius,"  he  was  blinded  after  a  cruel  method  long  established 
among  the  Persians;  but  Mirkhond  declares  that  he  was 
pardoned,  and  even  received  from  his  brother  marked  signs  of 
affection  and  favor. " 

The  coins  of  Zamasp  have  the  usual  inflated  ball  and  mural 
crown,  but  with  a  crescent  in  place  of  the  front  limb  of  the 
crown.  ^^  The  ends  of  the  diadem  appear  over  the  two  shoul- 
ders. On  either  side  of  the  head  there  is  a  star,  and  over 
either  shoulder  a  crescent.  Outside  the  encircling  ring,  or 
"pearl  border,"  we  see,  almost  for  the  first  time,'"  three  stars 
>vith  crescents.  The  reverse  bears  the  usual  fire-altar,  with  a 
star  and  crescent  on  either  side  of  the  flame.  The  legend  is 
extremely  brief,  being  either  Zamasp  or  Baq  Zamasp,  i.e. 
"Zamaspes,"  or  "the  divine  Zamaspes."    [PI.  XXH.,  Fig.  1.] 


432  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xr*. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Second  Reign  of  Kdbad.  His  Change  of  Attitude  toivards  th4 
Followers  of  Mazdak.  His  Cause  of  Quarrel  with  Rome. 
First  Roman  War  of  Kohad.  Peace  7nade  a.T).  505.  Rome 
fortifies  Daras  and  Theodosiojjolis.  Complaint  made  by 
Persia.  Negotiations  of  Kobad  with  Justin:  Proposed 
Adoption  of  Chosroes  by  the  Latter.  Internal  Troubles 
in  Persia.  Second  Roman  War  of  Kobad,  a.d.  524-531. 
Death  of  Kobad.     His  Character.     His  coins. 

Ka|Sd67)S  6  Ilepo^ov,  Tcoi'  Xlep(n.KU)U  TTpayfi.dT(ov  KpaTTjcras,  jroAAous  ixev  Kara  'Pu>/iiai'a)i'  jroAe- 
/U.OUS  SirjytyKe,  TToAAd  fie  Kara  PapfSdpuiv  rCif  npocroi.KOVi'Tuiv  ecrTrjtre  Tpovaia,  Kai  )(p6vov 
oiiSiva  TiapriKi  Tapaxal';  re  Ka\  Kiv&vvois  tyKaAifSoii^iei-os — Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  138,  B. 

The  second  reign  of  Kobad  covered  a  period  of  thirty  years, ' 
extending  from  a.d.  501  to  a.d.  531.^  He  was  contemporary, 
during  this  space,  with  the  Roman  emperors  Anastasius,  Jus- 
tin, and  Justinian,  with  Theodoric,  king  of  Italy,  with  Cassio- 
dorus,  Symmachus,  Boethius,  Procopius,  and  Behsarius.  The 
Oriental  writers  tell  us  but  little  of  this  portion  of  his  history. 
Their  silence,  however,  is  fortunately  compensated  by  the  un- 
usual copiousness  of  the  Byzantines,  who  dehver,  at  consider- 
able length,  the  entire  series  of  transactions  in  which  Kobad 
was  engaged  with  the  Constantinopolitan  emperors,  and  fur- 
nish some  interesting  notices  of  other  matters  which  occupied 
liim.  Procopius  especially,  the  eminent  rhetorician  and  secre- 
tary of  Belisarius,  who  was  born  about  the  time  of  Kobad's 
restoration  to  the  Persian  throne,  ^  and  became  secretary  to  the 
great  genei^al  four  years  before  Kobad's  death,"  is  ample  in  his 
details  of  the  chief  occurrences,  and  deserves  a  confidence 
which  the  Byzantines  can  rarely  claim,  from  being  at  once  a 
contemporary  and  a  man  of  remarkable  intelligence.  "His 
facts,"  as  Gibbon  well  observes,^  "are  collected  from  the  per- 
sonal experience  and  free  conversation  of  a  soldier,  a  states- 
man, and  a  traveller ;  his  style  continually  aspires,  and  often 
attains,  to  the  merit  of  strength  and  elegance ;  his  reflections, 
more  especially  in  the  speeches,  which  he  too  frequently  in- 
serts, contain  a  rich  fund  of  political  knowledge ;  and  the  his- 
torian, excited  by  the  generous  ambition  of  pleasing  and  in- 


CH.  XIX.]  SECOND  REIGN  OF  KOBAD.  433 

structing  posterity,  appears  to  disdain  the  prejudices  of  the 
people  and  the  flattery  of  courts." 

The  first  question  which  Kobad  had  to  decide,  when,  by  the 
voluntary  cession  of  his  brother,  Zamasp,  he  remounted  hia 
throne,  was  the  attitude  which  he  should  assume  towards  Maz- 
dak  and  his  followers.  By  openly  favoring  the  new  religion 
and  encouraging  the  disorders  of  its  votaries,  he  had  so  dis- 
gusted the  more  powerful  classes  of  his  subjects  that  he  had 
lost  his  crown  and  been  forced  to  become  a  fugitive  in  a  foreign 
country.  He  was  not  prepared  to  affront  this  danger  a  second 
time.  Still,  his  attachment  to  the  new  doctrine  was  not  shaken ; 
he  held  the  views  propounded  to  be  true,  and  was  not  ashamed 
to  confess  himself  an  unwavering  adherent  of  the  communistic 
prophet.*^  He  contrived,  however,  to  reconcile  his  belief  with 
his  interests  by  separating  the  individual  from  the  king.  As 
a  man,  he  held  the  views  of  Mazdak ;  but,  as  a  king,  he  let  it 
be  known  that  he  did  not  intend  to  maintain  or  support  the 
sectaries  in  any  extreme  or  violent  measures.  The  i-esult  was 
that  the  new  doctrine  languished;  Mazdak  escaped  persecu- 
tion and  continued  to  propagate  his\'iows;  but,  practically, 
the  progress  of  the  new  opinions  was  checked ;  they  had  ceased 
to  command  royal  advocacy,  and  had  consequently  ceased  to 
endanger  the  State ;  they  still  fermented  among  the  masses, 
and  might  cause  trouble  in  the  future ;  but  for  the  present  they 
were  the  harmless  speculations  of  a  certain  number  of  enthu- 
siasts who  did  not  venture  any  more  to  carry  their  theories 
into  practice. 

Kobad  had- not  enjoyed  the  throne  for  more  than  a  year  be- 
fore his  relations  with  the  great  empire  on  his  western  frontier 
became  troubled,  and,  after  some  futile  negotiations,  hostilities 
once  more  broke  out.  It  appears  that  among  the  terms  of  the 
peace  concluded  in  a.d.  442  between  Isdigerd  II.  and  the 
younger  Theodosius, "  the  Romans  had  undertaken  to  pay  an- 
nually a  certain  sum  of  money  as  a  contribution  towards  the 
expenses  of  a  fortified  post  which  the  two  powers  undertook 
to  maintain  in  the  pass  of  Derbend,^  between  the  last  spurs  of 
the  Caucasus  and  the  Caspian.  This  fortress,  known  as  Juroi- 
pach  or  Biraparach, "  commanded  the  usual  passage  by  which 
the  hordes  of  the  north  were  accustomed  to  issue  from  their 
vast  arid  steppes  upon  the  rich  and  populous  regions  of  the 
south  for  the  purpose  of  plundering  raids,  if  not  of  actual  con- 
quests. Their  incursions  threatened  almost  equally  Roman 
and  Persian  territory, '"  and  it  was  felt  that  the  'two  nations 


434  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  XTX. 

were  alike  interested  in  preventing  them.  The  original  agree- 
ment was  that  both  parties  shoiUd  contribute  equally,  alike  to 
the  building  and  to  the  maintaining  of  the  fortress ;  but  the 
Romans  were  so  occupied  in  other  wars  that  the  entire  burden 
actually  fell  upon  the  Persians.  These  latter,  as  was  natural, 
made  from  time  to  time  demands  upon  the  Romans  for  the 
payment  of  their  share  of  the  expenses;"  but  it  seems  that 
these  efforts  were  ineffectual,  and  the  debt  accumulated.  It 
was  under  these  circumstances  that  Kobad,  finding  himself  in 
want  of  money  to  reward  adequately  his  EphthaUte  allies, " 
sent  an  embassy  to  Anastasius,  the  Roman  emperor,  with  a 
peremptory  demand  for  a  remittance.  The  reply  of  Anastasius 
was  a  refusal.  According  to  one  authority"  he  declined  abso- 
lutely to  make  any  payment ;  according  to  another, "  he  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  lend  his  Persian  brother  a  siun  of 
money  on  receiving  the  customary  acknowledgment,  but  re- 
fused an  advance  on  any  other  terms.  Such  a  response  was  a 
simple  repudiation  of  obhgations  voluntarily  contracted,  and 
could  scarcely  fail  to  rouse  the  indignation  of  the  Persian  mon- 
arch. If  he  learned  further  that  the  real  cause  of  the  refusal 
was  a  desire  to  embroil  Persia  with  the  Ephthalites,  and  to  ad- 
vance the  interests  of  Rome  by  leading  her  enemies  to  waste 
each  other's  strength  in  an  internecine  conflict,  '*  he  may  have 
admired  the  cunning  of  his  rival,  but  can  scarcely  have  felt 
the  more  amicably  disposed  towards  him. 

The  natural  result  followed.  Kobad  at  once  declared  war. 
The  two  empires  had  now  been  uninterruptedly  at  peace  for 
sixty,  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  campaign  (that  of 
A.D."  441),  for  eighty  years.  They  had  ceased  to  feel  that 
respect  for  each  other's  arms  and  valor  which  experience 
gives,  and  which  is  the  best  preservative  against  wanton  hos- 
tilities. Kobad  was  confident  in  his  strength,  since  he  was 
able  to  bring  into  the  field,  besides  the  entire  force  of  Persia,  a 
large  Ephthalite  contingent,  and  also  a  number  of  Arabs. 
Anastasius,  perhaps,  scarcely  thought  that  Persia  would  go 
to  war  on  account  of  a  pecuniary  claim  which  she  had  allowed 
to  be  disregarded  for  above  half  a  century.  The  resolve  of 
Kobad  evidently  took  him  by  surprise ;  but  he  had  gone  too 
far  to  recede.  The  Roman  pride  would  not  allow  him  to  yield 
to  a  display  of  force  what  he  had  refused  when  demanded 
peacefully ;  and  he  was  thus  compelled  to  maintain  by  arms 
the  position  which  he  had  assimoed  without  anticipating  ita 
consequences. 


CH.  XIX.J  BE  BESIEGES  AMIDA.  435 

The  war  began  by  a  sudden  inroad  of  the  host  of  Persia  into 
Roman  Armenia,"  where  Theodosiopolis  was  still  the  chief 
stronghold  and  the  main  suppoi't  of  the  Roman  power. "  Un- 
prepared for  resistance,  this  city  was  surrendered  after  a  short 
siege  by  its  commandant,  Constantine,  after  which  the  greater 
part  of  Armenia  was  overrun  and  ravaged.  '^  From  Armenia 
Kobad  conducted  his  army  into  Northern  Mesopotamia,  and 
formed  the  siege  of  Amida  about  the  commencement  of  the 
winter.'"  The  great  strength  of  Amida  has  been  already 
noticed  in  this  volume. ''"  Kobad  found  it  ungarrisoned,  and 
only  protected  by  a  small  force,  cantoned  in  its  neighborhood, 
under  the  philosopher,  Alypius.'"  But  the  resolution  of  the 
townsmen,  and  particularly  of  the  monks,  was  great;  and  a 
most  strenuous  resistance  met  all  his  efforts  to  take  the  place. 
At  first  his  hope  was  to  effect  a  breach  in  the  defences  by 
means  of  the  ram ;  but  the  besieged  employed  the  customary 
means  of  destroying  his  engines,  and,  where  these  failed,  the 
strength  and  thickness  of  the  walls  was  found  to  be  such  that 
no  serious  impression  could  be  made  on  them  by  the  Persian 
battering  train.  It  was  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  some 
other  device;  and  Kobad  proceeded  to  erect  a  mound  in  the 
immediate  neighborhood  of  the  wall,  with  a  view  of  dominat- 
ing the  town,  driving  the  defenders  from  the  battlements,  and 
then  taking  the  place  by  escalade.  He  raised  an  immense 
work ;  but  it  was  undermined  by  the  enemy,  and  at  last  fell  in 
with  a  terrible  crash,  involving  hundreds  in  its  ruin."  It  is 
said  that  after  this  failure  Kobad  despaired  of  success,  and  de- 
termined to  draw  off  his  army ;  but  the  taunts  and  insults  of 
the  besieged,  or  confidence  in  the  prophecies  of  the  Magi,  who 
saw  an  omen  of  victory  in  the  grossest  of  all  the  insults,  caused 
him  to  change  his  intention  and  still  continue  the  siege.  His 
perseverance  was  soon  afterwards  rewarded.  A  soldier  dis- 
covered in  the  wall  the  outlet  of  a  drain  or  sewer  imperfectly 
blocked  up  with  rubble,  and,  removing  this  during  the  night, 
found  himseK  able  to  pass  through  the  wall  into  the  town. 
He  communicated  his  discovery  to  Kobad,  who  took  his  meas- 
ures accordingly.  Sending,  the  next  night,  a  few  picked  men 
through  the  drain,  to  seize  the  nearest  tower,  which  happened 
to  be  slackly  guarded  by  some  sleepy  monks,  who  the  day  be- 
fore had  been  keeping  festival,"  he  brought  the  bulk  of  his 
troops  with  scaling  ladders  to  the  adjoining  portion  of  the  wall, 
and  by  his  presence,  exhortations,  and  threats,'*  compelled 
them  to  force  their  way  into  the  place.     The  inhabitants  re 


i 


43g  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xix 

sisted  strenuously,  but  were  overpowered  by  numbers,  and 
the  carnage  in  the  streets  was  great.  At  last  an  aged  priest, 
shocked  at  the  indiscriminate  massacre,  made  bold  to  address 
the  monarch  himself  and  tell  him  that  it  was  no  kingly  act  to 
slaughter  captives,  "Why,  then,  did  you  elect  to  fight?"  said 
the  angry  prince.  "It  was  God's  doing,"  replied  the  priest, 
astutely ;  "  He  willed  that  thou  shouldest  owe  thy  conquest  of 
Amida,  not  to  our  weakness,  but  to  thy  own  valor."  The  flat- 
tery pleased  Kobad,  and  induced  him  to  stop  the  effusion  of 
blood;"  but  the  sack  was  allowed  to  continue;  the  whole  tow'u 
was  pillaged ;''  and  the  bulk  of  the  inhabitants  were  carried  ofE 
as  slaves." 

The  siege  of  Amida  lasted  eighty  days,''  and  the  year  a.d. 
503  had  commenced  before  it  was  over."    Anastasius,  on  learn- 
ing the  danger  of  his  frontier. town,  immediately  despatched 
to  its  aid  a  considerable  force,  which  he  placed  under  four 
commanders'"— Areobindus,  the  grandson  of  the  Gothic  officer 
of  the  same  name  who  distinguished  himself  in  the  Persian 
war  of  Theodosius;"  Celer,   captam  of  the  imperial  guard; 
Patricius,    the    Phrygian;    and    Hypatius,    one  of   his    own 
nephews.     The  army,  collectively,  is  said  to  have  been  more 
numerous  than  any  that  Rome  had  ever  brought  into  the  field 
against  the  Persians ;''  but  it  was  weakened  by  the  divided 
command,  and  it  was  moreover  broken  up  into  detachments 
which  acted  independently  of  each  other.     Its  advent  also  was 
tardy.     Not  only  did  it  arrive  too  late  to  save  Amida,  but  it  in 
no  way  interfered  with  the  after-movements  of  Kobad,  who, 
leaving  a  small  garrison  to  maintain  his  new  conquest,  carried 
off  the  whole  of  his  rich  booty  to  his  city  of  Nisibis,  and  placed 
the  bulk  of  his  troops  in  a  good  position  upon  his  own  fron- 
tier..='    When  Areobindus,  at  the  head  of  the  first  division, 
reached  Amida  and  heard  that  the  Persians  had  fallen  back, 
he  declined  the  comparatively  inglorious  work  of  a  siege,  and 
pressed  forward,  anxious  to  carry  the  war  into  Persian  terri- 
tory.    He  seems  actually  to  have  crossed  the  border  and  m= 
vaded  the  district  of  Arzanene,'"  when  news  reached  him  that 
Kobad  was  marching  upon  him  with  all  his  troops,  whereupon 
he  instantly  fled,  and  threw  himself  into  Constantia,  leaving 
his  camp  and  stores  to  be  taken  by  the  enemy.     Meanwhile 
another   division  of  the  Roman  army,  under  Patricius  and 
Hypatius,  had  followed  in  the  steps  of  Areobindus,  and  meet- 
ing with  the  advance-guard  of  Kobad,   which  consisted  of 
eight  hundred  Ephthalites,  had  destroyed  it  almost  to  a  man." 


CH.  XIX.]      THE  EPHTnALirES  INVADE  PEI^S/A.  437 

Ignorant,  however,  of  the  near  presence  of  the  main  Persian 
army,  this  body  of  troops  allowed  itself  soon  afterwards  to  be 
surprised  on  the  banks  of  a  stream,  while  some  of  the  men 
were  bathing  and  others  were  taking  their  breakfast,  and  was 
completely  cut  to  pieces  by  Kobad,  scarcely  any  but  the  gene- 
rals escaping. '° 

Thus  far  success  had  been  wholly  on  the  side  of  the  Persians ; 
and  if  circumstances  had  permitted  Kobad  to  remain  at  the 
seat  of  war  and  continue  to  direct  the  operations  of  his  troops 
in  person,  there  is  every  to  reason  to  believe  that  he  Avould 
have  gained  still  greater  advantages.  The  Roman  generals 
were  incompetent ;  they  were  at  variance  among  themselves ; 
and  they  were  unable  to  control  the  troops  under  their  com- 
mand. The  soldiers  were  insubordinate,  without  confidence 
in  their  officers,  and  inclined  to  grumble  at  such  an  unwonted 
hardship  as  a  campaign  prolonged  into  the  winter. "  Thus  all 
the  conditions  of  the  war  were  in  favor  of  Persia.  But  un- 
fortunately for  Kobad,  it  happened  that,  at  the  moment  when 
his  prospects  were  the  fairest,^"  a  danger  in  another  quarter 
demanded  his  presence,  and  required  hun  to  leave  the  conduct 
of  the  Roman  war  to  others.  An  Ephthalite  invasion  called 
him  to  the  defence  of  his  north-eastern  frontier  before  the  year 
A.D.  503  was  over,'"  and  from  this  time  the  operations  in  Meso- 
potamia were  directed,  not  by  the  king  in  person,  but  by  his 
generals.  A  change  is  at  once  apparent.  In  a.d.  504  Celer 
invaded  Arzanene,  destroyed  a  number  of  forts,  and  ravaged 
the  whole  province  with  fire  and  sword.*"  Thence  marching 
southward,  he  threated  Nisibis,  which  is  said  to  have  been 
within  a  little  of  yielding  itself.""  Towards  winter  Patricius 
and  Hypatius  took  heart,  and,  collecting  an  army,  commenced 
the  siege  of  Amida,  which  they  attempted  to  storm  on  several 
occasions,  but  without  success."  After  a  while  they  turned 
the  siege  into  a  blockade,  entrapped  the  commander  of  the 
Persian  garrison,  Glones,  by  a  stratagem,"  and  reduced  the 
defenders  of  the  place  to  such  distress  that  it  would  have  been 
impossible  to  hold  out  much  longer.  It  seems  to  have  been 
when  matters  were  at  this  point^^  that  an  ambassador  of  high 
rank"  arrived  from  Kobad,  empowered  to  conclude  a  peace, 
and  instructed  to  declare  his  master's  willingness  to  surrender 
all  his  conquests,  including  Amida,  on  the  payment  of  a  con- 
siderable sum  of  money.  The  Roman  generals,  regarding 
Amida  as  impregnable,  and  not  aware  of  the  exhaustion  of  its 
stores,  gladly  consented.    They  handed  over  to  the  Persians  a 


438  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARClll.  lCh.  xiX. 

thousand  pounds'  weight  of  gold,  and  received  in  exchange  the 
captured  city  and  territory."  A  treaty  was  signed  by  which 
the  contracting  powers  undertook  to  remain  at  peace  and  re- 
spect each  other's  dominions  for  the  space  of  seven  years."' 
No  definite  arrangement  seems  to  have  heen  made  with  res- 
pect to  the  yearly  payment  on  account  of  the  fortress,  Birapa- 
rach,  the  demand  for  which  had  occasioned  the  war.  This 
claim  remained  in  abej'ance,  to  be  pressed  or  neglected,  as 
Persia  might  consider  her  interests  to  require. 

The  Ephthalite  war,  which  compelled  Kobad  to  make  peace 
with  Anas  tasius,  appears  to  have  occupied  him  uninterruptedly 
for  ten  years."  During  its  continuance  Rome  took  advantage 
of  her  rival's  difficulties  to  continue  the  system  (introduced 
tmder  the  younger  Theodosius"")  of  augmenting  her  own  power, 
and  crippling  that  of  Persia,  by  establishing  strongly  fortified 
posts  upon  her  border  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Persian 
territory.  Not  content  with  restoring  Theodosiopolis  and 
greatly  strengthening  it  defences,  ^°  Anastasius  erected  an  en- 
tirely new  fortress  at  Daras,"  on  the  southern  skirts  of  the 
Mons  Masius,  within  twelve  miles  of  Nisibis,  at  the  edge  of  the 
great  Mesopotamian  plain.  This  place  was  not  a  mere  fort, 
but  a  city ;  it  contained  churches,  baths,  porticoes,  large  gran- 
aries, and  extensive  cisterns.  ^^  It  constituted  a  standing  men- 
ace to  Persia;"  and  its  erection  was  in  direct  violation  of  the 
treaty  made  by  Theodosius  with  Isdigerd  11.,^*  which  was  re- 
garded as  still  in  force  by  both  nations. 

We  cannot  be  surprised  that  Kobad,  when  his  EphthaHte 
war  was  over,  made  formal  complaint  at  Constantinople  (ab. 
A.D.  517)  of  the  infraction  of  the  treaty."  Anastasius  was  un- 
able to  deny  the  charge.  He  endeavored  at  first  to  meet  it  by 
a  mixture  of  bluster  with  professions  of  friendship ;  but  when 
this  method  did  not  appear  effectual  he  had  recourse  to  an  ar 
gument  whereof  the  Persians  on  most  occasions  acknowledged 
the  force.  By  the  expenditure  of  a  large  sum  of  money  he 
either  corrupted  the  ambassadors  of  Kobad,  or  made  them 
honestly  doubt  whether  the  sum  paid  would  not  satisfy  their 
master.  *° 

In  A.D.  518  Anastasius  died,  and  the  imperial  authority  was 
assumed  by  the  Captain  of  the  Guard,  the  "  Dacian  peasant,"  " 
Justin.  With  him  Kobad  very  shortly  entered  into  negotia- 
tions. He  had  not,  it  is  clear,  accepted  the  pecuniary  sacrifice 
of  Anastasius  as  a  complete  satisfaction.  He  felt  that  he  had 
many  grounds  of  quarrel  with  the  Romans.    There  was  the  old 


f 


CH.  XIX.]    STRANGE  PROPOSAL  MADE  BY  KOBAD.         430 

matter  of  the  annual  payment  due  on  account  of  the  fortress 
of  Biraparach;  there  was  the  recent  strengthening  of  Theo- 
dosiopoUs,  and  building  of  Daras ;  there  was  moreover  an  in- 
terference of  Rome  at  this  time  in  the  region  about  the  Cau- 
casus which  was  very  galling  to  Persia  and  was  naturally  re- 
sented by  her  monarch.  One  of  the  first  proceedings  of  Justin 
after  he  ascended  the  throne  was  to  send  an  embassy  with  rich 
gifts  to  the  court  of  a  certain  Hunnic  chief  of  these  parts,  called 
Ziligdes  or  Zilgibis/^  and  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  him  by 
which  the  Hun  bound  himself  to  assist  the  Romans  against  the 
Persians.  Soon  afterwards  a  Lazic  prince,  named  Tzath, 
whose  country  was  a  Persian  dependency,  instead  of  seeking 
inauguration  from  Kobad,  proceeded  on  the  death  of  his 
father"  to  the  court  of  Constantinople,  and  expressed  his  wish 
to  become  a  Christian,  and  to  hold  liis  crown  as  one  of  Rome's 
vassal  monarchs.  Justin  gave  this  person  a  warm  welcome, 
had  him  baptized,  married  him  to  a  Roman  lady  of  rank,  and 
sent  him  back  to  Lazica  adorned  with  a  diadem  and  robes  that 
sufficiently  indicated  his  dependent  position.  ^°  The  friendly  rela- 
tions established  between  Rome  and  Persia  by  the  treaty  of  a.d, 
505  were,  under  these  circumstances,  greatly  disturbed,  and  on 
both  sides  it  would  seem  that  war  was  expected  to  break  out." 
But  neither  Justin  nor  Kobad  was  desirous  of  a  rupture.  Both 
were  advanced  in  years,"  and  both  had  domestic  troubles  to  oc- 
cupy them.  Kobad  was  at  this  time  especiallyanxious  about  the 
succession.  He  had  four  sons, "'  Kaoses,  Zames,  Phthasuarsas, 
and  Chosroes,  of  whom  Kaoses  was  the  eldest.  This  prince, 
however,  did  not  please  him.  His  affections  were  fixed  on  his 
fourth  son,  Chosroes,  and  he  had  no  object  more  at  heart  than 
to  secure  the  crown  for  this  favorite  child.  The  Roman  wi  iters 
tell  us'^  that  instead  of  resenting  the  proceedings  of  Justin  in 
the  years  a.d.  520-522,  Kobad  made  the  strange  proposal  to  him 
about  this  time  that  he  should  adopt  Chosroes,  in  order  that 
that  prince  might  have  the  aid  of  the  Romans  against  his  coun- 
trymen, if  his  right  of  succession  should  be  disputed.  It  is,  no 
doubt,  difficult  to  believe  that  such  a  proposition  should  have 
been  made ;  but  the  circumstantial  manner  in  which  Procopius, 
writing  not  forty  years  after,  relates  the  matter,  renders  it 
almost  impossible  for  us  to  reject  the  story  as  a  pure  fabrica- 
tion. There  must  have  been  some  foundation  for  it.  In  the 
negotiations  between  Justin  and  Kobad  during  the  early  years 
of  the  former,  the  idea  of  Rome  pledging  herself  to  acknowledge 
Chosroes  as  his  father's  successor  must  have  been  brought 


440  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xix. 

forward.  The  proposal,  whatever  its  exact  terms,  led  however 
to  no  result.  Eonie  dechned  to  do  as  Kobad  desired;"  and 
thus  another  ground  of  estrangement  was  added  to  those  which 
had  previously  made  the  renewal  of  the  Eoman  war  a  mere 
question  of  time. 

It  is  probable  that  the  rupture  would  have  occurred  earlier 
than  it  did  had  not  Persia  about  the  year  a.d.  523  become  once 
more  the  scene  of  religious  discord  and  conspiracy.  The  fol- 
lowers of  Mazdak  had  been  hitherto  protected  by  Kobad,  and 
had  lived  in  peace  and  multiplied  throughout  all  the  provinces 
of  the  empire.'"  Content  with  the  toleration  which  they 
enjoyed,  they  had  for  above  twenty  years  created  no  disturb- 
ance, and  their  name  had  almost  disappeared  from  the  records 
of  history.  But  as  time  went  on  they  began  to  feel  that  their 
position  was  insecure."  Their  hapjDiness,  their  very  safety, 
depended  upon  a  single  life ;  and  as  Kobad  advanced  in  years 
they  grew  to  dread  more  and  more  the  prospect  which  his  death 
would  open.  Among  his  sons  there  was  but  one  who  had  em- 
braced their  doctrine ;  and  this  prince,  Phthasuarsas,  had  but 
little  chance  of  being  chosen  to  be  his  father's  successor. 
Kaoses  enjoyed  the  claim  of  natural  right ;  Chosroes  was  his 
father's  favorite ;  Zames  had  the  respect  and  good  wishes  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  people;"^  Phthasuarsas  was  disliked  by  the 
Magi,""  and,  if  the  choice  lay  with  them,  was  certain  to  be 
passed  over.  The  sectaries  therefore  determined  not  to  wait 
the  natural  course  of  events,  but  to  shape  them  to  their  own 
purposes.  They  promised  Phthasuarsas  to  obtain  by  their 
prayers  his  father's  abdication  and  his  own  appointment  to 
succeed  him,  and  asked  him  to  pledge  himself  to  establish  their 
religion  as  that  of  the  State  when  he  became  king.  The  prince 
consented;  and  the  Mazdakites  proceeded  to  arrange  their 
plans,  when,  unfortunately  for  them,  Kobad  discovered,  or 
suspected,  that  a  scheme  was  on  foot  to  deprive  him  of  his 
crown.  Whether  the  designs  of  the  sectaries  were  really  trea- 
sonable or  not  is  uncertain ;  but  whatever  they  were,  an  Orien- 
tal monarch  was  not  likely  to  view  them  with  favor.  In  the 
East  it  is  an  offence  even  to  speculate  on  the  death  of  the  king ; 
and  Kobad  saw  in  the  intrigue  which  had  been  set  on  foot  a 
criminal  and  dangerous  conspiracy.  He  determined  at  once  to 
crush  the  movement.  Inviting  the  Mazdakites  to  a  solemn  as- 
sembly, at  which  he  was  to  confer  the  royal  dignity  on  Phtha- 
suarsas, he  caused  his  army  to  surround  the  unarmed  multitude 
and  massacre  the  entire  number." 


Cfi.  xix.i         il^TERN-AL   TROlTBLES  IX  PEnSTA.  441 

Eelieved  from  this  peril,  Kobad  would  at  once  have  declared 
war  against  Justin,  and  have  marched  an  army  into  Roman 
territory,  had  not  troubles  broken  out  in  Iberia,  which  made  it 
necessary  for  him  to  stand  on  the  defensive."  Adopting  the 
intolerant  policy  so  frequently  pursued,  and  generally  with 
such  ill  results,  by  the  Persian  kings,  Kobad  had  commanded 
Gurgenes,  the  Iberian  monarch,  to  renounce  Christianity  and 
profess  the  Zoroastrian  religion.  Especially  he  had  reqiiired 
that  the  Iberian  custom  of  burying  the  dead  should  be  relin- 
quished, and  that  the  Persian  practice  of  exposing  corpses  to 
be  devoured  by  dogs  and  birds  of  prey"  should  supersede  the 
Christian  rite  of  sepulture.  Gurgenes  was  too  deeply  attached 
to  his  faith  to  entertain  these  propositions  for  a  moment.  He 
at  once  shook  off  the  Persian  yoke,  and,  declaring  hinaself  a 
vassal  of  Rome,  obtained  a  promise  from  Justin  that  he  would 
never  desert  the  Iberian  cause.  Rome,  however,  was  not  pre- 
pared to  send  her  own  armies  into  this  distant  and  inhospitable 
region;  her  hope  was  to  obtain  aid  from  the  Tatars  of  the 
Crimea,'^  and  to  play  off  these  barbarians  against  the  forces 
wherewith  Kobad  might  be  expected  shortly  to  vindicate  his 
authority.  An  attempt  to  engage  the  Crimeans  generally  in 
this  service  was  made,  but  it  was  not  successful.  A  small 
force  was  enrolled  and  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Gurgenes.  But 
now  the  Persians  took  the  field  in  strength.  A  large  army  was 
sent  into  Iberia  by  Kobad,  under  a  general  named  Boes.  Gur- 
genes saw  resistance  to  be  impossible.  He  therefore  fled  the 
country,  and  threw  himself  into  Lazica,  where  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  ground,  the  favor  of  the  natives,  and  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Romans  enabled  him  to  maintain  himself.  Iberia, 
however,  was  lost,  and  passed  once  more  under  the  Per- 
sians, who  even  penetrated  into  Lazic  territory  and  occupied 
some  forts  which  commanded  the  passes  between  Lazica  and 
Iberia.'^ 

Rome,  on  her  part,  endeavored  to  retaliate  (a.d.  526)  by  in- 
vading Persarmenia  and  Mesopotamia.  The  campaign  is  re- 
markable as  that  in  which  the  greatest  general  of  the  age,  the 
renowned  and  unfortunate  Belisarius,  first  held  a  command 
and  thus  commenced  the  work  of  learning  by  experience  the 
duties  of  a  military  leader.  Hitherto  a  mere  guardsman,  and 
still  quite  a  youth,"  trammelled  moreover  by  association  with 
a  colleague,  he  did  not  on  this  occasion  reap  any  laurels.  A 
Persian  force  imder  two  generals,  Narses  and  Aratius,  defended 
Persarmenia,   and,  engaging    the  Romans  under  Sittas  and 


442  ^^^  SEVENTH  MOFAttCnt.     •-        tcs.  xk. 

Belisarius,  succeeded  in  defeating  them.  At  the  same  time, 
Licelarius,  a  Thracian  in  the  Roman  service,  made  an  incursion 
into  the  tract  about  Nisibis,  grew  alarmed  without  cause  and 
beat  a  speedy  retreat.  Hereupon  Justin  recalled  him  as  m- 
competent,  and  the  further  conduct  of  the  war  in  Mesopotamia 
was  entrusted  to  Behsarius,  who  took  up  his  headquarters  at 
Daras. 

The  year  a.d.  527  seems  to  have  been  one  in  which  nothing 
of  importance  was  attempted  on  either  side.  At  Constanti- 
nople the  Emperor  Justin  had  fallen  into  ill  health,  and,  after 
associating  his  nephew  Justinian  on  the  1st  of  April,  had  de- 
parted this  life  on  the  1st  of  August.'"  About  the  same  time"' 
Kobad  found  his  strength  insufficient  for  active  warfare,  and 
put  the  command  of  his  armies  into  the  hands  of  his  sons. 
The  struggle  continued  in  Lazica,  but  with  no  decisive  result.'* 
At  Daras,  Belisarius,  apparently,  stood  on  the  defensive.  It 
was  not  till  a.d.  528  had  set  in  that  he  resumed  operations  in 
the  open  field,  and  prepared  once  more  to  measure  his  strength 
against  that  of  Persia, 

Belisarius  was  stirred  from  liis  repose  by  an  order  from 
court.  Desirous  of  carrying  further  the  poHcy  of  gaining 
ground  by  means  of  fortified  posts."  Justinian,  who  had  re- 
cently restored  and  strengthened  the  frontier  city  of  Martyr- 
opohs,*"  on  the  Nymphius,  sent  instructions  to  Behsarius, 
early  in  a.d.  528,  to  the  effect  that  he  was  to  build  a  new  fort 
at  a  place  called  Mindon,  on  the  Persian  border  a  little  to  the 
left  of  Nisibis."  The  work  was  commenced,  but  the  Persians 
would  not  allow  it  to  proceed.  An  army  which  numbered 
30,000  men,  commanded  by  Xerxes,*'  son  of  Kobad,  and 
Perozes,  the  Mihran,"  attacked  the  Roman  workmen;  and 
when  Behsarius,  reinforced  by  fresh  troops  from  Syria  and 
Phoenicia,  ventured  an  engagement,  he  was  completely  de- 
feated and  forced  to  seek  safety  in  flight.  The  attempted 
fortification  was,  upon  this,  razed  to  the  ground;  and  the 
Mihran  returned,  with  numerous  prisoners  of  importance,  into 
Persia." 

It  is  creditable  to  Justinian  that  he  did  not  allow  the  ill- 
success  of  his  Ueutenant  to  lead  to  his  recall  or  disgrace.  On 
the  contrary,  he  chose  exactly  the  time  of  his  greatest  depres- 
sion to  give  him  the  title  of  "General  of  the  East.""  Belisa- 
rius upon  this  assembled  at  Daras  an  imposing  force,  com- 
posed  of  Romans  and  allies,  the  latter  being  cliiefly  Massagetee. 
The  entire  number  amounted  to  25,000  men;'"  and  with  thia 


CH.  XIX.]  THE  PERSIANS  ATTACK  DARAS.  443 

army  he  would  probably  have  assumed  the  offensive,  had  not 
the  Persian  general  of  the  last  campaign,  Perezes  the  Mihran," 
again  appeared  in  the  field,  at  the  head  of  40,000  Persians** 
and  declared  his  intention  of  besieging  and  taking  Daras. 
With  the  insolence  of  an  Oriental  he  sent  a  message  to  Belisa- 
rius,  requiring  him  to  have  his  bath  prepared  for  the  morrow, 
as  after  taking  the  town  he  would  need  that  kind  of  refresh- 
ment/' Belisarius  contented  himself,  in  reply,  with  drawing 
out  his  troops  in  front  of  Daras  in  a  position  carefully  pre- 
pared beforehand,  where  both  his  centre  and  his  flanks  would 
be  protected  by  a  deep  ditch,  outside  of  which  there  would  be 
room  to  act  for  his  cavalry.  Perezes,  having  reconnoitred  the 
position,  hesitated  to  attack  it  without  a  greater  advantage  of 
numbers,  and  sent  hastily  to  Nisibis  for  10,000  more  soldiere, 
while  he  allowed  the  day  to  pass  without  anything  more 
serious  than  a  demonstration  of  his  calvary  against  the  Roman 
left,  and  some  insignificant  single  combats.'" 

The  next  morning  his  reinforcement  arrived;''  and  after 
some  exchange  of  messages  with  Behsarius,"^  which  led  to  no 
result,  he  commenced  active  operations.  Placing  his  infantry 
in  the  centre,  and  his  horse  upon  either  wing,  as  the  Romans 
had  likewise  done,  and  arranging  his  infantry  so  that  one  half 
should  from  time  to  time  relieve  the  other,''  he  assaulted  the 
Roman  line  with  a  storm  of  darts  and  arrows.  The  Romans 
replied  with  their  missile  weapons ;  but  the  Persians  had  the 
advantage  of  numbers ;  they  were  protected  by  huge  wattled 
shields;  and  they  were  more  accustomed  to  this  style  of  war- 
fare than  their  adversaries.  Still  the  Romans  held  out ;  but  it 
was  a  relief  to  them  when  the  missile  weapons  were  exhausted 
on  both  sides,  and  a  closer  fight  began  along  the  whole  line 
with  swords  and  spears.  After  a  while  the  Roman  left  was  in 
difficulties.  Here  the  Cadiseni  (Cadusians?)  under  Pituazes 
routed  their  opponents,  and  were  pursuing  them  hastily  when 
the  Massagetic  horse,  commanded  by  Sunicas  and  Aigan,  and 
three  himdred  Heruli  under  a  chief  called  Pharas,  charged 
them  on  their  right  flank,  and  at  once  threw  them  into  dis- 
order. Three  thousand  fell,  and  the  rest  were  driven  back 
upon  their  main  body,  which  still  continued  to  fight  bravely. 
The  Romans  did  not  push  their  advantage,  but  were  satisfied 
to  reoccupy  the  ground  from  which  they  had  been  driven.'* 

Scarcely  was  the  battle  re-establislied  in  this  quarter  when 
the  Romans  found  themselves  in  still  greater  difficiilties  upon 
their  right.     Here  Perezes  bad  determined  to  deliver  his  maia 


444  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xix. 

attack.  The  corps  of  Immortals,  which  he  had  kept  in  re- 
serve, and  such  troops  as  he  could  spare  from  his  centre,  were 
secretly  massed  upon  his  own  left,"  and  charged  the  Roman 
right  with  such  fury  that  it  was  bi-oken  and  began  a  hasty 
retreat.  The  Persians  pursued  in  a  long  column,  and  were 
carrying  all  before  them,  when  once  more  an  impetuous  flank 
charge  of  the  barbarian  cavalry,  which  now  formed  an  im- 
poi*tant  element  in  tlie  Roman  armies,  changed  the  face  of 
affairs,  and  indeed  decided  the  fortune  of  the  day.  The  Per- 
sian column  was  actually  cut  in  two  by  the  Massagetic  horse ; 
those  who  had  advanced  the  furthest  were  completely  sepa- 
rated from  their  friends,  and  were  at  once  surrounded  and 
slain.  Among  them  was  the  standard-bearer  of  Baresmanes, 
who  commanded  the  Persian  left.  The  fall  of  this  man  in- 
creased the  general  confusion.  In  vain  did  the  Persian 
column,  checked  in  its  advance,  attempt  an  orderly  retreat. 
The  Romans  assavdted  it  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  and  a 
terrible  carnage  ensued.  The  crowning  disaster  was  the  death 
of  Baresmanes,  who  was  slain  by  Sunicas,  the  Massa-Goth; 
whereupon  the  whole  Persian  army  broke  and  fled  without 
offering  any  further  resistance.  Here  fell  5000,  including 
numbers  of  the  "Immortals."  The  slaughter  would  have  been 
still  greater,  had  not  BeUsarius  and  his  heutenant,  Hermo- 
genes,  with  wise  caution  restrained  the  Roman  troops  and  re- 
called them  quickly  from  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  content 
with  the  success  which  they  had  achieved.  It  was  so  long 
since  a  Roman  army  had  defeated  a  Persian  one  in  the  open 
field  that  the  victory  had  an  extraordinary  value,  and  it 
would  have  been  foolish  to  risk  a  reverse  in  the  attempt  to 
give  it  greater  completeness.'® 

While  these  events  took  place  in  Mesopotamia,  the  Persian 
arms  were  also  unsuccessful  in  the  Armenian  highlands, 
whither  Kobad  had  sent  a  second  army  to  act  offensively 
against  Rome,  under  the  conduct  of  a  certain  Mermeroes. 
The  Roman  commanders  in  this  region  were  Sittas,  the  former 
colleague  of  Belisarius,"  and  Dorotheas,  a  general  of  experi- 
ence. Their  troops  did  not  amount  to  more  than  half  the 
number  of  the  enemy, '^  yet  they  contrived  to  inflict  on  the 
Persians  two  defeats,  one  in  their  own  territory,  the  other  in 
Roman  Armenia.  The  superiority  thus  exhibited  by  the 
Romans  encouraged  desertions  to  their  side ;  and  in  some  in- 
stances the  deserters  were  able  to  carry  over  with  them  to 
their  new  friends  small  portions  of  Persian  territory.'' 


CH.  XIX.]  PROJECT  OF  ALAMANBARU8,  445 

In  the  year  a.d.  531,  after  a  vain  attempt  at  negotiating 
terms  of  peace  with  Rome,""  the  Persians  made  an  effort  to 
recover  their  laurels  by  carrying  the  war  into  a  new  quarter 
and  effecting  a  new  combination.  Alamandarus,  sheikh  of 
the  Saracenic  Arabs,  had  long  been  a  bitter  enemy  of  the 
Romans,  and  from  his  safe  retreat  in  the  desert  had  been  ac- 
customed for  fifty  years  to  ravage,  ahnost  at  his  Avill,  the 
eastern  provinces  of  the  empire."'  Two  years  previously  he 
had  carried  fire  and  sword  through  the  regions  of  upper  Syria, 
had  burned  the  suburbs  of  Chalcis, '"-  and  threatened  the 
Roman  capital  of  the  East,  the  rich  and  luxurious  Antioch. 
He  owed,  it  would  seem,  some  sort  of  allegiance  to  Persia, "" 
although  practically  he  was  independent,  and  made  his  expe- 
ditions when  and  where  he  pleased.  However,  in  a.d.  531, 
he  put  himself  at  the  disposal  of  Persia,  proposed  a  joint 
expedition,  and  suggested  a  new  plan  of  campaign.  "Mesopo- 
tamia and  Osrhoene,"  he  said,  "on  which  the  Persians  were 
accustomed  to  make  their  attacks,  could  better  resist  them 
than  almost  any  other  part  of  the  Roman  territory,  In  these 
provinces  were  the  strongest  of  the  Roman  cities,  fortified  ac- 
cording to  the  latest  rules  of  art,  and  plentifully  supplied  with 
every  appliance  of  defensive  warfare.  There,  too,  were  the 
best  and  bravest  of  the  Roman  troops,  and  an  army  more 
numerous  than  Rome  had  ever  employed  against  Persia 
before.  It  would  be  most  perilous  to  risk  an  encounter  on  this 
gi-ound.  Let  Persia,  however,  invade  the  country  beyond  the 
Euphrates,  and  she  would  find  but  few  obstacles.  In  that 
region  there  were  no  strong  fortresses,  nor  was  there  any  army 
worth  mention.  Antioch  itself,  the  richest  and  most  populous 
city  of  the  Roman  East,  was  without  a  garrison,  and,  if  it  were 
suddenly  assaulted,  could  probably  be  taken.  The  incursion 
might  be  made,  Antioch  sacked,  and  the  booty  carried  off  into 
Persian  territory  before  the  Romans  in  Mesopotamia  received 
intelligence  of  Avliat  was  happening."  Kobad  listened  with 
approval,  and  determined  to  adopt  the  bold  course  suggested 
to  him.  He  levied  a  force  of  15,000  cavalry,'"^  and,  placing  it 
inider  the  command  of  a  general  named  Azarethes,  ""■  desired 
him  to  take  Alamandarus  for  his  guide  and  make  a  joint  expe- 
dition with  him  across  the  Euphrates.  It  was  imderstood  that 
the  great  object  of  the  expedition  was  the  capture  of  Antioch. 

The  allied  army  crossed  the  Euphrates  below  Circesiam,'"' 
and  ascended  tlie  right  Iiank  of  the  river  till  they  neared  the 
latitude  of  Antioch,  when  they  struck  westward  and  reached 


446  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xix 

Gabbula  '"  (the  modern  JabuT),  on  the  north  shore  of  the  salt 
lake  now  known  as  the  Sabakhah.'"'    Here  they  learned  to 
their  surprise  that  the  movement,  which  they  had  intended  to 
be  wholly  unknown  to  the  Eomans,  had  come  to  the  ears  of 
Behsarius, "°  who  had  at  once  quitted  Daras,  and  proceeded  by 
forced  marches  to  the  defence  of  Syria,  into  which  he  had 
thrown    himself  \^dth  an    army  of    20,000  men,""  Romans, 
Isaurians,  Lycaonians,'"  and  Arabs.     His  troops  were  already 
interposed  between  the  Persians  and  their  longed-for  prey, 
Behsarius  having  fixed  his  headquarters  at  Ctialcis,  "^  half  a 
degree  to  the  west  of  Gabbula,  and  twenty -fi.ve  miles  nearer 
to  Antioch.      Thus  balked  of  their  purpose,  and  despairing 
of  any  greater  success  than  they  had  already  achieved,  the 
allies  became  anxious  to  return  to  Persia  wath  the  plunder  of 
the  Syrian  towns  and  villages  wiiich  they  had  sacked  on  their 
advance.     Behsarius  was  quite  content  that  they  should  carry 
off  their  spoil,  and  would  have  condidered  it  a  sufScient  victory 
to  have  frustrated  the  expedition  without  striking  a  blow."" 
But  his  army  was  otherwise  minded;  they  were  eager  for 
battle,  and  hoped  doubtless  to  strip  the  flying  foe  of  his  rich 
booty.     Behsarius  was  at  last  forced,  against  his  better  judg- 
ment, to  indulge  their  desires  and  allow  an  engagement,  which 
was  fought  on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,   nearly  opposite 
Callinicus.  "^     Here  the  conduct  of  the  Roman  troops  in  action 
corresponded  bvit  ill  to  the  anxiety  for  a  conflict.     The  infantry 
indeed  stood  firm,  notwithstanding  that  they  fought  fasting;"* 
but  the  Saracenic  Arabs,   of  whom  a  portion  were  on  the 
Roman  side,  and  the  Isaurian  and  Lycaonian  horse,  who  had 
been  among  the  most  eager  for  the  fray,  offered  scarcely  any 
resistance ;  and,  the  right  wing  of  the  Romans  being  left  ex- 
posed by  their  flight,  Behsarius  was  compelled  to  make  his 
troops  turn  their  faces  to  the  enemy  and  their  backs  to  the 
Euphrates,  and  in  this  position,  where  defeat  would  have  been 
ruin,  to  meet  and  resist  all  the  assaults  of  the  foe  until  the 
shades  of  evening  fell,  and  he  was  able  to  transport  his  troops 
in  boats  across  the  river.     The  honors  of  victory  rested  with 
the  Persians,  but  they  had  gained  no  substantial  advantage ; 
and  when  Azarethes  returned  to  his  master  he  was  not  tin  justly 
reproached  with  having  sacrificed  many  lives  for  no  appreci- 
able result. ""    The  raid  into  Syria  had  failed  of  its  chief  object; 
and  Behsarius,  though  defeated,  had  returned,  with  the  main 
strength  of  his  army  intact,  into  Mesopotamia. 
The  battle  of  Callinicus  was  fought  on  Easter  Eve,  April  19 


k  3?-' 


en.  XIX.]      DEATH  OF  KOBAD—UIS  CEARACTER.  447 

Azarethes  probably  reached  Ctesiphon  and  made  his  report  to 
Kobad  towards  the  end  of  the  month.  Dissatisfied  with  what 
Azarethes  had  achieved,  and  feehng  that  the  season  was  not 
too  far  advanced  for  a  second  campaign,  Kobad  despatched  an 
army  under  three  chiefs,  into  Mesopotamia,  where  Sittas  was 
now  the  principal  commander  on  the  Roman  side,  as  Belisarius 
had  been  hastily  summoned  to  Byzantium  in  order  to  be  em- 
ployed against  the  Vandals  in  Africa.  This  force  found  no 
one  to  resist  in  the  open  field,  and  was  therefore  able  to  invade 
Sophene  and  lay  siege  to  the  Roman  fortress  of  Marty ropolis.'" 
Martyropolis  was  ill  provisioned,  and  its  walls  were  out  of 
repair.  The  Persians  must  soon  have  taken  it,  had  not  Sittas 
contrived  to  spread  reports  of  a  diversion  which  the  Huns 
were  about  to  make  as  Roman  allies.  Fear  of  being  caught 
between  two  fires  paralyzed  the  Persian  commanders;  and 
before  events  undeceived  them,  news  arrived  in  the  camp  that 
Kobad  was  dead,  and  that  a  new  prince  sat  upon  the  throne. 
Under  these  circumstances,  Chanaranges,  the  chief  of  the  Per- 
sian commanders,  yielded  to  representations  made  by  Sittas, 
that  peace  would  now  probably  be  made  between  the  contend- 
ing powers,  and  withdrew  his  army  into  Persian  territory.  ™ 

Kobad  had,  in  fact,  been  seized  with  paralysis  on  the  8th  of 
September,'"  and  after  an  illness  which  lasted  only  five  days, 
had  expired.  Before  dying,  he  had  commimicated  to  his  chief 
minister,  Mebodes,  his  earnest  desire  that  Chosroes  should  suc- 
ceed him  upon  the  throne,  and,  acting  under  the  advice  of 
Mebodes,  had  formally  left  the  crown  to  him  by  a  will  duly 
executed, ""  He  is  said  by  a  contemporary  to  have  been  eighty- 
two  years  old  at  his  death,'"  an  age  very  seldom  attained  by 
an  Oriental  monarch.  His  long  life  was  more  than  usually 
eventful,  and  he  cannot  be  denied  the  praise  of  activity,  perse- 
verance, fertility  of  resource,  and  general  military  capacity. 
But  he  was  cruel  and  fickle ;  he  disgraced  his  ministers  and  his 
generals  on  insufificient  grounds ;  he  allowed  himself,  from  con- 
siderations of  pohcy,  to  smother  his  religious  con^nctions;  and 
he  risked  subjecting  Persia  to  the  horrors  of  a  civil  war,  in 
order  to  gratify  a  favoritism  which,  however  justified  by  the 
event,  seems  to  have  rested  on  no  worthy  motive.  Chosroes 
was  preferred  on  account  of  his  beauty,  and  because  he  was 
the  son  of  Kobad's  best-loved  wife, '"  rather  than  for  any  good 

lualities;  and  inherited  the  kingdom,  not  so  much  because  he 
had  shown  any  capacity  to  govern  as  because  he  was  his  fa^ 

Iher's  darling. 


448  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xx 

The  coins  of  Kobad  are,  as  might  be  expected  from  the  length 
of  his  reign,  very  numerous.  In  their  general  appearance 
they  resemble  those  of  Zamasp,  but  do  not  exhibit  quite  so 
many  stars  and  crescents.  The  legend  on  the  obverse  is  either 
''Kavdf'  or  '' Kavdf'  afzui,''  i.e.  "Kobad,"  or  "May  Kobad 
be  increased."'"'  The  reverse  shows  the  regnal  year,  which 
ranges  from  eleven  to  forty- three,  '^^  together  with  a  mint-mark. 
The  mint-marks,  which  are  nearly  forty  in  number,  comprise 
almost  aU  those  of  Perozes,  together  with  about  thirteen 
others.'"    [PI.  XXII.  Fig.  2.] 


CHAPTER  XX. 


Accession  of  Chosroes  I.  (Anushirican).  Conspiracy  to  de- 
throne him  crushed.  General  Severity  of  his  Government. 
He  concludes  Peace  ivith  Rome,  a.  d.  533.  Terms  of  the 
Peace.  Causes  which  led  to  its  Rujjture.  First  Roman 
War  of  Chosroes,  a.d.  540-544.  Second  Roman  War,  a.d. 
549-557.  Eastern  Wars.  Conquest  of  Arabia  Felix-  SiqJ- 
posed  Campaign  in  India.  War  with  the  Turks.  Revolt 
of  Persarmenia.  Third  Roman  War,  a.d.  572-579.  Death 
of  Chosroes. 

TefllTJKOTOs  ToO  Ka/3aSou,  Xo<rpo7)s  6  ndw  6  Ka9'  rifjiai  SiaSexerai  tyjv  TraTpway  apxV"!  ««' 
TTinpa\e  TrKelcrTo.  '6<Ta  kox  (u.e'yi(rTa. — Agathias,  iv.  29;  p.  140,  A. 

The  accession  of  Chosroes  was  not  altogether  undisputed, 
Kaoses,  the  eldest  of  the  sons  of  Kobad,  regarding  himself  as  en- 
titled to  the  crown  by  right  of  birth,  assumed  the  insignia  of 
royalty  on  the  death  of  his  father,  and  claimed  to  be  acknowl- 
edged as  monarch. '  But  Mebodes,  the  Grand  Vizier,  interposed 
with  the  assertion  of  a  constitutional  axiom,  that  no  one  had  the 
right  of  taking  the  Persian  crown  untU  it  was  assigned  to  him 
by  the  assembly  of  the  nobles."  Kaoses,  who  thought  he  might 
count  on  the  goodwill  of  the  nobles,  acquiesced ;  and  the  assem- 
bly being  convened,  his  claims  were  submitted  to  it.  Here- 
upon Mebodes  brought  forward  the  formal  testament  of  Kobad, 
which  he  had  hitherto  concealed,  and,  submitting  it  to  the 
nobles,  exhorted  them  to  accept  as  king  the  brave  prince  desig- 
nated by  a  brave  and  successful  father.  His  eloquence  and 
eiuthority  prevailed ;  the  claims  of  Kaoses  and  pf  at  least  one 


CH,  xxl  ACCESSION  OF  CUOSROEfS  I  44<^ 

other  son  of  Kobad '  were  set  aside ;  and,  in  accordance  with 
his  father's  will,  Chosroes  was  proclaimed  lawfuJ  monarch  of 
Persia. 

But  a  party  among  the  nobles  were  dissatisfied  with  the  de- 
cision  to  which  the  majority  had  come.  They  dreaded  the 
restlessness,*  and  probably  feared  the  cruelty,  of  Chosroes. 
It  might  have  been  expected  that  they  would  have  espoused 
the  cause  of  the  disappointed  Kaoses,  which  had  a  solid  basis 
of  legality  to  rest  upon;  but,  apparently,  the  personal  charac- 
ter of  Kaoses  was  unsatisfactory,  or  at  any  rate,  there  was 
another  prince  whose  qualities  conciliated  more  regard  and 
aroused  more  enthusiasm.  Zames,  the  second  son  of  Kobad, 
had  distinguished  himself  repeatedly  in  the  field,  ^  and  was  the 
idol  of  a  considerable  section  of  the  nation,  who  had  long  de- 
sired that  he  should  govern  them.  Unfortunately,  however, 
he  possessed  a  disqiialification  fatal  in  the  eyes  of  Orientals ; 
he  had,  by  disease  or  mischance,  lost  one  of  his  eyes,  and  this 
physical  blemish  made  it  impossible  that  he  should  occupy  the 
Persian  throne. "  Under  these  circumstances  an  ingenious  plan 
was  hit  upon.  In  order  to  combine  respect  for  laAv  and  usage 
with  the  practical  advantage  of  being  governed  by  the  man  of 
their  choice,  the  discontented  nobles  conceived  the  idea  of  con- 
ferring the  crown  on  a  son  of  Zames,  a  boy  named  after  his 
grandfather  Kobad,  on  whose  behalf  Zames  would  naturally 
be  regent.'  Zames  readily  came  into  the  plot;  several  of  his 
brothers,  and,  what  is  most  strange,  Chosroes'  maternal  uncle, 
the  Aspebed,  supported  him;  the  conspiracy  seemed  nearly 
sure  of  success,  when  by  some  accident  it  was  discovered,  and 
the  occupant  of  the  throne  took  prompt  and  effectual  measures 
to  crush  it.  Zames,  Kaoses,  and  aU  the  other  sons  of  Kobad 
were  seized  by  order  of  Chosroes,  and,  together  icith  their  en- 
tire male  offspring,  were  condemned  to  death.*  The  Aspebed, 
and  the  other  nobles  foimd  to  have  been  accessory  to  the  con- 
spiracy, were,  at  the  same  time,  executed.  One  prince  alone, 
the  intended  puppet-king,  Kobad,  escaped,  through  the  com- 
passion of  the  Persian  who  had  charge  of  him,  and,  after  pass- 
ing many  years  in  concealment,  became  a  refugee  at  the  Court 
of  Constantinople,  where  he  was  kindly  treated  by  Jus- 
tinian.* 

When  Chosroes  had  by  these  means  secured  himself  against 
the  claims  of  pretenders,  he  proceeded  to  employ  equal  severity 
in  repressing  the  disordei's,  punishing  the  crimes,  and  compel- 
ling the  abject  submission  of  his  subjects.    The  heresiarch  Maa- 


450  TBE  SEVSKm  MONAnCQT.  [ch.  tx 

dak,  who  had  escaped  the  persecution  instituted  in  his  later 
years  by  Kobad,  and  the  sect  of  the  Mazdakites,  which,  despite 
that  persecution,  was  still  strong  and  vigorous,  were  the  first  to 
experience  the  oppressive  weight  of  his  resentment ;  and  the 
corpses  of  a  hundred  thousand  martyrs  blackening  upon  gib- 
bets proved  the  determination  of  the  new  monarch  to  make 
bis  will  law,  whatever  the  consequences.'"  In  a  similar  spirit 
the  hesitation  of  Mebodes  to  obey  instantaneously  an  order 
sent  him  by  the  king  was  punished  capitally,  and  with  circum- 
stances of  peculiar  harshness, "  by  the  stem  prince,  who  did 
not  allow  gratitude  for  old  benefits  to  affect  the  judgments 
which  he  passed  on  recent  offences.  Nor  did  signal  services  in 
the  field  avail  to  save  Chanaranges,  the  nobleman  who  pre- 
served the  young  Kobad,  from  his  master's  vengeance.  The 
conqueror  of  twelve  nations,  betrayed  by  an  unworthy  son, 
was  treacherously  entrapped  and  put  to  death  on  account  of  a 
single  humane  act  which  had  in  no  way  harmed  or  endangered 
the  jealous  monarch. " 

The  fame  of  Chosroes  rests  especially  on  his  military  exploits 
and  successes.     On  first  ascending  the  throne  he  seems,  how- 
ever, to  have  distrusted  his  capacity  for  war ;  and  it  was  with 
much  readiness  that  he  accepted  the  overtures  for  peace  made 
by  Justinian,  who  was  anxious  to  bring  the  Eastern  war  to  a 
close,  in  order  that  he  might  employ  the  talents  of  Belisarius 
in  the  reduction  of  Africa  and  Italy.    A  truce  was  made  be- 
tween Persia  and  Eome"  early  in  a.d.  532;  and  the  truce  was 
followed  after  a  short  interval  by  a  treaty— known  as  "the 
endless  peace  " ''— whereby  Rome  and  Persia  made  up  their 
differences  and  arranged  to  be  friends  on  the  following  condi- 
tions :  (1)  Rome  was  to  pay  over  to  Persia  the  sum  of  eleven 
thousand  pounds  of  gold,  or  about  half  a  million  of  our  money, 
as  her  contribution  towards  the  maintenance  of  the  Caucasian 
defences,  the  actual  defence  being  undertaken  by  Persia;  (2) 
Daras  was  to  remain  a  fortified  post,  but  was  not  to  be  made 
the  Roman  head-quarters  in  Mesopotamia,  which  were  to  be 
fixed  at  Constantia;  (3)  the  district  of  Pharangium  and  the 
castle  of  Bolon,  which  Rome  had  recently  taken  from  Persia, 
were  to  be  restored,  and  Persia  on  her  part  was  to  surrender 
the  forts  which  she  had  captured  in  Lazica;   (4)  Rome  and 
Persia  were  to  be  eternal  friends  and  allies,  and  were  to  aid 
each  other  whenever  required  with  supplies  of  men  and  mon- 
ey.'"    Thus  was  terminated  the  thirty  years'  war,  which,  com- 
mencing in  A.D.  502  by  the  attack  of  Kobad  on  Annastasius, " 


CH.  XX.]  PEACE  MADE  WITH  ROME.  451 

was  brought  to  a  close  in  A.D.  532,  and  ratified  by  Justinian  in 
the  year  following.''' 

When  Chosroes  consented  to  substitute  close  relations  of 
amity  with  Rome  for  the  hereditary  enmity  which  had  been 
the  normal  policy  of  his  house,  he  probably  expected  that  no 
very  striking  or  remarkable  results  would  follow.    He  supi^osed 
that  the  barbarian  neighbors  of  the  empire  on  the  north  and  on 
the  west  would  give  her  arms  sufficient  employment,  and  that 
the  balance  of  power  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Western  Asia 
;     would  remain  much  as  before.     But  in  these  expectations  he 
was  disappointed.     Justinian  no  sooner  found  his  eastern  fron- 
tier secure  than  he  directed  the  whole  force  of  the  empire  uj)on 
his  enemies  in  the  regions  of  the  west,  and  in  the  course  of 
half  a  dozen  years  (a.  d.  533-539),  by  the  aid  of  his  great  gener- 
al, Belisarius,  he  destroyed  the  kingdom  of  the  Vandals  in  the 
region  about  Carthage  and  Tunis,  '*  subdued  the  Moors, ''  and 
brought  to  its  last  gasp  the  power  of  the  Ostrogoths  in  Italy.-" 
The  territorial  extent  of  his  kingdom  was  nearly  doubled  by 
these  victories ;  his  resources  were  vastly  increased ;  the  pres- 
tige of  his  arms  was  enormously  raised ;  veteran  armies  had 
been  formed  which  despised  danger,  and  onl.Y  desired  to  be  led 
against  fresh  enemies;  and  officers  had  been  trained  capable 
of  conducting  operations  of  every  kind,  and  confident,  under 
all  circumstances,  of  success.     It  must  have  been  with  feelings 
of  dissatisfaction  and  alarm  not  easily  to  be  dissembled  that 
the  Great  King  heard  of  his  brother's  long  series  of  victories 
and  conquests,'"  each  step  in  which  constituted  a  fresh  danger 
to  Persia  by  aggrandizing  the  power  whom  she  had  chiefly  to 
fear.     At  first  his  annoyance  found  a  vent  in  insolent  demands 
for  a  share  of  the  Roman  spoils,  which  Justinian  thought  it 
prudent  to  humor  ;-^  but,  as  time  went  on,  and  the  tide  of  vic- 
tory flowed  more  and  more  sti'ongly  in  one  direction,  he  became 
less  and  less  able  to  contain  himself,  and  more  and  more  deter- 
mined to  renounce  his  treaty  with  Rome  and  renew  the  old 
struggle  for  supremacy.     His  own  inclination,  a  sufficiently 
strong  motive  in  itself,  was  seconded  and  intensified  by  appH- 
cations  made  to  him  from  without  on  the  part  of  those  who 
had  especial  reasons  for  dreading  the  advance  of  Rome,  and 
for  expecting  to  be  among  her  next  victims.     Witiges,  the  Os- 
trogoth king  of  Italy,  and  Bassaces,  an  Armenian  chief,  were 
the  most  important  of  these  applicants.     Embassies  from  these 
opposite  quarters ''  reached  Chosroes  in  the  same  year,  A  D. 
639,  and  urged  him  for  his  own  security  to  declare  war  agaiusi 


4.59  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xx 

Justinian  before  it  was  too  late.  "  Justinian,"  the  ambassadors 
said,  "aimed  at  universal  empire.  His  aspirations  had  for  a 
while  been  kept  in  check  by  Persia,  and  by  Persia  alone,  the  sole 
power  in  the  world  that  he  feared.  Since  the  '  endless  peace '  was 
made,  he  had  felt  himself  free  to  give  full  vent  to  his  ambitious 
greed,  had  commenced  a  course  of  aggression  upon  all  the  other 
conternainous  nations,  and  had  spread  war  and  confusion  on  all 
sides.  He  had  destroyed  the  kingdom  of  the  Vandals  in  Africa, 
conquered  the  Moors,  deceived  the  Goths  of  Italy  by  professions 
of  friendship,  and  then  fallen  upon  them  with  all  his  forces,  vio- 
lated the  rights  of  Armenia  and  driven  it  to  rebellion,  enslaved 
the  Tzani  and  the  Lazi,  seized  the  Greek  city  of  Bosporus,  and 
the '  Isle  of  Palms '  on  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea,  soUcited  the  alli- 
ance of  barbarous  Huns  and  Ethiopians,  striven  to  sow  discord 
between  the  Persian  monarch  and  his  vassals,  ^^  and  in  every 
part  of  the  world  shown  himself  equally  grasping  and  restless. 
What  would  be  the  consequence  if  Persia  continued  to  hold 
aloof?  Simply  that  aU  the  other  nations  would  in  turn  be  de- 
stroyed, and  she  would  find  herself  face  to  face  with  their  de- 
stroyer, and  would  enjoy  the  poor  satisfaction  of  being  de- 
voured last.  But  did  she  fear  to  be  reproached  with  break- 
ing the  treaty  and  forfeiting  her  pledged  word?  Rome  had 
already  broken  it  by  her  intrigues  with  the  Hvms,  the  EtMopi- 
ans,  and  the  Saracens ;  and  Persia  would  therefore  be  free  from 
reproach  if  she  treated  the  peace  as  no  longer  existing.  The 
treaty -breaker  is  not  he  who  first  draws  the  sword,  but  he  who 
sets  the  example  of  seeking  the  other's  hurt.  Or  did  Persia 
fear  the  result  of  declaring  war?  Such  fear  was  unreasonable, 
for  Rome  had  neither  troops  nor  generals  to  oppose  to  a  sud- 
den Persian  attack.  Sittas  was  dead ;"  Belisarius  and  the  best 
of  the  Roman  forces  were  in  Italy.  If  Justinian  recalled 
Belisarius,  it  was  not  certain  that  he  would  obey ;  and,  in  the 
worst  case,  it  would  be  in  favor  of  Persia  that  the  Goths  of 
Italy,  and  the  Armenians  who  for  centuries  had  been  subjects 
of  Rome,  were  now  ready  to  make  common  cause  with  her. " 
Thus  lu-ged,  the  Persian  king  determmed  on  openly  declaring 
war  and  making  an  attack  in  force  on  the  eastern  provinces 
of  the  empire. 

The  scene  of  contest  in  the  wars  between  Rome  and  Persia 
had  been  usually  either  Mesopotamia  or  Armenia.  On  rare  oc- 
casions only  had  the  traditional  policy  been  departed  from, 
and  attempts  made  to  peneti"ate  into  the  richer  parts  of  the 
Roman  East,  and  to  inflict  serious  injury  on  the  empire  by 


en.  xx.J  CnoSROSS  INVADES  STRIA.  453 

carrying  fire  and  sword  into  peaceful  and  settled  provinces. 
Kobad,  however,  had  in  his  later  years  -ventured  to  introduce 
a  new  system,  and  had  sent  troops  across  the  Euphrates  into 
Syria""  in  the  hope  of  ravaging  that  fertile  region  and  captur- 
ing its  wealthy  metropolis,  Antioch.  This  example  Chosroes 
now  determined  to  follow.  Crossing  the  great  stream  in  the 
lower  portion  of  its  course,  he  led  his  troops  up  its  right  bank, 
past  Circesium,  Zenobia,"  and  Calhnicus,  to  Suron,^"  a  Roman 
town  on  the  west  side  of  the  river.  As  this  small  place  ven- 
tured to  resist  him,  Chosroes,  bent  upon  terrifying  the  other 
towns  into  submission,  resolved  to  take  a  signal  revenge. 
Though  the  garrison,  after  losing  their  commandant,  made 
overtures  for  a  surrender,  he  insisted  on  entering  forcibly  at 
one  of  the  gates,  and  then,  upon  the  strength  of  tliis  violent 
entrance,  proceeded  to  treat  the  city  as  one  taken  by  storm, 
pillaged  the  houses,  massacred  a  large  portion  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, enslaved  the  others,  and  in  conclusion  set  the  place  on 
fire  and  burned  it  to  the  ground. "  It  was  perhaps  in  a  fit  of 
remorse,  though  possibly  only  under  the  influence  of  greed,'" 
that  shortly  afterwards  he  allowed  the  neighboring  bishop  of 
Sergiopolis  to  ransom  these  unfortunate  captives,  twelve  thou- 
sand in  number,  for  the  modest  sum  of  two  hundred  pounds 
of  gold. 

From  Suron  the  invading  army  advanced  to  Hierapolis, "  with- 
out encountering  the  enemy,  who  did  not  dare  to  make  any  resist- 
ance in  the  open  field,  but  sought  the  protection  of  walls  and 
strongholds.  The  defences  of  Hierapolis  were  in  tolerable  or- 
der ;  its  garrison  was  fairly  strong ;  and  the  Great  King  there- 
fore prudently  resolved  to  allow  the  citizens  to  ransom  them- 
selves and  their  city  at  a  moderate  price.  Two  thousand 
pounds  of  silver  was  the  amount  fixed  upon ;  and  this  sum  was 
paid  without  any  complaint  by  the  Hierapolites.  Plimdoi-,  not 
conquest,  was  already  distinctly  set  before  the  invader's  min<l 
as  his  aim ;  and  it  is  said  that  he  even  ofi'ered  at  this  period  tu 
evacuate  the  Roman  territory  altogether  upon  receiving  a 
thousand  pounds  of  gold.''^  But  the  Romans  were  not  yet 
brought  so  low  as  to  purchase  a  peace ;  it  was  thought  that 
Antioch  and  the  other  important  toAvns  might  successfully 
defy  the  Persian  arms,  and  hoped  that  Justinian  would  soon 
send  into  the  field  an  army  strong  enough  to  cope  with  that 
of  his  adversary.  The  terms,  therefore,  which  Chosroes  offered 
by  the  mouth  of  Megas,  bishop  of  Berhoca,  were  rejected ;  the 
Antiochenes  were  exhorted  tojemain  firm ;  Ephraim,  the  bishop. 


454  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCH  f.  [ch.  xx. 

was  denounced  to  the  authorities  for  counselling  submission; 
and  it  was  determined  to  make  no  pacific  arrangement,  but  tG 
allow  Chosroes  to  do  his  worst. ''  The  Persian,  on  his  side,  was 
not  slack  or  remiss.  No  sooner  had  he  received  the  ransom  of 
Hierapolis  than  he  advanced  upon  Berhoea  (now  Aleppo), 
which  he  reached  in  four  days. "  Observing  that  the  defences 
were  weak,  he  here  demanded  twice  the  ransom  that  he  had 
accepted  from  the  Hierapolites,  and  was  only  induced  to  fore- 
go the  claim  by  the  tears  and  entreaties  of  the  good  bishop, 
who  convinced  liim  at  length  that  the  Berhoeans  could  not  pay 
so  large  a  sum,  and  induced  him  to  accept  the  half  of  it.  A 
few  more  days'  march  brought  him  from  Aleppo  to  the  out- 
skirts of  Antioch ;  and  after  an  interval  of  nearly  three  cen- 
turies'" the  "  Queen  of  the  East,"  the  richest  and  most  magnifi- 
cent of  Oriental  cities,  was  once  more  invested  by  Persian 
troops  and  threatened  by  a  Sassanian  monarch. 

A  great  calamity  had  fallen  upon  Antioch  only  fourteen 
years  previously.  The  entire  town  had  been  ruined  by  a  suc- 
cession of  terrible  earthquakes,  which  commenced  in  October, 
A.D.  525,  and  terminated  in  August  of  the  ensuing  year.'"  All 
for  a  time  was  havoc  and  disorder.  A  landslip  had  covered  a 
portion  of  the  city, ''  and  in  the  remainder  almost  every  house 
was  overthrown.  But  the  liberality  of  Justinian/Hhe  spirit 
of  the  inhabitants,  and  the  efforts  of  the  governor, '"  had  effaced 
these  disasters ;  and  the  city,  when  the  Persians  appeared  be- 
fore it,  was  in  most  respects  grander  and  more  magnificent 
than  ever.  The  defences  were,  hewever,  it  would  seem,  im- 
perfect. The  citadel  especially,  which  was  on  the  high  ground 
south  of  the  city, had  been  constructed  with  small  attention  to 
the  rules  of  engineering  art,  and  was  dominated  by  a  height  at 
a  little  distance,  which  ought  to  have  been  included  within  the 
walls.""  Nor  was  this  deficiency  compensated  by  any  strength 
in  the  garrison,  or  any  weight  of  authority  or  talent  among 
those  with  whom  rested  the  command.  Justinian  had  origi- 
nally sent  his  nephew,  Germanus,  to  conduct  the  defence  of 
the  Syrian  capital,"'  while  Buzes,  an  officer  who  had  gained 
some  repute  in  the  Armenian  war,"-  was  entrusted  with  the 
general  protection  of  the  East  until  Belisarius  should  arrive 
from  Italy  ;"^  but  Germanus,  after  a  brief  stay,  withdrew  from 
Antioch  into  Cilicia, ""  and  Buzes  disappeared  without  any  one 
knoAving  whither  he  had  betaken  himself.""  Antioch  was  left 
almost  without  a  garrison ;  and  had  not  Theoctistus  and  Molat- 
zes,  two  officers  who  commanded  in  the  Lebanon,  come  to  the 


ca.  XX.]  Pall  of  antiocii.  ^t^?^ 

rescue  and  brought  with  them  a  body  of  six  thousand  disci- 
plined troops,"  it  is  scarcely  possible  that  any  resistance 
should  have  been  made.  As  it  was,  the  resistance  was  brief 
and  ineffectual.  Chosroes  at  once  discerned  the  weak  point  in 
the  defences,  and,  having  given  a  general  order  to  the  less 
trusty  of  his  troops  to  make  attacks  upon  the  lower  town  in 
various  places,  himself  with  the  flower  of  the  army  undertook 
the  assault  upon  the  citadel.  Here  the  commanding  position 
so  unaccountably  left  outside  the  walls  enabled  the  Persians 
to  engage  the  defenders  almost  on  a  level,  and  their  superior 
skill  in  the  use  of  missile  weapons  soon  brought  the  garrison 
into  difficulties.  The  assailants,  however,  might  perhaps  still 
have  been  repulsed,  had  not  an  unlucky  accident  supervened, 
which,  creating  a  panic,  put  it  in  the  power  of  the  Persians  by 
a  bold  movement  to  enter  the  place.  The  Romans,  cramped 
for  room  upon  the  walls,  had  extemporized  some  wooden 
stages  between  the  towers,  which  they  hung  outside  by  means 
of  ropes.  It  happened  that,  in  the  crush  and  tumult,  one  of 
these  stages  gave  way;  the  ropes  broke,  and  the  beams  fell 
with  a  crash  to  the  earth,  carrying  with  them  a  number  of  the 
defenders.  The  noise  made  by  the  fall  was  great,  and  produced 
a  general  impression  that  the  wall  itself  had  been  broken  down ; 
the  towers  and  battlements  were  at  once  deserted ;  the  Roman 
soldiers  rushed  to  the  gates  and  began  to  quit  the  town ;  Avhile 
the  Persians  took  advantage  of  the  panic  to  advance  their  scal- 
ing ladders,  to  mount  the  walls,  and  to  make  themselves  mas- 
ters of  the  citadel."  Thus  Antioch  Avas  taken.  The  prudence 
of  Chosroes  was  shown  in  his  quietly  allowing  the  armed  force 
to  withdraw;  his  resolve  to  trample  down  all  resistance  ap- 
peared in  his  slaughter  of  the  Antiochene  youth,  who  Avith  a 
noble  recklessness  continued  the  conflict  after  the  soldiers  had 
fled;  his  wish  to  inspire  terror  far  and  wide  made  him  dehver 
the  entire  city,  with  few  exceptions,  to  the  flames;^**  while  his 
avarice  caused  him  to  plunder  the  churches,  and  to  claim  as  his 
own  the  works  of  art,  the  marbles,  bronzes,  tablets,  and  pic- 
tures, with  which  the  Queen  of  the  Roman  East  was  at  this 
time  abundantly  provided.  But,  Avhile  thus  gratifying  hia 
most  powerful  passions,  he  did  not  lose  sight  of  the  opportunity 
to  conclude  an  advantageous  peace.  Justinian's  ambassadors 
had  long  been  pressing  him  to  come  to  terms  with  their  master. 
He  now  consented  to  declare  the  conditions  on  which  ho  was 
ready  to  make  peace  and  withdraw  his  army.  Rome  must  pay 
him,  as  an  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war,  the  sum  of  five 


I 


456  ^^^  SEVBNTB  MoyARCUT.  [en.  x\'. 

thousand  pounds  of  gold,  and  must  also  contract  to  make  a 
further  payment  of  five  hundred  pounds  of  gold  annually,  not 
as  a  tribute,  but  as  a  fair  contribution  towards  the  expense  of 
maintaining  the  Caspian  Gates  and  keeping  out  the  Huns/"  If 
hostages  were  given  him,  he  would  consent  to  abstain  from 
further  acts  of  hostility  while  Justinian  was  consulted  on  these 
proposals,  and  would  even  begin  at  once  to  withdraw  his  army. 
The  ambassadors  readily  agreed  to  these  terms,  and  it  was  un- 
derstood that  a  truce  would  be  observed  until  Justinian's 
answer  should  be  delivered  to  Chosroes. 

But  the  Great  King,  in  thus  formulating  the  terms  on  which 
he  would  be  content  to  make  peace,  did  not  intend  to  tie 
his  own  hands,  or  to  allow  the  Syrian  cities  before  which  he 
had  not  yet  appeared  to  be  quit  of  him  without  the  payment  of 
ransom.  After  visiting  Seleucia,  the  port  of  Antioch  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Orontes,  bathing  in  the  blue  waters  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  offering  sacrifice  to  the  (setting?)  sun  upon  the 
shore,  ^"  he  announced  his  intention  of  proceeding  to  Apameia, 
a  city  on  the  middle  Orontes,  which  was  celebrated  for  its 
wealth,  and  particularly  for  its  possession  of  a  fragment  of  the 
"true  cross,"  enshrined  in  a  case  which  the  pious  zeal  of  the 
faithful  had  enriched  with  gold  and  jewels  of  extraordinary 
value.  ^'  Received  peacefully  into  the  city  by  the  submissive 
inhabitants,  instead  of  fixing  their  ransom  at  a  definite  sum, 
he  demanded  and  obtained  all  the  valuables  of  the  sacred 
treasury,  ^^  including  the  precious  relic  which  the  Apamseans 
regarded  as  the  most  important  of  their  possessions.  As,  how- 
ever, it  was  the  case,  and  not  its  contents,  that  he  coveted, 
while  he  carried  off  the  former,  he  readily  restored  the  latter  to 
the  prayers  of  the  bishop  and  inhabitants.  ^'^ 

From  Apameia  Chosroes  returned  to  Antioch,  and  after 
witnessing  the  games  of  the  amphitheatre  and  securing  victory 
to  the  green  champion  because  Justinian  preferred  the  &Zue,  ^* 
he  set  out  at  last  on  his  return  to  Persia,  taking  care  to  visit, 
upon  his  way  to  the  Euphrates,  the  city  of  Chalcis, "  the  only 
important  place  in  Northern  Syria  that  had  hitherto  escaped 
him.  The  Chalcidians  were  required  not  only  to  ransom  them- 
selves by  a  sum  of  money,  but  to  give  up  to  Chosroes  the 
Eoman  soldiers  who  garrisoned  their  town.  By  a  perjury  that 
may  well  be  forgiven  them,  they  avoided  the  more  important 
concession,  but  they  had  to  satisfy  the  avarice  of  the  conqueror 
by  the  payment  of  two  hundred  pounds  of  gold.  The  Persian 
host  then  continued  its  march,  and  reaching  th©  Euphrates  aj= 


en.  XX.]  RETURN  MARCH  OF  GHOSROES.  457 

Obbane,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Barbalissus/"  crossed  by  a 
bridge  of  boats  in  three  days.  The  object  of  Chosroes  in  thus 
changing  his  return  Hne  of  march  was  to  continue  in  Roman 
Mesopotamia  the  course  which  he  had  adopted  in  Syria  since 
the  conclusion  of  the  truce— i.e.  to  increase  his  spoil  by  making 
each  important  city  ransom  itself.  Edessa,"  Constantina, '^ 
and  Daras  were  successively  visited,  and  purchased  their  safety 
by  a  contribution.  According  to  Procopius/"  the  proceedings 
before  Daras  were  exceptional.  Although  Chosroes,  before  he 
quitted  Edessa,  had  received  a  communication  from  Justinian 
accepting  the  terms  arranged  with  the  Roman  envoys  at 
Antioch,""  yet,  when  he  reached  Daras,  he  at  once  resolved 
upon  its  siege.  The  city  was  defended  by  two  walls,  an  outer 
one  of  moderate  strength,  and  an  inner  one  sixty  feet  high, 
with  towers  at  intervals,  whose  height  was  a  hundred  feet. 
Chosroes,  having  invested  the  place,  endeavored  to  penetrate 
within  the  defences  by  means  of  a  mine ;  but,  his  design  having 
been  betrayed,  the  Romans  met  him  with  a  countermine,  and 
completely  foiled  his  enterprise.  Unwilling  to  spend  any  more 
time  on  the  siege,  the  Persian  monarch  upon  this  desisted 
from  his  attempt,  and  accepted  the  contribution  of  a  thousand 
pounds  of  silver  as  a  sufficient  redemption  for  the  great  for- 
tress. " 

Such  is  the  account  of  the  matter  given  to  us  by  Procopius, 
who  is  our  only  extant  authority  for  the  details  of  this  war. 
But  the  account  is  violently  improbable.  It  represents  Chos- 
roes as  openly  flying  in  the  face  of  a  treaty  the  moment  that 
he  had  concluded  it,  and  as  departing  in  a  single  instance  from 
the  general  tenor  of  his  proceedings  in  all  other  cases.  In 
view  of  the  great  improbability  of  such  a  course  of  action,  it  is 
perhaps  allowable  to  su]jpose  that  Procopius  has  been  for  once 
carried  away  by  partisanship,  and  that  the  real  difference  be- 
tween the  case  of  Daras  and  the  other  towns  consisted  in  this, 
that  Daras  alone  refused  to  pay  its  ransom,  and  Chosroes  had, 
in  consequence,  to  resort  to  hostilities  in  order  to  enforce  it. 

Still,  no  doubt,  the  whole  conduct  of  Chosroes  in  enforcing 
ransoms  from  the  towns  after  the  conclusion  of  the  truce  was 
open  to  serious  question,  and  Justinian  was  quite  justified  in 
ireatuig  his  proceedings  as  a  violation  of  his  recent  engage- 
ments. It  is  not  unlikely  that,  even  without  any  such  excuse, 
he  would  shortly  have  renewed  the  struggle,  since  the  return 
of  Belisarius  in  triumph  from  the  Italian  war  had  placed  at  hia 
service  for  employment  in  the  East  a  general  from  whoso 


458  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  xx. 

abilities  much  was  naturally  expected.  As  it  was,  Justinian 
was  able,  on  receiving  intelligence  of  the  fines  levied  on 
Apameia,  Chalcis,  Edessa,  Constantina,  and  Daras,  and  of  the 
hostile  acts  committed  against  the  last-named  place,  with  great 
show  of  reason  and  justice,  to  renounce  the  recently  concluded 
peace,  and  to  throw  on  the  ill  faith  of  Chosroes  the  blame  of 
the  rupture/^ 

The  Persian  prince  seems  to  have  paid  but  little  heed  to  the 
denvmciation.  He  passed  the  winter  in  building  and  beautify- 
ing a  Persian  Antioch ''  in  the  neighborhood  of  Ctesiphon, 
assigning  it  as  a  residence  to  his  Syrian  captives,  for  whose  use 
he  constructed  public  baths  and  a  spacious  hippodrome,  where 
the  entertainments  familiar  to  them  from  their  youth  were  re- 
produced by  Syrian  artists. "  The  new  city  was  exempt  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  Persian  satraps,  and  was  made  directly  de- 
pendent upon  the  king,  who  supplied  it  with  corn  gratuitously, 
and  allowed  it  to  become  an  inviolable  asylum  for  aU  such 
Greek  slaves  as  should  take  shelter  in  it,  and  be  acknowledged 
as  their  kinsmen  by  any  of  the  inhabitants.  A  model  of  Greek 
civilization  was  thus  brought  into  close  contact  with  the  Per- 
sian court,  which  could  amuse  itself  with  the  contrasts,  if  it 
did  not  learn  much  from  the  comparison,  of  European  and 
Asiatic  manners  and  modes  of  thought. 

The  campaign  of  a.d,  540  was  followed  by  one  of  a  very  dif- 
ferent character  in  a.d.  541.  An  unexpected  offer  suddenly 
made  to  the  Persian  king  drew  him  from  his  capital,  together 
with  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  to  one  of  the  remotest  portions  of 
the  Persian  territory,  and  allowed  the  Romans,  instead  of 
standing  on  their  defence,  to  assume  an  aggressive  in  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  even  to  retaliate  the  invasion  which  the  year  before 
Cliosroes  had  conducted  into  the  heart  of  their  empire.  The 
hostile  operations  of  a.d.  541  had  thus  two  distinct  and  far- 
distant  scenes;  in  the  one  set  the  Persians,  in  the  other  the 
Romans,  took  the  offensive ;  the  two  wars,  for  such  they  in 
reality  were,  scarcely  affected  one  another;  and  it  will  there- 
fore be  convenient  to  keep  the  accounts  of  them  distinct  and 
separate.     To  commence  with. 

I.  The  Lazic  War.— Lazica  had  been  a  dependency  of  Rome 
from  the  time  when  Tzath,  upon  his  conversion  to  Christianity, 
professed  himself  the  vassal  of  Justin, "' and  received  the  in- 
signia of  royalty  from  his  new  patron  (a.d.  522).  The  terms  of 
the  connection  had  been  at  the  first  honorable  to  the  weaker 
nation,  which  paid  no  tribute,  admitted  no  Roman  garrison. 


CH.  XX.]      ACCEPTS  PROTECTORATE  OF  LAZICA.  459 

and  was  troubled  by  no  Roman  governor. '""'  As  time  went  on, 
however,  the  Romans  gradually  encroached  upon  the  rights  of 
their  dependants ;  they  seized  and  f  ortilied  a  strong  post,  called 
Petra,  upon  the  coast,"  appointed  a  commandant  who  claimed 
an  authority  as  great  as  that  of  the  Lazic  king,  and  established 
a  commercial  monopoly  wliich  pressed  with  great  severity 
upon  the  poorer  classes  of  the  Lazi."'  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  nation  determined  on  revolt ;  and  in  the  ^vinter  of 
A.D.  540-1  Lazic  ambassadors  visited  the  court  of  Persia,  ex- 
posed the  grievances  of  their  countrymen,  and  besought  Chos- 
roes  to  accept  their  submission,  and  extend  to  them  the  pro- 
tection of  his  government."'-'  The  province  was  distant,  and 
possessed  few  attractions;  whatever  the  tales  told  of  its 
ancient  wealth,  or  glories,  or  trade,'"  in  the  time  of  Chosroes 
it  was  poor  and  unproductive,  dependent  on  its  neighbors 
for  some  of  the  necessaries  and  all  the  conveniences  of  life," 
and  capable  of  exporting  nothing  but  timber,  slaves,  and 
skins."  It  might  have  been  expected,  under  such  circmn- 
stances,  that  the  burden  of  the  protectorate  would  have  been 
refused ;  but  there  was  an  advantage,  apparent  or  real,  in  the 
position  of  the  country,  discovered  by  the  sagacity  of  Chos- 
roes  or  suggested  to  him  by  the  interested  zeal  of  the  envoys,'* 
which  made  its  possession  seem  to  the  Persian  king  a  matter 
of  the  highest  importance,  and  induced  him  to  accept  the  offer 
made  him  without  a  moment's  delay.  Lazica,  the  ancient 
Colchis  and  the  modern  Mingrelia  and  Imeritia,  bordered 
upon  the  Black  Sea,  which  the  Persian  dominions  did  not  as 
yet  tovich.  Once  in  posession  of  this  tract,  Chosroes  conceived 
that  he  might  launch  a  fleet  upon  the  Euxine,  command  its 
commerce,  threaten  or  ravage  its  shores,  and  even  sail  against 
Constantinople  and  besiege  the  Roman  emperor  in  his  capital. 
The  Persian  king  therefore  acceded  to  the  request  of  the 
envoys,  and,  pretending  to  be  called  into  Iberia  by  a  threat- 
ened invasion  of  the  Huns,'*  led  a  large  army  to  the  Lazic 
border,  was  conducted  into  the  heart  of  the  country  by  the 
envoys,  received  the  submission  of  Gubazes,  the  king,  and 
then,  pressing  on  to  the  coast,  formed  the  siege  of  Petra, 
where  the  Roman  forces  were  collected.'^  Petra  offered  a 
stout  resistance,  and  repulsed  more  than  one  Persian  assault ; 
but  it  was  impossible  for  the  small  garrison  to  cope  with  tho 
numbers,  the  engineering  skill,  and  the  ardor  of  the  assail- 
ants. Atter  the  loss  of  their  commandant,  Johannes,  and  ihc 
fall  of  one  of  the  principal  towers,  the  soldiers  capitulated; 


460  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xx 

Petra  was  made  over  to  the  Persians,  who  restored  and 
strengthened  its  defences,  and  Lazica  became  for  the  time  a 
Persian  province. 

II.  The  War  in  Mesopotamia. — Belisarius,  on  reaching  the 
eastern  frontier,  fixed  his  head -quarters  at  Daras,"  and,  find 
ing  that  the  Persians  had  no  intention  of  invading  Syria  or 
Eoman  Mesopotamia,  resolved  to  lead  his  troops  into  the 
enemy's  territory.  As  his  forces  were  weak  in  numbers,  iU- 
armed,  and  ill-supplied,  he  could  scarcely  hope  to  accomplish 
any  great  enterprise;  but  it  was  important  to  recover  the 
Roman  prestige  after  the  occurrences  of  the  preceding  year, 
and  to  show  that  Eome  was  willing  to  encounter  in  the  open 
field  any  force  that  the  Persians  could  bring  against  her.  He 
therefore  crossed  the  frontier  and  advanced  in  the  direction  of 
Nisibis,"  less  with  the  intention  of  attacking  the  town  than  of 
distinctly  offering  battle  to  the  troops  collected  within  it. 
His  scheme  succeeded;  a  small  force,  wliich  he  threw  out  in 
advance,  drew  the  enemy  from  the  walls ;  and  their  piirsuit  of 
this  detachment  brought  them  into  contact  with  the  main 
army  of  Belisarius,  which  repulsed  them  and  sent  them  flying 
into  the  town."  Having  thus  established  his  superiority  in 
the  field,  the  Roman  general,  though  he  could  not  attack  Nisibis 
with  any  prospect  of  success,  was  able  to  adopt  other  offensive 
measures.  He  advanced  in  person  a  day's  march  beyond 
Nisibis,  and  captured  the  fort  of  Sisauranon,"  Eight  hun- 
dred Persian  cavalry  of  the  first  class  were  made  prisoners, 
and  sent  by  Belisarius  to  Byzantium,  where  they  were  de- 
spatched by  Justinian  to  Italy,  where  they  served  against  the 
Goths.  Arethas,  the  chief  of  the  Saracens  who  fought  on  the 
side  of  Rome,  was  sent  still  further  in  advance.  The  orders 
given  him  were  to  cross  the  Tigris  into  Assyria,  and  begin  to 
ravage  it,  but  to  return  within  a  short  time  to  the  camp,  and 
bring  a  report  of  the  strength  of  the  Persians  beyond  the  river. 
If  the  report  was  favorable,  Belisarius  mtended  to  quit  Mes- 
opotamia, and  take  the  whole  Roman  force  with  him  into 
Assyria.  His  plans,  however,  were  frustrated  by  the  selfish 
Arab,  who,  wishing  to  obtain  the  whole  Assyrian  spoil  for  him- 
self, dismissed  his  Eoman  troops,  proceeded  to  plunder  the  rich 
province  on  his  own  account,  and  sent  Belisarius  no  intelli- 
gence of  what  he  was  so  doing.  After  waiting  at  Sisauranon 
till  the  heats  of  summer  had  decunated  his  army,  the  Roman 
general  was  compelled  to  retreat  by  the  discontent  of  the  sol- 
ciery  and  the  representations  of  his  principal  oflScers.    He  with* 


c-n.  XX.]  RETREAT  OF  CHOSROES.  461 

drew  his  forced  within  the  Roman  frontier  without  molesta- 
tion from  the  enemy,  and  was  shortly  afterwards  summoned 
to  Constantinople  to  confer  on  the  state  of  affairs  with  the 
emperor/" 

The  military  operations  of  the  next  year  Ca.d.  542)  were 
comparatively  unimportant.  Chosroes  collected  a  large  army, 
and,  repeating  the  movement  of  a.d.  540,  made  liis  appearance 
in  Commagene  early  in  the  year,"  intending  to  press  forward 
through  Syria  into  Palestine,"'  and  hoping  to  make  himself 
master  of  the  sacred  treasures  which  he  knew  to  be  accumu- 
lated in  the  Holy  City  of  Jerusalem.  He  found  the  pro\dncial 
commanders,  Buzes  and  Justus,  despondent  and  unenterpris- 
ing, disclined  to  meet  him  in  the  field,  and  content  to  remain 
shut  up  within  the  walls  of  Hierapolis.  Had  these  been  his 
only  opponents  the  campaign  would  probably  have  proved  a 
success;  but,  at  the  first  news  of  his  invasion,  Justinian  de- 
spatched Belisarius  to  the  East  for  the  second  time,  and  this 
able  general,  by  his  arts  or  by  his  reputation,  succeeded  in 
arresting  the  steps  of  Chosroes  and  frustrating  his  expedition. 
Behsarius  took  up  his  head-quarters  at  Europus, "  on  the 
Euphrates,  a  little  to  the  south  of  Zeugma,  and,  spreading 
his  troops  on  both  banks  of  the  river,  appeared  both  to 
protect  the  Roman  province  and  to  threaten  the  return  of 
the  enemy.  Chosroes  having  sent  an  emissary  to  the  Roman 
camp  under  the  pretence  of  negotiating,  but  really  to  act 
the  part  of  a  spy,"  was  so  impressed  (if  we  may  believe 
Procopius)  by  the  accounts  which  he  received  of  the  ability 
of  the  general  and  the  warlike  qualities  of  his  soldiers,  that 
he  gave  up  the  idea  of  advancing  further,  and  was  content  to 
retire  through  Roman  Mesopotamia  into  his  own  territories. 
He  is  said  even  to  have  made  a  convention  that  he  would 
commit  no  hostile  act  as  he  passed  through  the  Roman  prov- 
ince ;  but  if  so,  he  did  not  keep  the  engagement.  The  city  of 
Callinicus  lay  in  his  way ;  its  defences  were  undergoing  repairs, 
and  there  was  actually  a  gap  in  one  place  where  the  old  wall 
had  been  pulled  down  and  the  ncAv  one  had  not  yet  been  built. 
The  Persian  king  could  not  resist  the  temptation  of  seizing 
this  easy  prey;  he  entered  the  vmdefended  town,  enslaved  all 
whom  he  found  in  it,  and  then  razed  the  place  to  the  ground.'* 

Such  is  the  account  Avhich  the  Byzantine  historian  gives  of 
the  third  campaign  of  Chosroes  against  the  Romans,  and  of 
the  motive  and  manner  of  his  retreat.  Without  taxing  hira 
with  falsehood,  we  may  suspect  that,  for  the  glorification  of 


462  THE  SEVENTH  MON AUGHT.  [ch.  xx. 

his  favorite  hero,  he  has  kept  back  a  portion  of  the  truth. 
The  retreat  of  Chosro^s  may  be  ascribed  with  much  probabih 
ity  to  the  advance  of  anotner  danger,  more  formidable  than 
BeHsarius,  which  exactly  at  this  time  made  its  appearance  in 
the  country  whereto  he  was  hastening.  It  was  in  the  summer 
of  A.D.  542  that  THE  PLAGUE  broke  out  at  Pelusium,""  and 
spread  from  that  centre  rapidly  into  the  rest  of  Egypt  and 
also  into  Palestine.  Chosroes  may  well  have  hesitated  to 
confront  this  terrible  foe.  He  did  not  ultimately  eacape  it ; 
but  he  might  hope  to  do  so,  and  it  would  clearly  have  been 
the  height  of  imprudence  to  have  carried  out  his  intention  of 
invading  Palestine  when  the  plague  was  known  to  be  raging 
there. 

The  fourth  year  of  the  Roman  war  (a.d.  543)  opened  with  a 
movement  of  the  Persian  troops  toward  the  Armenian  fron- 
tier,*^ consequent  upon  the  desertion  of  the  Persian  cause  by 
the  Roman  Armenians  in  the  course  of  the  winter."  Chos- 
roes in  person  once  more  led  the  attack,  and  proceeded  as  far 
as  Azerbijan ;  but,  the  pestilence  breaking  out  in  his  army,  he 
hastUy  retreated,**  after  some  futile  attempts  at  negotiation 
with  the  Roman  officers  opposed  to  him.  Belisarius  had  this 
year  been  sent  to  Italy,  and  the  Roman  army  of  the  East, 
amounting  to  thirty  thousand  men,*'  was  commanded  by  as 
many  as  fifteen  generals,  almost  of  equal  rank,  among  whom 
there  was  little  concert  or  agreement.  Induced  to  take  the 
offensive  by  the  retirement  of  the  Persian  king,  these  in- 
capable officers  invaded  Persarmenia  with  all  their  troops, 
and  proceeded  to  plunder  its  rich  plains  and  fertile  valleys. 
Encountering  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  the  Persian  general 
Nabedes,  who,  with  a  smaU  force,  was  strongly  posted  at  a 
village  called  Anglon,^"  they  were  compelled  to  engage  at 
disadvantage;  their  troops,  entangled  in  difficult  ground, 
found  themselves  attacked  in  their  rear  by  an  ambush; 
Narses,  the  bravest  of  them,  fell ;  and,  a  general  panic  seizing 
the  entire  multitude,  they  fled  in  the  extremest  disorder, 
casting  away  their  arms,  and  pressing  their  horses  till  they 
sank  and  expired."  The  Persians  pursued,  but  with  caution, 
and  the  carnage  was  not  so  great  as  might  have  been  ex 
pected ;  but  vast  numbers  of  the  disarmed  fugitives  were  over 
taken  and  made  prisoners  by  the  enemy;  and  the  arms, 
animals,  and  camp  equipment  which  fell  into  the  hands  o* 
the  Persians  amply  compensated  all  previous  losses,  and  left 
Persarmenia  the  richer  for  the  inroad. 


CH.  XX.]  CAMPATOyS  OF  A.D.   543   AND  544-  463 

The  ravages  of  the  pestilence  having  ceased,  Chosroes,  in  the 
following  year  (a.d.  544),  again  marched  westward  in  person, 
and  laid  siege  to  the  city  of  Edessa.'''  It  would  seem  that  he 
had  now  resolved  not  to  be  content  with  plundering  raids,  but 
to  attempt  at  any  rate  the  permanent  conquest  of  some  portion 
of  the  Roman  territory.  Edessa  and  Daras  were  the  two  towns 
on  which  the  Roman  possession  of  Western  Mesopotamia  at 
this  time  mainly  depended.  As  the  passing  of  Nisibis,  in  a.d. 
363,  from  Roman  into  Persian  hands,"'  had  given  to  Persia  a 
secure  hold  on  the  eastern  portion  of  the  country  between  the 
rivers,  so  the  occupation  of  Edessa  and  Daras  could  it  have 
been  effected,  would  have  carried  with  it  dominion  over  the 
more  western  regions.  The  Roman  frontier  would  in  this  way 
have  been  thrown  back  to  the  Euphrates.  Chosroes  must  be 
understood  as  aiming  at  this  grand  result  in  the  siege  which  he 
so  pertmaciously  pressed,  and  which  Edessa  so  gallantly  re- 
sisted, during  the  summer  of  a.d.  544.  The  elaborate  account 
which  Procopius  gives  of  the  siege^^  may  be  due  to  a  sense  of 
its  importance.  Chosroes  tried,  not  force  only,  but  every  art 
known  to  the  engineering  science  of  the  period ;  he  repeated 
his  assaults  day  after  day ;  he  allowed  the  defenders  no  repose ; 
yet  he  was  compelled  at  last  to  own  himself  baffled  by  the 
valor  of  the  small  Roman  garrison  and  the  spirit  of  the  native 
inhabitants,  to  burn  his  works,  and  to  return  home.  The  five 
hundred  pounds  of  gold"  which  he  extorted  at  last  from 
Martinus,  the  commandant  of  the  place,  may  have  been  a  salve 
to  his  wounded  pride ;  but  it  was  a  poor  set-off  against  the  loss 
of  men,  of  stores,  and  of  prestige,  which  he  had  incurred  by 
his  enterprise. 

It  was,  perhaps,  his  repulse  from  the  walls  of  Edessa  that  in- 
duced Chosroes,  in  a.d.  545,  seriously  to  entertain  the  proposals 
for  an  arrangement  which  were  made  to  him  by  the  ambassa- 
dors of  Justinian.  Throughout  the  war  their  had  been  contin- 
ual negotiations ;  but  hitherto  the  Persian  king  had  trifled  with 
his  antagonist,  and  had  amused  himself  with  discussing  terms 
of  accommodation  without  any  serious  purpose.  Now  at  last, 
after  five  years  of  incessant  hostilities,  in  which  he  had  gained 
much  glory  but  little  profit,  he  seems  to  have  desired  a  breath- 
ing-space. Justinian's  envoys  visited  him  at  Ctesiphon,''"  and 
set  forth  their  master's  desire  to  conclude  a  regular  peace. 
Chosroes  professed  to  think  that  the  way  for  a  final  arrange- 
ment would  be  best  prepared  by  the  conclusion,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, of  a  truce.    He  proposed,  in  lieu  of  a  peace,  a  cessation 


464  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xx. 

of  hostilities  for  five  years,  during  the  course  of  which  the 
causes  of  quarrel  between  the  two  nations  might  be  considered, 
and  a  good  understanding  estabhslied.  It  shows  the  weakness 
of  the  Empire,  that  Justinian  not  only  accepted  this  proposal, 
but  was  content  to  pay  for  the  boon  granted  him.  Chosroes 
received  as  the  price  of  the  five  years'  truce  the  services  of  a 
Greek  physician  and  two  thousand  pounds  of  gold." 

The  five  years'  truce  seems  to  have  been  observed  with  better 
faith  by  the  Persian  than  by  the  Roman  monarch.  Alamun- 
darus  indeed,  though  a  Persian  vassal,  regarded  himself  as  en- 
titled, despite  the  truce,  to  pursue  his  quarrel  with  his  natural 
enemy,  Arethas,"^  who  acknowledged  the  suzerainty  of  Rome; 
but  Chosroes  is  not  even  accused  of  instigating  his  proceedings ; 
and  the  war  between  the  vassals  was  carried  on  without  drag- 
ging either  of  the  two  lords-paramount  into  its  vortex.  Thus 
far,  then,  neither  side  had  any  cause  of  complaint  against  the 
other.  If  we  were  bound  to  accept  the  Roman  story  of  a  pro- 
ject formed  by  Chosroes  for  the  surprise  and  seizure  of  Daras,"' 
we  should  have  to  admit  that  circumstances  rather  than  his 
own  will  saved  the  Persian  monarch  from  the  guilt  of  being  the 
first  to  break  the  agreement.  But  the  tale  told  by  Procopius 
is  improbable ;"'°  and  the  Roman  belief  of  it  can  have  rested  at 
best  only  upon  suspicion.  Chosroes,  it  is  allowed,  committed  no 
hostile  act ;  and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  he  really  en- 
tertained the  design  ascribed  to  him.  At  any  rate,  the  design 
was  not  executed,  nor  even  attempted;  and  the  peace  was  thus 
not  broken  on  his  part.  It  was  reserved  for  Rome  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  truce  (a.d.  549)  expressly  to  break  its  provisions  by 
accepting  the  Lazi  into  alhance  and  sending  them  a  body  of 
eight  thousand  men  to  help  them  against  the  Persians. "' 

Very  soon  after  their  submission  to  Persia  the  Lazi  had  re- 
pented of  their  rash  and  hasty  action.  They  found  that  they 
had  gained  nothing,  while  in  some  respects  they  had  lost,  by 
their  change  of  masters.  The  general  system  of  the  Persian 
adixiinistration  was  as  arbitrary  and  oppressive  as  the  Roman. 
If  the  commercial  monopoly,  whereof  they  so  bitterly  com- 
plained, had  been  swept  away,  commerce  itself  had  gone  with 
it,  and  they  could  neither  find  a  market  for  their  own  products, 
nor  obtain  the  commodities  which  they  required."^  The  Per- 
sian manners  and  customs  introduced  into  their  country,  if  not 
imposed  upon  themselves,  were  detestable  to  the  Lazi,  who  were 
zealous  and  devout  Christians,  and  possessed  by  the  spirit  of 
intolerance,"""    Chosroes,  after  holding  the  territory  for  a  few 


I 


CH.  XX.]  no^rE  breaks  the  truce— lazic  war.     465 

years,  became  convinced  that  Persia  could  not  retain  it  unless 
the  disaffected  population  were  removed  and  replaced  by  faith- 
ful subjects.  He  designed  therefore,  we  are  told,  to  deport  the 
entire  Lazic  nation,  and  to  plant  the  territory  with  colonies  of 
Persians  and  others,  on  whose  fidelity  he  could  place  full  reli- 
ance. '°*  As  a  preliminary  step,  he  suggested  to  his  lieutenant 
in  Lazica  that  he  should  contrive  the  assassination  of  Gubazes, 
the  Lazic  king,  in  whom  he  saw  an  obstacle  to  his  project. 
Phabrizus,  however,  failed  in  his  attempt  to  execute  this  com- 
mission;'"^  and  his  failure  naturally  produced  the  immediate 
revolt  of  the  province,  which  threw  itself  once  more  into  the 
arms  of  Eome,  and,  despite  the  existing  treaty  with  the  Per- 
sians, was  taken  by  Justinian  under  his  protection. 

The  Lazic  war,  which  commenced  in  consequence  of  this  act 
of  Justinian's,  continued  almost  without  intermission  for  nine 
years — from  a.d.  549  to  557.  Its  details  are  related  at  great 
length  by  Procopius  and  Agathias,  ^"^  who  view  the  struggle  as 
one  which  vitally  concerned  the  interests  of  their  country. 
According  to  them,  Chosroes  was  bent  upon  holding  Lazica  in 
order  to  construct  at  the  mouth  of  the  Phasis  a  great  naval 
station  and  arsenal,  from  which  his  fleets  might  issue  to  com- 
mand the  commerce  or  ravage  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea. '" 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  country  was  eminently  fitted  for 
such  a  purpose.  The  soil  is  for  the  most  part  richly  fertile;""* 
the  hills  are  everyAvhere  covered  with  forests  of  noble  trees;'"' 
the  Rion  (Phasis)  is  deep  and  broad  towards  its  mouth;""  and 
there  are  other  streams  also  which  are  navigable.'"  If  Chos- 
roes entertained  the  intentions  ascribed  to  him,  and  had  even 
begun  the  collection  of  timber  for  ship-building""  at  Petra  on 
the  Euxine  as  early  as  a.d.  549,  we  cannot  be  surprised  at  the 
attitude  assumed  by  Eome,  or  at  her  persistent  efforts  to  re- 
cover possession  of  the  Lazic  territory. 

The  war  was  opened  by  an  attack  upon  the  great  centre  of 
the  Persian  power,  Petra.  This  place,  which  was  strongly 
situated  on  a  craggy  rock  projecting  into  the  sea,  had  been 
carefully  fortified  by  Justinian"'  before  Lazica  passed  into  the 
possession  of  Chosroes,  and  had  since  received  important  addi- 
tions to  its  defences  at  the  hands  of  the  Persians.  "*  It  was 
sufficiently  provisioned,""  and  was  defended  by  a  body  of  fif- 
teen hundred  men."°  Dagisthseus,  the  Roman  commander, 
besieged  it  with  his  entire  force  of  eight  thousand  men,  and 
succeeded  by  his  constant  attacks  in  reducing  the  garrison  to 
little  more  than  a  fourth  of  its  original  luimbcr.    Baflletl  in 


466  THE  SEVENTH  MOKARCUY.  [ch.  xx. 

one  attempt  to  effect  a  breach  by  means  of  a  mine,  he  had  con- 
trived to  construct  another,  and  might  have  withdrawn  his 
props,  destroyed  the  wall,  and  entered  the  place,  had  he  not 
conceived  the  idea  of  bargaining  with  the  emperor  for  a  speci- 
fic reward  in  case  he  effected  the  capture. '''  Whilst  he  waited 
for  his  messenger  to  bring  a  reply,  the  Persian  general,  Mer- 
meroes,  forced  the  passes  from  Iberia  into  Lazica,  and  de- 
scended the  valley  of  the  Phasis  with  an  army  of  30,000  men."^ 
Dagisthseus  in  alarm  withdrew,  and  Petra  was  relieved  and 
revictualled.  The  walls  were  repaired  hastily  with  sand- 
bags, ""  and  the  further  defence  was  entrusted  to  a  fresh  garri- 
son of  3000  picked  soldiers.  '*"  Mermeroes  then,  finding  it  diffi- 
ciilt  to  obtain  supplies  for  his  large  army,  retired  into  Persar- 
menia,  leaving  only  five  thousand  Persians  in  the  country  be- 
sides the  garrison  of  Petra.  This  small  force  was  soon  after- 
wards surprised  by  the  combined  Romans  and  Lazi,  who  com- 
pletely defeated  it,  destroying  or  making  prisoners  almost  the 
entire  number.'"' 

In  the  ensuing  year,  a.d.  550,  the  Persians  took  the  field  un- 
der a  fresh  general,  Chorianes,  '^^  who  brought  with  him  a  con- 
siderable army,  composed  of  Persians  and  Alans.  The  alhed 
Romans  and  Lazi,  under  Dagisthseus  and  Gubazes,  gave  battle 
to  this  new  foe  on  the  banks  of  the  Hippis  (the  Tschenikal?) ; 
and  though  the  Lazi,  who  had  insisted  on  taking  the  lead  and 
fighting  separately,  were  at  the  first  encounter  routed  by  the 
Persian  horse,  yet  in  the  end  Roman  discipline  and  stubborn- 
ness triumphed.  Their  solid  line  of  footmen,  bristhng  with 
spears,  offered  an  impervious  barrier  to  the  cavalry  of  the 
enemy,  wliich  did  not  dare  to  charge,  but  had  recourse  to  vol- 
leys of  missiles.  The  Romans  responded  with  the  same ;  and 
the  battle  raged  for  a  while  on  something  like  even  terms,  the 
superior  rapidity  of  the  Asiatics  being  counterbalanced  by  the 
better  protection  which  their  shields  gave  to  the  Europeans, 
until  at  last,  by  a  stroke  of  fortune,  Rome  obtained  the  victory. 
A  chance  arrow  killed  Chorianes,  and  his  army  instantly  fled. 
There  was  a  short  struggle  at  the  Persian  camp;  but  the 
Romans  and  Lazi  captured  it.  Most  of  the  Persians  were  here 
put  to  the  sword ;  the  few  who  escaped  quitted  Lazica  and  re- 
turned to  their  own  country.  ^" 

Soon  afterwards  Dagisthseus  was  superseded  by  Bessas,"* 
and  the  siege  of  Petra  was  recommenced.  The  strength  of 
the  place  had  been  considerably  increased  since  the  former 
attack  upon  it.    A  new  waU  of  groat  height  and  solidity  had 


I 


CH.  XX.]  THE  ROMANS  CAPTURE  RETRA.  467 

been  built  upon  a  framework  of  wood  in.  the  place  which  Da- 
gisthaeus  had  so  nearly  breached ;  the  Roman  mines  had  been 
filled  up  with  gravel;'-'*  ai-ms,  offensive  and  defensive,  had 
been  collected  in  extraordinary  abundance;  a  stock  of  flour 
and  of  salted  meat  had  been  laid  in  sufficient  to  support  the 
garrison  of  3000  men  for  five  years ;  and  a  store  of  vinegar, 
and  of  the  pulse  from  which  it  was  made,  had  likewise  been 
accumulated /^°  The  Eoman  general  began  by  attempting  to 
repeat  the  device  of  his  predecessor,  attacking  the  defences  m 
the  same  place  and  by  the  same  means ;  but,  just  as  his  mine 
was  completed,  the  new  wall  with  its  framework  of  wood  sank 
quietly  into  the  excavation,  without  suffering  any  disturb- 
ance of  its  parts,  while  enough  of  it  still  remained  above  the 
surface  to  offer  an  effectual  bar  to  the  assailants.'"  It  seemed 
hopeless  to  recommence  the  mine  in  this  place,  and  elsewhere 
the  nature  of  the  ground  made  mining  impossible ;  some  other 
mode  of  attack  had  therefore  to  be  adopted,  or  the  siege  must 
have  been  abandoned.  Rome  generally  took  towns  by  the 
battering-ram ;  but  the  enginCiS  in  use  were  of  such  heavy  con- 
struction that  they  could  not  be  dragged  up  an  ascent  hke  that 
upon  which  Petra  stood.  Bessas  was  in  extreme  perplexity, 
when  some  Hunnic  allies,  who  happened  to  be  in  his  camp, 
suggested  a  mode  of  constructing  a  ram,  as  effective  as  the 
ordinary  one,  which  should  nevertheless  be  so  light  that  it 
could  be  carried  on  the  shoulders  of  forty  men.  '^'*  Three  such 
machines  were  quickly  made;  and  under  their  blows  the  wall 
would  soon  have  given  way,  had  not  the  defenders  employed 
against  them  the  terrible  agency  of  fire,  showering  upon  them 
from  the  walls  lighted  casks  of  sulphur,  bitmnen,  and  naphtha, 
which  last  was  known  to  the  Greeks  of  Colchis  as  ''Medea's 
oil."'"  Uncertain  of  succeeding  in  this  attack,  the  Roman 
general  gallantly  led  a  scaling  party  to  another  portion  of  the 
walls,  and,  mounting  at  the  head  of  his  men,  attempted  to 
make  good  his  footing  on  the  battlements. "°  Thrown  headlong 
to  the  gi'ound,  but  undeterred  by  his  fall,  he  was  about  to  re- 
peat his  attempt,  when  he  found  it  needless.  Almost  simul- 
taneously his  troops  had  in  two  other  places  penetrated  into 
the  town.  One  band  had  obtained  an  entrance  by  scaling  the 
rocks  in  a  place  supposed  to  be  inaccessible;'"  a  second  owed 
its  success  to  a  combination  of  accidents.  First,  it  had  hap- 
pened that  a  gap  had  shown  itself  in  the  piece  of  the  wall 
which  sank  into  the  Roman  mine,  and  a  violent  struggle  had 
ensued  between  the  assailants  and  defenders  at  this  place.'" 


4G8  THE  SEVENTH  MOKAnCJTT.  [ch.  xx. 

Then,  while  this  fight  was  going  on,  the  fire  which  the  Per- 
sians were  using  against  the  Roman  battering-rams  had  been 
by  a  shift  of  wind  blown  back  upon  themselves,  and  the 
wooden  structure  from  which  they  fought  had  been  ignited, 
and  in  a  short  time  entirely  consumed,  together  with  its  in- 
mates.'" At  sight  of  the  conflagration,  the  Persians  who 
stood  in  the  gap  had  lost  heart,  and  had  allowed  the  Roman 
troops  to  force  their  way  through  it  into  Petra.  Thus  fell  the 
great  Lazic  fortress,  after  a  resistance  which  is  among  the 
most  memorable  in  history.  Of  the  three  thousand  defenders, 
seven  hundred  had  been  killed  in  the  siege ;  one  thousand  and 
seventy  were  destroyed  in  the  last  assault.  Only  seven  hun- 
dred and  thirty  were  made  prisoners ;  and  of  these  no  fewer 
than  seven  hundred  and  twelve  were  found  to  be  wounded. 
The  remaining  five  hundred  threw  themselves  into  the  citadel, 
and  there  resisted  to  the  last  extremity,  refusing  all  terms  of 
capitulation,  and  maintaining  themselves  against  an  over- 
whelming force,  until  at  last  by  sword  and  fire  they  perished 
to  a  man.'^^ 

The  siege  of  Petra  was  prolonged  far  into  the  winter,  and 
the  year  a.d.  551  had  begun  ere  the  resistance  ceased."^  Could 
the  gallant  defenders  have  maintained  themselves  for  a  few 
more  weeks,  they  might  not  improbably  have  triumphed. 
Mermeroes,  the  Persian  commander  of  two  years  previously, '" 
took  the  field  with  the  commencement  of  spring,  and,  at  the 
head  of  a  large  body  of  cavalry,  supported  by  eight  ele- 
phants, '"  began  his  m.arch  to  the  coast,  hoping  to  relieve  the 
beleaguered  garrison.  Unfortunately  he  was  too  late.  On  his 
march  he  heard  of  the  capture  of  Petra,  and  of  its  complete 
destruction  by  Bessas,  "^  who  feared  lest  the  Persians  should 
again  occupy  the  dangerous  post.  Mermeroes  had  no  difficidty 
in  establishing  Persian  rule  through  almost  the  whole  of 
Lazica.  The  Romans  did  not  dare  to  meet  him  in  the  field. "' 
Archaeopolis,  indeed,  repulsed  his  attack;""  but  no  other  im- 
portant place  in  the  entire  country  remained  subject  to  the 
Empire.  G-ubazes  and  his  followers  had  to  hide  themselves  in 
the  recesses  of  the  mountains.""  Quartering  his  troops  chiefly 
on  the  upper  Phasis,  about  Kutais"''  and  its  neighborhood, 
Mermeroes  strengthened  his  hold  on  the  country  by  building 
forts  or  receiving  their  submission,  and  even  extended  the 
Persian  dominion  beyond  Lazica  into  Scymnia  and  Suauia. '" 
Still  Rome,  with  her  usual  tenacity,  maintained  a  hold  upon 
certain  tracts ;  and  Gubazes,  faithful  to  his  allies  even  in  Ihe 


CH.  XX.  ]  A  TTEMPT  A  T  NEO  0  TIA  TIONS.  469 

extremity  of  their  depression,  maintained  a  guerilla  war,  and 
hoped  that  some  day  fortune  would  cease  to  frown  on  him. '" 

Meanwhile,  at  Byzantium,  fresh  negotiations  were  in  pro- 
gress, and  hopes  were  entertained  of  an  arrangement  by  which 
all  the  differences  between  the  two  great  powers  would  be  sat- 
isfactorily adjusted.  Isdigunas  again  represented  his  master 
at  the  Byzantine  court,  and  conducted  the  diplomatic  contest 
with  skill  and  ability.  Taxing  Justinian  with  more  than  one 
infraction  of  the  truce"^  concluded  in  a.d.  545,  he  demanded 
the  payment  of  a  lump  sum  of  two  thousand  six  hundred, 
pounds  of  gold,'"  and  expressed  the  willingness  of  Chosroes  to 
conclude  on  these  terms  a  fresh  truce  for  five  years,  to  take 
effect  from  the  delivery  of  the  money.  With  regard  to  the 
extent  of  country  whei'eto  the  truce  should  apply,  he  agreed 
to  an  express  limitation  of  its  range — the  settled  provinces  of 
both  empires  should  be  protected  by  it,  but  Lazica  and  the 
country  of  the  Saracens  should  be  excluded  from  its  opera- 
tion. '*'  Justinian  consented  to  these  terms,  despite  the  oppo- 
sition of  many  of  his  subjects,  who  thought  that  Rome  de- 
graded herself  by  her  repeated  payments  of  money  to  Persia, 
and  accepted  a  position  little  better  than  that  of  a  Persian 
tributary. '" 

Thus  the  peace  of  a.d.  551  did  nothing  towards  ending  the 
Lazic  war,  which,  after  languishing  through  the  whole  of  a.d. 

552,  burst  out  again  with  renewed  vigor  in  the  spring  of  a.d. 

553.  Mermeroes  in  that  year  advanced  from  Kutais  against 
Telephis, '"  a  strong  fort  in  the  possession  of  Rome,  expelled 
the  commandant,  Martinus,  by  a  stratagem,  pressed  forAvard 
against  the  combined  Roman  forces,  which  fled  before  him 
from  OUaria,""  and  finally  drove  them  to  the  coast  and  cooped 
them  up  in  "the  Island,""^'  a  small  tract  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Phasis  between  that  stream  and  the  Doconus.  On  his 
return  he  was  able  to  reinforce  a  garrison  which  he  had  es- 
tablished at  Onoguris  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Arch- 
ffiopoUs,  as  a  means  of  annoying  and  weakening  that  impor- 
tant station.'"  He  may  naturally  have  hoped  in  one  or  two 
more  campaigns  to  have  driven  the  last  Roman  out  of  the 
country  and  to  have  attached  Lazica  permanently  to  the  em- 
pire of  the  great  king. 

Unluckily,  however,  for  Persia,  the  fatigues  which  the  gal- 
lant veteran  had  undergone  in  the  campaign  of  a.d.  553  proved 
more  than  his  aged  frame  could  endure,  and  he  had  scarcely 
reached  Kutais  when  he  was  seized  with  a  fatal  malady,  to 


470  li'nB  SEVENTH  MONABCRT.  [ch.  xx 

which  he  succumbed  in  the  course  of  the  winter.'"  Chosroes 
appointed  as  his  successor  a  certain  Nachoragan,  who  is  said  to 
have  been  a  general  of  repute,"''  but  who  proved  himself  quite 
unequal  to  the  position  which  he  was  called  upon  to  fill,  and  in 
the  course  of  two  years  ruined  the  Persian  cause  in  Lazica. 
The  failure  was  the  more  signal  from  the  fact  that  exactly  at 
the  time  of  his  appointment  circumstances  occurred  which 
seriously  shook  the  Roman  influence  over  the  Lazi,  and  opened 
a  prospect  to  Persia  transcending  aught  that  she  could  reason- 
ably have  hoped.  This  was  nothing  less  than  a  most  serious 
quarrel  between  Gubazes,  the  Lazic  king,  and  some  of  the  prin- 
cipal Roman  commanders — a  quarrel  which  involved  conse- 
quences fatal  to  both  parties.  Gubazes,  disgusted  with  the 
negligence  or  incapacity  of  the  Roman  chiefs,  had  made  com- 
plaint of  them  to  Justinian;'"  they  had  retahated  by  accusing 
him  of  meditating  desertion,  and  had  obtained  the  emperor's 
consent  to  his  arrest,  and  to  the  use  of  violence  if  he  offered  re- 
sistance.'^* Armed  with  this  mandate,  they  contrived  in  a 
little  time  to  fasten  a  quarrel  upon  him ;  and,  when  he  declined 
to  do  as  they  required,  they  drew  their  swords  upon  him  and 
slew  him. '"  The  Lazic  nation  was,  naturally  enough,  alienated 
by  this  outrage,  and  manifested  an  inclination  to  throw  itself 
absolutely  into  the  arms  of  Persia."*®  The  Romans,  dispirited 
at  the  attitude  of  their  allies,  and  at  variance  among  themselves, 
could  for  some  months  after  Gubazes'  death  have  offered  but 
little  resistance  to  an  entei-prising  enemy.  So  demoralized 
were  they  that  an  army  of  50,000  is  said  to  have  fled  in  dismay 
when  attacked  by  a  force  of  Persians  less  than  a  twelfth  of 
their  number,'^'  and  to  have  allowed  their  camp  to  be  captured 
and  plundered.  During  this  critical  time  Nachoragan  remained 
inactive  in  Iberia,  and  contented  himself  with  sending  messen- 
gers into  Lazica  to  announce  his  near  approach  and  to  animate 
and  encourage  his  party. '""  The  result  was  such  as  might  have 
been  expected.  The  Lazi,  finding  that  Persia  made  no  effort 
to  take  advantage  of  their  abstention,  and  that  Rome  despite 
of  it  maintained  possession  of  the  greater  portion  of  their  coun- 
try, came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  desert 
their  natural  allies  on  account  of  a  single  outrage,  however 
monstrous,  and  agreed  to  renew  their  close  alliance  with  Rome 
on  condition  that  the  murderers  of  Gubazes  should  be  punished, 
and  his  brother,  Tzathes,  appointed  king  in  his  place.'"  Jus- 
tinian readily  gave  his  consent;'"  and  the  year  a.d.  555  saw  the 
quarrel  ended,  and  the  Lazi  once  more  heartily  in  accord  with 
their  Roman  protectors 


CH.  XX.]  ATTEMPT  ON  PIlAStS.  471 

It  was  when  affairs  were  in  this  state,  and  he  had  exactly- 
missed  his  opportunity,  that  Nachoragan  took  the  field,  and, 
advancing  from  Iberia  into  the  region  about  Kutais  with  an 
army  amounting  to  60,000  men,'"  made  preparations  for  carry- 
ing on  the  war  with  vigor.  He  was  opposed  by  Martinus,  Jus- 
tin, and  Babas,  the  two  former  of  whom  with  the  bulk  of  the 
Roman  forces  occupied  the  region  on  the  lower  Phasis,  known 
as  "  the  Island,"  while  Babas  held  the  more  central  position  of 
Archaeopolis. '"*  Nachoragan,  after  losing  about  2,000  of  his 
best  troops  in  the  vicinity  of  this  last-named  place, '"  resolved 
to  challenge  the  Eomans  to  a  decisive  encounter  by  attacking 
the  important  post  of  Phasis  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  With 
some  skill  he  succeeded  in  passing  the  Roman  camp  on  the 
island,  and  in  establishing  himself  in  the  plain  directly  south 
of  Phasis  before  the  Roman  generals  guessed  his  purpose.'"* 
They,  however,  were  able  by  a  quick  movement  to  throw  them- 
selves into  the  town,  and  the  struggle  became  one  between 
faiily  balanced  forces,  and  was  conducted  with  great  obstinacy. 
The  town  was  defended  on  the  south  by  an  outer  palisade,  a 
broad  ditch  protected  by  sharp  stakes  and  full  of  water,  and  an 
inner  bulwark  of  considerable  height  but  constructed  wholly  of 
wood.'*'  The  Phasis  guarded  it  on  the  north;  and  here  a 
Roman  fleet  was  stationed  which  lent  its  aid  to  the  defenders 
at  the  two  extremities  of  their  line.  The  yards  of  the  ships 
were  manned  with  soldiers,  and  boats  were  hung  from  them 
containing  slingers,  archers,  and  even  workers  of  catapults, 
who  delivered  their  weapons  from  an  elevation  exceeding  that 
of  the  towers. '°"  But  Nachoragan  had  the  advantage  of  num- 
bers; his  men  soon  succeeded  in  filling  up  part  of  the  ditch;"" 
and  the  wooden  bulwark  could  scarcely  have  long  resisted  his 
attacks,  if  the  contest  had  continued  to  be  wholly  one  of  brute 
strength.  But  the  Roman  commander,  Martinus,  finding  him- 
self inferior  in  force,  brought  finesse  and  stratagem  to  his  aid. 
Pretending  to  receive  intelligence  of  the  sudden  arrival  of  a 
fresh  Roman  army  from  Byzantium,  he  contrived  that  the  re- 
port should  reach  Nachoragan  and  thereby  cause  him  to  divide 
his  troops,  and  send  half  of  them  to  meet  the  supposed  rein- 
forcements."" Then,  when  the  Persian  general  nevertheless  re- 
newed his  assault,  Martinus  sent  secretly  5,000  men  under 
Justin  to  a  short  distance  from  Phasis;'"  and  this  detachment, 
appearing  suddenly  when  the  contest  was  going  on  at  the  wall, 
was  naturally  taken  for  the  newly  arrived  army,  and  caused  a 
general  panic.    The  Persians,  one  and  all,  took  to  flight;  a  gen- 


472  THE  SEVENTH  MONATtCBT.  [cu.  xx. 

eral  sally  was  made  by  the  Romans  in  Phasis ;  a  rout  and  a 
carnage  followed,  which  completely  disheartened  the  Persian 
leader,  and  led  him  to  give  up  his  enterprise.'"  Having  lost 
nearly  one-fourth  of  his  army,'"  Nachoragan  drew  off  to  Kutais, 
and  shortly  afterwards,  leaving  the  command  of  the  Persians 
in  Lazica  to  Vaphrizes,  retired  to  winter  quarters  in  Iberia.''* 

The  failure  of  Nachoragan,  following  closely  upon  the  decision 
of  the  Lazi  to  maintain  their  alliance  with  Rome  in  spite  of  the 
murder  of  Gubazes,  seems  to  have  convinced  the  Persian  mon- 
arch that,  in  endeavoring  to  annex  Lazica,  he  had  engaged  in 
a  hopeless  enterprise,  and  that  it  would  be  the  most  prudent 
and  judicious  course  to  yield  to  the  inevitable,  and  gradually 
withdraw  from  a  position  which  was  untenable.  Having  meted 
out  to  Nachoragan  the  punishment  usually  assigned  to  unsuc- 
cessful commanders  in  Persia,'"  he  sent  an  ambassador  to  By- 
zantium'" in  the  spring  of  a.d.  556,  and  commenced  negotia^ 
tions  which  he  intended  to  be  serious.  Diplomacy  seems  to 
have  been  as  averse  in  the  days  of  Chosroes  as  in  our  own  to  an 
undignified  rapidity  of  proceeding.  Honce,  though  there  could 
be  little  to  debate  where  both  parties  were  substantially  at  one, 
the  negotiations  begun  in  May  a.d.  556  were  not  concluded  till 
after  the  commencement  of  the  following  year.'"  A  complete 
suspension  of  hostilities  was  then  agreed  upon,  to  extend  to 
Lazica  no  less  than  to  the  other  dominions  of  the  two  mon- 
archs.  "*  In  Lazica  each  party  was  to  keep  what  it  possessed, 
territory,  cities,  and  castles.'"  As  this  joint  occupation  was 
scarcely  smtable  for  a  permanent  arrangement,  it  was  provided 
that  the  two  belligerents  should,  during  the  continuance  of  the 
truce,  proceed  to  settle  the  terms  on  which  a  lasting  peace 
might  be  estabhshed. '*° 

An  interval  of  five  years  elapsed  before  the  happy  result,  for 
which  both  parties  had  expressed  themselves  anxious,  was  ac- 
complished. '"  It  is  uncertain  how  Chosroes  was  occupied  dur- 
ing this  period ;  but  there  are  some  grounds  for  beheving  that 
he  was  engaged  in  the  series  of  Oriental  wars'"''  whereof  we 
shaU  have  to  speak  presently.  Success  appears  to  have  crowned 
his  arms  wherever  he  directed  them ;  but  he  remained  undaz- 
zled  by  his  victories,  and  still  retained  the  spirit  of  moderation 
which  had  led  him  in  a.d.  557  to  conclude  the  general  truce. 
He  was  even  prepared,  after  five  years  of  consideration,  to  go 
further  in  the  hne  of  pacific  policy  on  which  he  had  then  en- 
tered, and,  in  order  to  secure  the  continuance  of  his  good  rela- 
tions with  Rome,  was  willing  to  relinquish  all  claim  to  thp 


CH.  XX.]  PEACE  MADE  WITH  ROME.  473 

sovereignty  of  Lazica.  Under  these  circumstances,  ambassa- 
dors of  the  highest  rank,  representing  the  two  powers,  met  on 
the  frontier  between  Daras  and  Nisibis,  proclaimed  the  power 
and  explained  the  motives  of  their  respective  sovereigns,  and 
after  a  lengthy  conference  formulated  a  treaty  of  peace.  The 
terms,  which  are  given  at  length  by  a  writer  of  the  succeeding 
fceneration, '•*'  may  be  briefly  expressed  as  follows:'**  (1)  the 
Persians  were  to  withdraw  from  Lazica,  to  give  up  all  claim  to 
it,  and  to  hand  over  its  possession  to  the  Romans;  (2)  they 
wei-e  in  return  to  receive  from  Rome  an  annual  sum  of  30,000 
pieces  of  gold,  the  amount  due  for  the  first  seven  years  being 
paid  in  advance;'"  (3)  the  Christians  in  Persia  were  guaranteed 
the  full  and  free  exercise  of  their  religion,  but  were  forbidden 
to  make  converts  from  the  disciples  of  Zoroaster ;  (4)  commer- 
cial intercourse  was  to  be  allowed  between  the  two  empires,  but 
the  merchants  were  restricted  to  the  use  of  certain  roads  and 
certain  emporia ;  (5)  diplomatic  intercourse  was  to  be  wholly 
free,  and  the  goods  of  ambassadors  were  to  be  exempt  from 
duty ;  (6)  Daras  was  to  continue  a  foi-tified  town,  bvit  no  new 
fortresses  were  to  be  built  upon  the  frontier  by  either  nation, 
and  Daras  itself  was  not  to  be  made  the  headquarters  of  the 
Prefect  of  the  East,  or  to  be  held  by  an  unnecessarily  large  gar- 
rison ;  (7)  all  disputes  arising  between  the  two  nations  were  to 
be  determined  by  courts  of  arbitration ;  (8)  the  allies  of  the  two 
nations  were  to  be  included  in  the  treaty,  and  to  participate  in 
its  benefits  and  obligations ;  (9)  Persia  was  to  undertake  the 
sole  charge  of  maintaining  the  Caspian  Gates  against  the  Huns 
and  Alans ;  (10)  the  peace  was  made  for  a  period  of  fifty  years. 
It  has  been  held  that  by  this  treaty  Justinian  consented  to 
become  a  tributary  of  the  Persian  Empire;""  and  undoubtedly 
it  was  possible  for  Oriental  vanity  to  represent  the  arrange- 
ment made  in  this  light.'"  But  the  million  and  a  half,  which 
Rome  undertook  to  pay  in  the  course  of  the  next  fifty  years, 
might  well  be  viewed  by  the  Romans  as  an  outlay"  for  which 
they  received  an  ample  return  in  the  cession  to  them  of  the 
Persian  part  of  Lazica,  and  in  the  termination  of  theii-  obliga- 
tion to  contribute  towards  the  maintenance  of  the  Caspian 
Gates.  If  there  was  any  real  danger  of  those  results  following 
from  the  Persian  occupation  of  Lazica  which  both  nations 
anticipated,"'  the  sum  must  be  considered  to  have  been  one  of 
the  best  investments  ever  made  by  a  State.  Even  if  we  be- 
lieve the  dangers  apprehended  to  have  been  visionary,  yet  it 
cannot  be  viewed  as  an  exorbitant  price  to  have  paid  for  a 


474  ^'^^'  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xx. 

considerable  tract  of  fertile  country,  a  number  of  strong  for- 
tresses, and  the  redemption  of  an  obligation  which  could  not 
with  honor  be  disowned. 

To  Chosroes  the  advantage  secured  by  the  treaty  was  similar 
to  that  which  Rome  had  obtained'*'  by  the  peace  of  a.d.  532. 
Being  no  longer  under  any  necessity  of  employing  his  forces 
against  the  Romans  in  the  north-west,  he  found  himself  free  to 
act  with  greatly  increased  effect  against  his  enemies  in  the 
east  and  in  the  south.  Already,  in  the  interval  between  the 
conclusion  of  the  general  truce  and  of  the  fifty  years'  peace, 
he  had,  as  it  seems,  invaded  the  territories  of  the  Ephthalites, '"" 
and,  with  the  help  of  the  Great  Khan  of  the  Turks,  inflicted 
upon  this  people,  so  long  one  of  Persia's  most  formidable  ene- 
mies, a  severe  defeat.  According  to  Tabari,  he  actually  slew 
the  Ephthalite  monarch,  ravaged  his  territory,  and  pillaged 
his  treasures.'"  About  the  same  time  he  had  also  had  a  war 
with  the  Khazars,  had  overrun  their  country,  wasted  it  with 
fire  and  sword,  and  massacred  thousands  of  the  inhabitants. """ 
He  now  entertained  designs  against  Arabia  and  perhaps  India, 
countries  on  which  he  could  not  hope  to  make  an  impression 
without  earnest  and  concentrated  effort.  It  was  doubtless 
with  the  view  of  extending  his  influence  into  these  quarters 
that  the  Persian  monarch  evacuated  Lazica,  and  bound  his 
country  to  maintain  peace  with  Rome  for  the  next  half- 
century. 

The  position  of  affairs  in  Arabia  was  at  the  time  abnormal 
and  interesting.  For  the  most  part  that  vast  but  sterile  region 
has  been  the  home  of  almost  countless  tribes,  living  independ- 
ently of  one  another,  each  under  its  own  sheikh  or  chief,  in 
wild  and  unrestrained  freedom.'"'  Native  princes  have  seldom 
obtained  any  widely  extended  dominion  over  the  scattered 
population;  and  foreign  powers  have  still  more  rarely  exer- 
cised authority  for  any  considerable  period  over  the  freedom- 
loving  descendants  of  Ishmael.  But  towards  the  beginning  of 
the  sixth  century  of  our  era  the  Abyssinians  of  Axum,  a 
Christian  people,  ' '  raised  "  far  ' '  above  the  ordinary  level  of 
African  barbarism'"'**  by  their  religion  and  by  their  constant 
intercourse  with  Rome,  succeeded  in  attaching  to  their  em- 
pire a  large  portion  of  the  Happy  Arabia,  and  ruled  it  at  first 
from  their  African  capital,  but  afterwards  by  means  of  a 
viceroy,  whose  dependence  on  the  Negus  of  Abyssinia  was 
little  more  than  nominal.  Abraha,  an  Abyssinian  of  high 
rank, '^^  being  deputed  by  the  Negus  to  re-establish  the  au- 


«H.  XX.]  CONDITION  OF  ARABIA.  475 

thority  of  Abyssinia  over  the  Yemen  when  it  was  shaken  by 
a  great  revolt,  made  himself  master  of  the  country,  assumed 
the  crown,  established  Abyssinians  in  all  the  chief  cities,  built 
numerous  churches,  especially  one  of  great  beauty  at  Sana,  '•" 
and  at  his  death  left  the  kingdom  to  his  eldest  son,  Yaksoum. '" 
An  important  Christian  state  was  thus  estabUshed  in  the  Great 
Peninsula ;  and  it  was  natural  that  Justinian  should  see  with 
satisfaction,  and  Chosroes  with  some  alarm,  the  gro^vth  of  a 
power  in  this  quarter  which  was  sure  to  side  with  Rome  and 
against  Persia,  if  their  rivalry  should  extend  into  these  parts. 
Justinian  had  hailed  with  pleasure  the  original  Abyssinian 
conquest,  and  had  entered  into  amicable  relations  with  both 
the  Axumites  and  their  colonists  in  the  Yemen.'"*  Chosroes 
now  resolved  upon  a  counter  movement.  He  would  employ 
the  quiet  secured  to  him  by  the  peace  of  a.d.  562  in  a  great  at- 
tack upon  the  Abyssinian  power  in  Arabia.  He  would  drive 
the  audacious  Africans  from  the  soO  of  Asia,  and  would  earn 
the  eternal  gratitude  of  the  mmierous  tribes  of  the  desert.  He 
would  extend  Persian  influence  to  the  shores  of  the  Arabian 
Gulf,  and  so  confront  the  Romans  along  the  whole  line  of  their 
eastern  boundary.  He  would  destroy  the  point  cfappid  which 
Rome  had  acquired  in  South-western  Asia,  and  so  at  once 
diminish  her  power  and  augment  the  strength  and  glory  of 
Persia. 

The  interference  of  Chosroes  in  the  affairs  of  a  country  so 
distant  as  "Western  Arabia  involved  considerable  difficulties ; 
but  his  expedition  was  facilitated  by  an  application  which  he 
received  from  a  native  of  the  district  in  question.  Saif,  the 
son  of  Dsu-Yezm,  descended  from  the  race  of  the  old  Homerite 
kings  whom  the  Abyssinians  had  conquered,  grew  up  at  the 
court  of  Abraha  in  the  belief  that  that  prince,  who  had  married 
his  mother,  was  not  liis  step-father,  but  his  father.'''"  Unde- 
ceived by  an  insult  which  Masrouq,  the  true  son  of  Abraha 
and  succesor  of  Yaksoum,  offered  him, '""  Saif  became  a  refugee 
at  the  court  of  Chosroes,  and  importuned  the  Great  King  to 
embrace  his  quarrel  and  reinstate  him  on  the  throne  of  liis 
fathers.  He  represented  the  Homerite  population  of  Yemen 
as  groaning  under  the  yoke  of  their  oppressors  and  only 
waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  rise  in  revolt  and  shake  it  off. 
A  few  thousand  Persian  troops,  enough  to  form  the  nucleus  of 
an  army,  would  suffice ;  they  might  be  sent  by  sea  to  the  port 
of  Aden,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Arabian  Gulf,  where  the 
Homerites  would  join  them  in  large  numbers;  the  combined 


476  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xx: 

forces  might  then  engage  in  combat  with  the  Abyssinians,  and 
destroy  them  or  drive  them  from  the  land.  Cbosroes  took  the 
advice  tendered  him,  so  far  at  any  rate  as  to  make  his  expedi- 
tion by  sea.  His  ships  were  assembled  in  the  Persian  Gulf;  a 
certain  number  of  Persian  troops""  were  embarked  on  board 
them;  and  the  flotilla  proceeded,  under  the  conduct  of  Saif, 
first  to  the  mouth  of  the  Gulf,  and  then  along  the  southern 
coast  of  Arabia  to  Aden. '"'  Encouraged  by  their  presence,  the 
Homerites  rose  against  their  foreign  oppressors ;  a  war  followed, 
of  which  the  particulars  have  been  disfigured  by  romance ;-"' 
but  the  result  is  undoubted— the  Abyssinian  strangers  were 
driven  from  the  soil  of  Arabia;  the  native  race  recovered  its 
supremacy;  and  Saif,  the  descendant  of  the  old  Homerite 
kings,  was  established,  as  the  vassal  or  viceroy  of  Chosroes, 
on  the  throne  of  his  ancestors.-"*  This  arrangement,  however, 
was  not  lasting.  Saif,  after  a  short  reign,  was  murdered  by 
his  body-guard;-"'  and  Chosroes  then  conferred  the  govern- 
ment of  Yemen  upon  a  Persian  oflicer,  who  seems  to  have 
borne  the  usual  title  of  Marzpan,'""  and  to  have  been  in  no 
way  distinguished  above  other  rulers  of  provinces.  Thus  the 
Homerites  in  the  end  gained  nothing  by  their  revolt  but  a 
change  of  masters.  They  may,  however,  have  regarded  the 
change  as  one  worth  making,  since  it  gave  them  the  mild  sway 
of  a  tolerant  heathen  in  lieu  of  the  persecuting  rule  of  Christian 
bigots. 

Accordmg  to  some  writers,'"'  Chosroes  also,  in  his  later 
years,  sent  an  expedition  by  sea  against  some  portion  of  Hin- 
dustan, and  received  a  cession  of  territory  from  an  Indian 
monarch.  But  the  country  of  the  monarch  is  too  remote  for 
beUef,  and  the  ceded  provinces  seem  to  have  belonged  to  Per- 
sia previously.'"'  It  is  therefore,  perhaps,  most  probable  that 
friendly  intercourse  has  been  exaggerated  into  conquest,  and 
the  reception  of  presents  from  an  Indian  potentate'"'  meta- 
morphosed into  the  gain  of  territory.  Some  authorities  do  not 
assign  to  Chosroes  any  Indian  dominion;''"  and  it  is  at  least 
doubtful  whether  he  made  any  expedition  in  this  direction. 

A  war,  however,  appears  certainly  to  have  occupied  Chos- 
roes about  this  period  on  his  north-eastern  frontier.  The 
Turks  had  recently  been  advancing  in  strength  and  drawing 
nearer  to  the  confines  of  Persia.  They  had  extended  their 
dominion  over  the  great  Ephthalite  kingdom,  partly  by  force 
of  arms,'"  partly  through  the  treachery  of  Katulphus,  an 
Ephthalite  chieftain;'"  they  had  received  the  submission  of 


CH.  xx.l       EMBASSY  FROM  DIZABUL   TUK  TURK.  4ni 

the  Sogdians,  and  probably  of  other  tribes  of  the  Transoxianian 
region,  previously  held  in  subjection  by  the  Ephthalites;  and 
they  aspired  to  be  acknowledged  as  a  great  power,  the  second, 
if  not  the  first,  in  this  part  of  Asia.     It  was  perhaps  rather 
with  the  view  of  picking  a  quarrel  than  in  the  hope  of  any 
valuable  pacific  result,  that,  about  the  close  of  a.d.  567,  Diza- 
bul,  the  Turkish  Khan,  sent  ambassadors  to  Chosroes"'^  with 
pi-oposals  for  the  establishment  of  free  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  Turks  and  Persians,  and  even  for  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  of  friendship  and  alhance  between  the  two  nations. 
Chosroes  suspected  the  motive  for  the  overture,  but  was  afraid 
openly  to  reject  it.     He  desired  to  discourage  intercourse  be- 
tween his  own  nation  and  the  Tvii-ks,  but  could  devise    no 
better  mode  of  effecting  his  purpose  than  by  burning    the 
Turkish  merchandise  offered  to  him  after  he  had  bought  it, 
and  by  poisoning  the  ambassadors  and  giving  out  that  they 
had  fallen  victims  to  the  climate.     His  conduct  exasperated 
the  Turkish  Khan,  and  created  a  deep  and  bitter  hostility  be- 
tween the  Turks  and  Persians."*    It  was  at  once  resolved  to 
send  an  embassy  to  Constantinople  and  offer  to  the  Greek 
emperor  the  friendsliip  which  Chosroes  had  scorned.     The  em- 
bassy reached  the  Byzantine  court  early  in  a.d.  568,  and  was 
graciously  received  by  Justin,  the  nephew  of  Justinian,  who 
had  succeeded  his  uncle  on  the  imperial  throne  between  three 
and  four  years  previously.     A  treaty  of  alliance  was  made 
between  the  two  nations ;  and  a  Eoman  embassy,  empowered 
to  ratify  it,  visited  the  Turkish  court  in  the  Altai  mountains-'^ 
during  the  course  of  the  next  year  (a.d.  569),  and  drew  closer 
the  bonds  of  friendship  between  the  high  contracting  powers. 
But  meanwhile  Dizabul,  confident  in  his  own  strength,  had 
determined  on  an  expedition  into  Persia.     The  Eoman  ambas- 
sador,   Zemarchus,    accompanied  him   on  a    portion    of   hi.g 
march,-'"'  and  witnessed  his  insulting  treatment  of  a  Persian 
envoy,  sent  by  Chosroes  to  meet  him  and  deprecate  his  attack. 
Beyond  this  point  exact  information  fails  us ;  but  we  may  sus- 
pect that  this    is    the   expedition   commemorated  by   Mirk- 
hond,'"  wherein  the  Great  Khan,  having  invaded  the  Persian 
territory  in  force,  made  himself  master  of  Shash,  Ferghana, 
Samarkand,  Bokhara,  Kesh,  and  Nesf,  but,  hearing  that  Hor- 
misdas,  son  of  Chosroes,  was  advancing  against  him  at  the 
head  of  a  numerous  army,  suddenly  fled,  evacuating  all  the 
coimtry  that  he  hnd  occupied,  and  retiring  to  the  most  distant 
portion  of  Turkestan,    At  any  rate  the  expedition  cannot  have 


h 


478  THE  SEVENTH  MO^'AROUT.  [ch.  xx.     _ 

i 

had  any  great  success;  for  shortly  afterwards  (a.d.  571)  we  ^* 
find  Turkish  ambassadors  once  more  visiting  the  Byzantine 
court,  ^'*  and  entreating  Justin  to  renounce  the  fifty  years' 
peace  and  unite  with  them  in  a  grand  attack  upon  the  com- 
mon enemy,  which,  if  assaulted  simviltaneously  on  either  side. 
might  (they  argued)  be  almost  certainly  crushed.  Justin  gave 
the  ambassadors  no  definite  reply,  but  renewed  the  alliance 
with  Dizabul,  and  took  seriously  into  consideration  the  ques- 
tion whether  he  should  not  yield  to  the  representations  made 
to  him,  and  renew  the  war  which  Justinian  had  terminated 
nine  years  previously. 

There  were  many  circumstances  which  urged  him  towards 
a  rupture.  The  payments  to  be  made  under  the  fifty  years' 
peace  had  in  his  eyes  the  appearance  of  a  tribute  rendered  by 
Rome  to  Persia,  which  was,  he  thought,  an  intolerable  dis- 
grace.^'" A  subsidy,  not  very  dissimilar,  which  Justinian  had 
allowed  the  Saracenic  Arabs  under  Persian  rule,  he  had  al- 
ready discontinued ;""  and  hostilities  had,  in  consequence,  al- 
ready commenced  between  the  Persian  and  the  Roman  Sara- 
cens. ^°'  The  successes  of  Chosroes  in  Western  Arabia  had  at 
once  provoked  his  jealousy,  and  secured  to  Rome,  in  that  quar- 
ter, an  important  ally  in  the  great  Christian  kingdom  of  Abys- 
sinia. The  Turks  of  Central  Asia  had  sought  his  friendship 
and  offered  to  combine  their  attacks  with  his,  if  he  would 
consent  to  go  to  war.^"  Moreover,  there  was  once  more  dis- 
content and  even  rebellion  in  Armenia,  where  the  proselytiz- 
ing zeal  of  the  Persian  governors  had  again  driven  the  natives 
to  take  up  arms  and  raise  the  standard  of  independence.^'^' 
Above  all,  the  Great  King,  who  had  warred  with  such  success 
for  twenty  years  against  his  uncle,  was  now  in  advanced 
age,"*  and  seemed  to  have  given  signs  of  feebleness,  inasmuch 
as  in  his  recent  expeditions  he  had  individually  taken  no  part, 
but  had  entrusted  the  command  of  his  troops  to  others.^"  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  Justin,  in  the  year  a.d.  572,  deter- 
mined to  renounce  the  peace  made  ten  years  earlier  with  the 
Persians,  and  to  recommence  the  old  struggle.  Accordingly 
he  at  once  dismissed  the  Persian  envoy,  Sebocthes,  with  con- 
tempt, refused  wholly  to  make  the  stipulated  payment,  pro- 
claimed his  intention  of  receiving  the  Armenian  insurgents 
under  his  protection,  and  bade  Chosroes  lay  a  finger  on  them 
at  his  peril.""  He  then  appointed  Marcian  to  the  prefecture 
of  the  East,"'  and  gave  him  the  conduct  of  the  war  which  wa? 
now  inevitable. 


m.  XX.]       EI£^^EWAL   OF  THE  WAR  WITH  ROME.  470 

No  sooner  did  the  Persian  monarch  find  his  kingdom  seri- 
ously menaced  than,  despite  his  advanced  age,  he  immediately 
took  the  field  in  person.  Giving  the  command  of  a  flying 
column  of  6000  men  to  Adarman,''*  a  skilful  general,  he 
marched  himself  against  the  Romans,  who  under  Marcian"* 
had  defeated  a  Persian  force,  and  were  besieging  Nisibis,"" 
forced  them  to  raise  the  siege,  and,  pressing  forward  as  they 
retired,  compelled  them  to  seek  shelter  within  the  walls  of 
Daras,'"'  which  he  proceeded  to  invest  with  his  main  army. 
Meanwhile  Adarman,  at  the  head  of  the  troops  entrusted  to 
him,  crossed  the  Euphrates  near  Circesium,  and,  having  en- 
tered Syria,  carried  fire  and  sword  far  and  wide  over  that  fer- 
tile province.  ^'^  Repulsed  from  Antioch,  where,  however,  he 
burnt  the  suburbs  of  the  town,  he  invaded  Coelesyria,  took  and 
destroyed  Apamea,  and  then,  recrossing  the  great  river,  re- 
joined Chosroes  before  Daras.  The  renowned  fortress  made  a 
brave  defence.  For  about  five  months  it  resisted,  ^'^  without  ob- 
taining any  relief,  the  entire  force  of  Chosroes,  who  is  said""  to 
have  besieged  it  with  40,000  horse  and  100,000  foot.  At  last, 
on  the  approach  of  winter,  it  could  no  longer  hold  out ;  en- 
closed within  lines  of  circumvallation,  and  deprived  of  water 
by  the  diversion  of  its  streams  into  new  channels,-"^  it  found 
itself  reduced  to  extremity,  and  forced  to  submit  towards  the 
close  of  A.D.  573.  Thus  the  great  Roman  fortress  in  these  parts 
was  lost  in  the  first  year  of  the  renewed  war;  and  Justin, 
alarmed  at  his  own  temerity,  and  recognizing  his  weakness, 
felt  it  necessary  to  retire  from  the  conduct  of  affairs,  and  de- 
liver the  reins  of  empire  to  stronger  hands.  He  chose  as  his 
coadjutor  and  successor  the  Count  Tiberius,  a  Thracian  by 
birth,  who  had  long  stood  high  in  his  confidence;  and  this 
prince,  in  conjunction  with  the  Empress  Sophia,  now  took  the 
direction  of  the  war."" 

The  first  need  was  to  obtain  a  breathing-space.  The  Persian 
king  having  given  an  opening  for  negotiations,""  advantage 
was  taken  of  it  by  the  joint  rulers"^"  to  send  an  envoy,  fur- 
nished with  an  autograph  letter  from  the  empress,  and  well 
provided  with  the  best  persuasives  of  peace,  who  was  to  sug- 
gest an  armistice  for  a  year,  during  which  a  satisfactory  ar- 
rangement of  the  whole  quarrel  might  be  agreed  upon.  Tibe- 
rius thought  that  within  tliis  space  he  might  collect  an  army 
sufficiently  powerfiil  to  re-establish  the  superiority  of  the 
Roman  arms  in  the  east;  Chosroes  believed  himself  strong 
enough  to  defeat  any  force  that  Rome  could  now  bring  into 


480  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY,  [en.  xx. 

the  field."''  A  truce  for  a  year  was  therefore  concluded,  at 
the  cost  to  Rome  of  45,000  aurei;"^"  and  immense  efforts  were 
at  once  made  by  Tiberius  to  levy  troops  from  his  more  distant 
provinces,  or  hire  them  from  the  lands  beyond  his  borders. 
An  army  of  150,000  men  was,  it  is  said,  collected  from  the 
banks  of  the  Danube  and  the  Rhine,  from  Scythia,  Pannonia, 
Moesia,  Illyricum,  and  Isauria;""'  a  genei-al  of  repute,  Justin- 
ian, the  son  of  Germanus,  was  selected  to  command  them; 
and  the  whole  force  was  concentrated  upon  the  eastern 
frontier  ;"^-  but,  after  all  these  preparations,  the  Csesar's  heart 
failed  him,  and,  instead  of  offering  battle  to  the  enemy,  Tibe- 
rius sent  a  second  embassy  to  the  Persian  head-quarters,  early 
in  A.D.  575,  and  besought  an  extension  of  the  truce. ^"  The 
Romans  desired  a  short  term  of  peace  only,  but  wished  for  a 
general  suspension  of  hostilities  between  the  nations :  the  Per- 
sians advocated  a  longer  interval,  but  insisted  that  the  truce 
should  not  extend  to  Armenia. ""  The  dispute  continued  till 
the  armistice  for  a  year  had  run  out;'''^  and  the  Persians  had 
resumed  hostilities  and  threatened  Constantina'"  before  the 
Romans  would  give  way.  At  length  it  was  agreed  that  there 
should  be  peace  for  three  years,  but  that  Armenia  should  be 
exempt  from  its  operation."*'  Rome  Avas  to  pay  to  Persia, 
during  the  continuance  of  the  truce,  the  sum  of  30,000  aurei 
annually."" 

No  sooner  was  the  peace  concluded  than  Chosroes  put  him- 
self at  the  head  of  his  army,  and,  entering  Armenia  Proper, 
proceeded  to  crush  the  revolt,  and  to  re-establish  the  Persian 
authority  throughout  the  entire  region."*'  No  resistance  was 
offered  to  him ;  and  he  was  able,  before  the  close  of  the  year, 
to  carry  his  arms  into  the  Roman  territory  of  Armenia  Minor, 
and  even  to  threaten  Cappadocia.  Here  Justinian  opposed  his 
progress;  and  in  a  partial  engagement,  Kurs  (or  Cursus),  a 
leader  of  Scythians  in  the  Roman  service,  obtained  an  advan- 
tage over  the  Persian  rear-guard,  captured  the  camp  and  the 
baggage,  but  did  not  succeed  in  doing  any  serious  damage."" 
Chosroes  soon  afterwards  revenged  himself  by  surprising  and 
destroying  a  Roman  camp  during  the  night ;  he  then  took  and 
burnt  the  city  of  Mehtene  (Malatiyeh) ;  after  which,  as  winter 
was  approaching,  he  retired  across  the  Euphrates,  and  re- 
turned into  his  own  country.  Hereupon  Justinian  seems  to 
have  invaded  Persian  Armenia,  and  to  have  enriched  his 
troops  with  its  plunder;  according  to  some  writers,  he  even 
penetrated  as  far  as  the  Caspian  Sea,  and  embarked  upon  its 


cH.  xx.j    PBEsiA2\'S  ricTojiions  m  Armenia.]         48i 

^vatel•s;'•''  he  continued  on  Persian  soil  during  the  whole  of  the 
winter,  and  it  was  not  till  the  spring  came  that  he  re  entered 
Eoman  territory  (a.d.  576)."- 

The  campaign  of  a.d.  576  is  somewhat  obscure.  The  Romans 
seem  to  have  gained  certain  advantages  in  Northern  Ai'menia 
and  Iberia,""  while  Chosroes  on  his  part  carried  the  war  once 
more  into  Armenia  Minor,  and  laid  siege  to  Theodosiopolis, 
which,  however,  he  was  unable  to  take.'"  Negotiations  were 
upon  this  resumed,  and  had  progressed  favorably  to  a  certaia 
point,  when  news  arrived  of  a  great  disaster  to  the  Roman 
arms  in  Armenia,  which  changed  the  face  of  affairs  and  caused 
the  Persian  negotiators  to  break  up  the  conference.  Tam- 
chosro,  a  Persian  general,  had  completely  defeated  the  Roman 
army  under  Justinian."^  Armenia  had  returned  to  its  alle- 
giance. There  seemed  every  reason  to  believe  that  more  was. 
to  be  gained  by  arms  than  by  diplomacy,  and  that,  when  the 
three  years  peace  had  run  out,  the  Great  King  might  renew 
the  general  war  with  a  prospect  of  obtaining  important  suc- 
cesses. 

There  are  no  military  events  which  can  be  referred  to  the 
year  a.d.  577.  The  Romans  and  Persians  amused  each  other 
with  alternate  embassies  during  i|te  course,  and  Avith  negotia- 
tions that  were  not  intended  to  have  any  result.""  The  two 
monarchs  made  vast  preparations;  and  with  the  spring  of  a.d. 
578  hostiUties  recommenced.  Chosroes  is  accused  of  having 
anticipated  the  expiration  of  the  truce  by  a  period  of  forty 
days  ;"^  but  it  is  more  probable  that  he  and  the  Romans 
estimated  the  date  of  its  expiration  differently.  However 
this  was,  it  is  certain  that  his  generals,  Mebodes  and  Sapoes, 
took  the  field  in  early  spring  with  20,000  horse,"*  and  entering 
the  Roman  Armenia  laid  waste  the  country,  at  the  same  time 
threatening  Constantina and  Theodosiopolis.""  Simultaneously 
Tamchosro,""  quitting  Persarmenia,  marched  westward  and 
plundered  the  country  about  Amida  (Diarbekr).  The  Roman 
commander  Maurice,  who  had  succeeded  Justinian,  possessed 
considerable  military  ability.  On  this  occasion,  instead  of  fol- 
lowing the  ordinary  plan  of  simply  standing  on  the  defensive 
and  endeavoring  to  repulse  the  invaders,  he  took  the  bolder 
course  of  making  a  counter  movement.  Entering  Persarmenia, 
which  he  found  denuded  of  troops,  he  carried  all  before  him, 
destroying  the  forts,  and  plundering  the  country."'  Though 
the  summer  heats  brought  on  him  an  attack  of  fever,  he  con- 
tinued without  pause  his  destructive  march;  invaded  and  oc- 


482  Tim  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xx. 

cupied  Arzanene.  with  its  stronghold,  Aphunion,  carried  off 
the  population  to  the  number  of  10, 090,  and,  pressing  forwards 
from  Arzanene  into  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  took  Singara,  and 
carried  fire  and  sword  over  the  entire  region  as  far  as  the  Ti- 
gris. He  even  ventured  to  throw  a  body  of  skirmishers  across 
the  river  into  Cordyene  (Kurdistan) ;  and  these  ravagers,  who 
were  commanded  by  Kurs,  the  Scythian,  spread  devastation  over 
a  district  where  no  Roman  soldier  had  set  foot  since  its  cession 
by  Jovian. ^"^  Agathias  tells  us  that  Chosroes  was  at  the  time 
enjoying  his  summer  villeggiatura  in  the  Kurdish  hills,  and 
saw  from  his  residence  the  smoke  of  the  hamlets  which  the 
Roman  troops  had  fired. ''"^  He  hastily  fled  from  the  danger, 
and  shut  himself  up  within  the  walls  of  Ctesiphon,  where  he 
was  soon  afterwards  seized  with  the  dlness  which  brought  his 
life  to  a  close. 

Meanwhile  Kurs,  unconscious  probably  of  the  prize  that  had 
been  so  near  his  grasp,  recrossed  the  Tigris  with  his  booty  and 
rejoined  Maurice,  who  on  the  approach  of  winter  withdrew  into 
Roman  territory,  evacuating  all  his  conquests  excepting  Arza- 
nene."''* The  dull  time  of  winter  was,  as  usual,  spent  in  nego- 
tiations; and  it  was  thought  that  a  peace  might  have  been 
concluded  had  Chosroes  lived.""  Tiberius  was  anxious  to  re- 
cover Daras,  and  was  willing  to  withdraw  the  Roman  forces 
wholly  from  Persarmenia  and  Iberia,  and  to  surrender  Arza- 
nene and  Aphumon,  if  Daras  were  restored  to  him.  ^"  He  would 
probably  have  been  content  even  to  pay  in  addition  a  sum  of 
money. ^"  Chosroes  might  perhaps  have  accepted  these  terms; 
but  while  the  envoys  empowered  to  propose  them  were  on 
their  way  to  his  court,  early"**  in  the  year  a.d.  579,  the  a^"ed 
monarch  died  in  his  palace  at  Ctesiphon  after  a  reign  of  forty- 
eight  years."* 


'    ( 


Vol    II 


Plate.  XLI, 


J 


r--^ 


Plate  XLII 


I^M     J   ilKifMli 


Voil.    Ill, 


ChoSKOES   II.    AND  ♦EMBLjaf ATIC   FlOUBES   UNDEK   AeCH   AT   TAKHI-I-BoSTA^.. 


cfl.  XXI.]        ADMLMSTHATION  OF  CHOSRO^S  I  483 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

Administration  of  Persia  under  Chosroes  I.  Fourfold  Divi- 
sion of  the  Empire.  Carefid  Surveillance  of  those  en- 
trusted ivith  Power.  Severe  Punishment  of  Abuse  of 
Trust.  New  System  of  Taxation  introduced.  Connection 
of  Abuse  connected  ivifh  the  Military  Service.  Encourage- 
ment of  Agricidture  and  Marriage.  Relief  of  Poverty. 
Care  for  Travellers.  Encouragement  of  Learning.  Prac- 
tice of  Toleration  within  certain  Limits.  Domestic  Life 
of  Chosroes.  His  Wives.  Revolt  and  Death  of  his  Son, 
Nushizad.     Coins  of  Chosroes.    Estimate  of  his  Character. 

"Eywye  tou  av5pa.  nei^ova  9fiT)v  tCiv  dWiov  ^ap^aptav . — Agathias,  ii.  28, 

A  GENERAL  consensus  of  the  Oriental  writers'  marks  the  reign 
of  the  first  Chosroes  as  a  period  not  only  of  great  naihtary 
activity,  but  also  of  improved  domestic  administration. 
Chosroes  found  the  empire  in  a  disordered  and  ill-regulated 
condition,  taxation  arranged  on  a  bad  system,  the  people  op- 
pressed by  unjust  and  tyrannical  governors,  the  military  ser- 
vice a  prey  to  the  most  scandalous  abuses,  religious  fanaticism 
rampant,  class  at  variance  with  class,  extortion  and  wrong 
winked  at,  crime  unpunished,  agi'iculture  languishing,  and  the 
masses  throughout  almost  the  whole  of  the  country  sullen  and 
discontented.  It  was  his  resolve  from  the  first"  to  carry  out 
a  series  of  reforms — to  secure  the  administration  of  even- 
handed  jjustice,  to  put  the  finances  on  a  better  footing,  to  en- 
courage agriculture,  to  relieve  the  poor  and  the  distressed,  to 
root  out  the  abuses  that  destroyed  the  efficiency  of  the  army, 
and  to  excise  the  gangrene  of  fanaticism  which  was  eating  into 
the  heart  of  the  nation.  How  he  effected  the  last  named  object 
by  his  wholesale  destruction  of  the  followers  of  Mazdak  has 
been  already  related  f  but  it  appeared  unadvisable  to  interrupt 
the  military  history  of  the  reign  by  combining  with  it  any  ac- 
count of  the  numerous  other  reforms  which  he  accomphshed. 
It  remains  therefore  to  consider  them  in  this  place,  since  they 
are  certainly  not  the  least  remarkable  among  the  many  achieve- 
ments of  this  great  monarch. 

Persia,  until  the  time  of  Anushirwan,  had  been  divided  into 


484  ^'SE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch  xxi. 

a  multitude  of  provinces,  the  satraps  or  governors  of  which 
held  their  office  directly  under  the  crown.  It  was  difficult  for 
the  monarch  to  exercise  a  [sufficient  superintendence  over  so 
large  a  number  of  rulers,  many  of  them  remote  from  the 
court,  and  all  united  by  a  common  interest.  Chosroes  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  forming  four  great  governments,  and  entrust- 
ing them  to  four  persons  in  whom  he  had  confidence,  whose 
duty  it  should  be  to  watch  the  conduct  of  the  provincial  satraps 
to  control  them,  direct  them,  or  report  their  misconduct  to 
the  crown.  The  four  great  governments  were  those  of  the 
east,  the  north,  the  south,  and  the  west.  The  east  comprised 
Khorassan,  Seistan,  and  Kirman;  the  north,  Armenia,  Azer- 
bijan,  Ghilan,  Koum,  and  Isfahan ;  the  south,  Fars  and  Ahwaz ; 
the  west,  Irak,  or  Babylonia,  Assyria,  and  Mesopotamia.* 

It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  monarch,  however,  to  put  a 
blind  trust  in  his  instruments.  He  made  personal  progresses 
through  his  empire  from  time  to  time,  visiting  each  province 
in  turn  and  inquiring  into  the  condition  of  the  inhabitants.  ^ 
He  employed  continually  an  army  of  inspectors  and  spies,  who 
reported  to  him  from  all  quarters  the  sufferings  or  complaints 
of  the  oppressed,  and  the  neglects  or  misdoings  of  those  in 
authority. "  On  the  occurrence  of  any  specially  suspicious  cir- 
cumstance, he  appointed  extraordinary  commisssions  of  in- 
quiry, which,  armed  with  all  the  power  of  the  crown,  pro- 
ceeded to  the  suspected  quarter,  took  evidence,  and  made  a 
careful  report  of  whatever  wrongs  or  malpractices  they  dis- 
covered. ' 

When  guilt  was  brought  home  to  incriminated  persons  or 
parties,  the  punishment  with  which  they  were  visited  was 
swift  and  signal.  We  have  seen  how  harsh  were  the  sentences 
passed  by  Chosroes  upon  those  whose  offences  attacked  his 
own  person  or  dignity.^  An  equal  severity  appears  in  his 
judgments,  where  there  was  no  question  of  his  own  wrongs,  but 
only  of  the  interests  of  his  subjects."  On  one  occasion  he  is 
said  to  have  executed  no  fewer  than  eighty  collectors  of  taxes 
on  the  report  of  a  commission  charging  them  with  extortion.'" 

Among  the  principal  reforms  which  Chosroes  is  said  to  have 
introduced  was  his  fresh  arrangement  of  the  taxetion.  Hitherto 
all  lands  had  paid  to  the  State  a  certain  proportion  of  their 
produce,  a  proportion  which  varied,  according  to  the  estunated 
richness  of  the  soil,  from  a  tenth  to  one-half. "  The  effect  was 
to  discourage  all  improved  cultivation,  since  it  was  quite  possi- 
ble that  the  whole  profit  of  any  increased  outlay  might  be 


CH.  XXI.]        ESTABLISBMENT  OF  A  LAND-TAX.  485 

absorbed  by  the  State,  and  also  to  cramp  and  check  the  hberty 
of  the  cultivators  in  various  ways,  since  the  produce  could  not 
be  touched  until  the  revenue  official  made  his  appearance  and 
carried  off  the  share  of  the  crop  which  he  had  a  right  to  take.  '^ 
Chosroes  resolved  to  substitute  a  land-tax  for  the  proportionate 
payments  in  kind,  .and  thus  at  once  to  set  the  cultivator  at 
liberty  with  respect  to  harvesting  his  crops  and  to  allow  him 
the  entire  advantage  of  any  agumented  production  which 
might  be  secured  by  better  methods  of  farming  his  land.  His 
tax  consisted  in  part  of  a  money  payment,  in  part  of  a  pay- 
ment in  kind ;  but  both  payments  were  fixed  and  invariable, 
each  measure  of  ground  being  rated  in  the  king's  books  at  one 
dirhem  and  one  measure  of  the  produce.'^  Uncultivated  land, 
and  land  lying  fallow  at  the  time,  were  exempt;'^  and  thus  the 
scheme  involved,  not  one  survey  alone,  but  a  recurring  (annual) 
survey,'^  and  an  annual  registration  of  all  cultivators,  with  the 
quantity  of  land  under  cultivation  held  by  each,  and  the  nature 
of  the  crop  or  crops  to  be  grown  by  them.  The  system  was 
one  of  much  complication,  and  may  have  pressed  somewhat 
hardly  upon  the  poorer  and  less  productive  soils ;  but  it  was  an 
immense  improvement  .upon  the  previously  existing  practice, 
which  had  all  the  disadvantages  of  the  modern  tithe  system,  ag- 
gravated by  the  high  rates  exacted'"  and  by  the  certainty  that, 
in  any  disputed  case,  the  subject  would  have  had  a  poor  chance 
of  establishing  his  right  against  the  crown.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  the  caliphs,  when  they  conquered  Persia,  maintained  un- 
altered the  land  system  of  Chosroes''  which  they  found  estab- 
lished, regarding  it  as,  if  not  perfect,  at  any  rate  not  readily 
admitting  of  much  improvement. 

Besides  the  tax  upon  arable  lands,  of  which  we  have  hitherto 
spoken,  Chosroes  introduced  into  into  Persia  various  other 
imposts.  The  fruit  trees  were  everywhere  counted,  and  a  small 
payment  required  for  each.'"  The  personahty  of  the  citizens 
was  valued,  and  a  graduated  property-tax  established,  which, 
however,  in  the  case  of  the  most  opulent,  did  not  exceed  the 
moderate  sum  of  forty-eight  dirhems'"  (about  tAventy-seven 
shillings).  A  poll-tax  was  required  of  Jews  and  Christians,-" 
whereof  we  do  not  know  the  amount.  From  all  these  burdens 
liberal  exemptions  were  made  on  account  of  age  and  sex ;  no 
female  paid  anything;-'  and  males  above  fifty  years  of  age  or 
under  twenty  were  also  free  of  charge.  Due  notice  was  given 
to  each  individual  of  the  sum  for  which  he  was  liable,  by  the 
publication  in  each  province,  town,  and  village,  of  a  tax  table, 


4^6  ^HE  SEVENTH  MOKAliCIlT.  [cH.  xxr. 

ill  which  each  citizen  or  aUen  could  see  ap;ainst  his  name  the 
amount  about  to  be  claimed  of  him,  with  the  ground  upon 
which  it  was  regarded  as  due. '"'  Payment  had  to  made  by- 
instalments,  three  times  each  year,  at  the  end  of  every  four 
months." 

In  order  to  prevent  the  unfair  extortion,  which  in  the 
ancient  world  was  always,  with  reason  or  without,  charged 
upon  collectors  of  revenue,  Chosroes,  by  the  advice  of  the 
Grand  Mobed,  authorized  the  Magian  priests  everywhere  to 
exercise  a  supervision  over  the  receivers  of  taxes,  and  to 
hinder  them  from  exacting  more  than  their  due.^*  The  priests 
were  only  too  happy  to  discharge  this  popular  function ;  and 
extortion  must  have  become  rare  under  a  system  which  com- 
prised so  efficient  a  safeguard. 

Another  change  ascribed  to  Chosroes  is  a  reform  of  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  army.  Under  the  system  previously  ex- 
isting, Chosroes  found  that  the  resources  of  the  state  were 
lavishly  wasted,  and  the  result  was  a  military  force  inefficient 
and  badly  accoutred.  No  security  was  taken  that  the  soldiers 
possessed  their  proper  equipments  or  could  discharge  the  duties 
appropriate  to  their  several  grades.  Persons  came  before  the 
paymaster,  claiming  the  wages  of  a  cavalry  soldier,  who 
possessed  no  horse,  and  had  never  learned  to  ride.  Some,  who 
called  themselves  soldiers,  had  no  knowledge  of  the  use  of  any 
weapon  at  all ;  others  claimed  for  higher  grades  of  the  service 
than  those  whereto  they  really  belonged;  those  who  drew  the 
pay  of  cuirassiers  were  destitute  of  a  coat  of  mail ;  those  who 
professed  themselves  archers  were  utterly  incompetent  to 
draw  the  bow.  The  established  rates  of  pay  varied  between 
a  hundred  dirhems  a  year  and  four  thousand,  and  persons  en- 
titled to  the  lowest  rate  often  received  an  amount  not  much 
short  of  the  highest.  ^^  The  evil  was  not  only  that  the  treasury 
was  robbed  by  unfair  claims  and  unfounded  pretences,  but 
that  artifice  and  false  seeming  were  encouraged,  while  at  the 
same  time  the  army  was  brought  into  such  a  condition  that 
no  dependence  could  be  placed  upon  it.  If  the  number  who 
actually  served  corresponded  to  that  upon  the  rolls,  which  is 
uncertain,^"  at  any  rate  all  the  superior  arms  of  the  service 
fell  below  their  nominal  strength,  and  the  lower  grades  were 
crowded  with  men  who  were  only  soldiers  in  name. 

As  a  remedy  against  these  evils,  Chosroes  appointed  a  single 
paymaster-general,  and  insisted  on  his  carefully  inspecting 
and  reviewing  each  body  of  troops  before  he  allowed  it  to  draw 


CH.  XXI.]  BADEK  AND   CEOSROES.  487 

its  pay. "  Each  man  was  to  appear  before  him  fully  equipped 
and  to  show  his  proficiency  with  his  weapon  or  weapons; 
horse  soldiers  were  to  bring  their  horses,  and  to  exhibit  their 
mastery  over  the  animals  by  putting  them  through  their  paces, 
mounting  and  dismounting,  and  performing  the  other  usual 
exercises.  If  any  clumsiness  were  noted,  or  any  deficiency  in 
the  equipment,  the  pay  was  to  be  withheld  until  the  defect 
observed  had  been  made  good.  Special  care  was  to  be  taken 
that  no  one  drew  the  pay  of  a  class  superior  to  that  whereto 
he  really  belonged— of  an  archer,  for  instance,  when  he  was  in 
truth  a  common  soldier,  or  of  a  trooper  when  he  served  not  in 
the  horse,  but  in  the  foot. 

A  curious  anecdote  is  related  in  connection  with  these 
military  reforms.  When  Babek,  the  new  paymaster,  was 
about  to  hold  his  first  review,  he  issued  an  order  that  all  per- 
sons belonging  to  the  army  then  present  in  the  capital  should 
appear  before  him  on  a  certain  day.  The  troops  came;  but 
Babek  dismissed  them  on  the  ground  that  a  certain  person 
whose  presence  was  indispensable  had  not  made  his  appear- 
ance. Another  day  was  appointed,  with  the  same  result,  ex- 
cept that  Babek  on  this  occasion  plainly  intimated  that  it  was 
the  king  whom  he  expected  to  attend.  Upon  this  Chosroes, 
when  a  third  summons  was  issued,  took  care  to  be  present, 
and  came  fully  equipped,  as  he  thought,  for  battle.  But  the 
critical  eye  of  the  reviewing  officer  detected  an  omission, 
which  he  refused  to  overlook — the  king  had  neglected  to  bring 
with  him  two  extra  bow-strings.  Chosroes  was  required  to  go 
back  to  his  palace  and  remedy  the  defect,  after  which  he 
was  allowed  to  pass  muster,  and  then  summoned  to  receive 
his  pay.  Babek  affected  to  consider  seriously  what  the  pay  of 
the  commander-in-chief  ought  to  be,  and  decided  that  it  ought 
to  exceed  that  of  any  other  person  in  the  army.  He  then,  in 
the  sight  of  all,  presented  the  king  with  four  thousand  and  one 
dirhems,  which  Chosroes  received  and  carried  home."  Thus 
two  important  principles  were  thought  to  be  established — that 
no  defect  of  equipment  whatsoever  should  be  overlooked  in 
any  officer,  however  high  his  rank,  and  that  none  should  draw 
from  the  treasury  a  larger  amount  of  pay  than  4,000  du-hems 
(112Z.  of  our  money). 

The  encouragement  of  agi'icidture  was  an  essential  element 
in  the  system  of  Zoroaster;""  and  Chosi-oes,  in  devoting  his  at- 
tention to  it,  was  at  ones  performing  a  religious  duty  and 
increasing  the  resources  of  the   state,      It  was  his  earnest 


488  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ca.  xxi. 

desire  to  bring  into  cultivation  all  the  soil  which  -was  capable 
of  it;  and  with  this  object  he  not  only  issued  edicts  command- 
ing the  reclamation  of  waste  lands,  but  advanced  from  the 
treasury  the  price  of  the  necessary  seed-corn,  implements,  and 
beasts  to  all  poor  persons  wilHng  to  carry  out  his  orders.'" 
Other  poor  persons,  especially  the  infirm  and  those  disabled  by 
bodily  defect,  were  relieved  from  his  privy  purse;  mendicancy 
was  forbidden,  and  idleness  made  an  offence, "  The  lands  for- 
feited by  the  followers  of  Mazdak  were  distributed  to  neces- 
sitous cultivators. '"  The  water  system  was  carefully  attended 
to ;  river  and  torrent  courses  were  cleared  of  obstructions  and 
straightened  ;'^  the  superfluous  water  of  the  rainy  season  was 
stored,  and  meted  out  with  a  wise  economy  to  those  who  tilled 
the  soil,  in  the  spring  and  summer.  '^ 

The  prosperity  of  a  country  depends  in  part  upon  the 
laborious  industry  of  the  inhabitants,  in  part  upon  their  num- 
bers. Chosroes  regarded  Persia  as  insufficiently  peopled,  and 
made  efforts  to  increase  the  population  by  encouraging  and 
indeed  compelling  marriage.'"  All  marriageable  females  were 
required  to  provide  themselves  with  husbands;  if  they  neg- 
lected this  duty,  the  government  interfered,  and  united  them 
to  unmarried  men  of  their  own  class.  The  pill  was  gilt  to 
these  latter  by  the  advance  of  a  sufficient  dowry  from  the  pub- 
lic treasury,  and  by  the  prospect  that,  if  children  resulted  from 
the  union,  their  education  and  estabhshment  in  life  would  be 
undertaken  by  the  state.  Another  method  of  increasing  the 
popvdation,  adopted  by  Chosroes  to  a  certain  extent,  was  the 
settlement  within  his  own  territories  of  the  captives  whom  he 
carried  off  from  foreign  countries  in  the  course  of  his  military 
expeditions.  The  most  notorious  instance  of  this  policy  was 
the  Greek  settlement,  known  as  Riunia  (Rome),  estabhshed  by 
Chosroes  after  his  capture  of  Antioch  (a.d.  540),  in  the  near 
vicinity  of  Ctesiphon.'" 

Oriental  monarchs,  in  many  respects  civilized  and  enhght- 
ened,  have  often  shown  a  narrow  and  unworthy  jealousy  of 
foreigners.  Chosroes  had  a  mind  which  soared  above  this 
petty  prejudice.  He  encouraged  the  visits  of  all  foreigners, 
excepting  only  the  barbarous  Turks, "  readily  received  them 
at  his  court,  and  carefully  provided  for  their  safety.  Not 
only  were  the  roads  and  bridges  kept  in  the  most  perfect 
order  throughout  his  territories,'*  so  as  to  facilitate  locomO' 
tion,  but  on  the  frontiers  and  along  the  chief  lines  of  route 
guard-houses  were  built    and  garrisons  maintained  for  the 


CH.  XXI.]         ENCOUBAGEMEIs^T  OF  LEARNING.  489 

express  purpose  of  securing  the  safety  of  travellers.'"  The 
result  was  that  the  court  of  Chosroes  was  visited  by  numbers 
of  Europeans,  who  were  hospitably  treated,  and  invited,  or 
even  pressed,  to  prolong  their  visits. 

To  the  proofs  of  wisdom  and  enlightenment  here  enumerated 
Chosroes  added  another,  which  is  more  surprising  than  any 
of  them.  He  studied  philosophy,  and  was  a  patron  of  science 
and  learning.  Very  early  in  his  reign  he  gave  a  refuge  at  his 
cowrt  to  a  body  of  seven  Greek  sages  whom  a  persecuting 
edict,  issued  by  Justinian,  had  induced  to  quit  their  country 
and  take  up  their  abode  on  Persian  soil."  Among  the  refu- 
gees was  the  erudite  Damascius,  whose  work  De  Pvincijyiis  is 
well  known,  and  has  recently  been  found  to  exhibit  an  inti- 
mate acquaintance  with  some  of  the  most  obscure  of  the 
Oriental  religions."'  Another  of  the  exiles  was  the  eclectic 
philosopher  Simplicius,  ' '  the  most  acute  and  judicious  of  the 
interpreters  of  Aristotle. "  "  Chosroes  gave  the  band  of  phi- 
losophers a  hospitable  reception,  entertained  them  at  bis 
table,  and  was  unwilling  that  they  should  leave  his  court." 
They  found  him  acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Aristotle  and 
Plato,  whose  works  he  had  caused  to  be  translated  into  the 
Persian  tongue."  If 'he  was  not  able  to  enter  very  deeply  into 
the  dialectical  and  metaphysical  subtleties  which  characterize 
alike  the  Platonic  Dialogues  and  the  Aristotelian  treatises,  at 
any  rate  he  was  ready  to  discuss  with  them  such  questions  as 
the  origin  of  the  world,  its  destructibihty  or  indestructibility, 
and  the  derivation  of  all  tilings  from  one  First  Cause  or  from 
more."^  Later  in  his  reign,  another  Greek,  a  sophist  named 
Uranius,  acquired  his  especial  favor,"  became  his  instructor 
in  the  learning  of  liis  countiy,  and  was  presented  by  him  witli 
a  large  sum  of  money.  Further,  Chosroes  maintained  at  hif 
court,  for  the  space  of  a  year,  the  Greek  physician,  Tribunus, 
and  offered  him  any  reward  that  he  pleased  at  his  departure." 
He  also  instituted  at  Gondi-Sapor,  in  the  vicinity  of  Susa,  a 
sort  of  medical  school,  which  became  by  degrees  a  university, 
wherein  philosophy,  rhetoric,  and  poetry  were  also  studied." 
Nor  was  it  Greek  learning  alone  which  attracted  his  notice 
and  his  patronage.  Under  his  fostering  care  the  history  and 
jurisprvidence  of  his  native  Persia  were  made  special  objects 
of  study;  the  laws  and  maxims  of  the  first  Artaxerxes,  the 
founder  of  the  monarchy,  were  called  forth  from  the  obscurity 
whicli  had  rested  on  them  for  ages,  were  republished  and  de^ 
^•l:v"ed  to  be  authoritative ; "  while  at  the  same  time  the  annals 


490  TUE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxi 

of  the  monarchy  were  collected  and  arranged,  and  a  "Shah- 
nameh,"  or  "  Book  of  the  Kings,"  composed,  which  it  is  proba- 
ble formed  the  basis  of  the  great  work  of  Firdausi. '"  Even 
the  distant  land  of  Hindustan  was  explored  in  the  search  after 
varied  knowledge,  and  contributed  to  the  learning  and  civili- 
zation of  the  time  the  fables  of  Bidpai''  and  the  game  of 
chess. " 

Though  a  fierce  persecutor  of  the  deluded  followers  of 
Mazdak,"  Chosroes  admitted  and  practised,  to  some  extent, 
the  principles  of  toleration.  On  becoming  king,  he  laid  it 
down  as  a  rule  of  his  government  that  the  actions  of  men 
alone,  and  not  their  thoughts,  were  subject  to  his  authority.  '* 
He  was  therefore  bound  not  to  persecute  opinion ;  and  we  may 
suppose  that  in  his  proceedings  against  the  Mazdakites  he 
intended  to  punish  their  crimes  rather  than  their  tenets. 
ToAvards  the  Christians,  who  abounded  in  his  em.pire,"  he 
certainly  showed  himself,  upon  the  whole,  mild  and  moderate. 
He  married  a  Christian  wife,  and  allowed  her  to  retain  her 
religion. '"  When  one  of  his  sons  became  a  Christian,  the  only 
punishment  which  he  inflicted  on  hitn  was  to  confine  him  to 
the  palace."  He  augumented  the  munber  of  the  Christians  in 
his  dominions  by  the  colonies  which  he  brought  in  from 
abroad.  He  allowed  to  his  Christian  subjects  the  free  exercise 
of  their  religion,  permitted  them  to  build  churches,  elect 
bishops,  and  conduct  services  at  their  pleasure,  and  even 
suffered  them  to  bury  their  dead,'*  though  such  pollution  of 
the  earth  was  accounted  sacrilegious  by  the  Zoroastrians.  No 
unworthy  compliances  with  the  estabhshed  cult  were  required 
of  them.  Proselytism,  however,  was  not  allowed;  and  all 
Christian  sects  were  perhaps  not  viewed  with  equal  favor. 
Chosroes,  at  any  rate,  is  accused  of  persecuting  the  Cathohcs 
and  the  Monophysites,  and  compelling  them  to  join  the  Nesto- 
rians,  who  formed  the  predominant  sect  in  his  dominions." 
Conformity,  however,  in  things  outward,  is  compatible  with 
a  wide  diversity  of  opinion ;  and  Chosroes,  while  he  disliked 
differences  of  practice,  seems  certainly  to  have  encouraged,  at 
least  in  his  earlier  years,  a  freedom  of  discussion  in  religious 
matters  which  must  have  tended  to  shake  the  hereditary  faith 
of  his  subjects.'"  He  also  gave  on  one  occasion  a  very  re- 
markable indication  of  liberal  and  tolerant  views.  When  he 
made  his  first  peace  with  Rome,"  the  article  on  which  he 
insisted  the  most  was  one  whereby  the  free  profession  of  their 
known  opinions  and  tenets  in  their  own  country  was  secured 


CH.  XXI]  TOLERATION.  ^  491 

to  the  seven  Grecian  sages  who  had  found  at  his  court,  in 
their  hour  of  need,  a  refuge  from  persecution." 

In  his  domestic  relations  Chosroes  was  unfortunate.  With 
his  chief  wife,  indeed,  the  daughter  of  the  great  Khan  of  the 
Turks,  he  seems  to  have  hved  always  on  excellent  terms ;  and 
it  was  his  love  for  her  which  induced  him  to  select  the  son 
whom  she  had  borne  liim  for  his  successor  on  the  throne. 
But  the  wife  who  stood  next  in  Ms  favor  displeased  him  by 
her  persistent  refusal  to  renounce  the  religion  of  Christ  and 
adopt  that  of  her  husband  in  its  stead;"  and  the  quarrel 
between  them  must  have  been  aggravated  by  the  conduct  of 
their  child,  Nushizad,  who,  when  he  came  to  years  of  dis- 
cretion, dehberately  preferred  the  faith  of  his  mother  to  that 
of  his  father  and  of  the  nation.  ''^  With  this  choice  Chosroes 
was  naturally  offended;  but  he  restrained  his  anger  within 
moderate  limits,  and  was  content  to  punish  the  young  prince 
by  forbidding  him  to  quit  the  precincts  of  the  palace. "  Un- 
happy results  followed.  Nusliizad  in  his  confinement  heard  a 
rumor  that  his  father,  who  had  started  for  the  Syrian  war, 
was  struck  with  sickness,  was  not  likely  to  recover,  was  dead. 
It  seemed  to  him  a  golden  opportunity,  of  which  he  would  be 
foolish  not  to  make  the  most.  He  accordingly  quitted  liis 
prison,  spread  the  report  of  his  father's  death,  seized  the  state 
treasure,  and  scatterrd  it  with  a  liberal  hand  among  the  troops 
left  in  the  capital,  summoned  the  Christians  throughout  the 
empire  to  his  aid,  assumed  the  title  and  state  of  king,  was 
acknowledged  by  the  whole  of  the  southern  province,  and 
thought  himself  strong  enough  to  take  the  offensive  and  at- 
tempt the  subjugation  of  Irak.""  Here,  however,  he  was  met 
by  Phabrizus"  (Firuz?),  one  of  his  father's  generals,  who  com- 
pletely defeated  his  army  in  a  pitched  battle.  According  to 
one  account,  Nushizad  fell  in  the  thick  of  the  fight,  mortally 
wouuded  by  a  chance  arrow. "'  According  to  another,  he  was 
made  prisoner,  and  carried  to  Chosroes,  who,  instead  of  punish- 
ing him  with  death,  destroyed  his  hopes  of  reigning  by  inflict- 
ing on  him  a  cruel  disfigurement.  "^ 

The  coins  of  Chosroes  are  verg  numerous,  and  offer  one  or 
two  novel  and  curious  types.  The  most  remarkable  have  on 
the  obverse  the  head  of  the  king,  presenting  the  full  face,  and 
surmounted  by  a  mural  crown  with  a  low  cap.""  The  beard  is 
close,  and  the  hair  arranged  in  masses  on  either  side.  There 
are  two  stars  above  the  crown,  and  two  crescents,  one  over 
either  shoulder,  with  a  star  and  crescent  on  the  dress  in  front 


492  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xxL 

of  each  shoulder.  The  kings  wears  a  necklace,  from  which 
hang  three  pendants.  On  the  reverse  these  coins  have  a  full- 
length  figure  of  the  king,  standing  to  the  front,  with  his  two 
hands  resting  on  the  hilt  of  his  straight  sword,  and  its  point 
placed  between  his  feet.  The  crown  worn  resembles  that  on 
the  obverse ;  and  there  is  a  star  and  crescent  on  either  side  of 
the  head.  The  legend  on  the  obverse  is  Khusludi  afzum, 
"  May  Chosroes  increase;"  the  reverse  has,  on  the  left  Khus- 
ludi, with  the  regnal  year;  on  the  right,  a  longer  legend  which 
has  not  yet  been  satisfactorily  interpreted.''    [PI.  XXII.,  Fig. 

3.] 

The  more  ordinary  type  on  the  coins  of  Chosroes  I.  is  one 
differing  but  little  from  those  of  his  father,  Kobad,  and  his  son, 
Hormazd  IV,  The  obverse  has  the  king's  head  in  profile,  and 
the  reverse  the  usual  fire-altar  and  supporters.  The  distin- 
guishing mark  of  these  coins  is,  in  addition  to  the  legend,  that 
they  have  three  simple  crescents  in  the  margin  of  the  obverse, 
instead  of  three  crescents  with  stars.     [PI.  XXII.,  Fig.  4.] 

A  relic  of  Chosroes  has  come  down  to  us,  which  is  of  great 
beauty.  This  is  a  cup  composed  of  a  number  of  small  disks  of 
colored  glass,  united  by  a  gold  setting,  and  having  at  the  bot- 
tom a  crystal,  engraved  with  a  figure  of  the  monarch.  As  late 
as  1638  it  was  believed  that  the  disks  of  glass  were  jacynths, 
garnets,  and  emeralds,  while  the  stone  which  forms  the  base  was 
thought  to  be  a  white  sapphire.  The  original  owner  of  so  rare 
a  drinking-vessel  could  (it  was  siipposed)  only  be  Solomon ; " 
and  the  figure  at  the  bottom  was  accordingly  supposed  to  re- 
present the  Jewish  king.  Archaeologists  are  now  agreed  that 
the  engraving  on  the  gem,  which  exactly  resembles  the  figure 
upon  the  peculiar  coins  above  described,  represents  Chosroes 
Anushirwan,  and  is  of  his  age."'  There  is  no  sufficient  reason 
to  doubt  but  that  the  cup  itself  is  one  out  of  which  he  was 
accustomed  to  drink. 

I  It  is  the  great  glory  of  Anushirwan  that  the  title  which  his 
subjects  gave  him  '^  was  "  the  Just."  According  to  European, 
and  especially  to  modern  ideas,  this  praise  would  seem  to  have 
imdesei'ved;  and  thus  the  great  historian  of  the  Byzantine 
period  has  not  scrupled  to  declare  that  in  his  external  pohcy 
Chosroes  was  actuated  by  mere  ambition,  and  that  "in  his 
domestic  administration  he  deserved  the  appellation  of  a 
tyrant.""  Undoubtedly  the  punishments  which  he  inflicted 
were  for  the  most  part  severe ;  but  they  were  not  capricious, 
nor  uniform,  nor  without  reference  to  the  character  of  the 


f 


CH.  XXI.]  CHARACTER   OF  CHOSROKS  L  493 

offence.  Plotting  against  his  crown  or  his  person,  when  the 
conspirators  were  of  full  age,  treasonable  correspondence  with 
the  enemy,  violation  of  the  sanctity  of  the  harem,  and  the 
proselytism  which  was  strictly  forbidden  by  the  laws,  he 
punished  with  death.'"  But,  when  the  rebel  was  a  mere  youth, 
he  was  content  to  inflict  a  disfigurement ; "  whence  the  offence 
was  less,  he  could  imprison,"  or  confine  to  a  particular  spot,'' 
or  simply  banish  the  culprit  from  his  presence.'"  Instances 
on  record  of  his  clemency  to  offenders,"  and  others  which 
show  that,  when  his  own  interests  were  at  stake,  he  steadily 
refused  to  make  use  of  his  unlimited  power  for  the  oppression 
of  individuals.*-  It  is  unlikely  that  Anushirwan  was  distin- 
guished as  "the  Just"  without  a  reason;  and  we  may  safely 
conclude  from  his  acknowledged  title  that  his  subjects  found 
his  rule  more  fair  and  equitable  than  that  of  any  previous 
monarch. 

That  the  administration  of  Chosroes  was  wise,  and  that  Per- 
sia prospered  under  his  government,  is  generally  admitted. 
His  vigilance,  his  activity,  liis  care  for  the  poor,  his  efforts  to 
prevent  or  check  oppression,  are  notorious,  and  cannot  be 
gainsaid.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted  that  he  was  brave,  hardy, 
temperate,  prudent,  and  Hberal.  Whether  he  possessed  the 
softer  virtues,  compassion,  kindliness,  a  tender  and  loving 
heart,  is  perhaps  open  to  question.  He  seems,  however,  to 
have  been  a  good  husband  and  a  good  father,  not  easily 
offended,  and  not  over-severe  whence  offence  was  given  him.'^ 
His  early  severities  '*  against  his  brothers  and  their  followers 
may  be  regarded  as  caused  by  the  advice  of  others,  and  per- 
haps as  justified  by  state  policy.  In  his  later  life,  when  he  was 
his  own  master,  he  was  content  to  chastise  rebeUion  more 
mildly. 

Intellectiially,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  Chosroes  rose 
very  high  above  the  ordinaiy  Oriental  level.  The  Persians, 
and  even  many  Greeks,  in  his  own  day,  exalted  him  above 
measure,  as  capable  of  apprehending  the  most  subtle  arguments 
aud  the  deepest  problems  of  philosophy ; "  but  the  estimate  of 
Agathias '"'  is  probably  more  just,  and  this  reduces  him  to  a 
standard  about  which  there  is  nothing  surprising.  It  is  to  his 
credit  that  although  engaged  in  almost  perpetual  wars,  and 
burdened  moreover  with  the  administration  of  a  mighty  em- 
pire, he  had  a  mind  large  enough  to  entertain  the  consideration 
also  of  intellectual  problems,  and  to  enjoy  and  take  part  in 
their  discussion ;  but  it  could  scarcely  be  expected  that,  v.-ith 


494  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [CH.  xxt 

his  numerous  other  employments,  he  should  really  sound  to 
their  utmost  depths  the  profundities  of  Greek  thought,  or 
understand  the  speculative  diflaculties  which  separated  the 
various  schools  one  from  another.  No  doubt  his  knowledge 
was  superficial,  and  there  may  have  been  ostentation  in  the 
parade  which  he  made  of  it ; "  but  we  must  not  deny  him  the 
praise  of  a  quick,  active  intellect,  and  a  width  of  view  rarely 
found  in  an  Oriental. 

It  was  not,  however,  in  the  field  of  speculative  thought,  but  in 
that  of  practical  effort,  that  Chosroes  chiefly  distinguished 
himself  and  gained  his  choicest  laurels.  The  excellence  of  his 
domestic  administration  has  been  already  noticed.  But,  great 
as  he  was  in  peace,  he  was  greater  in  war.  Engaged  for  nearly 
fifty  years  in  ahnost  uninterrupted  contests,  he  triumphed  in 
every  quarter,  and  scarcely  experienced  a  reverse.  Victorious 
over  the  Romans,  the  Abyssinians,  the  Ephthalites,  and  the 
Turks,  he  extended  the  Hmits  of  his  empire  on  aU  sides,  pacified 
the  discontented  Armenia,  crushed  internal  revolt,  frustrated 
the  most  threatening  combinations,  and  established  Persia  in  a 
position  which  she  had  scarcely  occupied  since  the  days  of 
Darius  Hystaspis.  Personally  engaged  in  above  a  score  of 
fights,  by  the  admission  of  his  enemies  he  was  never  defeated 
but  once ; ''  and  there  are  circumstances  which  make  it  pro- 
bable that  this  single  check  was  of  slight  importance. "'  The 
one  real  failure  that  can  be  laid  to  his  charge  was  in  another 
quarter,  and  involved  no  military,  but  only  a  political  blunder. 
In  recoiling  from  the  difficulties  of  the  Lazic  war,'"  Chosroes 
had  not  to  deplore  any  disgrace  to  his  arms,  but  simply  to 
acknowledge  that  he  had  misunderstood  the  temper  of  the 
Lazic  people.  In  depreciation  of  his  military  talents  it  may  be 
said  that  he  was  never  opposed  to  any  great  general.  With 
Belisarius  it  would  certainly  seem  that  he  never  actually 
crossed  swords;  but  Justinian  and  Maurice  (afterwards  em 
peror),  to  whom  he  was  opposed  in  his  later  years,  were  no 
contemptible  antagonists.  It  may  further  be  remarked  that 
the  collapse  of  Persia  in  her  struggle  with  Rome "'  as  soon  as 
Chosroes  was  in  his  grave  is  a  tolerably  decisive  indication 
that  she  owed  her  long  career  of  victory  under  his  guidance  to 
his  possession  of  uncommon  military  ability. 


CH.  xxiLJ  ACCESatON  OF  MORMiaDAS  IV,  495 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

Accession  of  Hormisdas  IV.  His  good  Government  in  the 
Earlier  Portion  of  his  Reign.  Invasion  of  Persia  by  the 
Romans  under  Maurice.  Defeats  of  Adarman  and  Tam- 
chosro.  Campaign  of  Johannes.  Campaigns  of  Philippicus 
and  Heraclius.  Tyranny  of  Hormisdas.  He  is  attacked 
by  the  Arabs,  Khazars,  and  Turks.  Bahram  defeats  the 
Turks.  His  Attack  on  Lazica.  He  suffers  a  Defeat.  Dis- 
grace of  Bahram.  Dethronement  of  Hormisdas  IV.  and 
Elevation  of  Chosroes  II.  Character  of  Hormisdas.  Coins 
of  Hormisdas. 

XoapoTjs  KaretTTpe^liaTO  piov,  SiaSoxov  'Op/xi'crSai'  tov  vlov,  avSpa  TJj  xaAeJrorrjTi  ttji/  narpwav 
virepriKovTiKOTa.  riitv  Tpdirajv  avoaioTrjTa  •  Tji/  yap  piaioi  t€  Kai  toO  wAetoi'o?  epaarrji;  aKope. 
(/■Tos. — Theophylact.  Simocatt.  iii.  16. 

At  the  death  of  Chosroes  the  crown  was  assumed  without 
dispute  or  difficulty  by' his  son,  Hormazd,  who  is  known  to  the 
Greek  and  Latin  writers  as  Hormisdas  IV.  Hormazd  was  the 
eldest,  or  perhaps  the  only,  son  borne  to  Chosroes  by  the 
Turkish  princess,  Fakim, '  who,  from  the  time  of  her  marriage, 
had  held  the  place  of  sultana,  or  principal  wife.  His  illustrious 
descent  on  both  sides,  added  to  the  express  appointment  of  his 
father,  caused  him  to  be  universally  accepted  as  king ;  and  we 
do  not  hear  that  even  his  half-brothers,  several  of  whom  were 
older  than  himself,'  put  forward  any  claims  in  opposition  to 
his,  or  caused  him  any  anxiety  or  trouble.  He  commenced  his 
reign  amid  the  universal  plaudits  and  acclamations  of  his  sub' 
jects,  whom  he  delighted  by  declaring  that  he  would  follow  in 
all  things  the  steps  of  his  father,  whose  wisdom  so  much  ex- 
ceeded his  own,  would  pursue  his  policy,  maintain  his  officers 
in  power,  and  endeavor  in  all  respects  to  govern  as  he  had 
governed. '  When  the  mobeds  attempted  to  persuade  him  to 
confine  his  favor  to  Zoroastrians  and  persecute  such  of  his  sub- 
jects as  were  Jews  or  Christians  he  rejected  their  advice  with 
the  remark"  that,  as  in  an  extensive  territory  there  were  sura 
to  be  varieties  of  soil,  so  it  was  fitting  that  a  great  empire 
should  embrace  men  of  various  opinions  and  manners.  In  his 
progresses  from  one  part  of  his  empire  to  another  he  allowed  of 


493  ?'^^  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxh! 

no  injury  being  done  to  the  lands  or  gardens  along  the  route, 
and  punished  severely  all  who  infringed  his  orders.  ^  Accord- 
ing to  some,"  his  good  dispositions  lasted  only  during  the  time 
that  he  enjoyed  the  counsel  and  support  of  Abu-zurd-mihir, 
one  of  the  best  advisers  of  his  father ;  but  when  this  venerated 
sage  was  compelled  by  the  infirmities  of  age  to  quit  his  court 
he  fell  under  other  influences,  and  soon  degenerated  into  the 
cruel  tyrant  which,  according  to  all  the  authorities, '  he  showed 
himself  in  his  later  years. 

Meanwhile,  however,  he  was  engaged  in  important  wars, 
particularly  with  the  Eoman  emperors  Tiberius  and  Maurice, 
who,  now  that  the  gi'eat  Chosroes  was  dead,  pressed  upon  Per- 
sia with  augmented  force,  in  the  confident  hope  of  recovering 
their  lost  laurels.  On  the  first  intelligence  of  the  great  king's 
death,  Tiberius  had  endeavored  to  negotiate  a  peace  with  his 
successor,  and  had  offered  to  relinquish  all  claim  on  Armenia, 
and  to  exchange  Arzanene  with  its  strong  fortress,  Aphumon, 
for  Daras;  but  Hormisdas  had  absolutely  rejected  his  pro- 
posals, declared  that  he  would  surrender  nothing,  and  dechned 
to  make  peace  on  any  other  terms  than  the  resumption  by 
Rome  of  her  old  system  of  paying  an  annual  subsidy.^  The 
war  consequently  continued ;  and  Maurice,  who  still  held  the 
command,  proceeded,  in  the  summer  of  a.d.  579,  to  take  the 
offensive  and  invade  the  Persian  territory.  He  sent  a  force 
across  the  Tigris  under  Romanus,  Theodoric,  and  Martin,  which 
ravaged  Kurdistan,  and  perhaps  penetrated  into  Media,  ^  no- 
where encountering  any  large  body  of  the  enemy,  but  cari'ying 
all  before  them  and  destroying  the  harvest  at  their  pleasure. 
In  the  next  year,  a.d.  580,  he  formed  a  more  ambitious  project. 
Having  gained  over,  as  he  thought,  Alamundarus,  the  leader 
of  the  Saracens  dependent  on  Persia,  and  collected  a  fleet  to 
carry  his  stores,  he  marched  from  Circesium  down  the  course  of 
the  Euphrates,  intending  to  carry  the  war  into  Southern  Meso- 
potamia,'"  and  perhaps  hoping  to  capture  Ctesiphon.  He  ex- 
pected to  take  the  Persians  unaAvares,  and  may  not  unnaturally 
have  looked  to  gam  an  important  success ;  but,  unhappily  for 
his  plans,  Alamundarus  proved  treacherous.  The  Persian  king 
was  informed  of  his  enemy's  march,  and  steps  were  at  once 
taken  to  render  it  abortive.  Adarman  was  sent,  at  the  head  of 
a  large  army,  into  Roman  Mesopotamia,  where  he  threatened 
the  important  city  of  Callinicus  in  Maurice's  rear.  That  general 
dared  advance  no  further.  On  the  contrary,  he  felt  constrained 
to  fall  back,  to  give  up  his  scheme,  burn  his  fleet,  and  return 


CH.  xxii.l  PEnstA  INVADED  BT  MAURICE.  497 

hastily  -within  the  Eoman  frontier.  On  his  arrival,  he  en- 
gaged Adarman  near  the  city  which  he  was  attacking,  defeated 
him,  and  drove  him  back  into  Persia." 

In  the  ensuing  spring,  after  another  vain  attempt  at  negoti- 
ation, "  the  offensive  was  taken  by  the  Persians,  who,  early  in 
A.D.  581,  crossed  the  frontier  under  Tam-chosro,  and  attacked 
the  Roman  city  of  Constantia,  or  Constantina.'^  Maurice 
hastened  to  its  relief ;  and  a  great  battle  was  fought  in  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  city,  wherein  the  Persians  were  com- 
pletely defeated,  and  their  commander  lost  his  hfe.'*  Further 
advantages  might  have  been  gained ;  but  the  prospect  of  the 
succession  drew  Maurice  to  Constantinople,  where  Tiberius, 
stricken  with  a  mortal  disease,  received  him  with  open  arms, 
gave  Ms  daughter  and  the  state  into  his  care,  and,  dying  soon 
after,  left  him  the  legacy  of  the  empire,  which  he  administered 
with  success  for  above  twenty  years.  '^ 

On  quitting  the  East,  Maurice  devolved  his  command  upon 
an  officer  who  bore  the  very  common  name  of  Johannes,  but 
was  distinguished  further  by  the  epithet  of  Mustacon,  on  ac- 
count of  his  abundant  moustache. "'  This  seems  to  have  been 
a  bad  appointment.  Mustacon  was  unequal  to  the  position. 
He  gave  the  Persians  battle  at  the  conjunction  of  the  Nymphius 
with  the  Tigris,  but  was  defeated  with  considerable  loss,  partly 
through  the  misconduct  of  one  of  his  captains.  He  then  laid 
siege  to  Arbas,"  a  strong  fort  on  the  Persian  side  of  the 
Nymphius,  while  the  main  body  of  the  Persians  were  attack- 
ing Aphumon  in  the  neighboring  district  of  Arzanene.  The 
garrison  of  Arbas  made  signals  of  distress,  Avhich  speedily 
brought  the  Persian  army  to  their  aid ;  a  second  battle  was 
fought  at  Ai-bas,  and  Mustacon  was  again  defeated,  and  forced 
to  retire  across  the  Njnnphius  into  Roman  territory.'"  His  in- 
capacity was  now  rendered  so  clearly  evident  that  Maurice 
recalled  him,  and  gave  the  command  of  the  army  of  the  East 
to  a  new  general,  Philippicus,  his  brother-in-law.  '•' 

The  first  and  second  campaigns  of  Philippicus,  in  the  years 
A.D.  584  and  585,  were  of  the  most  commonplace  character. 
He  avoided  any  general  engagement,  and  contended  himself 
with  plundering  inroads  into  the  Persian  territory  on  either 
side  of  the  Upper  Tigris,  occasionally  suffering  considerably 
from  want  of  water  and  provisions.'"  The  Persians  on  their 
part  undertook  no  operations  of  importance  until  late  in  A.D. 
5S5,  when  Philippicus  had  fallen  sick.  They  then  made  at- 
tempts upon  Monocartum  and  Martyropolis,  which  were  un- 


II 


498  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxtl 

successful,  resulting  only  in  the  burning  of  a  church  and  a 
monastery  near  the  latter  to\vn.^'  Neither  side  seemed  capable 
of  making  any  serious  impression  upon  the  other ;  and  early 
the  next  year  negotiations  were  resumed,"  which,  however, 
resulted  in  nothing. 

In  his  third  campaign  Philippicus  adopted  a  bolder  hne  of 
proceeding.  Commencing  by  an  invasion  of  Eastern  Mesopo- 
tamia, he  met  and  defeated  the  Persians  in  a  great  battle  near 
Solachon,"  having  first  roused  the  enthusiasm  of  his  troops  by 
carrying  along  their  ranks  a  miraculous  picture  of  our  Lord,^* 
which  no  hiunan  hand  had  painted.  Hanging  on  the  rear  of  the 
fugitives,  he  pursued  them  to  Daras,  which  declined  to  receive 
within  its  walls  an  army  that  had  so  disgraced  itself."  The 
Persian  commander  withdrew  his  troops  further  inland ;  and 
Philippicus,  believing  that  he  had  now  no  enemy  to  fear,  pro- 
ceeded to  invade  Arzanene,  to  besiege  the  stronghold  of  Chlo- 
rnaron,^"  and  at  the  same  time  to  throw  forward  troops  into  the 
more  eastern  parts  of  the  country.  He  expected  them  to  be  un- 
opposed ;  but  the  Persian  general,  having  rallied  his  force  and 
augmented  it  by  fresh  recruits,  had  returned  towards  the  fron- 
tier, and,  hearing  of  the  danger  of  Arzanene,  had  flown  to  its 
defence.  Philippicus  was  taken  by  surprise,  compelled  to  raise 
the  siege  of  Chlomaron,  and  to  fall  back  in  disorder.  The  Per- 
sians pressed  on  his  retreat,  crossed  the  Nymphius  after  him, 
and  did  not  desist  from  the  pursuit  until  the  imperial  general 
threw  himself  with  his  shattered  army  into  the  strong  fortress 
of  Amida."  Disgusted  and  discredited  by  his  ill-success, 
Philippicus  gave  over  the  active  prosecution  of  the  war  to 
Heraclius,  and,  remaining  at  head-quarters,  contented  himself 
with  a  general  supervision. 

Heraclius,  on  receiving  his  appointment,  is  said  to  have  at 
once  assumed  the  offensive,  and  to  have  led  an  army,  consist- 
ing chiefly  or  entirely  of  infantry,"**  into  Persian  territory, 
which  devastated  the  country  on  both  sides  of  the  Tigris,  and 
rejoined  Philippicus,  without  having  suffered  any  disaster, 
before  the  winter.  Philippicus  was  encouraged  by  the  success 
of  his  lieutenant  to  continue  him  in  command  for  another  year ; 
but,  through  prudence  or  jealousy,  he  was  induced  to  intrust 
a  portion  only  of  the  troops  to  his  care,  while  he  assigned  to 
others  the  supreme  authority  over  no  less  than  one  third  of  the 
Roman  army.  The  result  was,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
inglorious  for  Rome.  During  a.d.  587  the  two  divisions  acted 
separately  in  different  quarters ;  and,  at  the  end  of  the  year, 


Ctt.  xxii.j  CAMPAIGNS  OF  IIERACLIUS.  499 

neither  could  boast  of  any  greater  success  than  the  reduction, 
in  each  case,  of  a  single  fortress.-"  PhOippicus,  however,  seems 
to  have  been  satisfied ;  and  at  the  approach  of  winter  he  with- 
drew from  the  East  altogether,  leaving  Herachus  as  his  repre- 
sentative, and  returned  to  Constantinople, 

During  the  earlier  portion  of  the  year  a.d.  588  the  mutinous 
temper  of  the  Roman  army  rendered  it  impossible  that  any 
military  operations  should  be  undertaken.^"  Encouraged  by 
the  disorganization  of  their  enemies,  the  Persians  crossed  the 
frontier,  and  threatened  Constantina,  which  was  however 
saved  by  Germanus/'  Later  in  the  year,  the  mutinous  spirit 
having  been  quelled,  a  counter-expedition  was  made  by  the 
Romans  into  Arzanene.  Here  the  Persian  general,  Maruzas, 
met  them,  and  drove  them  from  the  province ;  but,  following 
up  his  success  too  ardently,  he  received  a  complete  defeat  near 
Martyropohs,  and  lost  his  Ufe  in  the  battle.  His  head  was 
cut  off  by  the  civilized  conquerors,  and  sent  as  a  trophy  to 
Maurice.  ''^ 

The  campaign  of  a.d.  589  was  opened  by  a  brilliant  stroke 
on  the  part  of  the  Persians,  who,  through  the  treachery  of  a 
certain  Sittas,  a  petty  officer  in  the  Roman  army,  made  them- 
selves masters  of  Martyropolis.  ^^  It  was  in  vain  that  Philip- 
picus  twice  besieged  the  place ;  he  was  unable  to  make  any 
impression  upon  it,  and  after  a  time  desisted  from  the  attempt. 
On  the  second  occasion  the  garrison  was  strongly  reinforced 
by  the  Persians  imder  Mebodes  and  Aphraates,  who,  after  de- 
feating Philippicus  in  a  pitched  battle,  threw  a  large  body  of 
troops  into  the  town.  Philippicus  was  upon  this  deprived  of 
his  office,  and  replaced  by  Comentiolus,  with  Heraclius  as  sec- 
ond in  command.  ^^  The  new  leaders,  instead  of  engaging  in 
the  tedious  work  of  a  siege,  determined  on  re-establishing  the 
Roman  prestige  by  a  bold  counter-attack.  They  invaded  the 
Persian  territory  in  force,  ravaged  the  country  about  Nisibis, 
and  brought  Aphraates  to  a  pitched  battle  at  Sisarbanon,  near 
that  city.  Victory  seemed  at  first  to  incline  to  the  Persians ; 
Comentiolus  was  defeated  and  fled ;  but  Heraclius  restored  the 
battle,  and  ended  by  defeating  the  whole  Persian  army,  and 
driving  it  from  the  field,  with  the  loss  of  its  commander,  who 
was  slain  in  the  thick  of  the  fight. "  The  next  day  the  Pei*sian 
camp  was  taken,  and  a  rich  booty  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
conquerors,'"  besides  a  number  of  standards.  The  remnant  of 
the  defeated  army  found  a  refuge  within  the  walls  of  Nisibis. 
Liiter  in  the  year  Comentiolus  recovered  to  some  extent  his 


500  I'llE  SEVENTH  MOXARCHT.  [ch.  xxU. 

tarnished  laurels  by  the  siege  and  capture  of  Arbas,"  whose 
strong  situation  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  ]\Iartyropolis  ren- 
dered the  position  of  the  Persian  garrison  in  that  city  insecure, 
if  not  absolutely  untenable. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  western  provinces  of 
the  Persian  Empire,  when  a  sudden  danger  arose  in  the  east, 
which  had  strange  and  most  important  consequences.   Accord- 
ing to  the  Oriental  writers,  Hormisdas  had  from  a  just  mon- 
arch gradually  become  a  tyrant ;  under  the  plea  of  protecting 
the  poor  had  grievously  oppi-essed  the  rich ;  through  jealousy 
or  fear  had  put  to  death  no  fewer  than  thirteen  thousand  of 
the  upper  classes,'' and  had  thus  completely  alienated  all  the 
more  powerful  part  of  the  nation.     Aware  of  his  unpopularity, 
the  surrounding  tribes  and  peoples  commenced  a  series  of  ag- 
gi-essions,  plundered  the  frontier  provinces,  defeated  the  de- 
tachments sent  against  them  imder  commanders  who  were 
disaffected,   and    everyw^here    brought    the    empke  into  the 
greatest    danger.      The  Arabs''  crossed  the    Euphrates    and 
spread  themselves  over  Mesopotamia;  the  Khazars  invaded 
Armenia  and  Azerbijan ;  rumor  said  that  the  Greek  emperor 
had  taken  the  field  and  was  advancing  on  the  side  of  Syria,  at 
the  head  of  80,000  men;'"  above  all,  it  was  quite  certain  that 
the  Great  Khan  of  the  Tm-ks  had  put  his  hordes  in  motion,  had 
passed  the  Oxus  with  a  countless  host,"  occupied  Balkh  and 
Herat,  and  was  threatening  to  penetrate  into  the  very  heart  of 
Persia.     The  perilous  character  of  the  crisis  is  perhaps  exag- 
gerated;'' but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  advance  of  the 
Turks  constituted  a  real  danger.     Hormisdas,  however,  did  not 
even  now  quit  the  capital,  or  adventure  his  own  person.     He 
selected  from  among  his  generals  a  certain  Varahran  or  Bah- 
ram, "  a  leader  of  great  courage  and  experience,  who  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  in  the  wars  of  Anushirwan, "'  and,  placing 
all  the  resources  of  the  empire  at  his  disposal,  assigned  to  him 
the  entire  conduct  of  the  Turkish  struggle.     Bahram  is  said  to 
have  contented  himself  with  a  small  force  of  picked  men," 
veterans  between    forty  and  fifty  years    of    age,"  to  have 
marched  with  them  upon  Balkh,  contended  with  the  Great 
Khan  in  several  partial  engagements,''  and  at  last  entirely  de- 
feated him  in  a  great  battle,  wherein  the  Khan  lost  his  life.** 
This  victory  was  soon  followed  by  another  over  the  Khan's 
son,  who  was  made  prisoner  and  sent  to  Honnisdas."    An 
enormous  booty  was  at  the    same  time  despatched  to  the 
court  ;^°  and  Bahram  himself  was  about  to  return,  when  h« 


CH.  xxii.]  SORMISD  AS  INSULTS  B  Ann  A  }f.  Jyoi 

received  his  master's  orders  to  cany  his  arms  into  another 
quarter. 

It  is  supposed  by  some  that,  while  the  Turkish  hordes  were 
menacing  Persia  upon  the  north-east,  a  Roman  army,  intended 
to  act  in  concert  with  them,"  was  sent  by  Maujice  into  Al- 
bania, which  proceeded  to  threaten  the  common  enemy  in  the 
north-west.  But  the  Byzantine  writers  know  of  no  alliance  at 
this  time  between  the  Romans  and  Turks;  nor  do  they  tell  of 
any  offensive  movement  undei-taken  by  Rome  in  aid  of  the 
Turkish  invasion,  or  even  simultaneously  with  it.  According 
to  them,  the  war  in  this  quarter,  which  certainly  broke  out  in 
A.D.  589,  was  provoked  by  Honnisdas  himself,  who,  imme- 
diately after  his  Turkish  victories,  sent  Bahram  Avith  an  army 
to  invade  Colchis  and  Suania, '"-  or  in  other  words  to  resume  the 
Lazic  war,  from  which  Anushirwan  had  desisted"'  twenty-seven 
years  previously.  Bahram  found  the  province  unguarded,  and 
was  able  to  ravage  it  at  his  will ;  but  a  Roman  force  soon  gath- 
ered to  its  defence,  and  after  some  manoeuvres  a  pitched  battle 
was  fought  on  the  Araxes,  in  which  the  Persian  general  suf- 
fered a  defeat.  "*  The  military  results  of  the  check  were  insig- 
nificant ;  but  it  led  to  an  internal  revolution.  Hormisdas  had 
grown  jealous  of  his  too  successful  lieutenant,  and  was  glad  of 
an  opportunity  to  insult  him. "  No  sooner  did  he  hear  of  Bah 
ram's  defeat  than  he  sent  off  a  messenger  to  the  camp  upon 
the  Araxes,  who  deprived  the  general  of  his  command,  and 
presented  to  him,  on  the  part  of  his  master,  a  distaff,  some 
cotton,  and  a  complete  set  of  women's  garments.  '"^  Stung  to 
madness  by  the  undeserved  insult,  Bahram  retorted  with  a 
letter,  wherein  he  addressed  Hormisdas,  not  as  the  son,  but  as 
the  daughter  of  Chosroes."  Shortly  afterwards,  upon  the  ar- 
rival of  a  second  messenger  from  the  coui-t,  with  orders  to 
bring  the  recalcitrant  commander  home  in  chains,  Bahram 
openly  revolted,  caused  the  envoy  to  be  trampled  upon  by  an 
elephant, "  and  either  by  simply  putting  before  the  soldiers  his 
services  and  his  wrongs,  ^^  or  by  misrepresenting  to  them  the 
intentions  of  Hoi'misdas  towards  themselves,  induced  his  wholo 
army  with  one  accord  to  embrace  his  cause. 

The  news  of  the  great  general's  revolt  was  received  with  accla- 
mations by  the  provinces.  The  army  of  Mesopotamia,  collected 
at  Nisibis,  made  common  cause  with  that  of  Albania:  and  the 
united  force,  advancing  on  the  capital  by  way  of  Assyria,  took 
'up  a  position  upon  the  Upper  Zab  river. ""  Hoi-misdas  sent  a 
general,  Pherochanes,  to  meet  and  engage  the  rebels;  but  the 


502  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHt.  [ch.  xxii 

emissaries  of  Bahram  seduced  his  troops  from  their  allegiance : 
Pherochanes  was  murdered;"  and  the  insurgent  army,  aug- 
mented by  the  force  sent  to  oppose  it,  drew  daily  nearer  to 
Ctesiphon.  Meanwhile  Hormisdas,  distracted  between  hate 
and  fear,  suspecting  every  one,  trusting  no  one,  confined  him- 
self within  the  walls  of  the  capital,  where  he  continued  to  ex- 
ercise the  severities  which  had  lost  him  the  affections  of  his 
subjects.  According  to  some,  he  suspected  his  son,  Chosroes, 
of  collusion  with  the  enemy,  and  drove  him  into  banishment, " 
imprisoning  at  the  same  time  his  own  brothers  in-law,  Bindoes 
and  Bostam,  '^  who  would  be  likely,  he  thought,  to  give  their 
support  to  their  nephew.  These  violent  measures  precipitated 
the  evils  which  he  feared;  a  general  revolt  broke  out  in  the 
palace ;  Bostam  and  Bindoes,  released  from  prison,  put  them- 
selves at  the  head  of  the  malcontents,  and,  rushing  into  the 
presence-chamber,  dragged  the  tyrant  from  his  throne,  strip- 
ped him  of  the  diadem,  and  committed  him  to  the  dungeon 
from  which  they  had  themselves  escaped.  The  Byzantine  his- 
torians believed  '^''  that,  after  this,  Hormisdas  was  permitted  to 
plead  his  cause  before  an  assembly  of  Persian  nobles,  to  glorify 
his  own  reign,  vituperate  his  eldest  son,  Chosroes,  and  express 
his  willingness  to  abdicate  in  favor  of  another  son,  who  had  never 
offended  him.  They  supposed  that  this  ill-judged  oration  had 
sealed  the  fate  of  the  youth  recommended  and  of  his  mother, 
who  were  cut  to  pieces  before  the  fallen  monarch's  eyes,  whUe 
at  the  same  time  the  rage  of  the  assembly  was  vented  in  part 
upon  Hormisdas  himself,  who  was  blinded,  to  make  his  re- 
storation impossible.  But  a  judicious  critic  wOl  doubt  the 
likelihood  of  rebels,  committed  as  were  Bindoes  and  Bostam, 
consenting  to  allow  such  an  appeal  as  is  described  by  Theo- 
phylact ;  and  a  perusal  of  the  speeches  assigned  to  the  occasion 
will  certainly  not  diminish  his  scepticism."^  The  probability 
w^ould  seem  to  be  that  Hormisdas  was  blinded  as  soon  as  com- 
mitted to  prison,  and  that  shortly  afterwards  he  suffered  the 
general  fate  of  deposed  sovereigns,  being  assassinated  in  his 
place  of  confinement. "" 

The  deposition  of  Hormisdas  was  followed  almost  immedia- 
tely by  the  proclamation  of  his  eldest  son,  Chosroes,  the  prince 
known  in  history  as  "  Eberwiz"  or  "  Parviz, "  the  last  great 
Persian  monarch.  The  rebels  at  Ctesiphon  had  perhaps  acted 
from  first  to  last  with  his  cognizance :  at  any  rate,  they  cal- 
culated on  his  pardoning  proceedings  which  had  given  him 
actual  possession  of  a  throne  whereto,  without  their  aid,  ho 


CH.  XXII.]  COINS  OF  HORMTSDAS  IV.  503 

might  nevex'  have  succeeded.  They  accordingly  declared  him 
king  of  Persia  without  binding  him  by  conditions,  and  without 
negotiating  with  Bahrum,  who  was  still  in  arms  and  at  no 
great  distance. 

Before  passing  to  the  consideration  of  the  eventful  reign  with 
which  we  shall  now  have  to  occupy  ourselves,  a  glance  at  the 
personal  character  of  the  deceased  monarch  will  perhaps  be 
expected  by  the  reader.  Hormuzd  is  pronounced  by  the  con- 
current voice  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Orientals  one  of  the  worst 
princes  that  ever  ruled  over  Persia. "  The  fair  promise  of  his 
early  years  was  quickly  clouded  over ;  and  during  the  greater 
portion  of  his  reign  he  was  a  jealous  and  capricious  tyrant,  in- 
fluenced by  unworthy  favorites,  and  stimulated  to  ever-in- 
creasing severities  by  his  fears.  Eminence  of  whatsoever  kind 
roused  his  suspicions ;  and  among  his  victims  were  inchided, 
besides  the  noble  and  the  great,  a  large  number  of  philosophers 
and  men  of  science. ""  His  treatment  of  Bahram  was  at  once  a 
folly  and  a  crime — an  act  of  black  ingratitude,  and  a  rash  step, 
whereof  he  had  not  counted  the  consequences.  To  his  other 
vices  he  added  those  of  indolence  and  effeminacy.  From  the 
time  that  he  became  king  nothing  could  drag  him  from  the 
soft  life  of  the  palace ;  'in  no  single  instance  did  he  take  the 
field,  either  against  his  country's  enemies  or  his  own.  Miser- 
able as  was  his  end,  we  can  scarcely  deem  him  worthy  of  our 
pity,  since  there  never  lived  a  man  whose  misfortunes  were 
more  truly  brought  on  him  by  his  own  conduct. 

The  coins  of  Hormisdas  IV.  are  in  no  respect  remarkable. 
The  head  seems  modelled  on  that  of  Chosroes.  his  father,  but  is 
younger.  The  field  of  the  coin  within  the  border  is  somewhat 
unduly  crowded  with  stars  and  crescents.  Stars  and  crescents 
also  occur  outside  the  border,  replacing  the  simple  crescents  of 
Chosroes, "  and  reproducing  the  combined  stars  and  crescents 
of  Zamasp."  The  legend  on  the  obverse  is  AnhramazcK  afzud, 
or  sometimes  Auhramazi  afzun;''^  on  the  reverse  are  com- 
monly found,  besides  the  usual  fire-altar  and  supporters,  a 
regnal  year  and  a  mint-mark.  The  regnal  years  range  from 
one  to  thirteen;''  the  number  of  the  mint-marks  is  about 
thirty/'    [PI.  XXIII.,  Fig.  1.] 


504  T^^  SEVENTH  MONAliCUY.  [ch.  xxiii. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Accession  of  Chosroes  II.  (Ebenviz).  Bohr  am  rejects  his 
Terms.  Contest  betiveen  Chosroes  and  Bahrain.  Flight 
of  Chosroes.  Short  Reign  of  Bahram  {Vo.rahran  VI.). 
Campaign  of  a.d.  591.  Recovery  of  the  Throne  by  Chos- 
roes.    Coins  of  Bahram. 

'KyKa0i.(rTui(ri,v  [oi  Ileptrai]  /SatrtAea  XotrpoTji'  .   .   .   KaO'  ov  pipatioi  eTricTpaTeiiet  /xera  twi' 
d/xc/)  avTov. — Evagr.  Hist.  Eccles.  vi.  17. 

The  position  of  Chosroes  II.  on  his  accession  was  one  of  great 
difficulty.  Whether  actually  guilty  of  parricide  or  not, '  he  was 
at  any  rate  suspected  by  the  greater  part  of  his  subjects  of 
comiDlicity  in  his  father's  murder.  A  rebel,  who  was  the 
greatest  Persian  general  of  the  time,  at  the  head  of  a  veteran 
army,  stood  arrayed  against  his  avithority.  He  had  no  estab- 
lished character  to  fall  back  upon,  no  merits  to  plead,  nothing 
in  fact  to  urge  on  his  behalf  but  that  he  was  the  eldest  son  of 
his  father,  the  legitimate  representative  of  the  ancient  line  of 
the  Sassanidae.  A  revolution  had  placed  him  on  the  throne  in  a 
hasty  and  irregular  manner ;  nor  is  it  clear  that  he  had  ventured 
on  the  usual  formality  of  asking  the  consent  of  the  general 
assembly  of  the  nobles  to  his  coronation.^  Thus  perils  sur- 
rounded him  on  every  side ;  but  the  most  pressing  danger  of 
all,  that  which  required  to  be  immediately  met  and  confronted, 
was  the  threatening  attitude  of  Bahram,  who  had  advanced 
from  Adiabene  to  Holwan,^  and  occupied  a  strong  position  not 
a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  the  capital.  Unless  Bahram 
could  be  conciliated  or  defeated,  the  young  king  could  not  hope 
to  maintain  hunself  in  power,  or  feel  that  he  had  any  firm 
grasp  of  the  sceptre. 

Under  these  circumstances  he  took  the  resolution  to  try  firat 
the  method  of  conciliation.  There  seemed  to  be  a  fair  opening 
for  such  a  course.  It  was  not  he,  but  his  father,  who  had  given 
the  ofi:ence  which  drove  Bahram  into  rebellion,  and  almost 
forced  him  to  vindicate  his  manhood  by  challenging  his  de- 
tractor to  a  trial  of  strength.  Bahram  could  have  no  personal 
ground  of  quarrel  with  him.  Indeed  that  general  had  at  the 
first,  if  we  may  believe  the  Oriental  writers,  ^  proclaimed  Chos- 


CH.  xxiii.J     CHOSROES  II.    TREATS  WITH  BAHRAM.         505 

roes  as  king,  and  given  out  that  he  took  up  arms  in  order  to 
place  him  upon  the  throne.  It  was  thought,  moreover,  that 
the  rebel  might  feel  himself  sufficiently  avenged  by  the  death 
of  his  enemy,  and  might  be  favorably  disposed  towards  those 
who  had  first  blinded  Hormisdas  and  then  despatched  him  by 
the  bowstring. "  Chosroes  therefore  composed  a  letter  in  which 
he  invited  Bahrain  to  his  court,  and  offered  him  the  second 
place  in  the  kingdom,  if  he  would  come  in  and  make  his  sub 
mission.  The  message  was  accompanied  by  rich  presents,  and 
by  an  offer  that  if  the  terms  proposed  were  accepted  they 
should  be  confirmed  by  oath." 

The  reply  of  Bahrani  was  as  follows:  "  Bahram,  friend  of; 
the  gods,  conqueror,  illustrious,  enemy  of  tyrants,  satrap  of 
satraps,  general  of  the  Persian  host,  wise,  apt  for  command, 
god-fearing,  without  reproach,  noble,  fortunate,  successful,  ven- 
erable, thrifty,  provident,  gentle,  humane,  to  Chosroes  the  son 
of  Hormisdas  (sends  greeting).  I  have  received  the  letter 
which  you  wrote  with  such  little  wisdom,  but  have  rejected 
the  presents  which  you  sent  with  such  excessive  boldness.  It 
had  been  better  that  you  should  have  abstained  from  sending 
either,  more  especially  considering  the  irregularity  of  your 
appointment,  and  the  fact  that  the  noble  and  respectable  took 
no  part  in  the  vote,  which  was  carried  by  the  disorderly  and 
low-born.  If  then  it  is  your  wish  to  escape  your  father's  fate, 
strip  off  the  diadem  which  you  have  assumed  and  deposit  it  in 
some  holy  place,  quit  the  palace,  and  restore  to  their  prisons  the 
criminals  whom  you  have  set  at  Hberty,''  and  whom  you  had 
no  right  to  release  vmtil  they  had  undergone  trial  for  their 
crimes.  When  you  have  done  all  this,  come  hither,  and  I  will 
give  you  the  government  of  a  province.  Be  well  advised,  and 
so  farewell.  Else,  be  sure  you  will  perish  like  your  father." 
So  insolent  a  missive  might  well  have  provoked  the  yoimg 
prince  to  some  hasty  act  or  some  unworthy  shoAv  of  temper. 
It  is  to  the  credit  of  Chosroes  that  he  restrained  himself,  and 
even  made  another  attempt  to  terminate  the  quarrel  by  a  rec- 
onciliation. While  striving  to  outdo  Bahram  in  the  grandeur 
of  his  titles,*  he  still  addressed  him  as  his  friend.  He  compli- 
mented him  on  his  courage,  and  felicitated  him  on  his  excel- 
lent health.  "  There  were  certain  expressions,"  he  said,  "  in  the 
letter  that  he  had  received,  which  he  was  sure  did  not  speak 
his  friend's  real  feelings.  The  amanuensis  had  evidently  drunk 
more  wine  than  he  ought,  and,  being  half  asleep  when  ho 
wrote,  had  put  down  things  that  were  foolish  and  indeed  mou- 


506  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxiil 

strous.  But  he  was  not  disturbed  by  them.  He  must  dechne, 
however,  to  send  back  to  their  prisons  those  whom  he  had  rs' 
leased,  since  favors  granted  by  royalty  could  not  with  pro- 
priety be  withdrawn;  and  he  must  protest  that  in  the  cere- 
mony of  his  coronation  all  due  formahties  had  been  observed. 
As  for  stripping  himself  of  his  diadem,  he  was  so  far  from 
contemplating  it  that  he  looked  forward  rather  to  extending 
his  dominion  over  new  worlds.  As  Bahram  had  invited  him, 
he  would  certainly  pay  him  a  visit;  but  he  would  be  obhged  to 
come  as  a  king,  and  if  his  persuasions  did  not  produce  submis- 
sion he  would  have  to  compel  it  by  force  of  arms.  He  hoped 
that  Bahram  would  be  wise  in  time,  and  would  consent  to  be 
his  friend  and  helper." 

This  second  overture  produced  no  reply;  and  it  became  tol- 
erably evident  that  the  quarrel  could  only  be  decided  by  the 
arbitrament  of  battle.  Chosroes  accordingly  put  himself  at 
the  head  of  such  troops  as  he  could  collect,'  and  marched 
against  his  antagonist,  whom  he  found  encamped  on  the  Hol- 
wan  River. '"  The  place  was  favorable  for  an  engagement ;  but 
Chosroes  had  no  confidence  in  his  soldiers.  He  sought  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  Bahram,  and  renewed  his  offers  of  par- 
don  and  favor ;  but  the  conference  only  led  to  mutual  recrimi- 
nations," and  at  its  close  both  sides  appealed  to  arms.  During 
six  days  the  two  armies  merely  skirmished,  since  Chosroes 
bent  all  his  efforts  towards  avoiding  a  general  engagement; 
but  on  the  seventh  day  Bahram  surprised  him  by  an  attack 
after  night  had  fallen,"  threw  his  troops  into  confusion,  and 
then,  by  a  skilful  appeal  to  theu-  feelings,  induced  them  to 
desert  their  leader  and  come  over  to  his  side.  Chosroes  was 
forced  to  fly.  He  fell  back  on  Ctesiphon;'=  but  despairing  of 
making  a  successful  defence,  with  the  few  troops  that  remained 
faithful  to  him,  against  the  overwhelming  force  which  Bahram 
had  at  his  disposal,  he  resolved  to  evacuate  the  capital,  to  quit 
Persia,  and  to  throw  himself  on  the  generosity  of  some  one  of 
his  neighbors.  It  is  said  that  his  choice  was  long  imdeter- 
mined  between  the  Turks,  the  Arabs,  the  Khazars  of  the  Cau- 
casian region,  and  the  Romans.  '*  According  to  some  writers, 
after  leaving  Ctesiphon,  with  his  wives  and  children,  his  two 
uncles,  and  an  escort  of  thirty  men,''  he  laid  his  reins  on  his 
horse's  neck,  and  left  it  to  the  instinct  of  the  animal  to  deter- 
mine in  what  direction  he  should  flee.'"  The  sagacious  beast 
took  the  way  to  the  Euphrates;  and  Chosroes,  finding  him- 
self on  its   banks,  crossed  the  river,  and,  following   up  its 


CH.  XXIII.]         MAURICE  PROTECTS  CnOSROES.  507 

course,"  reached  with  much  diflBculty  the  well-known  Roman 
station  of  Circesium,  '*  He  was  not  immolested  in  his  retreat. 
Bahram  no  sooner  heard  of  his  flight  than  he  sent  off  a  body 
of  4000  horse,  with  orders  to  pursue  and  capture  the  fugitive. '" 
They  would  have  succeeded,  had  not  Bindoes  devoted  himself 
on  behalf  of  his  nephew,  and,  by  tiicking  the  oflBcer  in  com- 
mand, ^^  enabled  Chosroes  to  place  such  a  distance  between 
himself  and  his  pursuers  that  the  chase  had  to  be  given  up, 
and  the  detachment  to  return,  with  no  more  valuable  captm-e 
than  Bindoes,  to  Ctesiphon. 

Chosroes  was  received  with  all  honor  by  Probus,  the  gov- 
ernor of  Circesium,"'  who  the  next  day  communicatt*d  intelli- 
gence of  what  had  happened  to  Comentiolus,  Prefect  of  the 
East,  then  resident  at  Hierapolis.  At  the  same  time  he  sent 
to  Comentiolus  a  letter  which  Chosroes  had  addressed  to  Mau- 
rice, imploring  his  aid  against  his  enemies.  Comentiolus  ap- 
proved what  had  been  done,  despatched  a  coui'ier  to  bear  the 
royal  missive  to  Constantinople,  and  shortly  afterwards,  by 
the  direction  of  the  court,  invited  the  illustrious  refugee  to 
remove  to  Hierapohs,"  and  there  take  up  his  abode,  till  his 
cause  should  be  determined  by  the  emperor.  Meanwhile,  at 
Constantinople,  after  the  letter  of  Chosroes  had  been  read,  a 
serious  debate  arose  as  to  what  was  fittest  to  be  done."  While 
some  urged  with  much  show  of  reason  that  it  Avas  for  the  in- 
terest of  the  empire  that  the  civil  war  should  be  prolonged, 
that  Persia  should  be  allowed  to  waste  her  strength  and  ex- 
haust her  resources  in  the  contest,  at  the  end  of  which  it  would 
be  easy  to  conquer  her,  there  were  others  whose  views  were 
less  selfish  or  more  far-sighted.  The  prospect  of  uniting  the 
East  and  West  into  a  single  monarchy,  which  had  been  brought 
to  the  test  of  experiment  by  Alexander  and  had  failed,  did  not 
present  itself  in  a  very  tempting  light  to  these  minds.  They 
doubted  the  abOity  of  the  declining  empire  to  sway  at  once 
the  sceptre  of  Europe  and  of  Asia.  They  feared  that  if  the 
appeal  of  Chosroes  were  rejected,  the  East  would  simply  fall 
into  anarchy,  and  the  way  would  perhaps  be  prepared  for 
some  new  power  to  rise  up,  more  formidable  than  the  kingdom 
of  the  Sassanidse.  The  inclination  of  Maurice,  who  liked  to 
think  himself  magnanimous,''^  coincided  with  the  views  of 
these  persons:  their  counsels  w^ere  accepted;  and  the  reply 
was  made  to  Chosroes  that  the  Roman  emperor  accepted  him 
as  his  guest  and  .swi,""' undertook  his  quarrel,  and  would  aid 
him  with  all  the  forces  of  the  empire  to  recover  his  throne.  At 


508  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxiii. 

the  same  time  Maurice  sent  him  some  magnificent  presents,'* 
and  releasing  the  Persian  prisoners  in  confinement  at  Constant 
tinople,"  bade  them  accompany  the  envoys  of  Chosroes  and 
resume  the  service  of  their  master.  Soon  afterwards  more 
substantial  tokens  of  the  Imperial  friendship  made  their  ap- 
pearance. An  army  of  70,000  men''  arrived  under  Narses;  and 
a  subsidy  was  advanced  by  the  Imperial  treasury,  amounting 
(according  to  one  writer) ''^  to  about  two  milhons  sterling. 

But  this  valuable  support  to  his  cause  was  no  free  gift  of  a 
generous  friend ;  on  the  contrary,  it  had  to  be  purchased  by 
great  sacrifices.  Chosroes  had  perhaps  at  first  hoped  that  aid 
would  be  given  him  gratuitously,  and  had  even  regarded  the 
cession  of  a  single  city  as  one  that  he  might  avoid  making.'" 
But  he  learnt  by  degrees  that  nothing  was  to  be  got  from 
Rome  without  paying  for  it ;  and  it  was  only  by  ceding  Persar- 
menia  and  Eastern  Mesopotamia,  with  its  strong  towns  of 
MartyropoHs  and  Daras,"  that  he  obtained  the  men  and  money 
that  were  requisite. 

Meanwhile  Bahram,  having  occupied  Ctesiphon,  had  pro- 
claimed himself  king,='=  and  sent  out  messengers  on  all  sides  to 
acquaint  the  provinces  with  the  change  of  rulers.     The  news 
was  received  without  enthusiasm,  but  with  a  general  acquies- 
cence ;  and,  had  Maurice  rejected  the  application  of  Chosroes, 
it  is  probable  that  the  usurper  might  have  enjoyed  a  long  and 
quiet  reign.     As  soon,  however,  as  it  came  to  be  known  that 
the  Greek  emperor  had  espoused  the  cause  of  his  rival,  Bahram 
found  himself  in  difficulties :  conspii-acy  arose  in  his  own  court, 
and  had  to  be  suppressed  by  executions;'' murmurs  were  heard 
in  some  of  the  more  distant  provinces;  Armenia  openly  re- 
volted and  declared  for  Chosroes;''  and  it  soon  appeared  that 
in  places  the  fidehty  of  the  Persian  troops  was  doubtful.     This 
was  especially  the  case  in  Mesopotamia,''^  which  would  have  to 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  attack  when  the  Eomans  advanced. 
Bahram  therefore  thought  it  necessary,  though  it  was  now  the 
depth  of  winter,  to  strengthen  his  hold  on  the  wavering  prov- 
ince, and  sent  out  two  detachments,  under  commanders  upon 
whom  he  could  rely,  to  occupy  respectively  Anatho  and  Nisi- 
bis,  the  two  strongholds  of  greatest  importance  in  the  suspected 
region.     Mir-aduris  succeeded  in  entering  and  occupying  Ana- 
tho. "    Zadesprates  was  less  fortunate ;  before  he  reached  the 
neighborhood  of  Nisibis,   the  garrison  which  held  that  pjace 
had  deserted  the  cause  of  the  usurper  and  given  in  its  adhe- 
^ipn  to  Chosroes ;  and,  when  he  approached  to  reconnoitre,  h^ 


CH.  xxin.l  BAHRAM  IN  DIFFICULTIES.  509 

■was  made  the  victim  of  a  stratagem  and  killed  by  an  officer 
named  Rosas."  Mir-aduris  did  not  long  survive  him;  the 
troops  which  he  had  introduced  into  Anatho  caught  the  con- 
tagion of  revolt,  rose  up  against  him,  slew  him,  and  sent  his 
head  to  Chosroes."* 

The  spring  was  now  approaching,'"  and  the  time  for  mili- 
tary operations  on  a  grand  scale  drew  near.  Chosroes,  be- 
sides his  supporters  in  Mesopotamia,  Roman  and  Persian,  had 
a  second  army  in  Azerbijan,  raised  by  his  uncles  Bindoes  and 
Bostam,^"  which  Avas  strengthened  by  an  Armenian  contin- 
gent.*' The  plan  of  campaign  involved  the  co-operation  of 
these  two  forces.  With  this  object  Chosroes  proceeded  early 
in  the  spring,  from  Hierapolis  to  Constantina,*-  from  Constan- 
tina  to  Daras,"  and  thence  by  way  of  Ammodion"  to  the 
Tigris,  across  which  he  sent  a  detachment,  probably  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Mosul.  This  force  fell  in  with  Bryzacius, 
who  commanded  in  these  parts  for  Bahram,  and  surprising 
him  in  the  first  watch  of  the  night,  defeated  his  army  and 
took  Bryzacius  himseK  prisoner.  The  sequel,  which  Theophy- 
lact  appears  to  relate  from  the  information  of  an  eye-witness, 
furnishes  a  remarkable  evidence  of  the  barbarity  of  the  times. 
Those  who  captured  Bryzacius  cut  off  his  nose  and  his  ears, 
and  in  this  condition  sent  him  to  Chosroes.  The  Persian 
prince  was  overjoyed  at  the  success,  which  no  doubt  he  ac- 
cepted as  a  good  omen ;  he  at  once  led  his  whole  army  across 
the  river,  and  having  encamped  for  the  night  at  a  place 
called  Dinabadon,  entertained  the  chief  Persian  and  Roman 
nobles  at  a  banquet.  When  the  festivity  was  at  its  height, 
the  unfortunate  prisoner  was  brought  in  loaded  with,  fetters, 
and  was  made  sport  of  by  the  guests  for  a  time,  after  which, 
at  a  signal  from  the  king,  the  guards  plunged  their  swords 
into  his  body,  and  despatched  him  in  the  sight  of  the  feasters. 
Having  amused  his  guests  with  this  delectable  interlude,  the 
amiable  monarch  concluded  the  whole  by  anointing  them  with 
perfumed  ointment,  crowning  them  with  flowers,  and  bid- 
ding them  drink  to  the  success  of  the  war.  "The  guests," 
says  Theophylact,  "returned  to  their  tents,  delighted  with 
the  completeness  of  their  entertainment,  and  told  their  friends 
liow  handsomely  they  had  been  treated,  but  the  crown  of  all 
'they  said)  was  the  episode  of  Bryzacius."' 

Chosroes  next  day  advanced  across  the  Greater  Zab,  and, 
after  marching  four  days,  reached  Alexandriana,"  a  position 
probably  not  far  from  Arbela,  after  which,  in  two  days  more, 


510  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  xxnt 

he  arrived  at  Chneethas/'  which  was  a  district  upon  the  Zals 
Asfal,  or  Lesser  Zab  River.  Here  he  found  himself  in  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  Bahram,  who  had  taken  up  his  position 
on  the  Lesser  Zab,  with  the  intention  probably  of  blocking 
the  route  up  its  valley ,"  by  which  he  expected  that  the  Ar- 
menian army  would  endeavor  to  effect  a  junction  with  the 
army  of  Chosroes.  Here  the  two  forces  watched  each  other 
for  some  days,  and  various  manoeuvres  were  executed,  which 
it  is  impossible  to  follow,  since  Theophylact,  our  only  author- 
ity, is  not  a  good  military  historian.  The  result,  however,  is 
certain.  Bahram  was  out-manoeuvred  by  Chosroes  and  his 
Roman  allies ;  the  fords  of  the  Zab  were  seized ;  and  after  five 
days  of  marching  and  countermarching,  the  longed-for  junc- 
tion took  place."  Chosroes  had  the  satisfaction  of  embracing 
his  uncles  Bindoes  and  Bostam,  and  of  securing  such  a  rein- 
forcement as  gave  him  a  great  superiority  in  numbers  over 
his  antagonist. "" 

About  the  same  time  he  received  intelligence  of  another 
most  important  success.  Before  quitting  Daras,  he  had  de- 
spatched Mebodes,  at  the  head  of  a  small  body  of  Romans, " 
to  create  a  diversion  on  the  Mesopotomian  side  of  the  Tigris  by 
a  demonstration  from  Singara  against  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon. 
He  can  hardly  have  expected  to  do  more  than  distract  his 
enemy  and  perhaps  make  him  divide  his  forces.  Bahram, 
however,  was  either  indifferent  as  to  the  fate  of  the  capital,  or 
determined  not  to  weaken  the  small  army,  which  was  all  that 
he  could  muster,  and  on  which  his  whole  dependence  was 
placed.  He  left  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon  to  their  fate.  Mebodes 
and  his  small  force  marched  southward  without  meeting  an 
enemy,  obtained  possession  of  Seleucia  without  a  blow  after  the 
•withdrawal  of  the  garrison,  received  the  unconditional  sur^ 
render  of  Ctesiphon,  made  themselves  masters  of  the  royal 
palace  and  treasures,  proclaimed  Chosroes  king,  and  sent  to 
him  in  his  camp  the  most  precious  emblems  of  the  Persian 
sovereignty.^''  Thus,  before  engaging  w^ith  his  antagonist, 
Chosroes  recovered  his  capital  and  found  his  authority  once 
more  recognized  in  the  seat  of  government. 

The  great  contest  had,  however,  to  be  decided,  not  by  the 
loss  and  gain  of  cities,  nor  by  the  fickle  mood  of  a  populace, 
but  by  trial  of  arms  in  the  open  field.  Bahram  was  not  of  a 
temper  to  surrender  his  sovereignty  unless  compelled  by 
defeat.  He  was  one  of  the  greatest  generals  of  the  age, "  and, 
though  compelled  to  fight  under  every  disadvantage,  greatly 


CM.  Xxiii.]  COl^'TliSf  OP  BABUAM  AND    CliOSliOEa.  51  i 

outnumbered  by  the  enemy,  and  with  troops  that  were  to  a 
large  extent  disaffected,  he  was  bent  on  resisting  to  the  ut- 
most, and  doing  his  best  to  maintain  his  own  rights.  He 
seems  to  have  fought  two  pitched  battles  with  the  combined 
Romans  and  Persians,^''  and  not  to  have  succumbed  until 
treachery  and  desertion  disheartened  him  and  ruined  his 
caused  The  first  battle  was  in  the  plain  country  of  Adiabene, 
at  the  foot  of  the  Zagros  range.  Here  the  opposing  armies  were 
drawn  out  in  the  open  field,  each  divided  into  a  centre  and 
two  wings.  In  the  army  of  Chosroes  the  Romans  were  in  the 
middle,  on  the  right  the  Persians,  and  the  Armenians  on  the 
left.  Narses,  together  with  Chosroes,  held  the  central  position : 
Bahram  was  directly  opposed  to  them.  When  the  conflict 
began  the  Romans  charged  with  such  fierceness  that  Bahram 's 
centre  at  once  gave  way ;  he  was  obhged  to  retreat  to  the  foot 
of  the  hills,  and  take  up  a  position  on  their  slope.  Here  the 
Romans  refused  to  attack  him;  and  Chrsroes  very  impru- 
dently ordered  the  Persians  who  fought  on  his  side  to  advance 
up  the  ascent.  They  were  repulsed,  and  thrown  into  complete 
confusion ;  and  the  battle  would  infallibly  have  been  lost,  had 
not  Narses  come  to  their  aid,  and  with  his  steady  and  sohd 
battalions  protected  their  retreat  and  restored  the  fight.  Yet 
the  day  terminated  with  a  feehng  on  both  sides  that  Bahram 
had  on  the  whole  had  the  advantage  in  the  engagement ;  the 
king  de  facto  congratulated  himself ;  the  king  de  jure  had  to 
bear  the  insulting  pity  of  his  aUies,  and  the  reproaches  of  his 
own  countrymen  for  occasioning  them  such  a  disaster. " 

But  though  Bahram  might  feel  that  the  glory  of  the  day  was 
his,  he  was  not  elated  by  his  success,  nor  rendered  blind  to  the 
difficulties  of  his  position.  Fighting  with  his  back  to  the 
mountains,  he  was  liable,  if  he  suffered  defeat,  to  be  entangled 
in  their  defiles  and  lose  his  entire  force.  Moreover,  now  that 
Ctesiphon  was  no  longer  his,  he  had  neither  resources  nor 
point  d''appid  in  the  low  country,  and  by  falling  back  he  would 
at  once  be  approaching  nearer  to  the  main  source  of  his  own 
supplies,  which  was  the  country  about  Rei,"  south  of  the 
Caspian,  and  drawing  his  enemies  to  a  greater  distance  from 
the  sources  of  theirs.  He  may  even  have  thought  there  was  a 
chance  of  his  being  unpursued  if  he  retired,  since  the  Romans 
might  not  like  to  venture  into  the  mountain  region,  and  Chos- 
roes might  be  impatient  to  make  a  triumphal  entry  into  his 
capital.  Accordingly,  the  use  which  Bahram  made  of  his 
victory  was  quietly  to  evacuate  his  camp,  to  leave  the  low 


512  tup:  SWVEKTIt  MONAnctiT.  [cH.  xxiit. 

plain  region,  rapidly  pass  the  mountains,  and  take  up  his 
quarters  in  the  fertile  upland  beyond  them,  the  district  where 
the  Lesser  Zab  rises,  south  of  Lake  Urumiyeh. 

If  he  had  hoped  that  his  enemies  would  not  pursue  him, 
Bahram  was  disappointed.  Chosroes  himself,  and  the  whole 
of  the  mixed  army  which  supported  his  cause,  soon  followed 
on  his  footsteps,  and  pressing  forward  to  Canzaca, "  or  Shiz, '' 
near  which  he  had  pitched  his  camp,  offered  him  battle  for  the 
second  time.  Bahram  declined  the  offer,  and  retreated  to  a 
position  on  the  Balarathus,  where,  however,  after  a  short  time, 
he  was  forced  to  come  to  an  engagement.  He  had  received,  it 
would  seem,  a  reinforcement  of  elephants  from  the  provinces 
bordering  on  India, ''  and  hoped  for  some  advantage  from  the 
employment  of  this  new  arm.  He  had  perhaps  augmented  his 
forces, '"  though  it  must  be  doubted  whether  he  really  on  this 
occasion  outnumbered  his  antagonist.  At  any  rate,  the  time 
seemed  to  have  come  when  he  must  abide  the  issue  of  his  ap- 
peal to  arms,  and  secure  or  lose  his  crown  by  a  supreme  effort. 
Once  more  the  armies  were  drawn  up  in  three  distinct  bodies;" 
and  once  more  the  leaders  held  the  established  central  position. '" 
The  engagement  began  along  the  whole  line,  and  continued  for 
a  while  without  marked  result.  Bahram  then  strengthened  his 
left,  and,  transferring  himself  to  this  part  of  the  field,  made  an 
impression  on  the  Eoman  right.  But  Narses  brought  up  sup- 
ports to  their  aid,  and  checked  the  retreat,  which  had  already 
begun,  and  which  might  soon  have  become  general.  Hereupon 
Bahram  suddenly  fell  upon  the  Roman  centre  and  endeavored 
to  break  it  and  drive  it  from  the  field ;  but  Narses  was  again  a 
match  for  him,  and  met  his  assault  without  flinching,  after 
which,  charging  in  his  turn,  he  threw  the  Persian  centre  into 
confusion.  Seeing  this,  the  wings  also  broke,  and  a  general 
flight  began,*' whereupon  6000  of  Bahram's  troops  deserted, 
and,  drawing  aside,  allowed  themselves  to  be  captured. "  The 
retreat  then  became  a  rout.  Bahram  himself  fled  with  4,000 
men."  His  camp,  with  all  its  rich  furniture,  and  his  wives 
and  children,  were  taken. '°  The  elephant  corps  still  held  out 
and  fought  valiantly ;  but  it  was  surrounded  and  forced  to  sur- 
render." The  battle  was  utterly  lost;  and  the  unfortunate 
chief,  feeling  that  all  hope  was  gone,  gave  the  reins  to  his 
horse  and  fled  for  his  life.  Chosroes  sent  ten  thousand  men  in 
pursuit, "'  under  Bostam,  his  uncle ;  and  this  detachment  over- 
took the  fugitives,  but  was  repulsed"  and  returned.  Bahram 
continued  his  flight,  and  passing  through  Rei  and  Damaghan," 


CH.  xxTir.]  COINS  OF  BAURAM.  513 

reached  the  Oxus  and  placed  himself  under  the  protection  of 
.  f  the  Turks.     Chosroes,  having  dismissed  his  Roman  alhes,  re- 

i:  entered  Ctesiphon  after  a  year's  absence,  and  for  the  second 

time  took  his  place  upon  the  throne  of  his  ancestors. 

The  coins  of  Bahram  possess  a  peculiar  interest.  While 
there  is  no  numismatic  evidence  which  confirms  the  statement 
that  he  struck  money  in  the  name  of  the  younger  Chosroes, 
there  are  extant  three  types  of  his  coins,  two  of  which  appear 
to  belong  to  the  time  before  he  seated  himself  upon  the  throne, 
while  one —the  last— belongs  to  the  period  of  his  actual  sove- 
reignty." In  his  pre-regnal  coins,  he  copied  the  devices  of  the 
last  sovereign  of  his  name  who  had  ruled  over  Persia."  He 
adopted  the  mural  crown  in  a  decided  form,  omitted  the  stars 
and  crescents,  and  placed  his  own  head  amid  the  flames  of  the 
fire-altar.  His  legends  were  either  Varahran  Chub,  "  Bahram 
of  the  mace,""  or  Varahran,  malkan  malJca,  mazdisn,  bagi, 
ramashtri,  "Bahram,  king  of  kings,  Ormazd-worshipping, 
divine,  peaceful."    [PI.  XXIII.,  Fig.  2.] 

The  later  coins  follow  closely  the  type  of  his  predecessor, 
Hormisdas  IV.,  differing  only  in  the  legend,  which  is,  on  the 
obverse,  Varahran  afzun,  or  "Varahran  (may  he  be)  greater;" 
and  on  the  reverse  tha  regnal  year,  with  a  mint-mark.  The 
regnal  year  is  uniformly  "one;"  the  mint-marks  are  Zadra- 
carta,  Iran,  and  Nihach,  an  unknown  locality.  [PI.  XXIII. , 
Fig  3.] 


I 


514  TBE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxrr. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Second  Reign  of  Chosroes  II.  (Eberwiz).  His  Rule  at  first 
Unpopular.  His  Treatment  of  his  Uncles,  Bindoes  and 
Bostam.  His  vindictive  Proceedings  against  Bahram. 
His  supposed  Leaning  towards  Christianity.  His  Wives, 
Shirin  and  Kurdiyeh.  His  early  Wars.  His  Relations 
ivith  the  Emperor  Maurice.  His  Attitude  towards  Phocas. 
Ch^eat  War  of  Chosroes  ivith  Phocas,  a.d.  603-610.  War 
continued  ivith  Heraclius.  Immense  Successes  of  Chosroes, 
A.D.  611-620.  Aggressive  taken  by  Heraclius  a.d.  622.  His 
Campaigns  in  Persian  Territory  a.d.  622-628.  Murder  of 
Chosroes.     His  Character.    His  Coins. 

"  Regnum  ergd  occupavit  Cesra,  Alius  Hormozi,  qui  Aperwiz  cognominatus  est, 
annos  triginta  novem."— Eutychius,  Annales,  vol.  ii.  p.  207. 

The  second  reign  of  Chosroes  II. ,  who  is  commonly  known 
as  Chosroes  Eberwiz  or  Parwiz, '  lasted  little  short  of  thirty- 
seven  years'— from  the  summer  of  a.d.  591  to  the  February  of 
A.D.  628.  Externally  considered,  it  is  the  most  remarkable 
reign  in  the  entire  Sassanian  series,  embracing  as  it  does  the 
extremes  of  elevation  and  depression.  Never  at  any  other 
time  did  the  Neo-Persian  kingdom  extend  itself  so  far,  or  so 
distinguish  itself  by  military  achievements,  as  in  the  twenty 
years  intervening  between  a.d.  602  and  a.d.  622.  Seldom  was 
it  brought  so  low  as  in  the  years  immediately  anterior  and 
immediately  subsequent  to  this  space,  in  the  earKer  and  in 
the  later  portions  of  the  reign  whose  central  period  was  so 
glorious. 

'  Victorious  by  the  help  of  Rome,  Chosroes  began  his  second 
reign  amid  the  scarcely  disguised  hostility  of  his  subjects.  So 
greatly  did  he  mistrust  their  sentiments  towards  him  that  he 
begged  and  obtained  of  Maurice  the  support  of  a  Roman  body- 
guard,' to  whona  he  committed  the  custody  of  his  person.  To 
the  odium  always  attaching  in  the  minds  of  a  spirited  people 
to  the  ruler  whose  yoke  is  imposed  upon  them  by  a  foreign 
power,  he  added  further  the  stain  of  a  crime  which  is  happily 
rare  at  all  times,  and  of  which  (according  to  the  general  behef 
of  his  subjects)  no  Persian  monarch  had  ever  previously  been 


Vol.  Ill 


PUff   XLIII'. 


■a'  tfS 


Pi  ale  'aiV. 


Vol.   Ill 


en.  xxrv.]    DEATHS  OlT  BINDOES  AND  BOSTAM.  515 

guilty.  It  was  in  vain  that  ne  protested  his  innocence:  the 
popular  beUef  held  him  an  accomplice  m  his  fathei-'s  murder, 
and  branded  the  young  prince  with  the  horrible  name  of 
"parricide." 

It  was  no  doubt  mainly  in  the  hope  of  purging  himself  from 
this  imputation  that,  after  putting  to  death  the  subordinate 
instruments^  by  whom  his  father's  life  had  been  actually 
taken,  he  went  on  to  institute  proceedings  against  the  chief 
contrivers  of  the  outrage— the  two  uncles  who  had  ordered, 
and  probably  witnessed,  the  execution.  So  long  as  the  suc- 
cess of  his  arms  was  doubtful,  he  had  been  happy  to  avail 
himself  of  their  support,  and  to  employ  their  talents  in  the 
struggle  against  his  enemies.  At  one  moment  in  his  flight  he 
had  owed  his  life  to  the  self-devotion  of  Bindoes;"^  and  both  the 
brothers  had  merited  well  of  him  by  the  efforts  which  they 
had  made  to  bring  Armenia  over  to  his  cause,  and  to  levy  a 
powerful  army  for  him  in  that  region."  But  to  clear  his  own 
character  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  forget  the  ties  botli 
of  blood  and  gratitude,  that  he  should  sink  the  kinsman  in  the 
sovereign,  and  the  debtor  in  the  stern  avenger  of  blood.  Ac- 
cordingly, he  seized  Bindoes,  who  resided  at  the  court,  and 
had  him  drowned  in  the  Tigris.'  To  Bostam,  whom  he  had 
appointed  governor  of  Rei  and  Khorassan,"  he  sent  an  order  of 
recall,  and  would  undoubtedly  have  executed  him,  had  he 
obeyed ;  but  Bostam,  suspecting  his  intentions,  deemed  it  the 
wisest  course  to  revolt,'  and  proclaim  himself  independent 
monarch  of  the  north  country.  Here  he  established  himself 
in  authority  for  some  time,  and  is  even  said  to  have  enlarged 
his  territory  at  the  expense  of  some  of  the  border  chieftains;'" 
but  the  vengeance  of  his  nephew  pursued  him  unrelentingly, 
and  ere  long  accomplished  his  destruction.  According  to  the 
best  authority,"  the  instrument  employed  was  Bostam's  wife, 
the  sister  of  Bahram,  whom  Chosroes  induced  to  murder  her 
husband  by  a  promise  to  make  her  the  partner  of  his  bed. 

Intrigues  not  very  dissimilar  in  their  character  had  been 
previously  employed  to  remove  Bahram,  whom  the  Pei-sian 
monarch  had  not  ceased  to  fear,  notwithstanding  that  he  was 
a  fugitive  and  an  exile.  The  Khan  of  the  Turks  had  received 
him  with  honor  on  the  occasion  of  his  flight,  and,  accord- 
ing to  some  authors,'-'  had  given  him  his  daughter  in  marriage. 
Chosroes  lived  in  dread  of  the  day  when  the  gi-eat  general 
might  reappear  in  Persia,  at  the  head  of  the  Turkish  hordes, 
and  challenge  him  to  renew  the  lately-tei-minated  contest.'* 


516  Tlih!  SMVENfll  MOnAtiOBt.  [ch.  xxiv 

He  therefore  sent  an  envoy  into  Turkestan,  well  supplied  with 
rich  gifts,  whose  instrvictions  were  to  procure  by  some  means 
or  other  the  death  of  Bahram.  Having  sounded  the  Khan  upon 
the  business  and  met  with  a  rebuff,  the  envoy  addressed  him- 
self to  the  Khatun,  the  Khan's  wife,  and  by  liberal  presents  in- 
duced her  to  come  into  his  views.  A  slave  was  easily  found 
who  undertook  to  carry  out  his  mistress's  wishes,  and  Bahram 
was  despatched  the  same  day  by  means  of  a  poisoned  dagger.  '* 
It  is  painful  to  find  that  one  thus  ungrateful  to  his  friends 
and  relentless  to  his  enemies  made,  to  a  certain  extent,  profes- 
sion of  Christianity.  Little  as  his  heart  can  have  been  pene- 
trated by  its  spirit,  Chosroes  seems  certainly,  in  the  earlier 
part  of  his  reign,  to  have  given  occasion  for  the  suspicion, 
which  his  subjects  are  said  to  have  entertained,'^  that  he  de- 
signed to  change  his  religion,  and  confess  himself  a  convert  to 
the  creed  of  the  Greeks.  During  the  period  of  his  exile,  he  was, 
it  would  seem,  impressed  by  what  he  saw  and  heard  of  the 
Christian  worship  and  faith ;  he  learnt  to  feel  or  profess  a  high 
veneration  for  the  Vii-gin;'^  and  he  adopted  the  practice,  com- 
mon at  the  time,  of  addressing  his  prayers  and  vows  to  the 
saints  and  martyrs,  who  were  practically  the  principal  objects 
of  the  Oriental  Christians'  devotions.  Sergius,  a  martyr,  held 
in  high  repute  by  the  Christians  of  Osrhoene  and  Mesopotamia, 
was  adopted  by  the  superstitious  prince  as  a  sort  of  patron 
saint ;  and  it  became  his  habit,  in  circumstances  of  difficulty, 
to  vow  some  gift  or  other  to  the  shrine  of  St.  Sergius  at  Sergi- 
opohs,"  in  case  of  the  event  corresponding  to  his  wishes.  Two 
occasions  are  recorded  where,  on  sending  his  gift,  he  accompa- 
nied it  with  a  letter  explaining  the  circumstances  of  liis  vow 
and  its  fulfilment ;  and  even  the  letters  themselves  have  come 
down  to  us,"*  but  in  a  Greek  version.  In  one,  Chosroes  as- 
cribes the  success  of  his  arms  on  a  particular  occasion  to  the 
influence  of  his  self -chosen  patron ;  in  the  other,  he  credits  him 
with  having  procured  by  his  prayers  the  pregnancy  of  Sira 
(Shirin),  the  most  beautiful  and  best  beloved  of  his  wives.'"  It 
appears  that  Sira  was  a  Christian,  and  that  in  marrying  her 
Chosroes  had  contravened  the  laws  of  his  country,  which  for- 
bade the  king  to  have  a  Christian  wife.^"  Her  influence  over 
him  was  considerable,^'  and  she  is  said  to  have  been  allowed  to 
build  numerous  churches  and  monasteries  in  and  about  Ctesi- 
phon."  When  she  died,  Chosroes  called  in  the  aid  of  sculpture 
to  perpetuate  her  image,  and  sent  her  statue  to  the  Roman  Em» 
peror,  to  the  Turkish  Khan,  and  to  various  other  potentates." 


cir.  XXIV. ]     CEOSEOSS'S  RELATIONS  WITH  MAURICE.      517 

Chosroes  is  said  to  have  maintained  an  enormous  seraglio;"^ 
but  of  these  secondary  wives,  none  is  known  to  us  even  by 
name,  except  Kurdiyeh,  the  sister  of  Bahram  and  widow  of 
Bostam,  whom  she  murdered  at  Chosroes's  suggestion." 

During  the  earlier  portion  of  his  reign  Chosroes  seems  to 
have  been  engaged  in  but  few  wars,  and  those  of  no  great  im- 
portance. According  to  the  Armenian  writers,  ^^  he  formed  a 
design  of  depopulating  that  part  of  Armenia  which  he  had  not 
ceded  to  the  Romans,  by  making  a  general  levy  of  aU  the  males, 
and  marching  them  off  to  the  East,  to  fight  against  the  Ephtha- 
lites ;  but  the  design  did  not  prosper,  since  the  Armenians  car- 
ried all  before  them,  and  under  their  native  leader,  Smbat,  the 
Bagratunian,  conquered  Hyrcania  and  Tabaristan,  defeated  re- 
peatedly the  Koushans  and  the  Ephthalites,  and  even  engaged 
with  success  the  Great  Khan  of  the  Turks,  who  came  to  the 
support  of  his  vassals  at  the  head  of  an  army  consisting  of 
300,000  men.  By  the  valor  and  conduct  of  Smbat,  the  Pereian 
dominion  was  re-established  in  the  north-eastern  mountain  re- 
gion, from  Mount  Demavend  to  the  Hindu  Kush ;  the  Koushans, 
Turks,  and  Ephthalites  were  held  in  check;  and  the  tide  of 
barbarism,  which  had  threatened  to  submerge  the  empire  on 
this  side,  was  effectually-resisted  and  rolled  back. 

With  Rome  Chosroes  maintained  for  eleven  years  the  most 
friendly  and  cordial  relations.  Whatever  humiliation  he  may 
have  felt  when  he  accepted  the  terms  on  which  alone  Maurice 
was  willing  to  render  him  aid,  having  once  agreed  to  them,  he 
stifled  all  regrets,  made  no  attempt  to  evade  his  obligations," 
abstained  from  every  endeavor  to  undo  by  intrigue  what  he 
had  done,  unwillingly  indeed,  but  yet  with  his  eyes  open. 
Once  only  during  the  eleven  years  did  a  momentary  cloud 
arise  between  him  and  his  benefactor.  In  the  year  a.d.  600 
some  of  the  Saracenic  tribes  dependent  on  Rome  made  an  in- 
cursion across  the  Euphrates  into  Persian  ten-itory,  ravaged  it 
far  and  wide,  and  returned  with  their  booty  into  the  desert."* 
Chosroes  was  justly  offended,  and  might  fairly  have  consid- 
ered that  a  casus  helli  had  arisen ;  but  he  allowed  himself  to  bo 
pacified  by  the  representations  of  Maurice's  envoy,  George,  and 
consented  not  to  break  the  peace  on  account  of  so  small  a  mat- 
ter, George  claimed  the  concession  as  a  tribute  to  his  own 
amiable  qualities;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  Persian  monarch 
acted  rather  on  the  grounds  of  general  policy  than  from  any 
personal  predilection. 

Two  years  later  the  virtuous  but  perhaps  over-rigid  Maurice 


518  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxrv. 

was  deposed  and  murdered  by  the  centurion,  Phocas,  who,  on 
the  strength  of  his  popularity  with  the  army,  boldly  usurped 
the  throne.^'*  Chosroes  heard  with  indignation  of  the  execution 
of  his  ally  and  friend,  of  the  insults  offered  to  his  remains,'" 
and  of  the  assassination  of  his  numerous  sons,"  and  of  his 
brother.  ^^  One  son,  he  heard,  had  been  sent  off  by  Maurice  to 
implore  aid  from  the  Persians;"  he  had  been  overtaken  and 
put  to  death  by  the  emissaries  of  the  usurper  ;^^  bvit  rumor,  al- 
ways busy  where  royal  personages  are  concerned,  asserted 
that  he  lived,  that  he  had  escaped  his  pursuers,  and  had 
reached  Ctesiphon.  Chosroes  was  too  much  interested  in  the 
acceptance  of  the  rumor  to  deny  it;  he  gave  out  that  Theodo- 
siiis  was  at  his  court,  and  notified  that  it  was  his  intention  to 
assert  his  right  to  the  succession."  When,  five  months  after 
his  coronation,  Phocas  sent  an  envoy  to  announce  his  occupa- 
tion of  the  throne,  and  selected  the  actual  murderer  of  Maurice 
to  fill  the  post,  Chosroes  determined  on  an  open  rupture.  He 
seized  Lilius,  the  envoy,  threw  him  into  prison,^"  announced 
his  intention  of  avenging  his  deceased  benefactor,  and  openly 
declared  war  agamst  Rome. 

The  war  burst  out  the  next  year  (a.d.  603).  On  the  Roman 
side  there  was  disagreement,  and  even  civil  war ;  for  Narses, 
who  had  held  high  command  in  the  East  ever  since  he  restored 
Chosroes  to  the  throne  of  his  ancestors,  on  hearing  of  the 
death  of  Maurice,  took  up  arms  against  Phocas,  and,  throwing 
himself  into  Edessa,  defied  the  forces  of  the  usurper."  Ger- 
manus,  who  commanded  at  Daras,  was  a  general  of  small 
capacity,  and  found  himself  quite  unable  to  make  head,  either 
against  Narses  in  Edessa,  or  against  Chosroes,  who  led  his 
troops  in  person  into  Mesopotamia.  Defeated  by  Chosroes  in 
a  battle  near  Daras,  in  which  he  received  a  mortal  wound, 
Germanus  withdrew  to  Constantia,  where  he  died  eleven  days 
afterwards.'®  A  certain  Leontius,  a  eunvich,  took  his  place, 
but  was  equally  unsuccessful.  Chosroes  defeated  him  at 
Ai'xamus,  and  took  a  great  portion  of  his  army  prisoners  ;'* 
whereupon  he  was  recalled  by  Phocas,  and  a  third  leader, 
Domentziolus,  a  nephew  of  the  emperor,  was  appointed  to 
the  command.  Against  him  the  Persian  monarch  thought  it 
enough  to  employ  generals.*"  The  war  now  languished  for  a 
short  space;  but  in  A.D.  605  Chosroes  came  up  in  person  against 
Daras,  the  great  Roman  stronghold  in  these  parts,  and  be- 
sieged it  for  the  space  of  nine  months,"'  at  the  end  of  which 
time  it  surrendered.''    The  loss  was  a  severe  blow  to  the 


en.  XXIV. ]  HE  MAKES  WAR  ON  PIIOCAS.  619 

Roman  prestige,  and  was  followed  in  the  next  year  by  a  long 
series  of  calamities.  Chosroes  took  Turabdin,  Hesen-Cephas, 
Mardin,  Capher-tuta,  and  Amida."  Two  years  afterwards, 
A.D.  607,  he  captured  Harran  (Carrhae"),  Ras-el-ain  (Eesaina'"), 
and  Edessa,  the  capital  of  Osrhoene,  after  which  he  pressed 
forward  to  the  Euphrates,  crossed  with  his  army  into  Syria, 
and  fell  with  fury  on  the  Roman  cities  west  of  the  river. 
Mabog  or  Hierapolis,  Kenneserin.  and  Berhoea  (now  Aleppo), 
were  invested  and  taken "''  in  the  course  of  one  or  at  most  two 
campaigns;  while  at  the  same  time  (a.d.  609)  a  second  Per- 
sian army,  under  a  general  whose  name  is  unknown,  after  op- 
erating in  Armenia,  and  taking  Satala  and  Theodosiopolis,^'  in- 
vaded Cappadocia  and  threatened  the  great  city  of  Ca-sarea 
Mazaca,  which  was  the  chief  Roman  stronghold  in  these  parts. 
Bands  of  marauders  wasted  the  open  country,  carrying  terror 
through  the  fertile  districts  of  Phyi'gia  and  Galatia,  which  had 
known  nothing  of  the  horrors  of  war  for  centuries,  and  were 
rich  with  the  accumulated  products  of  industry.  According 
to  Thcophanes,^"  some  of  the  ravages  even  penetrated  as  far  as 
Chalcedon,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  straits  from  Constanti- 
nople; but  this  is  probably  the  anticipation  of  an  event  be- 
longing to  a  later  time."-  No  movements  of  importance  are  as- 
signed to  A.D.  610;  but  in  the  May  of  the  next  year  the  Per- 
sians once  more  crossed  the  Euphrates,  completely  defeated 
and  destroyed  the  Roman  army  which  protected  Syria,  and 
sacked  the  two  great  cities  of  Apameia  and  Antioch. '"" 

Meantime  a  change  had  occurred  at  Constantinople.  The 
double  revolt  of  Heraelius,  prefect  of  Egypt,  and  Gregory,  his 
lieutenant,  had  brought  the  reign  of  the  brutal  and  incapable 
Phocas  to  an  end,  and  placed  upon  the  imperial  throne  a 
youth  of  promise,  innocent  of  the  blood  of  Maurice,  and  well 
inclined  to  avenge  it.  ^'  Chosroes  had  to  consider  whether  he 
should  adhere  to  his  original  statement,  that  he  took  up  arms 
to  punish  the  murderer  of  his  friend  and  benefactor,  and 
consequently  desist  from  further  hostilities  now  that  Pliocas 
was  dead,  or  whether,  throwing  consistency  to  the  Avinds,  he 
should  continue  to  prosecute  the  war,  notwithstanding  tho 
change  of  rulers,  and  endeavor  to  push  to  the  utmost  the  advan- 
tage which  he  had  already  obtained.  He  resolved  on  this  latter 
alternative.  It  was  wliile  the  young  Heraelius  was  still  inse- 
cure in  his  seat  that  he  sent  his  armies  into  Syria,  defeated 
the  Roman  troops,  and  took  Antioch  and  Apameia.  Follow- 
ing up  blow  with  blow,  he  the  next  year  (a.d.  G12)   invaded 


620 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  xxrv 


Cappadocia  a  second  time  and  captured  Caesarea  Mazaca." 
Two  years  later  (a.d.  614)  he  sent  his  general  Shahr-Barz, 
into  the  region  east  of  the  Antilibanus,  and  took  the  ancient 
and  famous  city  of  Damascus.^'  From  Damascus,  in  the  en- 
suing year,  Shahr-Barz  advanced  against  Palestine,^*  and, 
summoning  the  Jews  to  his  aid,  proclaimed  a  Holy  War 
against  the  Christian  misbehevers,  whom  he  threatened  to  en- 
slave or  exterminate.  Twenty -six  thousand  of  these  fanatics 
flocked  to  his  standard;  and  having  occupied  the  Jordan 
region  and  GalUeee,  Shahr-Barz  in  a.d.  615  invested  Jeru- 
salem, and  after  a  siege  of  eighteen  days"  forced  his  way  into 
the  town,  and  gave  it  over  to  plunder  and  rapine.  The  cruel 
hostUity  of  the  Jews  had  free  vent.  The  chvirches  of  Helena, 
of  Constantino,  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre,  of  the  Resurrection, 
and  many  others,  were  burnt  or  ruined;'^  the  greater  part  of 
the  city  was  destroyed ;  the  sacred  treasuries  were  plundered ; 
the  relics  scattered  or  carried  off ;  and  a  massacre  of  the  in- 
habitants, in  which  the  Jews  took  the  chief  part,  raged 
throughout  the  whole  city  for  some  days.  As  many  as 
seventeen  thousand  or,  according  to  another  account,  ninety 
thousand,  were  slain."  Thirty-five  thousand  were  made 
prisoners.  ^*  Among  them  was  the  aged  Patriarch,  Zacharius, 
who  was  carried  captive  into  Persia,  where  he  remained  tUl 
his  death.  ^* 

The  Cross  found  by  Helena,  and  believed  to  be  "the  True 
Cross,"  was  at  the  same  time  transported  to  Ctesiphon,  where 
it  was  preserved  with  care  and  duly  venerated  by  the  Chris- 
tian wife  of  Chosroes.  ^° 

A  stUl  more  important  success  followed.  In  a.d.  616  Shahr- 
Barz  proceeded  from  Palestine  into  Egypt,  which  had  enjoyed 
a  respite  from  foreign  war  since  the  time  of  Julius  Cai^sar, 
surprised  Pelusium,  the  key  of  the  country,  and,  pressing  for- 
ward across  the  Delta,  easily  made  himself  master  of  the  rich 
and  prosperous  Alexandria."  John  the  Merciful,  who  was 
the  Patriarch,  and  Nicetas  the  Patrician,  who  was  the 
governor,  had  quitted  the  city  before  his  arrival,  and  had  fled 
to  Cyprus.''''  Hence  scarcely  any  resistance  was  made.  The 
fall  of  Alexandria  was  followed  at  once  by  the  complete  sub- 
mission of  the  rest  of  Egypt. "  Bands  of  Persians  advanced 
up  the  Nile  valley  to  the  very  confines  of  Ethiopia,  and 
established  the  authority  of  Chosroes  over  the  whole  country 
—a  country  in  which  no  Persian  had  set  foot  since  it  was 
wrested  by  Alexander  of  Macedon  from  Darius  Codomaunu^, 


CH.  XXIV.]        GREAT  SUCCESSES  OF  CH0SR0E8.  521 

While  this  remarkable  conquest  was  made  in  the  south- 
west, in  the  north-west  another  Persian  army  under  another 
general,  Saina  or  Shahen, "  starting  from  Cappadocia,  marched 
through  Asia  Minor  to  the  shores  of  the  Thracian  Bosphorus, 
and  laid  siege  to  the  strong  city  of  Chalcedon,  which  lay  upon 
the  strait,  just  opposite  Constantinople.  Chalcedon  made  a 
vigorous  resistance ;  and  Heraclius,  anxious  to  save  it,  had  an 
interview  with  Shahen,  and  at  his  suggestion  sent  three  of  his 
highest  nobles  as  ambassadors  to  Chosroes,"^  with  a  humble  re- 
quest for  peace.  The  overture  was  ineflfectual.  Chosroes  im- 
prisoned the  ambassadors  and  entreated  them  cruelly;"* 
threatened  Shahen  with  death  for  not  bringing  Heraclius  in 
chains  to  the  foot  of  his  throne;"  and  declared  in  reply  that  he 
would  grant  no  terms  of  peace — the  empire  was  his,  and  Her- 
aclius must  descend  from  his  throne."**  Soon  afterwards  (a.d. 
617)  Chalcedon,  which  was  besieged  through  the  winter,  fell ;"" 
and  the  Persians  established  themselves  in  this  important 
stronghold,  within  a  mile  of  Constantinople.'"'  Thi'ee  years 
afterwards,  Ancyra  {Angora),  which  had  hitherto  resisted  the 
Persian  arms,  was  taken;""  and  Rhodes,  though  inaccessible  to 
an  enemy  who  was  without  a  naval  force,  submitted." 

Thus  the  whole  of  the  Roman  possessions  in  Asia  and  Eastern 
Africa  were  lost  in  the  space  of  fifteen  years."  The  empire  of 
Persia  was  extended  from  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  to  the 
Egean  and  the  Nile,  attaining  once  more  almost  the  same 
dimensions  that  it  had  reached  under  the  first  and  had  kept 
until  the  third  Darius.  It  is  difficult  to  say  how  far  their 
newly  acquired  provinces  were  really  subdued,  organized,  and 
governed  from  Ctesiphon,  how  far  they  were  merely  overrun, 
plundered,  and  then  left  to  themselves.  On  the  one  hand,  we 
have  indications  of  the  existence  of  terrible  disorders  and  of 
something  approaching  to  anarchy  in  parts  of  the  conquered 
territory  during  the  time  that  it  was  held  by  the  Persians ;  on 
the  other,  we  seem  to  see  an  intention  to  retain,  to  govern, 
and  even  to  beautify  it.  Eutychius  relates'*  that,  on  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Romans  from  Syria,  the  Jews  resident  in  Tyre, 
who  numbered  four  thousand,  plotted  with  their  co-religionists 
of  Jerusalem,  Cyprus,  Damascus,  and  Galilee,  a  general  mas- 
sacre of  the  Tyrian  Christians  on  a  certain  day.  The  plot  was 
discovered;  and  the  Jews  of  Tyre  were  arrested  and  im- 
prisoned by  their  fellow-citizens,  who  put  the  city  in  a  state  of 
defence;  and  when  the  foreign  Jews,  to  the  number  of  26,000, 
came  at  tiie  appointed  time,  repulsed  them  from  the  walls, 


522  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxiv. 

and  defeated  them  with  great  slaughter.  This  story  suggests 
the  idea  of  a  complete  and  general  disorganization.  But  on 
the  other  hand  we  hear  of  an  augmentation  of  the  revenue'* 
imder  Chosroes  II. ,  which  seems  to  imply  the  establishment  in 
the  regions  conquered  of  a  settled  government ;  and  the  palace 
at  Mashita,  discovered  by  a  recent  traveller,"  is  a  striking 
proof  that  no  temporary  occupation  was  contemplated,  but 
that  Chosroes  regarded  liis  conquests  as  permanent  acquisi 
tions,  and  meant  to  hold  them  and  even  visit  them  occasionally. 

Heraclius  was  now  Avell-nigh  driven  to  despair.  The  loss  of 
Egypt  reduced  Constantinople  to  want,"  and  its  noisy  popu- 
lace clamored  for  food.  The  Avars  overran  Thrace,  and  con- 
tinually approached  nearer  to  the  capital.'*  The  glitter  of  the 
Persian  arms  was  to  be  seen  at  any  moment,  if  he  looked  from 
his  palace  windows  across  the  Bosphorus.  No  prospect  of  as- 
sistance or  relief  appeared  from  any  quarter.  The  empire  was 
"reduced  to  the  walls  of  Constantinople,  with  the  remnant  of 
Greece,  Italy,  and  Africa,  and  some  maritime  cities,  from  Tyre 
to  Trebizond,  of  the  Asiatic  Coast."  "  It  is  not  surprising  that 
under  the  circumstances  the  despondent  monarch  determined 
on  flight,  and  secretly  made  arrangements  for  transporting 
himself  and  his  treasures  to  the  distant  Carthage,*"  where  he 
might  hope  at  least  to  find  himself  in  safety.  His  ships,  laden 
with  their  precious  freight,  had  put  to  sea,  and  he  was  about 
to  f oUow  them,  when  his  intention  became  known  or  was  sus- 
pected ;  the  people  rose ;  and  the  Patriarch,  espousing  their 
side,  forced  the  reluctant  prince  to  accompany  him  to  the 
church  of  St.  Sophia,  and  there  make  oath  that,  come  what 
might,  he  would  not  separate  his  fortunes  from  those  of  the 
imperial  city.*' 

Baffled  in  his  design  to  escape  from  his  difficulties  by  flight, 
Heraclius  took  a  desperate  resolution.  He  would  leave  Con- 
stantinople to  its  fate, trust  its  safety  to  the  protection  afforded 
by  its  walls  and  by  the  strait  which  separated  it  from  Asia,*'' 
embark  with  such  troops  as  he  could  collect,  and  carry  the 
war  into  the  enemy's  country.  The  one  advantage  which  he  had 
over  his  adversary  was  his  possession  of  an  ample  navy,  and  con- 
sequent command  of  the  sea  and  power  to  strike  his  blows  unex- 
pectedly in  different  quarters.  On  making  known  his  inten- 
tion, it  was  not  opposed,  either  by  the  people  or  by  the  Patri- 
arch.*' He  was  allowed  to  coin  the  treasures  of  the  various 
churches  into  money,  **  to  collect  stores,  enroll  troops,  and,  on 
the  Easter  Monday*"  of  a.d.622,  to  set  forth  on  his  expedition. 


CH.  XXIV. j     BOLD  RESOLUTION  OF  HERACLIUS.  503 

His  fleet  was  steered  southward,  and,  thoiigli  forced  to  contend 
with  adverse  gales,""  made  a  speedy  and  successful  voyage 
through  the  Propontis,  the  Hellespont,  the  Egean,  and  the 
COician  Strait,  to  the  Giilf  of  Issus,"  in  the  angle  between 
Asia  Minor  and  Syria.  The  position  was  well  chosen,  as  one 
where  attack  was  dilficult,  where  numbers  would  give  Uttle  ad- 
vantage, and  where  consequently  a  small  but  resolute  force 
might  easily  maintain  itself  against  a  greatly  superior  enemy. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  a  post  from  which  an  advance  might 
conveniently  be  made  in  several  directions,  and  which  menaced 
almost  equally  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Armenia.  Moreover,  the 
level  tract  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea  was  broad 
enough  for  the  manoeuvres  of  such  an  army  as  Heraclius  com- 
manded, and  allowed  him  to  train  his  soldiers  by  exercises  and 
sham  fights  to  a  familiarity  with  the  sights  and  sounds  and 
movements  of  a  battle."*  He  conjectured,  rightly  enough,  that 
he  would  not  long  be  left  unmolested  by  the  enemy.  Shahr- 
Barz,  the  conqueror  of  Jerusalem  and  Egypt,  was  very  soon 
sent  against  him  f^  and,  after  various  movements,  which  it  is 
impossible  to  follow,  a  battle  was  fought  between  the  two 
armies  in  the  mountain  country  towards  the  Armenian  fron- 
tier, in  which  the  hero  of  a  hundred  fights  was  defeated,'"  and 
the  Romans,  for  the  first  time  since  the  death  of  Maurice,  ob- 
tained a  victory.  After  this,  on  the  approach  of  winter, 
Heraclius,  accompanied  probably  by  a  portion  of  his  army,  re- 
turned by  sea  to  Constantinople." 

The  next  year  the  attack  was  made  in  a  different  quarter. 
Having  concluded  alhances  with  the  Khan  of  the  Khazars  and 
some  other  chiefs  of  inferior  power,"-  Heraclius  in  the  month 
of  March  embarked  with  5000  men,"^  and  proceeded  from  Con- 
stantinople by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  first  to  Trebizond,"  and 
then  to  Mingrelia  or  Lazica."  There  he  obtained  contingents 
from  his  allies,  which,  added  to  the  forces  collected  from 
Trebizond  and  the  other  maritime  towns,  may  perhaps  have 
raised  his  troops  to  the  number  of  120,000,  at  which  we  find 
them  estimated.'"  With  this  army,  he  crossed  the  Araxes,'^ 
and  invaded  Armenia.  Chosroes,  on  receiving  the  intelli- 
gence, proceeded  into  Azerbijan  with  40,000  men,  and  occu- 
pied the  strong  city  of  Canzaca,'*  the  site  of  Avhich  is  probably 
marked  by  the  ruins  known  as  Takht  i-Sideiman."  At  the 
same  time  he  ordered  two  other  armies,  which  he  had  sent  on 
in  advance,  one  of  them  commanded  by  Shahr-Barz,  the  other 
by  Shahen,  to  effect  a  junction  and  oppose  themselves  to  tha 


524  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxiv, 

further  progress  of  the  emperor. '""  The  two  generals  were, 
however,  tardy  in  their  movements,'"'  or  at  any  rate  were 
outstripped  by  the  activity  of  HeracHus,  who,  pressing  for- 
ward from  Armenia  into  Azerbijan,  directed  his  march  upon 
Canzaca,  hoping  to  bring  the  Great  King  to  a  battle.  His 
advance-guard  of  Saracens  did  actually  surprise  the  picquets 
of  Chosroes ; '""  but  the  king  liimself  hastily  evacuated  the 
Median  stronghold,  and  retreated  southwards  through  Arde- 
lan  towards  the  Zagros  mountains,  thus  avoiding  the  engage- 
ment which  was  desired  by  his  antagonist.  The  army,  ou 
witnessing  the  flight  of  their  monarch,  broke  up  and  dis- 
persed.'" Heraclius  pressed  upon  the  flying  host  and  slew  all 
whom  he  caught,  but  did  not  suffer  himself  to  be  diverted 
from  his  main  object,  which  was  to  overtake  Chosroes.  His 
pursuit,  however,  was  imsuccessful.  Chosroes  availed  himself 
of  the  rough  and  difficiilt  country  which  hes  between  Azerbi- 
jan and  the  Mesopotamian  lowland,  and  by  moving  from 
place  to  place  contrive  to  baffle  his  enemy,  '°*  Winter  arrived, 
and  Heraclius  had  to  determine  whether  he  would  continue 
his  quest  at  the  risk  of  having  to  pass  the  cold  season  in  the 
enemy's  country,  far  from  all  his  resources,  or  relinquish  it 
and  retreat  to  a  safe  position.  Finding  his  soldiers  divided  in 
their  wishes,  he  trusted  the  decision  to  chance,  and  opening 
the  Gospel  at  random  settled  the  doubt  by  applying  the  first 
passage  that  met  his  eye  to  its  solution.  The  passage  sug- 
gested retreat;  and  Herachus,  retracmg  his  steps,  recrossed 
the  Araxes,  and  wintered  in  Albania.'"^ 

The  return  of  Heraclius  was  not  unmolested.  He  had  ex- 
cited the  fanaticism  of  the  Persians  by  destroying,  wherever 
he  went,  the  temples  of  the  Magians,""'  and  extinguishing  the 
sacred  fire,  which  it  was  a  part  of  their  religion  to  keep  con- 
tinually burning.  He  had  also  everywhere  delivered  the 
cities  and  villages  to  the  flames,  and  carried  off  many  thou- 
sands of  the  population.  The  exasperated  enemy  conse- 
quently hung  upon  his  rear,  impeded  his  march,  and  no  doubt 
caused  him  considerable  loss,  though,  when  it  came  to  fight- 
ing, Heraclius  always  gained  the  victory.'"'  He  reached 
Albania  without  sustaining  any  serious  disaster,  and  even 
brought  with  him  50,000  captives;  but  motives  of  pity,  or  of 
self-interest,  caused  him  soon  afterwards  to  set  these  prisoners 
free.  ""*  It  would  have  been  difficult  to  feed  and  house  them 
through  the  long  and  severe  winter,  and  disgraceful  to  sell  or 
Qiassacre  them, 


CH.  xxiY.]    VICTORIES  OF  IIERACLIU8  IN  PERSIA.         525 

In  the  year  a.d.  624  Chosroes  took  the  offensive,  and,  before 
Heraclius  had  quitted  his  winter  quarters,  sent  a  general,  at 
the  head  of  a  force  of  picked  troops,  into  Albania, '"'  with  the 
view  of  detaining  him  in  that  remote  province  during  the  sea- 
son of  military  operations.  But  Sarablagas  feared  his  adver- 
sary too  much  to  be  able  very  effectually  to  check  his  move- 
ments ;  he  was  content  to  guard  the  passes,  and  hold  the  high 
ground,  without  hazarding  an  engagement.  Herachus  con- 
trived after  a  time  to  avoid  him,  and  penetrated  into  Persia 
through  a  series  of  plains,  probably  those  along  the  course  and 
about  the  mouth  of  the  Araxes.  It  was  now  his  wish  to  push 
rapidly  southward ;  but  the  auxiliaries  on  whom  he  greatly  de- 
pended"" were  unwilling;  and,  while  he  doubted  what  course 
to  take,  three  Persian  armies,  under  commanders  of  note,'" 
closed  in  upon  him,  and  threatened  his  small  force  with  de- 
struction. Heraclius  feigned  a  disordered  flight,  and  drew  on 
him  an  attack  from  two  out  of  the  three  chiefs,  which  he  easily 
repelled.  Then  he  fell  upon  the  third,  Shahen,  and  completely 
defeated  him.  A  way  seemed  to  be  thus  opened  for  him  into 
the  heart  of  Persia,  and  he  once  more  set  ofE  to  seek  Chosroes ; 
but  now  his  allies  began  to  desert  his  standard,  and  return  to 
their  homes;'"  the  defeated  Persians  rallied  and  impeded  his 
march ;  he  was  obliged  to  content  himseK  with  a  third  victory, 
at  a  place  which  Theophanes  calls  Salban,'"  where  he  surprised 
Shahr-Barz  in  the  dead  of  the  night,  massacred  liis  troops,  his 
wives,  his  ofiicers,  and  the  mass  of  the  population,  which  fought 
from  the  flat  roofs  of  the  houses,  took  the  general's  arms  and 
equipage,  and  was  within  a  little  of  capturing  Shahr-barz  him- 
self.'" The  remnant  of  the  Persian  army  fled  in  disorder,  and 
was  hunted  down  by  Herachus,  who  pursued  the  fugitives  un- 
ceasingly tni  the  cold  season  approached,  and  he  had  to  retire 
into  cantonments.  The  half-burnt  Salban  afforded  a  welcome 
shelter  to  his  troops  during  the  snows  and  storms  of  an  Arme- 
nian winter."^ 

Early  in  the  ensuing  spring  the  indefatigable  emperor  again 
set  his  troops  in  motion,  and,  passing  the  lofty  range""  which 
separates  the  basin  of  Lake  Van  from  the  streams  that  flow 
into  the  upper  Tigris,  struck  that  river,  or  rather  its  large 
affluent,  the  Bitlis  Chai,'"  in  seven  days  from  Salban,  crossed 
into  Arzanene,  and  proceeding  westward  recovered  Martyr- 
opolis  and  Amida,""  which  had  now  been  in  the  possession  of 
the  Persians  for  twenty  years. ""  At  Amida  he  made  a  halt,  and 
wrote  to  inform  the  Senate  of  Constantinople  of  his  position 


526  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxiv. 

and  his  victories,  intelligence  which  they  must  have  received 
gladly  after  having  lost  sight  of  him  for  above  a  twelvemonth. 
But  he  was  not  allowed  to  remain  long  undisturbed.  Before 
the  end  of  March  Shahr-Barz  had  again  taken  the  field  in  force, 
had  occupied  the  usual  passage  of  the  Euphrates,  and  threat- 
ened the  hne  of  retreat  which  Heraclius  had  looked  upon  as 
open  to  him.  Unable  to  cross  the  Euphrates  by  the  bridge, 
which  Shahr-barz  had  broken,'-"  the  emperor  descended  the^ 
stream  till  he  found  a  ford,  when  he  transported  his  army  to 
the  other  bank,  and  hastened  by  way  of  Samosata  and  Germa- 
nicaea'"  into  Cilicia.  Here  he  was  once  more  in  his  own  terri- 
tory, with  the  sea  close  at  hand,  ready  to  bring  him  supplies  or 
afford  him  a  safe  retreat,  in  a  position  with  whose  advantages 
he  was  f amihar, '"  where  broad  plains  gave  an  opportunity  for 
skilful  maneuvers,  and  deep  rapid  rivers  rendered  defence 
easy.  Heraclius  took  up  a  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Sarus  (Syhun),  in  the  mimediate  vicinity  of  the  fortified  bridge 
by  which  alone  the  stream  could  be  crossed."^  Shahr-Barz 
followed,  and  ranged  his  troops  along  the  left  bank,  placing 
the  archers  in  the  front  line,  while  he  made  preparations  to 
draw  the  enemy  from  the  defence  of  the  bridge  into  the  plain 
on  the  other  side.  He  was  so  far  successful  that  the  Eoman 
occupation  of  the  bridge  was  endangered ;  but  Heraclius,  by  his 
personal  valor  and  by  almost  superhuman  exertions, '-'  restored 
the  day ;  with  his  own  hand  he  struck  down  a  Persian  of  gigan- 
tic stature  and  flung  him  from  the  bridge  into  the  river;  then 
pushing  on  with  a  few  companions,  he  charged  the  Persian  host 
in  the  plain,  receiving  undaunted  a  shower  of  blows,  while  he 
dealt  destruction  on  all  sides. '"  The  fight  was  prolonged  until 
the  evening  and  even  then  was  undecided ;  but  Shahr-Barz  had 
convinced  himseK  that  he  could  not  renew  the  combat  with  any 
prospect  of  victory.  He  therefore  retreated  during  the  night, 
and  withdrew  from  Cihcia.'-"  Heraclius,  finding  himself  free 
to  march  where  he  pleased,  crossed  the  Taurus,  and  proceeded 
to  Sebaste  (Sivas),  upon  the  Halys,  where  he  wintered  in  the 
heart  of  Cappadocia,  about  half-way  between  the  two  seas.  Ac 
cording  to  Theophanes,'"  the  Persian  monarch  was  so  much 
enraged  at  this  bold  and  adventurous  march,  and  at  the  suc- 
cess which  had  attended  it,  that,  by  way  of  revenging  himself 
on  Herachus,  he  seized  the  treasures  of  all  the  Christian  churches 
in  his  dominions,  and  compelled  the  orthodox  believers  to  em- 
brace the  Nestorian  heresy. 
The  twenty-fourth  year  of  the  war  had  now  arrived,  and  it 


CH.  XXIV.]  ALLIANCE  OF  GUOSROES  WITH  THE  AYAHS,  507 

was  difficult  to  say  on  Avhich  side  lay  tlie  balance  of  advantage. 
If  Chosroes  still  maintained  his  hold  on  Syria,  Egypt,  and  Asia 
Minor  as  far  as  Chalcedon,  if  his  troops  still  flaunted  their  ban- 
ners within  sight  of  Constantinople,  yet  on  the  other  hand  he 
had  seen  his  hereditary  dominions  deeply  penetrated  by  the 
armies  of  his  adversary ;  he  had  had  his  best  generals  defeated, 
his  cities  and  palaces  burnt,  his  favorite  provinces  wasted; 
Heraclius  had  proved  himself  a  most  formidable  opponent ;  and 
unless  some  vital  blow  could  be  dealt  him  at  home,  there  was 
no  forecasting  the  damage  that  he  might  not  inflict  on  Persia 
by  a  fresh  invasion.  Chosroes  therefore  made  a  desperate  at- 
tempt to  bring  the  war  to  a  close  by  an  effort,  the  success  of 
which  would  have  changed  the  history  of  the  world.  Having 
enrolled  as  soldiers,  besides  Persians,  a  vast  number  of  foreign- 
ers and  slaves,  '■'  and  having  concluded  a  close  alliance  with  the 
Khan  of  the  Avars,  he  formed  two  great  armies,  '■"  one  of  which 
was  intended  to  watch  Heraclius  in  Asia  Minor,  while  the.other 
co-operated  with  the  Avars  and  forced  Constantinople  to  sur- 
render. The  army  destined  to  contend  with  the  emperor  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  Shahen ;  that  which  was  to  bear 
a  part  in  the  siege  of  Constantinople  was  committed  to  Shahr- 
Barz.  It  is  remarkable  that  Heraclius,  though  quite  aware  of 
his  adversary's  plans,  instead  of  seeking  to  baffle  them,  made 
such  arrangements  as  facilitated  the  attempt  to  put  them  into 
execution.  He  divided  his  own  troops  into  three  bodies,  one 
only  of  which  he  sent  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  his  capital.  '^" 
The  second  body  he  left  with  his  brother  Theodore,  whom  he 
regarded  as  a  sufficient  match  for  Shahen.  With  the  third  di- 
vision he  proceeded  eastward  to  the  remote  province  of  Lazica^,  '^' 
and  there  engaged  in  operations  which  could  but  very  slightly 
affect  the  general  course  of  the  war.  The  Khazars  were  once 
more  called  in  as  allies;  and  their  Khan,  Ziebcl,  who  coveted 
the  plunder  of  Tiflis,  held  an  interview  with  the  emperor  in  the 
sight  of  the  Persians  who  guarded  that  town,  adored  his  ma- 
jesty, and  received  from  his  hands  the  diadem  that  adorned 
his  own  brow.'"  Richly  entertained,  and  presented  with  all 
the  plate  used  in  the  banquet,  with  a  royal  robe,  and  a  paii*  of 
pearl  earrings,  promised  moreover  the  daughter  of  the  em- 
peror(\vhose  portrait  he  was  shown)  in  marriage,  the  barbarian 
chief,  dazzled  and  flattered,  readily  concluded  an  alliance,  and 
associated  his  arms  with  those  of  the  Romans. '"  A  joint  at- 
tack was  made  upon  Tiflis,  "*  and  the  town  was  reduced  to  ex- 
tremities; when  Sarablagas,  with  a  thousand  men,  contrived 


^528  THE  SWENTII  MOKAIWIIY.  [cii.  xxiv. 

to  throw  himself  into  it,  and  the  alKes,  disheartened  thereby, 
raised  the  siege  and  retired. 

Meanwhile,  in  Asia  Minor,  Theodore  engaged  the  army  of 
Shahen;  and,  a  violent  hailstorm  raging  at  the  time,  which 
drove  into  the  enemy's  face,  while  the  Romans  were,  compara- 
tively speaking,  sheltered  from  its  force,  he  succeeded  in  de- 
feating his  antagonist  with  great  slaughter.  Choroes  was  in- 
furiated; and  the  displeasure  of  his  sovereign  weighed  so 
heavily  upon  the  mind  of  Shahen  that  he  shortly  afterwards 
sickened  and  died.  The  barbarous  monarch  gave  orders  that 
his  corpse  should  be  embalmed  and  sent  to  the  court,  in  order 
that  he  might  gratify  his  spleen  by  treating  it  with  the  grossest 
indignity. '" 

At  Constantinople  the  Persian  cause  was  equally  unsuccess- 
ful.    Shahr-Barz,   from  Chalcedon,  entered  into  negotiations 
with  the  Khan  of  the  Avars,  and  found  but  little  difficulty  in 
persuading  him  to  make  an  attempt  upon  the  imperial  city. 
From  their  seats  beyond  the  Danube  a  host  of  barbarians- 
Avars,  Slaves,   Gepidae,  Bulgarians,"'  and  others— advanced 
through  the  passes  of  Hsemus  into  the  plains  of  Thrace,  de- 
stroying and  ravaging.     The  population  fled  before  them  and 
sought  the  protection  of  the  city  walls,  which  had  been  carefully 
strengthened  in  expectation  of  the  attack,  and  were  in  good 
order. '"    The  hordes  forced  the  outer  works ;  but  aU  their  ef- 
forts,  though  made  both  by  land  and  sea,  were  unavailing 
against  the  main  defences ;  their  attempt  to  sap  the  wall  failed ; 
their  artillery  was  met  and  crushed  by  engines  of   greater 
power;"'  a  fleet  of  Slavonian  oanoes,  which  endeavored  to  force 
an  entrance  by  the  Golden  Horn,"' was  destroyed  or  driven 
ashore;'"  the  towers  with  which  they  sought   to  overtop  the 
walls  were  burnt;'*'  and,  after  ten  days  of  constantly  repeated 
assaults,  '*'  the  barbarian  leader  became  convinced  that  he  had 
undertaken  an  impossible  enterprise,  and,   having  burnt  his 
engines  and  his  siege  works, '^' he  retired.     The  result  might 
have  been  different  had  the  Persians,  who  were  experienced  in 
the  attack  of  walled  places,  been  able  to  co-operate  with  him ; 
but  the  narrow  channel  which  flowed  between  Chalcedon  and 
the  Golden  Horn  proved  an  insurmountable  barrier ;  the  Per- 
sians had  no  ships,  and  the  canoes  of  the  Slavonians  were  quite 
unable  to  contend  with  the  powerful  galleys  of  the  Byzantines, 
so  that  the  transport  of  a  body  of  Persian  troops  from  Asia  to 
Europe  by  their  aid  proved  impracticable. '"    Shahr-Barz  liad 
the  amioyance  of  witnessing  the  efforts  and  defeat  of  his  allies, 


CH.  XXIV.]  UERACLIUS  MARCHES  UPON  DASTAGEERD.  529 

without  having  it  in  his  power  to  take  any  active  steps  towards 
assisting  the  one  or  hindering  the  other. 

The  war  now  approached  its  termination ;  for  the  last  hope 
of  the  Persians  had  failed ;  and  HeracUus,  with  his  mind  set  at 
rest  as  regarded  his  capital,  was  free  to  strike  at  any  part  of 
Persia  that  he  pleased,  and,  having  the  prestige  of  victory  and 
the  assistance  of  the  Khazars,  was  likely  to  carry  all  before 
him.     It  is  not  clear '^"  how  he  employed  himself  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  a.d.  627;  but  in  the  September  of  that 
year  he  started  from  Lazica'*"  with  a  large  Roman  army  and  a  -^ 
contingent  of  40,000  Khazar  horse/"  resolved  to  surprise  his 
adversary  by  a  winter  campaign,  and  hoping  to  take  him  at  a 
disadvantage.     Passing  rapidly  through  Armenia  and  Azer- 
bijan  without  meeting  an  enemy  that  dared  to  dispute  his 
advance,  suffering  no  loss  except  from  the  guerilla  warfare  of 
some  bold  spirits  among  the  mountaineers  of  those  regions,  '^"* 
he  resolved,  notwithstanding  the  defection  of  the  Khazars,'" 
who  declined  to  accompany  him  further  south  than  Azerbijan, 
that  he  would  cross  the  Zagros  mountains  into  Assyria,  and 
make  a  dash  at  the  royal  cities  of  the  Mesopotamian  region, 
thus  retaliating  upon  Chosroes  for  the  Avar  attack  upon  Con- 
stantinople of  the  preceding  year,  undertaken  at  his  instiga- 
tion.    Chosroes  himself  had  for  the  last  tw^enty-four  years 
fixed  his  court  at  Dastagherd""  in  the  plain  country,  about 
seventy  miles  to  the  north  of  Ctesiphon.'"    It  seemed  to  Her- 
acUus that    this  position  might  perhaps  be  reached,  and  an 
effective  blow  struck  against  the  Persian  power.     He  hastened, 
therefore,  to  cross  the  mountains ;  and  the  9th  of  October  saw 
him  at  Chxaeethas, '"  in  the  low  country,  not  far  from  Arbela, 
where  he  refreshed  his  army  by  a  week's  rest.     He  might  now 
easily  have  advanced  along  the  great  post-road  which  con- 
nected Arbela  with  Dastagherd  and  Ctesiphon;  but  he  had 
probably  by  this  time  received  information  of  the  movements 
of  the  Persians,  and  was  aware  that  by  so  doing  he  w-ould 
place  himself  between  two  fires,  and  run  the  chance  of  being 
intercepted  in  his  retreat.    For  Chosroes,  having  collected  a 
large  force,  had  sent  it,  under  Rhazates,  a  new  general,  into 
Azerbijan;'"  and  this  force,  having  reached  Canzaca,  found 
itself  in   the  rear  of    Heraclius,   between   him   and  Lazica. 
Heraclius  appears  not  to  have  thought  it  safe  to  leave  this 
enemy  behind  him,   and  therefore  he  idled  away  above  a 
month  in  the  Zab  region,  waiting  for  Rhazates  to  make  his 
appearance.     That  general  had  strict  orders  from  the  Great 


530  THE  SEVENTH  MONAICHT.  [ch.  xxir. 

King  to  fight  the  Romans  wherever  he  found  them,  whatever 
might  be  the  consequence;'^^  and  he  therefore  followed,  as 
quickly  as  he  could,  upon  Heraclius's  footsteps,  and  early  in 
December  came  up  with  him  in  the  neighborhood  of  Nineveh. 
Both  parties  were  anxious  for  an  immediate  engagement, 
Ithazates  to  carry  out  his  master's  orders,  Heraclius  because 
he  had  heard  that  his  adversary  would  soon  receive  a  rein- 
>  f  orcement.  The  battle  took  place  on  the  12th  of  December, '" 
in  the  open  plain  to  the  north  of  Nineveh.'"'  It  was  contested 
from  eai'ly  dawn  to  the  eleventh  hour  of  the  day,  and  was 
finally  decided,  more  by  the  accident  that  Rhazates  and  the 
other  Persian  commanders  were  slain,  than  by  any  defeat  of 
the  soldiers.  Heraclius  is  said  to  have  distinguished  himself 
personally  during  the  fight  by  many  valiant  exploits;'"  but  he 
does  not  appear  to  have  exhibited  any  remarkable  strategy  on 
the  occasion.  The  Persians  lost  their  generals,  their  chariots, 
and  as  many  as  twenty-eight  standards;'"®  but  they  were  not 
routed,  nor  driven  from  the  field.  They  merely  drew  off  to 
the  distance  of  two  bowshots,'""  and  there  stood  firm  till  after 
niglitfall.  During  the  night  they  fell  back  further  upon  their 
fortified  camp,  collected  their  baggage,  and  retired  to  a  strong 
position  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains.  Here  they  were  joined 
by  the  reinforcement  which  Chosroes  had  sent  to  their  aid;'" 
and  thus  strengthened  they  ventured  to  approach  Herachus 
once  more,  to  hang  on  his  rear,  and  impede  his  movements. 
He,  after  his  victory,  had  resumed  his  march  southward,  had 
occupied  Nineveh,  recrossed  the  Great  Zab,  advanced  rapidly 
through  Adiabene  to  the  Lesser  Zab,  seized  its  bridges  by  a 
forced  march  of  forty-eight  (Roman)  miles,  and  conveyed  his 
army  safely  to  its  left  bank,  where  he  pitched  his  camp  at  a 
place  called  Yesdem,""  and  once  more  allowed  his  soldiers  a 
brief  repose  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  Christmas.  Chosroes 
had  by  this  time  heard  of  the  defeat  and  death  of  Rhazates, 
and  was  in  a  state  of  extreme  alarm.  Hastily  recalling  Shahr- 
Barz  from  Chalcedon,"' and  ordering  the  troops  lately  com- 
manded by  Rhazates  to  outstrip  the  Romans,  if  possible,  and 
interpose  themselves  between  Heraclius  and  Dastagherd, '"  he 
took  up  a  strong  position  near  that  place  with  his  own  army 
and  a  number  of  elephants,  and  expressed  an  intention  of 
there  awaiting  his  antagonist.  A  broad  and  deep  river,  or 
rather  canal,  known  as  the  Baras-roth  or  Barazrud,'"  pro- 
tected his  front;  while  at  some  distance  further  in  advance 
vas  the  Torna,  probably  another  canal,'"  where  he  expected 


CH.  XXIV.]  FLIGHT  OF  CHOSROES.  531 

that  the  army  of  Rhazates  -would  make  a  stand.  But  that 
force,  demoralized  by  its  recent  defeat,  fell  back  from  the  line 
of  the  Torna,  without  even  destroying  the  bridge  over  it;'" 
and  Chosroes,  finding  the  foe  advancing  on  him,  lost  heart, 
and  secretly  fled  from  Dastagherd  to  Ctesiphon, '"  whence  he 
crossed  the  Tigris  to  Guedeseer  or  Seleucia,  with  his  treasure 
and  the  best-loved  of  his  wives  and  children.'^*  The  army 
lately  under  Rhazates  rallied  upon  the  line  of  the  Nahr-wan"° 
canal,  three  miles  from  Ctesiphon;  and  here  it  was  largely 
reinforced,  though  with  a  mere  worthless  mob  of  slaves  and 
domestics.""  It  made  however  a  formidable  show,  supported 
by  its  elephants,  which  numbered  two  hundred ;  it  had  a  deep 
and  wide  cutting  in  its  front ;  and,  this  time,  it  had  taken  care 
to  destroy  all  the  bridges  by  which  the  cutting  might  have 
been  crossed.  Heraclius,  having  plundered  the  rich  palace  of 
Dastagherd, '"  together  with  several  less  splendid  royal  resi- 
dences, and  having  on  the  10th  of  January  encamped  within 
twelve  miles  of  the  Nahr-wan,'"  and  learnt  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  Armenian  contingent,  whom  he  sent  forward 
to  reconnoitre,  that  the  canal  was  impassable,  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  his  expedition  had  reached  its  extreme  limit, 
and  that  prudence  required  hmi  to  commence  his  retreat. 
The  season  had  been,  it  would  seem,  exceptionally  mild,  "^  and 
the  passes  of  the  mountains  were  still  oppn;  but  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  in  a  few  weeks  they  would  be  closed  by  the 
snow,  which  always  falls  heavily  during  some  portion  of 
the  winter.  Heraclius,  therefore,  like  Julian,"^  having  come 
within  sight  of  Ctesiphon,  shrank  from  the  idea  of  besieging  it, 
and,  content  with  the  punishment  that  he  had  inflicted  on  his 
enemy  by  wasting  and  devastation,  desisted  from  his  expedi- 
tion, and  retraced  his  steps.  In  his  retreat  he  was  more  for- 
tunate than  his  great  predecessor.  The  defeat  which  he  had 
inflicted  on  the  main  army  of  the  Persians  paralyzed  their 
energies,  and  it  would  seem  that  his  return  march  was  un- 
molested. He  reached  Siazurus  (Shehrizur)  early  in  Feb- 
ruary,'"' Barzan  {Berozeh)  probably  on  the  1st  of  March,''"  and 
on  the  11th  of  March  Canzaca,"'  where  he  remained  during  the 
rest  of  the  winter. 

Chosroes  had  escaped  a  great  danger,  but  he  had  incurred  a 
terrible  disgi-ace.  He  had  fled  before  his  adversary  without 
venturing  to  give  him  battle.  He  had  seen  palace  after  palace 
destroyed,  and  had  lost  the  magnificent  residence  where  he  had 
held  his  court  for  the  last  four-and-twenty  years.     The  Roman* 


532  27//i?  SEVEl^TII  MONAECnr.  [ch.  xxiv. 

had  recovered  300  standards,  "*  trophies  gained  in  the  numerous 
victories  of  his  early  years.  They  had  shown  themselves  able 
to  penetrate  into  the  heart  of  his  empire,  and  to  retire  Avithout 
suffering  any  loss.  Still,  had  he  possessed  a  moderate  amount 
of  prudence,  Chosroes  might  even  now  have  surmomited  the 
j)erils  of  liis  position,  and  have  terminated  his  reign  in  tran- 
quillity, if  not  in  glory.  Herachus  was  anxious  for  peace,'" 
and  wiUing  to  grant  it  on  reasonable  conditions.  He  did  not 
aim  at  conquests,  and  would  have  been  contented  at  any  time 
with  the  restoration  of  Egypt,  Syria,  and  Asia  Minor.  The 
Persians  generally  were  weary  of  the  war,  and  would  have 
hailed  with  joy  almost  any  terms  of  accommodation. ""  But 
Chosroes  was  obstinate ;  he  did  not  know  how  to  bear  the 
frowns  of  fortune ;  the  disasters  of  the  late  campaign,  instead 
of  bending  his  spirit,  had  simply  exasperated  him,  and  he 
vented  upon  his  own  subjects  the  ill-humor  which  the  successes 
of  his  enemies  had  provoked.  Lending  a  too  ready  ear  to  a 
whispered  slander,  he  ordered  the  execution  of  Shahr-Barz,  and 
thus  mortally  offended  that  general,  to  whom  the  despatch  was 
communicated  by  the  Eomans.'"  He  imprisoned  the  officers 
who  had  been  defeated  by,  or  had  fled  before  Heraclius. ""  Sev- 
eral other  tyrannical  acts  are  alleged  against  him;""  and  it  is 
said'"  that  he  was  contemplating  the  setting  aside  of  his  legiti- 
mate successor,  Siroes,  in  favor  of  a  younger  son,  Merdasas, 
his  offspring  by  his  favorite  wife,  the  Christian  Shirin,'"  when 
a  rebellion  broke  out  against  his  authority.  Gurdanaspa,  "^ 
who  was  in  command  of  the  Persian  troops  at  Ctesiphon,  and 
twenty -two  nobles  of  importance,'"  including  two  sons  of 
Shahr-Barz,  '***  embraced  the  cause  of  Siroes,  and  seizing  Chos- 
roes, who  meditated  flight,  '^^  committed  him  to  ' '  the  House  of 
Darkness,"  a  strong  place  where  he  kept  his  money.""  Here 
he  was  confined  for  four  days,  his  jailers  allowing  him  daOy  a 
morsel  of  bread  and  a  small  quantity  of  water ;  when  he  com- 
plained of  hunger,  they  told  him,  by  his  son's  orders,  that  he 
was  welcome  to  satisfy  his  appetite  by  feasting  upon  his  treas- 
ures. The  officers  whom  he  had  confined  were  allowed  free 
access  to  his  prison,  where  they  insulted  him  and  spat  upon 
him.  Merdasas,  the  son  whom  he  preferred,  and  several  of  his 
other  children,  were  brought  into  his  presence  and  put  to  death 
before  his  eyes.  After  suffering  in  this  way  for  four  days  he 
was  at  last,  on  the  fifth  day  from  his  arrest  (February  28),  put 
to  death  in  some  cruel  fashion,  perhaps,  like  St.  Sebastian,  by 
being  transfixed  with  arrows.'"    Thus  perished  miserably  the 


CH.  XXIV.]  CHARACTER  OF  CIIOSROES  II.  633 

second  Chosroes,  after  having  reigned  thirty-seven  years'" 
(a.d.  591-628),  a  just  but  tardy  Nemesis  overtaking  the  parri- 
cide. 

The  Oriental  writers  represent  the  second  Chosroes  as  a 
monarch  whose  character  was  orginally  admirable,  but 
whose  good  disposition  was  gradually  corrupted  by  the  pos- 
session of  sovereign  power-.  "Parviz,"  says  Mirkhond,""" 
"holds  a  distinguished  rank  among  the  kings  of  Persia 
through  the  majesty  and  firmness  of  his  government,  the  wis- 
dom of  his  views,  and  his  intrepidity  in  carrying  them  out,  the 
size  of  his  army,  the  amount  of  his  treasure,  the  flourishing 
condition  of  the  provinces  during  his  reign,  the  security  of  the 
highways,  the  prompt  and  exact  obedience  which  he  enforced, 
and  his  unalterable  adherence  to  the  plans  which  he  once 
formed."  It  is  impossible  that  these  praises  can  have  been 
altogether  undeserved ;  and  we  are  bound  to  assign  to  this 
monarch,  on  the  authority  of  the  Orientals,  a  vigor  of  admin- 
istration, a  strength  of  will,  and  a  capacity  for  governing,  not 
very  commonly  possessed  by  princes  born  in  the  purple.  To 
these  merits  we  may  add  a  certain  grandeur  of  soul,  and  power 
of  appreciating  the  beautiful  and  the  magnificent,  which, 
though  not  uncommon  in  the  East,  did  not  characterize  many 
of  the  Sassanian  sovereigns.  The  architectural  remains  of 
Chosroes,  which  will  be  noticed  in  a  future  chapter,  the  de- 
scriptions which  have  come  down  to  us  of  his  palaces  at 
Dastagherd '"^  and  Canzaca, '"  the  accounts  which  we  have  of 
his  treasures,""  his  court,''"  Ms  seraglio,'''*  even  his  seals,'"' 
transcend  all  that  is  known  of  any  other  monarch  of  his  line. 
The  employment  of  Byzantine  sculptors  and  arcliitects,  which 
his  works  are  thought  to  indicate,  implies  an  appreciation  of 
artistic  excellence  very  rare  among  Orientals.  But  against 
these  merits  must  be  set  a  number  of  most  serious  moi'al  de- 
fects, which  may  have  been  aggravated  as  time  went  on,  but 
of  which  we  see  something  more  than  the  germ,  even  while  he 
was  still  a  youth.  The  murder  of  his  father  was  perhaps  a 
state  necessity,  and  he  may  not  have  commanded  it,  or  have 
been  accessory  to  it  before  the  fact ;'°''  but  his  ingi-atitude  to- 
wards his  uncles,  whom  he  deliberately  put  to  death,  is  wholly 
unpardonable,  and  shows  him  to  have  been  ciiiel,  selfish,  and 
utterly  without  natural  affection,  even  in  the  earlier  portion  of 
his  reign.  In  war  he  exhibited  neither  courage  nor  conduct; 
all  his  main  military  successes  were  due  to  his  generals;  and 
in  his  later  years  he  seems  never  voluntarily  to  have  exposed 


534  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxnr. 

himself  to  danger.  In  suspecting  his  generals,  and  ill-using 
them  while  living,  he  only  followed  the  traditions  of  his 
house;'""  but  the  insults  offered  to  the  dead  body  of  Shahen. 
whose  only  fault  was  that  he  had  suffered  a  defeat,  were  un- 
usual and  outrageous.  The  accounts  given  of  his  seraglio  im- 
ply either  gi'oss  sensuahsm  or  extreme  ostentation;  perhaps 
we  may  be  justified  in  inclining  to  the  more  lenient  view,  if  we 
take  into  consideration  the  faithful  attachment  which  he  ex- 
hibited towards  Shirin."""  The  cruelties  which  disgraced  his 
later  years  are  wholly  without  excuse ;  but  in  the  act  which 
deprived  him  of  his  throne,  and  brought  him  to  a  miserable 
end — Ms  preference  of  Merdasas  as  his  successor — he  exhibited 
no  worse  fault  than  an  amiable  weakness,  a  partiaUty  towards 
the  son  of  a  wife  who  possessed,  and  seems  to  have  deserved,'^"'' 
his  affection. 

The  coins  of  the  second  Chosroes  are  numerous  in  the  ex- 
treme, ^"^  and  present  several  pecvdiarities.  The  ordinary  type 
has,  on  the  obverse,  the  king's  head  in  profile,  covered  by  a 
tiara,  of  which  the  chief  ornament  is  a  crescent  and  star  be- 
tween two  outstretched  wings.  The  head  is  surrounded  by  a 
double  pearl  bordering,  outside  of  which,  in  the  margin,  are 
three  crescents  and  stars.  The  legend  is  Khusrui  afzud,  with 
a  monogram  of  doubtful  meaning.  ^"^  The  reverse  shows  the 
usual  fire  altar  and  supporters,  in  a  rude  form,  enclosed  by  a 
triple  pearl  bordering.  In  the  margin,  outside  the  bordering, 
are  four  crescents  and  stars.  The  legend  is  merely  the  regnal 
year  and  a  mint-mark.  Thirty -four  mint-marks  ^'"' have  been 
ascribed  to  Chosroes  II.     [PI.  XXIII.,  Fig.  4.] 

A  rarer  and  more  curious  type  of  coin,°"  belonging  to  this 
monarch,  presents  on  the  obverse  the  front  face  of  the  king, 
surmounted  by  a  mural  crown,  having  the  star  and  crescent 
between  outstretched  wings  at  top.  The  legend  is  Khusrui 
malkan  malka  —  afzud.  "Chosroes,  king  of  kings  -  increase 
(be  his)."  The  reverse  has  a  head  like  that  of  a  woman,  also 
fronting  the  spectator,  and  wearing  a  band  enriched  with  pearls 
across  the  forehead,  above  which  the  hair  gradually  converges 
to  a  point.  [PI.  XXIV.,  Fig.  1.]  A  head  very  similar  to  this  is 
found  on  Indo-Sassanian  coins.  ^"^  Otherwise  we  might  have 
supposed  that  the  uxorious  monarch  had  wished  to  circulate 
among  lijs  subjects  the  portrait  of  his  beloved  Shirin. 


CH.  XXV.]  ACVE8SI0N  OF  KOBAD  11.  535 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

Accession  of  Siroes,  or  Kobad  II.  His  Letter  to  Heraclius. 
Peace  made  ivith  Rome.  Terms  of  the  Peace.  General 
Poptdarity  of  the  new  Reign.  Dissatisfaction  of  Shahr- 
Barz.  Kobad,  by  the  advice  of  the  Persian  Lords,  'murders 
his  Brothers.  His  Sisters  reproach  him  icith  their  Death. 
He  falls  into  loio  spirits  and  dies.  Pestilence  in  his  Reign. 
His  coins.  Accession  of  Artaxerxes  III.  Revolt  of  Shahr- 
Barz.  Reign  of  Shahr-Barz.  His  Murder.  Reign  of 
Purandocht.  Rapid  Succession  of  Pretenders.  Accession 
of  Isdigerd  III. 

"Kobades,  regno   preefectus,  justitiam  prae  se  tullt,  et  injuriam  qua  oppressa 
fuerat  amovit."— Eutychius,  Annales,  vol,  ii.  p.  252. 

Siroes,  or  Kobad  the  Second,  as  he  is  more  properly  termed, ' 
was  proclaimed  king  on  the  25th  of  February,"  a.d.  628,  four 
days  before  the  murder  of  Ins  father.  According  to  the  Orien- 
tal writers,'  he  was  very  unwilhng  to  put  his  father  to  death, 
and  only  gave  a  reluctant  consent  to  his  execution  on  the  rep- 
resentations of  his  nobles  that  it  was  a  state  of  necessity.  His 
first  care,  after  this  urgent  matter  had  been  settled,  was  to 
make  overtures  of  peace  to  Heraclius,  who,  having  safely 
crossed  the  Zagros  mountains,^  was  wintering  at  Canzaca. 
The  letter  which  he  addressed  to  the  Roman  Emperor  on  the 
occasion  is  partially  extant ;  but  the  formal  and  official  tone 
which  it  breathes  renders  it  a  somewhat  disappointing  docu- 
ment. Kobad  begins  by  addressing  Heraclius  as  his  brother, 
and  giving  him  the  epithet  of  "most  clement,"  '  thus  assmning 
his  pacific  disposition.  He  then  declares,  that,  having  been 
elevated  to  the  throne  by  the  especial  favor  of  God,  he  has  re- 
solved to  do  his  utmost  to  benefit  and  serve  the  entire  human 
race.  He  has  therefore  commenced  his  reign  by  throwmg  open 
the  prison  doors,  and  restoring  liberty  to  all  who  were  detained 
in  custody.*  With  the  same  object  in  view,  he  is  desirous  of 
living  in  peace  and  friendship  with  the  Roman  emperor  and 
state  as  well  as  with  all  other  neighboring  nations  and  kings. 
Assuming  that  his  accession  will  be  pleasing  to  the  emperor, 
ho  has  sent  Phseak,  one  of  his  privy  councillors,  to  express  the 


536  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxv. 

love  and  friendship  that  he  feels  towards  his  brother,  and  learn 
the  terms  upon  which  peace  will  be  granted  him. '  The  reply 
of  Heraclius  is  lost;  but  we  are  able  to  gather  from  a  short 
summary  which  has  been  preserved, '  as  well  as  from  the  sub- 
sequent course  of  events,  that  it  was  complimentary  and  fa- 
vorable; that  it  expressed  the  willingness  of  the  emperor  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  close,  and  suggested  terms  of  accommoda 
tion  that  were  moderate  and  equitable.  The  exact  formulation 
of  the  treaty  seems  to  have  been  left  to  Eustathius,  who,  after 
Heraclius  had  entertained  Pheeak  royally  for  nearly  a  week," 
accompanied  the  ambassador  on  his  return  to  the  Persian 
court. 

The  general  principle  upon  which  peace  was  concluded  was 
evidently  the  status  quo  ante  helium.  Persia  was  to  surrender 
Egypt,  Palestine,  Syria,  Asia  Minor,  Western  Mesopotamia, 
and  any  other  conquests  that  she  might  have  made  from  Rome, 
to  recall  her  troops  from  them, '"  and  to  give  them  back  into  the 
possession  of  the  Romans.  She  was  also  to  surrender  all  the 
captives  whom  she  had  carried  off  from  the  conquered  coun- 
tries;" and,  above  all,  she  was  to  give  back  to  the  Romans  the 
precious  relic  which  had  been  taken  from  Jerusalem,  '^  and 
which  was  believed  on  all  hands  to  be  the  veritable  cross 
whereon  Jesus  Christ  suffered  death.  As  Rome  had  merely 
made  inroads,  but  not  conquests,  she  did  not  possess  any  terri- 
tory to  surrender ;  but  she  doubtless  set  her  Persian  prisoners 
free,  and  she  made  arrangements  for  the  safe  conduct  and  hon- 
orable treatment  of  the  Persians,  who  evacuated  Syria,  Egypt, 
and  Asia  Minor,  on  their  way  to  the  frontier. ''  The  evacuation 
was  at  once  commenced ;  and  the  wood  of  the  cross,  which  had 
been  carefully  preserved  by  the  Persian  queen,  Shirin,'*was 
restored.  In  the  next  year,  '^  Heraclius  made  a  grand  pilgrim- 
age to  Jerusalem,  and  replaced  the  holy  relic  in  the  shrine  from 
which  it  had  been  taken. 

It  is  said  that  princes  are  always  popular  on  their  coronation 
day.  Kobad  was  certainly  no  exception  to  the  general  rule. " 
His  subjects  rejoiced  at  the  termination  of  a  war  which  had 
always  been  a  serious  drain  on  the  population,  and  which  lat- 
terly had  brought  ruin  and  desolation  upon  the  hearths  and 
homes  of  thousands.  The  general  emptying  of  the  prisons  was 
an  act  that  cannot  be  called  statesmanlike ;  but  it  had  a  spe- 
cious appearance  of  liberality,  and  was  probably  viewed  with 
favor  by  the  mass  of  the  people.  A  still  more  popular  measure 
must  have  been  the  complete  remission  of  taxes  with  which 


CH.  XXV.]  ATTITUDE  OF  SUAnn-BABZ.  537 

Kobad  inaugurated  his  reign  "—a  remission  which,  according 
to  one  authority,  was  to  have  continued  for  three  years,  had 
the  generous  prince  Uved  so  long.  In  addition  to  these  some- 
what questionable  proceedings,  Kobad  adopted  also  a  more 
legitimate  mode  of  securing  the  regard  of  his  subjects  by  a 
careful  administration  of  justice, '"  and  a  mild  treatment  of 
those  who  had  been  the  victims  of  his  father's  severities.  He 
restored  to  their  former  rank  the  persons  whom  Chosroes  had 
degraded  or  imprisoned,  and  compensated  them  for  their  in- 
juries by  a  liberal  donation  of  money. " 

Thus  far  all  seemed  to  promise  well  for  the  new  reign,  which, 
though  it  had  commenced  under  unfavorable  auspices,  bid  fair 
to  be  tranquil  and  prosperous.  In  one  quarter  only  was  there 
any  indication  of  coming  troubles.-"  Shahr-Barz,  the  great 
general,  whose  life  Chosroes  had  attempted  shortly  before  his 
own  death,  ^'  appears  to  have  been  dissatisfied  with  the  terms 
on  which  Kobad  had  concluded  peace  with  Rome ;  and  there 
is  even  reason  to  believe  that  he  contrived  to  impede  and  delay 
the  full  execution  of  the  treaty."  He  held  under  Kobad  the 
government  of  the  western  provinces. '^  and  was  at  the  head 
of  an  army  which  numbered  sixty  thousand  men.^*  Kobad 
treated  him  with  marked  favor ;  but  still  he  occupied  a  posi- 
tion almost  beyond  that  of  a  subject,  and  one  which  could  not 
fail  to  render  him  an  object  of  fear  and  suspicion.  For  the 
present,  however,  though  he  may  have  nurtured  ambitious 
thoughts,  he  made  no  movement,  but  bided  his  time,  remain- 
ing quietly  in  his  province,  and  cultivating  friendly  relations 
with  the  Roman  emperor." 

Kobad  had  not  been  seated  on  the  throne  many  months  when 
he  consented  to  a  deed  by  which  his  character  for  justice  and 
clemency  was  seriously  compromised,  if  not  wholly  lost.  This 
was  the  general  massacre  of  all  the  other  sons  of  Chosroes  II., 
his  own  brothers  or  half-brothers— a  numerous  body,  amount- 
ing to  forty  according  to  the  highest  estimate,  and  to  fifteen 
according  to  the  lowest. '"  We  are  not  told  of  any  circum- 
stances of  peril  to  justify  the  deed,  or  even  account  for  it. 
There  have  been  Oriental  dynasties,  where  such  a  wholesale 
murder  upon  the  accession  of  a  sovereign  has  been  a  portion  of 
the  established  system  of  government,  and  others  where  the 
milder  but  little  less  revolting  expedient  has  obtained  of  bhnd- 
ingallthe  brothers  of  the  reigning  prince;  but  neither  prac- 
tice was  in  vogue  among  the  Sassanians;  and  we  look  vainly 
for  the  reason  which  caused  an  act  of  the  kind  to  be  resorted 


538  THE  SEVENTH  MONAIWUT.  [ch.  xrv. 

to  at  this  conjuncture.  Mirkhond"  says  that  Firuz,  the  chief 
minister  of  Kobad,  advised  the  deed ;  but  even  he  assigns  no 
motive  for  the  massacre,  unless  a  motive  is  imphed  in  the 
statement  that  the  brothers  of  Kobad  were  "all  of  them  dis- 
tinguished by  their  talents  and  their  merit. "  Politically  speak- 
ing, the  measure  might  have  been  harmless,  had  Kobad  en- 
joyed a  long  reign,  and  left  behind  him  a  number  of  sons. 
But  as  it  was,  the  rash  act,  by  almost  extinguishing  the  race 
of  Sassan,  produced  troubles  which  greatly  helped  to  bring  the 
empire  into  a  condition  of  hopeless  exhaustion  and  weakness.     ■ 

While  thus  destroying  all  his  brothers,  Kobad  allowed  his 
sisters  to  live.  Of  these  there  were  two,  still  unmarried,  who 
resided  in  the  palace,  and  had  free  access  to  the  monarch. 
Their  names  were  Purandocht  and  Azermidocht,  Purandocht 
being  the  elder.  Bitterly  grieved  at  the  loss  of  their  kindred, 
these  two  princesses  rushed  into  the  royal  presence,  and  re- 
proached the  king  with  words  that  cut  him  to  the  soul.  "  Thy 
ambition  of  ruUng,"  they  said,"'  "  has  induced  thee  to  kUl  thy 
father  and  thy  brothers.  Thou  hast  accomplished  thy  purpose 
Avithin  the  space  of  three  or  four  months.  Thou  hast  hoped 
thereby  to  preserve  thy  power  forever.  Even,  however,  if 
thou  shouldst  live  long,  thou  must  die  at  last.  May  God  de- 
prive thee  of  the  enjoyment  of  this  royalty ! "  His  sisters' 
words  sank  deep  into  the  king's  mind.  He  acknowledged 
their  justice,  burst  into  tears,  and  flung  his  crown  on  the 
ground.  ='  After  this  he  fell  into  a  profound  melancholy, 
ceased  to  care  for  the  exercise  of  power,  and  in  a  short  time 
died.  His  death  is  ascribed  by  the  Orientals  to  his  mental 
sufferings;  but  the  statement  of  a  Christian  bishop  throws 
some  doubt  on  this  romantic  story.  Eutychius,  Patriarch  of 
Alexandria,  tells  us  that,  before  Kobad  had  reigned  many 
months,  the  plague  broke  out  in  his  country.  Vast  numbers  of 
his  subjects  died  of  it;  and  among  the  victims  was  the  king 
himself,'"  who  perished  after  a  reign  which  is  variously  esti- 
mated at  six,  seven,  eight,  and  eighteen  months.  =" 

There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  a  terrible  pestilence  did 
afflict  Persia  at  this  period.  The  Arabian  writers  are  here  in 
agreement  with  Eutychius  of  Alexandria,  ='  and  declare  that  the 
malady  was  of  the  most  aggravated  character,  carrying  off 
one  half,  or  at  any  rate  one  third,  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
provinces  which  were  affected,  and  diminishing  the  population 
of  Persia  by  several  hundreds  of  thousands."  Scourges  of  this 
kind  are  of  no  rare  occurrence  in  the  East ;  and  the  return  of  a 


CH.  XXV.]  ARTAXERXES  III  539 

mixed  multitude  to  Persia,  under  circum.stances  involving 
privation,  from  the  cities  of  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Palestine, 
was  well  calculated  to  engender  such  a  calamity. 

The  reign  of  Kobad  II.  appears  from  his  coins  to  have  lasted 
above  a  year."  He  ascended  the  throne  in  February,  a.d.  628; 
he  probably  died  about  July,"  a.d.  629.  The  coins  which  are 
attributed  to  him  resemble  in  their  principal  features  those  of 
Chosroes  II.  and  Artaxerxes  III.,  but  are  without  wings,  and 
have  the  legend  Kavat-Firuz.  The  bordering  of  pearls  is 
single  on  both  obverse  and  reverse,  but  the  king  wears  a  double 
pearl  necklace.  The  eye  is  large,  and  the  hair  more  carefully 
marked  than  had  been  usual  since  the  time  of  Sapor  II.  [PI. 
XXIV.,  Figs.  2  and  3]. 

At  the  death  of  Kobad  the  crown  fell  to  his  son,  Artaxerxes 
III.,  a  child  of  seven, ^'^  or  (according  to  others)  of  one  year 
only.  The  nobles  who  proclaimed  him  took  care  to  place  him 
under  the  direction  of  a  governor  or  regent,  and  appointed  to 
the  office  a  certain  Mihr-Hasis,  who  had  been  the  chief  pur- 
veyor of  Kobad."  Mihr-Hasis  is  said  to  have  ruled  with  jus- 
tice and  discretion ;  but  he  was  not  able  to  prevent  the  occur- 
rence of  those  troubles  and  disorders  which  in  the  East  almost 
invariably  accompany  the  sovereignty  of  a  minor,  and  render 
the  task  of  a  regent  a  hard  one.  Shahr-Barz,  who  had  scarcely 
condescended  to  comport  himself  as  a  subject  under  Kobad, 
saw  in  the  accession  of  a  boy,  and  in  the  near  extinction  of  the 
race  of  Sassan,  an  opportunity  of  gratifying  his  ambition,  and 
at  the  same  time  of  avenging  the  wrong  which  had  been  done 
him  by  Chosroes.  Before  committing  himself,  however,  to 
the  perils  of  rebellion,  he  negotiated  with  Herachus,  and  se- 
cured his  alliance  and  support  by  the  promise  of  certain  ad- 
vantages. The  friends  met  at  Heraclea^"  on  the  Propontis. 
Shahr-Barz  undertook  to  complete  the  evacuation  of  Egypt, 
Syria,  and  Asia  Minor,  which  he  had  delayed  hitherto,  and 
promised,  if  he  were  successful  in  his  enterprise,  to  pay  Hera- 
clius  a  large  sum  of  money  as  compensation  for  the  injuries 
inflicted  on  Rome  during  the  recent  war.''  Heraclius  con- 
ferred on  Nicetas,  the  son  of  Shahr-Barz,  the  title  of  "Patri- 
can, "  consented  to  a  marriage  between  Shahr-Barz's  daughter, 
Nike,  and  his  own  son,  Theodosius,  and  accepted  Gregoria,  the 
daughter  of  Nicetas,  and  grand-daughter  of  Shahr-Barz,  as  a 
wife  for  Constantino,  the  heir  to  the  empire."  He  also,  it  is 
probable,  supplied  Shahr-Barz  with  a  body  of  troops,"  to  assist 
him  in  his  struggle  with  Artaxerxes  and  IVIihr-Hasis. 


540 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XXV. 


Of  the  details  of  Sharhr  Barz's  expedition  we  know  nothing;. 
He  is  said  to  have  marched  on  Ctesiphon  with  an  army  o.^' 
sixty  thousand  men;'"  to  have  taken  the  cit;>-,  put  to  death 
Artaxerxes,  Mihr-Hasis,  and  a  number  of  the  nobles,"  and 
then  seized  the  throne.  We  are  not  told  what  resistance  was 
made  by  the  monarch  in  possession,  or  how  it  was  overcome, 
or  even  whether  there  was  a  battle.  It  would  seem  certain, 
,  however,  that  the  contest  was  brief.  The  young  king  was  of 
course  powerless;  Mihr-Hasis,  though  well-meaning,  must 
have  been  weak ;  Shahr-Barz  had  all  the  rude  strength  of  the 
animal  whose  name  he  bore,"  and  had  no  scruples  about  using 
his  strength  to  the  utmost.  The  murder  of  a  child  of  two,  or 
at  the  most  of  eight,  who  could  have  done  no  ill,  and  was  legiti- 
mately in  possession  of  the  throne,  must  be  pronounced  a  brutal 
act,  and  one  which  sadly  tarnishes  the  fair  fame,  previously 
unsullied,  of  one  of  Persia's  greatest  generals. 

It  was  easy  to  obtain  the  crown,  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  time;  but  it  was  not  so  easy  to  keep  what  had  been  wrong- 
fully gained.  Shahr-Barz  enjoyed  the  royal  authority  less 
than  two  months."  During  this  period  he  completed  the 
evacuation  of  the  Eoman  provinces  occupied  by  Chosroes  II., 
restored  perhaps  some  portions  of  the  true  cross  which  had 
been  kept  back  by  Kobad,"  and  sent  an  expeditionary  force 
against  the  Khazars  who  had  invaded  Armenia,  which  was 
completely  destroyed  by  the  fierce  barbarians.^'  He  is  said  by 
the  Armenians^'  to  have  married  Purandocht,  the  eldest 
daughter  of  Chosroes,  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  his  hold 
on  the  crown;  but  this  attempt  to  conciliate  his  subjects,  if  it 
■was  really  made,  proved  unsuccessful.  Ere  he  had  been  king 
for  two  months,  his  troops  mutinied,  drew  their  sw^ords  upon 
him,  and  killed  him  in  the  open  court  before  the  palace."' 
Having  so  done,  they  tied  a  cord  to  his  feet  and  dragged  his 
corpse  through  the  streets  of  Ctesiphon,  making  proclamation 
everywhere  as  follows:  "Whoever,  not  being  of  the  blood- 
royal,  seats  himself  upon  the  Persian  throne,  shall  share  the 
fate  of  Shahr-Barz."  They  then  elevated  to  the  royal  dignity 
the  princess  Purandocht, '"  the  first  female  who  had  ever  sat 
in  the  seat  of  Cyrus. 

The  rule  of  a  woman  was  ill  calculated  to  restrain  the  turbu- 
lent Persian  nobles.  Two  instances  had  now  proved  that  a 
mere  mble  might  ascend  the  throne  of  the  son  of  Babek;  and 
a  fatal  fascination  was  exercised  on  the  grandees  of  the  king- 
dom by  the  examples  of  Bahram-Chobin^'  and  Shahr-Barz. 


CH.  XXV.]  ACCKB810N  OF  ISDIQERD  III.  541 

Pretenders  sprang  up  in  all  quarters,  generally  asserting  some 
connection,  nearer  or  more  remote,  with  the  royal  house,  but 
relying  on  the  arms  of  their  partisans,  and  still  more  on  the 
weakness  of  the  government.  It  is  uncertain  whether  Puran- 
docht  died  a  natural  death  ;^^  her  sister,  Azermidocht,  who 
reigned  soon  after  her,  was  certainly  murdered.  ^'  The  crown 
passed  rapidly  from  one  noble  to  another,  and  in  the  course  of 
the  four  or  five  years  which  immediately  succeeded  the  death 
of  Chosroes  II.  it  was  worn  bj  nine  or  ten  different  persons. 
Of  these  the  greater  number  reigned  but  a  few  days  or  a  few 
months ;  no  actions  are  ascribed  to  them ;  and  it  seems  unnec- 
essary to  weary  the  reader  with  their  obscure  names,  or  with 
the  still  more  obscure  question  concerning  the  order  of  their 
succession.'^  It  maybe  suspected  that  in  some  cases  two  or 
more  were  contemporary,  exercising  royal  functions  in  differ- 
ent portions  of  the  empire  at  the  same  time.  Of  none  does  the 
history  or  the  fate  possess  any  interest ;  and  the  modern  his- 
torical student  may  well  be  content  with  the  general  knowl- 
edge that  for  four  years  and  a  half  after  the  death  of  Chosroes 
II.  the  government  was  in  the  highest  degree  unsettled ;  an- 
archy everywhere  prevailed ;  the  distracted  kingdom  was  torn 
in  pieces  by  the  struggles  of  pretenders;  and  "  every  province, 
and  almost  each  city  of  Persia,  was  the  scene  of  independ- 
ence, of  discord,  and  of  bloodshed."  " 

At  length,  in  June,"*"  a.d.  632,  an  end  was  put  to  the  internal, 
commotions  by  the  election  of  a  young  prince,  believed  to 
be  of  the  true  blood  of  Sassan,  in  whose  rule  the  whole 
nation  acquiesced  without  much  difficulty."  Yezdigerd  (or 
Isdigerd)  the  Third  was  the  son  of  Shahriar'*  and  the  grandson 
of  Chosroes  II.  ■"  He  had  been  early  banished  from  the  Court, '" 
and  had  been  brought  up  in  obscurity,  his  royal  birth  being 
perhaps  concealed,  since  if  known  it  might  have  caused  his 
destruction."'  The  place  of  his  residence  was  Istakr,''  the 
ancient  capital  of  Persia,  but  at  this  time  a  city  of  no  great 
importance.  Here  he  had  lived  unnoticed  to  the  age  of  fifteen, " 
when  his  royal  rank  having  somehow  been  discovered,  and  no 
other  scion  of  the  stock  of  Chosroes  being  known  to  exist,  he 
was  drawn  forth  from  his  retirement  and  invested  with  the 
sovereignty. 

But  the  appointment  of  a  sovereign  in  whose  rule  all  could 
acquiesce  came  too  late.  While  Rome  and  Persia,  engaged  in 
deadly  struggle,  had  no  thought  for  anything  but  how  most  to 
iaijure  each  other,  a  power  began  to  grow  up  in  an  adjacent 


.542  TBE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [en.  xxv. 

country,  which  had  for  long  ages  been  despised  and  thought 
incapable  of  doing  any  harm  to  its  neighbors.  Mohammed, 
half  impostor,  half  enthusiast,  enunciated  a  doctrine,  and  by 
degrees  worked  out  a  religion,  which  proved  capable  of  unit- 
ing in  one  the  scattered  tribes  of  the  Arabian  desert,  while  at 
the  same  time  it  inspired  them  with  a  confidence,  a  contempt 
for  death,  and  a  fanatic  valor,  that  rendered  them  irresistible 
by  the  surrounding  nations.  Mohammed's  career  as  prophet 
began  while  Herachus  and  Chosroes  II.  were  flying  at  each 
other's  throats;"  by  the  year  of  the  death  of  Chosroes  (a.d. 
G28)  he  had  acquired  a  strength  greater  than  that  of  any  other 
Arab  chief;"  two  years  later  he  challenged  Eome  to  the  com- 
bat by  sending  a  hostile  expedition  into  Syria  ;^''  and  before  his 
death  (a.d.  632)  he  was  able  to  take  the  field  at  the  head  of 
30,000  men.*'  During  the  time  of  internal  trouble  in  Persia 
he  procured  the  submission  of  the  Persian  governor  of  the 
Yemen  ;''^  as  well  as  that  of  Al  Mondar,""  or  Alamundarus, 
King  of  Bahrein,  on  the  west  coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf.'" 
Isdigerd,  upon  his  accession,  found  himself  menaced  by  a 
power  which  had  already  stretched  out  one  arm  towards  the 
lower  Euphrates,  while  with  the  other  it  was  seeking  to  grasp 
Syria  and  Palestine.  The  danger  was  imminent ;  the  means 
of  meeting  it  insufficient,  for  Persia  was  exhausted  by  foreign 
war  and  internal  contention ;  the  monarch  himself  was  but  ill 
able  to  cope  with  the  Arab  chiefs,  being  youthful  and  inexpe- 
rienced :  we  shall  find,  however,  that  he  made  a  strenuous  re- 
sistance. Though  contiaually  defeated,  he  prolonged  the  fight 
for  nearly  a  score  of  years,  and  only  succumbed  finally  when, 
to  the  hostility  of  open  foes,  was  added  the  treachery  of  pre- 
teaided  friends  and  allies." 


1 


CH.  XXVI.  POWJiHi  OF  ABU-BEKU.  543 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

Death  of  Mohammed  and  Collapse  of  Mohammedanism.  Be- 
covery  under  Abu-bekr.  Conquest  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hira. 
Conquest  of  Obolla.  Invasion  of  Mesopotamia.  Battle  of 
the  Bridge— the  Arabs  suffer  a  JReverse.  Battle  of  El  Bow- 
eib — Mihran  defeated  by  El  Mothanna.  Fresh  Effort  made 
by  Persia — Battle  of  Cadesia  —  Defeat  of  the  Persians. 
Pause  in  the  War.  March  of  Sa''ad  on  Ctesiphon.  Flight 
of  Isdigerd.  Capture  of  Ctesiphon.  Battle  of  Jalula. 
Conquest  of  Susiana  and  invasion  of  Persia  Proper.  Re- 
call of  Sd'ad.  Isdigerd  assembles  an  Army  at  Nehawend. 
Battle  of  Nehawend.  Flight  of  Isdigerd.  Conquest  of  the 
various  Persian  Provinces.  Isdigerd  murdered.  Char- 
acter of  Isdigerd.     Coins  of  Isdigerd. 

"  Yazdejlrd,  Persarum  rex  .  .  .  Rostamum  misit  oppugnatum  Saadum  .  .  .  neque 
unquam  bellorum  et  dissentionum  expers  fuit,  donee  occideretur.  Regnavit  au- 
tem  annos  viginti."— Eutychius,  Annates,  vol.  ii.  pp.  295-6. 

The  power  which  Mohammed  had  so  rapidly  built  up  fell  to 
pieces  at  his  decease.  Isdigerd  can  scarcely  have  been  well 
settled  upon  this  throne  when  the  welcome  tidings  must  have 
reached  him  that  the  Prophet  was  dead,  that  the  Arabs  gen- 
erally were  in  revolt,  that  Al  Mondar  had  renounced  Islamism, 
and  resumed  a  position  of  independence. '  For  the  time  Mo- 
hammedanism was  struck  down.  It  remained  to  be  seen 
whether  the  movement  had  derived  its  strength  solely  from 
the  genius  of  the  Prophet,  or  whether  minds  of  inferior  caHbre 
would  suffice  to  renew  and  sustain  the  impulse  which  had  pro- 
ceeded from  him,  and  which  under  him  had  proved  of  such 
wonderful  force  and  efficacy. 

The  companions  of  Mohammed  lost  no  time  in  appointing 
his  successor.  Their  choice  fell  upon  Abu-bekr,  his  friend  and 
father-in-law,  who  was  a  person  of  an  energetic  character, 
brave,  chaste,  and  temperate.  Abu-bekr  proved  himself  quite 
equal  to  the  difficulties  of  the  situation.  Being  unfit  for  war 
himself,  as  he  was  above  sixty  years  of  age,^  he  employed  able 
generals,  and  within  a  few  months  of  his  accession  struck  such 
a  series  of  blows  that  rebellion  coUapsed  everywhere,' and  io 


544  'I'liE  SEVENTH  MONAItCllT.  [ch.  xxvi. 

a  short  time  the  whole  Arab  nation,  except  the  tribe  of  Gassan, 
acknowledged  themselves  his  subjects.  Among  the  rivaln 
against  whom  he  measured  himself,  the  most  important  was 
Moseilama.  Moseilama,  who  affected  the  prophetic  character,^ 
had  a  numerous  following,  and  was  able  to  fight  a  pitched 
battle  with  the  forces  of  Abu-bekr,  which  numbered  40,000 
men.  ^  At  the  first  encounter  he  even  succeeded  in  repulsing 
this  considerable  army,  which  lost  1200  warriors;  but  in  a 
second  engagement  the  Mohammedans  were  victorious— 
Moseilama  was  slain— and  Kaled,  "  the  Sword  of  God,"  carried 
back  to  Medina  the  news  of  his  own  triumph,  and  the  spoils  of 
the  defeated  enemy.  Soon  after  the  fall  of  Moseilama,  the 
tribes  still  in  rebellion  submitted  themselves,  and  the  first  of 
the  Caliphs  found  himself  at  liberty  to  enter  upon  schemes  of 
foreign  conquest. 

Distracted  between  the  temptations  offered  to  his  arms  by 
the  East  and  by  the  West,  Abu-bekr  in  his  first  year  (a.d.  633) 
sent  expeditions  in  both  directions,  against  Syria,  and  against 
Hira,  where  lyas,  the  Persian  feudatory,  who  had  succeeded 
Noman,  son  of  Al  Mondar,"  held  his  court,  on  the  western 
branch  of  the  Euphrates.  For  this  latter  expedition  the 
commander  selected  was  the  irresistible  Kaled,  who  marched  a 
body  of  2000  men'  across  the  desert  to  the  branch  stream,* 
which  he  reached  in  about  latitude  30°.  Assisted  by  Al 
Mothanna,  chief  of  the  Beni  Sheiban,  who  had  been  a  subject 
of  lyas,  but  had  revolted  and  placed  himself  under  the  protec- 
tion of  Abu-bekr,^  Kaled  rapidly  reduced  the  kingdom  of  Hira, 
took  successively  Banikiya,  Barasuma,  and  El  Lis, '"  descended 
the  river  to  the  capital,"  and  there  fought  an  important  battle 
with  the  combined  Persian  and  Arab  forces,  the  first  trial  of 
arms  between  the  followers  of  Mohammed  and  those  of 
Zoroaster.  The  Persian  force  consisted  entirely  of  horse,  and 
was  commanded  by  a  general  whom  the  Arab  writers  call 
Asadsubeh. '■-  Their  number  is  not  mentioned,  but  was 
probably  small.  Charged  furiously  by  Al  Mothanna,  they 
immediately  broke  and  fled ;  Hira  was  left  with  no  other  pro- 
tection than  its  walls;  and  lyas,  yielding  to  necessity,  made 
his  submission  to  the  conqueror,  and  consented  to  pay  a  tribute 
of  290,000dirhems.'=' 

The  splendid  success  of  his  pioneer  induced  Abu-bekr  to  sup- 
port the  war  in  this  quarter  with  vigor.  Eeinforcements 
joined  Kaled  from  every  side,  and  in  a  short  time  he  found 
himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  18, 000  men.  '*    With  this 


Vol 


Plate  XLV. 


Konp.n  FiounK,   shdwino  Sassanian  EMiutdmr.nv. 


Plate. 'XLVi 


Vok 


Section  of  Central  Domed  CuAMisEa,  Fibuzabad  (after  Flaodin}, 


EXTLENAL    Or.VA  MENTATION    OK  -PiLACK    AT    FlCCZABAD. 


CB.  XXVI.]  SUCQ^SSMS  OF  KALED.  545 

force  he  proceeded  southwards,  bent  on  reducing  the  entire 
tract  between  the  desert  and  the  Eastern  or  real  Euphrates. 
The  most  important  city  of  the  southern  region  was  at  the  time 
OboUa,  which  was  situated  on  a  canal  or  backwater  derived 
from  the  Euphrates,  not  far  from  the  modem  Busrah.  '^  It  was 
the  great  emporium  for  the  Indian  trade,  and  was  knoAvn  as 
the  limes  Indorum,"^  or  "frontier  city  towards  India."  The 
Persian  governor  was  a  certain  Hormuz  or  Hormisdas,  Avhoheld 
the  post  with  a  body  of  20,000  men."  Kaled  fought  his  second 
great  battle  with  this  antagonist,  and  was  once  more  com- 
pletely victorious,  killing  Hormuz,  according  to  the  Arabian 
accounts,  with  his  own  hands.'*  Obolla  surrendered;  a  vast 
booty  was  taken;  and,  after  liberally  rewarding  his  soldiers, 
Kaled  sent  the  fifth  part  of  the  spoils,  together  with  a  captured 
elephant,  to  Abu-bekr  at  Medina.  The  strange  animal  aston- 
ished the  simple  natives,  who  asked  one  another  wonderingly, " 
"Is  this  indeed  one  of  God's  works,  or  did  human  art  make 
it?" 

The  victories  of  Kaled  "over  Asadsubeh  and  Hormuz  were 
followed  by  a  number  of  other  successes,^"  the  entire  result  be- 
ing that  the  whole  of  the  fertile  region  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Euphrates,  from  Hit  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  was  for  the  time  re- 
duced, made  a  portion  of  Abu-bekr's  dominions,  and  parcelled 
out  among  Mohammedan  governors.'"  Persia  was  deprived  of 
the  protection  which  a  dependent  Arab  kingdom  to  the  west  of 
the  river  had  hitherto  afforded  her,  and  was  brought  into  di- 
rect contact  with  the  great  Mohammedan  monarchy  along  al- 
most the  whole  of  her  western  frontier.  Henceforth  she  was 
open  to  attack  on  this  side  for  a  distance  of  above  four  hundred 
miles,  with  no  better  barrier  than  a  couple  of  rivers  interposed 
between  her  enemy  and  her  capital. 

Soon  after  his  conquest  of  the  kingdom  of  Hira,  Kaled  was 
recalled  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Syrian  war,"  and  was  em- 
ployed in  the  siege  of  DaiAiascus,"^  while  Persia  enjoyed  a 
breathing-space.  Advantage  was  taken  of  this  interval  to  stir 
up  disaffection  in  the  newly  conquered  province.  Rustam,  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  against  the  Arabs  by  Isdigerd,"  sent 
emissaries  to  the  various  towns  of  the  Sawad,"  virging  them  to 
rise  in  revolt  and  promising  to  support  such  a  movement  with 
a  Persian  army.'"'  The  situation  was  critical;  and  if  the  Mo- 
hammedans had  been  less  tenacious,  or  the  Pereians  more 
skilfully  handled,  the  whole  of  the  Sa"\vad  might  have  been  re- 
covered.    But  Rustam  allowed  bis  troops  to  be  defeated  in  de- 


546  THE  SEVENTII  MONARCIlf.  [cH.  xxvi, 

tail.  Al  Mothanna  and  Abu  Obediah,  in  three  separate  engage- 
ments, at  Namarik,  Sakatiya,  and  Barusma,"  overcame  the 
Persian  leaders,  Jaban,  Narses,  and  Jalenus,  and  drove  their 
shattered  armies  back  on  the  Tigris.  The  Mohammedan  au- 
thority was  completely  re-established  in  the  tract  between  the 
desert  and  the  Euphrates ;  it  was  even  extended  across  the  Eu- 
phrates into  the  tract  watered  by  the  Shat-el-Hie ;  and  it  soon 
became  a  question  whether  Persia  would  be  able  to  hold  tht 
Mesopotamian  region,  or  whether  the  irrepressible  Arabs  woula 
not  very  shortly  wrest  it  from  her  grasp.  But  at  this  point  in 
the  history  the  Arabs  experienced  a  severe  reverse.  On  learn- 
ing the  defeat  of  his  lieutenants,  Rustam  sent  an  army  to 
watch  the  enemy,  under  the  command  of  Bahman-Dsul- 
hadjib,^'  or  "Bahman  the  beetle-browed,"  which  encamped 
upon  the  Western  Euphrates  at  Kossen-natek,  not  far  from  the 
site  of  Kufa.  At  the  same  time,  to  raise  the  courage  of  the 
soldiers,  he  entrusted  to  this  leader  the  sacred  standard  of 
Persia,  the  famous  durufsh-kaivani,  or  leathern  apron  of  the 
blacksmith  Kawah,^"  ^vhich  was  richly  adorned  with  silk  and 
gems,  and  is  said  to  have  measured  eighteen  feet  long  by 
twelve  feet  broad. '°  Bahman  had  with  him,  according  to  the 
Persian  tradition,  30,000  men  and  thirty  elephants;^'  the  Arabs 
under  Abu  Obediah  numbered  no  more  than  9000,  or  at  the 
most  10,000,=''  Bahman  is  reported'^  to  have  given  his  adver- 
sary the  alternative  of  passing  the  Euphrates  or  allowing  the 
Persians  to  cross  it.  Abu  Obediah  preferred  the  bolder  course, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  dissuasions  of  his  chief  officers,  threw  a 
bridge  of  boats  across  the  stream,  and  so  conveyed  his  troops 
to  the  left  bank.  Here  he  found  the  Persian  horse-archers 
covered  with  their  scale  armor,'*  and  drawn  up  in  a  solid  line 
behind  their  elephants.  Galled  severely  by  the  successive 
flights  of  arrows,  the  Arab  cavalry  sought  to  come  to  close 
quarters ;  but  their  horses,  terrified  by  the  unwonted  sight  of 
the  huge  animals,  and  further  alarmed  by  the  tinkling  of  the 
bells  hung  round  their  necks,"  refused  to  advance.  It  was 
found  necessary  to  dismount,  and  assail  the  Persian  line  on 
foot.  A  considerable  impression  had  been  made,  and  it  was 
thought  that  the  Persians  would  take  to  flight,'*  when  Abu 
Obediah,  in  attacking  the  most  conspicuous  of  the  elephants, 
was  seized  by  the  infuriated  animal  and  trampled  under  his 
leet."  Inspirited  by  this  success,  the  Persians  rushed  upon 
their  enemies,  who,  disheartened  by  the  loss  of  their  comman- 
der, began  a  retrograde  movement,  falling  back  upon  tbeir 


CH.  XXVI.]  BATTLE  OF  THE  BRIDGE.  547 

newly-made  bridge.  This,  however,  was  found  to  have  been 
broken,  either  by  the  enemy,  ="  or  by  a  rash  Arab  who  thought, 
by  making  retreat  impossible,  to  give  his  own  side  the  courage 
of  despair.  Before  the  damage  done  could  be  repaired,  the  re- 
treating host  suffered  severely.  The  Persians  pressed  closely 
upon  them,  slew  many,  and  drove  others  into  the  stream, 
where  they  were  drowned.  Out  of  the  9000  or  10,000  who 
originally  passed  the  river,  only  5000  returned,  and  of  these 
2000  at  once  dispersed  to  their  homes.  ^'  Besides  Abu  Obediah, 
the  veteran  Salit  was  slain ;"  and  Al  Mothanna,  who  succeeded 
to  the  command  on  Abu  Obediah's  death,  was  severely 
wounded.'"  The  last  remnant  of  the  defeated  army  might 
easily  have  been  destroyed,  had  not  a  dissension  arisen  among 
the  Persians,  which  induced  Bahman  to  return  to  Ctesiphon. 

The  Arabs,  upon  this  repulse,  retired  to  El  Lis ;  *'-  and  Al 
Mothanna  sent  to  Omar  for  reinforcements,  which  speedily 
arrived  under  the  command  of  Jarir,  son  of  Abdallah,"  Al 
Mothanna  was  preparing  to  resume  the  offensive  when  the 
Persians  anticipated  him.  A  body  of  picked  troops,  led  by 
Mihran,"  a  general  of  reputation,  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and 
made  a  dash  at  Hira.  Hastily  collecting  his  men,  who  were 
widely  dispersed,  Al  Mothanna  gave  the  assailants  battle  on 
the  canal  El  Boweib,  in  the  near  vicinity  of  the  threatened 
town,  and  though  the  Persians  fought  with  desperation  from 
noon  to  sunset,  succeeded  in  defeating  them  and  in  killing 
their  commander.  "^  The  beaten  army  recrossed  the  Euphra- 
tes, and  returned  to  Ctesiphon  without  suffering  further 
losses,  since  the  Arabs  were  content  to  have  baffled  their 
attack,  and  did  not  pursue  them  many  miles  from  the  field  of 
battle.""  All  Mesopotamia,  however,  was  by  this  defeat  laid 
open  to  the  invaders,  whose  ravages  soon  extended  to  the 
Tigris  and  the  near  vicinity  of  the  capital.  *' 

The  year  a.d.  636  now  arrived,  and  the  Persians  resolved 
upon  an  extraoixlinary  effort.  An  army  of  120,000  men  was 
enrolled,*"  and  Rustam,  reckoned  the  best  general  of  the  day, 
was  placed  at  its  head.""  The  Euphrates  was  once  more 
crossed,  the  Sawad  entered,  its  inhabitants  invited  to  revolt," 
and  the  Arab  force,  which  had  been  concentrated  at  Cadesia 
(Kadisiyeh),  where  it  rested  upon  a  fortified  town,  was  sought 
out  and  challenged  to  the  combat.  The  Caliph  Omar  had  by 
great  efforts  contrived  to  raise  his  troops  in  the  SawAd  to  the 
number  of  30, 001),  "and  had  entrusted  the  command  of  them 
to  Sa'ad,  the  sou  of  Wakas,  since  Al  ]\Iothauna  had  died  of  hig 


548  THE  SEVENTH  M0NARCH7.  [en.  xxvi. 

wound."  Sa'ad  stood  wholly  on  the  defensive.  His  crimp 
was  pitched  outside  the  walls  of  Cadesia,  in  a  position  pro- 
tected on  either  side  by  a  canal/'  or  branch  stream,  derived 
from  the  Euphrates,  and  flowing  to  the  south-east  out  of  the 
Sea  of  Nedjef .  He  himself,  prevented  by  boUs  from  sitting  on 
his  horse,  looked  down  on  his  troops,  and  sent  them  directions 
from  the  Cadesian  citadel.^*  Rustam,  in  order  to  come  to 
blows,  was  obliged  to  fill  up  the  more  eastern  of  the  branch 
streams  (El  Atik),  with  reeds  and  earth,"  and  in  this  way  to 
cross  the  channel.  The  Arabs  made  no  attempt  to  hinder  the 
operation;  and  the  Persian  general,  having  brought  his  vast 
army  directly  opposite  to  the  enemy,  proceeded  to  array  his 
troops  as  he  thought  most  expedient.  Dividing  his  army  into 
a  centre  and  two  wings,  he  took  himself  the  position  of  honor 
in  the  mid  hne^"  with  nineteen  elephants  and  three  fifths  of 
his  forces,"  while  he  gave  the  command  of  the  right  wing  to 
Jalenus,  and  of  the  left  to  Bendsuwan ;  ^*  each  of  whom  we 
may  suppose  to  have  had  24.000  troops  and  seven  elephants. 
The  Arabs,  on  their  side,  made  no  such  division.  Kaled,  son 
of  Orfuta,  was  the  sole  leader  in  the  fight,  though  Sa'ad  from 
his  watch-tower  observed  the  battle  and  gave  his  orders.  The 
engagement  began  at  mid-day  and  continued  till  sunset.  At 
the  signal  of  Allah  akbar,  "God  is  great,"  shouted  by  Sa'ad 
from  his  tower,  the  Arabs  rushed  to  the  attack.  Their  cavalry 
charged;  but  the  Persians  advanced  against  them  their  line 
of  elephants,  repeating  with  excellent  effect  the  tactics  of  the 
famous  "Battle  of  the  Bridge.'"'  The  Arab  horse  fled;  the 
foot  alone  remained  firm;  victory  seemed  inclining  to  the 
Persians,  who  were  especially  successful  on  either  wing;'" 
Toleicha,  with  his  "lions""  failed  to  re-establish  the  balance; 
and  all  would  have  been  lost,  had  not  Assem,  at  the  command 
of  Sa'ad,  sent  a  body  of  archers  and  other  footmen  to  close 
with  the  elephants,  gall  them  with  missiles,  cut  their  girths, 
and  so  precipitate  their  riders  to  the  ground.  Reheved  from 
this  danger,  the  Arab  horse  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  Per- 
sians, who  as  evening  approached  retired  in  good  order  to 
their  camp.  The  chief  loss  on  this,  the  "day  of  concussion," " 
was  suffered  by  the  Arabs,  who  admit  that  they  had  500 
killed,"  and  must  have  had  a  proportional  number  of 
wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  second  day  the  site  of  the  battle  was 
somewhat  changed,  the  Persians  having  retired  a  little  during 
the  night."    Reinforcements  from  Syria  kept  reaching  the 


CH.  XXVI.]  DAT  OF  SUCCOURS.  549 

Arab  camp  through  most  of  the  day ; "  and  hence  it  is  known 
to  the  Arab  writers  as  the  "day  of  succors.'""  The  engage- 
ment seems  for  some  time  not  to  have  been  general,  the  Arabs 
waiting  for  more  troops  to  reach  them,  while  the  Persians 
abstained  because  they  had  not  yet  repaired  the  furniture  cf 
their  elephants."  Thus  the  morning  passed  in  light  skir- 
mishes and  single  combats  between  the  champions  of  either 
host,  who  went  out  singly  before  the  lines  and  challenged 
each  other  to  the  encounter."**  The  result  of  the  duels  was 
adverse  to  the  Persians,  who  lost  in  the  course  of  them  two  of 
their  best  generals,  Bendsuwan  and  Bahman-Dsulhadjib.''' 
After  a  time  the  Arabs,  regarding  themselves  as  sufficiently 
reinforced,  attacked  the  Persians  along  their  whole  line, 
partly  with  horse,  and  partly  with  camels,  dressed  up  to 
resemble  elephants."'  The  effect  on  the  Persian  cavalry  was 
the  same  as  had  on  the  preceding  day  been  produced  by  the 
real  elephants  on  the  horse  of  the  Arabs ;  it  was  driven  off  the 
field  and  dispersed,  suffering  considerable  losses.  But  the 
infantry  stood  firm,  and  after  a  while  the  cavalry  rallied; 
Rustam,  who  had  been  in  danger  of  suffering  capture,  was 
saved;"  and  night  closing  in,  defeat  was  avoided,  though  the 
advantage  of  the  day  rested  clearly  with  the  Arabs.  The 
Persians  had  lost  10,000  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  Arabs  no 
more  than  2000." 

In  the  night  which  followed  "the  day  of  succors"  great 
efforts  were  made  by  the  Persians  to  re-equip  their  elephants, 
and  when  morning  dawned  they  were  enabled  once  more  to 
bring  the  unwieldy  beasts  into  line.  But  the  Arabs  and  their 
horses  had  now  grown  more  familiar  Avith  the  strange  ani- 
mals ;  they  no  longer  shrank  from  meeting  them ;  and  some 
Persian  deserters  gave  the  useful  infonnation  that,  in  order  to 
disable  the  brutes  it  was  only  necessary  to  wound  them  on  the 
proboscis  or  in  the  eye.  Thus  instructed,  the  Arabs  made  the 
elephants  the  main  object  of  their  attack,  and,  having 
wounded  the  two  which  were  accustomed  to  lead  the  rest, 
caused  the  whole  body  on  a  sudden  to  take  to  flight,  cross  the 
canal  El  Atik,  and  proceed  at  full  speed  to  Ctesiphon.  The 
armies  then  came  to  close  quarters;  and  the  foot  and  horse 
contended  through  the  day  witb  swords  and  spears,  neither 
side  being  able  to  make  any  serious  impression  upon  the 
other."  As  night  closed  in,  however,  the  Persians  once  more 
fell  back,  crossing  the  canal  El  Atik,'*  and  so  placing  that 
b.irrior  between  themselves  and  llicir  adversiiries. 


550  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvi. 

Their  object  in  this  manoeuvre  was  probably  to  obtain  the 
rest  which  they  must  have  greatly  needed.  The  Persians 
were  altogether  of  a  frame  less  robust,  and  of  a  constitution 
less  hardy,  than  the  Arabs.  Their  army  at  Kadisiyeh  was, 
moreover,  composed  to  a  large  extent  of  raw  recruits ;  and 
three  consecutive  days  of  severe  fighting  must  have  sorely 
tried  its  endurance.  The  Persian  generals  hoped,  it  would 
seem,  by  crossing  the  Atik  to  refresh  their  troops  with  a  quiet 
night  before  renewing  the  combat  on  the  morrow.  But  the 
indefatigable  Arabs,  perhaps  guessing  their  intention,  deter- 
mined to  frustrate  it,  and  prevented  the  tired  host  from 
enjoying  a  moment's  respite.  The  "day  of  embittered  war," 
as  it  was  called,"  w^as  followed  by  the  "night  of  snarling"— a 
time  of  horrid  noise  and  tumult,  during  which  the  discordant 
cries  of  the  troops  on  either  side  were  thought  to  resemble  the 
yells  and  barks  of  dogs  and  jackals.  Two  of  the  bravest  of 
the  Arabs,  Toleicha  and  Amr,  crossed  the  Atik  with  small 
bodies  of  troops,  and  under  cover  of  the  darkness  entered  the 
Persian  camp,  slew  numbers,  and  caused  the  greatest  con- 
fusion." By  degrees  a  general  engagement  was  brought  on, 
which  continued  into  the  succeeding  day,  so  that  the  "night 
of  snarling"  can  scarcely  be  separated"  from  the  "day  of 
cormorants"  "—the  last  of  the  four  days'  Kadisiyeh  fight. 

It  would  seem  that  the  Persians  must  on  the  fourth  day  have 
had  for  a  time  the  advantage,  since  we  find  them  once  more 
fighting  upon  the  old  ground,  in  the  tract  between  the  two 
canals,  with  the  Atik  in  their  rear."  About  noon,  however,  a 
wind  arose  from  the  west,  bringing  with  it  clouds  of  sand, 
which  were  blown  into  the  faces  and  eyes  of  the  Persians, 
while  the  Arabs,  having  their  backs  to  the  storm,  suffered  but 
little  from  its  fury.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Moslems 
made  fresh  efforts,  and  after  a  while  a  part  of  the  Persian  army 
was  forced  to  give  ground.  Hormuzan,  satrap  of  Susiana,  and 
Firuzan,  the  general  who  afterwards  commanded  at  Ne- 
havend,'°  fell  back.  The  hue  of  battle  was  dislocated ;  the  per- 
son of  the  commander  became  exposed  to  danger ;  and  about 
the  same  time  a  sudden  violent  gust  tore  away  the  awning 
that  shaded  his  seat,"'  and  blew  it  into  the  Atik,  which  was  not 
far  off.  Rustam  sought  a  refuge  from  the  violence  of  the  storm 
among  his  baggage  mules,  and  was  probably  meditating  flight, 
when  the  Arabs  were  upon  him.  Hillal,  son  of  Alkama,  intent 
upon  plunder,  began  to  cut  the  cords  of  the  baggage  and  strew 
it  upon  the  ground,     A  bag  falling  severely  injured  Rustam/' 


CH.  XXVI.]     COMPLETE  DEFEAT  OF  TEE  PERSIANS.        551 

who  threw  himself  into  the  Atik  and  attempted  to  swim 
across.  Hillal,  however,  rushed  after  him,  drew  him  to  shore\, 
and  slew  him ;  after  which  he  mounted  the  vacant  throne,  and 
shouted  as  loudly  as  he  could,"  "  By  the  lord  of  the  Kaaba,  I 
have  killed  Rustam."  The  words  created  a  general  panic. 
Everywhere  the  Persian  courage  fell ;  the  most  part  despaired 
wholly,  and  at  once  took  to  flight ;  a  few  cohorts  alone  stood 
firm  and  were  cut  to  pieces  f*  the  greater  number  of  the  men 
rushed  hastily  to  the  Atik;  some  swam  the  stream  others 
crossed  where  it  had  been  fiUed  up;  but  as  many  as  30,000 
perished  in  the  waves/^  Ten  thousand  had  fallen  on  the  field 
of  battle*"'  in  the  course  of  the  preceding  night  and  day,  while 
of  the  Mohammedans  as  many  as  6000  had  been  slain.  Thus 
the  last  day  of  the  Kadisiyeh  fight  was  stoutly  contested ;  and 
the  Persian  defeat  was  occasioned  by  no  deficiency  of  courage, 
but  by  the  occurrence  of  a  sand-storm  and  by  the  almost  acci- 
dental death  of  the  commander.  Among  the  Persian  losses  in 
the  battle  that  of  the  national  standard,"  the  durufsh-kawani 
was  reckoned  the  most  serious. 

The  retreat  of  the  defeated  army  was  conducted  by  Jalenus. 
Sa'ad,  anxious  to  complete  his  victory,  sent  three  bodies  of  troops 
across  the  Atik,  to  press  upon  the  flying  foe.  One  of  these, 
commanded  by  Sohra,  came  up  with  the  Persian  rear  guard 
under  Jalenus  at  Harrar,  and  slaughtered  it,  together  with  its 
leader.^*  The  other  two  seem  to  have  returned  without  effect- 
ing much.  The  bulk  of  the  fugitives  traversed  Mesopotamia 
in  safety,  and  found  a  shelter  behind  the  waUs  of  Ctesiphon. 

By  the  defeat  of  Kadisiyeh  all  hope  of  recovering  the  ter- 
ritory on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates  was  lost ;  but  Persia 
did  not  as  yet  despair  of  maintaining  her  independence.  It  was 
evident,  indeed,  that  the  permanent  maintenance  of  the  capital 
was  henceforth  precarious ;  and  a  wise  forethought  would  have 
suggested  the  removal  of  the  Court  from  so  exposed  a  situation 
and  its  transference  to  some  other  position,  either  to  Istakr, 
the  ancient  metropolis  of  Persia  Proper,  or  to  Hamadan,  the 
capital  city  of  Media.  But  probably  it  was  considered  that  to 
retire  voluntarily  from  the  Tigris  Avould  be  a  confession  of 
weakness,  as  fatal  to  the  stabihty  of  the  empire  as  to  be  driven 
back  by  the  Arabs ;  and  perhaps  it  may  have  been  hoped  that 
the  restless  nomads  would  be  content  with  their  existing  con- 
quests, or  that  they  might  receive  a  chock  at  the  hands  of 
Rome  which  would  put  a  stop  to  their  aggressions  elsewhere. 
It  is  remarkable  that,  during  the  pause  of  a  year  and  a  half 


552  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvi. 

which  intesrvened  between  the  battle  of  Kadisiyeh  and  the  re- 
sumption of  hostilities  by  the  Arabs,  nothing  seems  to  have 
been  done  by  Persia  in  the  way  of  preparation  against  her  ter- 
rible assailants. 

In  the  year  a.d.  637  the  Arabs  again  took  the  offensive. 
They  had  employed  the  intervening  year  and  a  half  in  the 
foundation  of  Busrah  and  Kufa/"  and  in  the  general  consolida 
tion  of  their  sway  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates.""  They 
were  now  prepared  for  a  further  movement.  The  conduct  of 
the  war  was  once  more  entrusted  to  Sa'ad.  Having  collected 
an  army  of  20,000  men,"  this  general  proceeded  from  Kufa  to 
Anbar"^  (or  Perisabor),  where  he  crossed  the  Euphrates,  and 
entered  on  the  Mesopotamian  region.  Isdigerd,  learning  that 
he  had  put  his  forces  in  motion,  and  was  bent  upon  attacking 
Ctesiphon,  called  a  council  of  war,  and  asked  its  advice  as  to 
the  best  course  to  be  pursued  under  the  circumstances."'  It 
was  generally  agreed  that  the  capital  must  be  evacuated,  and 
a  stronger  situation  in  the  more  mountainous  part  of  the  coun- 
try occupied ;  but  Isdigerd  was  so  unwiUing  to  remove  that  he 
waited  till  the  Arabian  general,  with  a  force  now  raised  to 
60,000,  had  reached  Sabat,"^  which  was  only  a  day's  march 
from  the  capital,  before  he  ccmld  be  induced  to  commence  his 
retreat.  He  then  abandoned  the  town  hastily,  without  carry- 
ing off  more  than  a  small  portion  of  the  treasures  which  his 
ancestors  had  during  four  centiiries  accumulated  at  the  main 
seat  of  their  power,  and  retired  to  Holwan,  a  strong  place  in 
the  Zagros  mountain-range."^  Sa'ad,  on  learning  his  move- 
ment, sent  a  body  of  troops  in  pursuit,  which  came  up  with 
the  rear-guard  of  the  Persians,  and  cut  it  in  pieces,  but  effected 
nothing  really  important.  Isdigerd  made  good  his  retreat,  and 
in  a  short  time  concentrated  at  Holwan  an  army  of  above 
100,000  men.""  Sa'ad,  instead  of  pushing  forward  and  engaging 
this  force,  was  irresistibly  attracted  by  the  reputed  wealth  of 
the  Great  Ctesiphon,  and,  marching  thither,  entered  the  unre- 
sisting city,"'  with  his  troops,  in  the  sixteenth  year  of  the 
Hegira,  the  four  hundred  and  eleventh  from  the  foundation  of 
the  Sassanian  kingdom  by  Artaxerxes,  son  of  Babek. 

Ctesiphon  was,  undoubtedly,  a  rich  prize.  Its  palaces  and 
its  gardens,  its  opulent  houses  and  its  pleasant  fields,  its  foun- 
tains and  its  flowers,  are  celebrated  by  the  Arabian  writers, 
who  are  never  weary  of  rehearsing  the  beauty  of  its  site,  the 
elegance  of  the  buildings,  the  magnificence  and  luxury  of  their 
furniture,  or  the  amount  of  the  t4'easures  which  were  containec? 


en.  XXVI.]  TEE  ARABS  TAKE  CTESiniON.  553 

in  them,"'  The  royal  palace,  now  known  as  the  Taklit-i- 
Khosru,"  especially  provoked  their  admiration.  It  was  built 
of  polished  stone,  and  had  in  front  of  it  a  portico  of  twelve 
marble  pillars,  each  150  feet  high.  The  length  of  the  edifice 
was  450  feet,  its  breadth  180,  its  height  150.  In  the  centre 
was  the  hall  of  audience,  a  noble  apartment,  115  feet  long  and 
85  high,""'  with  a  magnificent  vaulted  roof,  bedecked  with 
golden  stars,  so  arranged  as  to  represent  the  motions  of  the 
planets  among  the  twelve  signs  of  the  Zodiac,""  where  the  mon- 
arch was  accustomed  to  sit  on  a  golden  throne,  hearing  causes 
and  dispensing  justice  to  his  subjects.  The  treasury  and  the 
various  apartments  were  full  of  gold  and  silver,  of  costly  robes 
and  precious  stones,  of  jewelled  arms  and  dainty  carpets.  The 
glass  vases  of  the  spice  magazine  contained  an  abundance  of 
musk,  camphor,'"^  amber,  gums,  drugs,  and  delicious  per- 
fumes. In  one  apartment  was  found  a  carpet  of  white  brocade, 
450  feet  long  and  90  broad,  with  a  border  worked  in  precious 
stones  of  various  hues,  to  represent  a  garden  of  all  kinds  of 
beautiful  flowers.  The  leaves  were  formed  of  emeralds,  the 
blossoms  and  buds  of  pearls,  rubies,  sapphires,  and  other  gems 
of  immense  value.  Among  the  objects  found  in  the  treasury 
were  a  horse  made  entirely  of  gold,  bearing  a  silver  saddle  set 
with  a  countless  multitude  of  jewels,  and  a  camel  made  of 
silver,  accompanied  by  a  foal  of  which  the  material  was  gold. 
A  coffer  belonging  to  Isdigerd  was  captui^ed  at  the  bridge  over 
the  Nahrwan  canal  as  it  guardians  were  endeavoring  to  carry 
it  off.  Among  its  contents  were  a  robe  of  state  embroidered 
with  rubies  and  pearls,  several  garments  made  of  tissue  of 
gold,  the  crown  and  seal  of  Chosroes  (Anushirwan?),  and  ten 
pieces  of  silk  brocade.  The  armory  of  Chosroes  also  fell  into 
the  conqueror's  hands.  It  contained  his  helmet,  breastplate, 
greaves,  and  arm-pieces,  all  of  solid  gold  adorned  with  pearls, 
six  "cuirasses  of  Solomon,"  and  ten  costly  scimitars.  The 
works  of  art,  and  a  fifth  part  of  the  entire  booty,  were  set 
apart  for  the  Caliph  Omar,  and  sent  by  trusty  messengers  to 
Medina;  the  value  of  the  remainder  was  so  enormous'"  that 
when  Sa'ad  divided  it  among  his  GO,  000  soldiers  the  share  of 
each  amounted  to  12,000  dirhems  (312Z.). 

It  is  said  ""  that  Sa'ad,  after  capturing  Ctesiphon,  was  anxious 
to  set  out  in  pursuit  of  Isdigerd,  but  was  restrained  by  de- 
spatches received  from  Omar,  which  commanded  him  to  remain 
at  the  Persian  capital,  and  to  employ  his  brother  Hashem.  and 
the  experienced  general  El  Kakaa,  in  the  further  prosecution 


S54  THE  SEVENTH  MOKARCHT.  [ch.  xXTt 

of  the  war.  Hasliem  was,  therefore,  sent  with  12,000  men, 
against  the  fugitive  monarch,  whose  forces,  said  to  have  ex- 
ceeded 100,000  men,  and  commanded  by  a  Mihran,  were  drawn 
up  at  Jalula,  not  far  from  Holwan.""  The  disparity  of  num- 
bers forced  Hashem  to  condescend  to  maneuvering ;  and  it  was 
six  months  before  he  ventured  on  a  general  engagement  with 
his  antagonist.  Again  the  Mohammedans  proved  victorious ; 
and  this  time  the  carnage  was  excessive;  100,000  Persians  are 
said  to  have  lain  dead  on  the  battle-field ;  the  commander  was 
himself  among  the  slain.  Jalula  at  once  surrendered;  and 
fresh  treasures  were  obtained.  Among  other  precious  articles, 
a  figure  of  a  camel,  with  its  rider,  in  soUd  gold,  was  found  in 
one  of  the  tents. '""  Altogether  the  booty  is  reckoned  at  about 
four  millions  of  our  money — the  share  of  each  soldier  engaged 
being  10,000  dirhems,'"  or  about  2G07.  sterling. 

Isdigerd,  on  learning  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Jalula,  quitted 
Holwan,  and  retired  to  Rei,  a  large  town  near  the  Caspian 
sea,'°'  at  a  short  distance  from  the  modem  Teheran,  thus 
placing  the  entire  Zagros  range  between  himself  and  his 
irresistible  foes.  A  general  named  Khosru-sum  was  left  behind 
with  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  was  bidden  to  defend  Holwan 
to  the  last  extremity.  Instead  of  remaining,  however,  within 
the  walls  of  the  stronghold,  Khosru  sum  rashly  led  his  force  to 
meet  that  of  El  Kakaa,  who  defeated  him  at  Easr-i-Shirin  "' 
and  entirely  dispersed  his  army.  Holwan,  being  left  without 
protection,  surrendered ;  the  conquest  of  Shirwan,  Mah-sabadan, 
and  Tekrit  followed;""  and  by  the  close  of  the  year  a.d.  637 the 
banner  of  the  Prophet  waved  over  the  whole  tract  west  of 
Zagros,  from  Nineveh  almost  to  Susa,  or  from  the  Kurnib  to 
the  Kuran  river. 

Another  short  pause  in  the  Arabian  aggressions  upon  Persia 
now  occurred;  but  in  the  year  a.d.  639  their  attacks  were  re- 
sumed, and  the  Persians  had  to  submit  to  further  losses. 
Otba,  governor  of  Busrah,  sent  an  expedition  across  the  Shat- 
el-Arab  into  Susiana,'"  and,  supported  by  the  Arab  population 
of  the  province,  which  deserted  the  Persian  side,  engaged  Hor- 
muzan,  the  satrap,  in  two  battles,  defeated  him,  and  forced 
him  to  cede  a  portion  of  his  territory,  including  the  important 
city  of  Ahwaz."^  Soon  afterwards,  Ala,  governor  of  Bahrein, 
conducted  in  person  an  expedition  into  Persia  Proper,  crossing 
the  Gulf  in  the  rude  vessels  of  the  time,  and  attacking  Shehrek, 
the  Persian  satrap,  who  acknowledged  the  authority  of  Isdi- 
gerd.   Here,  the  Arabs  were  for  once  unsu-^ceiRsfuI.    Shehrek 


fcH.  XXVI.]  t]vVAsIo:^'^  OP  snsiANA.  555 

collected  a  force  which  Ala  was  afraid  to  encounter ;  the  Arab 
chief  retreated  to  the  coast,  but  found  his  fleet  engidfed  by 
the  waves ;  and  it  was  only  with  great  difficulty  that  he  made 
his  escape  by  land  from  the  country  which  he  had  ventured  to 
invade.  He  owed  his  escape  to  Otba,  who  sent  troops  from 
Busrah  to  his  aid,  defeated  Shehrek,  and  rescued  his  fellow 
governor  from  the  peril  which  threatened  him."^ 

In  the  next  year  (a.d.  640)  Hormuzan,  incited  by  Isdigerd, 
made  a  desperate  attempt  to  recover  the  territory  which  he 
had  been  compelled  to  cede.  Assisted  by  Shehi-ek,  governor  of 
Persia  Proper,  he  attacked  the  Arabs  unawares,  but  was 
speedily  met,  driven  from  Ram-Hormuz  to  Shuster,  and  there 
besieged  for  the  space  of  six  months.  As  many  as  eighty 
engagements  are  said  to  have  taken  place  before  the  walls,"* 
with  no  decided  advantage  to  either  side.  At  length  Al-Bera, 
son  of  Mahk,  one  of  the  companions  of  the  Prophet,  and  be- 
lieved by  many  to  possess  the  prophetic  spirit,  announced  that 
victory  was  about  to  inchne  to  the  Moslems,  but  that  he  him- 
self would  be  slain.  A  chance  arrow  having  fulfilled  won  half 
of  the  prediction,  the  Arabs  felt  an  assurance  that  the  other 
half  would  follow,  and  fought  with  such  fanatic  ardor  that 
their  expectations  were  soon  fulfilled.  The  town  was  won ;  but 
Hormuzan  retired  into  the  citadel,  and  there  successfully 
maintained  himself,  till  Abu-Sabra,  the  Mohanunedan  general, 
consented  to  spare  his  life,  and  send  him  to  Medina,  where  his 
fate  should  be  determined  by  the  Caliph.  Hormuzan,  on  ob- 
taining an  audience,  pretended  thirst  and  asked  for  a  cup  of 
water,  which  was  given  him:  he  then  looked  suspiciously 
around,  as  if  he  expected  to  be  stabbed  while  drinking.  "Fear 
nothing,"  said  Omar;  "your  life  is  safe  till  you  have  drunk  the 
water."  The  crafty  Persian  flung  the  cup  to  the  ground,  and 
Omar  felt  that  he  had  been  outwitted,  but  that  he  must  keep 
his  word.  Hormuzan  became  an  Arab  pensionary,  and  shortly 
afterwards  embraced  Islamism."^  His  territories  were  occu' 
pied  by  the  Moslems,  whose  dominions  were  thereby  extended 
from  the  Kuran  to  the  Tab  river. 

The  Arab  conquests  on  the  side  of  Persia  had  hitherto  been 
effected  and  maintained  by  the  presiding  genius  of  one  of  the 
ablest  of  the  Mohammedan  commanders,  the  victor  of  Kadi- 
siyeh,  Sa'ad  Ibn  Abi  Wakas.  Fi*om  Kufa,  where  he  built  him- 
self a  magnificent  palace,  which  Omar  however  caused  to  be 
destroyed,""  this  great  general  and  skilful  administrator  direct- 
ed the  movements  of  armies,  arranged  the  divisions  of  pro* 


556  THE  SEVENTH  MONAttCllT.  [ch.  xxvi. 

vinces,  apportioned  the  sums  to  be  paid  to  the  revenue,  dealt 
out  justice,  and  generally  superintended  affairs  throughout  the 
entire  region  conquered  by  the  Arabs  to  the  east  of  the  desert. 
A  man  in  such  a  position  necessarily  made  himself  enemies; 
and  complaints  were  frequently  carried  to  Omar  of  his  lieu- 
tenant's pride,  luxury,  and  injustice.'"  What  foundation 
there  may  have  been  for  these  charges  is  uncertain;  but  it 
seems  that  Omar  was  persuaded,  towards  the  close  of  a.d.  640, 
or  very  early  in  a.d.  641,  that  they  were  of  sufficient  weight  to 
make  it  necessary  that  they  should  be  investigated.  He 
accordingly  recalled  Sa'ad  from  his  government  to  Medina,  and 
replaced  him  at  Kufa  by  Ammar  Ibn  Yaser."" 

The  news  of  this  change  was  carried  to  Isdigerd  at  Rei,  and 
caused  him  to  conceive  hopes  of  recovering  his  lost  territory. 
The  event  shows  that  he  attributed  too  much  to  the  personal 
ability  of  his  great  antagonist ;  but  the  mistake  was  not  im- 
natural ;  and  it  was  a  noble  impulse  which  led  him  to  seize  the 
first  promising  occasion,  in  order  to  renew  the  struggle  and 
make  a  last  desperate  effort  to  save  his  empire  and  repulse  the 
barbarous  nomads.  The  facts  are  not  as  the  Arabian  historians 
represent  them.  There  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
Mohammedans  to  be  content  with  the  conquests  which  they 
made,  or  to  remain  within  the  boundary  line  of  the  mountains 
that  separate  the  Mesopotamian  region  from  the  high  plateau 
of  Iran.  "'^  Mohammedanism  had  an  insatiable  ambition,  and 
was  certain  to  spread  itself  in  all  directions  until  its  forces 
were  expended,  or  a  bound  was  set  to  it  by  resistance  which  it 
could  not  overcome.  Isdigerd,  by  remaining  quiet,  might  per- 
haps have  prolonged  the  precarious  existence  of  Persia  for 
half  a  dozen  years,  though  even  this  is  uncertain,  and  it  is  per- 
haps as  probable  that  the  tide  of  conquest  would  have  flowed 
eastward  in  a.d.  641  or  642,  even  had  he  attempted  nothing. 
What  alone  we  can  be  sure  of  his,  that  no  acquiescence  on  his 
part,  no  abstention  from  warhke  enterprise,  no  submission 
short  of  the  acceptance  of  Islamism,  would  have  availed  to 
save  his  country  for  more  than  a  very  brief  space  from  the 
tramp  of  the  hordes  that  were  bent  on  enriching  themselves 
with  the  plunder  of  the  whole  civilized  world,  and  imposing  on 
all  the  nations  of  the  earth  their  dominion  and  their  reUgion. 

From  the  citadel  of  Rei,  Isdigerd,  in  a.d.  641,  sounded  the 
call  to  battle  with  no  uncertain  note.  His  envoys  spread 
themselves  through  Media,  Azerbijan,  Khorassan,  Gurgan, 
Tabaristan.  Merv,  Bactria,  Seistan,  Kerman,  and  Farsistan"' 


<;fl.  XXVI.]  BATTLE  OF  KEIIAVKSt^.  f,57 

(or  Persia  Proper),  demanding  contingents  of  troops,  and  ap- 
pointing, as  the  place  of  rendezvous,  the  small  town  of  Nehav- 
end,  which  is  in  the  mountain  region,  about  fifty  miles  south  of 
Hamadan.     The  call  was  responded  to  with  zeal ;  and  in  a  shoi-t 
time  there  was  gathered  together  at  the  place  named  an  army 
of  150,000  men. '^'    Firuzan,  one  of  the  nobles  who  had  com- 
manded at  Kadisiyeh, '"  was  made  general -in-chief .    The  design 
was  entertained  of  descending  on  Holwan,  and  thence  upon  the 
lowland  region,   of  re-taking  Ctesiphon,   crossing  the    great 
rivers,  and  destroying  the  rising  cities  of  Kufa  and  Busrah.  '■' 
But  the  Arabs  were  vipon  the  alert,  and  anticipated  the  in- 
tended invasion.     Neman,  son  of  Mokarrin,  Avho  commanded 
at  Ahwaz,  was  hastily  commissioned  by  Omar  to  collect  the 
Arab  troops  stationed  in  Irak,  Khuzistan,  and  the  Sawcid,  to 
put  himself  at  their  head,   and  to  prevent  the  outbreak  by 
marching  at  once  on  Nehavend.      He  succeeded  in  uniting 
under  his  standard  about  30,000  soldiers,'-^  and  with  this  mode- 
rate force  entered  the  mountain  tract,  passed   Holwan  and 
Merj,  and  encamped  at  Tur,  where  he  expected  the  attack  of 
the  enemy.'"    But  Firuzan  had  now  resolved  to  maintain  the 
defensive.      He  had  entrenched  himself  strongly  in  front  of 
Nehavend  and  was  bent  on  Avearing  out  the  patience  of  the 
Arabs  by  a  prolonged  resistance.     Noman,  finding  himself  un- 
molested, advanced  from  Tur  to  the  immediate  neighborhood 
of  Nehavend,  and  endeavored  to  provoke  his  adversary  to  give 
battle,  but  without  effect.     For  two  months  the  two  hosts  faced 
each  other  without  fighting.     At  last,  the  stores  of  the  xVrnbs, 
as  well  as  their  patience,  began  to  fail;  and  it  was  necessary  to 
employ  some  device,  or  to  give  up  the  war  altogether.     Here- 
upon, Noman,  by  the  advice  of  two  of  his  captains,  had  re- 
course to  a  stratagem.     He  spread  a  report  that  Omar  was 
dead,  and  breaking  up  from  from  his  camp  began  a  hasty  re- 
treat.    The  plan  succeeded.      Firuzan  quitted  his  entrench- 
ments, and  led  his  army  on  the  traces  of  the  flying  foe.     It  was 
two  days  before  he  reached  them,  and  onihethh-d  day  the  bat- 
tle began.     Noman,  having  addressed  liis  soldiers  and  made 
arrangements  concerning  the  command  in  case  of  his  own 
death,  mounted  a  milk-white  steed,'-'''' and  gave  the  signal  for 
the  fight  by  thrice  shouting  the  famous  tekhir,  or  battle-cry, 
'yAllah  dkhar.^''     The  Arabs  charged  Avith  fury,   and  for  a 
while,  amid  the  clouds  of  dust  which  rose  beneath  their  feet, 
nothing  was  heard  but  the  clash  of  steel. '"    At  length  the  Per- 
sians gave  way ;  but,  as  Noman  advanced  his  standard  and  led 


S58  THE  SBVENTB  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvr 

the  pursuit,  a  volley  of  arrows  from  the  flying  foe  checked  his 
movement,  and  at  the  same  time  terminated  his  career.  A 
shaft  had  struck  him  in  a  vital  part,  and  he  fell  at  the  moment 
of  victory.  For  his  men,  maddened  by  the  loss  of  their  com- 
mander, pressed  on  more  furiously  than  before ;  the  Persians 
•were  unable  to  rally ;  and  a  promiscuous  flight  began.  Then 
followed  a  dreadful  slaughter.  The  numbers  of  the  Persians 
must  have  impeded  their  retreat;  and  in  the  defiles  of  the 
mountains  a  rapid  flight  was  impossible.  Firuzan  himself, 
who,  instead  of  falling  back  on  Nehavend,  took  the  road  lead- 
ing north  to  Hamadan,  was  overtaken  by  El  Kakaa  in  a  narrow 
pass,  and  put  to  the  sword.  More  than  100,000  Persians  are 
said  to  have  perished.  '^*  The  victors,  pressing  onwards,  easily 
took  Nehavend.  Hamadan  surrendered  to  them  shortly  after- 
wards. ''^ 

The  defeat  of  Nehavend  terminated  the  Sassanian  power. '^° 
Isdigerd  indeed,  escaping  from  Rei,  and  flying  continually 
from  place  to  place,  prolonged  an  inglorious  existence  for  the 
space  of  ten  more  years — from  a.d.  641  to  a.d.  651;  but  he  had 
no  longer  a  kingdom.  Persia  fell  to  pieces  on  the  occasion  of 
"the  victory  of  victories,'^' and  made  no  other  united  effort 
against  the  Arabs.  Province  after  province  was  occupied  by 
the  fierce  invaders ;'^'^  and,  at  length,  in  a.d.  651,  their  arms 
penetrated  to  Merv,  where  the  last  scion  of  the  house  of  Babek 
had  for  some  years  found  a  refuge.  It  is  said  that  during  this 
interval  he  had  made  efforts  to  engage  the  Khan  of  the  Turks 
and  the  Emperor  of  the  Chinese  to  embrace  his  cause;"*  but,  if 
this  were  so,  it  was  without  success.  Though  they  may  have 
lent  him  some  encouragement,  no  real  effort  was  made  by 
either  potentate  on  his  behalf.  Isdigerd,  at  Merv,  during  his 
later  years,  experienced  the  usual  fate  of  sovereigns  who  have 
lost  their  kingdoms.  He  was  alternately  flattered  and  coerced 
by  pretended  friends  among  his  own  people — induced  to  cherish 
vain  hopes,  and  driven  to  despair,  by  the  fluctuating  counsels 
of  the  monarchs  of  neighboring  nations.  At  last  he  was  mur- 
dered by  a  subject  for  the  sake  of  his  clothes,  when  he  was 
flying  from  a  combined  attack  of  treacherous  subjects  and 
offended  foreigners."^* 

It  is  difficult  to  form  a  decided  opinion  as  to  the  character  of 
Isdigerd  III.  He  was  but  fifteen  years  of  age  at  his  accession, 
twenty-four  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Nehavend,  and  thirty- 
four  at  his  decease,  a.d.  651.  It  is  in  his  favor  that  "history 
lays  no  crimes  to  his  charge ;"  '"  for  this  can  be  said  of  very  few 


CH.  XXVI.]   UHARACTER  OF  ISDIGERD  UL— COINS.  559 

Sassanian  sovereigns.  It  is  also  to  his  credit  that  he  persevered 
so  long  in  struggling  against  his  fate,  and  in  endeavoring  to 
maintain,  or  restore,  the  independence  of  his  nation.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  confessed  that  there  is  little  to  be 
admired  in  the  measures  which  he  took  to  meet  the  perils  of 
the  time,  and  that  personally  he  appears  to  have  been  weak  and 
of  luxurious  habits.  During  the  whole  of  his  long  struggle 
with  the  Arabs  he  seems  never  once  to  have  placed  himself  at 
the  head  of  his  troops,  much  less  to  have  crossed  swords  with 
the  enemy.  He  intrusted  the  defence  of  Persia  to  generals, 
and  did  not  even  seek  to  inspire  his  soldiers  with  enthusiasm 
by  his  own  presence  in  their  camp.  Always  occupying  some 
secure  fortress  far  in  the  rear  of  his  army,  he  fled  from  each  as 
the  enemy  made  a  step  in  advance,  quitting  Ctesiphon  for  Hol- 
wan,  Holwan  for  Rei,  and  Rei  for  Merv,  never  venturing  upon 
a  stand,  never  making  an  appeal  to  the  loyalty  wliich  was 
amongst  the  best  qualities  of  the  Persians,  and  which  would 
have  caused'  them  to  fight  with  desperation  in  defence  of  a 
present  king.  Carrying  with  him  in  all  his  wanderings  the 
miserable  pageant  of  an  Oriental  court,  he  suffered  his  move- 
ments to  be  hampered  and  his  resources  ci'ippled  by  a  throng 
of  4000  useless  retainers,  '^^  whom  he  could  not  bring  himself  to 
dismiss.  Instead  of  donning  the  armor  which  befitted  one  who 
was  struggling  for  his  crown,  he  wore  to  the  last  the  silken 
robes,  the  jewelled  belt,  the  rings  and  bracelets  that  were  only 
suited  for  the  quiet  inmate  of  a  palace,  and  by  this  incongruous 
and  misplaced  splendor  he  provoked,  and,  perhaps  we  may  say, 
deserved  his  fate.  A  monarch  who  loses  his  crown  for  the  most 
part  awakens  interest  and  sympathy ;  but  no  historian  has  a 
word  of  commiseration  for  the  last  of  the  Sassanidae,  who  is 
reproached  with  feebleness,  cowardice,  and  effeminacy.""  It 
must  certainly  be  allowed  that  he  was  no  hero ;  but  considering 
his  extreme  youth  when  his  perils  began,  the  efforts  which  ho 
made  to  meet  them,  and  the  impossibility  of  an  effective 
resistance  in  the  effete  and  exhausted  condition  of  the  Persian 
nation,  history  is  scarcely  justified  in  passing  upon  the  unfortu- 
nate prince  a  severe  judgment. 

The  coins  assigned  to  Isdigerd  III.  are  neither  numerous  nor 
very  remarkable.  '"*  The  head  is  in  general  very  similar  to  that 
of  Artaxerxes  III.  The  pearl  boi'dering  around  it  is  single,  and 
in  the  margin  are  the  usual  stars  and  crescents  of  the  later 
Sassanian  kings.  The  margin,  however,  shows  also  in  some 
instances  a  peculiar  device  behind  the  crown,  and  also  a  legend, 


^60 


THK  SWVENTB  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XXVIt 


whicli  has  been  read,  but  very  doubtfully, ""  as  "  Ormazd. "  The 
king's  name  is  given  as  Iskart  or  Iskarti.  Among  the  regnal 
years  marked  on  the  reverse  have  been  found  the  numbers 
*' nineteen"  and  "twenty."  Among  the  mint-marks  are  Azer- 
bijan,  Abiverd,  and  Merv.  [PI.  XXIV.,  Fig.  4.] 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


Architecture  of  the  Sassanians.  Its  Origin.  Its  Peculiarities. 
Oblong  Square  Plan.  Arched  Entrance  Halls.  Domes  rest- 
ing on  Pendentives.  Suites  of  Apartments.  Ornamenta- 
tion: Exterior,  by  Pilasters,  Cornices,  String-courses,  and 
shallow  arched  Recesses,  ivith  Pilasters  between  them  ;  In- 
terior, by  Pillars  supporting  transverse  Ribs,or  by  Door- 
ways and  False  Windows,  like  the  Persopolitan.  Specimen 
Palaces  at  Serbistan,  at  Firuzbad,  at  Ctesiphon,  at  Mashita. 
Elaborate  Decoration  at  the  last-named  Palace.  Decoration 
Elseivhere.  Arch  of  TaJcht-i-Bostan.  Sassanian  Statuary. 
Sassanian  Bas-reliefs.  Estimate  of  their  Artistic  Value, 
Question  of  the  Employment  by  the  Sassaniajis  of  Byzan- 
tine Artists.     General  Summary. 

"  With  the  accession  of  the  Sassanians,  Persia  regained  much  of  that  power  aud 
stability  to  which  she  had  been  so  long  a  stranger.  ,  .  .  The  improvement  in  the 
fine  arts  at  home  indicates  returning  prosperity,  and  a  degree  of  security  miknown 
since  the  fall  of  the  Acheemenidse." — Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture,  vol.  i 
pp.  381-2,  2d  edition. 

When  Persia  under  the  Sassanian  princes  shook  off  the  bar- 
barous yoke  to  which  she  had  submitted  for  the  space  of  almost 
five  centuries,  she  found  architecture  and  the  other  fine  arts  at 
almost  the  lowest  possible  ebb  throughout  the  greater  part  of 
Western  Asia. '  The  ruins  of  the  Achsemenian  edifices,  which 
were  still  to  be  seen  at  Pasargadae,  Persopolis,  and  elsewhere,  * 
bore  witness  to  the  grandeur  of  idea,  and  magnificence  of  con- 
struction, which  had  once  formed  part  of  the  heritage  of  the 
Persian  nation;  but  the  intervening  period  was  one  during 
which  the  arts  had  well-nigh  wholly  disappeared  from  the 
Western  Asiatic  world ;  and  when  the  early  sovereigns  of  the 
house  of  Sassan  felt  the  desire,  common  with  powerful  mon- 
archs,  to  exhibit  their  greatness  in  their  buildings,  they  found 


CH.  xxvtl.]  GENERAL  FEATURES  OF  THE  PALACES.      561 

themselves  at  the  first  without  artists  to  design,  without  ai-ti- 
sans  to  construct,  and  ahnost  without  models  to  copy.  The 
Parthians,  who  had  ruled  over  Pei'sia  for  nearly  foiu*  himdi-ed 
years,'  had  preferred  country  to  city  hfe,  tents  to  buildings, 
and  had  not  themselves  erected  a  single  edifice  of  any  preten- 
sion during  the  entire  period  of  their  dominion."  Nor  had  the 
nations  subjected  to  their  sway,  for  the  most  part,  exhibited 
any  constructive  genius,  or  been  successful  in  supplying  the 
artistic  deficiencies  of  their  rulers.  In  one  place  alone  was 
there  an  exception  to  this  general  paralysis  of  the  artistic 
powers.  At  Hatra,  in  the  middle  Mesopotamian  region,  an 
Arab  dynasty,  which  held  under  the  Parthian  kings,  had 
thought  its  dignity  to  require  that  it  should  be  lodged  in  a  i)al- 
ace,^  and  had  resuscitated  a  native  architecture  in  Mesopotamia, 
after  centuries  of  complete  neglect.  When  the  Sassanians 
looked  about  for  a  foundation  on  which  they  might  work,  and 
out  of  which  they  might  form  a  style  suitable  to  their  needs 
and  worthy  of  their  power  and  opulence,  they  found  what  they 
sought  in  the  Hatra  edifice,  which  was  within  the  limits  of 
their  kingdom,  and  at  no  gi-eat  distance  from  one  of  the  cities 
where  they  held  their  Court. 

The  early  palaces  of  the  Sassanians  have  ceased  to  exist. 
Artaxerxes,  the  son  of  Babek,  Sapor  the  first,  and  their  imme- 
mediate  successors,  undoubtedly  erected  residences  for  them- 
selves exceeding  in  size  and  richness  the  buildings  which  had 
contented  the  Parthians,  as  well  as  those  in  which  their  OAvn 
ancestors,  the  tributary  kings  of  Persia  under  Parthia,  had 
passed  their  Uves.  But  these  residences  have  almost  wholly 
disappeared.'  The  most  ancient  of  the  Sassanian  buildings 
which  admit  of  being  measured  and  described  are  assigned' 
to  the  century  between  a.d.  350  and  450;  and  we  are  thus 
unable  to  trace  the  exact  steps  by  which  the  Sassanian  style 
was  gi'adually  elaborated.  Wo  come  upon  it  when  it  is  be- 
yond the  stage  of  infancy,  when  it  has  acquired  a  marked  and 
decided  character,  when  it  no  longer  hesitates  or  falters,  but 
knows  what  it  wants,  and  goes  straight  to  its  ends.  Its  main 
featui'es  are  simple,  and  arc  uniform  from  first  to  last,  the 
later  buildings  being  merely  enlargements  of  the  earlier, '  by  an 
addition  to  the  number  or  to  the  size  of  tbe  apartments.  The 
principal  peciiliarities  of  the  style  are,  first,  that  the  plan  of 
the  entire  building  is  an  oblong  square,  without  adjuncts  or 
projections;  secondly,  that  the  main  entrance  is  into  a  lofty 
vaulted  porch  or  hall  by  an  archway  of  the  entire  width  of  the 


562  THE  SEVENTB  MONARCUf.  \cn.  xxvil 

apartment;  thirdly,  that  beside  these  oblong  halls,  the  build- 
ing contains  square  apartments,  vaulted  with  domes,  which 
are  circular  at  their  base,  and  elliptical  in  their  section,  and 
which  rest  on  pendentives  of  an  unusual  character;  fourthly, 
that  the  apartments  are  numerous  and  en  suite,  opening  one 
into  another,  without  the  intervention  of  passages ;  and  fifthly, 
that  the  palace  comprises,  as  a  matter  of  course,  a  court, 
placed  towards  the  rear  of  the  building,  with  apartments 
opening  into  it. 

The  oblong  square  is  variously  proportioned.  The  depth 
maybe  a  Uttle  more  than  the  breadth,"  or  it  maybe  nearly 
twice  as  much. '"  In  either  case,  the  front  occupies  one  of  the 
shorter  sides,  or  ends  of  the  edifice.  The  outer  wall  is  some- 
times pierced  by  one  entrance  only;"  but,  more  commonly, 
entrances  are  multiplied  beyond  the  limit  commonly  observed 
in  modern  buildings.'*  The  great  entrance  is  in  the  exact 
centre  of  the  front.  This  entrance,  as  already  noticed,  is  com- 
monly by  a  lofty  arch  which  (if  we  set  aside  the  domes)  is  of 
almost  the  full  height  of  the  building,  and  constitutes  one  of 
its  most  striking,  and  to  Europeans  most  extraordinary, 
features.  From  the  outer  air,  we  look,  as  it  were,  straight 
into  the  heart  of  the  edifice,  in  one  instance"  to  the  depth  of 
115  feet,  a  distance  equal  to  the  length  of  Henry  VII. 's  Chapel 
at  Westminster.  The  effect  is  very  strange  when  first  seen 
by  the  inexperienced  traveller ;  but  similar  entrances  are  com- 
mon in  the  mosques  of  Armenia  and  Persia,  and  in  the  palaces 
of  the  latter  country.  In  the  mosques  "lofty  and  deeply- 
recessed  portals,"  "unrivaUed  for  grandeur  and  appropriate- 
ness," '*  are  rather  the  rule  than  the  exception;  and,  in  the 
palaces,  "Throne-rooms"  are  commonly  mere  deep  recesses 
of  this  character,  vavilted  or  supported  by  pillars,  and  open  at 
one  end  to  the  fuU  width  and  height  of  the  apartment.''  The 
height  of  the  arch  varies  in  Sassanian  buildings  from  about 
fifty  to  eighty-five  feet;  it  is  generally  plain,  and  without 
ornament;  but  in  one  case  we  meet  with  a  foiling  of  small 
arches  round  the  great  one,  '^  which  has  an  effect  that  is  not 
unpleasing. 

The  domed  apartments  are  squares  of  from  twenty-five  to 
forty  feet,  or  a  little  more.  The  domes  are  circular  at  their 
base ;  but  a  section  of  them  would  exhibit  a  half  ellipse,  with  its 
longest  and  shortest  diameters  proportioned  as  three  to  two.'' 
The  height  to  which  they  rise  from  the  ground  is  not  much 
above  seventy  feet. "    A  single  building  will  have  two  or  thi-ee 


CH.  xx\^I.]  DOMES— ORNAMENTATION.  663 

domes,  either  of  the  same  size,  or  occasionally  of  different 
dimensions.  It  is  a  peculiarity  of  their  construction  that  they 
rest,  not  on  drums,  but  on  pendentives  of  a  curious  chai*acter. 
A  series  of  semi-circular  arches  is  thrown  across  the  angles  of 
the  apartment,  each  projecting  further  into  it  than  the  pre- 
ceding, and  in  this  way  the  corners  are  got  rid  of,  and  the 
square  converted  into  the  circular  shape. ^^  A  cornice  ran 
round  the  apartment,  either  above  or  below  the  pendentives, 
or  sometimes  both  above  and  below.^*'  The  domes  were  pierced 
by  a  number  of  small  holes,  which  admitted  some  light,  and 
the  upper  part  of  the  walls  between  the  pendentives  was 
also  pierced  by  windows. 

There  are  no  passages  or  corridors  in  the  Sassanian  palaces. 
The  rooms  for  the  most  part  open  one  into  the  other.  Where 
this  is  not  the  case,  they  give  upon  a  common  meeting-ground, 
which  is  either  an  open  court,  or  a  large  vaidted  apartment. 
The  openings  are  in  general  doorways  of  moderate  size,  but 
sometimes  they  are  arches  of  the  full  width  of  the  subordinate 
room  or  apartment.  As  many  as  seventeen  or  eighteen  rooms 
have  been  found  in  a  palace."' 

There  is  no  appearance  in  any  Sassanian  edifice  of  a  real 
second  story.  The  famous  Takht-i-Khosru  presents  exter- 
nally the  semblance  of  such  an  arrangement ;  but  this  seems 
to  have  been  a  mere  feature  of  the  external  ornamentation, 
and  to  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  interior. -^ 

The  exterior  ornamentation  of  the  Sassanian  buildings  was 
■by  pilasters,  by  arched  recesses,  by  cornices,  and  sometimes 
by  string-courses."  An  ornamentation  at  once  simple  and 
elegant  is  that  of  the  lateral  faces  of  the  palace  at  Firuzabad, 
where  long  reed-like  pilasters  are  carried  from  the  ground  to 
the  cornice,  while  between  them  are  a  series  of  tall  narrow 
doubly  recessed  arches.^*  Far  less  satisfactory  is  the  much 
more  elaborate  design  adopted  at  Ctesiphon,"  where  six  series 
of  blind  arches  of  different  kinds  are  superimposed  the  one  on 
the  other,  with  string-courses  between  them,  and  with  pilasters, 
placed  singly  or  in  pairs,  separating  the  arches  into  groups, 
and  not  regidarly  superimposed,  as  pillars,  whether  I'eal  or 
seeming,  ought  to  be. 

The  interior  ornamentation  was  probably,  in  a  great  measure, 
by  stucco,  painting,  and  perhaps  gilding.""  All  this,  however, 
if  it  existed,  has  disappeared ;  and  tlie  mteriors  now  present  a 
bare  and  naked  appearance,  which  is  only  slightly  relieved  by 
the  occasional  occurrence  of  windows,  of  ornamental  door- 


564  ^'^^'  SEVENTH  MONABCHT.  [ch  xxvii 

ways,  and  of  niches,  which  recall  well-known  features  at 
PersepoHs.  In  some  instances,  however,  the  arrangement  of 
the  larger  rooms  was  improved  by  means  of  short  pillars, 
placed  at  some  distance  from  the  walls,  and  supporting  a  sort 
of  transverse  rib,  which  broke  the  uniformity  of  the  roof.^' 
The  pillars  were  connected  with  the  side  walls  by  low  arches. 

Such  are  the  main  pecuharities  of  Sassanian  palace  architec- 
ture. The  general  effect  of  the  great  halls  is  grand,  though 
scarcely  beautiful;  and,  in  the  best  specimens,''  the  entire 
palace  has  an  air  of  simple  severity  which  is  striking  and 
dignified.  The  internal  arrangements  do  not  appear  to  be 
very  convenient.  Too  much  is  sacrificed  to  regularity;  and 
the  opening  of  each  room  into  its  neighbor  must,  one  would 
think,  have  been  unsatisfactory.  Still,  the  edifices  are  re- 
garded as  "indicating  considerable  originahty  and  power," 
though  they  ' '  point  to  a  state  of  society  when  attention  to 
security  hardly  allowed  the  arcliitect  the  free  exercise  of  the 
more  delicate  ornaments  of  his  ai't."^ 

From  this  general  account  of  the  main  features  of  the 
architecture  it  is  proposed  now  to  proceed  to  a  more  particular 
description  of  the  principal  extant  Sassanian  buildings — the 
palaces  at  Serbistan,  Firuzabad,  Ctesiphon,  and  Mashita. 

The  palace  at  Serbistan  is  the  smallest,  and  probably  the 
earliest  of  the  four.  It  has  been  assigned  conjecturaUy  to  the 
middle  of  the  fourth  century,^"  or  the  reign  of  Sapor  II.  The 
ground  plan  is  an  oblong  but  little  removed  from  a  square,  the 
length  being  43  French  metres,  and  the  breadth  nearly  37 
metres.''  [PI.  XXV.,  Fig.  1.]  The  building  faces  west,  and  is 
entered  by  thi'ee  archways,  between  which  are  groups  of  three 
semi-circular  pilasters,  while  beyond  the  two  outer  arches 
towards  the  angles  of  the  building  is  a  single  similar  pilaster, 
Witliin  the  archways  are  halls  or  porches  of  different  depths, 
the  central  one  of  the  three  being  the  shallowest.  [PI.  XXV., 
Fig.  2.]  This  opens  by  an  arched  doorway  into  a  square 
chamber,  the  largest  in  the  edifice.  It  is  domed,  and  has  a 
diameter  of  about  42  feet  or,  including  recesses,  of  above  57 
feet.  The  interior  height  of  the  dome  from  the  floor  is  65  feet. 
Beyond  the  domed  chamber  is  a  court,  wliich  measures  45  feet 
by  40,  and  has  rooms  of  various  sizes  opening  into  it.  One  of 
these  is  domed;  and  others  are  for  the  most  part  vaulted. 
The  great  domed  chamber  opens  towards  the  north,  on  a  deep 
porch  or  hall,  which  was  entered  from  without  bj"  the  usual 
arched  portal.     On  the  south  it  communicates  with  a  pillared 


CH.  xxvir.]  THE  PALACE  AT  FIRUZABAD.  565 

hall,  above  60  feet  long  by  30  broad.  There  is  another  some- 
what similar  hall  on  the  north  side  of  the  building,  in  width 
about  equal,  but  in  length  not  quite  50  feet.  In  both  halls  tho 
pillars  are  short,  not  exceeding  six  feet.  They  support  piers, 
which  run  up  perpendicularly  for  a  considerable  height,  and 
then  become  ribs  of  the  vaulting. 

The  Firuzabad  palace  has  a  length  of  above  390  and  a  width 
of  above  180  feet.^^  Its  supposed  date"  is  a.d.  450,  or  the  reign 
of  Isdigerd  I.  As  usual  the  ground  plan  is  an  oblong  square. 
[PI.  XXVI.]  It  is  remarkable  that  the  entire  building  had  but 
a  single  entrance."  Tliis  was  by  a  noble  arch,  above  50  feet  in 
height,  which  faced  north,  and  gave  admission  into  a  vaulted 
hall,  nearly  90  feet  long  by  48  wide,  having  at  either  side  two 
lesser  halls  of  a  similar  character,  opening  into  it  by  somewhat 
low  semi-circular  arches,  of  nearly  the  full  width  of  tho  apart- 
ments. Beyond  these  rooms,  and  communicating  with  them  by 
narrow,  but  elegant  doorways,  were  three  domed  chambers  pre- 
cisely similar,  occupying  together  the  full  width  of  the  build- 
ing, each  about  43  feet  square,  and  crowned  by  elliptical  domes 
rising  to  the  height  of  nearly  70  feet.  [PI.  XXVII.,  Fig.  1.] 
The  ornamentation  of  these  chambers  was  by  their  doorways, 
and  by  false  windows,  on  the  Persepolitan  model.  The  domed 
chambers  opened  into  some  small  apartments,  beyond  which 
was  a  large  court,  about  90  feet  square,  surrounded  by  vaulted 
rooms  of  various  sizes,  which  for  the  most  part  communicated 
directly  with  it.  False  windows,  or  recesses,  relieved  the  in- 
terior of  these  apartments,  but  were  of  a  less  elaborate  char- 
acter than  those  of  the  domed  chambers.  Externally  the  whole 
building  was  chastely  and  tastefully  ornamented  by  the  tall 
narrow  arches  and  reed-like  pilasters  already  mentioned.'' 
[PI.  XXVII.,  Fig.  2.]  Its  character,  however,  was  upon  the 
whole  "simple  and  severe;"  nor  can  we  quarrel  with  the 
judgment  which  pronounces  it  "more  like  a  gigantic  bastile 
than  the  palace  of  a  gay,  pavilion-loving  people  like  the 
Persians.'"'' 

It  is  difficult  to  form  any  very  decided  opinion  upon  the 
architectural  merits  of  tho  third  and  gi-andost  of  tho  f^assnnian 
palaces,  the  well  known  "  Takht-i-Khosru,"  or  palace  of  Chos- 
roes  Anushirwan,  at  Ctesiphon."  What  remains  of  this  mas- 
sive erection  is  a  mere  fragment,'*  which,  to  judge  from  the 
other  extant  Sassanian  ruins,  cannot  have  formed  so  much  as 
one  fourth  part  of  the  original  edifice.  [PI.  XXVIII.,  Fig.  1.] 
Nothing  has  come  down  to  our  day  but  a  single  vaulted  haU 


566  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvii 

on  the  grandest  scale,  72  feet  wide,  85  high,  and  115  deep,  to- 
gether with  the  mere  outer  wall  of  what  no  doubt  constituted 
the  main  fagade  of  the  building.  The  apartments,  which,  ac- 
cording to  aU  analogy,  must  have  existed  at  the  two  sides,  and 
in  the  rear,  of  the  great  hall,  some  of  which  should  have  been 
vaulted,  have  wholly  perished.  Imagination  may  supply  then^ 
from  the  Firuzabad,  or  the  Mashita  palace ;  but  not  a  trace, 
even  of  their  foundations,  is  extant;  and  the  details,  conse- 
quently,  are  uncertain,  though  the  general  plan  can  scarcely 
be  doubted.  At  each  side  of  the  great  hall  were  probably  two 
lateral  ones,  communicating  with  each  other,  and  capable  of 
being  entered  either  from  the  hall  or  from  the  outer  air.  '^  Be* 
yond  the  great  hall  was  probably  a  domed  chamber,  equalhng 
it  in  width,  and  opening  upon  a  court,  round  which  were  a 
number  of  moderate-sized  apartments.  The  entire  building 
was  no  doubt  an  oblong  square,  of  which  the  shorter  sidea 
seem  to  have  measured  370  feet."  It  had  at  least  three,  and 
may  not  improbably  have  had  a  larger  number  of  entrances, 
since  it  belongs  to  tranquil  times  and  a  secure  locality. 

The  ornamentation  of  the  existing  fagade  of  the  palace  is  by 
doorways,  doubly-arched  recesses,  pilasters,  and  string-courses. 
These  last  divide  the  building,  externally,  into  an  appearance 
of  three  or  four  distinct  stories.  The  first  and  second  stories 
are  broken  into  portions  by  pilasters,  which  in  the  first  or 
basement  stories  are  in  pairs,  but  in  the  second  stand  singly. 
It  is  remarkable  that  the  pilasters  of  the  second  story  are  not 
arranged  with  any  regard  to  those  of  the  first,  and  are  conse- 
quently in  many  cases  not  superimposed  upon  the  lower  pi- 
lasters. In  the  third  and  fourth  stories  there  are  no  pilasters, 
the  arched  recesses  being  here  continued  without  any  inter- 
ruption. Over  the  great  arch  of  the  central  hall,  a  foiling  of 
seventeen  small  semicircular  arches  constitutes  a  pleasing  and 
unusual  feature. 

The  Mashita  palace,  which  was  almost  certainly  built  be- 
tween A.D.  614  and  a.d.  627,  while  on  a  smaller  scale  than  that 
of  Ctesiphon,  was  far  more  richly  ornamented.  [PI.  XXVIII,, 
Fig.  2.]  This  construction  of  Chosroes  II.  (Parwiz)  consisted 
of  two  distinct  buildings  (separated  by  a  court-yard,  in  which 
was  a  fountain),  extending  each  of  them  about  180  feet  along 
the  front,  ^vith  a  depth  respectively  of  140  and  150  feet."'  The 
main  building,  which  lay  to  the  north,  was  entered  from  the 
court-yard  by  three  archways,  semicircular  and  standing  side 
by  side,  separated  only  by  columns  of  hard,  white  stone,  of  a 


CH.  xxvir.]  ORNAMENTATION  OF  MASHITA  I'ALACE.       567 

quality  approaching  to  marble.  These  columns  were  sur- 
mounted by  debased  Corinthian  capitals,  of  a  type  introduced 
by  Justinian/- and  supported  arches  which  were  very  richly 
fluted,  and  which  are  said  to  have  been  "not  milike  our  own 
late  Norman  work." ^=  [PI.  XXIX.,  Fig.  2.]  The  archways 
gave  entrance  into  an  oblong  court  or  hall,  about  80  feet  long, 
by  sixty  feet  wide,  on  which  opened  by  a  wide  doorway  the 
main  room  of  the  building.  This  was  a  triapsal  hall,  built  of 
brick,  and  surmounted  by  a  massive  domed  roof  of  the  same 
material,  which  rested  on  pendentives  like  those  employed  at 
Serbistan  and  at  Firuzabad."  The  diameter  of  the  hall  was  a 
little  short  of  60  feet.  On  either  side  of  the  triapsal  haU,  and 
in  its  rear,  and  again  on  either  side  of  the  court  or  hall  on 
which  it  opened,  were  rooms  of  a  smaller  size,  generally  open- 
ing into  each  other,  and  arranged  symmetrically,  each  side 
being  the  exact  counterpart  of  the  other.  The  number  of  these 
smaller  apartments  was  twenty-five.     [PI.  XXIX.,  Fig.  1.] 

The  other  building,  which  lies  t^^wards  the  south,  and  is  sep- 
arated from  the  one  just  described  by  the  whole  length  of  the 
court-yard,  a  distance  of  nearly  200  feet,  appears  to  have  been 
for  the  most  part  of  an  inferior  character.  It  comprised  one 
large  hall,  or  inner  court,  but  otherwise  contained  only  small 
apartments,  which,  it  is  thought,  may  have  been  "intended  as 
guard-rooms  for  the  soldiers.'"'  Although,  however,  in  most 
respects  so  unpretending,  this  edifice  was  adorned  externally 
with  a  richness  and  magnificence  unparalleled  in  the  other  re- 
mains of  Sassanian  times,  and  scarcely  exceeded  in  the  arclii- 
tecture  of  any  age  or  nation.  Forming,  as  it  did,  the  only 
entrance  by  which  the  palace  could  be  approached,'"  and  pos- 
sessing the  only  front  which  was  presented  to  the  gaze  of  the 
outer  world,  its  ornamentation  was  clearly  an  object  of  Chos- 
roes'  special  care,  who  seems  to  have  lavished  upon  it  all  the 
known  resources  of  art.  The  outer  wall  was  built  of  finely- 
dressed  hard  stone  :*'  and  on  this  excellent  material  the  sculp- 
tors of  the  time— whether  Persian  or  Byzantine,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  determine— proceeded  to  carve  in  the  most  elaborate 
way,  first  a  bold  pattern  of  zigzags  and  rosettes,  and  then, 
over  the  entire  surface,  a  most  delicate  tracery  of  foliage,  ani- 
mals, and  fruits.  The  effect  of  the  zigzags  is  to  divide  the 
wall  into  a  number  of  triangular  compartments,  each  of  which 
is  treated  separately,  covered  with  a  decoration  peculiar  to  it 
self,  a  fretwork  of  the  richest  kind,  in  which  animal  and  vege- 
table forms  are  most  happily  intermingled.    In  one  a  vase  of 


^68  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvii. 

an  elegant  shape  stands  midway  in  the  triangle  at  its  base ; 
two  doves  are  seated  on  it,  back  to  back ;  from  between  them 
rises  a  vine,  which  spreads  its  luxuriant  branches  over  the  en- 
tire compartment,  covering  it  with  its  graceful  curves  and 
abundant  fruitage ;  on  either  side  of  the  vase  a  lion  and  a  wild 
boar  confront  the  doves  with  a  friendly  air ;  while  everywhere 
amid  the  leaves  and  grapes  we  see  the  forms  of  birds,  half  re- 
vealed, half  hidden  by  the  fohage.  Among  the  birds,  pea- 
cocks, parrots,  and  partridges  have  been  recognized;  among 
the  beasts,  besides  Hons  and  wild  boars,  buffaloes,  panthers, 
lynxes,  and  gazelles.  In  another  panel  a  winged  lion,  the 
"Hneal  descendant  of  those  found  at  Nineveh  and  Persepo- 
lis,"*"  reflects  the  mythological  symbolism  of  Assyria,  and 
shows  how  tenacious  was  its  hold  on  the  West- Asian  mind. 
Nor  is  the  human  form  wholly  wanting.  In  one  place  we  per- 
ceive a  man's  head,  in  close  juxtaposition  with  man's  insepara- 
ble companion,  the  dog;  in  another,  the  entire  figure  of  a  man, 
who  carries  a  basket  of  fruit." 

Besides  the  compartments  within  the  zigzags,  the  zigzags 
themselves  and  the  rosettes  are  ornamented  with  a  patterning 
of  large  leaves,  while  the  moulding  below  the  zigzags  and  the 
cornice,  or  string-course,  above  them  are  covered  with  con- 
ventional designs,  the  interstices  between  them  being  filled  in 
with  very  beautiful  adaptations  of  lesser  vegetable  forms.'" 

Altogether,  the  ornamentation  of  this  magnificent  facade 
may  be  pronounced  almost  unrivalled  for  beauty  and  appropri- 
ateness; and  the  entire  palace  may  well  be  called  "a  marvel- 
lous example  of  the  sumptuousness  and  selfishness  of  ancient 
princes,""  who  expended  on  the  gratification  of  their  own 
taste  and  love  of  display  the  riches  which  would  have  been 
better  employed  in  the  defence  of  their  kingdoms,  or  in  the  re- 
lief of  their  poorer  subjects. 

The  exquisite  ornamentation  of  the  Mashita  palace  exceeds 
anything  which  is  found  elsewhere  in  the  Sassanian  buildings, 
but  it  is  not  wholly  different  in  kind  from  that  of  other  remains 
of  their  architecture  in  Media  and  Persia  Proper.  The  archi- 
volte  which  adorns  the  arch  of  Takht-i-Bostan"  [PI.  XXXI., 
Fig.  1.]  possesses  almost  equal  delicacy  with  the  patterned  cor- 
nice or  string-course  of  the  Mashita  building;  and  its  flowered 
panels  may  compare  for  beauty  with  the  Mashita  triangular 
compartments.  [PI.  XXXI.,  Fig.  2.]  Sassanian  capitals  are 
also  in  many  instances  of  lovely  design,  sometimes  dehcately 
diapered  CA,  B),  sometimes  worked  with  a  patteru  i^  '^onven- 


CH.  XXVII.]  OTHER  SA88ANIAN  0R2^AMENTATI0IT.  569 

tional  leaves  and  flowers  (C)  [PI.  XXXII.],  occasionally  ex- 
hibiting the  human  form  (D,  E),  or  a  flowery  patterning,  like 
that  of  the  Takht-i-Bostan  (P,  G).  [PI.  XXXIII.]  In  the  more 
elaborate  specimens,"  the  four  faces— for  the  capitals  are 
square— present  designs  completely  different;  in  other  in- 
stances, two  of  the  four  faces  are  alike,  but  on  the  other  two 
the  design  is  varied. "  The  shafts  of  Sassanian  columns,  so  far 
as  we  can  judge,  appear  to  have  been  fluted. " 

A  woi'k  not  exactly  architectural,  yet  possessing  architectural 
features— the  well-known  arch  of  Chosroes  II.  above  alluded 
to — seems  to  deserve  description  before  we  pass  to  another 
branch  of  our  subject.  [PI.  XXXIV.,  Fig.  1.]  This  is  an  arch- 
way or  grotto  cut  in  the  rock  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  near  Kermau- 
shah,  which  is  extremely  curious  and  interesting.  On  the 
brink  of  a  pool  of  clear  water,  the  sloping  face  of  the  rock  has 
been  cut  into,  and  a  recess  formed,  presenting  at  its  further  end 
a  perpendicular  face.  This  face,  which  is  about  34  feet  broad, 
by  31  feet  liigh,  and  which  is  ornamented  at  the  top  by  some 
rather  rude  gradines,  has  been  penetrated  by  an  arch,  cut  into 
the  solid  stone  to  the  depth  of  above  20  feet,  and  elaborately 
ornamented,  both  within  and  Avithout.  Externally,  the  arch 
is  in  the  first  place  surmounted  by  the  archivolte  already 
spoken  of,  and  then,  in  the  spandrels  on  either  side  are  intro- 
duced flying  figures  of  angels  or  Victories,  holding  chaplets  in 
one  hand  and  cups  or  vases  in  the  other,  which  are  Httle  infe- 
rior to  the  best  Roman  art.'"  [PI.  XXXIV.,  Fig.  3.]  Between 
the  figures  is  a  crescent,  perhaps  originally  enclosing  a  ball, " 
and  thus  presenting  to  the  spectator,  at  the  culminating  point 
of  the  whole  sculpture,  the  familiar  emblems  of  two  of  the  na- 
tional divinities.  Below  the  spandrels  and  archivolte,  on  either 
side  of  the  arched  entrance,  are  the  flowered  panels  above-men- 
tioned, alike  in  most  respects,  but  varying  in  some  of  their  de- 
tails. Within  the  recess,  its  two  sides,  and  its  further  end, 
are  decorated  with  bas-reliefs,  those  on  the  sides  representing 
Chosroes  engaged  in  the  chase  of  the  wild  boar  and  the  stag, " 
while  those  at  the  end,  which  are  in  two  lines,  one  over  the 
other,  show  the  monarch,  above,  in  his  robes  of  state,  receiving 
wreaths  from  ideal  beings;  below,  in  his  war  costume,  mounted 
upon  his  favorite  charger,  Sheb-Diz, "  with  his  spear  poised  in 
his  hand,  awaiting  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  The  modem 
critic  regards""  this  figure  as  "original  and  interesting."  We 
shall  have  occasion  to  recur  to  it  when  we  treat  of  the  "Man- 
nei-s  and  Customs"  of  the  Neo-Persian  people. 


570  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvil 

The  glyptic  art  of  the  Sassanian  is  seen  chiefly  in  their  bas- 
rehefs;  but  one  figure  "in  the  round"  has  come  down  to  us 
from  their  times,  which  seems  to  deserve  particular  description. 
This  is  a  colossal  statue  of  Sapor  I.,  hewn  (it  would  seem) 
out  of  the  natural  rock,^'  which  still  exists,  though  overthrown 
and  mutilated,  in  a  natural  grotto  near  the  ruined  city  of  Sha- 
pur.  [PI.  XXXV.]  The  original  height  of  the  figure,  accord- 
ing to  M.  Texier,*^  was  6  metres  7  centimetres,  or  between  19 
and  20  feet.  It  was  well  proportioned,  and  carefully  wrought, 
representing  the  monarch  in  peaceful  attire,  but  with  a  long 
sword  at  his  left  side,  wearing  the  mural  crown  which  charac- 
terizes him  on  the  bas-rehefs,"  and  dressed  in  a  tunic  and 
trowsers  of  a  hght  and  flexible  material,  apparently  either  silk 
or  muslin.  The  hair,  beard,  and  mustachios,  were  neatly  ar- 
ranged and  well  rendered."*  The  attitude  of  the  figure  was 
natural  and  good.  One  hand,  the  right,  rested  upon  the  hip  ; 
the  other  touched,  but  without  grasping  it,  the  hilt  of  the  long 
straight  sword.  If  we  may  trust  the  representation  of  M. 
Texier's  artist,  the  folds  of  the  drapery  were  represented  with 
much  skill  and  delicacy ;  but  the  hands  and  feet  of  the  figure, 
especially  the  latter,  were  someAvhat  roughly  rendered." 

The  bas-reliefs  of  the  Sassanians  are  extremely  numerous, "" 
and  though  generally  rude,  and  sometimes  even  grotesque," 
are  not  without  a  certain  amount  of  merit.  Some  of  the  earlier 
and  coarser  specimens  have  been  already  given  in  this  vohune; 
and  one  more  of  the  same  class  is  here  appended  [PI,  XXXVI. , 
Fig.  1.]  but  we  have  now  to  notice  some  other  and  better  ex- 
amples, which  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Persians  of  this  period 
attained  a  considerable  proficiency  in  this  branch  of  the  glyp- 
tic art.  The  reUefs  belonging  to  the  time  of  Sapor  I.  are  gen- 
erally poor  in  conception  and  ill-executed ;  but  in  one  instance, 
unless  the  modern  artist  has  greatly  flattered  his  original,  "*  a 
work  of  this  time  is  not  devoid  of  some  artistic  excellence. 
This  is  a  representation  of  the  triumph  of  Sapor  over  Valerian, 
comprising  only  four  figures — Sapor,  an  attendant,  and  two 
Romans — of  which  the  three  principal  are  boldly  drawn,  in  at- 
titudes natural,  yet  effective,  and  in  good  proportion.  [PI. 
XXXVII.]  The  horse  on  which  Sapor  rides  is  of  the  usual 
clumsy  description,  reminding  us  of  those  which  draw  our 
brewers'  wains ;  and  the  exaggerated  hair,  floating  ribbons  and 
uncouth  head-dress  of  the  monarch  give  an  outre  and  ridicu- 
lous air  to  the  chief  figure;  but,  if  we  deduct  these  defects, 
which  are  common  to  almost  all  the  Sassanian  artists,  the  rep- 


I 


en.  XXVII.]  BAS-IiELIRPS  OP  SAPOR  J.  571 

resentation  becomes  pleasing  and  dignified.  Sapor  sits  his 
horse  well,  and  thinks  not  of  himself,  but  of  what  he  is  doing. 
Cyriades,  who  is  somewhat  too  short,  receives  the  diadem  from 
his  benefactor  with  a  calm  satisfaction.'"  But  the  best  figiu-e 
is  that  of  the  captive  emperor,  who  kneels  on  one  knee,  and, 
with  outstretched  arms,  implores  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror. 
The  whole  representation  is  colossal,  the  figures  being  at  least 
three  times  the  size  of  life ;  the  execution  seems  to  have  been 
good;  but  the  work  has  been  considerably  injured  by  the  ef- 
fects of  tune. 

Another  bas-relief  of  the  age  of  Sapor  I.  is  on  too  large  a 
scale,  and  too  complicated,  to  be  represented  here;'"  but  a  de- 
scription may  be  given  of  it,  and  a  specimen  subjoined,  from 
which  the  reader  may  judge  of  its  character.  On  a  surface  of 
rock  at  Shapur,  carefully  smoothed  and  prepared  for  sculpture, 
the  second  Sassanian  monarch  appears  in  the  centre  of  the  tab- 
let, mounted  on  horseback,  and  in  his  usual  costume,  with  a 
dead  Roman  under  his  horse's  feet,  and  holding  another  (Cyri- 
ades?), by  the  hand.  In  front  of  him,  a  third  Roman,  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  defeated  nation,  makes  submission ;  and  then 
follow  thii'teen  tribute-bearers,  bringing  rings  of  gold,  shawls, 
bowls,  and  the  like,  and  conducting  also  a  horse  and  an  elephant. 
Behind  the  monarch,  on  the  same  line,  are  thirteen  mounted 
guardsmen.  Directly  above,  and  directly  below  the  central 
group,  the  tablet  is  blank;  but  on  either  side  the  subject  is  con- 
tinued, above  in  two  lines,  and  below  in  one,  the  guardsmen 
towards  the  left  amounting  in  all  to  fifty-six,  and  the  tribute- 
bearers  on  the  right  to  thirty-five.  The  whole  tablet  comprises 
ninety-five  human  and  sixty-three  animal  figures,  besides  a 
Victory  floating  in  the  sky.  The  illustration  |P1.  XXXVIIT.] 
is  a  representation  of  the  extreme  right-hand  portion  of  the 
second  line. 

After  the  time  of  Sapor  I.  there  is  a  manifest  decline  in  Sas- 
sanian art.  The  reliefs  of  Varahran  II.  and  Varahran  III.,  of 
Narses  and  Sapor  III. ,  fall  considerably  below  those  of  Sapor, 
son  of  Artaxerxes.^'  It  is  not  till  we  arrive  at  the  time  of  Va- 
rahran IV.  (A.D.  388-399)  that  we  once  more  have  works  which 
possess  real  artistic  merit.  Indications  have  already  appeared 
in  an  earlier  chapter  "  of  this  monarch's  encouragement  of  art- 
ists, and  of  a  kind  of  art  really  meriting  the  name.  We  saw 
that  his  gems  were  exquisitely  cut,  and  embodied  designs  of 
first-rate  excellence.  It  has  now  to  be  observed  further,  that 
among  the  bas-rehefs  of  the  greatest  merit  which  belong  to 


n 


tm 


THE  SEVENtii  MONARCBY. 


[CH.  XXVH 


Bassanian  times,  one  at  least  must  be  ascribed  to  him;  and 
that,  this  being  so,  there  is  considerable  probability  that  two 
others  of  the  same  class  belong  also  to  his  reign.  The  one  which 
must  undoubtedly  be  his,  and  which  tends  to  fix  the  date  of 
the  other  two,  exists  at  Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  near  Persepohs,  and 
has  frequently  been  copied  by  travellers.''  It  represents  a 
mounted  warrior,  with  the  peculiar  head-dress  ''*  of  Varahran 
JV.,  charging  another  at  full  speed,  striking  him  with  his 
spear,  and  bearing  both  horse  and  rider  to  the  ground.  [PI. 
XXXIX.]  A  standard-bearer  marches  a  little  behind;  and  a 
dead  warrior  Kes  underneath  Varahran's  horse,  which  is  clear- 
ing the  obstacle  in  his  bound.  The  spirit  of  the  entire  compo- 
sition is  admirable ;  and  though  the  stone  is  in  a  state  of  ad- 
vanced decay,  travellers  never  fail  to  admire  the  vigor  of  the 
design  and  the  life  and  movement  which  characterize  it.'^ 

The  other  similar  reliefs  to  which  reference  has  been  made 
exist,  respectively,  at  Nakhsh-i-Rustam  and  at  Firuzabad.  The 
Nakhsh-i-Rustam  tablet '°  is  almost  a  duplicate  of  the  one  above 
described  and  represented,  differing  from  it  mainly  in  the  omis- 
sion of  the  prostrate  figure,  in  the  forms  of  the  head-dresses 
borne  by  the  two  cavaliers,  and  in  the  shape  of  the  standard. 
It  is  also  in  better  preservation  than  the  other,  and  presents 
some  additional  details.  The  head-dress  of  the  Sassanian  war- 
rior is  very  remarkable,  being  quite  unlike  any  other  known 
example.  It  consists  of  a  cap,  which  spreads  as  it  rises,  and 
breaks  into  three  points,  terminating  in  large  striped  balls." 
[PL  XXVI.,  Fig.  2.]  His  adversary  wears  a  helmet  crowned 
with  a  similar  ball.  The  standard,  which  is  in  the  form  of  a 
capital  T,  displays  also  five  balls  of  the  same  sort,  three  rising 
from  the  cross-bar,  and  the  other  two  hanging  from  it.  Were 
it  not  for  the  head-dress  of  the  principal  figure,  this  sculpture 
might  be  confidently  assigned  to  the  monarch  who  set  up  the 
neighboring  one.  As  it  is,  the  point  must  be  regarded  as  unde- 
cided, and  the  exact  date  of  the  relief  as  doubtful.  It  is, 
however,  unlikely  to  be  either  much  earlier,  or  much  later,  than 
the  time  of  Varahran  IV. 

The  third  specimen  of  a  Sassanian  battle-scene  exists  at 
Firuzabad,  in  Persia  Proper,  and  has  been  carefully  rendered 
by  M.  Flandin.'®  It  is  in  exceedingly  bad  condition,  but  ap- 
pears to  have  comprised  the  figures  of  either  five  or  six  horse- 
men, of  whom  the  two  principal  are  a  warrior  whose  helmet 
terminates  in  the  head  of  a  bh'd,  and  one  who  wears  a  crown, 
above  which  rises  a  cap,  surmounted  by  a  baU.     [PI. XL.]    The 


cm.  XKXn.]      LATER  SAS8ANIAK  BAS-TtELIKFS.  ^73 

former  of  these,  who  is  undoubtedly  a  Sassanian  prince," 
pierces  with  his  spear  the  right  side  of  the  latter,  who  is  rep- 
resented in  the  act  of  falHng  to  the  ground.  His  horso  tumbles 
at  the  same  time,  though  whj^  he  does  so  is  not  quite  clear, 
since  he  has  not  been  touched  by  the  other  charger.  His  atti- 
tude is  extravagantly  absurd,  his  hind  feet  being  on  a  level 
with  the  head  of  his  rider.  Still  more  absurd  seems  to  have 
been  the  attitude  of  a  horse  at  the  extreme  right,  which  turns 
in  falling,  and  exposes  to  the  spectator  the  inside  of  the  near 
thigh  and  the  belly.  But,  notwithstanding  these  drawbacks, 
the  representation  has  great  merit.  The  figures  live  and 
breathe— that  of  the  dying  king  expresses  horror  and  helpless- 
ness, that  of  his  pursuer  determined  purpose  and  manly 
strength.  Even  the  very  horses  are  alive,  and  manifestly  re- 
joice in  the  strife.  The  entire  work  is  full  of  movement,  of 
variety,  and  of  artistic  spirit. 

If  we  have  regard  to  the  highest  qualities  of  glyptic  art,  Sas- 
sanian sculpture  must  be  said  here  to  culminate.  There  is  a 
miserable  falling  off,  when  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  yeai-s 
later  the  Great  Chosroes  (Anushirwan)  represents  himself  at 
Shapur,*"  seated  on  his  throne,  and  fronting  to  the  spectator, 
with  guards  and  attendants  on  one  side,  and  soldiers  bringing 
in  prisoners,  human  heads,  and  booty,  on  the  other.  [PI. 
XLI.]  The  style  here  recalls  that  of  the  tamer  reliefs  set  up 
by  the  first  Sapor,"'  but  is  less  pleasing.  Some  of  the  prisoners 
appear  to  be  well  drawn ;  but  the  central  figure,  that  of  the 
monarch,  is  grotesque ;  the  human  heads  are  ghastly ;  and  the 
soldiers  and  attendants  have  little  merit.  The  animal  forms 
ai'e  better— that  of  the  elephant  especially,  though  as  compared 
with  the  men  it  is  strangely  out  of  proportion. 

With  Chosroes  II.  (Eberwiz  or  Parviz),  the  grandson  of 
Anushirwan,  who  ascended  the  throne  only  twelve  years  after 
the  death  of  his  grandfather,  and  reigned  from  a.d.  591  to  a.d. 
G28,  a  reaction  set  in.  We  have  seen  the  splendor  and  good 
taste  of  his  Mashita  palace,  the  beauty  of  some  of  his  coins," 
and  the  general  excellence  of  his  ornamentation.  **'  It  remains 
to  notice  the  character  of  his  reliefs,  found  at  present  in  one 
locality  only,  viz.,  at  Takht-i-Bostnn,  where  they  constitute  the 
main  decorations  of  the  great  triumphal  arch  of  this  monarch. 
[PI.  XLII.] 

These  reliefs  consist  of  two  classes  of  works,  colossal 
figures  and  hiniting-pieces.  The  colossal  figures,  of  wliich 
some  account  has  been  already  given,  and  which  are  repre^ 


574 


Tim  aSVSNTH  MOKABGBY. 


[CH.  XXVIi 


sentod  in  PL  XLI.,  have  but  little  merit.  They  are  curious  on 
account  of  their  careful  elaboi'ation,  and  furnish  important  in- 
formation with  respect  to  Sassanian  dress  and  armature,  but 
they  are  poor  in  design,  being  heavy,  awkward,  and  ungainly. 
Nothing  can  well  be  less  beautiful  than  the  three  overstout 
personages,  who  stand  with  their  heads  nearly  or  quite  touch- 
ing the  crown  of  the  arch,  at  its  further  extremity,  carefully 
drawn  in  detail,  but  in  outline  little  short  of  hideous.  The 
least  bad  is  that  to  the  left,  whose  drapery  is  tolerably  well 
arranged,  and  whose  face,  judging  by  what  remains  of  it,  was 
not  unpleasing.  Of  the  other  two  it  is  impossible  to  say  a 
word  in  commendation. 

The  mounted  cavalier  below  them— Chosroes  himseK  on  his 
black*  ^  war  horse,  Sheb-Diz — is  somewhat  better.  The  pose  of 
horse  and  horseman  has  dignity ;  the  general  proportions  are 
fairly  correct,  though  (as  usual)  the  horse  is  of  a  breed  that 
recalls  the  modern  dray-horse  rather  than  the  charger.  The 
figure,  being  near  the  ground,  has  suffered  much  mutilation, 
probably  at  the  hands  of  Moslem  fanatics ;  the  off  hind  leg  of 
the  horse  is  gone ;  his  nose  and  mouth  have  disappeared ;  and 
the  horseman  has  lost  his  right  foot  and  a  portion  of  his  lower 
clothing.  But  nevertheless,  the  general  effect  is  not  altogether 
destroyed.  Modern  travellers  admire  the  repose  and  dignity 
of  the  composition,  its  combination  of  simphcity  with  detail, 
and  the  delicacy  and  finish  of  some  portions."*  It  may  be 
added  that  the  relief  of  the  figure  is  high ;  the  off  legs  of  the 
horse  were  wholly  detached ;  and  the  remainder  of  both  horse 
and  rider  was  nearly,  though  not  quite,  disengaged  from  the 
rock  behind  them. 

The  hunting -pieces,  which  ornament  the  interior  of  the 
arched  recess  on  either  side,  are  far  superior  to  the  colossal 
figures,  and  merit  an  exact  description.  On  the  right,  the  per- 
pendicular space  below  the  spring  of  the  arch  contains  the 
representation  of  a  stag  hunt,  in  which  the  monarch  and  about 
a  dozen  other  mounted  horsemen  take  part,  assisted  by  some 
ten  or  twelve  footmen,  and  by  a  detachment  mounted  on  ele- 
phants. [PI.  XLIII.]  The  elephants,  which  are  nine  in  num- 
ber, occupy  the  extreme  right  of  the  tablet,  and  seem  to  be 
employed  in  driving  the  deer  into  certain  prepared  enclosures. 
Each  of  the  beasts  is  guided  by  three  riders,  sitting  along  their 
backs,  of  whom  the  central  one  alone  has  the  support  of  a  sad- 
dle or  howdah.  The  enclosures  into  which  the  elephants  drive 
the  game  are  three  in  number;  they  are  surrounded  by  nets,- 


CH.  sxvix.i    MtJNTiNG-PiECES  OF  CHOSRO^S  II.  t)75 

and  from  the  central  one  alone  is  there  an  exit.  Through  this 
exit,  which  is  guarded  by  two  footmen,  the  game  passes  into 
the  central  field,  or  main  space  of  the  sculpture,  where  the 
king  awaits  them.  He  is  mounted  on  his  steed,  with  his  bow 
passed  over  his  head,  his  sword  at  his  side,  and  an  attendant 
holding  the  royal  parasol  over  him.  It  is  not  quite  clear 
whether  he  himself  does  more  than  witness  the  chase.  The 
game  is  in  the  main  pursued  and  brought  to  the  ground  by 
horsemen  without  royal  insignia,**'  and  is  then  passed  over  into 
<i  further  compartment — the  extreme  one  towards  the  left, 
where  it  is  properly  arranged  and  placed  upon  camels  for  con- 
veyance to  the  royal  palace.  During  the  whole  proceeding  a 
band  of  twenty-six  musicians,  some  of  whom  occupy  an  ele- 
vated platform,  delights  with  a  ' '  concord  of  sweet  sounds"  the 
assembled  sportsmen." 

On  the  opposite,  or  left-hand,  side  of  the  recess,  is  represented 
a  boar-hunt.  [PI.  XLIV.]  Here  again,  elephants,  twelve  in 
number,  drive  the  game  into  an  enclosure  without  exit.  Within 
this  space  nearly  a  hundred  boars  and  pigs  may  be  counted. 
The  ground  being  marshy,  the  monarch  occupies  a  boat  in  the 
centre,  and  from  this  transfixes  the  game  with  his  arrows. 
No  one  else  takes  part  in  the  sport,  unless  it  be  the  riders  on  a 
troop  of  five  elephants,  represented  in  the  lower  middle  por- 
tion of  the  tablet.  When  the  pigs  fall,  they  are  carried  into  a 
second  enclosure,  that  on  the  right,  where  they  are  upturned, 
disembowelled,  and  placed  across  the  backs  of  elephants,  which 
convey  them  to  the  abode  of  the  monarch.  Once  more,  the 
scene  is  enlivened  by  music.  Two  bands  of  harpers  occupy 
boats  on  either  side  of  that  which  carries  the  king,  while  an- 
other harper  sits  with  him  in  the  boat  from  which  he  delivers 
his  arrows.  In  the  water  about  the  boats  are  seen  reeds, 
ducks,  and  numerous  fishes.  The  oars  by  which  the  boats  are 
propelled  have  a  singular  resemblance  to  those  which  are  rep- 
resented in  some  of  the  earliest  Assyrian  sculptures. '"  Two 
other  features  must  also  be  noticed.  Near  the  top  of  the  tablet, 
towards  the  left,  five  figures  standing  in  a  boat  seem  to  be 
clapping  their  hands  in  order  to  drive  the  pigft  towards  the 
monarch ;  while  in  the  right  centre  of  the  picture  there  is  an- 
other boat,  more  higlily  ornamented  than  the  rest,  in  which 
we  seem  to  have  a  second  representation  of  the  king,  differing 
from  the  first  only  in  the  fact  that  his  arrow  has  flown,  and 
that  he  is  in  the  act  of  taking  another  arrow  from  an  attend- 
ant.    In  this  second  representation  the  king's  head  is  sur 


576 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  xxvii. 


rounded  by  a  nimbus  or  "  glory."  Altogether  there  are  in  this 
tablet  more  than  seventy-five  human  and  nearly  150  animal 
forms.  In  the  other,  the  human  forms  are  about  seventy,  and 
the  animal  ones  about  a  hundred. 

The  merit  of  the  two  reliefs  above  described,  which  would 
require  to  be  engraved  on  a  large  scale,  in  order  that  justice 
should  be  done  to  them,  ^''  consists  in  the  spirit  and  truth  of  the 
animal  forms,  elephants,  camels,  stags,  boars,  horses,  and  in 
the  life  and  movement  of  the  whole  picture.  The  rush  of  the 
pigs,  the  bounds  of  the  stags  and  hinds,  the  heavy  march  of 
the  elephants,  the  ungainly  movements  of  the  camels,  are  well 
portrayed ;  and  in  one  instance,  the  foreshortening  of  a  horse, 
advancing  diagonally,  is  respectably  rendered.'"'  In  general, 
Sassanian  sculpture,  like  most  delineative  art  in  its  infancy, 
affects  merely  the  profile;  but  here,  and  in  the  overturned 
horse  already  described,^'  and  again  in  the  Victories  which  or- 
nament the  spandrels  of  the  arch  of  Chosroes,  the  mere  profile 
is  departed  from  with  good  effect,  and  a  power  is  shown  of 
drawing  human  and  animal  figaires  in  front  or  at  an  angle. 
What  is  wanting  in  the  entire  Sassanian  series  is  idealism,  or 
the  notion  of  elevating  the  representation  in  any  respects 
above  the  object  represented ;  the  highest  aim  of  the  artist  is 
to  be  true  to  nature ;  in  this  truthfulness  is  his  triumph ;  but 
as  he  often  falls  short  of  his  models,  his  whole  result,  even  at 
the  best,  is  unsatisfactory  and  disappointing. 

Such  must  almost  necessarily  be  the  sentence  of  art  critics, 
who  judge  the  productions  of  this  age  and  nation  according  to 
the  abstract  rules,  or  the  accepted  standards,  of  artistic  effort. 
But  if  circumstances  of  time  and  coimtry  are  taken  into  ac- 
count, if  comparison  is  hmited  to  earlier  and  later  attempts  in 
the  same  region,  or  even  in  neighboring  ones,  a  very  much 
more  favorable  judgment  will  be  passed.  The  Sassanian  re- 
liefs need  not  on  the  whole  shrink  from  a  comparison  with 
those  of  the  Achsemenian  Persians.  If  they  are  ruder  and 
more  grotesque,  they  are  also  more  spirited  and  more  varied ; 
and  thus,  though  they  fall  short  in  some  respects,  stUl  they 
must  be  pronoimced  superior  to  the  Achsemenian  in  some  of 
the  most  important  artistic  qualities.  Nor  do  they  fall  greatly 
behind  the  earher,  and  in  many  respects  admirable,  art  of  the 
Assyrians.  They  are  less  numerous  and  cover  a  less  variety 
of  subjects ;  they  have  less  delicacy ;  but  they  have  eqtial  or 
greater  fire.  In  the  judgment  of  a  traveller  not  given  to  ex- 
travagant praise,  they  are,  in  some  cases  at  any  rate,  "exe- 


Cti.  xxvtr.J  SASSANIAN  ART,  NATIVE  OR   FOREIGN?       T)?? 

cuted  in  the  most  masterly  style."  "I  never  saw,"  observes 
Sir  R.  Ker  Porter,  "the  elephant,  the  stag,  or  the  boar  por- 
trayed with  greater  truth  and  spirit.  The  attempts  at  detailed 
human  form  are,"  he  adds,  "far  inferior." " 

Before,  however,  we  assign  to  the  Sassanian  monarchs,  and 
to  the  people  whom  they  governed,  the  merit  of  having  pro- 
duced results  so  worthy  of  admiration,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
inquire  whether  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  other  than 
native  artists  were  employed  in  their  production.  It  has  been 
very  confidently  stated  that  Chosroes  the  Second  ' '  brought 
Roman  artists"  to  Takht-i-Bostan,"  and  by  their  aid  eclipsed 
the  glories  of  his  great  predecessors,  Artaxerxes,  son  of  Babek, 
and  the  two  Sapors.  Byzantine  forms  are  declared  to  have 
been  reproduced  in  the  moldings  of  the  Great  Arch,  and  in 
.the  Victories."*  The  lovely  tracery  of  the  Mashita  Palace  is 
regarded  as  in  the  main  the  work  of  Greeks  and  Syrians." 
No  doubt  it  is  quite  possible  that  there  may  be  some  truth  in 
these  allegations ;  but  we  must  not  forget,  or  let  it  be  forgot- 
ten, that  they  rest  on  conjecture  and  are  without  historical 
foundation.  The  works  of  the  first  Chosroes  at  Ctesiphon,  ac- 
cording to  a  respectable  Greek  writer,""  were  produced  for  him 
by  foreign  artists,  sent  to  his  court  by  Justinian.  But  no  such 
statement  is  made  with  respect  to  his  grandson.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  is  declared  by  the  native  writers"  that  a  certain 
Ferhad,  a  Persian,  was  the  chief  designer  of  them ;  and  mod- 
ern critics  admit  that  his  hand  may  perhaps  be  traced,  not 
only  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  but  at  the  Mashita  Palace  aJso."'  If 
then  the  merit  of  the  design  is  conceded  to  a  native  artist,  w^e 
need  not  too  curiously  inquire  the  nationality  of  the  workmen 
employed  by  him. 

At  the  worst,  should  it  be  thought  that  Byzantine  influence 
appears  so  plainly  in  the  later  Sassanian  works,  that  Rome 
rather  than  Persia  must  be  credited  with  the  buildings  and 
sculptures  of  both  the  first  and  the  second  Chosroes,  still  it 
will  have  to  be  allowed  that  the  earlier  palaces— those  at  Ser- 
bistan  and  Firuzabad — and  the  spirited  battle-scenes  above  de- 
scribed,"" are  wholly  native;  since  they  present  no  trace  of  any 
foreign  element.  But,  it  is  in  these  battle-scenes,  as  already 
noticed, '°°  that  the  delineative  art  of  the  Sassanians  cuhni- 
nates;  audit  may  further  be  questioned  whether  the  Firuza- 
bad palace  is  not  the  finest  specimen  of  their  architecture, 
severe  though  it  be  in  the  character  of  its  ornamentation ;  so 
that,  even  sliould  we  surrender  the  whole  of  the  later  works 


578  "THE  sEvmm  monarchy.       [ch.  xxvia 

enoiigli  "will  still  remain  to  show  that  the  Sassanians,  and  the 
Persians  of  their  day,  had  merit  as  artists  and  huilders,  a 
merit  the  more  creditable  to  them  inasmuch  as  for  five  cen- 
turies they  had  had  no  opportunity  of  cultivating  their 
powers,  having  been  crushed  by  the  domination  of  a  race 
singularly  devoid  of  artistic  aspirations.  Even  with  regard  to 
the  works  for  which  they  may  have  been  indebted  to  for- 
eigners, it  is  to  be  remembered  that,  unless  the  monarchs  had 
appreciated  high  art,  and  admired  it,  they  would  not  have 
hired,  at  great  expense,  the  services  of  these  aliens.  For  my 
own  part,  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  Sassanian  remains 
of  every  period  are  predominantly,  if  not  exclusively,  native, 
not  excepting  those  of  the  first  Chosroes,  for  I  mistrust  the 
statement  of  Theophylact. '" 


CHAPTEK  XXVIII. 


ON  THE  RELIGION,  MANNERS,  CUSTOMS,  ETC.,  OF  THE  LATER 

PERSIANS, 

Religion  of  the  later  Persians,  Dualism  of  the  extremest  Jcind. 
Ideas  entertained  icith  respect  to  Ormazd  and  Ahriman. 
Representations  of  them.  Ormazd  the  special  Ghxardian 
of  the  Kings.  Lesser  Deities  subject  to  Ormazd :  Mithra, 
Serosh,  Vayu,  Airyanam,  Vitraha,  etc.  The  six  Amshash- 
pands:  Bahman,  Ardibehesht,  Shahravar,  Isfand-armat, 
Khordad,  and  Amerdat.  Eeligion,  how  far  idolatrous. 
Worship  of  Anaitis.  Chief  Evil  Sjmnts  subject  to  Ahri- 
man: AJcomano,  Indra,  ^aurva,  Naonhaitya,  Taric,  and 
Zaric.  Position  of  Man  between  the  two  Worlds  of  Good 
and  Evil.  His  Duties:  Worship,  Agriculture.  Purity. 
Nature  of  the  Worship.  Hymns,  Invocations,  the  Homa 
Ceremony,  Sacrifice.  Agriculture  a  part  of  Religion. 
Purity  required:  1,  Moral;  2,  Legal.  Nature  of  each. 
Man's  future  Prospects.  Position  of  the  Magi  under  the 
Sassanians;  their  Organization,  Dress,  etc.  The  Fire- 
temples  and  Altars.  The  Barsom.  The  Khrafgthraghna. 
Magnificence  of  the  Sassanian  Court ;  the  Throne-room,  the 
Seraglio,  the  Attendants,  the  Ministers.  Midtitude  of  Pal- 
aces.    Dress  of  the  Monarch :  1,  in  Peace ;  2,  in  War, 


CH.  XXVIII.]  SASSA^VAy  MANNERS  AND  CUSTOMS.  579 

Favorite  Pastimes  of  the  Kings.  Hunting.  Maintenance 
of  Paradises.  Stag  and  Boar-hunts.  Music.  Hawking. 
Games.  Character  of  the  Persian  Warfare  under  the 
Sassanians.  Sassanian  Chariots.  The  Elephant  Corps. 
The  Cavalry.  The  Archers.  The  ordinary  Infantry. 
Officers.  Standards.  Tactics.  Private  Life  of  the  later 
Persians.  Agricidtural  Employment  of  the  Men.  Non- 
seclusion  of  the  Women.  General  Freedom  from  Oppres- 
sion of  all  Classes  except  the  highest. 

^      Hepuai  olSa  i-d/ioco-i  TolaSe  xpcufteVovs. — Herod,  i.  131. 

The  general  character  of  the  Persian  religion,  as  revived  by 
the  founder  of  the  Sassanian  dynasty,  has  been  described  in  a 
former  chapter;^  but  it  is  felt  that  the  present  work  would  be 
incomplete  if  it  failed  to  furnish  the  reader  with  a  tolerably 
full  account  of  so  interesting  a  matter ;  more  especially,  since 
the  religious  question  lay  at  the  root  of  the  original  rebellion 
and  revolution  which  raised  the  Sassanidse  to  power,  and  was 
to  a  considerable  extent  the  basis  and  foundation  of  their  au- 
thority. An  access  of  religious  fervor  gave  the  Persians  of  the 
third  century  after  Christ  the  strength  which  enabled  them  to 
throw  off  the  yoke  of  their  Parthian  lords  and  recover  the 
sceptre  of  Western  Asia.  A  strong — almost  fanatical— relig- 
ious spirit  animated  the  greater  number  of  the  Sassanian  mon- 
archs.  When  the  end  of  the  kingdom  came,  the  old  faith  was 
still  flourishing ;  and,  though  its  star  paled  before  that  of  Mo- 
hammedanism, the  faith  itself  survived,  and  still  survives  at 
the  present  day.^ 

It  has  been  observed  that  Dualism  constituted  the  most 
noticeable  feature  of  the  religion.  ^  It  may  now  be  added  that 
the  Dualism  professed  was  of  the  most  extreme  and  pronounced 
kind.  Ormazd  and  Ahriman,  the  principles  of  Good  and  Evil,  < 
were  expressly  declared  to  be  " twins. "^  They  had  "in  the 
beginning  come  together  to  create  Life  and  Death,"  and  to 
settle  "how  the  world  was  to  be."  ''  There  was  no  priority  of 
existence  of  the  one  over  the  other,  and  no  decided  superiority. 
The  two,  being  coeval,  had  contended  from  all  eteniity,  and 
would,  it  was  almost  certain,  continue  to  contend  to  all  eter- 
nity, neither  being  able  to  vanquish  the  other.  Thus  an  eternal 
struggle  was  postulated  between  good  and  evil;  and  the  issue 
was  doubtful,  neither  side  possessing  any  clear  and  ina»ufest 
advantage. 


5S0  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxviii. 

The  two  principles  were  Persons.  Ormazd  was  "  the  creator 
of  life,  the  earthly  and  the  spiritual,"'  he  who  "made  the 
celestial  bodies,  earth,  water,  and  trees.'"  He  was  "good,"' 
"holy,"'  "pure,"'"  "true,""  "the  Holy  God,"'^  "the 
Holiest,""  "the  Essence  of  Truth,"'"  "the  father  of  aU 
truth,"''  "the being  best  of  all,'"'  "the  master  of  purity."" 
He  was  supremely  "happy,"  "  being  possessed  of  every  bless- 
ing, "health,  wealth,  virtue,  wisdom,  immortality.""  From 
him  came  every  good  gift  enjoyed  by  man ;  on  the  pious  and 
the  righteous  he  bestowed,  not  only  earthly  advantages,  but 
precious  spiritual  gifts,  tinith,  devotion,  "the  good  mind," 
and  everlasting  happiness;-"  and,  as  he  rewarded  the  good,  so 
he  also  punished  the  bad,  "  though  this  was  an  aspect  in  which 
he  was  but  seldom  represented. 

"While  Ormazd,  thus  far,  would  seem  to  be  a  presentation  of 
the  Supreme  Being  in  a  form  not  greatly  different  from  that 
wherein  it  has  pleased  him  to  reveal  Himself  to  mankind 
through  the  Je^vish  and  Christian  scriptures,  there  are  certain 
points  of  deficiency  in  the  representation,  which  are  rightly 
viewed  as  placing  the  Persian  very  considerably  below  the 
Jewish  and  Christian  idea."  Besides  the  limitation  on  the 
power  and  freedom  of  Ormazd  implied  in  the  eternal  co-ex- 
istence with  him  of  another  and  a  hostile  principle,  he  is  also 
limited  by  the  independent  existence  of  space,  time,  and  light, 
which  appear  in  the  Zenda vesta  as  "  self-created,"  or  "  without 
beginning,"'^  and  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  "condition- 
ing "  the  Supreme  Being,  who  has  to  work,  as  best  he  may, 
imder  circumstances  not  caused  by  himself.  Again,  Ormazd 
is  not  a  purely  spiritual  being.  He  is  conceived  of  as  possess- 
ing a  sort  of  physical  nature.  The  "light."  which  is  one  of  his 
properties,  seems  to  be  a  material  radiance."*  He  can  be  spoken 
of  as  possessing  health."  The  whole  conception  of  him,  though 
not  grossly  material,  is  far  from  being  wholly  immaterial. 
His  nature  is  complex,  not  simple.  ^^  He  may  not  have  a  body, 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word ;  "  but  he  is  entangled  with 
material  accidents,  and  is  far  from  answering  to  the  pure 
spii'it,  "without  body,  parts,  or  passions,"  which  forms  the 
Christian  conception  of  the  Deity. 

Ahriman,  the  Evil  Principle,  is  of  course  far  more  powerful 
and  terrible  than  the  Christian  and  Jewish  Satan.  He  is  un- 
caused, co-eternal  with  Ormazd,  engaged  in  a  perpetual  war- 
fare with  him.  Whatever  good  thing  Ormazd  creates,  Ahri- 
rnan  corrupts  and  ruins  it.      Moral  and  physical  evils  are 


ra.  XXVIII.]  ORMAZD  AND  AURIMAN,  REPRESENTED.      581 

alike  at  his  disposal.  He  blasts  the  earth  with  barrenness,  or 
makes  it  produce  thorns,  thistles,  and  poisonous  plants;  his 
are  the  earthquake,  the  storm,  the  plague  of  haU,  the  thunder- 
bolt ;  he  causes  disease  and  death,  sweeps  off  a  nation's  flocks 
and  herds  by  murrain,  or  depopulates  a  continent  by  pesti- 
lence; ferocious  wild  beasts,  serpents,  toads,  mice,  hornets, 
mosquitoes,  are  liis  creation ;  he  invented  and  introduced  into 
the  world  the  sins  of  witchcraft,  murder,  unbelief,  cannibahsm, 
sodomy ;  he  excites  wars  and  tumidts,  stirs  up  the  bad  against 
the  good,  and  labors  by  every  possible  expedient  to  make  vice 
triumph  over  virtue.  Ormazd  can  exercise  no  control  over 
him ;  the  utmost  that  he  can  do  is  to  keep  a  perpetual  watch 
on  his  rival,  and  seek  to  baffle  and  defeat  him.  This  he  is  not 
always  able  to  do.  Despite  his  best  endeavors,  Ahriman  is  not 
vmfrequently  victorious." 

In  the  purer  times  of  the  Zoroastrian  religion  it  would  seem 
that  neither  Ormazd  nor  Ahriman  was  represented  by  sculp- 
tured forms.  "^  A  symbolism  alone  was  permitted,  which  none 
could  mistake  for  a  real  attempt  to  portray  these  august 
beings.'"  But  by  the  date  of  the  Sassanian  revival,  the  orig- 
inal spirit  of  the  religion  had  suffered  considerable  modifica- 
tion ;  and  it  was  no  longer  thought  impious,  or  perilous,  to 
exhibit  the  heads  of  the  Pantheon,  in  the  forms  regarded  as 
appropriate  to  them,  upon  pul)lic  monuments.  The  great 
Artaxerxes,  probably  soon  after  his  accession,  set  up  a  memo- 
I'ial  of  his  exploits,  in  which  he  represented  himself  as  receiv- 
ing the  insignia  of  royalty  from  Ormazd  himself,  while  Ahri- 
man, prostrate  and  seemingly,  though  of  course  not  reaUy, 
dead,  lay  at  the  feet  of  the  steed  on  wiiich  Ormazd  was 
mounted. ''  In  the  form  of  Ormazd  there  is  nothing  very  re 
markable;  he  is  attired  like  the  king,  has  a  long  beard  and 
flowing  locks,  and  carries  in  his  left  hand  a  huge  staff  or  baton, 
which  he  holds  erect  in  a  slanting  position.  The  figure  of 
Aliriman  possesses  more  interest.  The  face  wears  an  expression 
v:>f  pain  and  suffering;  but  the  features  are  calm,  and  in  no 
way  disturbed.  They  are  regular,  and  at  least  as  handsome 
as  those  of  Artaxerxes  and  his  divine  patron.  He  wears  a 
band  or  diadein  across  the  brow,  above  wliich  we  see  a  low 
cap  or  crown.  From  this  escape  the  heads  and  necks  of  a 
number  of  vipers  or  snakes,  fit  emblems  of  the  poisonous  and 
"  death-dealing  "  ^"-  Evil  One. 

Some  further  representations  of  Ormazd  occur  in  the  Sassa- 
nian sculptures;  but  Ahriman  seems  not  to  ba  portrayed  els^ 


582  TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [cH.  xxvia 

■where.  Ormazd  appears  on  foot  in  a  relief  of  the  Great  Arta- 
xerxes,  which  contains  two  figures  only,  those  of  himself  and 
his  divine  patron/^  He  is  also  to  be  seen  in  a  sculpture  which 
belongs  probably  to  Sapor  I. ,  and  represents  that  monarch  in 
the  act  of  receiving  the  diadem  from  Artaxerxes,  his  father.  '* 
In  the  former  of  these  two  tablets  the  type  exhibited  in  the 
bas-rehef  just  described  is  followed  without  any  variation ;  in 
the  latter,  the  type  is  considerably  modified.  Ormazd  still 
carries  his  huge  baton,  and  is  attired  in  royal  fashion;  but 
otherwise  his  appearance  is  altogether  new  and  singular.  His 
head  bears  no  crown,  but  is  surrounded  by  a  halo  of  streaming 
rays;  he  has  not  much  beard,  but  his  hair,  bushy  and  abun- 
dant, flows  down  on  his  two  shoulders ;  he  faces  the  spectator, 
and  holds  his  baton  in  both  his  hands ;  finally,  he  stands  upon 
a  blossom,  which  is  thought  to  be  that  of  a  sun-flower.  Per- 
haps the  conjecture  is  allowable  that  here  we  have  Ormazd  ex- 
hibited to  us  in  a  solar  character, "  with  the  attributes  of 
Mithra,  from  whom,  in  the  olden  time,  he  was  carefully  dis- 
tinguished. 

Ormazd  seems  to  have  been  regarded  by  the  kings  as  their 
special  guardian  and  protector.  No  other  deity  (unless  in  one 
instance"')  is  brought  into  close  proximity  with  them;  no 
other  obtains  mention  in  their  inscriptions ;  from  no  other  do 
they  allow  that  they  receive  the  blessing  of  ofi'spring."  What- 
ever the  religion  of  the  common  people,  that  of  the  kings 
would  seem  to  have  been,  in  the  main,  the  worship  of  this> 
god,  whom  they  perhaps  sometimes  confused  with  Mithra,  or 
associated  with  Anaitis,  but  whom  they  never  neglected,  or 
failed  openly  to  acknowledge.  ^* 

Under  the  great  Ormazd  were  a  number  of  subordinata 
deities,  the  principal  of  whom  were  Mithra  and  Serosh. 
Mithra,  the  Sun-God,  had  been  from  a  very  early  date  an  object 
of  adoration  in  Persia,  only  second  to  Ormazd.  '^  The  Achae- 
menian  kings  "  joined  him  occasionally  with  Ormazd  in  their 
invocations.  In  processions  his  chariot,  drawn  by  milk-white 
horses,  followed  closely  on  that  of  Ormazd.*'  He  was  often 
associated  with  Ormazd,  as  if  an  equal,  *-  though  a  real  equahty 
was  probably  not  intended.  He  was  "great,"  "  pure,"  "im- 
perishable," "the  beneficent  protector  of  all  creatures,"" 
and  ' '  the  beneficent  preserver  of  all  creatures. "  ■"  He  had  a 
thousand  ears  and  ten  thousand  eyes.*^  His  worship  was  pro- 
bably more  widely  extended  than  that  of  Ormazd  himself, 
and  was  connected  in  general  with  a  material  representation. 


CH.  XXVIII.]    SEJROSII  AND   THE  AMSHASJIPAyDS.  r^S'^ 

In  the  early  times  this  was  a  simple  disk,  or  circle;  *'  but  from 
the  reign  of  Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  a  human  image  seems  to 
have  been  substituted. "  Prayer  was  offered  to  Mithra  three 
times  a  day/*  at  dawn,  at  noon,  and  at  sunset;  and  it  was 
usual  to  worship  him  with  sacrifice.  The  horse  appears  to 
have  been  the  victim  which  he  was  supposed  to  prefer. "' 

Sraosha,  or  Serosh,  was  an  angel  of  great  power  and  dignity. 
He  was  the  special  messenger  of  Ormazd,  and  the  head  ot  liis 
celestial  army.  He  was  ''tall,  well-formed,  beautiful,  swift, 
victorious,  happy,  sincere,  true,  the  master  of  truth."  It 
was  his  office  to  deliver  revelations,  to  show  men  the  paths 
of  happiness,  and  to  bring  them  the  blessings  which  Ormazd 
had  assigned  to  each.  He  invented  the  music  for  the  five  most 
ancient  Gathas,  discovered  the  barsom  or  divining-rod,  and 
first  taught  its  use  to  mankind.  From  his  palace  on  the  high- 
est summit  of  the  Elburz  range,  he  watched  the  proceedings 
of  the  evil  genii,  and  guarded  the  world  from  their  attempts. 
The  Iranians  were  his  special  care ;  but  he  lost  no  opportunity 
of  injuring  the  Powers,  of  Darkness,  and  lessening  their  do- 
minion by  teaching  everywhere  the  true  religion.  In  the  other 
world  it  was  his  business  to  conduct  the  souls  of  the  faithful 
through  the  dangers  of  the  middle  passage,  and  to  bring  them 
before  the  golden  throne  of  Ormazd.  '■"" 

Among  minor  angelic  powers  were  Vayu,  "the  ^vind,"  "  who 
is  found  also  in  the  Vedic  system ;  Airyanam,  a  god  presiding 
over  marriages;^''  Vitraha,  a  good  genius;'"'  Tistrya,^nhe  Dog 
Star,  etc.  The  number  of  the  minor  deities  was  not,  however, 
great ;  nor  do  they  seem,  as  in  so  many  other  polytheistic  re- 
ligions, to  have  advanced  in  course  of  time  from  a  subordinate 
to  a  leading  position.  From  first  to  last  they  are  of  small 
account;  and  it  seems,  therefore,  unnecessary  to  detain  the 
reader  by  an  elaborate  description  of  them. 

From  the  mass,  however,  of  the  lower  deities  or  genii  must 
be  distinguished  (besides  Mithra  and  Serosh)  the  six  Amesha 
Spentas,  or  Amshashpands,  who  formed  the  council  of  Or- 
mazd, and  in  a  certain  sense  reflected  his  glory.  These  were 
Vohu-mano  or  Bahman,  Ashavahista  or  Ardibehesht,  Khsha- 
thra-vairya  or  Shahravar,  Spcnta-Arraaiti  or  Isfandarmat, 
Haurvatat  or  Khordad,  and  Amcretat  or  Amerdat."  Vohu- 
mano,  "the  Good  Mind, "  originally  a  mere  attribute  of  Or- 
mazd, came  to  be  considered  a  distinct  being,  created  by  him 
to  be  liis  attendant  and  his  councillor.  He  was,  as  it  were,  the 
Grand  Vizier  of  the  Almighty  King,  the  chief  of  the  heavenly 


584 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY, 


[CH.  XXVIII. 


conclave.  Ormazd  entrusted  to  him  especially  the  care  of 
animal  life ;  and  thus,  as  presiding  over  cattle,  he  is  the  patron 
deity  of  the  agriculturist.^"  Asha-vahista,  "the  best  tiiith," 
or  "the  best  purity,"  is  the  Light  of  the  universe,  subtle,  per- 
vading, omnipresent.  He  maintains  the  splendor  of  the  vari- 
ous luminaries,  and  presides  over  the  element  of  fire. "  Ehsha- 
thra-vairya,  "wealth,"  has  the  goods  of  this  world  at  his  dis- 
posal, and  specially  presides  over  metals,  the  conventional 
signs  of  wealth;  he  is  sometimes  identified  with  the  metal 
which  he  dispenses.'^'  Spenta-Armaiti,  "Holy  Armaiti,"  is  at 
once  the  genius  of  the  Earth,  and  the  goddess  of  piety.  She 
has  the  charge  of  "the  good  creation,"  watches  over  it,  and 
labors  to  convert  the  desolate  and  unproductive  portions  of  it 
into  fruitful  fields  and  gardens. '"  Together  with  Vohu-mano, 
she  protects  the  agriculturist, ""  blessing  his  land  with  increase, 
as  Vohu-mano  does  his  cattle.  She  is  called  "  the  daughter  of 
Ormazd,""  and  is  regarded  as  the  agent  through  whom  Or- 
m.azd  created  the  earth.  "^  Moreover.  "  she  tells  men  the  ever- 
lasting laws,  which  no  one  may  abohsh,""  or,  in  other  words, 
imparts  to  them  the  eternal  principles  of  morality.  She  is 
sometimes  represented  as  standing  next  to  Ormazd  in  the 
mythology,  as  in  the  profession  of  faith  required  of  converts 
to  Zoroastrianism.  "*  The  two  remaining  Amshashpands, 
Haurvatat  and  Ameretat,  "Health"  and  "Immortality,"  have 
the  charge  of  the  vegetable  creation;  Haurvatat  causes  the 
flow  of  water,  so  necessary  to  the  support  of  vegetable  life  in 
countries  where  little  rain  falls;  Ameretat  protects  orchards 
and  gardens,  and  enables  trees  to  bring  their  fruits  to  per- 
fection. 

Another  deity,  practically  perhaps  as  much  worshipped  as 
Ormazd  and  Mithra,  was  Anaitis  or  Anahit.  Anaitis  was 
originally  an  Assyrian  and  Babylonian,"^  not  a  Zoroastrian 
goddess;  but  her  worship  spread  to  the  Persians  at  a  date 
anterior  to  Herodotus, ""  and  became  in  a  short  time  exceed- 
ingly popular.  It  was  in  connection  with  this  worship  that 
idolatry  seems  first  to  have  crept  in,  Artaxerxes  Mnemon  (ab. 
B.C.  400)  having  introduced  images  of  Anaitis  into  Persia,  and 
set  them  up  at  Susa,  the  capital,  at  PersepoHs,  Ecbatana, 
Bactra,  Babylon,  Damascus,  and  Sardis."  Anaitis  was  the 
Babylonian  Venus ;  and  her  rites  at  Babylon  were  undoubtedly 
of  a  revolting  character.  "*  It  is  to  be  feared  that  they  were 
introduced  in  all  their  grossness  into  Persia,  ai  I  that  this  wa& 
the  cause  of  Anahit  ^s  great  popularity.    Her  cult  ' '  was  pro- 


CH.  xxYiii.]  EVIL   OENII.  585 

vided  with  priests  and  hieroduli,  and  connected  with  mys- 
teries, feasts,  and  unchaste  ways.""" 

The  Persian  system  was  further  tainted  with  idolatry  in 
respect  of  the  worship  of  Mithra,"  and  possibly  of  Vohu-mano 
(Bahman),  and  of  Amerdat;"  but  on  the  whole,  and  es- 
pecially as  compared  with  other  Oriental  cults,  the  rehgion, 
even  of  the  later  Zoroastrians,  must  be  regarded  as  retaining  a 
non-materialistic  and  anti-idolatrous  character,  which  elevated 
it  above  other  neighboring  religions,  above  Brahminism  on  the 
one  hand  and  Syro-Chaldaean  nature-worship  on  the  other. 

In  the  kingdom  of  Darkness,  the  principal  powers,  besides 
Ahriman,  were  Ako-mano,  Indra,  Qaurva,  Naonhaitya,  Taric, 
and  Zaric."  These  six  together  formed  the  Council  of  the 
Evil  One,  as  the  six  Amshashpands  formed  the  council  of 
Ormazd.  Ako-mano,  "the  bad  mind,"  or  (literally)  "the 
naught  mind,"'' was  set  over  against  Vohu-mano,  "the  good 
mind,"  and  was  Ahriman's  Grand  Vizier.  His  special  sphere 
was  the  mind  of  man,  where  he  suggested  evil  thoughts,  and 
prompted  to  bad  words  and  wicked  deeds.  Indra,  identical 
with  the  Vedic  deity,  but  made  a  demon  by  the  Zoroastrians, 
presided  over  storm  and  tempest,  and  governed  the  issues  of 
war  and  battle.  Qaurva  and  Naonhaitya  were  also  Vedic 
deities  turned  into  devils.'*  It  is  difficult  to  assign  them  any 
distinct  sphere.  Taric  and  Zaric,  "Darkness"  and  "Poison," 
-  had  no  doubt  occupations  corresponding  with  their  names. 
Besides  these  chief  demons,  a  countless  host  of  evil  genii  {divs) 
and  fairies  (pairiJcas)  awaited  the  orders  and  executed  the  be- 
hests of  Alarimah. 

Placed  between  the  two  contending  worlds  of  good  and  evil, 
man's  position  was  one  of  extreme  danger  and  difficulty. 
Originally  set  upon  the  earth  by  Ormazd  in  order  to  maintain 
the  good  creation,  he  was  liable  to  the  continual  temptations 
and  seductions  of  the  divs  or  devas,  who  were  "wicked,  bad, 
false,  untrue,  the  originators  of  mischief,  most  baneful,  de- 
structive, the  basest  of  all  things.""  A  single  act  of  sm  gave 
them  a  hold  upon  him,  and  each  subsequent  act  increased 
their  power,  until  ultimately  he  became  their  mere  tool  and 
slave."  It  was  however  possible  to  resist  temptation,  to  cling 
to  the  side  of  right,  to  defy  and  overcome  the  deltas.  Man. 
might  maintain  his  uprightness,  walk  in  the  path  of  duty,  and 
by  the  help  of  the  asuras,  or  "good  spirits," attain  to  a  blissful 
paradise. 

To  arrive  at  this  result,  man  had  carefully  to  observe  three 


586  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvm 

principal  duties.  These  were  worship,  agriculture,  and  purity. 
Worship  consisted  in  the  acknowledgment  of  the  One  True 
God,  Ormazd,  and  of  liis  Holy  Angels,  the  Amesha  Spentas  or 
Amshashpands,  in  the  frequent  offering  of  prayers,  praises, 
and  thanksgivings,  in  the  rescitation  of  set  hymns,  the  per- 
formance of  a  certain  ceremony  called  the  Homa,  and  in  the 
occasional  sacrifice  of  animals.  The  set  hymns  form  a  large 
portion  of  the  Zendavesta,  where  they  occur  in  the  shape  of 
Gathas,"  or  Yashts,'*  sometimes  possessing  considerable 
beauty."  They  are  sometimes  general,  addressed  to  Ormazd 
and  the  Amesha  Spentas  in  common,  sometimes  special,  con- 
taining the  praises  of  a  particular  deity.  The  Homa  ceremony 
consisted  in  the  extraction  of  the  juice  of  the  Homa  plant  by 
the  priests  during  the  recitation  of  prayers,  the  formal  pre- 
sentation of  the  liquor  extracted  to  the  sacrificial  fire,  the  con- 
sumption of  a  small  portion  of  it  by  one  of  the  officiating 
priests,  and  the  division  of  the  remainder  among  the  worship- 
pers. As  the  juice  was  drunk  immediately  after  extraction 
and  before  fermentation  had  set  in,  it  was  not  intoxicating. 
The  ceremony  seems  to  have  been  regarded,  in  part,  as  having 
a  mystic  force,  securing  the  favor  of  heaven ;  in  part,  as  exert- 
ing a  beneficial  effect  upon  the  body  of  the  worshipper  through 
the  curative  power  inherent  in  the  Homa  plant.""  The  ani- 
mals which  might  be  sacrificed  were  the  horse,  the  ox,  the 
sheep,  and  the  goat,  the  horse  being  the  favorite  victim.  A 
priest  always  performed  the  sacrifice, ''  slaying  the  animal,  and 
showing  the  flesh  to  the  sacred  fire  by  way  of  consecration, 
after  which  it  was  eaten  at  a  solemn  feast  by  the  priest  and 
people. 

It  is  one  of  the  chief  peculiarities  of  Zoroastrianism  that  it 
regarded  agriculture  as  a  reUgious  duty.  Man  had  been 
placed  upon  the  earth  especially  "to  maintain  the  good 
creation, "  and  resist  the  endeavors  of  Ahriman  to  injure,  and 
if  possible,  ruin  it.  This  could  only  be  done  by  careful  tilling 
of  the  soil,  eradication  of  thorns  and  weeds,  and  reclamation 
of  the  tracts  over  which  Ahriman  had  spread  the  curse  of 
barrenness.  To  cultivate  the  soil  was  thus  incmnbent  upon 
all  men;  the  whole  community  was  required  to  be  agricultiu-al ; 
and  either  as  proprietor,  as  farmer,  or  as  laboring  man,  each 
Zoroastrian  was  bound  to  ' '  further  the  works  of  life  "  by  ad- 
vancing tillage.  "'^ 

The  purity  which  was  required  of  the  Zoroastrian  was  of  two 
kinds,  moral  and  legal.    Moral  purity  comprised  all  that  Chris- 


CH.  xxviii.]  POSITION  OF  THE  MAGT.  587 

tianity  includes  under  it— truth,  justice,  chastity,  and  general 
sinlessness.  It  was  coextensive  with  the  whole  sphere  of  hu- 
man activity,  embracing  not  only  words  and  acts,  but  even 
the  secret  thoughts  of  the  heart."  Legal  purity  was  to  be  ob- 
tained only  by  the  observance  of  a  multitude  of  trifling  cere- 
monies and  the  abstinence  from  ten  thousand  acts  in  their  na- 
ture wholly  indifferent."  Especially,  everything  was  to  be 
avoided  which  could  be  thought  to  pollute  the  four  elements- 
all  of  them  sacred  to  the  Zoroastrian  of  Sassanian  times— fire, 
water,  earth,  and  air.  *^ 

Man's  struggle  after  hoHness  and  purity  was  sustained  in  the 
Zoroastrian  system  by  the  confident  hope  of  a  futurity  of  hap- 
piness. It  was  taught"'^  that  the  soul  of  man  was  immortal, 
and  would  continue  to  possess  for  ever  a  separate  conscious 
existence.  Immediately  after  death  the  spirits  of  both  good 
and  bad  had  to  proceed  along  an  appointed  path  to  ' '  the  bridge 
of  the  gatherer  "  {cMnvat  peretu).  This  was  a  narrow  road 
conducting  to  heaven  or  paradise,  over  which  the  souls  of  the 
pious  alone  could  pass,-  while  the  wicked  fell  from  it  into  the 
gulf  below,  where  they  found  themselves  in  the  place  of  pun- 
ishment. The  steps  of  the  good  were  guided  and  supported  by 
the  angel  Serosh — the  ' '  happy,  well-formed,  swift,  tall  Serosh  " 
— who  conducted  them  across  the  difficult  passage  into  the 
heavenly  region.  There  Bahman,  rising  from  his  throne, 
greeted  them  on  their  entrance  with  the  salutation,  "Happy 
thou  who  art  come  here  to  us  from  the  mortality  to  the  im- 
mortality!" Then  they  proceeded  joyfully  onward  to  the 
presence  of  Ormazd,  to  the  immortal  saints,  to  the  golden 
throne,  to  paradise.  As  for  the  wicked,  when  they  fell  mto 
the  gulf,  they  found  themselves  in  outer  darkness,  in  the  king- 
dom of  Ahriman,  where  they  were  forced  to  remain  and  to 
feed  on  poisoned  banquets.  i 

The  priests  of  the  Zoroastrians,  from  a  time  not  long  subse-  ' 
quent  to  Darius  Hystaspis,"  were  the  Magi.  This  tribe,  or 
caste,  originally  perhaps  external  to  Zoroastrianism,  had  come 
to  be  recognized  as  a  true  priestly  order;  and  was  intrusted 
by  the  Sassanian  princes  with  the  whole  control  and  direction 
of  the  rehgion  of  the  state.***  Its  chief  was  a  personage  holding 
a  rank  but  very  little  inferior  to  the  king.  He  bore  the  title  of 
Tenpet,'"  "  Head  of  the  Religion,"'  or  Movpetan  Movpet;'  "  Head 
of  the  Chief  Magi."  In  times  of  difficulty  and  danger  he  was 
sometimes  called  upon  to  conduct  a  revolution;"  and  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  things  he  was  always  reckoned  among  the 


5SS  ?^^  S^VEyTE  WyjJiCffT.  [ca.  xxnn. 

nMHisrch's  chief  coonsdlors^"  Xexi  in  rank  to  him  'wo*  a 
nnmbs-  of  Mocpet&,  or  "  Clnef  Magi"  called  aJso  destoors  &t 
*'  rolcars,™  "who  scsxcsiy  perhaps  ecinsilTait'ii  an  oarder,  bat  still 
bdd  an  ejEahed  position.*^  TTnder  these  were,  finally,  a  lai^ 
body  of  ordinary  3£a^  dispersed  thiou^pioalt  the  empire:,  but 
e^iecialtf  congregated  in  the  chief  towns. 

Ibe  Magi  officiated  in  a  peculiar  dress.  Ibis  consfeted  of 
a  tan  peaked  cap  <tf  felt  or  some  siniilar  materiaL,  having 
deep  lappets  at  the  side,  ^phieh  concealed  the  jaw  and  even  the 
l^s,  and  a  loDgT^hite  robe,  or  doafc.  deisoending  to  the  anklesL*^* 
Ibey  assemhled  oflben  in  large  numbers,  and  marvhed  in  stately 
proeesslans,  impressing  the  nudtitade  by  a  grand  and  stnkii^ 
cerenumiaL  Besides  the  offerings  which  were  lavisied  upon 
tiiem  by  tbe  faiiMul,  they  pc«sses!ed  considerable  endowments 
in  land,**  which  famished  thein  with  an  assured  subsistence. 
They  "were  allowed  by  Chosroes  the  First  a  certain  adminis- 
tr:i.rive  power  in  civil  matters;  the  colleetionof  the  revenue 
was  to  take  place  under  their  supervision :  they  were  empow- 
ered to  interfere  in  cases  of  oppression,  and  protect  the  subject 
against  the  tax-gatherer.  ** 

The  Zoroastrian  worship  was  iniimrcely  connected  with  fire- 
temples*'  and  fire-altars.  A  fire-temple  was  maintained  in 
every  important  city  throughout  the  empii'e :  and  iu  these  a 
sacred  fiame,  believed  to  have  been  lighted  from  heaven,  was 
kept  np  perpetually,  by  the  care  of  the  priests,  and  was  spo'ken  of 
as  "  tmextrnguishable. "  *'  Fire-altars  probably  also  existed,  in- 
dependently of  temples :  and  an  erection  of  this  kind  maintiuned 
from  first  to  last  an  honorable  position  on  the  Sassanian  coins, 
being  the  m>>^"n  impress  upon  the  reverse. "  It  was  represented 
with  the  dame  rising  from  it,  and  sometimes  with  a  head  in 
the  flame :  "  its  stem  was  ornamented  with  garLmds  or  fillets : 
and  on  either  side,  as  protectors  or  as  worshippers,  were  repre- 
sented two  figiues,  sometimes  watching  the  flame,  sometimes 
turned  from  it.  guarding  it  apparently  from  external  ene- 
mies."- 

Besides  the  sacerdotal,  the  Magi  claimed  to  exercise  the 
prophetical  office.  From  a  verv  earlv  date  thev  had  made  them- 
selves  conspicuous  as  omen-readei^  and  dream-expoimders  ;•" 
but,  not  content  with  such  occasional  exhibitions  of  prophetic 
power,  they  ultimately  reduced  divination  to  a  system,  and, 
by  the  help  of  the  bars=om  or  bimdle  of  divining  rods,  imder- 
took  to  return  a  true  answer  on  all  points  connected  with  the 
future,  upon  which  they  might  be  consulted.   '    Creduhty  is 


CH.  sxTHL]  THE  BARSOM—THE  KHRAFrTHRAGRXA.      589 

never  wanting  among  C  "  -  •.  tho  power  of  the  priest- 
hood was  no  doubt  grt.....    .-.  i.  by  a  pretension  which 

was  easily  made.  r\?adily  beheved,  and  not  genertilly  disci-edited 
by  failiuvs,  however  numerous. 

The  Magian  priest  was  (."ommonly  seen  with  the  barsom  in 
his  hand :  but  occasionally  he  exchanged  th:\t  instrument  for 
another,  known  as  the  I'hratX'thraghita."^  It  was  among  the 
duties  of  the  pious  Zonx^strian.  and  more  especially  of  thos* 
who  were  entrusted  with  the  priestly  otiii^^.  to  wage  perpetual 
war  with  Ahriman.  and  to  destroy  his  works  whenever  oppor- 
timity  offen?d.  Xow  among  these,  constituting  a  portion  of 
"the  bad  creation,'  wer>e  all  such  animals  as  frvvgs,  toads, 
snakes,  newts,  mice,  lizards,  flies,  and  the  like.  The  Magi 
took  every  opportunity  of  killing  such  creatures:  '-"'  and  the 
khrafythraghna  was  ;\n  implement  which  they  invented  for  the 
sake  of  carrying  out  this  pious  purpose. 

The  court  of  the  Sassanian  kings,  especially  in  the  later 
period  of  the  empire,  was  arr.vnged  upon  a  scale  of  almi^vjt  im- 
exampled  grandeur  and  magnificence.  The  rc>bes  worn  by  the 
Great  King  were  beautifully  embroidered,  and  covered  with 
gems  and  pearls,  which  in  some  representations  may  be 
coimted  by  hundreds,-'*  fPL  XLV.]  The  roycU  crown,  which 
could  not  be  worn,  but  was  hung  from  the  ceiling  by  a  gold 
ch:nn  exactly  over  the  head  of  the  king  when  he  took  his  seat 
in  his  throne -room,  is  said  to  have  been  adorned  with  a 
thousand  pearls,  each  as  large  as  an  egg.  •"  The  throne  itself 
wcv>  of  gold,  and  was  supported  on  four  feet,  each  formed  of  a 
single  enormous  ruby.'*  The  great  throne-room  was  orna- 
mented with  enormous  columns  of  silver,  between  which  were 
hangings  of  rich  silk  or  brocade.  ■  *  The  vaulted  roof  presented 
to  the  eye  representations  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  sim.  the 
moon,  and  the  stars;''  while  glolvs.  probably  of  crystal,  or  of 
burnished  metal,  hung  susjvnded  from  it  '  at  various  heights, 
lighting  up  the  dark  sj^ace  as  with  a  thousand  lustres. 

The  state  observed  at  the  court  resembled  that  of  the  most 
formcU  and  stately  of  the  Oriental  monarchies.  The  courtiers 
were  organized  in  seven  nmks.  Foremost  came  the  Ministers 
of  the  crown ;  next  the  Mobeds,  or  chief  Magi :  after  them,  the 
?ii"»-6etfj«.  or  judges:  then  the  sipehbeds.  or  commanders-in  chief, 
of  whom  there  were  commonly  four:  last  of  all  the  singers, 
musicians,  and  men  of  science,  arranged  in  three  orders.  The 
king  sat  apart  even  from  the  highest  nobles,  who,  miless  sum- 
moned, might  not  approach  nearer  than  thirty  feet  from  biir^ 


590  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvm 

A  low  curtain  separated  him  from  them,  which  was  under  the 
charge  of  an  officer,  who  drew  it  for  those  only  with  whom  the 
king-  had  expressed  a  desire  to  converse."" 

An  important  part  of  the  palace  was  the  seraglio.  The  poly- 
gamy practised  by  the  Sassanian  princes  was  on  the  largest 
scale  that  has  ever  been  heard  of,  Chosroes  II.  having  main- 
tained, we  are  told,  three  thousand  concubines."^  The  modest 
requirements  of  so  many  secondary  wives  necessitated  the 
lodging  and  sustenance  of  twelve  thousand  additional  females,  "* 
chiefly  slaves,  whose  office  was  to  attend  on  these  royal  favor- 
ites, attire  them,  and  obey  their  behests.  Eunuchs  are  not 
mentioned  as  employed  to  any  large  extent;  but  in  the 
scidptures  of  the  early  princes  they  seem  to  be  represented  as 
holding  offices  of  importance,"^  and  the  analogy  of  Oriental 
courts  does  not  allow  us  to  doubt  that  the  seraglio  was,  to  some 
extent  at  any  rate,  under  their  superintendence.  Each  Sas- 
sanian monarch  had  one  sultana  or  principal  wife,  who  was 
generally  a  princess  by  birth,  but  might  legally  be  of  any 
origin.  In  one  or  two  instances  the  monarch  sets  the  effigy  of 
his  principal  wife  upon  his  coins  ;"^  but  this  is  unusual,  and 
when,  towards  the  close  of  the  empire,  females  were  allowed 
to  ascend  the  throne,  it  is  thought  that  they  refrained  from 
parading  themselves  in  this  way,  and  stamped  their  coins 
with  the  head  of  a  male. '" 

In  attendance  upon  the  monarch  were  usually  his  parasol- 
bearer,  his  fan-bearer,  who  appears  to  have  been  a  eunuch, "' 
the  Senekapan,^^'^  or  "Lord  Chamberlain,"  the  Maypet,  or 
' '  Chief  Butler, ' '  the  Andertzapet,  or  ' '  Master  of  the  Wardrobe, " 
the  Akhorapet,  or  "Master  of  the  Horse,"  the  Taharhapet  or 
"Chief  Cupbearer,"  the  Shahpan,  or  "Chief  Falconer,"  and' 
the  Krhogpet,  or  "  Master  of  the  Workmen."  Except  the  para- 
sol-bearer and  fan-bearer,  these  officials  all  presided  over  de- 
partments, and  had  under  them  a  numerous  body  of  subordi- 
nates. If  the  royal  stables  contained  even  8000  horses,  which 
one  monarch  is  said  to  have  kept  for  his  own  riding,'''"  the 
grooms  and  stable-boys  must  have  been  counted  by  hundreds ; 
and  an  equal  or  greater  number  of  attendants  must  have  been 
required  for  the  camels  and  elephants,  which  are  estimated  ""' 
respectively  at  1200  and  12,000.  The  "workmen"  were  also 
probably  a  corps  of  considerable  size,  continually  engaged  in 
repairs  or  in  temporary  or  permanent  erections. 

Other  great  officials,  corresponding  more  nearly  to  the  "  Min- 
isters" of  a  modern  sovereign,  were  the  VzourJchramanatar,^''^ 


CH.  xrviii.]  COSTUME  OF  THE  KING.  591 

or  "Grand  Keeper  of  the  Royal  Orders,"  who  held  the  post  now 
known  as  that  of  Grand  Vizier ;  the  Dprapet  Ariats,  or  ' '  Chief 
of  the  Scribes  of  Iran,"  a  sort  of  Chancellor;  the  Hazarapet 
dran  Ariats,  or  "Chiliarch  of  the  Gate  of  Iran,"  a  principal 
Minister;  the  Hamarakar,  a  "Chief  Cashier"  or  "  Paymaster;" 
and  the  Khohrdean  djnr,  or  "Secretary  of  Council,"  a  sort  of 
Privy  Council  clerk  or  registrar.  The  native  names  of  these 
officers  are  known  to  us  chiefly  through  the  Armenian  writers 
of  the  fifth  and  seventh  centui'ies. '" 

The  Sassanian  court,  though  generally  held  at  Ctesiphon, 
migrated  to  other  cities,  if  the  king  so  pleased,  and  is  found 
established,  at  one  time  in  the  old  Persian  capital,  Persepolis,  "* 
at  another  in  the  comparatively  modern  city  of  Dastagherd. '" 
The  monarchs  maintained  from  first  to  last  nmnerous  palaces, 
which  they  visited  at  their  pleasure  and  made  their  residence 
for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  period.  Four  such  palaces  have  been 
already  described;'"  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  many 
others  existed  in  various  parts  of  the  empire.  There  was  cer 
tainly  one  of  great  magnificence  at  Canzaca;'"  and  several  are 
mentioned  as  occupied  by  Heraclius  in  the  country  between 
the  Lower  Zab  and  Ctesiphon.'"  Chosroes  II.  undoubtedly 
built  one  near  Takht-i-Bostan ;  and  Sapor  the  First  must  have 
had  one  at  Shapur,  where  he  set  up  the  greater  portion  of  his 
monuments.  The  discovery  of  the  Mashita  palace,  in  a  position 
so  little  inviting  as  the  land  of  Moab,  seems  to  imply  a  very 
general  establishment  of  royal  residences  in  the  remote  prov- 
inces of  the  empire. 

The  costume  of  the  later  Persians  is  known  to  us  chiefly  from 
the  representations  of  the  kings,  on  whose  figures  alone  have 
the  native  artists  bestowed  much  attention.  In  peace,  the 
monarch  seems  to  have  worn  a  sort  of  pehsse  or  long  coat,  par- 
tially open  in  front,  and  with  close-fitting  sleeves  reaching  to 
the  wrist,  '''^  under  which  he  had  a  pair  of  loose  trousers  de- 
scending to  the  feet  and  sometimes  even  covering  ""  them.  A 
belt  or  girdle  encircled  his  waist.  His  feet  were  encased  in 
patterned  shoes,"'  tied  with  long  flowing  ribbons.  Over  his 
pelisse  he  wore  occasionally  a  long  cape  or  short  cloak,  which 
was  fastened  with  a  brooch  or  strings  across  the  breast  and 
flowed  over  the  back  and  shoulders. '"  The  material  compos- 
ing the  cloak  was  in  general  exceedingly  light  and  flimsj'.  The 
head-dress  commonly  worn  seems  to  have  been  a  round  cap, 
which  was  perhaps  ornamented  with  jewels. '"  The  vest  and 
trousers  were  also  in  some  cases  richly  jewelled.'"    Every 


592  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY.  [ch.  xxvm 

king  wore  ear-rings,"*  with  one,  two,  or  three  pendants.  A 
collar  or  necklace  was  also  commonly  worn  round  the  neck ; 
and  this  had  sometimes  two  or  more  pendants  in  front.  Occa- 
sionally the  beard  was  brought  to  a  point  and  had  a  jewel 
hanging  from  it.'^''  The  hair  seems  always  to  have  been  worn 
long;  it  was  elaborately  curled,  and  hung  down  on  either 
shoulder  in  numerous  ringlets.  When  the  monarch  rode  out 
;/  'n  state,  an  attendant  held  the  royal  parasol  over  him. '" 
i  In  war  '^*  the  monarch  encased  the  upper  part  of  his  person 
in  a  coat  of  mail,  composed  of  scales  or  links.  Over  this  he 
wore  three  belts ;  the  first,  which  crossed  the  breast  diagonally, 
was  probably  attached  to  his  shield,  which  might  be  hung  from 
it ;  the  second  supported  his  sword ;  and  the  third  his  quiver, 
and  perhaps  his  bow-case.''^  A  stiff,  embroidered  trouser  of 
great  fulness  protected  the  leg,  while  the  head  was  guarded  by 
a  helmet,  and  a  vizor  of  chain  mail  hid  all  the  face  but  the 
eyes.  The  head  and  fore-quarters  of  the  royal  charger  were 
also  covered  with  armor,  which  descended  below  the  animal's 
knees  in  front,  but  was  not  carried  back  behind  the  rider. 
The  monarch's  shield  was  round,  and  carried  on  the  left  arm ; 
liis  main  offensive  weapon  was  a  heavy  spear,  which  he  bran- 
dished in  his  right  hand. 

One  of  the  favorite  pastimes  of  the  kings  was  hunting.  The 
Sassanian  remains  show  us  the  royal  sportsmen  engaged  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  stag,  the  wild  boar,  the  ibex,  the  antelope,  and 
the  buffalo. '"  To  this  catalogue  of  their  beasts  of  chase  the 
classical  writers  add  the  lion,  the  tiger,  the  wild  ass,  and  the 
bear.  Lions,  tigers,  bears,  and  wild  asses  were,  it  appears,  col- 
lected far  the  purpose  of  sport,  and  kept  in  royal  parks  or  para- 
dises *"  until  a  hunt  was  determined  on.  The  monarchs  then 
engaged  in  the  sport  in  person,  either  singly  or  in  conjunction 
with  a  royal  ambassador,'^-  or  perhaps  of  a  favorite  minister, 
or  a  few  friends.  "^  The  hon  was  engaged  hand  to  hand  with 
sword  or  spear ;  the  more  dangerous  tiger  was  attacked  from  a 
distance  with  arrows. '"  Stags  and  wild  boars  were  sufficiently 
abundant  to  make  the  keeping  of  them  in  paradises  unneces- 
sarj".  When  the  king  desired  to  hunt  them,  it  was  only  requi- 
site to  beat  a  certain  extent  of  country  in  order  to  make  sure 
of  finding  the  game.  This  appears  to  have  been  done  generally 
by  elephants,  which  entered  the  marshes  or  the  woodlands,  and, 
spreading  themselves  wide,  drove  the  animals  before  them 
towards  an  enclosed  space,  surrounded  by  a  net  or  a  fence,  where 
the  king  was  stationed  with  his  friends  and  attendants.    If  the 


i| 


CH.  xxvm.]  MUSIC— HAWKim.  593 

tract  was  a  marsh,  the  monarch  occupied  a  boat,  from  which 
he  quietly  took  aim  at  the  beasts  that  came  within  shot. 
Otherwise  he  pursued  the  game  on  horseback, "'  and  ti-ansfixed 
it  while  riding  at  full  speed.  In  either  case  he  seems  to  have 
joined  to  the  pleasures  of  the  chase  the  delights  of  music. 
Bands  of  harpers  and  other  musicians  were  placed  near  him 
within  the  enclosure,  and  he  could  listen  to  their  strains  while 
he  took  his  pastime. '" 

The  musical  instruments  which  appear  distinctly  on  the 
Sassanian  sculptures  are  the  harp,  the  horn,  the  drum,  and  the 
flute  or  pipe.  The  harp  is  triangular,  and  has  seven  strings ; 
it  is  held  in  the  lap,  and  played  apparently  by  both  hands. 
The  drum  is  of  small  size.  The  horns  and  pipes  are  too  rudely 
represented  for  their  exact  character  to  be  apparent.  Con 
certed  pieces  seem  to  have  been  sometimes  played  by  harpers 
only,  of  whom  as  many  as  ten  or  twelve  joined  in  the  execu- 
tion. Mixed  bands  Avere  more  numerous.  In  one  instance'" 
the  number  of  performers  amounts  to  twenty-six,  of  whom 
seven  play  the  harp,  an  equal  nmnber  the  flute  or  pipe,  three 
the  horn,  one  the  drum,  while  eight  are  too  slightly  rendered 
for  their  instruments  to  be  recognized.  A  portion  of  the 
muscians  occupy  an  elevated  orchestra,  to  which  there  is  ac- 
cess by  a  flight  of  steps. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  Sassanian  monarchs  took  a 
pleasure  also  in  the  pastime  of  hawking.  It  has  been  already 
noticed  that  among  the  officers  of  the  court  was  a  "Head  Fal- 
coner," who  must  have  presided  over  this  species  of  sport,'" 
Hawking  was  of  great  antiquity  in  the  East, '"  and  appears  to 
have  been  handed  down  uninterruptedly  from  remote  times  to 
the  present  day.  We  may  reasonably  conjecture  that  the  os- 
triches and  pheasants,  if  not  the  peacocks  also,  kept  in  the  roy- 
al preserves, ""  were  intended  to  be  used  in  this  pastime,  the 
hawks  being  flown  at  them  if  other  game  proved  to  bo  scarce. 

The  monarchs  also  occasionally  amuced  themselves  in  their 
leisure  hours  by  games.  The  introduction  of  chess  from  India 
by  the  great  Chosroes  (Anushirwan)  has  already  been  noticed ;'" 
and  some  authorities  state  that  the  same  monarch  brought  into 
use  also  a  species  of  tric-trac  or  draughts. '"  Unfortunately  we 
have  no  materials  for  determining  the  exact  form  of  the  game 
in  either  case,  the  Sassanian  remains  containing  no  represen- 
tation of  such  trivial  matters. 

In  the  character  of  their  warfare,  the  Persians  of  tlie  Sassa- 
nian period  did  not  greatly  differ  from  the  same  people  under 


594  THE  SEVENTH  M0NARCII7.  [ch.  itxvm 

the  Achsemenian  kings.  The  principal  changes  which  time 
had  brought  about  were  an  ahnost  entire  disuse  of  the  war 
chariot,'"  [PI.  XLVI.  Fig., 3.]  and  the  advance  of  the  elephant 
corps  into  a  very  prominent  and  important  position.  Four 
main  anns  of  the  service  were  recognized,  each  standing  on  a 
different  level :  viz.  the  elephants,  the  horse,  the  archers,  and 
the  ordinary  footmen.  The  elephant  corps  held  the  first  posi- 
tion."* It  was  recruited  from  India,  but  was  at  no  time  very 
numerous.  Great  store  was  set  by  it;  and  in  some  of  the 
earher  battles  against  the  Arabs  the  victory  was  regarded  as 
gained  mainly  by  this  arm  of  the  service. '"  It  acted  with  best 
effect  in  an  open  and  level  district ;  but  the  value  put  upon  it 
was  such  that,  however  rough,  mountainous,  and  woody  the 
country  into  which  the  Persian  arms  penetrated,  the  elephant 
always  accompanied  the  march  of  the  Persian  troops,  and  care 
was  taken  to  make  roads  by  which  it  could  travel."'  The 
elephant  corps  was  under  a  special  chief,  known  as  the  Zend- 
kapet,  or  "Commander  of  the  Indians,^^ ^^''  either  because  the 
beasts  came  from  that  coimtry,  or  because  they  were  managed 
by  natives  of  Hindustan. 

The  Persian  cavalry  in  the  Sassanian  period  seems  to  have 
been  almost  entirely  of  the  heavy  kind.  [PI.  XLVI.,  Fig.  4.] 
We  hear  nothing  during  these  centuries  of  those  clouds  of 
light  horse  which,  under  the  earher  Persian  and  under  the 
Parthian  monarchy,  hung  about  invading  or  retreating 
armies,  countless  in  their  numbers,  agile  in  their  move- 
ments, a  terrible  annoyance  at  the  best  of  times,  and  a  fearful 
peril  under  certain  circumstances.  The  Persian  troops  which 
pursued  Julian  were  composed  of  heavily  armed  cavalry,  foot 
archers,  and  elephants;"®  and  the  only  light  horse  of  which  we 
have  any  mention  during  the  disastrous  retreat  of  his  army 
are  the  Saracenic  aUies  of  Sapor. "'  In  these  auxiharies,  and 
in  the  Cadusians  from  the  Caspian  region,  the  Persians  had 
always,  when  they  wished  it,  a  cavalry  excellently  suited  for 
light  service ;  but  their  own  horse  during  the  Sassanian  period 
seems  to  have  been  entirely  of  the  heavy  kind,  armed  and 
equipped,  that  is,  very  much  as  Chosroes  II.  is  seen  to  be  at 
Takht-i-Bostan. '^^  The  horses  themselves  wore  heavily  ar- 
mored about  their  head,  neck,  and  chest;  the  rider  wore  a 
coat  of  mail  which  completely  covered  his  body  as  far  as  the 
hips,  and  a  strong  helmet,  with  a  vizor,  which  left  no  part  of 
the  face  exposed  but  the  eyes.  He  carried  a  small  round  shield 
on  his  left  arm,  and  had  for  weapons  a  heavy  spear,  a  sword, 


CH.  xxviii.]        THE  CAVALRY— THE  ARCHERS.  595 

and  a  bow  and  arrows.  He  did  not  fear  a  collision  with  the 
best  Roman  troops.  The  Sassanian  horse  often  charged  the 
infantry  of  the  legions  with  success,  and  drove  it  headlong 
from  the  field  of  battle.  In  time  of  peace,  the  royal  guards 
were  more  simply  accoutred.     [See  PI.  XLVI.] 

The  archers  formed  the  elite  of  the  Persian  infantry. ""  They 
were  trained  to  deliver  their  arrows  with  extreme  rapidity,  and 
with  an  aim  that  was  almost  unerring.  The  huge  wattled 
shields,  adopted  by  the  Achaemenian  Persians  from  the  As- 
syrians, still  remained  in  use;"^^  and  from  behind  a  row  of 
these,  rested  upon  the  ground  and  forming  a  sort  of  loop-holed 
wall,  the  Sassanian  bowmen  shot  their  weapons  with  great 
effect ;  nor  was  it  until  their  store  of  arrows  was  exhausted 
that  the  Romans,  ordinarily,  felt  themselves  upon  even  terms 
with  their  enemy.  Sometimes  the  archers,  instead  of  thus 
fighting  in  line,  were  intermixed  with  the  heavy  horse,'"'  with 
which  it  was  not  difficult  for  them  to  keep  pace.  They  galled 
the  foe  with  their  constant  discharges  from  betAveen  the  ranks 
of  the  horsemen,  remaining  themselves  in  comparative  se- 
curity, as  the  legions  rarely  ventured  to  charge  the  Persian 
mailed  cavalry.  If  they  were  forced  to  retreat,  they  still  shot 
backwards  as  they  fled;'"*  and  it  was  a  proverbial  saying  with 
the  Romans  that  they  were  then  especially  formidable.'"' 

The  ordinary  footmen  seem  to  have  been  armed  with  swords 
and  spears,  perhaps  also  with  darts.  They  were  generally 
stationed  behind  the  archers,""'  who,  however,  retired  through 
their  ranks  when  close  fighting  began.  They  had  little  de- 
fensive armor;  but  stiU  seem  to  have  fought  with  spirit  and 
tenacity,  being  a  fair  match  for  the  legionaries  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  and  superior  to  most  other  adversaries. 

It  is  uncertain  how  the  various  arms  of  the  service  were 
organized  internally.  We  do  not  hear  of  any  divisions  cor- 
responding to  the  Roman  legions  or  to  modern  regiments ;  yet 
it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  there  were  not  some  such  bodies.'" 
Perhaps  each  satrap'"*  of  a  provinc;e  commanded  the  troops 
raised  within  his  government,  taking  the  actual  lead  of  the 
cavalry  or  the  infantry  at  his  discretion.  The  CroAvn  doubt- 
less appointed  the  commanders-in-chief— the  Sparapets,  Spaha- 
pets,  or  Sipehheds,"'"  as  well  as  the  other  generals  (arzbeds), 
the  head  of  the  commissariat  (hambarapet  or  hambamkapet), 
and  the  commander  of  the  elephants  {zendlcapet).  The  satraps 
may  have  acted  as  colonels  of  regiments  under  the  arzbeda. 


596 


THE  SEVENTH  ^WNARCIIY. 


[CH.   XXVIII. 


and  may  probably  have  had  the  nomination  of  the  subordinate 
(regimental)  oflScers. 

The  great  national  standard  was  the  famous  "leathern 
apron  of  the  blacksmith,"  originally  unadorned,  but  ulti- 
mately covered  with  jewels,  which  has  been  described  in  a 
former  chapter.""  This  precious  palladium  was,  however,  but 
rarely  used,  its  place  being  supplied  for  the  most  part  by 
standards  of  a  more  ordinary  character.  These  appear  by  the 
monuments"'  to  have  been  of  two  kinds.  Both  consisted  pri- 
marily of  a  pole  and  a  cross-bar ;  but  in  the  one  kind  the  cross- 
bar sustained  a  single  ring  with  a  bar  athwart  it,  while  below 
depended  two  woolly  tassels ;  in  the  other,  three  striated  balls 
rose  from  the  cross-bar,  while  below  the  place  of  the  tassels 
was  taken  by  two  similar  balls.  It  is  difficult  to  say  what 
these  emblems  symbolized,"- or  why  they  were  varied.  In 
both  the  representations  where  they  appear  the  standards  ac- 
company cavali-y.  so  that  they  cannot  reasonably  be  assigned 
to  different  arms  of  the  service.  That  the  number  of  standards 
carried  into  battle  was  considerable  may  be  gathered  from  the 
fact  that  on  one  occasion,  when  the  defeat  sustained  was  not 
very  complete,  a  Persian  army  left  in  the  enemy's  hands  as 
many  as  twenty-eight  of  them.'" 

During  the  Sassanian  period  there  was  nothing  very  remark- 
able in  the  Persian  tactics.  The  size  of  armies  generally  va- 
ried from  30,000  to  60,000  men,""  though  sometimes'"  100,000, 
and  on  one  occasion""  as  many  as  140,000,  are  said  to  have 
been  assembled.  The  bulk  of  the  troops  were  footmen,  the 
proportion  of  the  horse  probably  never  equalling  one  third  of  a 
mixed  army.'"  Plundering  expeditions  were  sometimes  under- 
taken by  bodies  of  horse  alone;'"  but  serious  invasions  were 
seldom  or  never  attempted  unless  by  a  force  complete  in  all 
arms ;  comprising,  that  is,  horse,  foot,  elephants,  and  artillery. 
To  attack  the  Romans  to  any  purpose,  it  was  always  necessary 
to  engage  in  the  siege  of  towns ;  and  although,  in  the  earlier 
period  of  the  Sassanian  monarchy,  a  certain  weakness  and  in- 
efficiency in  respect  of  sieges  manifested  itself,'"  yet  ultimate- 
ly the  difficulty  was  overcome,  and  the  Persian  expeditionary 
armies,  well  provided  with  siege  trains,  compelled  the  Roman 
fortresses  to  surrender  within  a  reasonable  time.  It  is  remark- 
able that  in  the  later  period  so  many  fortresses  were  taken 
with  apparently  so  little  difficulty— Daras,  Mardin,  Amida. 
Carrhae,  Edessa,  Hierapolis,  Berhaea,  Theodosiopolis,  Antioch, 
Damascus,  Jerusalem,  Alexandria,  Caesarsea  Mazaca,  Chalce- 


CH.  xxvin.]     PRIVATE  LIFE  OF  TEE  PEOPLE.  597 

don;  the  siege  of  none  lasting  more  than  a  few  months,  or 
costing  the  assailants  very  dear.  The  method  used  in  sieges 
was  to  open  trenches  at  a  certain  distance  from  the  walls,  and 
to  advance  along  them  under  cover  of  hurdles  to  the  ditch,  and 
fill  it  up  with  earth  and  fascines. ""  Escalade  might  then  be 
attempted ;  or  movable  towers,  armed  with  rams  or  balistce, 
might  be  brought  up  close  to  the  walls, ""  and  the  defences  bat- 
tered till  a  breach  was  effected.  Sometimes  mounds  were 
raised  against  the  walls'^-  to  a  certain  height,  so  that  their 
upper  portion,  which  was  their  weakest  part,  might  be  at- 
tacked, and  either  demoHshod  or  escaladed.  If  towns  resisted 
prolonged  attacks  of  this  kind,  the  siege  was  turned  into  a 
blockade,'"^  lines  of  circumvallation  being  drawn  round  the 
place,  water  cut  off,  and  provisions  prevented  from  entering. 
Unless  a  strong  relieving  army  appeared  in  the  field,  and 
drove  off  the  assailants,  this  plan  was  tolerably  sure  to  be 
successful. 

Not  much  is  known  of  the  private  hfe  of  the  later  Persians. 
Besides  the  great  nobles  and  court  officials,  the  strength  of  the 
nation  consisted  in  its  dikhans  or  landed  proprietors,  who  for 
the  most  part  lived  on  their  estates,  seeing  after  the  cultivation 
of  the  soil,  and  employing  thereon  the  free  labor  of  the  peas- 
ants. It  was  from  these  classes  chiefly  that  the  standing  army 
was  recruited,  and  that  gi^eat  levies  might  always  be  made  in 
time  of  need.  Simple  habits  appear  to  have  prevailed  among 
them;  polygamy,  though  lawful,  was  not  greatly  in  use;'"  the 
maxims  of  Zoroaster,  which  commanded  industry,  purity,  and 
piety,  were  fairly  observed.  Women  seem  not  to  have  been 
kept  in  seclusion,  ""*  or  at  any  rate  not  in  such  seclusion  as  had 
been  the  custom  under  the  Parthians,  and  as  again  became 
usual  under  the  Arabs.  The  general  condition  of  the  popula- 
tion was  satisfactory.  Most  of  the  Sassanian  monarchs  seem 
to  have  been  desirous  of  governing  weU ;  and  the  system  in- 
augurated by  Anushirwan,  '"■'  and  maintained  by  his  successors, 
secured  the  subjects  of  the  Great  King  from  oppression,  so  far 
as  was  possible  Avithout  representative  government.  Provincial 
rulers  were  well  watched  and  -rt^ell  checked;  tax-gatherers  were 
prevented  from  exacting  more  than  their  due  by  a  wholesale 
dread  that  their  conduct  would  be  reported  and  punished; 
great  pains  were  taken  that  justice  should  be  honestly  admin- 
istered; and  in  all  cases  where  an  individual  felt  aggrieved  at 
a  sentence  an  appeal  lay  to  the  king.  On  such  occasions  the 
cause  was  re-tried  in  open  court,  at  the  gate,  or  in  the  great 


598 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCUT. 


[CII.  XXVIII 


square;  the  king,  the  Magi,  and  the  great  lords  hearing  it, 
while  the  people  were  also  present. '"  The  entire  result  seems 
to  have  been  that,  so  far  as  was  possible  under  a  despotism, 
oppression  was  prevented,  and  the  ordinary  citizen  had  rarely 
any  ground  for  serious  complaint. 

But  it  was  otherwise  with  the  highest  class  of  all.  The  near 
relations  of  the  monarch,  the  great  officers  of  the  court,  the 
generals  who  commanded  armies,  were  exposed  without  de- 
fence to  the  monarch's  caprice,  and  held  their  lives  and  liber- 
ties at  his  pleasure.  '^'  At  a  mere  word  or  sign  from  him  they 
were  arrested,  committed  to  prison,  tortured,  blinded,  or  put 
to  death,  no  trial  being  thought  necessary  where  the  king 
chose  to  pronounce  sentence.  The  intrinsic  evils  of  despotism 
thus  showed  themselves  even  under  the  comparatively  mild 
government  of  theSassanians;'^"  but  the  class  exposed  to  them 
was  a  small  one,  and  enjoyed  permanent  advantages,  which 
may  have  been  felt  as  some  conpensation  to  it  for  its  occasional 
sufferings. 


CH.  XXVIU.] 


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NOTES  TO  THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


PREFACE. 

*  Gibbon  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  ch. 
llf.  sub  fin.) 

'  The  ancient  writers  are  liberal  in 
their  admis.sions  of  this  fact.  (See  Jus- 
tin, xli.  1,  §  7;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  14;  Strab.  xi. 
9,  §2;  Plin.  H.  N.  v.  25;  and  Herodian, 
iv.  18.)  It  is  surprising  that  moderns 
have  so  generally  overlooked  these  pas- 
sages. 

'  History  and  Coinage  of  the  Parthi- 
ans,  published  at  Cork  in  1853. 

CHAPTER  I. 

1  The  limit,  eastward,  of  the  region 
here  described  is  the  course  of  the  Heri- 
rud,  which  pierces  the  mountain  chain 
in  long.  61°  E.  nearly. 

^  The  chief  of  these  are  known  as  the 
Daman-i-Koh,  the  Ala  Tagh,  and  the 
Jaghetai  or  Djuvein  mountains. 

'  See  Eraser's  Khorasan,  pp.  433,  434, 
598,  &c. 

*  Ibid.  pp.  380,  405,  406,  &c. 

*  Herodotus  unites  the  Parthiaus  with 
the  Chorasmians  (Kharesm),  the  Sog- 
dians,  and  the  Arians  (Heratees),  and 
again  witlx  the  Hyrcanians  (Ourghan), 
the  Saraiigians,  and  the  Thamanfeans 
(Herod,  iii.  93,  117).  In  the  Inscriptions 
of  Darius,  Parthia  is  connected  with  Sa- 
rangia.  Aria,  Sagartia(the  Iranic  desert), 
and  Hyrcania.  (See  the  author's  Herod- 
otus, vol.  iv.  p.  162,  2ud  edition.) 

'  Arrian,  Jixp.  Alex.  iii.  25. 

'  Isid.  Char.  Mans.  Parth.  %  12.  Com- 
pare Plin.  H.  N.  vi.  25. 

9  Hecatompylos.  (See  Polyb.  x.  25; 
Strab.  ix.  9,  §  1;  Diod.  Sic.  xvii.  57.) 

"  See  especially  Arrian,  E.xp.  Alex.  iii. 
2.3-25;  Plin.  //.  N.,  1.  s.  c;  and  Isid.  Cliar. 
§  10-12. 

'"  According  to  Strabo  (1.  s.  c),  the 
western  boundary  of  Parthia  was  at  the 
Caspian  Gates,  or  more  than  a  hundred 
miles  further  west  than  Damaghan;  but 
the  region  immediately  east  of  the  Gates 
is  more  commonly  assigned  either  to 
Hyrcania  or  to  Media. 

"  Shah  Abbas  the  First  transplanted 
about  15.000  Kurds  from  the  Turkish 
frontier  to  Kliorasiin,  and  .settled  them 
in  the  mountain  region,  that  they  might 
guard  it  ag.ainst  the  Usbegs  and  other 
Tatar  tribes  The  descendants  of  these 
colonists  slill  occujiy  most  of  tlie  range 
between  tJie  Mesti'ed  valley  and  the 
Kharesniian  desert 


"  Fraser,  Khorasan,  p.  554. 

>•  One  of  the  chief  of  these  conveys 
to  the  Tejend  the  waters  of  the  Tchesh- 
ma  Gilass,  a  small  lake  beautifully  clear, 
on  the  western  side  of  the  valley,  about 
twenty -five  miles  above  Meshed. 

'<  Vamb6ry,  Travels  in  Central  Asia, 
Map. 

■^  In  this  respect  the  mountains  oi 
ancient  Parthia  present  a  strong  con- 
trast to  those  of  the  neighboring  Hyrca- 
nia. The  banks  of  the  Gurghan  and 
Ettrek  are  richly  wooded  (Eraser,  pp. 
599-602;  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex.  iii.  23);  while 
the  mountains  of  eastern  Khorasan  are 
almost  destitute  of  trees.  (Fraser,  pp. 
407.  470,  &c.) 

'«  Even  where  the  surface  was  gravel, 
Mr.  Fraser  noticed  "  a  richer  stratum  be- 
neath" (p.  550). 

"  Kinnsir,  Persian  Empire,  pp.  185, 
186 ;  Fraser,  Khorasan,  pp.  405,  406. 

18  Plin.  H.  N.  vi.  25. 

'»  As  Bostam  (Fraser.  p.  336),  Khyia- 
bad  (Ibid.  p.  359),  and  others.  (Ibid.  pp. 
373.  374,  380,  &c.) 

30  Kinneir,  p.  185;  Fraser,  pp.343,  379, 
&c. 

21  The  name  "Atak"  is  given  to  the 
skirts  of  the  mountains  both  north  and 
south  of  Parthia.  It  is  the  Ttn-aniau 
correspondent  of  the  Arian  daman, 
which  has  the  same  application  and 
meaning.    (Fraser,  p.  245.) 

3"  Seeabove,  Mofe  15.  Yet  Strabo  says 
(xi.  9,  §  1)  that  it  was  "  thickly  wooded  " 

(Satreta). 

23  Fraser,  pp.  401,  405, 432, 438, 436,  &c. ; 
Kinneir,  p.  175. 

2*  Kinneir,  p.  185;  Fraser,  Appendix, 
p.  25. 

=<>  Fraser,  pp.  319,  .379,  &c. 

*"  So  Fraser,  p.  335.  Macdonald  Kin- 
neir, with  unwonted  extravagance, 
speaks  of  the  return  from  dry  grain  be^ 
ing  a  hundred,  and  from  rice  four  hun- 
drnd  fold  I     (Persian  Empire,  p.  178.) 

"   Fraser,  pp.  388  and  406. 

"  Kinneir,  p.  184;  Fraser,  pp.  367,  .371, 
413.  421,  &c. 

''''  On  the  turquoise  mines  of  Xtsha- 
pur,  see  Fraser,  ch.  xvi.  pp.  407-117. 

'"  See  the  passage  quoted  at  the  head 
of  the  chapter. 

*i  Fraser,  Appendix,  p.  134. 

"  Ibid.  i>p.  3i)3.  3|:l  and  .581. 

"  Ibi.:    pp.  4.'i6,  .5."i2,  and  .554. 

'<  Kiuutir,  i».  170. 


601i 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  II. 


38  Fraser,  p.  557. 

s*  VambSry  calls  it  "  that  immense  aw- 
ful desert  where  the  traveller  may  wan- 
der about  for  weeks  and  weeks  without 
finding  a  drop  of  sweet  water,  or  the 
shelter  of  a  singletree"  (Travels,  p.  3cy). 
MouraviefEsays:  "  This  country  exhibits 
the  image  of  death,  or  rather  of  the 
desolation  left  behind  by  a  great  convul- 
sion of  nature.  Neither  birds  nor  quad- 
rupeds are  found  in  it:  no  verdure  nor 
vegetation  cheers  the  sight,  except  here 
and  there  at  long  intervals  some  spots 
on  which  there  grow  a  few  stunted 
shrubs."  (See  De  Hell's  Travels  in  the 
Steppes  of  the  Caspian  Sea,  p.  326,  E  T.) 

3'  M.  Vamb6ry  reckons  the  entire 
Turkoman  population  south  of  the  Oxus 
from  the  Caspian  to  Balkh  at  196.500 
tents,  or  982,500  souls.  (Travels,  p.  309.) 
Chorasmia  was  not  more  than  about 
one-half  of  this  region. 

38  In  the  Behisiun  Inscription  Darius 
evidently  includes  Margiana  (Margush) 
in  Bactria  (col.  iii.  par.  3,  4).  Strabo, 
however  (xi.  10,  §  2),  Ptolemy  (vi.  11), 
and  Isidore  (Mans.  Parth.  §  14)  make  it 
a  separate  countrj'. 

3'  See  the  Map  to  Vamb6ry's  Travels. 

*"  Strab.  xi.  10.  §  2.  There  seems  no 
reason  to  doubt  this  statement,  though 
Mr.  Fraser  supposes  that  the  irrigation 
could  never  have  been  carried  to  a  much 
greater  distance  than  twelve  or  fourteen 
miles.     (Khorasan,  App.  p.  56.) 

*'  Strab.  1.  s.  c. 

*^  SeeFerrier,  Caravan  Journeys,  pp. 
139,  165;  Fraser,  Khorasan,  App.  pp.  SO- 
BS; Vamb^ry,  pp.  257-270. 

*'  Strabo  gives  Aria  a  length  of  2,000 
stades  (230  miles),  and  a  breadth  of  300 
stades  (35  miles).  This  would  make  its 
area  about  8,000  square  miles,  or  less 
than  one-third  of  the  area  of  Parthia 
(see  text,  p.  2). 

**  Ferrier,  Caravan  Jourrteys,  pp.  273, 
274. 

<*  Fraser,  p.  246,  and  App.  p.  24. 

••«  Vamb6ry,  p.  288. 

*"<  Herod,  vii.  85.  If  the  Sagartians 
used  the  lasso  in  war,  we  may  he  sure 
that,  like  the  inhabitants  of  the  Pampas, 
they  employed  it  also  in  peace,  to  cap- 
ture the  animals  which  they  hunted. 

<"  Eiglit  thousand  is  the  largest  num- 
ber which  we  find  brought  into  the  field 
by  the  Sagartians.    (Herod.  1.  s.  c.) 

<»  See  text,  p.  2. 

'•  See  the  graphic  descriptions  of  Mr. 
Fraser  (Khorasan,  pp.  599,  600,  608,  &c.) 

»>  Ibid.  p.  616. 

"'  Vamb^ry,  p.  72. 

•»  "XiiioSpa  ev6ai>u)r  (Strab.  xi.  7,  §  2). 
According  to  this  writer,  a  single  vine  in 
Hyrcania  produced  a  metretes  (nine  gal- 
lons) of  wine,  a  single  fig-tree  produced 
Bixty  medimni  (ninety  bushels)  of  figs, 
and  corn  did  not  require  to  be  sown,  but 
(sprang  from  the  casual  droppings  of  the 
last  year's  crop. 

**  When  Hyrcania  is  called  by  Strabo 
"large"  (nofjirj),  he  intends  to  comxiare 


it,  not  with  Parthia,  but  with  the  small 
districts  occupied  by  separate  tribes 
along  the  south  coast  of  the  Caspian  Sea 
(Strabo,  xi.  7,  §  1,  2i.  A  comparison  of 
it  with  Parthia  is  difticult,  owing  to  the 
uncertainty  of  their  respective  bounda- 
ries ;  but  if  we  regard  the  line  of  demar- 
cation as  running  along  the  mountains 
south  of  the  Gurglian,  thence  passing 
to  the  Alatagh,  and  proceeding  along 
the  water-shed  south  of  Knoshan  to  tha 
Kurdish  range  about  Mohammedabad, 
the  proportions  of  the  two  will  be  as 
stated  in  the  sext. 

'''>  See  Justin,  xli.  1.  •'  Hi  et  Assyrio- 
rum  et  IMedorum  temporibvis  inter  Ori- 
entis  populos  obscurissimi  fuere.  Pos- 
tea  quoque  cum  imperium  Orientis  a 
Medis  ad  Persas  translatum  est,  veluti 
valgus  sine  nomine,  prseda  victorum 
fuere.  Postremo  Macedonibus,  triumph- 
ato  Oriente,  servierunt:  ut  cuivis  nu'rum 
videatur  ad  tantam  eosfelicitatem  pro- 
vectos,  ut  iniperent  gentibus,  sub  qua- 
rum  imperio  veluti  servile  vulgus  fuere." 

CHAPTER  n. 

1  Diodorus  enumerates  the  Parthians 
among  the  nations  conquered  by  Ninus 
(ii.  2.  §  3),  and  also  says  that  in  the  lime 
of  Cyaxares  they  revolted  from  the 
Medes  and  placed  themselves  under 
Scythian  protection.  But  no  value  can 
be  set  upon  these  stories,  which  he 
adopted  from  the  untrustworthy  Cte- 
sias. 

2  See  Behist.  Ins.  col.  1.  par.  6,  and 
Kakhsh-i-Evstani  Ins.  par.  3. 

3  See  the  great  inscription  of  Darius 
at  Persepolis,  par.  2,  §  3. 

*  Behist.  Ins.  col.  ii.  par.  16,  and  col. 
iii.  par.  1. 

6  Fr.  173. 

«  Herod,  iii.  93. 

'  Ibid.  vii.  66.    Compare  chap.  64. 

8  Ibid.  iii.  117. 

"  As  Trogus  Pompeius,  who  is  followed 
by  .Tustiu  (xli.  1). 

1"  Strab.  xi.  9.  §  3.    Compare  xi.  8,  §  2. 

"  Arrian,  Fr.  1. 

12  See  Herod,  ii.  103. 

13  Diod.  ic.  Si.  55,  §  4. 

i<  Herod,  ii.  104;  Diod.  Sic.  1.  s.  c. 

15  John  of  Malala  knows  the  number 
of  the  colonists  (15.000),  tliat  they  were 
all  youths,  and  all  warriors  (p.  26;  ed. 
Niebuhr). 

1 "  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  3.  Of/  ttolw  5'  wnoAoyeiTai 
Aaa9    cXfal    Ttva^    riov   VTrep    Trj<;    Mai(ijTtSo9 

i'  Daha?  or  Dai  are  found  in  a  great 
variety  of  places,  as  in  Persia  Proper 
(Herod,  i.  125),  in  Samaria  (Ezr.  iv.  9),  in 
Thrace  (Thnc.  ii.  96).  in  the  tract  east  of 
the  Caspian  (Strab.  Jx.  8,  §  2).  &c.  It  is 
not  probable  that  they  were  all  really 
the  same  people. 

18  The  Gieeks  did  not  come  into  con- 
tact with  the  Pfirfhians  till  B.C.  331. 
Probably'  thej'  did  not  carp  much  to  in- 
quire into  their  origin  till  atiw  «,o, 
255. 


en.  in.] 


TUB  SIXTH  MONAECHT. 


603 


"  .Tustin,  xli.  1;  Eustath.  ad  Dionys. 
Per.  1.  104;. 

20Strab.   xi.   9.    g    2.      Ta    ee-q    T<i    e'xovTa 

TToAii  ^tei/  TO  fidp^apov  Koi  to  Stut^iKof.  Com- 
pare Plin.  H.  N.  vi.  25. 

'"Justin,  xli.  2.  "Sermo  his  inter 
Seythicum  Medicumque  medius,  et  ex 
utrisque  mixtus." 

22  Ibid.  ■'  Armorum  patrius  ac  Scythi- 
cus  mos." 

23  strabo  calls  the  Massagretae  Scyths 
(xi.  8,  §  2).  Pliny  not  only  includes  under 
the  name  all  the  tribes  between  Arme- 
nia and  Northern  India  (H.  N.  vi.  25),  but 
regards  it  as  having  originally  extended 
to  the  Sarmatians  and  the  Germans  (ib. 
iv.  81).  According  to  Strabo,  some  of 
the  older  Greek  geographers  called  all 
the  nations  of  the  north  either  Scythians 
or  Celto-Scythians  (xi.  6,  §  2). 

^*  See  the  article  on  Parthia  in  Dr. 
Smith's  Dictionary  of  Greek  and  Roman 
Geograjihy. 

26  Tlie  Etruscans  in  Italy,  the  Galatians 
in  Asia  Minor,  the  Basques  in  Spain,  are 
cases  in  point.  It  would  be  easy  to  ad- 
duee  others. 

2«  Priapatius  has  indeed  been  explain- 
ed as  equivalent  to  the  ZeniUc  Frijapai- 
tis,  "  lover  of  his  father"  (Lassen,  In- 
dische  Alterthniiishunde.  vol.  it.  p.  285, 
note  3).  But  the  etymology  is  uncer- 
tain. 

2T  Julian,  Or.  de  Conatant.  gest.  ii.  p. 
63,  A. 

28  See  Ritter's  Erdkunde,  vol.  viii.  p. 
56. 

28  .Justin  says  that  the  word  "Parthi  " 
meant  "  exiles"  in  the  Scythic  speech 
(xli.  1),  but  this  derivation  assumes  the 
proper  original  form  of  the  name  to  be 
Parada  (Sanskrit  jxirdes,  =  "of  an- 
other country"),  whereas  the  earliest 
and  probably  most  correct  form  is 
Parthiva.  (Compare  Greek  Uapdvjji'r] 
and  napBvaloi..)  Lassen  translates  the 
word  "Parthi"  by  "those  who  march 
over  the  borders"  "(/»id.  Alt.  1.  s.  c),  but 
gives  explanation  of  his  etymology.  Am- 
mianns  tells  us  that  a  commander  of  tlie 
cavalry  was  called  i-ita.ra  by  the  Par- 
thians;  but  Hesycliius  alters  both  the 
word  and  the  meaning,  making  the 
former  /3i'<7Taf .  and  the  latter  "  king." 

5°  The  Persian  form  seems  to  have 
been  gnrdci.  as  in  Parsagarda  (Plin.  H. 
N.  vi.  26),  which  became  corrupted  into 
Pasargadaa.  The  Parthian  is,  like  the 
Armenian,  certa,  as  in  Vologesocerta 
(ib.  1.  s.  c). 

"Justin,  xli.  3.  "  Equis  omni  tem- 
pore vectantur:  illis  bella,  illis  corivivia. 
illis  publica  ac  privata  negotia  oheunt." 
Compare  Vamb6rv's  account  of  the 
modern  Usbegs  ( Trn  rel.'i  in  Central  Asia, 
p.  845  and  plate  opjjosite). 

32  Ibid.     "In  cibum  parci.^' 

"  Plin.  H.  N.  xiv.  22. 

'<  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "  Semper  aut  in  ex- 
ternosaut  in  domesticos  motus  inquieti; 
nntnra  taciti." 

3"  Ibid.  xli.  2.    Compare  the  case  of 


the  Mongols,  where  the  "  Golden  Horde" 
alone  was  free. 

38  Plin.  H.  y.  vi.  2.5. 

"  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  34L 
(Smith's  edition.) 

38  Lectures  on  Roman  Histon/,  vol.  ill. 
p.  276;  E.  T. 

3i>  On  the  modern  Tadjiks,  the  settled 
Iranian  population  of  Bokhara  and  Ko- 
kand, seeVamb6ry's  Travels,  pp.  367. 
381.  &c. 

■•"TDiod.  Sic.  ii.  2.  §  3;  34,  §  1  and  §  6. 

■"  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
234  and  428;  2nd  ed. 

12  Herod,  i.  1.53. 

<3  Herod,  i.  177.  Ta  fiev  vw  Karui  ti)? 
'' A<Ttrj<;'* ApwoLyo^  dudaTaTa  CTrotec  Ta  6e  ai'tti 
auT^s  aiiTos  KOpos  irdv  fOvoi  Kara- 
CT  pe<l>6  ixe  foi    Kal    oiiSev  n  apifd . 

■'■' Arrian,  Fxp.  Al.  iii.  25;  Q.  Curt. 
Hi.'<t.  Al.  vi.  2. 

<5  Herod,  iii.  93. 

■""Strab.  xi.  9,  §  1.  ^uvcTtAei  ixerd  Tui» 
Ypxaviiiv  Kara  Ta  IlepoiKd. 

■"  See  text,  p.  8. 

■•8  Behist.  Ins.  col.  ii.  par.  2.  Compare 
Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  411-413; 
2nd  ed. 

*»  Arrian,  iii.  8;  Q.  Curt.  iv.  12. 

CHAPTER  III. 

•  Seleucus  is  rarely  mentioned  by  Ar- 
rian. His  name  occurs  only  in  v.  13,  16; 
vii.  4  and  26. 

2  See  Thirlwall,  Hist,  of  Greece,  vol. 
vii.  pp  139,  140;  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece, 
vol.  viii.  p.  517. 

3  Thirlwall,  vol.  vii.  p.  245. 

•  Ibid.  p.  ,308. 

6  Thirlwall,  vol.  vii.  p.  401;  Grote,  vol. 
viii.  p.  .576. 

«  Bishop  Thirlwall  notes  that  Armenia, 
shortly  before  the  battle  of  Ipsus,  was 
independent  under  Ardoates,  a  native 
king  (vol.  vii.  p.  402.  and  compare  Diod. 
Sic.  xxxi.  19.  §  ,5),  and  suggests  that  after 
Ipsus  Seleucus  was  too  much  engaged 
with  other  affaii's  to  bring  Armenia  un 
der.  But  either  Seleucus  or  one  of  his 
early  successors  must  have  reconquered 
Armenia,  for  it  did  not  permanently  es- 
tablish its  independence  till  B.C.  190. 
(Strab.  xi.  14,  §  .5.) 

'  Its  limits  eastward  are  somewhat 
douhtfiU.  Seleucus  appears  to  have 
ceded  a  portion,  at  any  rate,  of  his  In- 
dian possessions  to  Sandracottus  before 
Ipsus.     (Thirlwall,  vol.  vii.  p.  395.') 

8  Saudracottus  presented  Seleucus  with 
.500  of  these  animals  (Strab.  xv.  2,  §  9). 
They  were  largely  used  both  by  him  and 
by  Ills  successors  in  their  wars. 

•  See.  for  details  of  the  localitiea.  An- 
cient Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  158-162,  2nd 
edit. 

>"  Thirlwall,  Hist,  of  Greece,  toI.  vit 
p.  120. 

"  This  is  rather  indicated  bv  the  pains 
which  he  took  to  improve  Babvlon  (Arr. 
E.rp.  Al.  vll.  17.  10,  21)  than  distinctly 
declared  by  any  important  authorities. 
U  has  been  recigiiized  as  tdleiably  cer> 


604 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHT. 


[CH.  HI. 


tain  by  modem  writers.   (See  Dr.  Smith's 
Diet,  of  Biography,  vol.  i.  p.  VZ2,  &c. 

12  Strab.  xvl.  1,  f  5;  Plin.  H.  N.  vi.  26. 

isStrab.  xvi.  2,  §4. 

1*  On  the  views  and  intentions  of  Alex- 
ander, see  the  excellent  remarks  of 
Bishop  Thirlwall  {History  of  Greece,  vol. 
vii.  pp.  119-125). 

J«  See  text.  p.  25. 

'^Diod.  Sic.  xxi.  5. 

1'  Pausan.  i  7.  §  .3. 

18  On  this  war,  see  Niebuhr,  Lectures 
on  And.  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  286,  E.  T. 

i»  Memnon,  De  rebus  Heracl.  xx.  3. 
^      20  Ibid.  xvi. 

21  Antiochus  I.  obtained  his  name  of 
Holer  (Saviour)  from  a  victory  over  the 
Gauls  (Appian,  Syriaca,  p.  130,  C.)  He 
was  slain  in  a  battle  against  the  same 
enemy  (Phylarch.  ap.  Plin.  H.  N.  viii. 
■12;  ^lian,  H.  An.  vi.  44). 

22  Strab.  xiii.  4,  §  2. 

2s  Appian,  Syr.  p.  130,  D. 

24  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  2. 

25  The  title  was  conferred  by  the  Mile- 
sians on  the  expulsion  of  Timarchus. 
(See  above,  note  21.) 

2*  See  Niebuhr"s  Lectures,  vol.  iii.  pp. 
286.  287;  and  compare  Athen.  Deipno- 
soph.  ii.  p.  45;  x.  p.  438;  Ilieronym.  ad. 
Dan.  xi.  &c. 

27  Justin  gives  the  name  as  Theodotus 
(Justin,  xli.  4);  but  Diodotus,  which  is 
the  form  used  by  Strabo  (xi.  9,  §  3),  ap- 
pears upon  the  Bactrian  coins  [PL  1,  Fig. 
1]  (Lasiaen,  Indische  Altherthumsk.  vol. 
ii.  p.  284;  Num.  Chr.  New  Series,  vol. 
viii.  p.  278). 

28  Justin's  "thousand  Bactrian  cities" 
(xli.  1)  are  no  doubt  an  exaggeration, 
but  they  indicate  a  truth — that  the  coun- 
try was  populous  and  flourishing. 

28  The  Bactrians  were  among  the  na- 
tions selected  by  Mardonius  to  continue 
the  struggle  with  the  Greeks  when  the 
bulk  of  Xerxes'  army  returned  home 
(Herod,  viii.  113).  They  fought  well  at 
Arbela  (Arr.  Exp.  Al.  iii.  13;  Q.  Curt.  iv. 
15,  §  18).  and  offered  a  strenuous  resist- 
ance to  ."Vlexander  (.Arr.  iv.  ]-22). 

""  Bactria  was  made  generally  a  soil; 
of  roj'al  appanage.  It  was  conferred  by 
Gyrus  on  his  second  son.  Smerdis  (Ctes. 
Exc.  Pers.  S  8).  In  the  reign  of  Xerxes 
it  was  first  held  by  his  brother.  Masistes 
(Herod,  ix.  113).  and  afterwards  by  an- 
other brother,  Hystaspes  (Diod.  Sic.  xi. 
69). 

"  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p. 
380.  2nd  edit. 

'2  It  is  true  that  the  Parthians  used  the 
Greek  language  on  their  coins  and  for 
inscriptions,  and  also  that  some  of  their 
kings  took  the  title  of  ^lAeAATji/.  Still  I 
believe  the  statement  in  the  text  to  be  a 
correct  one.  It  applies  especially  to  the 
early  kingdom— from  B.C.  250  to  b.c.  127. 

'3  Strabo  (xi.  9.  §  3)  mentions  this  view, 
but  implies  his  own  dissent  from  it. 

"  .\rv.  Fr.  1.  Compare  Syncell.  p.  284, 
B.  and  Zosimus.  i.  18.  The  latter  says: 
'ApadKTjf  6  IlapSuaiot,  Sia.  ttji'  eij  rbv  ofitA- 


(f)OV  TripiSaTr)!"  li^piv  ayavaKTrjaa^,  n6\efio9 
Trpb?  Tov  'A;'Ti6;^ou  traTpdiriqi'  apajuei'O?,  a'tri' 
av  e6u>Ke  TOis  IlapOvaioii;  eK^aAoGcrt  MaKe- 
5ova^,  et5  eaurou?  rrjv  dp\r]i'  TreptaT^aatt 

'sstrab.  xi.  9,  §2. 

^'  Justin,  xli.  4. 

3'  See  text,  p.  10. 

38  Frolich,  Annales  Regum  Syriee,  p. 
26;  Heeren,  Manual  of  Ancient  History, 
p.  299,  E.  T.  Mr.  P.  Smith  (Ancient  His- 
tory, vol.  ii.  p.  92),  and  Mr.  Lindsay 
(History  and  Coinage  of  the  Parthians, 
p.  4),  taking  the  later  part  of  the  same 
Olympic  year,  make  the  Bactrian  king- 
dom to  have  been  founded  in  b  c.  255. 

Major  Cunningham  has  recently  ar- 
gued for  the  low  date  of  b.c.  246  (Num. 
Chron.  New  Series,  vol.  vii.  pp.  261- 
265);  by  which  the  Bactrian  revolt  is 
made  to  fall  four  years  later  than  the 
Parthian.  But  Strabo,  whom  he  con- 
fesses to  be  the  main  authority,  is  clear 
that  Bactria  set  the  example  of  revolt, 
which  Parthia  followed  (Geograph.  xi.  9, 
§  2  and  §  3). 

'^  See  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  p.  216, 
n.  1. 

4"  Justin  says,  after  speaking  of  the 
Parthian  revolt:  '''Eodein  tempore,  etiam 
Theodotus,  mille  urbium  Bactrianaruia 
praefectus.  deficit "  (xli.  4). 

4' Strabo  says:  IIpijToi'  p.iv  t-^v  Bax- 
Tpt  avT]v  dTT€(XTr}(7av  ot  TTCTrtcTTev/LteVot  .  .  . 
ineLT  'ApcraKTjs  ■  ■  .  inrf\6ev  ctti  ttji' 
IlapBvaiav  Kal  €Kpa.T-q<Tev  aiiTyjs  This  au- 
thority is  followed  by  Droj-sen  (Ge- 
schichte  des  Helhnisnius,  vol.  ii.  §  331), 
Lassen  (Indische  Alterthumskunde,  vol. 
ii.  p.  284),  Mr.  P.  Smith  (Ancient  History, 
vol.  u.  pp.  91.  92),  and  most  moderns. 

42  Justin  places  it  in  the  consulship  of 
L.  ManliusVulsoandM.  Atilius Regulus, 
which  was  b  c.  256.  But  M.  Atihus  is 
probably  an  error  for  C.  Atilius,  who 
was  consul  with  L.  Manlius  Yulso  in  b.c. 
250.  Eusebius  distinctly  places  the  re- 
volt of  the  Parthians  in  this  year  ( Chron. 
Can.  ii.  p.  3.52);  and  Moses  of  Chorene 
exactly  agrees,  when  he  assigns  it  to  the 
eleventh  year  of  Antiochus  Theus. 
(Hist.  Arnien.  ii.  1,  ad  fin.)  Compare 
Samuel  Aniens.  Sum.  Temp.  i.  7,  §  13. 

4  3  See  text.  p.  23. 

**  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  2.  Kar'  apxd^  y-fv  olv 
aaOei'/)^  r)  Siano\eixwv  Trpbs  Toiis  dtpaipeOepTai 
Tr)v  ;^(upav. 

4  5  Q.  Curt.  vi.  2. 

48  Suidas  ad  voc.  *Apo-aK)7s.  Syneellus 
indicates  that  his  death  was  violent  (vol. 
i.  p.  .540). 

4'  See  Justin,  xli.  5;  Strab.  xv.  1,  §  36; 
Mos.  Chor.  ii.  1;  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6,  &c. 

48  All  the  Parthian  coins  bear  the  name 
of  Arsaces.  A  few  comparatively  have 
the  special  name  of  the  monarch  in  ad- 
dition. (See  CUnton.  F.  R.  vol.  ii.  p.  252; 
Lindsay,  History  of  the  Parthians,  pp. 
134-163,  and  plates  1-10.)  In  the  public 
documents  also  it  would  seem  that  the 
special  designation  of  the  monarch  was 
omitted  (Dio  Cass.  Ixvi.  11). 

4"  The  practice  is  not  that  of  tke  Pto- 


CH.  IV.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONAUCHY. 


mi 


lemies,  who  bore  the  name  of  Ptolemy 
as  a  family  appellation,  and  took  some 
further  designation  for  distinction's 
sake. 

*>"  Syncellus  (p.  284,  B)  says  37  years; 
but  the  synchronisms  in  the  Parthian 
history  scarcely  allow  so  much. 

"  As  by  Justin,  Ammianus  (1.  s.  c), 
and  others. 

'^  See  the  inscription  of  Adule  (Bockh, 
Corp.  Iiiscr.  Gr.  vol.  iii.  p.  509). 

'3  Justin,  xli.  4.  (On  the  situation  and 
general  character  of  Hyrcania,  see  eh. 
i.  p.  12.) 

"  Ibid. 

'5  Strab.  xi.  8,  §  8.  'Apcraicr)?  toi'  KaAAt- 
viKOV  i^ivytav  SeAeuKOi'  ei?  Toi/s  "Atrn-acrtdKas 
ixuiprjae.  Major  Cunningham  place.s  the 
flight  of  Tiridates  in  b.c.  246,  the  first 
year  of  Callinicus  (Num.  Chron.  New- 
Series,  vol  ix.  p.  .S3);  but  there  seems  to 
be  no  reason  for  supposing  that  tliat 
monarch  threatened  the  eastern  prov- 
inces until  B.C.  237,  his  tenth  year,  nor 
any  probability  that  Tiridates  would  de- 
sert his  kingdom  until  the  Syrian  mon- 
arch actuallj'  made  his  expedition. 

"  On  the  character  and  geographical 
position  of  the  Aspasiacae,  see  Polyb.  x. 
47.  This  writer  assigns  them  th,e  whole 
region  between  the  Oxus  and  the  Tanais; 
but  such  an  extension  of  their  country 
can  only  have  rested  on  conjecture. 
What  Polybius  kneio  was  that  they 
dwelt  north  of  the  0.^us,  which  they 
were  in  the  habit  of  crossing  to  make 
raids  into  Hyrcania. 

"Justin,  1.  s.  c:  "  Sed  cito,  mort/ 
Tlieodoti  metu  liberatus,  cum  filio  ejur 
— et  ipso  Theodoto— fijedus  ac  pace;u 
fecit;  nee  multo  post  cum  Seleuco  rege, 
ad  defectores  persequendos  veuieute, 
I'ongressus  victor  fuit."  Major  Cun- 
ningham concludes,  on  the  streugti?  of  a 
fragment  of  Posidonius  (ap.  ^Hhen. 
Deipn.  iv.  p.  153,  A),  that  Seleuc.s  was 
not  only  defeated  by  Tiridates,  b'.t  made 
prisoner  (Nam.  Chron.  vol.  ix.  p.  34). 
But  this  would  make  Posidonius  ex- 
pressly contradict  Justin,  who  says  that 
beleucus  after  his  defeat  was  recalled 
to  his  own  kingdom  by  f'-esh  troubles. 
(See  note  1  on  tlie  next  chapter.)  Others, 
as  Vaillant,  Clinton,  aij.l  H.  H.Wilson, 
have  concluded  from  the  fragment  of 
I'osidonius  that  Callinicus  must  have 
subsequently  made  a  second  expedition 
against  the  Partblans,  and  have  then 
been  made  prisoner— an  expedition  of 
which  the  Posidonian  fragment  is  the 
only  trace.  But  it  has  been  well  pointed 
out  by  Mr.  Bunbury  that  that  fragment 
belongs  to  the  history,  not  of  Seleucus 
Callinicus,  but  of  Seleucus,  the  eldest 
son  of  AntiochusSidetes,  who  was  takea 
prisoner  by  Phraates  II.  in  B.C.  129 
{Diet,  of  Greek  and  Komnn  Biography, 
vol.  iii.  p.  774).  The  sixteenth  book  of 
Posidonius,  which  contained  the  pas- 
sage, treated  of  this  period,  and  the 
passage  ilself,  which  speaks  of  a  Syrian 
expuilitioa  agaiusi  Media,  is  inappro- 


priate to  the  time  of  Tiridates.  The  olj 
jection  taken  to  Mr.  Bimbury's  view, 
that  Seleucus  is  called  "king"  in  the 
passage,  has  no  force.  The  word  ,8acrcAfus 
is  constantly  applied  to  princes  by  the 
Greek  writers;  and,  moreover,  Seleucus, 
the  elde.st  surviving  son  of  Callinicus 
(Euseb.  Chron.  Can.  i.  40,  §  19),  would 
have  been  de  jure  ' '  king' '  on  his  father's 
death. 

58  '•  Veiut  initium  libertatis. "  (Justin, 
xli.  4,  ad  fill.) 

s'See  text,  pp.  2  and  19.  The  con- 
quest of  Hyrcania  may  liave  rai.sed  the 
Parthian  territory  froiu  ;i3,0'jO  to  50,000 
square  miles. 

•°  Justin,  no  doubt,  reports  the  actual 
words  of  Trogus  wheu  he  says  (1.  s.  c), 
"  quem  diem  Pa^thi  exiude  soleuneui, 
velut  initium  libsftatis,  observant." 

CHAPTER  rv. 

>  Justin,  yl).  5.  "  Revocato  Seleuc* 
novis  motibiiL  in  .\siain." 

2  See  note  'iT,  Chapter  III. 

3  Justin, '..  s.  c.  "  Dato  la.vamento,  reg. 
num  Pryr'jhicum  format,  militeni  legit, 
castella  munit,  civitates  firmat;  urbeni 
quoquf.  nomine  Daram  in  nionte  Zapa- 
orten'^n  condit;  cujus  loci  ea  conditio 
est,  ut  neque  munitius  quidquam  esse, 
Hdque  amcjenius  possit.  Ita  enim  et 
P'aeruptis  rupibus  uiuiiquo  cingitur,  ut 
f  utela  l(Mu  nullis  deftMisoribus  egeat;  et 
soli  circuuijacentis  tanta  ubertas  est,  ut 
propriisopibusexpleatur.  Jam  fontimn 
ac  sylvarum  ea  copia  est,  utet  aquarum 
abnndantia  irrigetur,  et  venationum  vo- 
luptatil)us  exornetur." 

«  See  Plin.  //.  J\^.  vi.  16.  The  double 
resemblance  of  Apavortene  (Zapavor- 
tene  iu  one  !\IS.)  to  Zapaortenon,  and 
of  Dareium  to  Dara,  is  enough  to  show 
that  Pliny  and  Justin  are  speaking  of 
the  same  locality.  The  description  of 
Dareium  in  Pliny  as  "  fertilitatis  inclutas 
locus"  is  a  confirmation,  if  one  were 
needed. 

^  This  emplacement  depends  especially 
on  the  identification  of  Justin's  Zapaor- 
tenon with  the  Apavarctica  of  Isidore 
of  Charax  (^fans.  Parth.  §  13),  which 
lav  between  Parthyene  and  Margiana. 

•  See  Polyb.  x.  28,  §  7;  Plin.  H.  N.  vi. 
15;  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  1. 

''  See  Vaillant,  Hiiit.  Arsacid.  p.  16; 
Heeren,  Manual,  p.  300.  E.  T. ;  Plate  in 
Smith's  Diet,  of  (Ik.  and  Rom.  Biog- 
raphi/,  vol.  i.  p.  ^'>i:  Lin<Isay,  Ifistory 
and  Coinage  of  the  Parthians,  p.  4;  ic. 
Mr.  Clinton  questions  the  existence  of 
any  such  king  (F.  li.  vol.  ii.  p.  241,  note 
•);"but  the  name  is  given  in  the  Epitonm 
of  Trogus  Pompeius.  and  the  actions  are 
those  wrongly  assigned  by  Mr.  Clinton 
to  Tiridates. 

'  This  is  implied  in  the  account  of  Po- 
lybius, esjiecially  in  the  fact  recorded, 
tnat  Antioohus,  in  reoccupving  the 
place,  plundered  it  (Polyb.  x.  27.  §  13). 

"  .Tuslin  (.\li  .")t  niakt"<  the  inunber  of 
his  troops  100,000  foot  and  20,000  horsey 


B06 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  :v. 


which  is  not  at  all  an  extravagant  esti- 
mate. 

'"This  is  the  easiest  pass  from  Meso- 
potamia into  Media,  and  the  one  which 
is  open  the  earliest. 

11  ■ATci'xto'To?.    Polyb.  X.  27,  §  6. 

12  •YirovoiJ.oL.  Polyb.  X.  28,  §  2.  On  the 
extensive  use  of  kanats  in  Persia,  see 
text.  p.  4. 

1'  Polyb.  (1.  S.  C.)  4>peaTi'a5  ayi'Oov/ueVas 
Tois  aTrei'pois. 

1*  Polyb  X.  28,  §  5.  Compare  the  con- 
duct of  the  European  Scyths  at  the  time 
of  the  invasion  of  their  country  by  Da- 
rius (Herod,  iv.  120). 

"Polyb.  X  28,  §6. 

"Ibid.  §7. 

"  Ibid.  X.  29,  §  1. 

1*  Aid    xapaBpa';    ;^ei^appou.      (lb.    X.    30, 

§  2.)  The  situation  of  the  Parthian  and 
Hyrcanian  towns  is,  unfortunately,  still 
so  uncertain  that  it  is  impossible  to  fol- 
low the  march  of  Antiochus  upon  the 
map.  Hecatompylos  probably  lay  be- 
tween the  Jaghetai  and  the  Alatagh; 
and  it  was  this  latter  chain  which  An- 
tiochus had  to  cross  in  order  to  enter 
Hyicania.  Polybius  calls  it  Mount  La- 
bus. 

1'  As  Tambraca  and  Syrinx. 

'"'Justin,  xli  5:  "  Adversus  Antiochum 
Seleuci  filium  mira  viriuie  pugnavlt." 

21  The  expression  used  by  Justin— "ad 
postremum  in  societatem  ejus  (sc.  An- 
tiochi)  adsumptus  est  " — seems  to  imply 
something  more  ihan  a  mere  peace. 

22  Polyb.  xi.  34,  §  9, 10.  The  terms  were 
the  following:  — Euthydemus  supplied 
Antiochus  with  pi'ovisions  for  his  army, 
and  surrendered  to  him  all  his  elephants. 
Antiochus  allowed  Euthydemus  to  re- 
tain his  government,  and  recognized  his 
title  of  "king."  A  marriage  was  ar- 
ranged between  , Demetrius,  the  eldest 
son  of  Euthydemus,  and  a  daughter  of 
Antiochus.  probably  not  of  marriage- 
able age.  Finall}-,  an  alliance,  offensive 
and  defensive  (avfxnaxia),  was  concluded 
between  the  two  powers.  These  favor- 
able terms  wei'e  granted  to  the  Bactrian 
monarch,  chiefly  on  account  of  his  rep- 
resentations that  a  strong  Bactria  was 

*  needed  in  order  to  keep  in  check  the 
northern  nomads,  who  were  continually 
threatening  an  irruption , which ,  if  it  once 
took  place,  would  barbarize  the  whole 
country.  This  is  the  first  we  hear  of  an 
aggressive  attitude  being  assumed  by 
the  Scythic  hordes  across  the  Jaxartes. 
23Appian,   Syriac.  p.   86  a.    "Ai'tioxos 

.  .  .  iiT^a\u3V  e?  Mrj6iai'  re  Ka\  TIap9vTqvy}P, 
Kat  erepa  cOurj  dt^tcTTa/xei'a  ert  7rp6  avTov, 
Kal   TToAAd  Spdtratiy  Kal   /Lieya?  ' Ai'Tiox_o<;  eirt- 

icArjeec?.    Compare  Polyb.  xi.  34,  §  16. 

24  Justin,  xh.  5. 

26  See  text,  p.  25. 

2'  On  the  Greek  cities  founded  by  Alex- 
ander in  Bactria,  see  Strabo,  xi.  11,  §  4; 
in  Sogdiana,  see  Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  iv.  3, 
ad  fln.;  in  the  Paropamisus,  ib.  iv.  22; 
on  the  Indus  and  its  tributaries,  Ktrab. 
XV.  2,  S  9;  Arrian,  v.  19;  vi.  15,  81,  &C. 


2'  That  the  Hindoo  civilization  of  the 
time  was  not  altogether  contemptible  is 
shown  by  Lassen  in  the  second  book  of 
his  Inclische  Alierthumskunde  (vol.  ii. 
pp.  1-111). 

28  See  especially  the  account  of  Justin, 
XV.  4,  §  12-19.  ■'  Transitum  delude  in  In- 
dia fecit,  quae  post  mortem  Alexandri, 
veluti  cervicibus  jugo  servitutis  excusso, 
preefeetos  ejus  occiderat.  Auctor  liber- 
tatis  Sandrocottus  fuerat;  sed  titulum 
libertatis  post  victoriam  in  servitutem 
verterat;  siquidem  occupato  regno, 
populum,  quem  ab  externa  dominatione 
vindicaverat,  ipse  servitio  premebat." 

29  Palibothra,  on  the  Ganges,  is  made 
the  head  of  the  kingdom  of  Sandracot- 
tus  by  Strabo.  who  follows  the  eye-wit- 
ness, Megasthenes  (xv.  1,  §  36).  Plutarch 
(Vit.  Alex.  §  62)  extends  the  Prsesian  In- 
dians, over  whom  he  ruled,  to  the  "  A  Itars 
of  Alexander,"  which  were  on  the  Hv- 
phasis,  or  Sutlej  (Diod.  Sic.  xvii.  95,  §  i). 
Seleucus  must  have  come  into  contact 
with  Sandracottus  in  the  Punjaub  re- 
gion. 

5"  Strabo  (1.  s.  c.)  gives  as  the  amount 
of  his  force  400,000;  Plutarch  (1.  s.  c), 
600.000. 

'1  Appian  mentions  hostilities  (to;/  'I^ 

Sbi/ Trepacra?  e  n  o  \e  ijurja  e  v  'Ai'SpoKOTio  ^a 
ciAei  Tuv  Trep'i  avTov  'Iv&iov.  Syriac.  Y>.  123. 
B) ;  but  Strabo  (xv.  2,  §  9)  and  Justin  (xv. 
1,  §  21)  speak  merely  of  an  alliance. 

32  Strabo,  I.  s.  c.  Plutarch  {Vit.  Alex. 
§  62)  mentions  the  elephants,  but  not  the 
cession  of  territory. 

S3  On  this  dynastic  appellation,  see 
Lassen,  Indische  Alterthimiskunde,  vol. 
ii.  p.  196. 

'4  Polyb.  X.  34,  §  11.  Lassen  has  shown 
that  Sophagesenus  (Snbliagase7ia)  was 
probably  a  title  of  Jaloka.  the  son  of 
Asoka.  and  grandson  of  Chandragitpta 
(Sandracottus). 

3'  So  Wilson  (Ai-iaiia  Antiqua,p  229); 
but  I  do  not  find  any  statement  of  the 
fact  by  any  ancient  writer. 

s'Strab.  xi.  11,  §  1. 

3'  Demetrius  is  called  by  Justin  "King 
of  the  Indians"  (xli.  6.  §  4).  He  is  rea- 
sonably regarded  as  the  founder  of  the 
city  called  Demetrias  in  Araehosia  (Isid. 
Char.  §  19).  His  Indian  conquests  are 
attested  by  Strabo  (1.  s.  c.) 

38  This  has  been  questioned  by  Wilson 
{Ar.  Ant.  p.  230);  but  Lassen  (Ind.  Alt. 
vol.  ii.  p.  300)  regards  the  evidence  as, 
on  the  whole,  conclusive. 

3"  Ptol.  Geograph.  vii.  1;  p.  171. 

■"•  The  coins  of  Euthydemus  are  found 
over  a  wide  space,  and  show  his  empire 
to  have  included  the  provinces  of  Sog- 
diana, Bactria,  Margiana,  Aria,  the  Pa- 
ropamisus, Drangiana,  and  Araehosia. 

*i  See  text,  p.  33. 

*2  Justin  says,  "  Phraates  Mardos,  vali- 
dam  gentem,  bello  domuit"  (xli.  5). 
Arrian  notes  that  at  the  time  of  Alex- 
ander they  were  "  poor"  (rrej/TjTes),  but 
"brave  in  their  penury"  (judxi/u.oi  im  t^ 
neyiq.    Exp.  Al,  iii,  24/ 


ca.  v.] 


mr.  SIXTH  MOKAnciiT. 


mi 


♦'  The  position  of  the  Mardians  has 
been  much  disputed.  I  am  induced  to 
assign  them  this  locality  at  this  time 
from  a  consideration  of  Arrian  (1.  s.  c.) 
compared  with  Strabo  (xi.  8,  §  1  and  §  8). 

**  Arrian,  1.  s.  c. ;  Q.  Curt.  Hist.  Alex. 
vi.  5.  The  latter  writer  says:  "Interiora 
regionis  ejus  haud  sane  adire  sine  mag- 
na vexatione  [Alexandri]  exercitus  po- 
terat.  Juga  montium,  wrfealtae  sj-lvae, 
rupesque  invite  sepiunt. 

<5  Niebuhr,  Li'ctures  on  Ancient  His- 
tory, vol.  iii.  p.  44.'5,  E.  T. 

*•  The  Mardians  were  a  robber  tribe, 
whose  allegiance  to  Persia  had  sat  very 
lightly  on  them.  Thej^  submitted  to 
Alexander,  but  probably  reverted  soon 
after  to  their  old  condition. 

■•7  Isid.  Char  Mnns.  Pnrth.  §  7.  Com- 
pare Strab.  xi.  23,  §  7;  Diod.  Sic.  xix. 
44,  §  5;  Ptol.  Geogi:  vi.  2. 

♦8  See  the  descriptions  of  Fraser  (Kho- 
rasan,  pp.  387,  288),  and  Kinneir  (Per- 
sian Empire,  p.  119). 

<"  Rhages  appears  in  the  Zendavesta 
mider  the  form  of  Raglta.  It  is  men- 
tioned in  the  Behistim  inscription  (col. 
ii.  par.  13),  ami  in  the  Books  of  Tobit 
(i.  14;  vi.  9)  and  Judith  (i.  .5). 

'"Set'  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  p. 
273:  2nd  ed. 

=ii  Isid.  Char.  Mnns:  Partli.  %  J.  'EctcO- 
Oiv  'Payiai/rj  Mr/Si'a,  kv  r]  .  .  .  "Paya.  koX 
Xapaf,  tov  neyiiTTri  Tiov  Kara  Tr)u  MijSiai'  17 
'Paya.  Ei?  6e  riji'  Xapa/ca  irpcuTOS  ^aaiAeOs 
*l'paaTrj?  TOU?   MapSou?  wkktci'. 

^'^  Fraser,  Khurasan,  p.  291. 

^3  Ancient  Monarchiex,  1.  s.  c.  The 
more  northern  pass  is  called  the  Girduui 
Siyiiluk.  It  is  perhaps  the  "  Pylai  Cas- 
l)i8e"  of  PUny  {H.  N.  vi.  14). 

54  See  above,  note  51.  Mr.  Lindsay 
{History  of  the  Farthians,  p.  7)  has 
sti-angely  confounded  the  Median  Cha- 
rax  witli  Charax  Spasiui  at  ihe  mouth 
->f  the  Tigris,  and  ha-<  imagined  that 
IMiraates  I.  extended  his  dominion  to 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

»5  So  Uroysen,  Geschichte  des  Hellen- 
i.^mus.  vol.  ii.  p.  710.  Isidore's  descrip- 
tion (e<rTii'  vir'o  to  opos  o  /caAttrat  Kaff- 
77 CO?)  would  lead  one  to  place  it  some- 
what nearer  the  "  Gates." 

'« The  word  "  Charax"  properly  means 
'■  palisade. ■'  and  applied  to  a  town  indi- 
cates tlial  it  was  guarded  by  a  palisjided 
earthwork.  On  the  strength  of  such 
l)aliscided  places  under  the  Parthians, 
see  Polyb.  x.  31,  S  8.  Td(/jpoi  yap  Titrau 
TpiTTai,  7rAaT0';  fifv  oux  eAaTTOi'  exovcrai 
TpiOLKOvTa  7rr)xu>>',  Poiflo?  &e  nei'TCKai&£Ka-  em 
&i  Tois  x^"^'"'"'  tKao'T'?!  ^apaKujixara. 
StTrAa  entKiiTo,  Kal  TeAeuTaioi'  TTpoTii\t<Tixa 

SUVOLTOV. 

"  Unless  this  had  been  the  case,  Jus- 
tin would  scarcely  have  dwelt  so  much 
upon  the  meritorious  character  of 
Phraates'  action  {Hist.  Phil.  xli.  5,  ad 
fin). 

"»  See  Lindsay's  Parthians.  p.  13f>.  The 
figure  is  from  a  coin  of  this  monarch. 
^Pl.  1,  Fig.  2.] 


CHAPTER  V. 

'  See  text,  ch.  iv.  p.  35. 

^  Bactria  appears  to  have  been  from 
the  first  less  centralized  than  Part^hia. 
Strabo's  expression  that  "  those  who 
weie  intrusted  with  its  government " 
(oi  7re77io-Ttv(jiei'oO  caused  it  to  revolt,  is 
remarkable,  and  implies  a  plurality  of 
princes.  The  early  coins  are  in  accord- 
ance. Those  of  Dio<Iolus  II.  show  us 
two  other  contemporary  princes,  .\nti- 
machus  and  Agathooles.  who  at  one 
time  held  their  principalities  under  him, 
and  at  another  time  were  independent. 
(See  Num.  Chron.  New  Series,  vol  viii. 
PI,  8,  Nos.  5-7:  PI.  9,  Nos.  ]-S.)  Major 
Cunningham  believes  that  about  b.c. 
230-225  there  were  four  cf)ntemporary 
princes  of  what  is  conimoidy  known  as 
the  Bactrian  series.  (Ibid.  vol.  ix.  p. 
128.)  According  to  him,  the  miion  of 
the  Greek  power  in  the  countries  east  of 
Parthia  was  tirst  effected  by  Euthyde- 
mus.  ab.  B.C.  225. 

'  Wilson,  Ariana  Antigua,  pp.  229, 
234,  &c.  Lassen  agrees,  tliough  a  little 
doubtfully  (Indi.iche  Alter thumskunde, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  304.  305). 

•  According  to  Major  Cunningham,  the 
Indian  provinces  remained  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  family  of  Demetrius,  fall- 
ing to  his  son  (?i,  Lysias,  who  had  for 
successors  Atitialcidas,  Amyntas,  and 
Herm.TBUs.  (Num.  Chron.  New  Series, 
vol.  ix.  p.  150.  Compare  vol.  viii.  p. 
274.) 

^  Justin,  xli.  6. 

•  Strab,  xi.  8,  SJ  2.  MaAio-ra  5e  yi'ujpi^oc 
ycyoi'acrt  ^t^il■  rOjaaSujr  ot  TOu^'EAArji'a?  a(^e- 

Adfieroi  TTji'  RaLKTpicLi'Tiv.  Strabo  does  not 
fix  the  date,  but  it  can  scarcely  have 
been  either  earlier  or  later  than  the 
reign  of  Eucratidas.  (Compare  Wilson, 
Ariana  Antiqua,  p.  2315.) 

'  The  accession  of  Epiphanes  is  fixed 
to  B,c.  175  by  the  best  chronologers. 
(See  Clinton,  F.  H.  vol.  iii.  pp.  317-322.) 
Mithridates  probably  became  king  iu 
B.C.  174. 

8  See  1  Maccab.  i.  21-64;  and  compare 
Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xii.  5,  6;  Diod.  Sic. 
xxxiv.  1,  §  3,  4. 

»  1  Mac.  ii.-vi. 

'"  Appian,  Syr jac.  p.  131,  B.;  Liv.  xli. 
25. 

"Polyb.  xxxi.  11:  1  Mac.  vi.  1-4.  .\i)- 
pi.an  makes  him  succeed  in  plundering 
the  Temple  (Sj/riac.  p.  131,  C).  but  he  is 
to  be  corrected  from  Polybias. 

'2  Polyb.  1.  s.  c.  The  .lews  naturally 
regarded  their  own  wrongs  as  the  cause 
of  tlieir  oppressor's  untimely  end.  (1 
JIac.  vi.  13) 

"  Si/riac.  p.  117,  B. 

'4  Porphyr.  ap.  Euseb.  Chron.  Can. 
i.  40,  §  15. 

"1  Mac.  vi.  17-62. 

"Ibid.  vi.  1.5,  .55,  63. 

•  '  He  was  in  his  twentj'-third  year. 
(See  Polyh.  xxxi.  12,  §.5.) 

's  The  circumstances  of  this  secret  de- 
parture are  given  in  detail  by  Pulybius, 


608 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  T. 


who  was  a  friend  of  Demetrius  and  privy 
to  liis  escape.    (See  Polyb.  xxxi.  19-23.) 

i«  Strab.  xi.  11,  §  2.  Mithridates  is  not 
named  by  Strabo,  but  must  have  been 
the  conqueror,  as  the  contemporary  of 
Eucratidas. 

2"  Lassen,  Indische  Alter thumskunde, 
vol.  ii.  p.  294. 

21  See  note  56,  Chapter  III. 

22  The  names  furnish  but  an  uncertain 
g-round.  Lassen  seems  to  assume  the 
identity  of  Turifia  with  Turan,  which  is 
no  doubt  possible,  but  still  very  doubt- 
ful, the  word  Tvran  not  otherwise  oc- 
curring till  the  time  of  the  Sassanians. 
Aspionus  is  not  very  close  to  Aspasiacse. 
Professor  H.  H.  Wilson  placed  Aspionus 
at  Andkhuy,  and  Turiiia  in  the  Hazareh 
Mountains,  to  the  south  of  Maymene. 
(See  his  Map,  Ariana  Antiqua,  opp.  p. 
214.) 

23  The  quasi -in  dependence  of  Media  is 
implied  in  the  account  of  Justin,  who 
represents  the  war  simply  as  one  be- 
tween the  Medes  and  the  P'arthians  (xli. 

6). 

24  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "Cum  vanus  utri- 
upque  populi  casus  fuisset,  ad  postre- 
mum  victoria  penes  Parthos  fuit." 

25  Justin's  words  ("  Blithridates  Mediae 
Pacasin  prseponit ")  point  rather  to  an 
appointment  as  satrap;  but  the  ordinary 
system  of  the  Parthians  was  to  govern 
by  means  of  tributary  monarchs. 

"2<' Justin,  1.  s.  c. 

2'  Q.  Curt.  Hist.  Alex.  vi.  4,  §  15. 

2"  Xen.  Cyrop.  iv.  2,  §  8. 

29  See  the  author's  Herodotus,  voL  i. 
p.  ,34.5,  2nd  edit. 

3"  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "  Bellum  cum  Ely- 
riaeorum  rege  gessit  [Mithridates]." 

51  If  the  Persians  and  Babylonians  had 
been  reduced  by  force  of  arms,  Justin 
would  probably  have  mentioned  their 
reduction  in  Bb.  xli.  ch.  6  As  it  is,  we 
ruist  regard  the  submission  of  Baby- 
lonians as  implied  in  that  chapter,  and 
that  of  the  Persians  in  Bk.  xxxvi.  ch. 
1. 

32  The  reduction  of  the  Babylonians  is 
assigned  by  Orosius  (v.  5)  to  the  time  of 
the  contest  between  Demetrius  and  Alex- 
ander Balas.  B.C.  1.53-151.  But  the  au- 
thority is  not  very  good,  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  they  submitted  earlier. 

33  The  reduction  of  the  Bactrians  by 
Mithridates  is  implied  in  the  statement 
of  Justin,  that  they  were  among  the 
people  who  welcomed  the  expedition  of 
Demetrius,  having  experienced  the  cru- 
elty of  the  Parthians  (xxxvi.  1).  The 
exact  time  of  the  invasion  and  the  Bac- 
triaii  monarch  who  resisted  it,  are  un- 
certain. 

3»  This  relation  of  Heliocles  to  Eucra- 
tidas is  proved  by  a  coin,  which  shows 
him  to  have  been  associated  with  tliat 
monarch,  agreeably  to  the  statement  of 
Justin.  (See  Wilson,  Ar.  Ant.  p  2t)4; 
Las.sen.  Lid.  Alt.  ii.  p.  313.)  Major  Cun- 
ninyham's  idea,  that  the  effigies  on  the 
obverse  of  this  coin  represent  the  father 


and  mother  of  Eucratidas,  seems  to  ma 
quite  iintenaV)le. 

'5  Justin,  xli.  6.  §  5. 

36  Wilson,  p.  264. 

S''  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  It  may  have  been  in 
the  same  spirit  that  Heliocles  took  the 
epithet  of  Ai/caios,  which  appears  upon 
his  coins. 

38  Justin,  xli.  6. 

'9  Orosius,  V.  5.  Compare  Diod.  Sic. 
xxxiii.  20.  These  conquests  are  some- 
what doubtful,  since  Justin  seems  to 
have  known  nothing  of  them. 

■">  See  Wilson,  Ariana  Aniiqna,  pp. 
26&-300. 

41  Moses  of  Chorene  makes  Assyria 
subject  to  Mithridates.  whom  he  calls 
"  the  great  Arsaces"  (Hist.  Armen.  ii.  4, 

§1). 
••2  See  text,  pp.  4,  6,  and  7. 

43  Q.  Curt.  Hist.  Alex.  vii.  4,  §  26: 
"  Bactriana  terra  multiplex  et  varia 
natui  a  est.  Alibi  multa  arbor,  et  vitis 
largos  mitesque  fructus  alit:  solum 
pingue  crebri  fontes  rigant ;  quae  mitiora 
sunt  frumento  conseruntur  :  caetera  ar- 
men torum  pabulo  cedunt." 

44  Ibid.  vi.  5. 
46  IhiA.  vi.  4. 

4  6  Polyb.  X.  28,  §3. 

4'  Especially  the  .district  called  Nissea, 
where  the  Kisaean  horses  were  bred. 
(Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  vii.  13;  Diod.  Sic.  xvii. 
110,  §  6;  Am.  Marc,  xxiii.  6.) 

48  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
289.  290,  2nd  ed. 

49  Strab.  XV.  3.  §  11. 

6»  Herod,  i.  193;  Berosus,  Fr.  1,  §  2. 

61  Theophrast.  Hist.  Plant,  viii.  7; 
Plin.  H.  N.  xviii.  17. 

62  Strab,  xvi.  1.  §  14. 

63  Theophrast.  Hist.  Plant,  ii.  2. 

64  Herod.  1.  s.  c. ;  Strab.  1.  s.  c;  Amm. 
Marc.  xxiv.  3;  Zosim.  iii.  p.  173. 

66  The  troubles  of  the  reign  of  Deme- 
trius are  given  with  much  fulness  in  the 
first  book  of  Maccabees,  ch.  xi.-xiii. 

66  The  provinces  complained  of  his 
cruelty  ("propter  Arsacidae  regis  Par- 
thorum  crudelitatem."— Justin,  xxxvi. 
1,  §3). 

6'  See  text,  p.  40. 

68  Justin,  xxxvi.  1,  §2:  "ad  abolendam 
seguitise  maculam." 

6»  "  Qu6d  veteri  Macedonum  imperio 
admoti,  novi  populi  superbiam  mdigne 
ferebant."     (Justin,  xxxvi.  1.  §  3.) 

60  "  Cum  et  Persanim,  et  Elymaeorum, 
et  Bactrianorum  auxiliis  juvaretur,  mul- 
tis  proeliis  Parthos  fudit."  (lb.  §  4. 
Compare  xxxviii.  9,  §  2.) 

6'  "  Ad  postremum  tamen  pacis  simu- 
latione  deceptus  capitur"  (lb.  xxxvi.  1, 
§  5.)  "  Repente  insidiis  circumventus" 
(lb.  xxxviii.  9,  §  2). 

62  Justin,  1.  s.  c. ;  Appian,  Syriac.  p. 
133,  A.;  Diod.  Sic.  xxxiv.  15;  Ores.  v.  4. 

63  "  Amisso  exercitu"  (Justin,  xxxviii. 
9,  2).    Comp.  1  Mac.  xiv.  3. 

64  .Instill,  xxxvi.  1,  §  5:  "Traductus 
per  ora  civitatium,  populis,  qui  descive- 
1-ant,  in  ludibrium  favoris  osienditur," 


en.  VI.] 


TUE  SIXTH  MOKAnCHY. 


009 


"Ibid.  1.  s.  c:  " Missus  deiiide  in  Hyr- 
cauiaiu.  benifjne  et  juxta  cultum  pi-is- 
tiiuB  fortuiias  habetiir."  Compare 
xxxviii.  9,  §  3.  "  Cui  Arsacides  Partho- 
runi  rex,  magna  et  regio  animo,  misso 
in  HjTcaniam  noa  cultimi  taiitum  re- 
pium"  praestitit.  sed  et  filiam  in  matri- 
inoiiiuin  dedit,"  &c. 

"  .■^pp.  Syriac,  1.  s.  c. 

•'  Adversa  valetudine  correptus " 
(Justin,  xli.  6,  §  9). 

CHAPTER  VI. 
'  Posidonius  ap.  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  3.    Tmv 

llapQvaitoi^  <Tvv^6pi6v  4>r}(Tiv  elvai  XloaetSu}- 
ViO';  fitTToi',  TO  iJ-ky  o-vyyGi'ojv,  to  5e  O'0</>aJ»' 
Koi  fji.6.yu>v,  ef  oil'  a/Lct^oii'  Tous  Pa<Tl\el';  Ka8i- 
(7Ta(r^at. 

'  There  are  five  Instances  of  brothers 
succeeding— viz..  those  of  Mithridatesl., 
<  )rodes  I.,  Gotarzes,  Chosroes,  and  Arta- 
baiius  III.  One  of  these,  however,  that 
of  Mithridatesl.,  is  ascribed  to  the  will 
of  the  j)revious  monarch. 

3  As  in  the  case  of  Artabanus  I.,  the 
successor  of  Phraates  II. 

■•Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  42;  Appian,  Parth.  p. 
141,  A.  According  to  this  latter  writer, 
the  right  was  hereditary  in  the  family 
to  which  the  Surena  who  opposeti  Cras- 
sus  belonged. 

s  Pliraafcs  IV.,  on  his  accession,  put 
to  death  his  twenty-nine  brothers. 

'The  high  po.sitibn  of  the  Magi  under 
the  Parthian  kings  is  strongly  marked 
by  their  place  in  the  Great  Council.  (See 
above,  note  1.) 

'Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p. 
333  (Smith's  edition). 

8  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6;  p.  405. 

9  Ibid.  p.  40G. 

'"  Agatlii.as,  ii.  25.  To  iiayiKoy  <f>v\ov 
iyxpaTe';  ef  iKeiyov  [rou  'ApTa^dpov\  ye-yoi't 
Kal  ayepio\oi'^  ov  ^ey  r}8r]  Koi  TrpoTepoi',  outtw 
6e  e?  TOUTO  TifXTj?  tc  Kal  Trapprjffi'as  ijptxeioi', 
aW'  OTTolov  vn'o  Toir  ev  Te'Aet  etrrlv  7}  »cai  Jre- 
piopao-dai. 

1'  Pliny  correctly  calls  the  Parthian 
provinces  "  kingdoms."  ("  Regna  Par- 
thorum  ootodecim  sunt  onmia."  H.  N. 
vi.  25.)  Tlie  Greek  writers  most  com- 
monly call  them  "satrapies,"  but  incor- 
rectly. 

'2  Strab.  XV.  3,  §24. 

'» Ibid.  xvi.  1,  §  19  This  monarch  ap- 
pears to  have  had  special  pi-ivileges. 

'*  .Toseph.  Ant.  Jiid.  x.x.  2;  Oros.  vii. 
G;  Did  Cass.  Ixviii.  19. 

'^  Uio  Cass.  xl.  20;  Ixviii.  18. 

'«  Aiiimianus  makes  the  vitaxcn  eigh- 
teen in  inimber.  but  includes  among 
them  the  "  kings"  of  Persia,  Susiana.&c. 
He  explains  the  term  as  signifying 
"  Masters  of  the  Horse  and  Royal  Sa- 
traps;" but  Hesychius  says  more  brietiy. 
and  probaljly  lU'ire  correctly.  /3io-Ta|  6 
pao'iAtu?  irapa  Flepcrai!  (i.e.  [lapflot?). 

"  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  339, 
Smith's  edition. 

'8  See  Lindsay,  History  of  the  Pnr- 
thians,   p.    213.     In  one   instance    the 


phrase  is  exchanged  for  Poo-iAew'oi'TO!  ^a- 

fftAeoji'. 

'"The  phrase  "Satrap  of  Satraps" 
occurs  only  in  one  inscription,  that  of 
Gotarzes  at  Behistun,  and  has  been 
thought  to  throw  some  doubt  on  the 
identification  of  the  Gotarzes  who  set  it 
up  with  the  twenty-first  Arsaces.  But 
the  doubt  is  scarcely  reasonable ;  and  it 
does  not  seem  unlikely  that  under  the 
Parthian  .system  the  distinct  force  of 
the  word  "satrap"  would  be  lust,  and 
it  would  come  to  be  regarded  as  a  title 
equivalent  to  king. 

'">  Appian  enumerates  twenty-five  be- 
sides those  that  Seleucus  Nicator  built 
and  named  after  himself  or  his  relations, 
which  he  estimates  at  thirty-five  more. 
(Syriaca.  pp  124,  125.)  Isidorof  Charax 
finds,  upon  a  single  line  of  route,  sixteen 
(Mans.  Parth.  Ji  1-19).  On  the  general 
subject,  see  Grote,  History  of  Greece, 
vol.  viii.  p.  474,  ed.  of  1802. 

=  iPhn.  //.  iV.  vi.  m. 

22  "  Civitas  potens, septamuris."  (Tac. 
Ann.  vi.  42.) 

23-'j\o-er  totius  Orientis  fertilissi- 
mus."    (Plin.  1.  s.  c.) 

24  "Trecenti,  opibus  aut  sapientia  de- 
lecti,  ut  Senatus."    (Tacit.  1.  s.  c.) 

25  Sep  what  Dio  says  of  the  Greek  and 
Macedonian  colonies  in  Jlesopotamia  at 
the  time  of  the  invasion  of  <  "rassus  (xl. 
13).  Compare  Appian,  Parthica,  p.  136, 
D. 

2«  Diod.  Sic.  xxxiii.  20. 

2'  See  text.  p.  49. 

28  See  Tiglath-Pileser  Inscription,  p. 
20;  Behist.  Ins.  col.  i.  par.  1;  Persep. 
Ins.  passim. 

2"  The  SeleucidiT"  from  first  to  last  re- 
tain the  modest  B.\iIAEn:i.  The  (ira-co- 
Ractrian  kings  use  the  same  style  at 
first,  but  afterwards  change  it  for  BA- 
2IAEn:i  .MKIWLOY.  (See Wilson,, 47-(ana 
Antirpia.  pp.  237-241  t  Tigranes  of  Ar- 
meina.  like  the  later  Parthian  monarchs, 
claims  to  be  /Sao-iAeu?  fiaaiMuiv. 

3"  Herodian,  vi   6. 

3'  On  the  ordinary  Scythic  cap,  see  the 
author's  Herodotus,  vol.  iii.  p.  3,  and  vol. 
iv.  p.  ,53. 

'2  Herodian,  vi.  6. 

33  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6:  "  Ad  id  tem- 
pus  reges  ejiisdem  gentis  pertiimidi  ap- 
pellari  se  patiuntur  Solis  fratres  atqiie 
Lunse."  The  same  title  is  borne  b.y  the 
modern  Shahs  of  Persia. 

s-i  Ibid.  "In  qiialibet  civili  concerta- 
tione,  q\](P  assiilue  aiiud  eos  eveniunt, 
velut  sacrilegium  quisque  oavet  ne  dex- 
tera  sua  Arsacidem  anna  gestantem 
feriat  vel  privatmn." 

36  According  to  Mr.  Lindsay.  Priapa- 
tiits  was  the  first  "Theopator"  (History 
of  the  I'ortliians.  p.  213).  Others  make 
the  first  to  have  been  t'hraate-s  II,.  the 
son  and  successor  of  Mithridntes  (Clin- 
ton. Fa.s/t  h'vtnani.  vol.  ii.  p.  252).  The 
first  king  who  took  the  epithet  of  dt'oi  ia 
thought  to  be  Phraates  IH.     (Ibid.) 

3'  See  Mos.  Chor.  Hi^t.  Armen.  ii  74. 


(^10 


m]i  SIXTH  MONAItCHt. 


[ca.  vit. 


"Fanoi-um  religiones  prsecipue  instan- 
ravit.  .  .  .  Statuas  auteni,  quas  Valar- 
saees  majoribus  suis  statiierat.  Solisque 
et  LunEe  simulachra,  qua?  ille  .  .  .  Ar- 
taxata  deportaverat,  ea  Artasires  con- 
fre^it." 

3' Pliny  calls  it  "caput  regnorum  " 
(H.  N.  vi.  2tj|;  Tacitus,  "  secies  imperii"' 
(Ann.  vi.  26):  Dio  Cassius  describes  it  as 

7roAi5  iv  fj  fiacri\eia  [oi  IlapSoi]  exoueri 
(Hist.  Rom.  xl.  45);  Ammianus  (xxiii.  6, 
p.  40i),  as  "  Persidis  specimen  sum- 
mum." 

3*^  ^iuoSaatv  epTavda  tou  xeLixojvo?  Stayeiv 
ot  ^acrtAeis  S  la.  to  eudepoi'  (xvi.  1,  ^  16). 

SI*  H.  N.  vi.  26;  §  122. 

*"  Strab.  1.  S.  C.  TavTJji'  ewotoCcTO  x^*-" 
fxd&iov  ol  Tojv  HapOvaliuy  ^atrtAets,  (/)et5d)ixe- 
vot  Tuiu  SeAevKetot/,  u'a  fjirj  Kara<naQfX€X}oivro 
vtrh  Tov  ^KvOiKoii  </)uAou  Kai  o"TpaTta>TLKoO. 

<'  Strab.  1.  s.  c.    Compare  xi.  13,  §  1. 

*^  Ibid.  xi.  7,  §  2. 

*^  Deipnosoph.  xii.  8;  p.  514. 

"  .l/ans.  Por</i.  S  "• 

**  An  occasional  tlying  visit  may  have 
been  paid  to  Hecatompylos,  where  the 
old  palace  of  the  early  kings  was  main- 
tained at  least  to  the  time  of  Strabo  (xi. 
9,  §  1);  but  the  province  was  not  rich 
enough  to  furnish  food  for  the  vast  num- 
bers of  the  later  Court.    (Ibid.) 

48  Isid.  Char.  Mans.  Parth.  §  12.  In 
later  times  Arbela  appears  to  have  be- 
come the  royal  burying-place  (D.  Cass. 
Ixxviii.  1). 

"  Plutarch,  Vit.  Crass.  §  21.  Comp. 
Appian,  Parthica,  p.  141.  A. 

"8  Plut.  Vit.  Crass.  §  24. 

48  Ibid.  §  21. 

'0  Diod.  Sic.  xxxiii.  20. 

^'  See  Agathias,  who,  writing  under 
the  Byzantine  emperors,  ab.  a.d.  560- 
,580.  thus  sums  up  the  Parthian  period  : 

Ilapduaiot,  e^t'O?  KaTqKoov  kcli  y]Ki(TTa  ^v  toJ 
TTpc  ToO  bvoixauTOTarov,  TrapeAvCTai'  tt)?  ap\y)'i 
TOIL'?  MaKcSoi'a?.  Kat  etTa  e^eu'ot  Twv  oAoiv 
TrXr^v  AtyuTTTou  TjyouvTO,  'Apo'aKov  juei'  7rp6- 
Tepoi'  Try?  a7TO(TTao'ea>9  dp^ajaeVou,  w?  fat 
*Apo"aKi6a9  Toil's  juct'  avrhv  6i'o/i.d^c<T0at, 
Mt^ptfiaTou  6e  ou  ttoAAuj  vo'Tepoi'  €9 
fjL  ey  a  t  l  k  \eos  to  IlacrSvattui'  ovo- 
fi.a    efe^e-y/cdcTos.    (ii^iS^.  ii.  25,  ad  fin.) 

CHAPTER  Vn. 
'  Justin,  xxxviii.  9,  §  10. 

2  Appian,  Syriac.  p.  132,  A.  Justin, 
however,  makes  the  marriage  take 
place  in  the  reign  of  Mithridates 
(xxxviii.  9,  §  3). 

3  Justin,  §  4-8. 

*  "  Ut  invisus  a  conspectu  submove- 
tur"  abid.). 

* "  Talis  aureis  ad  exprobrationem 
puerilis  levitatis  donatur"  (Ibid.). 

'  1  Mac.  XV.  10-25;  Appian,  Syriac.  p. 
132,  B. 

T  1  Mac.  xiil.  36-42. 

8  Ibid.  XV.  26. 

»  1  Mac.  XV.  28-36. 

10  Ibid.  xvi.  8-10. 

"  Euseb.  Chron.  Can.  i.  40,  §  18;  Jo- 
seph.   Ant.  Jud.  xiiL  8,  §  2. 


12  Justin,  xxxviii.  10.  §2. 

13  See  Herod,  vii.  186;  Tacit.  Hist.  iii. 
33.  &c. 

1''  Oiosius  wrote  about  a.d.  420.  His 
chronology  is  exceedingly  confused,  but 
he  occasionally  preserves  in  his  details 
important  facts,  which  he  has  obtained 
from  earlier  writers.  The  passage  here 
referred  to  is  in  Book  v.  ch.  10. 

1*  See  text,  p.  58. 

1"  Porphyr.  ap.  Euseb.  Chron.  Can. 
i.  40.  §  18:  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  2. 

1'  Justin,  xlii.  1,  §  2. 

IS  Ibid,  xxxviii.  10.  §5. 

1"  According  to  Justin,  the  common 
soldiers  had  their  military  boots  fastened 
with  gold  (compare  Val.  Max.  ix.  1),  and 
their  cooking  utensils  were  of  silver. 

2"  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xiii.  8.  The  pres- 
ence of  Hyrcanus  is  confirmed  by  Nico- 
las of  Damascus  (Fr.  74). 

21  "Cum  execratione  superbise  Par- 
thicse"  (Justin,  xxxviii.  10,  §  5). 

22  Nic.  Dam.  Fr.  74. 

23  Justin,  xxxviii.  10,  §  6. 

'*  Porphyr.  ap.  Euseb.  Chron.  Can. 
1.  s.  c;  Appian,  Syriac,  p.  132,  B;  Justin 
xxxviii.  10,  §  7. 

25  Justin,  §8. 

26  Dio  (xl.  46)  speaks  of  the  Parthians 
as  disinclined  to  make  war  in  winter, 
because  a  damp  air  relaxed  their  bow- 
strings. But  physicall.y,  they  were  as 
capable  of  enduring  the  winter  cold  as 
the  summer  heats. 

27  According  to  Posidonius,  Antiochus 
in  this  expedition  "  feasted  daily  vast 
crowds  of  his  men,  and  allowed  his 
guests  not  only  to  consume  as  much  as 
they  would,  but  even  to  carry  away  with 
them  from  the  banquet,  birds,  beasts, 
and  fish  that  had  not  been  touched,  to 
the  extent  of  a  wagon-load  each  ban- 
quet; in  addition  to  which  he  presented 
them  with  honey-cakes  and  garlands 
scented  with  myrrh  and  frankincense 
tied  with  golden  strings  six  feet  long" 
(Fr.  17). 

28  See  Justin,  xxxviii.  10.  §  8;  and  com- 
pare Diodorus  (xxxv.  17,  §  2),  where 
Athenteus,  one  of  the  generals  of  Anti- 
ochus, is  said  to  have  distinguished  him- 
self by  behaving  worse  than  others  to- 
wards those  on  whom  he  was  quartered, 
and  to  have  suffered  for  it  afterwards. 

29  Justin.  1.  s.  c. 

3"  This  seems  the  only  way  of  recon- 
ciling Diodorus  (xxxv.  15)  with  Porphyry 
(ap.  Euseb.  1.  s.  c.)  and  Moses  of  Chorene 
(ii.  2).  The  last  two  distinctly  state  that 
the  battle  in  which  Antiochus  fell  was 
fought  in  the  winter.  Diodorus,  on  the 
other  hand,  speaks  of  the  spring  warmth 
as  having  begun  to  melt  the  snow,  when 
Phraates  sent  his  embassy. 

31  It  would  appear  from  this  that  De- 
metrius was  either  not  yet  released,  or 
not  known  to  be  at  large  by  his  brother. 
Probably  the  order  to  release  him  was 
sent  to  Hyrcania  at  the  beginning  of  the 
winter;  but  it  may  well  he  that  it  could 
uoi  be  executed  immediately.    The  se- 


CH.  vin.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCUT. 


611 


verity  of  the  weather  makes  travelling 
very  diffieult  on  the  higii  plateau  during 
December  and  January;  and  it  would 
have  been  especially  hard  to  cross  the 
Zagros  range  during  this  season.  De- 
metrius may  not  have  reached  Syria  till 
February,  and  Antiochus  may,  there- 
fore, not  have  known  that  he  was  at 
liberty. 

'*  Justin,  xxxviii.  10.  §  8.  "  Die  statuta 
omnes  apud  se  divisum  exercitum  per 
insidias,  ne  invicem  ferre  auxilia  pos- 
sent,  aggrediuntur." 

33  Justin,  xxxviii.  10,  §  9;  Diod.  Sic. 
xxxiv.  16. 

"Diod.  Sic.  1.  s.  e._ 

35  'AveSe^eTo    Trji'    Tuiv   /Sap/Sopwi'    (<j>oSov 

eupiutrTcos,  says  Diodorus.  "Fortius, 
quam  exercitus  ejus,  dimicavit,"  says 
Justin. 

3«''Metu  suorum  desertus  occiditur" 
(Justin,  xxxviii.  10,  §  10).  Atheueeus, 
the  general  who  had  adrised  retreat,  was 
the  first  to  fly.    (Diod.  Sic.  1.  s.  c.) 

3'  Justin,  Porphyry,  Josephus,  and 
Orosius  say  that  he  was  slain ;  Appian 
(Syriac.  p.  13-J,  B)  and  ^^lian  (Bist.  An. 
X.  34)  declare  that  he  killed  himself. 

'8  Porphyr.  ap  Euseb.  Cliron.  Can. 
xl.  18. 

'"Justin,  1.  s.  c. 

<o  Diod.  Sic.  xxxiv.  17,  §  1. 

*•  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xiii.  9. 

*^  Cilicia  was  lost  B.C.  UK.  The  towns 
on  the  coast,  Tyre,  Sidon,  Seleucia,  &c., 
about  the  same  time  assumed  indepen- 
dence. 

<3  The  exact  time  was  sixty-three 
years,f  rom  the  spring  of  b.c.  128  to  B.c.65. 

<■•  Justin,  xxxviii.  10,  §  11. 

*•'*  Justin,  1.  s.  c. 

<»8ee  text,  p.  53. 

<'  Justin,  xxxviii.  9,  §  8. 

<8  Ibid,  xxxviii.  10.  §  10. 

<»  Porphyr.  ap.  Euseb.  Chron.  Can.  i. 
40.  §  18.  "  Seleucum  Arsaces  captivum 
abduxit,  regioque  more  custodieudum 
curavit." 

'"Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "Exsequias  regio 
more  fecit." 

5'  Ibid,  xxxix.  1,  §  6. 

»2  Ibid.  xhi.  1,  §  1.  The  statement  is 
confirmed  by  Diodorus  (xxxiv.  18),  who 
says  that  Phraates  expected  to  make 
hiiiiself  master  of  Syria  with  ease  {iK-ni- 

^MV  pSiu)^  aiiTrj?  KvpLfvaeiv). 

f'3  Justin,  xlii.  1.  §2. 

"Ibid   ^3;  Posidon.  Fr.  21. 

'*  Diod.  Sic.  xxxiv.  21. 

'"  Himerus  is  called  "  king  of  the  Par- 
tliians"  by  Diodorus  — an  expression 
which  requires  explanation  rather  than 
correction.    Posidonius  speaks  of  him 

as  vhv  TV  pavvritr  avT  a  Ba(3uAa»i'iaji'  (Fr. 

21).  According  to  Justin  (xlii.  2,  §  3),  he 
was  Phraates'  vicarius. 

"Justin,  xlii.  1,  §4. 

'"Ibid.  §5. 

"The  accession  "f  Phraates  II.  is 
fixed  by  various  considerations  to  about 
tlif' year  no.  i:!fi.  His  death  must  have 
taken  place  in  e.c.  128  or  e.c,  127, 


""  Indications  of  this  are  his  relations 
with  Himerus  (see  text,  p.  60),  and  the 
rapidity  with  which  he  fell  in  love  with 
Demetrius'  daughter  (Justin,  xxxviii. 
10,  §  10). 

«'  The  natural  cruelty  of  Phraates  is 
shown,  1,  in  his  treatment  of  his  Greek 
captives  ("exercitiun  Grsecorum  su- 
perbe  crudel  iter  que  tractaverat,'")  Jus- 
tin, xlii.  1,  §  4;  2,  in  his  feelings  towards 
the  people  of  Seleucia  (aAAoTptaj?  7rp6« 

StAeuKet!    hi.aKii)Xivo<;  icai  iJLVr\a  i  kolkihv , 

Diod.  Sic.  xxxiv.  19);  and  perhaps,  3,  in 
his  appointment  of  Himerus,  whose  se- 
verities he  must  have  countenanced  or 
at  least  permitted. 

"'■^  Note  especially  his  winter  campaign 
against  Antiochus  (see  text,  p.  58). 

'3  As  in  his  treatment  of  Demetrius 
after  his  two  escapes,  in  his  conduct  to- 
wards Seleucus,  Antiochus'  son,  and  (in 
a  less  degree)  in  his  treatment  of  An- 
tiochus' body. 

'■i  This  is  the  impression  raised  by  the 
story  which  Diodorus  tells  about  the 
Seleucenscs.  "The  Seleucenses,"  he 
says,  "  understanding  that  Arsaces  was 
angry  with  them,  sent  ambassadors  to 
deprecate  his  wrath,  and  bade  them  be 
sure  to  bring  back  an  answor  from  the 
king.  So  Arsaces  took  the  ambassadors 
to  the  place  where  Pitthides,  a  man 
whose  eyes  had  been  put  out,  was  wont 
to  sit,  and  said — '  Tell  the  men  of  Seleu- 
cia that  they  all  deserve  the  fate  of 
Pitthides ! '  "  As  it  does  not  appear  that 
Phraates  took  any  steps  to  carry  out  his 
threat,  it  can  scarcely  have  been  serious. 

"'  Besides  the  above  story,  there  is  an 
anecdote  of  Phraates  told  bj-  Posidonius. 
which  deserves  to  be  noticed.  "  When 
Antiochus,  who  made  war  upon  Ar- 
saces," he  says,  "was  dead,  and  th« 
latter  was  occupying  hitnself  about  his 
funeral,  ho  exclaimed,  '  Oh,  Antiochus, 
thy  rashne.ss  and  th.y  intemperance  were 
thy  ruin;  in  thy  mighty  cups  thou 
thoughtest  to  swallow  down  the  king- 
dom of  the  Arsacidse ! '"    (Posid.  Fr.  20.) 

CHAPTER  "Vail. 

J  Justin,  xlii.  2,  §  1. 

'•'Justin's  phrase  ("In  hujus  locum 
Artabanus.  patriius  ejus,  rex  suhatitui- 
tur")  implies  their  election,  which,  be- 
sides, we  know  to  have  be(>n  the  regular 
course  of  procedure.     (See  text.  p.  4H.) 

^  As  Priapatius  died  in  or  about  a  c. 
181,  Artabanus  could  not  in  B.C.  127  be 
less  than  54  yeai  s  of  age. 

*  The  tyranny  of  this  governor  is  wit- 
nessed to  in  a  general  way  by  Justin 
(xlii.  1,  §3).  and  Po.sidonius  (Fr.  21). 
Some  particulars  of  it  are  given  by 
Diodorus.  "  Evemerus,"  he  says,  "  the 
Parthian  king,  was  a  Hyrcanian  by  race, 
and  exceeded  in  cruelty  all  other  tyrants 
on  recoi'd.  There  was  no  form  of  pun- 
ishment which  he  omitted  to  use.  C>n 
accwsaliiiiis  of  a  triviiU  character  he 
concleiiined  m.iny  of  the  nabvl'mi.inslo 
slavery,  and  scut  them  \ml1i  ihcir  fawi- 


612 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


^CH.  IX. 


lies  into  Media  to  be  publicly  sold.  He 
burnt  the  market-place  of  Babylon,  and 
several  of  the  temples,  destroying  at  the 
same  time  the  finest  portion  of  the  city." 

s  Trog.  Pomp.  Prolog,  lib.  xlii.  "  Ut 
praefectus  Parthis  a  Phraate  Mesenis 
helium  intulit."  Mesen6  was  the  tract 
between  Babylonia  and  the  sea ;  it  had 
probably  not  yet  been  made  subject  to 
Parthia. 

«  Justin,  xlii.  2,  §  1.  "  Scythae  autem 
contenti  victoria,  depopulata  Parthia, 
in  patriam  revertuntur." 

'  Strab.  xi.  8,  §  3. 

8  That  the  pressure  of  the  nomadic 
hordes  on  Bactria  began  as  early  as  the 
reign  of  Euthydemus  (B.C.  220-200),  ap- 
pears from  his  representations  to  An- 
tiochus  (Polyb.  xi.  34,  §  5). 

"  Strab.  1.  s.  c.  Oi.  6e  awiBivTo  <j)6pov^' 
^6po^  &'  riv  TO  €7rtTp€Treti'  TaKTot?  Tiai  XpO' 
VOLS   rr}V   ^lopav    KaTaTpe\eiv    Kal    <f)epe<r0aL 

Keiav.  I  understand  this  as  a  pasture 
right  similar  to  that  claimed  by  the 
Samnites  in  Campania  (Arnold,  Hist,  of 
Rome,  vol.  ii.  p.  108),  only  enjoyed  at  a 
different  time  of  the  year. 

i»  Strab.  xi.  8,  §  2  and  §  4;  Trog.  Pomp. 
Prol.  lib.  xli. 

1 1  This  is  the  date  given.  (See  Wilson, 
Ariana  Ant.  p.  303.)  It  does  not  pre- 
tend to  exactness ;  and  we  may  perhaps 
conclude  from  the  words  of  Euthyde- 
mus (see  above,  note  8),  which  were 
spoken  b.c.  205,  that  the  movement 
commenced  seven  or  eight  years  earlier. 

12  Wilson,  1.  s.  c. 

13  The  Chinese  authority  for  the  his- 
tory of  this  migration  is  a  certain  Chang- 
kian,  who  was  sent  on  a  mission  from 
China  to  the  Yuechi  in  e.g.  139,  and  re- 
turned to  his  native  country  in  B.C.  126. 

1*  The  great  Scythian  invasion  in  the 
reign  of  Cyaxares  (ab.  b.c.  630)  is  a  well- 
attested  fact  of  history.  (See  Herod,  i. 
10.3-5;  iv.  1;  Strab.  i.  3,  §  21;  xi.  8,  §4; 
Euseb.  Chron.  Can.  ii.  p.  227;  Oros.  i.  19; 
Syncell.  p.  214,  C;  &c.)  It  is  the  first  ua- 
vasion  of  the  kind  that  can  be  regarded 
as  certain,  Justin's  story  of  a  Scythic 
conquest  of  Asia  in  the  time  of  Sesos- 
tris  (ii.  3,  §  15;  cf.  Sti-ab.  xv.  1,  §  6)  being 
probably  apocryphal. 

'5  The  attack  made  by  Cyrus  on  the 
Massagetse  belongs  to  the  year  b.c.  559. 

"The  Chinese  regard  the  conquests 
as  made  by  the  Su  and  the  Yue-chi.  In 
migratory  movements,  the  expelled 
people  are  constantly  led  by  individuals 
of  the  race  that  has  expelled  them. 

"  See  text,  p.  64. 

18  This  name  is  first  found  in  Isidore 
of  Charax,  who  belongs  probably  to  the 
Augustan  age. 

1' Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  pp.  303, 
305,  347,  &c. 

2»  Ibid,  p  802. 

»i  Strab.  xi.  8,  §  8. 

9«  Ibid.  §  2, 

*'  See  Trog.  Pomp.  Prol.  lib.  xlii. ;  Jus- 
tin, xlii.  2,  §  2;  Strab.  1.  s-  C ;  Dionys. 
Perieg.  752, 


^*  Trogus  said  that  theAsiaiii  at  one 
time  furnished  kings  to  the  Tochari. 
(Prol.  lib.  xlii.  ad  fin.) 

25  Strab.  1.  s.c;  Trog.  Pomp.  Prol.  lib. 
xli. 

28  Strab.  1.  s.  c. 

27  Ibid.  xi.  8,  §  8. 

28  Herod,  i.  215,  216. 
2»  Strab.  xi.  8,  §  6. 

3"  That  the  Massagetae  were  not  the 
only  cannibals  among  the  nomadic 
hordes  of  these  parts,  appears  from 
Pliny,  who  notes  the  same  feature  in 
the  Tochari  ("  Tochari  .  .  .  humanis 
corporibus  vescuntur."    H.  N.  vi.  17). 

siSeePlin.  H.  iV.  xi.  53. 

32  Herod,  i.  216.  ©eif  p.ovvov  riKiou 
crepovTai.  Strabo  repeats  the  statement 
(1.  s.  c). 

33  "  Bello  Tocharis  illato''  (Hist.  Phil. 
xlii.  2.  §  2). 

3'i  See  text,  p.  64. 

35  "In  brachio  vulneratus,  statim  de- 
cedit."  (Justin,  1.  s.  c.)  The  immediate 
death  consequent  upon  a  wound  in  the 
fore-arm  raises  a  painful  suspicion  that 
the  weapon  which  dealt  the  wound  had 
been  poisoned.    (See  above,  note  31.) 

CHAPTER  IX. 

1  See  the  passage  quoted  at  the  head 
of  the  chapter.  Compare  Trog.  Pomp. 
Prol.  lib.  xlii. 

2  Justin,  xlii.  4,  §  1.  That  Trogus  did 
not  make  the  mistake  appears  from  the 
Prologue  to  book  xlii.,  where  we  are 
told  that  he  placed  several  kings  be- 
tween Mithridates  II.  and  Orodes. 

3  "  Cum  Sc.ythis  prospere  aliquoties 
dimicavit,  ultorque  injurise  parentum 
fuit."    (Justin.  xJii.  2,  §  5.) 

*  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  2.  'A<f>ii\oin-o  ri)!  Bok- 
Tpiavfi^   p.epo';    [oi    UapBvaloi.]    P  (.  ac  aixe- 

VO l      TOUS      SkV^O!. 

6Isid.  Char.  Mans.  Parth.  §  18. 
«  "  Multos  populos  Parthico  regno  ad- 
didit."    (xlii.  2,  §  4.) 

7  Justin,  xlii.  2.  §  6.  Some  of  the  MSS. 
have  "Arthoadisti,"  others  "Artadisti." 
It  may  be  suspected  that  the  true  read- 
ing is  "  Artavasdis." 

8  Appian  makes  Tigranes  the  son  of  a 
Tigranes  {Syr.  p.  118,  D):  but  his  au- 
thority is  not  very  great.  Moses  of  Cho- 
rene  calls  his  father  Ardashes. 

9  Justin,  xlii.  2,  §§7.  8. 

10  Gen.  viii.  4.  The  geographical  term 
used  is  Ararat,  tO"1~:N'  which  is  ety- 
mologically  quite  distinct  from  Armenia, 
but  which  "designates  the  same  counUy. 

"SeeBeros.  Fr.  7,  §  6. 

12  Lenormant,  Manual  d'Histoire  An- 
tique de  rOrient,  vol.  i.  pp.  379,  385,  &c. 
The  conclusion  is  based  on  the  etymo- 
logical identity  of  a  word  read  as  Lema- 
nen  or  Remanen  with  Armina  (Old 
Pers.)  or  Armenia.  The  etymology  is, 
of  course,  quite  possible ;  but  it  is  against 
the  identification  that  the  word  Armivn 
seems  not  to  liavp  been  known  in  the 
country  till  the  times  of  the  Medo-Per- 
sjaus, 


::;h.  ix.] 


THE  SIXTU  MONjIRCIIT. 


(513 


*3  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
101,  112,  150,  210,  &c.    (2nd  edit.) 

i*For  au  account  of  these  inscrip- 
cions,  see  linysivd,  Nineveh  and  JSnhi/lon, 
pp.  394-403.  They  have  been  published 
by  Schulz. 

IS  Arghistis  contended  with  Sargon, 
ab.  B.C.  720-TOO,  and  the  second  Bilat- 
Duri  (MJlidduris  of  Layard)  with  Asshur- 
bani-pal,  ab.  B.C.  G40. 

1'  They  style  themselves  "  kings  of  the 
Nairi,"  and  relate  their  successful  expe- 
ditions into  the  Minui  country.  Their 
inscriptions  at  Malatiyeh,  Palu,  and  in 
the  Miyandab,  south  of  Lake  Urumiyeh, 
indicate  the  extent  of  their  sway. 

"  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  p.  210, 
2nd  edit. 

•8  Sir  H.  Rawlinson  in  the  author's 
Herodotus,  vol.  iv.  p.  206,  2nd  edit. 

19  Herod,  vii.  73. 

^'^  See  the  Beh.  Ms.  col.  i.  par.  6;  col. 
ii.  par.  7,  &c.  The  term  'Ap/ieViot  seems 
to  have  been  first  introduced  into  Greece 
by  Hecatseus  (Fr.  195). 

'1  In  the  Behistun  Inscription  we  have 
three  Armenian  names,  Dadarshish, 
Arakha,  and  Handita.  Of  these  Dadar- 
shish is  manifestly  Arian,  being  a  redu- 
plicated form  from  darsh,  "to  dare." 
Arakha  has  the  root  Ar  (=  arii/a,  "  no- 
ble") with  the  Scythic  termination  akh 
sufBied  to  it.  Handita  has  the  same 
participial  ending  as  Khshathrita  (Xa- 
thritis),  Arshita  (Arsites),  and  the  like, 
but  its  etymology  is  otherwise  obscure. 
To  these  undoubted  Armenian  names 
we  may  add  from  Moses  of  Choren^ 
Tigranes,  Tigrania,  Eryandus  (=  Ary- 
andes),  and  Zaria;  and  from  Xeuophon, 
Sabaris  (=  Sybares).  Of  these,  Tigranes, 
Aryandes,  and  Sybares  are  well-known 
Persian  names;  Tigrania  is  a  feminine 
form  of  Tigranes  (compare  Roxan^); 
Zaria  is  from  zara,  "gold."  and  would 
mean  "golden-haired."  Compare  the 
Greek  Chrys6  and  Chrysis. 

*^  The  later  Armenian  religion  was 
like  the  Persian  (Strab.  xi.  14,  §  16). 
The  religion  of  the  Urarda  was  entirely 
different. 

23  Steph.  Byz.  ad  roc.  'Apii-evia. 

'*  Hist.  Armen.  i.  21. 

's  Behist.  Ins.  col.  i.  par.  6;  Herod,  iii. 
»3;  Xen.  An.  iv.  3,  §  4;  4,  §  4;  Arrian, 
Exp.  Alex.  iii.  8. 

2«  Beh.  Inscr.  col.  ii.  par.  3-13. 

«'  Strab.  xi.  14,  §  9.  'O  o-aTpairrjs  T^? 
Ap/u.ei'ias  T<Z  UifxTji  kolt  tTO'S  hicixvpiov;  jrui- 
Aou?  Tot?  Mt^paKU'ots  tTrejU.Tre*'. 

29  Herod,  vii.  73;  Arrian,  1.  s.  e. 
a»  Arrian,  iii.  16. 
so  Strab.  xi.  14,  §15. 

31  Ibid.    'Hxpov  ouToi    fApTofidS  re  Koi. 
Zapia£pi;|  ToO  ^acriAeio?  eTriTpe'i/zai'TOS. 
3'-'  Appian,  Si/riaca,  p.  117,  B. 
S3  See  JIos.  C;hor.  Hist.  Arm.  ii.  3. 
s<  Ibid.  chs.  4-7. 
«6  Ibid.  ch.  8. 
38  Ibid.  ch.  9,  §1. 
"^Ardashes   is   made   by  Moses   the 


father  and  predecessor  of  Tigranes,  and 
is  given  a  reign  of  twentvlive  years. 
(Compare  ii.  10.  §  1,  with  ii.  13,  §  1.)  This 
would  bring  his  accession  to  b.c.  121, 
and  would  make  the  expedition  of  Mith- 
ridates  II.  (ab.  B.C.  100)  certainly  fall 
in  his  time. 

5^  Strab.  xi.  14,  §  15.  Kar'  apxis  p-kv 
(«)p,r)ptu(7e  Trapa  Ildpdois.  Compare  Jus- 
tin, xxxviii.  3,  §  1. 

3"  As  Tigranes  lived  to  B.C.  55,  and  was 
eighty-five  at  his  death  (Luciau.  Mavr. 
§  15),  he  must  have  been  born  b.c  140; 
in  which  case  he  can  scarcely  have  been 
given  as  a  hostage  till  B.C.  120.  His  ac- 
cession to  the  throne  is  generally  placed 
B.C.  96. 

■"'  The  chief  use  which  Rome  made  of 
her  victory  at  Magnesia  was  to  augment 
the  territory  of  her  ally,  Eunienes  of 
Pergamus,  whose  dominions  she  more 
than  doubled  on  the  occasion.  (See 
Niebuhr,  Lectures  on  Ancient  HL'itory, 
vol.  iii.  p.  403,  E.  T.) 

<i  Justin,  xxxvi.  4,  S§  6-9;  Veil.  Paterc. 
ii.  4,  &c. 

■»2  Justin,  xxxvii.  1,  §  2. 

<3Meumon,  Fr.  30;  Justin,  xxxvii.  3; 
Strab.  vii.  4,  §  3,  &c. 

**  Appian,  Mithridat.  p.  180,  C.  Plut. 
Lucull.  §  14;  Justin,  xxxviii.  3,  §  2;  Mem- 
non,  Fr.  43,  §  2. 

45  Plut.  Sull.  §  5;  Liy.  Epit.  Ixx. 

*'  Plut.  1.  S.  C.  IIAetoi'as  ' Xpiiiviiov  Trpo- 
^oyfOovvTat;  aTroKTctVa?,  TopSioi'  p-hv  e^/jAa- 
a^v,  ' Apio^ap^avrju  6'  aneSei^e  ^afftAta. 

<'  Strab.  xi.  14,  §  15;  Justin,  xxxviii.  3, 

§1- 

<<*  Strab.  1.  s.  c.  The  district  ravaged 
was   tliat  about    Nineveh    and  Arbela 

(€Trop0))a'€  Tijv  r€    irepi    NiVoi'  /cat    TTjr    Trtpt 

•Ap/3r)Aa).    There  is  a  difficulty  in  fixing 
the  time  of  tl>.e.se  events,  and  I  have 
been  guided  by  probability  in  placing 
them  at  this  exact  period. 
<"  Plutarch  speaks  of  the  Parthians  as 

(TvpLpa^iat;    Kai    t/nAt'a?     6to^tei'ou?.      Livy's 

epitomizer  .says:  "  Parthorum  legati,  a 
rege  Arsace  missi,  venerunt  ad  SuUam, 
ut  amicitiam  populi  Roniani  peterent." 
Velleius  puts  the  embassy  nine  j-ears 
later  (i.  24,  §  3),  when  SulUi  was  in  Asia 
for  the  second  time;  but  the  combined 
authority  of  Livy  and  Plutarch  out- 
wt'iglis  his. 

'>'>  We  find  no  mention  in  any  author 
of  a  treaty  being  made  at  tliis  time. 
That  friendly  relations  were  regarded  as 
established  is  implied  in  the  expressicin 
of  Livy's  epitomizer,  under  b.c;.  66,  "C'n. 
I'tjmpeius  cum  rege  Parthorum  Phriuite 
aniifitiam  rexowifrt."    (Ep.  c.) 

iii  See  Plut.  Lucull.  §  14.  Tiypavj,?, 
txojv  &vi'ap.LV  jj  Ildpflous  ncpiKoiTTti  t^s 
'.V<rta9. 

"2  Ibid.  §  21.  TJji'  UdpSuiu,  (US  iWof. 
ou5ei9,  5vi'ap.iv  €Ta7reiuuj(Tev. 

"  Cf.  strab.  xi.  14,  §  10,  with  Plut. 
Lncull.  §  21. 

^*  See  text,  p.  69. 

"  As  related  by  Plutarch,  Sull.  §  5. 


614 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[en.  X. 


CHAPTER  X. 
'  Clinton,  Fasti  Romani,  vol.  ii.  p.  245, 

note  1. 

2  The  known  kings  between  Mithri- 
dates  II.  and  Orodes  are  three  only — 
viz.,  Sanatroeces.  Phraates  III.,  and  Mi- 
thridates  III.  The  succession  of  these 
three  and  of  Orodes  to  Mithridates  III. 
is  certain.  Thus  the  only  possible  gap 
is  between  Mithridates  II.  and  Sana- 
trceces. 

'  Lucian,  Macrob.  §  15. 

*  "  Varia  Complurium  regum  succes- 
none."  A  varied  succession  implies  ir- 
regularity, which  is  naturally  accom- 
panied by  disturbance. 

^  Plut._  Lucull.  §  36.     T))s  nipeov  Svva- 

\4fxiiii'  ovS'  'Apfieviov;  ti/Spi^oi'Tas  eppufie- 
vrji  afjiVvecrBaL, 

«  Sanatrceces  and  Mnasciras,  who  were 
respectively  eighty  and  about  ninety  at 
their  accession. 

'  So  Phlegon  (Fr.  12),  who  is  more 
definite  in  his  statement  than  Mr.  Clin- 
ton, represents  (F.  R.  vol.  ii.  p.  245). 
Dio  (Hist.  Rom.  xxxv.  3;  xxxvi.  28)  and 
Appian  (Mithridat.  p.  242,  E.)  are  less 
exact,  but  on  the  whole  confirm  Phlegon. 

8  Sanatrosces  (2ANATPOIKH2)  is  the 
form  found  upon  the  coins;  Sinatroces 
is  that  of  the  best  MSS.  of  Lucian ;  Sin- 
tricus  occurs  Ln  Appian  (1.  s.  c.)  Phle- 
gon gives  Sinatruces  (Sn'orpoii/CT)?). 

'  Or,  strictly  speaking,  seventy-nine 
(oySorfKOdTov  Ito5  yeyovuii.    Lucian,  1.  s.  C.) 

'0  The  suspicion  arises  from  the  fact 
that,  like  Phraates  II.,  he  takes  the  epi- 
thet of  ^eoTTttTiop  upon  his  coins,  which 
implies  the  divinity  of  his  father.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  Parthian  monarch  be- 
sides Mithridates  I.  had  yet  been  deified. 
The  age  of  Sanatrceces  is  suitable.  As 
he  was  seventy-nine  in  B.C.  76,  he  must 
have  been  born  B.C.  155,  or  about  twenty 
years  before  Mithridates  I.  died. 

"Lucian,  1.  s.  c.  The  "  Sacauracae" 
are  not  otherwise  known,  unless  we  re- 
gard them  as  identical  with  the  Saca- 
rauli  (see  test,  p.  66). 

'2  Gordyen6  and  Adiaben^.  (See  Plut. 
Lncull.  §  21  and  §  26.)  It  is  uncertain 
whether  Media  AtropatenS,  which  had 
also  been  conquered  by  Tigranes  (Strab. 
xi.  14,  §  15;  Plut.  Lucvll.  §  26),  had  up  to 
this  time  ever  formed  a  portion  of  the 
Parthian  dominions.  Most  probably  it 
had  not. 

Jastrab.  xi.  14,  §15. 

"  Plutarch.  Lucull.  §  26;  Strab.  1.  s.  c. 

'S  'YnriKoovi  i<TXf  KaX  rhv  'ATpo/ianjvoi' 
KoX  Toj'  TopSvalov.  Strab.  1.  s.  c.  Com- 
pare Plut.  Lucull.  §§26  and  27. 

'^Appian,  Syr.  p.  133;  Plut.  Lucull. 
§  14;  Justin,  xl.  1;  Eutrop.  vi.  8. 

"The  exact  position  of  Tigranocerta 
Is  unknown,  but  it  was  probably  not  far 
from  the  modern  Mardin.  (See  Strab. 
XV).  1,  §  23;  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  5.) 

'8  According  to  Strabo,  twelve  Greek 
cities  were  depopulated  to  fuinish  Ti- 
granocerta with  inhabitants  (xi.  14,  §  15). 


According  to  Appian,  300,000  Cappado 
cians  were  transplanted  thither  (Mithrid. 
p.  216,  C).  Plutarch  speaks  of  the  popu- 
lation as  having  been  drawn  from  Cili- 
cia,  Cappadocia,  Gordyen6,  Assyria,  and 
AdiabenS  (Lucull.  §  26). 

19  See  Appian,  Mithrid.  p.  229.  A- 
Kat  /SatrtAeia  /cat  Trapafiei'crov?  Kara  to  Trpoa- 
<7T6io>'  eTToici  fxaKpoi)^,  Kal   Kvvr]yi<Tia  itoKKa 

^"  Appian  says  the  walls  were  seventj- 
five  feet  high  (ib.  p.  228,  E.).  The  height 
of  those  seen  by  Xenophon  in  Assyria 
was  100  or  150  feet.    (Anab.  iii.  4,  §§  7-11.) 

2'  A  threat  was  also  implied  in  the  as- 
sumption by  Tigranes  of  the  title  "  King 
of  kings"  (Plut.  Lucidl.  §§  14  and  21), 
hitherto  only  borne  by  the  Parthian 
monarchs. 

2*  One  of  the  predecessors  of  Sana- 
troeces had.  it  would  seem,  allied  him- 
self with  Mithridates  about  B.C.  88  (Ap- 
pian, Mithr.  p.  180,  C. ;  Memnon,  Fr.  30, 
§  3);  but  Parthia  does  not  appear  to 
have  ever  lent  him  any  aid. 

23  The  existence  of  these  feelings  is  in- 
dicated, 1,  by  the  speech  which  Trogus 
put  into  the  mouth  of  Mithridates  (Jus- 
tin, xxxviii.  4-7);  and,  2,  by  the  alleged 
letter  of  Mithridates  to  the  Parthian 
king.    (Sallust.  Hist.  Rom.  ix.  Fr.  12.) 

2<  Justin,  xxxviii.  5,  §  3;  Memnon,  Fr. 
30,  §  2. 

25  As  Ariobarzanes  in  Cappadocia,  and 
the  third  Kicomedes  in  Bithynia. 

"«  Memnon,  Fr.  43,  §  2. 

27  Appian,  Mithr.  p.  230,  D;  Dio.  Cass, 
xxxv.  1  and  3;  Memnon,  Fr.  58,  §  2. 
This  last  writer  calls  the  Parthian  mon- 
arch, by  mistake,  Phradates  (i.e.  Phra- 
ates). It  is  evident  from  Dio  Cass.  xxxv. 
3,  compared  with  xxxvi.  28,  that  it  was 
Sanatroeces.  and  not  his  son,  Phraates, 
who  amused  Lucullus  and  Mithridates 
with  promises. 

28  Plut.  Lucull.  §  30. 

2»  Appian,  p.  242,  E;  Dio  Cass,  xxxvi. 
28,  B. 
2°  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c.    'O  nojiwiios  tiJv 

<^  t  At  at' Ttp  ^pa.6.T[i  €7rt  rot?  auTot?  Trpo- 
<Tvv€Tid€To.  This  can  only  mean  that 
Pompey  and  Mithridates  offered  the 
same  terms.  What  these  were  is  best 
learnt  from  Memnon,  Fr.  58,  §  2  (Steirpetr- 

^euero  7rapa;^tupett/  avTt^  rriv  MetroiroTa^ttiai' 
Kol  TTjj/  'ASiaprjyriv  Kai  Tous  MeydAous  AiiAui- 

31  Appian,  p.  342,  E;  Dio  Cass,  xxxvi. 
34,  O. 

'2  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c, 

33  Dio  Cass,  xxxvi.  35;  App.  Mithr.  p. 
243,  B. 

3<  Appian,  Mithr.  p.  243,  C. 

3'  Ibid.  p.  243,  E. 

3  8  Plut.  Pomp.  §  36;  Dio  Cass.  xxxviL 
5  C. 
'  37  Plut.  Pomp.  §  38;  Dio  Cass,  xxxvii.  6. 

38  Dio  Cass.  1.  S.  C.  7re>>|/as  Trpc'cr^ets 
TrdvTa  '6<ra  ijStKTjTO  ineKa^ei  ot — and  again, 
7rpc'(T/3et?  T€  aO^t?  Trpb?  avTou  aTTCtrTetAe  KaX 
TroAAd  fxev  Tov  Tt-ypdrou  KaTT^-yopTjcre,  tto^AoL 
£e  Kai  c;  Toi/^  'Ftoixatoi/f  i^nfarjjji'qvty,     T1M4 


CH    XI.] 


TEE  SIXTH  MONABGUT. 


615 


writer  evidently  feels  the  injustice  with 
which  Phraates  was  treated. 

3*  See  the  account  which  Dio  gives  of 
Pompey's  motives  (xxxvii.  7). 

*"  >i>)j<Tas  iiTTep  bpiuiv  TLVUiV  T))i'  Sia<j>opa.v 
OUTU)  Trpbs  Toi"  Tiypai'ij  elvai.  (Dio  Cass, 
xxxvii.  7,  D  ) 

*i  Both  Dio  (xxxvii.  6,  A.)  and  Plutarch 
(Pomp.  §  33,  nd  fin.)  record  Phraates' 
demand,    but    the    latter    alone    gives 

Pompey's  reply— opco  xprj<Te(Tdai  tw  Sixaiui. 

*^  Plut.  Pomp.  §  39;  Dio  Cass,  xxxvii. 
7,  D. 

*'  Dio  Cass,  xxxvii.  7,  Ei5  i\Tri(na.vTO 
aix4>6Tepoi.,  says  Dio,  on  OTrorepo?  av  aiiTMv 
Tou  iTepov  KpaT^o'ete,  T(ov  re  Trpayp-dTOu  rot? 
'Pw|ixaiois  TrpocrKdi/(ei  (leg.  7rpo)<:6i|/6i),  ical 
avTo;  ev;(6i.p(jJTepos  <T</>t<rt  yei/ijaeTai.  'E/cei- 
voi  /u.ei'  Srj  6ia  TavTa  KaTjjWdyrjaav. 

**  Ibid,  xxxix.  56. 

45  Justin,  xlii.  4.  §1.  The  fact  that 
both  Jlithridates  II.  and  III.  were  en- 
gaged in  Armenian  wars  seems  to  have 
been  among  the  reasons  of  Justin's  con- 
fusing them. 

*•  This  was  clearly  the  case  at  the 
time  of  the  invasion  of  Crassus,  when 
the  Parthians  were  masters  of  the  whole 
of  Mesopotamia  as  far  as  the  Euphrates. 

■"  Plutarch  tells  us  that  the  Parthian 
general  who  defeated  Crassus  had  pre- 
viously brought  back  Orodes  from  ban- 
ishment (Vit.  Crass.  §  21).  Appian  fol- 
lows him  (Parth.  p.  141.  A). 

■•s  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "Propter  crudehta- 
tem  a  senatu  Parthico  regno  pellitiir." 

4"  Dio  Cass,  xxxix.  .56.     MiSptSdrTji'  toi' 

aS€\(j>hv  CK  TJjs  Mr)6ia9,  ^«  ^p;(ei',  i^e^aKe. 

*"  App.  Syriac.  p.  120,  A;  Parthic.  p. 
134,  A. 

»'  Justin,  xlii.  4,  §  2. 

'2  That  Seleueia  had  been  in  rebellion 
against  Orodes  before  b.c.  54,  and  had 
been  recovered  for  him  by  the  general 
whom  he  employed  against  Crassus,  is 
relati^d  by  Plutarch  {Crass.  §  21).  It  is 
rea.souabie  to  connect  this  rebellion  with 
the  civil  war  between  the  brothers. 
Mommsen,  however,  does  so  too  posi- 
tively,    (liiiiii.  (leschichte,  vol.  iii.  p.  323.) 

53  Justin  incorrectly  says,  '^  Babylo- 
niam,  (juo  Mithridates  confugerat.  diu 
obsidet,  et  fame  coactos  in  deditionem 
oppidanos  (!onipellit."  (1.  s.  c.)  But  it  is 
evident  that  the  town,  Babylon  ("  Baby- 
loneni")  is  intended. 

^<  ■'  Plus  hostera  quani  fratrem  cogi- 
tans."    (Justin,  xlii.  4,  §  4.) 

CHAPTER  XI. 

'  Gabinius,  to  whom  Mithridates  fled 
was  not  proconsul  of  Syria  till  B.C.  .56, 
and  Midiridates  therefore  cannot  have 
applied  to  him  till  that  year.  As  the 
civil  war  followed  on  this  application, 
and  the  siege  of  Babylon  is  expressly 
said  to  have  occupied  a  long  time  (Jus- 
tin). ;\Titliridates  can  scarcely  have  sub- 
mitted until  B.C.  .55. 

-  TJv.  Jihyit.  cv. ;  Dio  Cass,  xxxix.  33. 

3  i'liit    Crass.  §  10. 

■•  Ibid,     'iis    irai6idi'    airoi^oi'aii'    to    Aov- 


KovKXov  TTpbs  Tiypanji'  KaX  IIo^itdjiou  Trpbl 
MiSptSarr)!',  d\pi  3aKTpiu>u  (cat  'IvSiav  Kai 
T^s  «fu)  SaAa<Tcrr)s  avrfyev  eauToi/  rait  i\wi<Ti. 

Compare  App.  Parth.  p.  135,  C. 

5  Tlie  name  is  given  variously,  as  Ab- 
garus,  Acbariis,  and  Avgarus  (Auyapos); 
but  the  first  form  is  the  only  one  used 
upon  the  coins  of  Edessa.  Otherwise 
the  form  Acbarus  might  seem  prefera- 
ble, as  the  representative  of  the  Arabic 
Akbar.  All  the  princes  of  Edessa  seem 
to  have  been  called  either  Abgarus  or 
Mannus. 

«  Dio  Cass.  xl.  20;  App.  Parth.  p.  140,  A. 

'  Dio  Cass.  XXXV.  2,  ad  fin. 

8  Ibid.  xl.  20. 

»  Crassus  left  Rome  in  the  j-ear  of  his 
consulship  B.C.  55,  later  than  Nov.  15 
(Cic.  Ep.  ad  Att.  iv.  13).  He  took  ship 
from  Brundusium  before  the  storms  of 
winter  were  over  (Plut.  Cra.'is.  §  17),  pro- 
ceeded to  Asia  Minor,  and  marclied  rap- 
idly through  Galatia  (iJTreiYtTo  ^la  ToAa- 
Ti'as,  ib.)  into  Syria,  where  he  must  have 
arrived  as  early  as  April  or  May. 
Mommsen,  however,  overstates  the  case, 
when  he  makes  him  reach  Syria  "  at  the 
very  beginning  of  700"  (bereits  jVufang 
700). 

1"  Dio  Cass.  xl.  13.  Compare  Isid.  Char. 
Mans.  Parth.  §  1.  The  chief  of  these 
cities  were  Apaineia,  Anthemusias  or 
Charax  Sidae,  Ichnae,  and  Nicephorium. 

'  1  Dio  Cass.  xl.  12.  This  engagement 
took  place  near  Ichnas,  which  was  on 
the  Belik,  about  seventeen  miles  north 
of  Rakkah  (Nicephorium). 

i^Plut.  Cj-a.s.9.  §  17;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  13. 

'3  Seven  thousand  foot  and  a  thousand 
horse.    (Plut.  I.  s.  c.) 

'4  It  is  certain  that  Crassus  plundered 
the  ancient  shrine  of  Atargatis  or  Der- 
ceto  at  Hierapolis  (Plut.  Crass.  §  17: 
App.  Parth.  p.  137.  B).  According  to 
Josephus  (Ant.  Jud.  xiv.  7,  S  1),  he  also 
made  a  journey  to  Jerusalem  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  plundering  the  Jewish 
Temple.     (Compare  Orosius,  vi.  13.) 

*5  y.ntypd<f)ujv  kol  StJ/xoi?  Kai  6vi'a(TT€iat? 
tTTpaTnoTuiu  KaTa\6yov<;,  etr'  ai'iei?  dpyvpiov 
SiSoi'Ta?.     (Plut.  Crass.  1.  s.  c.) 

"The  intention  of  Crassus  to  attack 
the  Parthians  was  well  known  at  Home, 
and  was  opposed  by  a  powerful  party. 
(See  Plut.  Crass.  §  16;  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Div. 
V.  8:  &c.) 

1'  Plut.  Crass.  §  18;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  16. 

'^Di-an  Slerivale  speaks  of  some  of 
the  Roman  detachments  in  Mesopota- 
mia as  "  compelled  to  abandon  their 
Eosts"  (Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii.  p.  11); 
ut  1  find  no  such  statement  in  the  au- 
thorities. Dio  says  that  a  Parthian  army 
was  sent  against  the  places  that  had 
been  tiken  and  those  that  had  fallen 
away  (I.  s.  c):  Plutarch  n<Iils  that  at- 
tacks and  combats  took  jilace.  and  that 
some  of  (be  soldiers  in  garrison,  escap- 
ing from  tlie  beleaguered  towns,  brought 
Crassus  an  exaggerated  accoimt  of  the 
difficulties  of  Harthi.Tn  warfare  i|.  s.  c). 

I'Artavasdes  offered  u  contingetit  ol 


616 


THE  SIXTH  MONARGHT. 


[CH.  XL 


80,000  foot  and  16,000  horse,  of  whom 
10,000  should  be  lieavily  armed.  Crassiis 
replied  "  that  his  march  would  lie 
through  Mesopotamia,  as  he  had  left 
there  many  good  soldiers."''  (Plut.  1.  s.  c.) 

20  This  point,  as  already  stated,  was 
probably  the  modern  Bir,  or  Bireh-jik, 
whicli  best  answers  on  the  whole  to  the 
Koman  "Zeugma."  (See  the  note  of  C. 
Miiller  on  Isid.  Char.  Mans.  Parth.  §  1.) 
It  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Einn- 
kaleh  (twenty-six  miles  higher  up  the 
river),  nor  with  Thapsacus  (160  miles 
lower  down),  where  Alexander  crossed. 
Dio  (xl.  17)  has  misled  Dean  Merivale. 
(R.  E.  vol.  ii.  page  13,  note.) 

21  Plut.  Crass.  ^  20.  The  seven  legions 
of  this  writer  may  be  estimated  roughly 
at  35,000  footmen.  Florus  (iii.  11)  raises 
the  number  of  legions  to  eleven,  and 
Appian  {Bell.  Civ.  iii.  18)  makes  the  en- 
lire  force  amount  to  100,000  men. 

^^'A/oia  i})v\aKa  tou  ixrj  KVK^uidrji'ai,  to;' 
-iroTaixof  crxo^Ta?.     (Plut.  Crass.  1.  S.  C.) 

'-■•  Ibid.  §  23.  Artavasdes  is  said  to 
have  suggested  this  route. 

2<  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex.  iii.  7. 

25  Plut.  Crass.  §21. 

2"  Ibid.  §20  and  §22. 

2'  See  Chesney,  Euphrates  Expedition, 
vol.  i.  pp.  46-49;  Niebuhr,  Voyage  en 
Arable,  pp.  320-334;  Pocock,  Description 
of  the  East,  vol.  ii.  pp.  158-163. 

28  On  the  line  of  route  between  Zeugma 
and  Nicephorium,  which  must  have 
nearly  coincided  with  the  march  of 
Crassus,  Isidore  places  three  cities,  one 
village,  and  four  fortified  posts.  (Mans. 
Parth.  §  1.) 

29  Plut.  Crass.  21;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  16. 

3"  It  has  been  already  observed  that 
Snrenas,  or  Surena,  was  properly  an 
official  title.  (See  text,  p.  48.)  Plu- 
tarch, however,  Dio,  and  the  Pseudo- 
Appian  use  it  as  a  proper  name. 

31  This  account  is  taken  from  Plutarch 
(Crass.  §  21). 

32  Blommsen  regards  the  employment 
of  cavalry  only  against  Crassus  as  a 
"brilliant  idea"  (genialen  Gedanken)  of 
the  Parthian  commander  (Geschichte, 
vol.  iii.  p.  328). 

33  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp. 
178-179,  2nd  edit. 

3<  On  the  ordinary  Scythic  equipment 
of  a  light  horseman,  see  the  author's 
Herodottis,  vol.  iii.  p.  34, 2nd  edit.  There 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Parthian 
was  different. 

35  Plut.  Cra.^s.  §  24,  ad  fin. ;  Virg 
Oeorq.  iii.  31;  Hor.  Od.  i.  19.  11:  ii.  13,  16; 
Justin,  xli.  2;  Tac.  An.  vi.  35,  &c. 

3«  Pint.  Crnss.  §25. 

37  Plutarch  speaks  of  the  "barbed 
points"     (ijyicKTTpw/ixecas    a/ci6as)     of     the 

Parthian  arrows.    (1.  s.  c.) 

38  The  Greeks  called  these  horsemen 
KaTa(j>pdKTov^,  "  protected,  covered  up" 
Thev  are  best  described  by  Heliodorus 
(.Mihiop.  ix.  pp.  431-433). 

3»  See  Justin,  xli.  2.  §  10.  "Muniinen- 
tum  ipsis  equisque  loricse  plumatee  sunt, 


qua}   utrumque   toto  coi"pore  tegunt.'* 
Comjiare  Virg.  JEn.  xi.  770. 

""  Plut.  Crass.  §  24.  Kpaicci  toO  Map. 
yiavov  txiSripov  o'tiX^oi'Tos  of 0  koi.  irvpiKafj.- 
77  es. 

^1  The  contus  (koi/tos)  of  the  Greeks 
and  Romans. 

■12  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p. 
178.  2nd  edit. 

■iSTliey  are  called  "a  vast  number" 
(ttA^Sos  TToAii,  Plut.  Crass.  §  23).  and  "an. 
immense  body  "  (copioi  immanes.  Veil 
Pat.  ii.  46).  The  Parthians  brought  50,- 
000  horse  into  the  field  against  Antony 
(Ju.stin,  xli.  2,  §  6). 

"4  Dio  Cass.  xl.  21. 

4  5  Plut.  Crass.  §23. 

4 •'The  arguments  of  Dean  Merivale 
are  conclusive  (Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  18,  19);  but  he  somewhat  mars  their 
effect  by  suggesting  that  Plutarch  may 
have  confounded  the  Belik  with  the 
Khabour,  and  that  the  battle  may  have 
really  been  fought  on  the  latter  stream. 
The  general  tradition  that  the  scene  of 
the  fight  was  near  Carrhse,  and  the  spe- 
cial mention  of  Ichnse  as  also  in  the 
neighborhood  (Plut.  Crass.  §  25),  make 
it  certain  that  the  scene  is  rightly  placed 
on  the  Belik,  since  both  those  cities 
were  on  that  river. 

4'  See  Moinmsen,  Rom.  Geschichte, 
vol.  iii.  p.  327.  This  writer  shows  no 
knowledge  of  the  real  character  of  the 
country. 

*8  Dio  has  no  mention  of  sands  or 
deserts.  On  the  contrary,  he  makes  the 
scene  of  the  battle  hilly  ground,  partly 
covered  with  trees  (xl.  21). 

4"  The  direct  distance  from  Zeugma  to 
the  probable  scene  of  the  engagement 
(half-way  between  Carrhas.and  Ichnse) 
is  less  than  eighty  miles.  The  army, 
however,  did  not  take  this  line,  but 
marched  at  first  along  the  left  bank  of 
the  Euphrates.  From  the  near-^st  bend 
of  the  Euphrates  to  the  scene  -..f  action 
is  less  than  fiftj^  miles. 

5<)  Plut.  Crass.  §  23;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  23. 

51  Plut.  Crass,  p.  22,  ad  fin.  This  ac- 
count is  more  probable  than  that  of  Dio, 
that  he  remained  with  the  Romans  till 
after  the  death  of  the  young  Crassus, 
and  then  fell  upon  their  rear  while  the 
Parthians  attacked  in  front.  (Dio  Cass, 
xl  23  ) 

62  P'ut.  Crass.  §  23. 

5'  Dio  Cass.  xl.  21.  'H  re  xuipa.  avuifxa- 
A6?  TTTj  ^i'  Kai  SevSpa  elx^^- 

5'  Plut.  Crass.  1.  s.  c. 
55  So  Plut.  (Cras.i.  §  24).    But  it  may 
be  doubted  if  the  intention  really  existed. 
5«  Pint.  Crass.  §  23. 

57  Ibid.  §  24. 

58  Ibid.  §  25.  Compare  Lucan,  Phars. 
viii.  ,386-387. 

5»  "Eight  cohorts"  (Plutarch)  would 
be  nhfujt  this  number. 

•'"  Pio  says  that  not  a  single  prisoner 
vas  taken"  on  the  first  day  (xl.  24);  but 
Plutarch  allows  the  capture  of  500 
(Crass.  §  25,  ad  Jin.). 


CH.  XI.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


617 


•1  On  the  position  of  Ichnae,  see  Is. 
Char.  Mans.  Parth.  §  1;  and  compare 
Mons.  C.  Muller's  note  ad  loc. 

«2  Plut.  Crass.  §  26. 

«3  Plut.  Crass.  §  a7;  Dio  Cass.  xl.  22. 

'*  Dio  Cass.  xl.  24.  O'i  re  koi'toI  to)!/ 
^appdpiov  01  fiiv  a7reo'Tpa(/)jj<rai',  oi  6e  €(cAd<T- 
firjcrav  koX  al  vevpai  .  ■  .  (ppdyrjaav  Ta  re 
Pi^rj  efeTofeu^T),  xal  Ta  |i<i>i)  Trdi/Ta  aTrij/a- 
/SAui'flrj'  TO  Te  jueyccTTOi',  oi  ai'Spes  auTol  (^o- 
I'euoi'Tes  «f  eKa/noc. 

•»  On  the  Persian  practice,  see  Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p.  191,  2nd  edit. 
Fear  of  a  night  attack,  and  the  difficulty 
of  unfastening  and  caparisoning  their 
horses  in  a  hurry,  were  at  the  root  of 
the  custom. 

*^  Plut.  Crass.  1.  s.  c, 

«'  So  Plutarch  (§28)'.  o;  ndpeoi.  vvkto^ 
(lev  ai<T66fi.cvoi.  ttji'  a.noSpaan',  o  v  k  e  S  i  u)  - 
(t OK .  Dean  Merivale  has,  I  think,  mis- 
understood a  somewhat  obscure  passage 
in  the  preceding  section — where  the  re- 
treating army  is  said  to  have  thought 
the  enemy  was  upon  them  (lo  s  e  n- 1  ij « - 
poixiviav  Tu>v  Trokep-liov) — and  has  made 
the  Parthians  start  in  pursuit,  but  soon 
give  up  the  attempt,  because  "their 
horses,  after  a  long  day's  service,  were 
unable  to  keep  pace  with  the  headlong 
rush  of  desperate  men."  This  is  hot 
very  probable,  and  it  is  certainly  not 
contamed  in  the  authorities. 

08  See  Lucan,  Pharsalia,  viii.  .3T7-.3~9: 
"  Non  aries  illis,  non  ulla  est  machina 
belli: 

Hand   fossas    implere    valent;    Par- 
thoque  sequente 

Murus   erit,  quodcunque   potest   ob- 
stare  sagittae." 
Compare  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  4. 

88  Plut.  Crass.  §  29. 

'»  I  do  not  understand  why  Dr.  Momm- 
sen  speaks  of  Sinnaca  as  a  "  fort"  (Fe.s-- 
tung,  vol.  iii.  p.  SiO).  Plutarch  seems  to 
regard  it  as  a  mere  hill)  note  the  ex- 
pression aAAoi'  K6(l>ov,  VTroKeCp.ivov  Tois 
Stfi-dicois) ;  and  Strabo  only  calls  it  a 
"place"  (xwpi'ov,  xvi.  1,  §  23). 

'•See  text,  p.  86. 

'^  Mommsen  seems  to  doubt  whether 
the  Parthians  really  intended  any 
treachery  (Geschichte,  vol.  iii.  p.  3.30). 
But  the  Romans caa  scarcely  have  been 
mistaken  upon  the  point.  Such  treachery 
has  been  constant  in  the  East  from  the 
time  of  the  Ten  Thousand  to  the  Aff- 
Khan  war  of  1841. 

"  Plutarch  makes  him  killed  by  a 
Parthian  named  Pomaxirthres,  but  con- 
fesses that  the  exact  truth  was  not 
known  (Crass.  S  31).  Dio  gives  both  ac- 
counts (xl.  27). 

'«  Plut.  Crass.  §  .31,  ad  fin. 

'6  Plin.  H.  iV.  vi.  16. 

"  See    the    well-known    passage    of 
Horace  (Od.  iii.  5,  b): — 
"  Milesne  Crassi  conjuge  barbara,"  &c. 

"  The  Roman  captives  served  as  sol- 
diers in  the  Parthian  armies  (Veil.  Pat. 
U.  82:  Florus.  iv.  10). 


"  "  Romanos  rerum  dominos"  (Vii^. 
^Kji.  i.  282). 

"  As  Julian  did  (Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5). 

8»  See  Justin,  xli.  1,  §  7:— "Parthi,  a 
Romanis  triuis  bellis,  per  maximos  du- 
ces florentissimis  temporibus  lacessiti, 
soli  ex  omnibus  gentibus  non  pares  so- 
lum, verum  etiain  victores  fuere.'''  And 
Dio  (xl.  14): — TeAeuTuvre?  &i,  «jri  toctoOto 
Kai  Trft;  6d^rj?  Kat  Tr)^  6vi'a.iJ.€ut<;  i^utprjaai', 
uJ<7T€  Kai  TOts  *Pa)/iatoi5  t6t€  a.vTnro\€fxr)(Tai, 
K  al  fieOpo  del  ^LVTinaXot.  i/o/xt^€- 
crd  at . 

6 '  Compare  besides  the  passages  above 
quoted,  Strab  xi.  9,  §  2;  Plin.  H.  N.  v. 
25;  and  Herodian,  iv.  18. 

82  Plut.  Crass.  §  3S. 

83  Eurip./?rt(c7i.  1169- 1200 (ed.Dindorf). 

84  Ibid.  1170-1  nX':— 

^epofiev  ef  6peo9 

eAiKa  i-eoTO/xov  €7rl  fi.e\a9pa, 

fiaxapiav  Brfpav. 

8»  Compare  the  proceedings  of  Tomy- 
ris  with  the  head  of  Cyrus,  as  related  m 
Herodotus,  i.  214;  and  for  more  exact 
parallels  see  Appian,  Mithridat.  p.  184, 
C;  and  Mich.  Pateol.  ii.  24. 

88  So  Florus  (iii.  11,  §  11)  and  Dio  (xl. 
27).  Plutarch  omits  the  circumstance; 
but  I  think,  witli  Dean  Merivale,  that 
there  is  no  reason  why  we  .^ihould  disbe- 
lieve it.    (Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii.  p.  26.) 

87  Plut.  Crass.  §  32.  Outoi  TavTd  ye  Ka- 
Tai//efO'd/ievo9, 

88  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud.  xiv.  7,  §  3. 
•■»  Plut.  Crasx.  §  33. 

"o  Plut.  Crass.  §21.  Compare  Dio  Cass, 
xl.  12;  Oros.  vi.  13. 

«>  Dio  Cass.  xl.  28. 

"  Ibid.  Compare  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Att.  v. 
18.  20;  ad  Div.  xv.  1;  &c. 

"'See,  on  this  point,  the  interesting 
despatch  of  Cicero  to  the  Roman  Senate 
(Ep.  ad.  Div.  XV.  1). 

»■•  See  the  complaints  of  Cicero  in  the 
despatch  above  referred  to;  and  note 
that  Cicero  himself  had  for  his  large 
province  not  two  complete  legions  (^. 
ad  Div.  iii.  6). 

"5  Dio  Cass.  xl.  28,  ad  fin.    "Vmv  triiJ.iav 

rfi  tc  'Pw^iaiioi'  SecrrrOTeia  a.x6oy.ivu>v,  <cai 
jrpo?  aiiTOU?  (i.e.  Toi/S  \\a.pQov%),  aTC  Ka.\  yeC- 
Toi'a!  Koi  avvriOm  (T(t>C(Tiv  orras,  clttokKlvov- 

TlOl'. 

»8Cic.  Ep.  ad  Div.  xv.  1. 

'"  "  Cappadocia  est  inanis."    (Cic.   1. 
s  c ). 
'  »8  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Div.  xv.  3;  ad  Att.  v.  20. 

'»  Ejp.  ad  Div.  xv.  4. 

'<">  n)id.  xv.  1.  •' Hoc  autem  tempore 
res  sese  ita  habet,  ut,  nisi  exercitum 
tantum  quantum  ad  maximum  helium 
mittere  voletis,  mature  in  has  provincias 
miseritis,  summum  periculum  sit,  ne 
amittenda-  sint  omnes  has  provineiaj." 

i<"  Dio  Cass.  xl.  29;  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Att. 
v.  20. 

loj  Cicero  tells  us  that  his  cavalry  de- 
feated a  Parthian  detachment  within 
the  limits  of  Cilicia  (Ep.  ad  Div.  xv.  4). 

»os  Dio  Cass.  xl.  29. 


618 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  m 


10*  Ibid.  Ko(7(Ttos  lcx«P^':  avrov';  an€- 
Kpovaaro. 

i»5  Ibid.  Compare  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Alt.  v. 
20;  ad  Div.  ii.  10. 

io«  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Att.  v.  21;  vi.  1. 

»""  Cic.  Ep.  ad  Att.  v.  21:  "  Maximum 
bellum  impendet."  Compare  ad  Att. 
vi.  1  (p.  91a);  ad  Div.  ii.  10. 

108  Die  Cass.  xl.  30. 

108  Justin,  xlii.  4,  §  5.  The  time  of  the 
recall  is  misplaced  by  Justin,  but  the 
fact  may  be  accepted  on  his  authority. 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

1  See  text,  p.  105.  It  appears  from 
several  coins  of  Orodes,  which  bear  the 
legend  BA2IAEn2  BASIAEfiN  AP2A- 
KOY  4>IAEAAHN02  KAI  AP2AKOY 
IIAKOPOY,  that  Pacorus  was  associated 
by  his  father  in  the  government  during 
the  later  years  of  his  reign.  Hence  he 
is  correctly  called  "king"  byLivy  (^tf. 
cxxvui.),  Justin  (xlii.  4,  §  lOj,  and  Taci- 
tus [Hist.  V.  9).  See  upon  these  coins 
Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage  of  the 
Parthians,  pp.  147,  148,  and  compare 
PI.  3.  Nos.  49  and  50. 

2  Dio  Cass.  xli.  55.  Compare  Justin, 
xlii.  4,  §  6  (which,  however,  is  an  over- 
statement) and  Caes.  Bell.  Civ.  iii.  82. 

3  Dio  Cass.  xlii.  2. 

*  Plut.  Pomp.  §  76;  Appian,  Bell.  Civ. 
ii.  p.  480,  A;  Veil.  Pat.  ii.  53.  Dio  ques- 
tions the  truth  of  the  report.    (1.  s.  c.) 

6  The  design  is  attributed  to  him  at 
this  time  by  Dio,  or  rather  by  Antony, 
as  reported  by  Dio  (xliv.  46). 

*  Dio  Cass,  xliii.  51. 

'  Suetonius  represents  him  as  intend- 
ing to  enter  Parthia  by  way  of  the 
Lesser  Armenia,  and  to  proceed  cau- 
tiously to  try  the  strength  of  the  Par- 
thians before  engaging  them  in  battle 
(Jul.  §  44).  Plutarch  says  that  he  meant, 
after  conquering  the  Parthians.  to  pro- 
ceed by  the  Caspian  and  the  Caucasus 
into  Scythia,  from  Scythia  to  assail  the 
Germans,  and  when  he  had  overrun 
Germany,  to  return  into  Italy  by  way  of 
Gaul  {Jul.  §  58). 

8  No  attempt  was  made  seriously  to 
curtail  the  Parthian  power,  much  less 
to  conquer  the  Parthian  State,  until  the 
time  of  Trajan  (a.d.  115),  a  hundred  and 
sixty  years  later.  Antony's  invasion 
was  a  mere  ostentatious  raid  without 
serious  object. 

9  Dio  Cass,  xlvii.  27. 

10  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  iv.  pp.  623,  624. 
"  Appian.  Bell.  Civ.  iv.  p.  625,  D,  E. 
12  The  authorities  are  not  altogether 

agreed  on  this  point.  Dio  says  (xlvui. 
24)  that  Orodes  temporized,  and  neither 
refused  the  overtures  of  Cassius  nor  ac- 
cepted them.  But  Justin  distinctly 
states  that  the  Parthians  helpeil  Brutus 
and  Cassius  (xlii.  4,  §  7)  and  Appian 
mentions  them  thrice  among  the  troops 
who  fought  at  Philippi  (Bell.  Civ.  p.  640, 
C,  D). 

I'Octavian.  Antony,  and  Lepidus. 
There  was  also  a  fourth,  Sext.  Pompeius, 


who  forced  himself  into  partnership 
with  the  other  three  a  Jitlle  later. 

1*  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  v.  p.  674. 

15  Q.  Labienus,  the  son  of  Titus,  Cae- 
sar's legate  in  Gaul,  had  baen  sent  as 
envoy  to  Orodes  by  Brutus  and  Cassius 
(Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  24),  and  was  at  the 
Parthian  Court  when  news  of  the  defeat 
at  Philippi  arrived.  Dreading  the  "  pro- 
scription" of  the  victors,  he  determined 
to  continue  with  the  Parthia/is,  and  to 
put  his  services  at  their  disposal. 

1'  Perusia  was  taken  in  January,  b.c. 
40;  but  the  news  of  its  capture  would 
not  reach  Ctesiphon  for  some  months. 

I''  Strab.  xvi.  2,  §  10. 

18  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  25  (§  108). 

i»  Dio  Cass,  xlviii,  §§  108-110. 

20  Ibid,  xlviii.  26  (§  111).  Compare  Ap- 
pian, Bell.  Civ.  V.  p.  701,  B. 

21  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xiv.  13;  Bell.  Jud. 
i.  13. 

"  Joseph.  Bell.  Jud.  i.  13,  §  1. 

23  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  25,  ad  fin. 

21  Ibid  xlviii.  26.  Compare  Strab.  xiv. 
2,  §  24. 

25  Plut.  Anton.  %  30;  Appian,  Parth. 
p.  156.  A. 

2  6  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  39;  Plut.  Anton. 
§33.. 

27  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  40. 

28  Labienus  styled  himself  "  Impera- 
tor  Parthicus"  (Strab.  1.  s.  c. ;  Dio  Cass, 
xlviii.  26,  ad  fin.)\  and  even  put  this 
ridiculous  title  upon  his  coins.  [PI.  II. 
Fig.  1.] 

29  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  40,  ad  fin.;  Plut. 
Anton.  §  33. 

30  For  the  position  of  this  pass,  see 
Strabo,  xv.  2.  §  8. 

31  Dio  Cass,  xlviii.  41;  Plut.  1.  s.  c..- 
Strab.  1.  s.  c. 

32  Dio    Cass,    xlix.    20.      Tov    UdKopov 

Toji'  Ka\  €Jt\  SiKaiocrvi'J)  Kal  ewl  7rpa6T))Ti  [oi 
2vpot]  vn€pr}ydntt}v. 

33  As  Antiochus,  king  of  Commagen6; 
Lysanias,  tetrarch  of  Itursea;  Malchus, 
sheikh  of  the  Nabataean  Arabs;  Chav- 
nasus,  Antigonus,  and  others.  (Dio 
Cass,  xlviii.  41;  xlix.  19.  32,  &c.) 

3<  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xiv.  15;  Bell.  Jud. 
i.  15,  10. 

35  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  19. 

36  Ibid.  20. 

37  See  text,  p.  93. 

36  In  describing  this  battle,  I  have  fol. 
lowed  Dio's  account  (xlix.  20),  rather 
than  Justin's  (xlii.  4)  as  at  once  more 
graphic  and  more  probable. 

39  See  text,  p.  14. 

•10  Compare  on  this  point  Dio  Cass, 
xlix.  20,  and  26,  with  Plut.  Anton.  §  41. 
Note  especially  the  statement  of  Dio: — 

oi  (7(j>(v8ovriTai..  ttoAAoi  T€  oi'Te;,  Kol  /x  a  k  p  o  - 
rdpai  T<ov  Tofiui'  i  e  I'Te  s,  Trai'TO  »cal  Tor 
KaTtxippaKTOi'  io'xi'pws  cAu/Aat'i'ovTo — and  the 

fact  implied  in  Plutarch  that  the  slingers 
used  leaden  bullets  (/tioAu^Seis)  instead 
of  stones. 

<i  Justin,  xlii.  4,  §§  12-13.  Compare 
Dio  Cass.  xhx.  23. 


Ch.  XIII.  j 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHT. 


619 


«"  Justin,  xlii.  4,  §  14. 

•"  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  23. 

<*Orodes  had  married  a  daughter  of 
Antiochus,  king  of  Coinmag6n6  (Dio 
Cass.  1.  s.  c.) 

*o  According  to  Plutarch  (Crass.  §  33) 
Phraates  first  attempted  his  father's  de- 
struction by  means  of  poison,  but  the 
poison  faihng  to  take  effect,  he  then 
smothered  him  with  his  pillow. 

CHAPTER  Xni. 

I  To  reconcile  Dio  (xlix.  23)  with  Jus- 
tin (xlii.  4,  §  14),  it  is  necessary  to  sup- 
pose that  the  grandsons  of  Antiochus 
were  murdered  first,  the  sons  of  Orodes 
bj'  his  concubines  afterwards. 

^  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

'  Plut.  Anton.  §  37.     "Avrip  innpavri^  <cat 
fivvaTos. 
*  Hor.  Od.  iii.  6,  9. 
s  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  24. 
« Ibid.  c.  25. 
''  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  24,  ad  fin. 

8  The  "  Fasti  triumphales"  give  under 
the  year  a.u.c.  715  (—  b.c.  38)  the  entry 
"  P.  "VENTIDIVS  PRO  COS.  EX  TAVRO 
MONTE  ET  PARTHEIS." 

9  See  text,  p.  109. 

'»  So  Florus  (iv.  10)  and  Justin  (xlii.  5, 
§3).  Livy  says  eighteen  (Epit.  cxxx.); 
Velleius  (ii.  82,  §  1),  thirteen. 

I I  These  numbers  are  taken  from  Plu- 
tarch (^Jif  on..  §  37),  whose  account  is  the 
most  circumstantial,  and  (on  the  whole) 
the  one  most  to  be  depended  upon. 

i»  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  25. 

IS  Media  Atropaten6  was  sometimes 
subject  to  Parthia,  sometimes  indepen- 
dent. That  at  this  time  it  was  depen- 
dent appears  from  the  whole  narrative 
of  the  war  in  Plutarch  and  Dio. 

I''  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

>'•  See  text,  p.  115.  On  the  identity  of 
Dio's  Praaspa  (the  Vera  of  Strabo,  xi. 
13,  §  3)  with  the  modern  Taklit-i-Sulei- 
man,  see  a  paper  by  Sir  II.  Rawlinson 
in  the  Geographical  Journal,  vol.  x.  pp. 
11.3-117. 

!•  Plut.  Anton.  §  38,  ad  fin.;  Dio  Cass, 
xlix.  25. 

"  So  Plutarch  (1.  s.  c).  The  "  two  le- 
gions" of  Livy  ("duabus  legionibus 
&va.\SR\»,"  Epit.  cxxx.)  seem  to  refer  to 
this  battle.  Compare  Veil.  Pat.  ii.  82, 
$2. 

»8  Plut.  Anton.  §  39. 

i»  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  26. 

'•">  Plut.  Anton.  §  39,  ad  fin.;  Dio  Cass, 
xlix.  27. 

21  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  27;  Plut.  Antcm.  §40. 

"  Plut.  Anton.  §  41. 

"^^  If  Praasda  was,  as  is  probable,  the 
modern  Takht-i-Suleiman,  this  would  be 
the  route  along  the  course  of  the  Jaghetu 
and  the  eastern  .shores  of  Lake  Urumi- 
yeh,which  is  the  road  an  army  would  nat- 
urally follow.  (See  Geograph.  Joum. 
vol.  X.  p.  115.) 

-^  Plut.  1.  8.  c.  Compare  Dio  Cass, 
xlix.  28. 

'^'  Sir  H.  Rawlinson  has  shown  that 


this  route  corresponds  in  every  particu. 
lar  to  that  described  by  Plutarch. 
(Geograph.  Joum.  vol.  x.  pp.  115-117.) 

2'  Slerivale,  Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii.  p. 
289. 

"  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  31. 

^»  Plut.  Anton.  §  51. 

"•  Florus  says  that  not  more  than  one- 
third  of  the  legionaries  escaped  (iv.  10); 
Velleius,  that  one-fourth  of  the  soldiers 
and  one-third  of  the  attendants  perished 
(ii  82).  Plutarch  estimates  the  loss  in 
Media  at  24,000  men  (Anton.  §50);  but 
it  is  doubtful  whether  he  means  to  in- 
clude in  this  the  10,000  destroyed  with 
Statianus.  If  not,  he  would  regard  thw 
army  as  reduced  on  its  return  to  Ar 
menia  from  100,000  to  66,000. 

'"  Plut.  Anton.  §  45,  ad  fin.  *9€ipon«'- 
vuiv  Be  TToWCyv,  Kai  Tiov  lldpOuti'  ovk  a<^icrTa- 

VtOV  l<TTOpOV<TiV,*il  fXVplOt.. 

31  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  .33.     Plut.  ^ri  ton.  §  52. 

32  Polemo,  who  is  called  "  king  of 
Pontus"  (Dio  Cass.  xlix.  23)— that  is,  of 
the  portion  which  had  not  been  ab- 
sorbed into  the  Roman  Empire.  On  the 
history  of  this  Polemo,  see  Clinton,  F. 
H.  vol.  ili.  p.  428,  note  m. 

3  3  Plut.  Anton.  §  52. 

3<  Dio_  Cass.   xlix.  33.      T<p    noAeVun 

fj^iaBhv  TJJ!  KTjpuKCi'as  T'r\v  fiiKpoTepav  'Ap/xe- 
piav  Sovi'at.. 

35  Ibid.  xlix.  39. 

3'  These  are  said  to  have  been  at  first 
of  silver  (Dio  Cass.  xlix.  39,  ad  fin.),  and 
afterwards  of  gold  (ib.  40;  Veil.  Paterc. 
ii.  82). 

3'  This  king  had  the  same  name  as  the 
Armenian  monarch— viz.,  Artavasdes. 
He  has,  therefore,  to  prevent  confu- 
sion, not  been  named  in  the  text. 

3**  Compare  Taoit.  Ann.  ii.  3:  "Arme- 
nia inter  Parthoruiu  et  Romanas  opes 
inflda  ob  scelus  Antonii." 

3»  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  44. 

«oSee  Plut.  Anton.  §  54;  Dio  Cass, 
xlix.  41. 

<i  Dio  Cass.  xlix.  44. 

«' Dio  Cass.  Ii.  16. 

13  Justin,  xUi.  5,  §  4.  It  was  probably 
now  that  Phraates,  fearing  that  his  se- 
raglio would  fall  into  the  hands  of  Tiri- 
dates,  murdered  all  his  concubines. 
(Isid.  Char.  M.  P.  §  1.) 

**  Tiridates  cannot  have  reigned  in 
Parthia  more  than  about  three  years 
(from  B.C.  S^i  to  30):  but  he  continued  to 
claim  the  title  of  king  and  to  i.ssue  coins 
till,  at  any  rate,  B.C.  26.  Coins  which 
seem  rightly  assifjnod  to  him  in  the 
British  Museum  CollHction  (arranged  by 
the  late  Mr.  De  Sails)  bear  tlio  dates 
Kn2  and  Sn2.  or  B.C.  27  and  26.  The 
earliest  coin  of  a  similar  type  which  is 
dated,  bears  the  letters  002.  or  B.C.  ;«. 

<' Justin  makes  tliese  events  taka 
place  later,  when  .Aupu'^tus  was  in  Spain 
(B.C.  27-24);  but  it  set-iiis  impossible  that 
thn  circumstiintial  account  of  Dio  (.Ii.  18> 
can  be  a  mere  fiction. 

*«  Dio  Cass.  Ihi.  33. 


620 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XIV 


*'  The  standards  were  surrendered  to 
Tiberius  (Suet.  Tib.  §  9),  who  was  com- 
missioned by  Augustus  to  receive  tliem. 
Their  recovery  is  celebrated  in  jubilant 
chorus  by  the  Roman  writers.  (Suet. 
Octar.  §  21 ;  Liv.  EjJit.  cxxxix. :  Veil. 
Pat.  ii.  91;  Florus,  iv.  12.  §  63;  Justin, 
xlii.  5,  §  11;  Eutrop.  vii.  5;  Oros.  vi.  21, 
ad  fin. ;  Hor.  Od.  iv.  15,  6-8;  Ovid.  Trist. 
ii.  227,  228,  &c.) 

■•^  See  Tacit.  Ann.  i.  11,  ad  fin.;  Dio 
Cass.  Iv.  33,  &c. 

••>*  As  when  she  assisted  Meherdates 
against  Gotarzes  (see  text,  p.  145). 

^0  This  date  is  fixed  by  the  mention  in 
Strabo  (xvi.  1.  §  28)  of  titius  as  the  gov- 
ernor of  Syria  at  the  time  when  the 
youths  were  sent  to  Rome.  M.  Titius 
ruled  Syria  as  legate  from  b.c.  11  to 

B  c   T 

'^istrab.  xvi.  1.  §  28;  Tac.  A7in.  ii.  1; 
Veil.  Pat.  ii.  94;  Justin,  xlii.  5,  §  12. 

52  Strabo.  1.  s  c.  The  names  of  two  of 
these  youths  appear  in  an  inscription 
foimd  at  Rome  and  published  by  Gruter 
(Corp.  Inscr.  p.  cclxxviii.  2),  part  of 
which  runs  thus: 

SERASPADANES    .     PHRAATIS 

ARSACIS    .    REGVM     .    REGIS    .    F 

PARTHVS 

RHODASPES    .    PHRAATIS 

ARSACIS    .    REGVM     .    REGIS    .    F 

PARTHVS 

5'  Strab.  1.  S.  C.  Tui'  ^ei'  ovv  naiSioi'  bcroi 
Trepienrii'  iv  'Pcu/iirj  S-q/xocria  ^acriAi/cu)?  Ti);oie- 
AouvTat. 

''» Among  the  Latin  writers,  the  idea 
commences  with  Velleius,  the  flatterer 
of  Tiberius  (ii.  94,  ad  fin.).  From  him 
it  passes  to  Suetonius  (Octav.  §21),  Jus- 
tin (1.  s.  c),  Eutropius  (vii.  5),  Orosius 
vi.  21,  ad  fin.),  &c.  We  find  it.  however, 
even  previously  to  Velleius,  in  Strabo. 
The  good  sense  of  Tacitus  prevents  him 
from  accepting  the  view. 

"Tac.  Ann.  ii.  3;  Suet.  Tib.  6  9;  Dio 
Cass.  iiv.  9.  By  a  strange  mistake,  Vel- 
leius calls  the  king  whom  Tiberius  set 
up  Artavasdes  (ii.  94). 

*'  Tac.  Ann.  1.  s.  c. 

5'  Ibid.  Coins  of  the  year  b.c.  5  (a.u.c. 
749)  have  the  legend 

ARMENIA  RECEPTA. 

S8  Dio  Cass.  Iv.  9. 

*'  This  Tigranes  is,  I  believe,  mentioned 
only  in  a  fragment  of  Dio  (Iv.  11),  the 
exact  place  of  which  is  uncertain. 

'"  It  has  been  usual  to  regard  Phraates 
rv.  as  having  reigned  till  a.d.  4  (Heeren. 
Manual,  p.  303.  E.  T.;  Plate  in  Smith's 
Biographical  Dictionary,  vol.  i.  p.  357; 
Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage,  pp.  48, 
49);  or  even  till  a.d.  15  (Clinton's  Fasti 
Bomani,  vol.  ii.  p  246).  But  the  dates 
on  the  coins  of  Phraataces  prove  that 
he  was  king  in  b.c.  2,  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  he  was  associated 
by  his  father.  The  difficulty  on  the 
point  has  been  in  part  owing  to  Dio's 
calling  the  son  "Phraates"  (Iv.  11)  as 
well  as  the  father. 

•>  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4;,  gives 


the  name  as  Thermusa;  but  it  appears 
as  "  Musa"  (MOY2A)  invariably  upon  the 
coins. 

"2  Joseph.  A7it.  Jud,  1.  s.  c. 

«3  Pacorus,  the  eldest  son  of  Orodes, 
was  of  age  to  receive  a  militar}*  com- 
mand in  B.C.  51,  and  must  therefore  have 
been  born  as  early  as  b.c.  69  or  70. 
Phraates,  the  second  son,  is  likely  to 
have  been  but  a  few  years  younger.  He 
would  therefuie  be  sixty-five  or  sixty-six 
in  B.C.  2. 

"''  From  the  year  of  the  campaign  of 
Antony  (b.c.  36)  to  the  commencement 
of  the  war  between  Vologeses  I.  and 
Nero  (A.D.  58)  was  a  period  of  ninety-four 
years. 

«6  Till  the  attack  of  Trajan,  a.d.  114. 
fifty-two  years  after  the  end  of  the  war 
with  Nero. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

'  Dio  Cass.  Iv.  11.  It  has  been  usual  to 
regard  this  passage  of  Dio  (recovered 
from  the  Excerpt,  de  Legationibus)  as 
belonging  to  the  reign  of  Phraates  IV., 
and  not  of  Phraataces;  but  I  have  no 
doubt  that  it  refers  to  the  latter.    The 

phrase  tous  a6eA<|)ous  inX  eiprji'r)  anairiov  is 

by  itself  decisive.  There  were  no  broth- 
ers of  Phraates  at  Rome  whom  he  could 
demand.  Neither  could  Augustus  have 
called  in  question  the  roj-al  title  of 
Phraates.  with  whom  he  had  kept  up 
diplomatic  intercourse  as  unquestioned 
Knig  of  Parthia  for  nearly  thirty  years. 
The  misconception  has  arisen  from  the 
name.  But  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  form  Phraataces  is  a  mere 
diminutive  of  Phraates.  and  that  it  is 
found  only  in  Josephus,  whose  Parthian 
names  are  not  always  to  be  depended 
upon.    (See  note  61,  Chapter  XIII.) 

^  Dio  Cass.  Iv.  11.  To  re  ovoixa  to  /Satrt- 
kiKOv  KaraBecrBaL,  Ka'i  T^s  'Ap/necias  anoaTrj- 
vaL  npoaira^e. 

3  Ibid.  U  UdpOo^  ovx  ocrov  ov  Karimr]- 
f  ej',  aAAa  /cat  avTeypaipev  oi  rd  T£  aAAa  vnep- 
(^povw?,  Kat  avTOi'  ^er  ^acriAe'a  ^acrtAe'wj' 
eKelvoi'  6e  Kaiaapa  fxavov  ovo^daa';. 

*  Veil.  Pat.  ii.  101.  This  interview  is 
placed  by  some  in  a.d.  2  (Clinton,  F.  H. 
vol.  iii.  p.  262;  Merivale,  Roman  Empire, 
vol.  iv.  pp.  285.  286);  but  it  seems  un- 
likely that  Caius  would  have  delayed  so 
long  the  main  purpose  of  his  Eastern 
expedition.  In  the  Tauchnitz  edition 
of  Velleius,  the  date  a.d.  1  is  given  for  it. 

*  Velleius,  who  gives  these  details,  was 
himself  present  at  the  meeting,  and  evi- 
dently regards  it  as  an  event  of  first- 
rate  importance.  "  Quod  spectaculum," 
he  says.  "  stantis  ex  diverse,  hinc  Ro- 
mani.  illinc  Parthorum  exercitus,  cum 
duo  inter  se  eminentissima  imperiorum 
et  hominum  coirent  capita,  perquam 
clarum  et  memorabile.  sub  initia  stipen- 
diorum  meorum,  tribuno  mjlitiim  mihi 
visere  contigit."  That  Phraataces.  and 
Tint  Phraates.  was  the  Parthian  mon- 
arch present  appears  from  the  MS.  read- 
ing  of  the  preceding  sentence,   whicb 


CH.  XIV.] 


fiiE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


621 


runs  thus:  "  Cum  rege  Parthorum,  emi- 
neatissimo  juvene,  in  insula  quam  am- 
nis  Euphrates  ambiebat,  aequato  utri- 
usque  partis  numero,  coiit."  Recent 
editors  have  altered  "  eniineutissinio 
juvene"  into  "  eniinentissinius  juvenis." 

'  DiO  Cass.  Iv.  11.  'O  hi  hi)  <tipaaT7)9  Ka- 
TTjAAayT)  eirl  Toi  T^«  ' A.pfJ.tvia.';  a-no<nr]vai.. 

'Veil.  Pat."  ii.  102;  Suet.  Octnv.  %  65; 
Tacit.  Ann.  i.  3;  Zonaras,  p.  53!l,  D. 

9  Dio  (1.  s.  c.)  notes  this,  assigning  two 
reasons  for  the  withdrawal  of  tlie  Par- 
thian claims  to  Armenia,  the  pT-esence 
of  Caius  in  Syria,  and  the  Parthian 
king's  expectation  of  disturbances 
among  his  subjects  (ra  oiiceta  TopaTTo^iei/a 
fiiCTci  auTOu  UTrtTOTrao-e). 

"Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4. 

loit  is  pei-haps  doubtful  whether 
Phraates  IV.  had  not  done  the  same 
during  liis  later  years,  as  Mionuet  (,We- 
dailies,  supplement,  torn.  viii.  pp.  441- 
443)  and  Mr.  Lindsay  {History  and  Coin- 
age, p.  149)  imagine.  On  the  whole, 
however,  I  incline  to  the  belief  that  the 
Musa  coins  belong  wholly  to  Phraaiaces. 

I'The  coins  ot  Phraataces  liave  on 
the  one  side  his  head,  which  is  being 
crowned  by  two  Victories;  on  the  other 
the  head  of  Musa,  witli  the  legend 
M0Y2H2  B.\2IAI22HS  0EA2  OYPA- 
NIA2.  [PI.  II.  Fig.  2. J  Thev  bear  the 
three  dates  IT,  AIT,  and  EIT.  or  b.c.  2, 
B.C.  1,  and  A.D.  4.  (See  for  the  last-men- 
tioned dates,  Numismatic  Chronicle, 
New  Series,  No.  xliii   p.  218.) 

'*  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4. 

"  This  seems  to  follow  from  the  ex- 
pression used  by  Josephus,  oi  yiwaioTaToi. 

XlapOiav  .  .  ■  'OpuiSrjv  ixaXovv  n  pea  ^  tv  - 
<r  a  vre  s  . 

1^  Joseph.  1.  s.  c.  The  violent  deaths 
of  at  least  two  kings  lietween  Phraates 
IV.  and  Artabanus  III.  are  attested  by 
Tacitus  (Ann.  ii.  2),  who  says:  "Post 
fiuem  Phraatis  et  sequentium  regutn  ob 
internas  aedes,''  &c. 

"Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c;  Joseph.  1.  s.  c; 
Suet.  Tib.  §  16. 

>«  "  Ignotaj  Parthis  virtutes  nova  vi- 
tia."    (.Tacit.  1.  s.  c.) 

1' Tacit.  Ann.  ii.  3.  "  Apud  Dahas 
adultus."  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  1.  s.  c. 
'ApTOL^avov    Mr)5eias     Bao'iAeuoi'Ta,      yevoi 

'Ap(TaKLSuJl'. 

i»  Voiiones  commemorated  his  victory 
in  the  Roman  fashion  by  striking  coins 
which  bore  upon  the  one  side  his  head, 
A-ith  the  legend  BA2IAEY2  ONnNH2; 
and  on  the  other  a  Victory,  with  the  le- 
gend BA2IAEYS  ONnNH2  NEIKH2A2 
APTABANON.     [PI.  II.  Fig.  3  J 

1°  Joseph.  1.  s.  0. 

2»  Tacit.  Ann.  ii.  4.  .     .  , 

31  Oi  TTcpl  Ncf^aTTiv  SwaTo'i  TU>V  '.Vp/U-CI/tU)!/ 
' XpTa^aviiy  npocriOiVTai..      (Joseph.  1.  S.  C.) 

23  Josephus   expresses    this  broadly. 

'O    Ti(3eptos    aiiTu)    aireiire,   jrpbs    .    .     •    Tou 

ridpeou  Ta5  iTr'eiAas.  Tacitus  implies 
it  when  he  says:  "  Si  nostra  vi  defende- 
retur,  bellum  adversus  Parthos  sunien- 
dum  erat." 


33  Tacit.  .471)1.  ii.  4.  ad  fin. 
3<  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4,  od 
fin.  It  is  supposed  Ijy  some  that  Jose- 
phus in  this  passage  refers  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  Arsaces,  another  sun  of  Ar- 
tabanus, on  the  thniiie  <if  Armenia, 
nearly  twenty  years  afterwards.  But 
the  close  connection  of  the  clause  with 
one  in  which  he  speaks  of  Vonones  as 
guarded  in  Syria,  limits  the  date  to  a.d. 
16-18.  That  Artabanus  had  a  son,  Oro- 
des,  distinct  from  Arsaces,  king  of  Ar- 
menia, appears  from  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  33. 
25  •'  i^'ermissie  Germanico  proviucia", 
qua;  mari  dividuntur."  Tac.  Ann.  ii.  43. 
38  Ibid.  ii.  .'J6.  . 

2'  See  note  32,  Chapter  XIII. 
3*  Tacitus  says  (1.  s.  c.)  that  the  name 
was  taken  from  that  of  the  city  Artax 
ata,  which  is  absuiil;  for  Arlaxata  is 
Artaxia-.iata,  "  Arta.xias's  city"  (com 
pare  Samosata,  and  see  Strab.  xi.  14. 
^  0),  an<I  itself  took  its  name  from  the 
iirst  Arta.xias.  Dean  Merivale  observes 
tliat  the  word  "signified  greatne.ss  or 
sovereignty"  (vol.  v  p.  192);  which  is 
true,  but  not  of  much  importance,  since 
the  derivation  would  scarcely  occur  to 
either  Zeno  or  liis  subjects.  What  was 
needed  was  that  the  new  king  shoidd 
exchange  his  Greek  name  for  a  native 
one.  He  chose  Artaxias  as  that  of  two 
previous  monarchs  who  had  distin- 
guished themselves. 

3'J  Tacit.  Ann.  ii.  58. 

s"  Germanicus  was  believed  to  be  ac- 
tuated on  this  occasion  in  part  by  his 
hostility  to  the  governor  of  Syria.  Piso. 
and  his  wife,  Plancina,  whom  Vonones 
had  courted.  But  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  he  allowed  motives  of  this  kind 
to  influence  him. 

siTacit.  ^n;i.  ii.  68. 

33  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  31. 

33  Tiberius  was  seventy-five  in  a.d.  34. 

s*  Vitellins,  wlio  was  made  consul  at 
the  beginning  of  a.d.  34,  ai)pears  (like 
Germanicus)  to  have  at  once  set  out  for 
his  province.  (See  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud. 
xviii.  4,  *i  2,  and  compare  Burton,  Hist, 
of  First' Three  Centuries.  voL  i.  p.  125.) 

35  It  is  almost  certain  that  this  prince 
must  have  had  some  real  personal  name 
besides  the  family  title  of  Arsaces.  (See 
Strab.  XV.  1.  §  36  ) 

3"  Tacit.  .4(111.  vi.  31. 

3'  Dio  Cass.  Iviii.  26. 

3«  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  4,  §  4.  ne>- 
TTfi  £e  Kal  Ti(3epio!  uj?  OuiTeAAior  ypaixfiara, 
KcAeuuji'  avTof  7fprx<r<T<ri«'  </)iAia>'  n-pb?  .\pTii- 
Pavoi'  Tor  UdpBuiv  ^atriAfa-  (<lt6^€i  yap  axi- 
TOi'  €\0po<;  utv,  Kai  ' Xpfxiviav  napf<Tna<Tp.«' 
I'D?,  Ml  "■■'  tAcoi'  KaKovpyij. 

3"  Tacit.  A)ui.  1.  s.  c. 

40  •'  Destinata  retineus,  consiliisetastu 
res  externas  moliri:  arma  procul  ha- 
bere."   Tacit.  .4)iu.  vi.  :12. 

<'  Tacit.  1.  s.  c. :  Dio  Cass.  Iviii.  26. 

"Sueton.  Tib.  §  66:— "Quin  et  Arta- 
bani,  Parthorum  regis,  faceratus  est 
Uteris,  parricidia  et  ciedes  et  ignaviam 
et  luxuriam  objicientis,  monentisque  ut 


622 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[cfl.  Irv. 


voluntaria  morte  maximo  justissimoque 
eiviuin  odio  quamprinium  satisfaoeret." 

*^  Dean  Merivale  calls  Tiridates  '"  the 
son  of  Phraates"  (Rom.  Empire,  vol.  v. 
p.  416);  but,  if  this  had  been  so,  Tacitus 
would  most  certainly  have  mentioned 
it.  Tacitus  calls  him  "  sanguinis  ejus- 
dem"  (of  the  same  family),  and  speaks 
of  the  elder  Phraates  (Phraates  IV.)  as 
his  grandfather  (Ann.  vi.  37),  but  leaves 
us  to  guess  which  son  of  this  king  was 
his  father.  I  suspect  it  was  either  Rho- 
daspes  or  Seraspadanes. 

■«■'  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  32;  Joseph.  Ant. 
Jtid.  xviii.  4,  §  4. 

■•^Tiberius  had  suggested  this  candi- 
date.   (Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c.) 

■•«  Ibid.  vi.  33. 

■•'  Tacitus  calls  them  Sarmatians  (Ann. 
vi.  33);  Josephus,  Scyths  (.Ant.  Jud. 
xviii.  4,  §  4).  Botli  writers  absurdly 
bring  them  through  "the  Caspian 
Gates" ;  but  it  is  clear  that  the  Mozdok 
pass  of  the  Caucasus  is  meant. 

*^  The  Sarmatians  were  ready  to  have 
sold  their  services  to  both  sides ;  but  the 
Iberians  guarded  the  main  pass  through 
the  Caucasus;  and  the  Derbend  pass, 
between  the  mountains  and  the  Caspian, 
was  (according  to  Tacitus)  impassable 
during  the  summer  time,  being  then 
flooded  by  the  sea.    (Ann.  I.  s.  c.) 

49  Ibid.  vi.  34. 

5»  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  35. 

^'  Ant.  Jud.  1.  s.  0. 

62  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  36. 

S3  TlofjLTTrj  )(pr]fjLdTuiv  ci?  T6  {rvyyeveli;  Koi 
<^i'A.ous  Tous  cKeiVou.  (Joseph.  Ant.  Jud. 
1.  s.  c.)    Tacitus  omits  this  feature. 

**  "  Interim  posse  Parthos,  absentium 
sequos,  praBsentibus  mobiles,  ad  pceni- 
tentiam  mutari."  Tac.  Ann.  vi.  30,  ad 
fin. 

66  Ibid.  vi.  37.  The  Roman  general  al- 
most immediately  retired. 

6«  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  41.  Artemita  was  in 
Sittacene,  not  far  from  Ctesiphon  (Strab. 
xvi.  1,  §  7).  The  site  of  Halus  is  un- 
known. 

6'  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  42. 

68  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  43. 

69  "  Sensit  vetus  regnandi,  falsos  in 
amore,  odia  non  fingere."  (Tacit.  Ann. 
vi.  44.) 

*'"  Tacitus  says  "  Scyths"  only  ("  auxi- 
lia  Scytharum") ;  Josephus,  '•  Dah®  and 

Sacae"  (aTpariav  Aadif  re  koi  Sa/cwi').     The 

early  connection  of  Artabanus  with  the 
Dahse  (Tac.  Ann.  ii.  3)  makes  it  proba- 
ble that  he  would  obtain  aid  from  them. 

"Tacitus  says  "the  Armenians  and 
Elymceans'^  (vi.  44);  but  the  latter  lay 
exactly  in  the  opposite  quarter  to  Ar- 
menia, and  seem  to  be  wrongly  men- 
tioned. 

«2  "  Principio  a  gente  Arabvim  facto." 
(Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c.)  The  Arabians  of 
the  Mesopotamian  Desert  are  probably 
intended. 

'2  Josephus  says:  noX6/u.^(ras  tou?  av- 
SecTTTj/coTas  KoLTeax^  ttji/  apxriv  (Ant.  Jud. 
xviii.  4,  §  4,  ad  Jin.);  but  the  fuller  nar- 


rative of  Tacitus  shows  that  there  was 
no  actual  fighting. 

*■»  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  4,  §  5. 

•6  Josephus  describes  this  interview 
at  some  length.  The  Euphrates  was 
bridged  in  the  usual  way,  by  a  bridge  of 
boats,  and  the  two  chiefs  met,  each  ac- 
companied by  a  guard,  midway  on  the 
bridge.  After  the  conditions  of  peace 
had  been  settled,  Herod  Antipas,  who 
was  present  as  a  Roman  ally,  enter- 
tained the  Parthian  king  and  Roman 
governor  at  a  banquet,  held  in  a  mag- 
nificent tent  erected  midway  between 
the  two  shores. 

'^ The  term  "hostage"  is  used  by  Jo- 
sephus (1.  s.  c),  Suetonius  (Calig.  §  19), 
and  Dio  (lix.  27).  One  would  be  glad  to 
know  whether  the  Parthians  themselves 
regarded  the  transaction  in  the  same 
light  as  the  Romans  appear  to  have 
done. 

«'  Sueton.  Calig.  §  14;  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

•8  This  seems  to  me  the  best  mode  of 
reconciling  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  4, 
§  5  with  Dio  Cass.  lix.  27  and  Sueton. 
Calig.  1.  s.  c. ;  Vitell.  §  2. 

'"Compare  Acts  ii.  9;  Joseph.  Ant. 
Jud.  xvi.  6,  §  1-  xviii.  9,  §  1 ;  Philo.  Leg. 
ad  Caium.  p.  1032;  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Ar- 
men.  ii.  3,  7;  &c. 

'"  On  the  transfer  of  Jews  from  Baby- 
lonia to  Antioch,  see  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud. 
xii.  3,  §  1 ;  contr.  Ap.  ii.  4. 

'1  Joseph.  A7it.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  1. 

"  This  narrative  rests  wholly  upon  the 
authority  of  Josephus.  Its  internal 
probability,  its  thoroughly  Oriental  col- 
oring, and  its  general  harmony  with 
what  we  otherwise  know  of  Parthia  at 
this  time,  have  led  to  its  acceptance  by 
Milman  and  other  writers  not  inclined 
to  credulity. 

'3  Probably  from  about  a.d.  19  to  34. 

'■'  Mithridates  was  stripped  naked  and 
set  upon  an  ass,  and  in  this  guise  was 
conveyed  from  the  battle-field  to  the 
camp  of  the  victors.  (Joseph.  A.  J.  xviii. 
9,  §  6.) 

'6  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  8.    'Ael 

(OS  €7rl  TToAu  6td(f)opoi  KaBearriKGa'aiV,  /cat  oiro- 
Te'pois  napayeiOLTO   Oappnv    -npoT^pov    aAArj- 

"  The  words  of  Josephus  (tw  eKTM  eret 

^Qopa.  iv  Ba^uAoivt  eyerero  avTuiv)  are  am- 
biguous. Dean  Milman  understood  them 
to  intend  a  pestilence.  (History  of  the 
Jews.  vol.  ii.  p.  189,  12mo  edit.) 

'■^  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  9. 

'8  See  text,  pp.  14  and  109. 

"  Strabo  (xi.  9,  §  .2)  praises  the  Par- 
thian rule  as  salutary  and  vigorous 
(XpTOTi/j-ov  TTpos  riyeixoviav).  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  nation  showed  some- 
thing of  that  aptitude  for  command  and 
government  which  distinguishes  the 
Turks. 

80  The  Jewish  troubles  precede  in  Jo- 
sephus his  account  of  the  death  of  Ca- 
ligula, so  that  apparently  they  fall  into 
the  j-ear  a.d.  40.  The  death  of  Artaba 
nus,   which  followed   cl<jsely  upon  his 


CH.  xr.j 


Ths  sixth  monarchy. 


623 


second  ejcpuision  and  restoration  (Jo- 
seph A.  J.  XX.  3,  §  4),  is  shown  by  the 
series  of  Parthian  coins  to  have  hap- 
pened in  A.D.  42. 

"1  This  portion  of  the  history  depends 
wholly  on  the  authority  of  Josephus, 
who  is  not  perhaps  to  be  implicitly 
trusted.    (See  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  3,  §  1-3.) 

62  Ibid.  XX.  2,  §  3. 

"'  The  reduction  of  Seleucia  appears 
from  Tacitus  to  liave  fallen  into  the 
year  A.D.  46.  This  was,  he  says  (xi.  9), 
the  seventh  year  after  it  revolted.  The 
revolt  must  therefore  have  taken  place 
in  A.D.  40.  That  it  fell  in  the  reign  of 
Artabanus  appears  from  Tacit.  Ann.  xi. 
8. 

8*  This  date  is  earlier  than  that  gen- 
ereJly  assigned,  which  is  a.d.  44  (Heeren, 
M\t,nual,  p.  303,  E.  T. ;  Lewis,  History 
of  the  Parthian  Empire,  p.  231;  Vail- 
laut,  Arsac.  Imperium,  p.  220).  But  it  is 
rendered  certain  by  the  coins,  which 
have  for  the  last  year  of  Artabanus  the 
date  I'NT  Awiou  (=  Aug.  a.d.  42),  and  for 
the  first  of  Vardanes  TNT  rapwcat. 
(=  September  of  the  same  year). 

CHAPTER  XV. 

1  Ant.  Jud.  XX.  3,  §  4.  Tr);/  PaaiXeCav 
To*  Tratfit  OvapBdi'T^j  KaTaAtTrwt'. 

'^  Ann.  xi.  8.  The  true  meaning  of 
Tacitus  in  the  passage  has  been  ques- 
tioned (see  Walther's  Tacitxis,  note  ad 
loc);  but,  for  my  own  part,  I  cannot 
feel  a  doubt  that  he  regards  Gotarzes  as 
king  before  V^ardanes. 

3  Some  suppose  the  Artabanus  in- 
tended to  be  Artabanus  III.,  the  pre- 
ceding king;  but  he  was  the  father,  not 
the  brother,  of  Gotarzes.  (See  Joseph. 
Ant.  Jud.  1.  s.  c,  where  Vardanes  is 
called  the  son  of  Artabanus  III.  and 
Gotarzes  the  brother  of  Vardanes.) 

<The  possibility  of  this  feat  has  been 
questioned,  and  it  has  been  proposed  to 
alter  the  text  of  Tacitus  from  "biduo 
tria  M.  passuum"  to  "  triduo  duo  M. 
passuum"  (see  Walther's  Tacitus,  vol. 
ii.  p.  18).  But  the  feat  of  Vardanes  does 
not  come  up  to  that  of  Tiberius,  who 
travelled  in  one  night  and  day  200  Ro- 
man (or  184  British)  miles  to  visit  his 
sick  brother,  Drusus  (Plin.  H.  N.  vii.  20). 

"Coins  of  a  uniform  type,  differing 
altogether  from  those  of  (iotarzes,  and 
reasonably  ascribed  to  Vardanes,  bear 
the  dates  TNT,  ANT,  ENT,  SNT  and  ZNT, 
or  A.D.  42,  43,  44,  45,  and  46. 

'  Tacit.  Anil.  xi.  8. 

■^  "  Bactrianos  apud  campos."  Tacit. 
I.  s.  c. 

*  Tacit.  Ann.  xi.  9. 

'  Compare  Tac.  Ann.  xi.  10  with  Jo- 
seph. Ant.  .Md.  XX.  3,  §4.  The  intended 
"Roman  War"  of  the  latter  writer  is 
the  projected  "Armenian  expedition" 
of  the  former. 

'"See  text,  p.  131. 

"  DioCass.  Ix.  8;  Tac.  Attn.  xi.  8. 

"  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. ;  Senec.  De  Tran- 
iuill,  §  11. 


•'"Cuncta  in  Mithridatem  fluxere, 
atrociorein  quam  novo  regno  conduce- 
ret"  (Tacit.  .4?i7i.  xi.  9). 

'■•  A  Parthian  king  could,  no  doubt, 
command  the  services  of  uis  feudato- 
ries; but  it  depended  very  much  upon 
themselves  what  forces  they  should 
bring  into  the  field.  To  obtain  any  real 
success,  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the 
feudatories  was  necessary. 

'^  Artabanus  rewarded  Izates  by  add- 
ing this  tract  to  his  dominions.  (Joseph. 
^.  J.  XX.  3,  §3.) 

"See  text,  p.  140. 

"  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  3,  §  4.  ndAc/xof 
wpbs  'l^dTTiv  <caT>jyyetAei'.  Compare  the 
remark  of  Tacitus—"  Exin  validissimas 
prce/ecittras  invasit "'  {Ann.  xi.  10). 

'*  I  cannot  follow  this  campaign  in  de- 
tail, as  the  rivers  "  Erinde"  and  "'  Siude," 
mentioned  by  Tacitus,  are  unknown  to 
the  geographers. 

'^  Tacit.  Ann.  xi.  10.  Josephus  gives 
no  details,  but  says  simply  oi-aipoOo-i 
aiiToi'. 

2i>So  Tacitus  (1.  s.  c).  "  Nece  Barda- 
nis  turbataj  Parthorum  res,  inter  am- 
biguos,  quis  in  regnum  acciperetur. 
Multi  ad  Gotarzem  inclinabant;  quidam 
ad  Meherdatem,  prolem  Phraatis."  But 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  Meherdates 
was  thought  of  until  Gotarzes  had  ren- 
dered himself  obnoxious  to  his  subjects. 

21  Coins  of  Vardanes  bear  the  date 
ZNT,  or  A.D.  45-46.  A  coin  of  Gotarzes 
is  dated  ZNT,  Uafifiov,  or  July,  a.d.  46. 

52  Tacit.  Ann.  xi.  10  :  "  Gotarzes  .  .  . 
per  soivitiam  ac  luxum  adegit  Parthos 
mittere  ad  Principem  Homanum  occul- 
tas  preces."  Compare  the  expression 
".socors  domi,"  in  Ann.  xii.  10. 

23  This  speech  is  given  by  Tacitus  with 
his  usual  brevity  {Ann.  xii.  10).  He  adds 
that  the  envoys  said  more  to  the  same 
effect. 

24  Ibid.  xii.  11. 

26  See  text,  pp.  85,  88,  93. 
2«  Tacit.  Ann.  xii.  13. 
2'  The  notices  of  Tacitus  do  not  enable 
us  to  follow  with  any  exactness  the 
movements  of  Gotarzes;  but  I  think 
there  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  he  was  pro- 
tecting Ctesiphon,  and  that  the  scene  of 
his  manoeuvres  and  of  the  final  engage- 
ment was  the  tract  south  of  Nineveh, 
between  the  Tigris  and  the  Zagros  moun- 
tain range.  If  the  reading  "  Arbela"' 
be  allowed  to  stand  in  Ann.  xii.  13.  we 
may  limit  the  scene  of  action  a  little 
more,  and  say  that  it  lay  between  Arhil 
and  Baghdad.  Sambtilos,  the  moun- 
tain which  Gotarzes  at  first  occupied,  is 
Erobably  the  modern  Mount  Sunbulah, 
etween  the  plains  of  Ghilan  and  Deira, 
in  lat.  34°  25',  long.  40"  10'  nearly.  This 
is  a  "very  remarkable  range,  far  ex- 
ceeding in  height  all  others  at  the  foot 
of  Zagros"  iJorirnal  of  Geograph.  So- 
ciety. xo\.  ix.  p.  41).  On  the  summit  is 
"a  fine  table-land,  wooded  witli  dwarf 
oak,"  while  the  sides  are  in  most  places 
bounded   by    "naked   and   precipilou* 


624 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XVI 


crags  like  these  of  Behistun"  (ibid.  p. 
42).  But  tlie  second  position  of  Go- 
tarzes,  beliind  tlie  river  Corma,  cannot 
be  identified,  since  tliere  are  scarcely 
sufficient  grounds  for  regarding  that 
stream  as  the  Kara-Su,  or  river  of  Kir- 
man  shah. 

28  In  the  East,  mutilation  of  any  kind 
is  regarded  as  incapacitating  a  man 
from  the  exercise  of  sovereignty.  Hence 
the  Persian  kings  were  in  the  habit,  un- 
til recently,  of  blinding  all  their  brothers 
upon  their  accession. 

29  Tacit.  Ann.  xii.  14.  "  Ostentui  cle- 
mentise  suae,  et  in  nos  dehonestamento." 

3»  See  note  18,  Chapter  XIV. 

2'  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  p.  8.  "On 
y  reconnait  neannioius  les  silhouettes 
de  plusieurs  personnages  de  haute  taille, 
surmontes  d'autres  plus  petits,  parmi 
lesquels  se  distinguent  un  cavalier  arme 
d'une  lance,  et  uue  espece  de  gloire  ou 
de  renommfie  couronnant  un  autre  gue- 
rier  acheval." 

32  Some  account  of  this  inscription 
has  been  given  by  Sir  R.  K.  Porter 
(Travels,  vol.  ii.  p.  151),  by  Sir  H.  Rav\'- 
linson  {Geograph.  Journal,  vol.  ix.  p. 
115),  and  by  MM.  Flandin  and  Coste 
(Voyage  en  Perse,  Planches  anciennes, 
pi.  119).  The  best  account  is  that  of  the 
second-named  traveller, who  transcribed 
the  inscription  as  follows:  AAil>A2ATH2 
MI0PATH2nEn  .  .  .  rnTAPZHC  2A- 
TPAnHSTONSATPAnfiN  ....  He  also 
read  in  a  corner  of  the  tablet  the  words 
rnTAP2HC  rEOno©P02.  it  has  been 
argued  that  the  inscription  cannot  have 
been  set  up  by  King  Gotarzes.  on  ac- 
count of  the  title  "Satrap  of  Satraps"; 
but  this  argument  is  not  convincing.  See 
note  19,  Chapter  VI.)  The  combination 
of  the  names  Gotarzes  and  Meherdates 
(Mithrates)  with  the  locality,  certainly 
near  the  scene  of  the  battle,  and  the 
winged  Victory,  common  on  Parthian 
coins  at  exactly  this  time,  is  a  far  more 
weighty  one  in  favor  of  the  inscription, 
being  rightly  assigned  to  the  monarch 

3'  A  coin  of  Gotarzes  bears  the  dat<? 
BHT,  or  A.D.  50-51.  One  of  Vonones  U. 
has  PHT,  or  a.d.  51-52. 

^*  "  Dein  Gotarzes  morbo  obiit "  (Ann. 
xii.  14). 

^^  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  3,  §  4.  Mct' 
oil  TToAuv  }^p6vov  ef  e7rt/3ovA^s  TeAe-jTij- 
crai'Ta. 

3«  Philostratus  is  quoted  as  calling  him 
"  the  younger  brother  of  Artabanus 
III."  (Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage, 
p.  70.)  But  the  authority  of  Philostra- 
tus on  a  point  of  this  kind  is  worthless. 

3'  Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c. 

"*  The  date  in  question  is  rHT.  which 
corresponds  to  the  last  three  months  of 
A.D.  51  and  the  first  nine  of  a.d.  52. 

3'  This  appears  from  Tacitus  (Ann. 
xii.  44  and  50). 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

1  Tacit.  Ann.  xii.  44.  "  Con(,<es5U  fra- 
truni  regnum  adeptus."    Tli<5  names  of 


the  two  brothers  are  given  by  Josephus 
(Ant.  Jud.  XX.  2,  §  4),  and  Dio  Cassiua 
(Ixiii.  5).  The  ft;>rmer  tells  us  that  Pa- 
corus  was  older  than  Tiridates. 

2  The  government  bestowed  on  Pa- 
corus  was  that  of  Media;  whether  Me- 
dia Magna  or  Atropatene  is  uncertain. 

3  See  text,  p.  131. 

*  Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c. 

^  Ibid.  xii.  47.  Mithridates  and  his 
wife,  who  was  the  sister  of  Rhadamis- 
tus,  were  first  smothered.  The  children 
were  then  killed  for  lamenting  their 
parents. 

*  Tacit.  Ann.  xii.  50.  The  first  inva- 
sion  of  Volagases  falls  into  the  lattei 
part  of  AD.  51,  which  was  the  year  that 
he  became  king,  according  to  the  coins. 

'  Compare  Tacit.  Ann.  xii.  50,  51,  witli 
xiii.  6. 

^As  Volagases  was  descended  f rom  g 
branch  of  the  Arsacid*  quite  distinct 
from  that  whereto  Artabanus  had  be- 
longed, there  was  not  the  "  ingratitude" 
in  this  demand  which  some  writers  havft 
seen  in  it. 

"  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  4,  §  2. 

"Ibid.  §3. 

"  Tacit.  Ann.  xiii.  6. 

1 2  The  Lesser  Armenia  was  assigned 
to  Aristobulus,  a  son  of  Herod,  king  of 
Chalcis,  and  a  first  cousin  of  Agrippa  II. 
Sophene,  the  more  southern  portion  of 
the  Greater  Armenia,  was  entrusted  ta 
a  certain  Sohemus.    (Tac.  Ann.  xiii.  7.) 

'3  It  is  characteristic  of  Roman  vanity, 
which  could  not  bear  to  admit  a  loss, 
that  Corbulo's  appointment  was  said  to 
be  not  "  reciperandae,"  but  "  retinendce. 
Armeniae."    (Tacit.  Ann.  xiii.  8.) 

'*  Tacitus  (An7i.  xiii.  9)  does  not  clear- 
ly express  this;  but  it  seems  to  follow 
from  his  silence  as  to  any  recovery  of 
Armenia  in  a.d.  55,  joined  to  his  admis- 
'   eion  that  Tiridates  possessed  the  coun- 
1   try  in  a.d.  58  (ibid.  xiii.  34,  37). 
I        1^  Tac.  Ann.  xiii.  7. 

'"Ibid.  Tacitus  is  confirmed  by  the 
coins,  which  show  that  Vardanes  was 
proclaimed  at  least  as  eaily  as  a.d.  55. 

''  Tac.  Ann.  xiii.  9. 

18  The  coins  ascriljed  to  Vardanes  II. 
bear  the  dates  ZHT,  HWT,  and  ®BT,  or 
A.D.  55,  56,  and  57-5S. 

"Tacit.  Ann.  x'.ii  34.  It  would  seem 
that  when  ths  hostages  were  given  in 
A.D.  55,  ambasEddoi-s  were  sent  to  Rome 
to  endeavor  to  effect  some  arrangement. 
It  was  long  before  any  answer  was 
vouchsafed  them  (Dio  Cass.  Ixii.  20). 
When  &,  reply  came,  it  appears  to  have 
been  to  the  effect  that  Tiridates  must 
either  relinquish  Armenia,  or  consent  to 
receive  it  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans, 
and  hold  it  as  a  Roman  fief. 

2»  Tacit.  Ann.  xiii.  37. 

21  Ibid.  ch.  35. 

22  "Tunc  primum  illecti  Isichi,  gens 
baud  alias  socia  Romanis."  (Ibid.  ch. 
37.) 

23  Tacit.  Ann.  1.  s.  c.  Compare  xiy. 
25  and  xv.  1. 


CH.  xvr.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONAUCTTf. 


625 


'*  Tacit.  Ann.  xiii.  38  40. 

25  Ibid.  xiv.  aG. 

"'Tacitus  says  of  the  Armenians, 
"  Ambigua  fide  utraque  anna  invita- 
bant,  situ terraiuni,  siinilituiline  luoriun 
Partliis  propiores,  eoiuuibiisipie  per- 
mixti  ac  libertate  i^iiota,  illuc  magi.t  iid 
sei'vitium  incUiiabant."    (Ami.  xiii.  34.) 

2'  We  Ivnow,  unfortunately,  nothing  of 
these  wars  but  the  mere  fact  of  their  oc- 
currence. Some  iiave  supposed  them 
to  have  been  stn-red  up  and  assisted  by 
Rome  (Merivale,  Rmnan  Empire,  vol. 
vii.  p.  23);  but  there  is  no  evidence  of 
this.  On  one  occasion,  a  Hyrcaniau  em- 
bassy made  its  way  to  Rome,  and  so- 
licited aid  from  Nero  (Tac.  Ann.  xiv.  25), 
but  apjjarently  without  any  result.  Ou 
their  return  to  the  East,  these  envo3s 
were  protected  by  Curbulo,  who  sent 
them  home  by  the  circuitous  route  of 
the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Indus  {'!)■ 

28  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  1 ;  Dio  Cass.  Ixii.  30. 

2»  This  seems  to  be  implied  in  the  re- 
flection ascribed  to  Monobazus  by  Taci- 
tus (1.  s.  c  ),  "Levius  servitium  apud 
Romanos  deditis  quam  captis." 

3°  The  Latin  ignavia  (the  term  used  by 
Tiridates  in  Tacitus)  unites  these  two 
notions. 

5'  See  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  2.  It  b,as  been 
thought  best  not  to  overload  this  history 
with  the  speeches  which  Greek  and  Ro- 
man writers  put  into  the  mouths  of 
their  historical  characters  on  all  possi- 
ble occasions.  In  the  present  instance 
an  exception  is  made  on  account  of  the 
suital)ility  of  the  sentiments  to  the  oc- 
casion. 

32  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  2. 

33  Ibid.  ch.  4. 

3<  See  text,  p.  1.54. 

'5  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  5. 

36  "Imbecillum  equitem  pabuli  inopia: 
nam  exorta  vis  locustarum  ambederat 
quicquid  herbiduin  aut  frondosum" 
(Tac.  1.  s.  c).  On  the  ravages  commit- 
ted by  these  insects  in  Mesopotamia  and 
the  adjacent  regions,  see  Ancient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  ii.  pp.  399,  493,  3nd  edit. 

"  Tacitus  does  not  expressly  mention 
this  condition,  but  implies  it  in  Ann.  xv. 
6.  ("Cur  enim  exercitum  Rouianuin  a 
Tigranocertis  deductum  :'  Cur  deserta 
per  otium  quae  hello  defenderant '/'") 

^"  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  3. 

3"  Tills  is  clearly  the  meaning  of  the 
threat — "  Se  tributa  et  leges,  et  pro  um- 
bra regis  Romanum  jus  victis  iuipositu- 
rmn."  It  was  not  likely  to  conciliate 
the  Armenians. 

*"  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  7. 

*'  Ibid.  ch.  9. 

♦2  See  text,  pp.  56-58. 

*3  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  10.  The  infantry 
had  the  support  of  some  troops  of  Pan- 
nonian  horse,  which  fled,  however,  on 
the  aiiproach  of  Volaga.ses. 

•••'  ■•  Hostem  instare."    (Tacit.  1.  s.  c.) 

«»Ibid.  XV.  11. 

*'  Arsamosata  must  not  be  confounded 
Trith  Samosata,  now  Sumeisat.    Samo-    i 


sata  was  situated  on  the  Euphrates 
(Sliab  xvi.  3.  S  3|,  from  which  Arsamo- 
sata was  at  least  forty  (Roman)  miles 
distant  (Tac.  Aim.  xv.  1(5;. 

■"Tac.  Ann.  xv.  13. 

■"*  '•  Veniiet  propere;  signa  et  aquilas, 
et  nomen  relicjuum  infeTicis  exercitus 
tueretur."     (Ibid.  ch.  11.) 

<"  Ibid.  ch.  16. 

5»Dio  Cass.   Ixii.  21.     Compare  Ta<-. 

.41171.  XV.  15. 

5'  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  15. 

62  Ibid.  ch.  16. 

"  Dio  Cass.  Ixii.  33;  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  17. 

^^  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  34. 

"  Ibid.  ch.  35. 

59  Tacitus  compares  the  powers  novf 
granted  to  Corbulo  with  those  whicK 
weie  entrusteil  to  Pompey  by  the  (Ja 
binian  law.  (See  on  this  Merivale,  Ho 
man  Einpire.  vol.  i.  p.  (Hi.) 

5'  Dio  attributes  to  Nero  at  this  time 
the  proposal  of  exactly  those  condi- 
tions of  peace  which  he  rejected  (Dio 
Cass.  Ixii.  2-2}.  He  is  to  be  corrected 
from  Tacitus  (Ann.  xv.  35). 

^'*  See  Tac.  Ann.  xv.  36,  where  there  is 
mention  of  his  obtaining  picked  cohorts 
from  Egypt  and  lllyricum. 

s"  Ibid!  ch.  37. 

«»  Ibid.  ch.  38. 

<"  Ibid.  chs.  39-31. 

"2  The  arrangement  was  made  in  the 
summer  of  a.d.  63.  Tiridates  did  not 
make  his  appearance  at  Rome  till  the 
spring  of  a.d.  66.  (See  Clinton,  F.  Ji., 
vol  i.  p.  48.) 

63  Dio  Cass.  Ixiii.  1,  3. 

"'I  This  is  the  meaning  of  Dio  (Ixiii.  7), 
where  vnep  toi/  'loytov  has  been  generally 
translated  "across  the  Adriatic,"  in- 
stead of  "above"  or  "round  the  head 
of  the  Adriatic,"  which  is  the  true  mean- 
ing. 

"5  Sueton.  Neron.  §  30.  Dio  agrees 
(Ixiii.  3). 

6'  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

6'  According  to  this  author,  Tiridates 
said—"  Master,  I  am  a  descendant  of 
Arsaces,  a  brother  of  the  kings  Volaga- 
sus  and  Pacorus;  but  I  am  thy  slave.  I 
have  come  hither  to  thee,  who  art  my 
(Jod,  to  wdishij)  thee,  as  I  would  Mitli- 
ras;  and  fiom  henceforth  my  fate  will 
be  whatever  thou  makest  it.  For  thou 
art  my  Fate  and  my  Fortune."  (Dio 
Cass.  Ixiii.  5.) 

»8  Dio  Cas.s.  1.  s.  c;  Sueton.  Ner.  §  13. 

">'  Dio  Cass.  Ixiii.  7. 

">  Writers  on  Roman  history  have  nofc 
always  seen  this.  But  Dean  Merivale 
well  observes,  in  concluding  his  notice 
of  the  events—"  While  Tn-idates  did 
homage  for  his  kingdom  to  Nero,  he 
ii-ds  suffered  to  place  Itintself  really  un- 
der tile  protect  ion  of  Vologcsus"  (Ronuin 
Empire,  vol.  vii.  p.  36). 

"  Pacorus  is  mentioned  as  king  of 
Parthiaby  Martial  in  an  epigram  written 
under  Domitian,  ))robably  towards  the 
close  of  his  reign,  which  was  from  a.d. 
81   to  A.D.  96.    (Mart.   Epiy.   ii.   30,  3 ) 


626 


TBS!  SiXfll  MONARCEf. 


[CH.  XVlL 


Clinton  dates  the  epigram  a.d.  94  or  95 
IF.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  ?9). 

"See  Sueton.  Ner.  %  57;  Vesp.  §  6; 
Domit.  §2;  Tac.  Hist.  iv.  51;  Dio  Cass. 
l.\vi.  11;  Joseph.  Bell.  Jud.  vii.  5,  §  2, 
and  7,  §  2, 

'3  Vaillaat,  Arsacid.  Irnper.  pp.  249- 
292;  Heeren,  Manual  of  Ancieid  Histo- 
ry, p.  303,  E.  T. ;  Plate  in  Smith's  Dic- 
tionary of  Gi'eek  and  Roman  Biogra- 
phy, vol.  i.  pp.  358,  359. 
*  '4  Acoin  of  Pacorus,  bearinghis  name, 
has  the  date  ©IIT  Aato-iow,  or  June,  a.d. 
78. 

"The  coins  which  run  from  AHT  (a.d. 
52)  to  HIIT  (AD.  7(5)  are  thought  to  pre- 
sent two  distinct  types  of  face,  one  of 
which  is  found  always  before  a.d.  62, 
and  the  other  always  after  that  date. 
This  seems  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  best 
luimismatologists,  as  MM.  Longperier 
and  De  Bartliolomei,  Mr.  Lindsay,  and 
the  late  Mr.  De  Sails.  For  my  own  part, 
I  confess  1  am  unable  to  detect  any 
clear  difference. 

"*  Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage,  p.  87. 

"In  the  British  Museum  Collection, 
arranged  by  the  late  Mr.  De  Sails,  these 
names  are  adopted. 

'8  By  Mr.  Lindsay  {History  and  Coin- 
age, pp.  71-101). 

'^  Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage,  p.  87. 

»»  See  text,  pp.  153,  154.  The  revolt 
appears  to  have  broken  out  in  a.d.  58 
(Tac.  Ann.  xiii.  37).  We  hear  of  it  as 
continuing  in  a.d.  60  (ibid.  xiv.  25),  and 
again  in  a.d.  62  (ibid.  xv.  1).  From  this 
time  we  have  no  distinct  mention  of  it 
until  A.D.  75,  when  it  appears  from  Jo- 
sephus  (Bell.  Jud.  vii.  7,  §  4)  that  the  re- 
volt had  succeeded,  and  that  a  king 
ruled  in  Hyrcania  who  was  completely 
independent. 

CHAPTER  XVn. 

1  The  peace  dates  from  the  year  a.d. 
62,  when  the  arrangement  was  made 
■with  Corbulo  (see  text,  pp.  159,  160).  It 
was  not  infringed  until  the  great  expe- 
dition of  Trajan  in  a.d.  115. 

2  See  text,  p.  161. 

=  Tacit.  Hist.  ii.  82. 

*  Sueton.  Vesp.  §  6;  Tac.  Hist.  iv.  51. 

6  Tacit.  Hist.  1.  s.  c. 

*  Joseph.  Bell.  Jud.  vii.  5,  §  2. 

7  Ibid.  vii.  7,  §  1. 

*  Joseph.  Bell.  Jud.  vii.  7,  §  2. 

*  This  may  possibly  have  been  the  let- 
ter to  which  Dio  Cassius  alludes  (Ixvi. 
11),  wherein  Volagases  addressed  the 
Roman  emperor  thus: — "  Arsaces,  King 
of  Kings,  to  Flavius  Vespasianus,  sends 
greeting";  whereto  Vespasian  was  con- 
tent to  reply  with  very  palpable  irony, 
"  Flavius  Vespasianus  to  Arsaces,  King 
of  Kings,  sends  greeting."  It  is,  how- 
ever, on  the  whole  more  likely  that  the 
letter  with  this  heading  was  provoked 
by  the  refusal  of  Vespasian  to  help  the 
Parthian  monarch  against  the  Alani. 

'"A.D.  75. 

II  The  Alani  are  first  mentioned  by 


Dionysius  the  Geographer  (b.c.  30-10\ 
who  joins  them  with  the  Daci  and  tlm 
Tauri  (Perieg.  305,  300),  and  again  places 
them  between  the  latter  and  the  Aga- 
thyrsi  (308,  309).  A  similar  position  (in 
the  south  of  Russia  in  Europe,  the  mod- 
ern Ukraine)  is  assigned  to  them  by 
Pliny  (H.  N.  iv.  12,  §  25)  and  Josephus 
Bell.  Jud.  vii.  7,  §  4).  Seneca  {Thyest. 
629)  places  them  further  west,  upon  the 
Ister.  Ptolemy  has  two  bodies  of  Alani, 
one  in  the  position  above  described,  the 
other  in  Seythia  within  the  Imaus,  north 
and  partly  east  of  the  Caspian  {Geo- 
graph.  ii.  14,  ill.  5,  vi.  14).  It  must  have 
been  from  these  last,  the  successors, 
and,  according  to  some  (Amm.  Marc. 
xxxi.  2),  the  descendants  of  the  ancient 
Massagetae,  that  the  Alani  came  who  at- 
tacked Pacorus  and  Tiridates.  Their 
alliance  with  the  Hyrcanians  shows  that 
they  rounded  the  south-east  corner  of 
the  Caspian,  and  their  passage  through 
the  Gates  into  Media  and  Armenia 
equally  indicates  that  they  invaded 
those  countries  fro7n  the  East.  The 
ethnology  of  the  Alani  has  been  much 
disputed.  Some  regard  them  as  Medes, 
some  as  Teutons,  others  as  Turks  or 
Fins.  It  is  in  favor  of  their  Finnish 
origin  that  Alani  and  Rhox-alani  are 
significant  in  Finnish,  Alani  (alain) 
meaning  "  men,"  and  Rhox-alani  (riiots- 
alain)  "  red-haired  men."  A  special 
connection  is  traced  between  the  Alani 
and  the  Os  or  Osethi  of  the  Caucasus. 

12  This  implies  a  development  of  Hyr- 
canian  power  not  otherwise  reconled, 
but  in  itself  not  improbable.  The 
"  Gates"  were  beyond  the  limits  of  Hyr- 
cania Proper,  but  closely  adjoined  upon 
it,  and  would  be  likely  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  power  which  held  the  ad- 
jacent mountain-tract. 

"  Joseph.  B.  J.  vii.  7,  §  2.  On  the  use 
of  the  lasso  by  Asiatics,  see  Herod,  vii. 
85;    Pausan.  i.  21,  §  8;  Suidas,  ad  voc. 

2«ipa,  &C. 

"  Sueton.  Domit.  §  2.  Compare  Dio 
Cass.  Ixvi.  15. 

15  Joseph.  1.  s.  c. 

1^  The  earliest  known  coin  of  Pacorus 
bears  date  ©HT,  Aanriov.     It  has  the 

legend  [Ilja/cdpo  .  .  .  SiKai'ov  [e]  IT i.<i>avov[<; 
(/)iAe]AA7)i'o[s]. 

"  The  first  period  of  struggle,  in 
which  either  state  sought  to  conquer 
territory  from  the  other,  lasted  from 
B.C.  55  to  36,  and  was  succeeded  by  sev- 
enty years  of  peace— from  B.C.  35  to  a.d. 
35.  The  second,  for  supremacy  over 
Armenia,  commenced  a.d.  35,  and  ter- 
minated A.D.  63  by  Rome's  acceptance 
of  Tiridates.  This  was  followed  by  a 
peace  which  lasted  fifty-three  years — 
from  A.D.  63  to  a.d.  115. 

'SVaillant,  Arsac.  Imp.  p.  296;  Plate 
in  Smith's  Biogr.  Diet.,  vol.  i.  p.  359; 
Lewis,  History  of  the  Parthian  Empire, 
p.  318.  Lindsay  (History  and  Coinage, 
p.  101)  suggests  that  he  was  not  the  son 
of  Volagases  I.  but  his  grandson. 


CH.  XVIII.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


627 


>*  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6,  "  Ctesiphon, 
quam  .  .  .  rex  Pacorus,  incolarutn  viri- 
bus  ampliflcatam  et  mcenibus,  Grteco 
indito  nomine,  Persidis  effecit  specimen 
Bummuin." 

*"  8ueton.  Neron.  §  57.  "  Denique,  cum 
post  viginti  annos,  adolescente  me,  ex- 
titisset  conditiouis  iucertae,  qui  se  Nero- 
nem  esse  jactaret,  tam  favorabile  nomen 
ejus  apud  Partlios  fult,  ut  veheineuter 
adjutus,  et  vix  reddifus  sit."  Tlie 
"  twenty  years"  of  tliis  passage,  dating 
from  the  death  of  Nero,  a.d.  69,  fix  the 
appearance  of  this  P.seudo-Nero  to  a.d. 
89,  the  ninth  year  of  Domitian. 

">  Phn.  Ep.  X.  16.  "Callidromum 
,  .  .  captum  a  Susa^o  in  Moesia,  &c. 

2'  Suidas  ad  voc.  mvyitt). 

^^  Zonaras,  p.  578,  B.  The  date  is  fixed 
by  the  mention  inimediatel.v  afterwards 
of  the  great  eruption  of  Vesuvius  in  the 
reign  of  Titus,  which  belongs  to  a.d.  79. 

*<  One  of  these,  of  whom  there  is  a 
coin  in  the  Brit.  Mus.  dated  BOT,  or  a.d. 
80,  81,  is  thought  by  some  to  be  the  Ar- 
tabanus  of  Zonaras.  The  other,  whose 
head  is  entirely  different,  has  been  iden- 
tified with  the  Volagases  who  succeeded 

=^  This '  legend  (U  b)1  B  h  b/.V  h  B) 

is  read  as  XDxQ  minQ  °''  ^l^tra- 
dat  malcha,  i.e.  "King  Mithridates."' 
(See  Nurnism.  Chron.  vol.  xi.  PI.  vii.  No. 
4.)  Legends  in  the  same  ciiaracter  are 
frequent  on  the  coins  of  the  later  Par- 
thian kings. 

"•  We  have,  however,  an  indication  of 
them  in  Dio  Cassius,  who.  speaking  of 
the  slight  resistance  offered  to  Trajan 
in  his  advance  upon  Babylon,  says, 
"  There  were  few  to  hinder  him,  since 
the  power  of  Parthia  had  been  brought 
low  through  the  civil  wars,  and  there 
were  still  unsubdued  rebellions"  Oxviii. 
26). 

!"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  17. 

'*  Pacorus  had  had  occasion  before 
his  death  to  make  various  complaints  to 
Trajan  (Suidas  ad  voc.  eTriKAr/fxa).  This 
would  imply  that  Rome  had  already 
taken  an  aggressive  attitude,  and  was 
preparing  the  way  for  a  rupture. 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

1  The  date  here  is  uncertain;  and  it  is 
even  not  quite  clear  whether  Exedares 
was  placed  on  the  Armenian  tliroiie  by 
Pacorus  or  Chosroes.  It  seems,  how- 
ever, scarcely  likely  that  Tiridates 
should  have  lived  much  be.yond  a.d.  100, 
or  that  Chosroes,  if  he  haid  established 
Exedares,  should  have  so  readily  de- 
posed him. 

5  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  17. 

'The  Dacian  War  occupied  Trajan 
from  A.D.  101  to  A  D.  ]0(>  The  year  ad. 
107  was  spent  in  .securing  po.sscssiou  of 
the  Dacian  territory.  (Clinton,  F.  R., 
vol   i.  pp.  ,S8-94.) 

*  Som«  good  remarks  on  these  sub- 


jects will  be  found  in  Dean  Merivale'a 
Roman  Empire,  vol.  viii.  pp.  134-153. 

^  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  29. 

'See  text,  p.  84. 

'  Dio  Cass  Ixviii.  17. 

*  Dio  calls  the  Armenian  matter  a 
mere  pretext,  and  Trajan's  love  of  glory 
the  real  cause  of  the  war  (Ixviii.  17). 

"  Ilai'Ta  TO.  npoeriKovTa  jrot>)<rei  (ibid.   1. 
s.  c  ) 
'  ■»  Clinton.  F.  R.,  vol.  i.  p.  98. 

"  See  text,  p.  168. 

'2  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  18. 

>3Ibid.  ch.  19. 

'^  Fronto,  Princip.  Hist,  in  his  Opera 
inedita,  vol.  ii.  p.  340. 

"  tiiKy\v  avcLiixov  uivona^ov  (Dio  CaSS. 
l.xviii.  19). 

"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  20. 

"Eutrop.  Breviar.  viii.  3;  Fronto, 
Princip.  Hist.\o\.  ii.  p.  349  ;  Arrian,  Fr. 
16.  Fronto  and  Arrian  were  contem- 
porary with  Trajan. 

"^'Oti  TrpcoTos  TTapa^aii'iov  Ta  (vyKeifitvti 

iTvxe  Tfi<;  6i/cr)!.    (Arrian,  1.  s.  c.) 

1"  See  Fronto,  1.  s.  c. 

2"  See  the  fragmeMt  of  Arrian  given 
by  Suidas,  ad  voc.  vi-wo-ts,  which  consists 
of  words  that  Arrian  must  have  put  in- 
to the  mouth  of  Trajan: — Ilepl  WapBafia- 

aipov  &e,  oi'vt  '.\^t5apou   cti'at,    aAA'  eai/Tov 

T))I'  yVulCTLV    OTl   ffpMTOS,  K.T,\.       (SCO  abOVC, 

note  18.) 
=  1  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  21. 

22  Arrian,  ap.  Suid.  ad  voc.  ap.fCXoyo';. 

23  Eutrop.  Breviar.  viii.  2  ;  Hist.  Mi«. 
cell.  X.  3,  p.  206  (ed.  Eyssenhardt,  Bero. 
lin.  1868). 

2«  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  19. 
2' Eutrop.  1.  s.  c;  Hist.  Misc.  1.  s.  c; 
Plin.  Ep.  X.  1.3-15. 
2«  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  21. 
2'  Dio  (?ass.  (1.  s.  c.)    Compare  ch.  18. 
"8  Ibid.  ch.  22. 

"Suidas  ad  voc.  v(t>riyria-ofTai. 

so  The  captures  of  Nisibis  and  Batnte 
are  mentioned  by  Dio  (Ixviii.  23).  The 
general  reduction  of  the  Cardueni 
(Kurds),  or  inhabitants  of  Gordyen^,  is 
attested  by  Eutropius  (1.  s.  c.)  and  the 
Historia  yiiscella  (1.  s.  c.) 

"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  22. 

'2  See  a  representation  in  Vaillant's 
Hi.it.  Ar.iac.  p.  312,  and  compare  Eckhel, 
Doct.  Num.  vol.  vi.  j),  438. 

"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  23. 

'<  So  Dean  Merivale  (Rom.  Empire. 
vol.  viii.  p.  1C2>,  following  Francke.  I 
differ  with  relu.ctance  and  hesitation  ; 
but,  on  the  whole,  Dio,  as  reported  by 
Xiphilinus,  seems  to  me  our  safest  guide 
for  tlie  general  course  of  the  events  of 
this  period. 

30  Dio  distinctly  places  rlie  earthquake 
at  Antioch  ami  Trajan's  escape  from  its 
perils  at  the  close  of  the  campaign  of 
A.D.  115.  which  he  terminates  with  the 
captures  of  Nisibis  and  Batnn^  (Xiphil. 
Kpif.  Dioii.  p.  249).  Malala  al.so  a-ssigns 
the  eartli(|uake  to  tliis  winter.  Dec  1  5 
(xi.  )).  .3.M').  I  do  not  undcT-staiid  th« 
argument  of  Clinton,  that  the  death  of 


628 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XIX, 


Pedo  (the  consul  of  ad.  115)  in  the  earth- 
quake proves  it  to  have  occurred  in  the 
preceding  winter  {F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  100>. 
Whetlier  the  earthquake  vias  in  Janu- 
ary, A.D.  115,  or  in  December  of  that 
year,  it  would  equally  fall  within  Pedo"s 
consulate. 

3"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  26.  Compare  Taylor 
in  Geograph .  Journal,  vol.  xxxv.  p.  56. 

37  Kara  to  Kdp&vi'OP  opos.      (Dio   CasS.  1. 

s.  c.)  The  Carduuian  mountain  of  Dio  is 
the  ]\lons  Masius  of  Strabo,  which  runs 
parallel  witli  the  course  of  the  Upper 
Tigris  from  Diarbekr  to  Tilleh,  and 
meets  the  river  at  Jezireh. 

38  Joh.  Malal.  1.  s.  c. 

39  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  24,  25. 

*«  Hist.  Misc.  X.  5;  Oros.  vli.  12;  Eu- 
seb.  Chron.  Can.  ii.  pp.  380,  381. 

■•1  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  26. 

^2  See  above,  note  37. 

<  3  These  are  alluded  to  by  Dio  at  the 
close  of  ch.  26.  A  passage  in  John  of 
Malala  (Chron.  xi.  p.  273;  sets  them  forth 
more  at  large.  His  account  of  them, 
however,  cannot  be  accepted,  since  it 
contradicts  Dio  and  Victor. 

■»«  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  22.  This  fragment  is 
misplaced  in  Fabricius's  generally  excel- 
lent edition  of  Dio  (Hamburg,  1752).  It 
belongs  to  the  period  covered  by  ch.  26. 

*^  The  capture  of  Hatra  is  implied  in 
the  mention  of  its  revolt  (Dio  Cass. 
Ixviii.  31). 

■"*Ibid.  ch  27.  The  only  bitumen-pits 
in  Babylonia  are  at  Hit  (the  'Is  of  Hero- 
dotus, i.  179). 

■"  Dean  Merivale  supposes  Seleucus  to 
have  held  out  after  the  fall  of  Ctesiphon 
(Bom.  Empire,  vol.  vii.  p.  163),  and  says 
its  reduction  was  left  to  Trajan's  gen- 
erals. To  me  this  seems  unlikely,  and  I 
lind  no  authority  for  the  statement. 

••8  Few  writers  notice  the  employment 
by  Trajan  of  twotleets.one  on  each  river; 
and  not  one  attempts  to  account  for  the 
transfer  of  the  Euphrates  fleet  to  the  Ti- 
gris when  there  was  already  a  flotilla 
upon  the  latter  stream.  Fabricius  alone 
notices  the  difficulty  (note  on  §  172).  I 
should  imagine  that  the  artificial  dams 
and  natural  reefs  which  cross  the  bed  of 
tlie  Tigris  between  Mosul  and  Tekrit  (La 
yard,  Nin.  and  Babylon,  p.  466)  rendered 
the  descent  of  the  vessels  in  the  later 
months  of  summer  impracticable.  That 
the  vessels  were  of  a  large  size  appears 
from  Arrian,  Fr.  19. 

<»  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  28. 

s»  This  appears  from  the  capture  of 
his  daughter  and  his  golden  throne; 
which  were  taken  by  the  Romans  who 
went  in  pursuit  of  him,  at  Susa.  (See 
Spartian.  Hadr.  §  13;  Capit.  Ant.  Pi.  §  9, 
&c.) 

»'  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  28  and  29. 

»2  Ibid.  chs.  30  and  31. 

»3  Ibid.  ch.  30. 

5<  Fronto,  Princip.  Hist.  p.  338.  "  Lega- 
tus  cum  exercitu  csesus." 

55  This  is  so  probable,  that  we  may  ac- 
cept the  evidence  of  John  of  Malala  on 


the  point  (1.  s.  c),  notwithstanding  the 
general  untrustworthiness  of  his  narra- 
tive. 
=«  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  30. 

5' Ibid.  Ixviii.  31.  Mera  Taiira  cs  T  rj  v 
'A  p  a  ^  t  a  V    ijAde  Kai  Tois  'ATpr^/tois  e7re;^ei- 

PT)(7€.  (Compare  Ixxv.  11,  12;  Herodian, 
iii.  28,  &c.) 

58  Herodian.  iii.  1. 

59  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

'"Ibid.  Ixviii.  33.  Trajan  was  about  to 
make  another  expedition  into  Southern 
Mesopotamia,  when  his  last  illness  pre- 
vented him. 

"1  Eutrop.  Breviar.  viii.  3;  Hist.  Mis- 
cell,  x.  7. 

«2  ^1.  Spart.  Hadrian.  §  5.  Spartian 
by  mistake  calls  him  Partamo-siVis. 

"  See  Vaillant,  Hist.  Arsac.  p.  319. 

^*  There  is,  I  believe,  only  a  single 
coin  which  is  thought  to  support  the 
view  that  Osrhoen6  became  a  kingdom 
dependent  on  the  Romans  at  the  acces- 
sion of  Hadrian.  This  is  described  by 
Eckhel  (Doct.  Num.  vol.  iii.  p.  512)  and 
Mionnet  (Description  de  Medailles,  vol. 
V.  p.  613),  who  both  view  it  with  suspi- 
cion. 

^5  Dio_  Cass.  Ixviii.  33.    Outw  fikv  oi  'P«- 

IxaloL,  T^5  Tc  'Apfteviai  koI  t^s  MeffOTroTa- 
/xtas  T^s  TrAet'oi'O?  toji'  re  Ildp9u)U  KpaTrjaav- 
res,  11.6.7  r\v  i-n  ovqa  av  Ka.\  /idrrjv 
iKiv&v  V  tv  cr  av  . 

«8  ^1.  Spart.  Hadrian,  §  12,  ad  fin. 

"  Ibid.  §  13. 

*8  A  coin  of  Chosroes  in  the  Brit.  Mu- 
seum bears  the  date  ®AY,  which  corre- 
sponds to  A.D.  127-8.  A  coin  ascribed  to 
Volagases  II.  by  Mr.  Lindsay,  with  the 
date  HMY  (a.d.  136-7),  has  a  head  exact- 
ly like  that  of  Chosroes  upon  it.  (See 
Lindsay,  PI.  ix.  No.  77.) 

«9  Dio  Cass.  Ixix.  15;  Xiphil.  Ep.  Dion. 
XV.  (p.  264). 

">  Vaillant,  Hist.  Arsac.  p.  323;  Eckhel, 
Doctr.  Num.  vol.  iii.  p.  537:  Lewis,  iftsi. 
of  the  Parthian  Empire,  p.  332;  Lindsay, 
History  and  Coinage,  p.  116;  Plate  in. 
Smith's  Diet,  of  Greek  and  Roman  Bi- 
ography, vol.  i.  p.  359. 

"  The  usual  legend  on  a  tetra- 
drachm  of  Volagases  II.  is  BA^IAEfiS 
BASIAEON  AP2AKOY  OAArA20Y  AI- 
KAIOY  EIlI-t-ANOYS  "HAEAAHNOS. 
His  drachms  bear  almost  universally 
the  inscription  JiylXT^>ll'  or 
XDT'a  "Iti'iS.  Volgasu  Malcha,  "King 
Volagases." 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

1  If  we  allow  Volagases  to  have  been 
even  twenty  years  of  age  when  he  first 
came  forward  as  a  claimant  of  the  Par- 
thian crown  (a.d.  77-8),  he  must  have 
been  seventy-two  at  the  death  of  Chos- 
roes in  A.D.  130. 

2  Volagases  II.  wears  a  tiara,  orna- 
mented at  the  edge  with  liooks  or  featli- 
ers.  His  nose  is  prominent,  his  ey? 
large,  hi-;  hair  curled,  his  beard  pointed 
and  wavy. 


CH.  XX.] 


TUE  SIXTH  MONARCir. 


620 


•  Dio  Cass.  Ixix.  15;  Zonaras,  p.  .'J90,  C. 
«  Ml.  Spart.  Hadrian,  i  13. 

»  Ibid.  §  17,  ad  fin. 

•  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

'  lu  the  case  of  the  Daciaus.  (Dio  Cass. 
Ixviii.  6;  Plin.  Paneg.  11,  12.) 

•  Dio  Cass.  Ixix.  15. 
9  Ibid. 

1"  This  appears  from  a  coiu  struck  in 
the  first  year  of  Aiitoniiiiis,  liaving  on 
the  obverse  the  liead  of  the  Emperor, 
and  on  the  reverse  a  female  figure,  liold- 
ing  a  bow  and  quiver  with  the  left  hand, 
and  presenting  a  crown  with  the  right, 
witli  the  inscription  PARTIIIA. 

»i  .'El.  Spart.  Hadrian.  §  13. 

>2  Jul.  Capit.  Antun.  Pi.  S  9. 

'3  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p. 
205;  Smith's  ed. 

•<  See  Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage, 
pp.  186,  187. 

•6  Jul.  Capit.  Anton.  Phil.  §  8.  "Par- 
thicum  bellum,  paratum  sub  Pio,  Marci 
et  Veri  tempore  indi.xit  Volagessus." 

"  Ibid.  Anton.  Pi.  §  9.  "  Parthorum 
regem  ab  Armenioruiu  expugnatione  so- 
ils litteris  reppulit  [Pius]." 

"  See  Jambl.  ap.  Phot.  Bibliothec. 
Cod.  xciv.  p.  i!41;  Dio  Cass.  ap.  Suid.  ad 
voc.  Maprios;  Pronto,  Epist.  ad  V^erxmi, 
ii.  1  (p.  127.  ed.  Naber). 

'*  Mos.  Choren.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  61. 

1'  Luciau.  Alex.  Pseudo-Mant.  §  27. 

^"  Ibid.  (Juomodo  Hist,  sit  conscri- 
bend.  §21. 

3'  Dio  Cass.  Ixxi.  2. 

'2  According  to  some,  he  starved  him- 
self (Lucian,  1.  s.  c);  according  to  others 
he  cut  his  throat  with  a  piece  of  glass 
(ibid.  §  27).  The  true  account  of  his 
death  is  given  by  Dio.    (1.  s.  c.    Oi/oAd- 

yaiao';  .  ,  .  aTpaToir^Soy  oAoi'  'Poj/xatKut^ 
avToi<;  7)y6)U.6a"t  KareTo^eufre  kol  6itV/)(?6tpf.) 

'^^  Dio  Cass.  ixxi.  2;  Oros.  vii.  15. 

^  Jul.  Capit.  Anton.  PItil.  §  8. 

"5  Ibid.  Ver.  Jmperat.  §  6.  "Syris 
defectionem  cogitantibus." 

2"  Ibid.  1.  s.  0. 

"'  Pronto,  Princip.  Hist.  p.  208,  ed. 
Naber. 

2"  Dio  Cass.  Ixi.  2;  Jul.  Capit.  Ver. 
Imp  §  7. 

"  Vulc.  Gall.  Avid.  Cass.  §§  5,  fi.  Com- 
pare Pronto,  Princip.  Hist.  pp.  206-208; 
where,  however,  the  credit  of  establish- 
ing a  proper  discipline  is  assigned  by 
till"  pohte  courtier  to  Verus. 

'"  Dio  Cass.  1.  S.  c.  'ETrioi'Ta  Tov  OvoKo- 
yaifroi'  yti'i'at'to?  uTrt'/xeii'e. 

"  Liician.  (Jiiomndo  historia  sit  con- 
nerih.  S  20  and  §  28. 

3-  .Iiil.  Capit.  Ant.  Phil.  §  9;  Suidas  ad 

voc.  \ir)po<;. 

3'  Suidas,  1.  s.  c.  Comp.  Jamblich.  ap. 
Phot.  Bibl.  xciv.  p.  241. 

"  Vulc.  Gall.  Avid.  Cass.  %  7;  Dio  Cass. 
Ixxi.  22-27. 

3»  Dio  Cass.  Ixxi.  3;  Vulc.  Gall.  Avid. 
Cass.  §  6. 

"  Dio  Cass.  Fr.  ap.  Suidam,  sub  voc. 
Zevyixa.. 

s'  Pronto,  Epist.  if.  I,  p.  121. 


'^  Lucian.   Qiiomodo,  &c.,  §  29. 

^^  Jul.  Cap.  Ver.  Imp.  §  7. 

<"  Dio  Cass.  Ixxi.  2;  Jul.  Capit.  Ver. 
Imp.  §  8;  Eutrop.  Brev.  viii.  5;  Oros.  vii. 
15;  Amm.  Marc  xxiii.  6.  Capilolinus 
disbelieves  the  charge  made  against  the 
Sehiuciaus. 

•"  Dio  (;ass.  1.  s.  c. 

<2  Jul.  Capit.  Ver.  Imp.%  7.  Compare 
Eckhel,  Doct.  Num.  vol.  vii.  pp.  51  and 
92. 

■'2  See  Ammian.  Marc,  xxiii.  6,  §  24. 
Compare  Jul.  Capit.  Ver.  Imp.  §  8. 

''■'  Dio  Cass.  Ixxi.  2. 

■'•'  Anun.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

•"  Kutrop.  Bj-pl'.  viii.  6:— "Tantus  ca- 
sus ixslilenti'di  fuit,  ut  .  .  .  per  Italiam 
provinciasque  maxima  homiiium  pars, 
militum  omnes  fere  copiaB  laiiguore  de- 
feceriut."    Compare  Oros.  vii.  15. 

<'  This  is  seen  most  clearly  in  the  se- 
ries of  Mesopotainian  coins,  especially 
those  of  Carrhajand  Edessa,  which  bear 
on  the  obverse  the  head  of  a  Roman 
Emperor  from  the  time  of  Aurelius  and 
Verus.  (See  Mioimet,  Description  de 
Mi'-il.  Ant.  toni.  v.  pp.  59;i-G25. 

■•"See  text,  p.  110. 

■""See  text,  p.  107. 

'"Jul.  Cap.  Avid.  Cass.  §  7;  Dio  Cass. 
Ixxi.  22. 

'^lyul.  Capit.  Ant.  Phil.  S  22.  "  Ini- 
minel)at  et  Parthicum  bellum  et  Britan- 
uieum." 

"Jul.  Capit.  Ant.  Phil.  §  26,  ad  init. 
The  "'/'ccsiau ambassadors  of  this  pas- 
sage are  undoubtedly  envoys  from  Vola- 
gases. 

"  A.D.  180.  (See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i. 
p.  178.) 

*•'  Our  authorities  for  the  time  of  Com- 
modus  are  tlu-ee  only:  Dio  in  the  Epi- 
tome of  Xiphilinus,  Ilerodian  (book  i.), 
and  Lampridius  in  the  Historia;  Augits- 
toi  Scriptores.  These  writers  are  almost 
silent  as  to  the  condition  of  the  East  at 
the  period. 

^'^  The  latest  coins  of  Volagases  III. 
bear  the  date  B*,  which  corresponds  to 
the  latter  part  of  a.d.  190  and  the  earlier 
of  A.D.  101. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

'  Reimar  and  others  have  supposed 
that  Volagases,  the  adversary  ot  Seve- 
rus,  was  the  son  of  a  SanatrrHces,  or 
Sanatruces,  on  the  strength  of  a  frag- 
ment of  Dio  Cassius  (Ixxv.  9,  ad  fin.). 
But  it  is  more  probable  tliat  the  frag- 
ment refers  to  a  dilTerent  Volat,'ases,  an 
Armenian  prince,  contemporary  with 
the  Parthian  Volagases  IV. 

3  Ilerodian.  ii.  31.  The  ex^jrcssions 
used  are  somewhat  vague— oi  t«  cn-cKeira 
Tiypiio?  Koi  Ei'M/)paTou  a<*Tpa.—a\,  icai  paai- 
Ae(?  CTTftrTfAAor,  k.t.X. 

^  llerculian.  iii.  1. 

*  Arab  tribes  from  a  very  early  period 
held  jiortioiis  of  Mesopotamia.  Xeuo- 
phon  calls  tlie  tract  between  (he  Klia- 
bour  and  the  Babylonian  alluvium 
"Arabia"  (Auab.  i.  5,  §1).    Strabo  as- 


630 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XX, 


signs  the  same  region  to ' '  Scenite  Arabs" 
(xvi.  1,  §  26).  Arabs  appear  in  Upper 
Mesopotamia  about  the  time  of  Pompey 
(Dio  Cass.  XXXV.  2).  Osrhoen6  is  reclf- 
oned  as  Arabian  by  Plutarch  (Crass.  § 
21),  and  Appian  (Parth.  p.  140,  A).  Hatra, 
or  Atra  (now  el-Hadhr).  is  first  men- 
tioned in  the  wars  of  Trajan,  and  is  al- 
ways said  to  be  Arabian.  (See  Dio  Cass. 
Ixviii.  31;  Ixxv.  ia-12;  Herodian.  iii.  28; 
&c.) 

^  Herodian.  iii.  1  and  27. 

« Ibid.  iii.  1. 

'  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  1. 

^  Ibid,      Oi  ixev  '0<rpoT)i'o't    k  al    oi    'ASi- 
a^r)  vol    OLTrocrTOLVTe^    /cat    NtVt^ic   TroAiop- 
Kovmf^,  (c.T.A. 
9  Ibid. 

'"  Dio  tells  a  story,  which  has  a  some- 
what apocrj'phal  air,  to  illustrate  the 
sufferings  of  the  army.  An  especially 
dry  summer  had,  he  tells  us,  caused  the 
springs  generally  to  fail,  and  the  troops 
on  their  way  through  the  desert  were 
so  parched  with  drought,  and  so  choked 
with  dust,  that  they  could  no  longer 
converse,  but  could  barely  articulate 
"Water,  water."  At  length  they  reach- 
ed a  well,  but  the  water  was  so  foul  that 
at  first  none  would  drink  it.  Seeing 
this,  Severus  caused  a  goblet  to  be  filled 
ior  himself,  and  in  the  sight  of  the 
troops  swallowed  the  whole  at  a  draught. 
The  men  then  consented  to  drink  and 
were  refreshed.    (Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  2.) 

n  Dio  says  vaguely  that  Severus 
"gave  dignity"  to  Nisibis  (Ixxv.  3,  a^iui- 
fko.  Tjj  Ni(n'(3ci  Sous).  The  nature  of  the 
dignity  appears  from  the  coins,  which 
give  Nisibis  the  titles  of  KOAHNIA  and 
MHTPOnOAI2.  (See  Mionnet,  Descrrj- 
tion,  etc.,  tom.  v.  pp.  625-628.) 

'*  Dio  (iass.  1.  s.  c.  Compare  Spartian. 
Sev.  Imp.  %  9.  In  commemoration  of 
these  successes  Severus  took  the  epi- 
thets of  Arabicus  and  Adiabenicus, 
which  are  frequent  in  his  inscriptions 
and  on  his  coins.  (See  Clinton,  F.  R. 
vol.  i.  p.  196.) 

13  See  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv  9. 

i<  Spartianus.  See  his  "  Life  of  Seve- 
rus," §  15,  where  we  are  told  that  Seve- 
rus, as  soon  as  he  arrived  in  Syria, 
"  Parthos  summovit." 

"  "  .(Estate  igitur  jam  exeunte  ingres- 
sus,"  &c.  (Spartian.  Sev.  Imp.  %  16,  ad 
init.) 

1^  Herodian.  iii.  1. 

"  Compare  on  this  subject  Herodian, 
iii.  2?  with  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  9. 

'*  This  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  ex- 
pression of  Dio  (Ixxv.  9,  ad  fin.    fiepos  re 

rri^'Ap^evia^  ctti  Tjj  eiprfi'ifj  ^aptVaro), which 

must  denote  the  cession  to  Volagases  of 
some  part  of  the  Roman  Armenia  (Ar- 
menia Minor). 

1"  Herodian.  iii.  27,  ad  fin. 

2"  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  9. 

2'  This  seems  to  be  tlie  only  way  of 
reconcfling  Dio  (Ixxv.  9)  with  Herodian 
(iii.  28,  ad  init.) 

»2  See  text,  p.  176, 


2'  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

"<  Herodian's  narrative  is  absurd  as  it 
stands;  but  there  may  be  some  truth  in 
his  statement  that  the  Romans  found 
the  Parthians  unprepared  {vpocrn^rdfTei 

oi 'PaJjuatoi  anapaaK^vdo'TOiS  roi?  ^ap^apot?, 
iii.  30). 

25  Spartianus  (Sev.  Imp.  §  16.  "  Ctesi- 
phontem  pulso  rege  pervenit "). 

2'  Herodian.  1.  s.  c.  Dio  implies  the 
flight  of  Volagases,  when  he  says  oi  p.€v- 
Toi  ouTc  rhp  OvoK6ya.L<Tov  iireSiia^tv  [6  2e- 
P^posJ. 

2'  Compare  Dio  Cass.  Ixxr.  9  with  He- 
rodian. iii.  30;  and  see  also  Spartian. 
Sev.  Imp.  %  16:  "  Oppidum  cepit,  et  re- 
gem  fugavit,  et  plurimos  inter em.it. ^'' 

28  Spartian.  Sev.  Imp.  §  16. 

2^  Ibid.  "Longius  ire  non  potuit." 
Dio,  however,  expresses  surprise  that  no 
pursuit  was  attempted. 

3"  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  9. 

3' See  text,  p.  179. 

^2  Dio  Cass.  ixxv.  10.  It  is  uncertain 
whether  Herodian  means  to  describe  the 
first  or  second  attack.  He  mentions 
one  siege  only,  and  places  it  before  that 
of  Ctesiphon  (iii.  28,  29);  but  the  narra- 
tive of  Dio,  which  is  at  once  more  mi- 
nute, and  internally  more  probable, 
seems  preferable. 

'3  One  of  these  was  Lsetus,  who  a  lit- 
tle earlier  had  saved  Nisibis  (see  above, 
note  13).  Severus  (according  to  Dio) 
grew  jealous  of  him,  because  the  sol- 
diers declared  that  they  would  follow 
no  other  leader.  Marius  Maximus,  how- 
ever, assigned  his  death  to  a  different 
cause,  and  placed  it  earlier.  (See  Spar- 
tian. Sev.  Imp.  §  15.) 

^*  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  11. 

35  Ibid.  Ixxv.  12.  The  ruins  of  this 
temple  still  exist  at  El  Hadhr. 

3«  The  combustible  material  used  is 
said  to  have  been  naphtha,  the  flame  of 
which  was  thought  to  be  almost  inextin- 
guishable. (Dio  Cass.  Fr.  175,  §  2;  Ixxv. 
11.  Compare  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6,  p. 
406.) 

"Herodian.  iii.  28. 

3s  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  11,  ad  fin. 

33  Ibid.  ch.  12. 

4°  Spartian  tells  us  {Sev.  Imp.  §  16) 
that  (5tesiphon  was  taken  at  the  begin- 
ning of  winter  ("hiemali  prope  tem- 
pore"). Herodian  places  the  siege  of 
Hatra  at  tlie  time  of  the  great  heats  (iii. 
28). 

■"  Dio  says  that  one  of  the  officers  of 
Severus  offered  to  take  Hatra  if  550  Eu- 
ropean troops  were  placed  at  his  dis- 
posal. The  repl.y  of  Severus  was, 
"  Whence  am  I  to  get  such  a  niunber  of 
soldiers  ?" 

42  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  13. 

<3  Spartian.  Sev.  Imp.  §  18: — "  Adia- 
benos  in  tributarios  coegit."  This  au- 
thority is  superior  to  that  of  Aureliug 
Victor,  wlio  says — "Adiabena  quoque, 
ni  terrarum  macies  despectaretur.  in 
tributarios  concessisset.    (De  Cces.  §  20.) 

<<  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  pp.  204-208. 


CH.  XXI.] 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


631 


<"*  See  text,  p.  24. 

*»  Clinton,  F.  K.  vol.  i.  p.  218. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

•  The  negotiations  between  Caracallus 
and  Artabanus,  which  Herodian  de- 
scribes (iv.  18-20),  must  have  taken 
place  in  the  course  of  this  year.  (See 
CUnton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  234.) 

2  See  Lindsay,  History  and  Coinage, 
pp.  11.3.  114. 

s  Die  Cass.  Ixxvii.  12. 

<  Ibid.  Ixxvii.  19  and  21.  The  IlapSo? 
of  the  latter  chapter  must,  it  would 
seem,  be  the  OuoAdyaipos  of  the  former. 

•Herodian.  1.  s.  c.    Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  1. 

*  Dio  Cass.  Ixxvii.  22  ;  Herodian.  iv. 
13  ;  Spanheim,  De  Usu  Numism.  Diss, 
xii. 

'  Dio  Cass.  Ixxvii.  12.  (Compare  Gib- 
bon, vol.  i.  p.  343  ;  Smith's  edition.) 

8  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

»  Ibid.  Ixxvii.  21. 

'"  Tliese  were  a  certain  Tiridatos,  who 
seems  to  have  been  an  Armenian  prince, 
and  a  Cynic  philosopher,  named  Anti- 
oclms  (Dio  Cass.  Ixxvii.  19). 

'»  Ibid.  Ixxvii.  21. 

'2  H<>rodian.  iv.  18: — Ueixnei  Sk  -npea- 
jSciaf  Kcu  Buy  pa  n  darj^  uAi)?  re  ffoAu- 
TeAoO?    K  at    T  i  XI'  r)t;    n  o  IK  i  Kr)s  . 

>' Herodian.  iv.  18. 

i<  See  Dio  c;ass.  Iv.  23,  24. 

*°  Ta  juei'  npuiTa  roLavTa  €7rt(rTeAA(oi',  tt  a - 
p  7)  T  e  r  T  o  .     (Herodian.  iv.  19.) 

"  Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  1. 

1'  Herodian.  iv.  20.  The  full  passajje 
in  Herodian  is  as  follows  : — "  But  when 
Antoninus  urped  his  request,  and  added 
fresh  giil>i  and  oaths  in  confirmation 
of  his  serious  meaning  and  real  friendli- 
ness, the  Barbarian  yielded,  and  pro- 
mi.sed  to  give  him  his  daughter,  and 
addressed  him  as  his  future  son-in-law. 
Now.  when  this  was  noised  abroad,  the 
Partliiaiis  made  ready  to  receive  the 
Roman  moiuirch,  and  were  transported 
with  joy  at  the  pr()si)eet  of  an  eternal 
peace.  Antoninus  thereupon  crossed 
the  rivers  without  hindrance,  and  enter- 
ed Parthia,  just  as  if  it  were  his  own 
laud.  Everywhere  along  his  route  the 
people  greeted  him  with  sacrifices, 
and  dressing  their  altars  with  garlands, 
offered  upon  them  all  manner  of  spices 
and  incense;  whereat  he  made  pretence 
of  being  vastly  pleased.  As  his  journey 
now  approached  its  close,  and  he  drew 
near  to  the  Parthian  Court,  Artabanus, 
instead  of  awaiting  liis  arrival,  went 
out  and  met  him  in  the  spacious  plain 
before  the  city,  with  intent  to  entertain 
his  daughter's  bridegroom  and  his  own 
son  in-law.  Meanwhile  the  whole  mul- 
titude of  the  barljarians,  crowned  with 
freshly  gathered  (lowers,  and  clad  in 
gaiineuts  worke<i  witli  gold  and  varions- 
l.V  dj'ed,  were  keeping  holiday,  and 
dancing  grsicefully  to  the  sound  of  the 
flute,  tlie  pipe,  and  the  drum,  an  amuse- 
ment wherein  they  take  great  delight 


after  they  have  indulged  freely  in  wine. 
Now,  after  all  the  people  had  come  to- 
gether, they  got  off  their  horses,  hung 
their  quivers  and  their  bows,  and  gave 
themselves  wholly  to  libations  and  re- 
vels. The  concourse  of  barbarians  was 
very  great,  and  they  stood  arranged  in 
no  order,  since  they  did  not  apprehend 
any  danger.  l)ut  were  all  endeavoring  to 
catch  a  sight  of  the  bridegroom.  Sud- 
denly .\ntoninus  gives  his  men  the 
signal  to  fall  on,  and  massacre  the  bar- 
barians. These,  amazed  at  the  attack, 
and  finding  themselves  struck  and 
wounded,  forthwith  took  to  flight.  Arta- 
banus was  hurried  away  by  his  guards, 
and  put  on  a  horse,  whereby  he  escaped 
with  a  few  followers.  The  rest  of  the 
barbarians  were  cut  to  pieces,  since 
they  coidd  not  reach  their  horses, 
which,  when  they  dismounted,  they 
had  allowed  to  graze  freely  over  the 
plain;  nor  were  they  able  to  make  use 
of  their  legs,  since  these  were  entangled 
in  the  long  flowing  garments  which  de- 
scended to  their  heels.  Manj-  too  had 
come  without  quivers  or  bows,  as  they 
were  not  wanted  at  a  wedding.  Anto- 
ninus, when  he  had  made  a  vast  slaugh- 
ter, and  taken  a  multitude  of  prisoners, 
and  a  ri<,-h  booty,  moved  oft  without 
meeting  any  resistance.  He  allowed 
his  soldiers  to  burn  all  the  cities  and 
villages,  and  to  carry  awa.y  as  plunder 
whatever  they  chose."  No  doubt  this 
pa.ssage  contains  a  good  deal  of  rhetoric; 
l)ut  it  describes  a  scene  which  we  can 
scarcely  suppose  to  be  imaginary. 

"Ramsay  in  Smith's  Bing.  Diet.  vol. 
i.  p.  608;  Champagny,  Lex  C('sars  du 
:ii)ie.  Sircle.  vol.  i.  p.  38.5,  &c. 

1' There  is  something  supicious  in  the 
extreme  brevity  of  Dio's  narrative 
(Ixxviii.  1),  and  in  his  statement  that  he 
has  nothing  important  to  tell  of  the  war 
beyond  the  fact  that  when  two  soldiers 
were  (luarrelliug  over  a  wineskin, 
Caracallus  ordei'ed  them  to  cut  it  in  two 
with  their  swords,  and  they  obeyed  him. 
His  account  of  the  war  in  this  pl.ace 
does  not  harmonize  with  his  statement 
in  ch.  26,  that  Artabaniis  was  violently 
angry  at  the  treatment  which  he  had  re- 
ceived and  determined  to  re.sent  it. 
Again,  the  price  which  he  allows  that 
Macrinus  paid  for  peace  (ch.  27),  is 
altogether  exorbitant  unless  it  was 
agreed  to  as  compensation  for  some  ex- 
traordinary outrage. 

'•"'  Dio  says  that  there  was  no  engage- 
ment at  all  between  the  Parthinns  and 
the  Romans  (Ixxviii.  1).  Spartia?)us 
speaks  of  a  battle  in  whii'h  Caracallus 
defeated  the  Satraps  of  Artabanus  (.4»i(. 
CnracttU.  §  ti).  Dio  makes  the  eountries 
invaded  AdiabenCi  and  Media.  Spar- 
tianus  indicates  a  more  southern  local- 
ity by  saying  that  the  invmling  army 
passed  through  Babylonia.  ("  per  Baby- 
lon ios,''  1.  s.  c.) 

^'  Spartiantis   says  "  per  Cadusioa  et 


R33 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XXt 


Babylonios"  {Ant.  Caracall.  §  6");  but 
this  is  impossible,  since  the  Cadusii  lay 
upon  the  Caspian. 

2*  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  1.  The  mention  of 
Arbela  indicates  this  route. 

33  Assyrian  and  Persian  monarchs  con- 
stantly conveyed  to  Arbela  great  crimi- 
nals to  be  executed  there.  (See  the 
Journal  of  As.  Society  for  1865,  p.  195, 
note  17.)  Rabbinical  tradition  placed 
there  the  tomb  of  Seth.  (Schindler's 
Pentaglott.  col.  144.) 

24  See  Gibbon,  vol.  i.  p.  272  (Smith's 
edition).  Both  the  phrases  quoted  are 
used  by  this  writer. 

25  Herodian.  iv.  21 ;  Spal-tian.  Ant. 
Car.  §  6. 

2«  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  3. 

2'  Ibid.  Ixxviii.  5;  Herodian.  iv.  24; 
Spart.  1.  s.  c;  Eutrop.  Brei\  viii.  11. 

2»  Herodian.  iv.  27;  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii. 
26. 

29  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  26. 

3'  I  follow  here  the  narrative  of  Hero- 
dian (iv.  30),  since  the  passage  of  Dio 
which  contained  an  account  of  the 
struggle  is  too  much  mutilated  to  be  in- 
telligible. 

='  Herodian.  iv.  28. 

32  Ibid.  iv.  30  (p.  172). 

33  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  26. 

s*  Herodian.  iv.  30  (p.  173). 

35  So  Herodian,  1.  s.  c. 

3"  Herodian  makes  the  third  day's  bat- 
tle terminate,  like  those  of  the  two  pre- 
ceding days,  without  decisive  result;  but 
Dio  evidently  regarded  the  Romans  as 
vanquished. 

3'  See  the  fragment  of  Dio,  which  (as 
restored  by  Fabricius)  reads  thiis:— tj; 

ToO  MaKpi'i'OU  4>vyXI  aBvfxr]<rdtii.ei'ot  rjTTrjflr)- 
aav. 

3s  See  Dio  Cass.  Ixxviii.  27. 

39  The  ignominy  was  cloaked  under  the 
transparent  fiction  that  the  payment  was 
\)y  way  of  presents  to  the  Parthian  mon- 
arch and  his  lords  (Dio  Cass.  I.  s.  c). 

*"  Agathias,  ii.  26. 

*'  Agathias,  ii.  25.  'Hi'  Se  ye  o5to5  tjj 
fiayLKji  KaTOXOS  iepovpyt'a,  Kal  aiiTOvpyoi  Tmv 
anopprjTijiv. 

"  See  Malcolm's  History  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  pp.  94,  95.  Compare  Gibbon.  De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  1.  pp.  322,  333,  Smith's 
edition. 

■>3  Malcolm,  p.  95. 

*'^  See  text,  pp.  199.  200. 

■""  Mos.  Choren.  Hist.  Amen.  ii.  68. 

"  Strab.  XV.  3,  §  24. 

1^  See  text,  p.  48. 

IS  Agathias,  ii.  25. 

<9  Herodian.  iv.  30,  p.  174. 

5"  Herodian  (vi.  6)  says: — 'ApTafe'pfrj;  6 

Jl  €  ptT  Ci  y  /3a(7tA€i>5,  juera  to  Tlapdvaiov^ 
Ka9e\e~tv  Koi  T^?  Kara  rtji'  ai'aToAiji'  apx^js 
wapaAOffai.  'ApTa^avov  Tov  nporepoi'  Ka\ov- 
ju.e»/oi'  Toy  fxcyay  ^ao"tAea  /cat  Sv<ri  6ta6?J)ua<7t 
XP'ip.eyov  a-rreKTCit'e.  Dio.  it  is  true.  Seems 
to  have  called  him  merely  "a  certain 
Persian"  ('Aprafepf))?  n?  IlepCTT)?)  ;  and 
later  writers  indulged  in  various  tales  as 
to  his  low  birth.    (Agathias,  ii.  27;  Gib- 


bon, Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  331; 
Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  1.  pp. 
89,  90.)  But  these  stories  are  probably 
myths,  which  clustered  about  the  foun- 
der of  the  second  Persian  kingdom  as  so 
many  similar  ones  did  about  the  founder 
of  the  first,  Cyrus.  (Herod,  i.  107-128.) 
On  the  abundance  of  such  myths  in  con- 
nection with  the  person  of  Artaxerxes, 
see  Moses  of  Chorene  {Hist.  Arm.  ii.  67), 
who  speaks  of  "  the  dream  of  desire,  and 
the  judgment,  and  the  fire  that  sprang 
from  Sassan,  the  imprisoned  flock  and 
the  white  eye,  the  predictions  of  the 
soothsayers,  and  all  that  follows  them — 
Artaxerxes'  incest  and  his  murders,  the 
wild  eloquence  of  the  Magian  damsel  ow- 
ing to  the  calf,  &c. ;  the  she-goat,which, 
protected  by  the  Eagle,  suckled  the  boy ; 
the  information  of  the  Crow,  and  the 
Lion's  remiss  defence,  the  service  ren- 
dered by  the  Wolf,  and  the  strange  trial 
of  strength,  and  all  the  other  silly  fables 
which  are  related  in  the  books,  but  which 
I  do  not  intend  to  repeat." 

"The  exact  date  of  the  rebellion  of 
Artaxerxes  is  unknown.  Roman  writers 
only  tell  us  that  he  conquered  Artabanus 
and  began  to  threaten  Rome  in  a.d.  226, 
The  coins  confirm  this,  but  add  nothing. 
Abulpharagius,  the  Arabian  writer,  says 
that  Artaxerxes  founded  the  New  Per- 
sian kingdom  in  the  third  year  of  Alex- 
ander Severus,  or  a.d.  224  (p.  80). 

52  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
91. 

53  Ibid. 

5''  Dio.  Cass.  Ixxx.  3. 

55  So  Malcolm,  following  Persian  au- 
thorities.    (History  of  Persia,  1.  s.  c.) 

5«  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. ;  Herodion.  vi.  6,  7; 
Agathias,  ii.  25,  &c. 

5'  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

5*  A  coin  of  Artavasdes  has  been  fig- 
ured and  described  by  Mr.  Taylor  in  the 
Numismatic  Chronicle  for  1871,  p.  226, 
and  pi.  ii.  No.  7.  The  same  coin  is  fig- 
ured also,  but  very  poorly,  in  Lindsay 
(History  and  Coinage,  pi.  iv.  No.  95),  and 
is  there  assigned  wrongly  to  Volagases 
V.    The  legend  upon  it  can  be  read  as 

^]2mK    (Artabazu)    or     Artavasdes. 

Some  coins  of  this  king  bear  the  date 
©A*,  or  A.D.  227. 

59  Procopius  de  .3Sdific.  Justinian,  iii. 
1.  The  native  historians  give  this  prince 
the  name  of  Chosroes,  but  do  not  ac- 
knowledge his  close  relationship  to  Ar- 
tabanus. (See  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Arm.  ii. 
64-70.) 

'"Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c.  On  the  efforts 
which  were  made  by  the  Armenian  king 
to  help  Artabanus,  see  Mos.  Chor.  H.  A. 
ii.  68,  70, 

"  Dio  Cass,  ut  supra.  Compare  Hero- 
dian. vi.  15. 

"2  Mos.  Chor.  H.  A.  ii.  70. 

'3  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  \ 
p.  96.  note. 

«■•  See  text,  p.  130. 

«5  See  text,  p.  log. 


CH.  XXII.] 


TEE  SIXTH  MONAROHT. 


63S 


CHAPTER  XXII. 
1  Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture, 
vol.  ii.  p.  4ii2. 
»  See  Art.  xxii.  pp.  467-470. 
3  Vol.  ii.  pp.  4:^3-4^5. 

*  See  Arrian,  Fr.  15:  'Arpai,  ttoAis  (xe- 
Tafu  Eu<|)pdTov  Kai  Tiypr/Tos.  Compare  Dio 
Cass.  Ixviii.  31;  Ixxv.  10;  Herodiaii.  iii. 
1  anil  28;  Arrian,  Fr.  6. 

5  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.  "  Hatram  .  .  . 
oppidum,  quod  diruetidum  adorti  tein- 
poribus  variis  Trajanus  et  Severus.  prin- 
cipes  bellicosi.  cum  exercitibus  psene 
deleti  sunt."  See  above,  pp.  179  and  197. 

•  Herodian.  iii.  28. 

'  Dio  Cass.  Ixxv.  13. 

8  Herodian,  iii.  1  and  37. 

9  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.  "  Hatram  .  .  . 
vetus  oppidum  in  media  solitudine  posi- 
tuui,  oliinque  desertum." 

'"In  this  description  I  follow  especi- 
ally the  account  given  by  Mr.  Ross,  {Geo- 
graph  Journal,  1.  s.  c.)  On  some  points 
I  am  further  indebted  to  Mr.  Ainsworth 
(Geographical  Journal,  vol.  xi.  pp.  13  et 
xeq  ;  Researches  in  Mesopotamia,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  165  et  seqq.),  and  oiio  thers  to  Mr. 
Fergiiss>>n  (History  of  Architecture,  vol. 
ii.  pp.  42;i-435). 

1 1  The  width  was  a  little  more  than  ten 
feet. 

1^  Mr.  Ross's  plan  shows  one  gateway 
only — viz.,  the  eastern  one.  Mr.  Ains- 
worth, however,  states  that  there  were 
four.  The  plan  which  the  latter  travel- 
ler sent  with  his  memoir  to  the  Royal 
Geographical  Society  was,  unfortu- 
nately, not  published. 

'  3  Mr.  Ross  represents  the  watercourse 
as  straight,  but  Mr.  Ainsworth  says  it  is 
toi-tuous.     (Researches,  vol.  ii.  p.  167.) 

1*  In  the  East  the  Temple  was  com- 
monly, or  at  any  rate  frequently,  an  ad- 
junct of  the  palace.  Two  temples  form- 
ed part  of  the  old  Assyrian  palace  at  Ca- 
lali  orNimrud.  (See  Ancient  Monarcliies, 
vol.  i.  pp.  319-320,  3nd  edition.)  A  tem- 
ple was  included  within  Sargon's  palace 
at  Khorsahad  (ibid.  p.  2%).  Mr.  Fergus- 
son  regards  the  grand  bviildings  at  Fer- 
sepolis  as  "  Palace- Temples." 

"These  measurements  were  furnish- 
ed to  Mr  Fergusson  by  Mr,  Layard. 
(Hist,  of  Architecture,  vol.  ii.  pp.  423-4.) 
Mr.  Ross  regarded  the  enclosure  as  "  a 
square  of  300  good  paces'"  (query,  yards?) 
See  the  Oeograph.  Journal,  vol.  ix.  p. 
468. 

"Ainsworth,  Researches,  &c..  vol.  ii. 
p.  166.  At  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
row  of  small  chambers  was  a  hall  of 
some  size. 

"'  So  Mr.  Ross  (Geogrnph.  Journal,  1. 
8.  c.)  But  from  the  drawuig  it  -would 
seem  that  the  estimate  is  insufficient. 

"*  Mr.  Ross  says  "32  long  paces,"  by 
which  he  seems  to  mean  "  steps."  Mr. 
Ainsworth  says  "'  31  yards." 

" '  ••  Twelve  long  paces"  (Ross).  "  Four- 
teen yards"  (Ainsworth). 

2»  Mr.  Ross  and  Mr.  Ainswoi-th  agree  in 
this  estimate. 


21  The  "  female  form  floating  in  air" 
was  confined  to  the  hall  marked  No.  II. 
on  the  plan  [see  PI.  IV.  Fig.  2  J.  The 
stones  of  the  other  arches  bore  heads 
both  male  and  female,  some  with  "  very 
curious  curling  bagwigs."  (Compare  the 
bushy  wigs  on  many  of  the  Parthian 
coins.) 

2^  In  the  Hall  marked  No.  H.  on  the 
plan  [see  PI.  IV.  Fig  2J,  the  heads  were 
uniformly  three,  as  in  Plate  V.  Fig.  1. 
In  Hall  No.  V.  each  pillar  bore  two 
heads.  Hall  No.  VH.  seems  to  have 
had  no  pillars.  The  north  side  is  in  ruins: 
the  south  is  ornamented  with  a  row  of 
eight  human-headed  bulls,  standing  out 
from  the  walls  as  far  as  their  shoulders 
at  a  distance  from  the  ground  of  about 
ten  feet.  (Ross  in  Geographical  Journal, 
vol.  ix.  p.  4(i9.) 

23  See  above,  note  21. 

2<  Ainsworth,  Researches,  vol.  ii.  p. 
165.  Mr.  Ross  believed  that  he  found 
traces  of  a  staircase  leading  to  the  upper 
rooms  at  the  southern  end  of  the  build- 
ing. (Geograph.  Journal,  vol.  ix.  p. 
470.) 

26  See  the  ground  plan  in  Mr.  Fergus- 
son's  Hisior;/  of  Architectu7-e,  vol.  u.  p. 
430. 

28  Ross  in  Geograph.  Journal,  vol.  ix. 
p.  468. 

2'  See  Plate  V.  Fig.  1. 

28  Layard,  Nineveh  and  Babylon,  p. 
571. 

29  See  text,  p.  187. 

3"  Ross  in  Geograj^h.  Journal,  vol.  ix. 
p.  370.  Mr.  Ainsworth  regards  some  o* 
these  buildings  as  dwelling  houses,  and 
thinks  that  only  upon  a  very  cursory 
inspection  could  they  have  been  con- 
sidered in  all  cases  tombs  (Researches, 
vol.  ii.  p.  171).  He  does  not,  however, 
question  the  sepulchral  character  of  the 
greater  number. 

31  As  especially  those  at  Serbistan  and 
Firuzabad,  described  by  Mr.  Fergusson 
in  his  History  of  Architecture,  vol.  ii. 
pp  428-430. 

32  See  I.oftus,  Chaldcea  and  Susiana. 
pp.  202-214. 

33  Loftus,  Chaldcea  and  Sxtsiana,  p. 
226. 

34  Ibid.  p.  225.    (See  PI.  V.  Fig.  1 .) 

'5  Ibid.  p.  227.  Mr.  Loftus  argues  that 
the  peculiarities  of  Saracenic  architec- 
tui'e,  its  richly  wrought  tracing  and  geo- 
metric ornamentation,  originated  with 
the  Parthians,  were  disused  by  the  Sas- 
eanians,  and  after  the  Mohammedan 
conquest  were  revived  by  the  Arabs 
(Chaldcea  and  Susiana,  p.  228.) 

3' On  these  coffins,  see  Loftus,  pp. 
203-206;  Layard,  Nineveh  and  Babylon, 
p.  558;  Rawlinson,  Herodotus,  vol.  i.  p. 
272,  2nd  edition. 

3'  Loftus,  p.  213. 

38  Ibid.  p.  214. 

3»  Similar  ideas  existed  among  the 
early  Babylonians  (Ancieift  Monarch- 
ies, vol.  i.  pp.  86-89,  2nd  edition),  and  had 
probably  been  passed  on  to  thw  mixed 


63  i 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  xxni. 


race  which  inhabited  the  same  tract  of 
country  under  the  Parthians. 

•"•  As  Mr.  Loftus  supposed  (Chaldcea 
and  Susiana,  p.  211). 

*^  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  i.  p. 
389;  vol.  ii.  p.  570,  2nd  edit. 

<2  Compare  the  note  of  Sir  D.  Brews- 
ter at  the  end  of  Mr.  Layard's  Nineveh 
and  Babylon,  pp.  674-676. 

*^  Loftus,  Chaldcea  and  Susiana,  p. 
211. 

*•>  Ibid. 

•"*  On  this  inscription,  see  text,  p.  147. 

*^  This  monument  was  seen  by  Sir  H. 
Rawlinson  in  1838.  and  described  in  the 
Journal  of  the  Geographical  Society, 
vol.  ix.  p.  115.  It  was  carefully  copied 
by  M.  Coste  and  inserted  in  the  great 
work  of  M.  Flandin  ( Voyage  en  Perse, 
Planches  Anciennes,  No.  119).  The  ac- 
companying [PI.  VII.]  is  taken  from  this 
engraving. 

♦'  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  tom.  iv. 
pi.  208. 

<*  If  the  inscription  were  copied  by  a 
person  versed  m  the  character,  it  is 
probable  that  there  would  be  little  diffi- 
culty in  deciphering  it.  But  the  djjffer- 
ences  between  several  of  the  Parthian 
letters  are  so  slight  that  it  is  extremely 
hard  for  a  person  unskilled  in  the  char- 
acter to  make  a  correct  transcript.  Still 
the  word  "satrap"  seems  to  be  tracea- 
ble at  the  commencement  of  the  left- 
hand  inscription. 

*'>  These  reliefs  were  communicated 
by  the  Baron  to  M.  Flandin,  and  will  be 
found  represented  in  the  Voyage  en 
Perse,  tom.  iv.  plates  224  and  226.  They 
exist  on  an  isolated  mass  of  black  rock, 
near  Tengh-i-Saoulek  in  the  Bakhtyari 
mountains  (Voyage,  tom.  i.  pp.  184,  i85). 

sostrab.  xv.  3,  §15. 

^'  M.  Flandin  doubts  whether  the  ani- 
mal is  intended  for  a  bear  or  a  lion 
(Voyage,  p.  IS.'j);  but  his  representation 
fairly  resembles  the  former,  while  it 
presents  no  likeness  to  the  latter  ani- 
mal. 

^"^  Compare  a  representation  of  a  Par- 
thian warrior  in  M.  Flandin's  work  (pi. 
225);  and  see  also  the  coin  of  Labienus, 
which  represents  him  eqviipped  in  Par- 
thian fashion  (see  PI.  II.  Fig.  1.) 

'3  The  sculptures  at  Persepolis, 
Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  Behistun,  &c  ,  must 
always  have  been  exposed  to  view,  and 
would  have  sufficed  to  form  a  better 
taste  than  that  which  is  actually  found 
among  the  Parthians  had  they  possessed 
fair  eesthetic  capacity.  That,  besides 
these,  they  possessed  Greek  models  ap- 
pears from  the  emblems  upon  their 
coins. 

CHAPTER   XXIII. 

>  By  "the  Zoroastrian  system"  must 
be  here  understood,  not  the  original 
teaching  of  Zoroaster  as  exhibited  to  us 
in  the  more  ancient  portions  of  the  Zen- 
davesta  (see  the  author's  Ancient  Mon- 
archies,   vol,    ii.  pp.    328-344),    but  the 


mixed  religion  produced  by  the  contact 
of  ZoroasLrianism  with  Magism,  which 
was  adapted  by  the  Achsemeuiaii  mon- 
archs  from  Xerxes  downwards.  (Ibid, 
pp.  344-354.) 

^  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  C,  p.  405,  ed.  Gro- 
nov. 

'  Herodian.  iv.  30.  'Aa-Tracra/utei/oi  TOi' 
*HAtor',  d>9  €0os  cLvroL^. 

*  The  worship  at  Hatra  (see  text,  p. 
196)  is  probably  a  fair  specimen  of  the 
Parthian  cult  of  the  Sun  at  other  places. 
The  Hatrene  worship  maj-  have  had  an 
Arabian  tinge,  but,  on  the  whole,  it  is 
probable  that  it  conformed  itself  to  that 
of  the  dominant  people. 

*  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Arm.  ii.  74. 

«  Percep.  Inscr.  H.  11.  14,  22,  24. 
'  See  Mos.  Choren.  1.  s.  c. 

*  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  3. 
9  Ibid.  §  6. 

'0  We  have  an  account  of  this  worship 
only  in  Josephus  (Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  5); 
he,  however,  appears  to  be  perfectly  fa- 
miliar with  it.    He  calls  the  images  a<l>i- 

Spvfiara  TOiv  Beiav  and  a■e^a(r/^iaTa.  and  the 

worship  offered  to  them  depandav  or  Bprj- 

(TKeiau. 

11  Justin,  xli.  3. 

12  Ibid. 
"Strab.  xi.  9,  §3. 

1*  Mos.  Choren.  Hist.  Arm.  1.  s.  c. 

15  Herodian.  iv.  30. 
"  Agathias,  ii.  26. 
>'  See  text,  p.  209. 

16  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6,  p.  403;  Jul.  Ca- 
pit.  Vit.  Ver.  Imp.  §  8. 

1^  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  1,  et  sea. 
2«  Ibid. 

21  See  Bayer,  Hist.  Edess.  e  numis  il- 
lustrata,  ill.  p.  173,  and  Asseman,  Biblio- 
theca  0)-ientalis,  vol.  i.  p.  423. 

22  On  the  supposed  letter  of  Abgarus, 
king  of  Edessa,  to  our  Lord,  and  the  re- 
ply to  it,  bis  cure  by  Thaddseus,  and  the 
conversion  of  his  subjects,  see  Euseb. 
Hist.  Ec.  i.  13,  and  compare  Lardner, 
Credibility,  vol.  vi,  p.  596,  and  Burton, 
Eccles.  Hist,  of  First  Three  Centuries, 
vol.  i.  pp.  328,  329. 

23  A  council  was  held  in  Edessa  on  the 
proper  time  for  keeping  Easter  in  the 
year  A.t.  198.  (Burton,  vol.  ii.  p.  216.) 
The  S3riac  (Peshito)  version  of  the 
Scriptures  was  probably  made  for  the 
Edessene  Christians  before  the  end  of 
the  first  century  (ib.  vol.  i.  p.  328;  Mi- 
chaelis.  Introduction,  vii.  §8). 

2-1  Acts,  ii.  9. 

^^  Hist.  Eccles.  iii.  1.  Ruflnus,  who 
wi'ote  in  the  fourth  century,  saj's  that 
St.  Thomas  was  buried  at  Edessa. 
(Hist.  Eccl.  ii.  5.  Compare  Socrat.  iv. 
18  and  Sozom.  vi.  18.) 

28  Bardesanes  ap.  Euseb.  Prcep.  Ev. 
vi.  10.  Bardesanes  was  a  native  of 
Edessa,  and  wrote  a  little  after  the  mid- 
dle of  the  second  century. 

2'  Herodian.  iii.  1. 

2**  Ibid.  'O  Tlapdvaio?  InicrTeKtiv  e(^Tj 
T0t5  aaTpdnai^  Bvvap.tv  a^pot^etr'  ovTto  ya.p 
(lijoOev,  oirrji'iKa  av  6e»)0j7  cTTpaTov  trvWeyeiff 


trt.  xxin.] 


TffS  SIXTH  MONAEOHT. 


63S 


Ttti  fjLr)  ii\ti.v  ;iiitr9o</)6povs  koX   avviaro^  (7Tpa- 

TiUiTLKOif. 

21*  Tliese  auxiliary  forces  are  not  often 
mentioned  by  the  Greek  and  Latin 
writers.  Still  occasionally  we  catch  a 
gHnii)se  of  them.  (See  Joseph,  xviii.  y, 
§12;  XX.  3,  S4,  &c.) 

3". Justin,  xli.  3. 

3'  Plutarch,  Crass.  §  21.  Eixe  Si  tou? 
CTiinffai/Ta?  iTTirtis  [6  Soupij^asj ,  o^oO  TreAti- 
Ta?  re  fcal  fiouAou?,  [xvpiiof  ovk  airoS^ovTa^. 

3'^  Justin  (1.  s.  c.)  estimates  the  nobles 
in  the  Parthian  army  which  fought 
against  Antony  at  400,  the  army  itself  at 
60,000.  This  would  give  to  each  noble  an 
average  of  135  followers. 

3'  This,  at  any  rate,  was  the  propor- 
tion in  the  case  mentioned  in  note  31, 
where  the  10,000  slaves  and  retainers  of 
Surenas  were  accompanied  by  a  thou- 
sand baggage-camels.  (Plut.  1.  s.  c. ; 
Appian,  Parth.  p.  141.) 

^<  Plut.  Crass.  §  19  ;  Appian,  Parth.  p. 
13S. 

'■'^  As  that  employed  against  Crassus. 
(See  text,  p.  89.) 

3'  Oujpaxa;     a)/.'.o^up(TOUS     Kal     cri5>)poC?. 

Pint.  Crass.  §  35.  Compare  Justin,  xli. 
2,  ad  fin. 

"  Plut.  Crass.  §  34. 

38  Ibid.  §§  18,  35. 

3'  Ibid.  §  34.  Kpdfr)  toC  Map-yi'ai'oO  <ri5rj- 
pov  (TTiA^oi'TO?  ofu  Kal  7ruptAa/u.7res. 

<"  Herodian.  iv.  30,  p.  173.  The  repre- 
sentation of  a  mailed  warrior  thus  at- 
tired at  Takht-i-Bostan  (Ker  Porter,  vol. 
ii.  PI.  63),  though  of  the  Sassanian  pe- 
riod, lends  force  to  the  statement  of  He- 
rodian. 

■"  Die  Cass.  xl.  15.  Compare  Justin, 
xli.  2,  ad  fin. 

^■■'Plut.  Ant.  §  45;  Crass.  §  37;  Die 
Cass.  xl.  33;  Appian,  Parth.  p.  148;  He- 
rodian. iv.  W. 

■•3  App.  Parth.  p.  144.  The  size  and 
strength  of  the  bow  which  thej^  used  en- 
abled the  Parthians  to  deliver  their  ar- 
rows at  a  speed  which  was  very  un\isual, 
and  which  made  them  most  formidable 
archers.  (See  Plut.  Cras.s.  §§  18  and  2t.) 
Tlie  arrow  was  not  seen  till  it  struck, 
and  it  pierced  easily  through  all  cus- 
toni.iry  armor. 

**  The  knife,  which  was  worn  in  pri- 
vate Mfe  (Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  3,  ^  4), 
was  certainly  not  laid  aside  in  war.  It 
was  frequently  employed  to  cut  oflf  the 
head  of  a  dead  enemy.  (Plut.  Crass. 
§§25  and  31.) 

*^  Justin,  1.  s.  c. 

<•  Plut.  Crass.  §  34,  ad  init. 

*''  Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "  Hos  pari  ac  liberos 
sues  cura  habent,  et  equitare  et  sagit- 
tare  magna  industria  docent." 

"8  Plut.  Crass.  §  34,  ad  fin. ;  Justin,  xli. 
2;  Virg.  Georg.  iii.  31;  Hor.  Od.  i.  19,  11; 
ii.  13,  16;  Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  35. 

"  Dio  Cass.  xl.  34. 

»"  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

"  Plut.  Crass.  §  31 ;  Appian,  Parthica, 
p.  1 14. 

»"  Herodian.  iv.  38,  30. 


"  Ibid.  p.  173. 
'■•  Dio  Cass.  xl.  15,  ad  fin. 
'^Justin,  xli.  3- — '•  Obsessas  expug- 
nare    urbes  nesciunt."      Compare  Dio 

Cass.  xl.  39  ('ASui/aToi  TTo\iopKfi<jai  Ti  rjaav) 
and  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  4  ("  Partho  ad  ex- 
sequendas  obsidiones  nulla  cominus  au- 
dacia"). 

s»  They  were  ready  to  have  besieged 
Crassus  in  Carrhse,  if  he  had  shut  him- 
self up  in  it  (Plut.  Crass.  §  38).  They  ac- 
tuall.y  besieged  Antioch  in  b.c.  53.  and 
Apamaea  in  B.C.  40.  See  text,  pp.  101 
and  106.) 

s'  See  Plut.  Anton.  §  49.  Their  per- 
sistency against  Macrinus  is  noticed  as 
something  strange  and  unusual  (Hero- 
dian. iv.  30;  pp.  173,  174). 

^8  Plut.  Crass.  §39: — NuKTo/iax«iv  ov  nd- 
Tpiov  aiiTois  e'cTTii'.     Compare  Anton.  §  47. 

6»  So  Dio  (xl.  34).  But  the  real  grounds 
of  their  usage,  a  usage  common  to  them 
with  the  Persians,  are  better  seen  from 
what  Xenophon  says  of  the  latter. 
Anab.  iii.  4,  §34.  Compare  .4ncien(Jifon- 
archies,  vol.  iv.  p.  138.) 

'"Ilopa    TO     eicoSbs     eTt    vVKTOi    iSiot- 
Kov.     (Plut.  Ant.  §47.) 
«>  Dio  Cass.  xl.  15;  Plut.  Anton.  §  40. 
"  See  text,  p.  57. 
'3  See  text,  p.  157. 

^**  Tbf  ^Atoi'  4>Aoytufie'a"TaTO»'  ovTa  av4\ov- 
Tat  Tij  avvrjOnLa.      (Dio  CasS.  1.  S.  C.) 
85  Ibid. 

*"  Plutarch  says  that  the  general  em- 
ployed against  Crassus  was  accompanied 
by  300  chariots  containing  his  concu- 
bines (Crn.fs.  §  21).  _ 

"  Ibid.  §  32.  Kar'  ovpav  T^s  (f>a\ayyoi 
€19  Tropica;  Kai  /cporaAa  Kai  i/zaAp-ous  Kai  nav' 
vvxiSa^  aKoAdarous  juerd  yvcaiKUf  TeAeuri- 
<Tav. 

'8  Ibid.     S^AeuKtaSes  fraZpai  /xovaovpyoi. 

'^  Dio  Cass.  xl.  15,  ad  fin. 

"">  Plut.  Crass.  §  31.  If  the  general  em- 
ployed against  Crassus  had  a  thousand 
bagfrage  camels  for  his  own  slaves  and 
retainers,  the  entire  army  nuiy  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  accompanied  by 
several  thousands. 

"  Ibid.  §35,  ad  init. 

"Polyb.  X.  34,  §  11;  xxxi.  3,  §  11; 
Strab.  XV.  1,  §  .30;  Plut.  Alex.  §  63. 

'3  The  elephant  occurs  on  the  coins  of 
the  Bactrian  kings  (Mionnet,  Supple- 
ment, tom.  viii.  pp.  482.  485).  One  mon- 
arch, Demetrius,  wears  a  head-dress 
made  out  of  the  head  of  an  elephant 
(ibid.  p.  473). 

'<  Tacit.  An7i.  xv.  15. 

"  See  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  3.  6,  &c. ;  and 
compare  Malcohn,  Hi.ttori/  of  Persia, 
vol.  i  p.  170;  Ockley,  History  of  the  Sa- 
rarens,  p.  143;  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol. 
ii.  PI.  63  and  64. 

'«  Plut.  Cra.i.t.  §  26;  Herodian.  iv.  30. 

"  Ju.stin.  xli.  3;  Plut.  Crass.  §  23,  sub 
fin.:  A]ipinii.  forth,  p.  143. 

"Pint,  rra.ss.  §27. 

'»  ComiMire  Dio  Cn.ss.  xl.  15;  Pint.  Ant. 
§§39,  42.45;  Herodian.  iv.  :W.  Justin's 
summary  expresses  a  fair  judgment:^ 


636 


TtiE  StXfn  Mo^ARCHf. 


[CH. 


XXIIt. 


"Pngnant  procurrentibiis  equis.  aut 
terga  daiitibus;  ssepe  etiam  fugam  sim- 
ulant, lit  incautiores  adversum  vulnera 
insequentes  habeant.  .  .  .  Nee  pugnare 
dill  possunt;  cseterum  intolerandi  fo- 
rent,  si  quantus  his  impetus  est,  vis  tanta 
et  perseverantia  asset  "  (xl.  2). 

sopiut.  Crass.  §30;  Anton.  §§  46  and 
49. 

81  Plutarch,  1.  s.  c. 

s2Vell.  Paterc.  ii.  101;  Joseph.  Ant. 
Jxid.  xviii.  4,  §  5. 

83  On  the  Parthian  knowledge  of 
Greek,  see  Plut.  Crass.  §  33.  I  gather 
from  Dio  and  Herodian  that  Greek  was 
the  language  used  in  the  diplomatic  in- 
tercourae  of  the  Parthians  and  Ro- 
mans. 

8*  See  the  passages  cited  in  note  82. 

*»  Plut.  Crass.  %  31.      Aeiv  Se  ypai/zao-flai 

Tas  <Tu>'e>j(cas.  Compare  Herodian.  iv.  18 
and  30. 

8*  Hence  such  phrases  as  "renovari 
dextras"  (Tac.  Ann.  ii.  58),  and  the  like. 

8'  Herodian.  iv.  30. 

88  Joseph,  ^nf.  Jttd.  xviii.  2,  §  4;  4, 
§  5;  Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  25;  Herodian.  iv.  18. 

8»  See  text,  p.  121. 

""  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  4,  §  5. 

"  On  these  letters,  see  Tacit.  Ann.  xv. 
24;  Dio  Oass.  Iv.  11;  Sueton.  Tiber.  §  66; 
Herodian.  iv.  18.  19,  30,  &c. 

»2  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  2,  §  3. 

» 3  Ibid,  xviii.  2,  §  4;  Tacit.  Ann.  ii.  1; 
Strab.  xvi.  1,  §28. 

*•»  Joseph,  xviii.  4,  §  5. 

"5  See  text.  p.  5. 

««  Strab.  xi.  9,  §  1. 

»'  Herodian.  iv.  19. 

»8  Strab.  xi.  13,  §  1. 

*»  Joseph.  A7it.  Jud.  xvii.  2,  §  4. 

>»"  Plut.  Crass.  §  32,  ad  fin. 

'»!  See  text,  p.  124. 

""^  Philostratus  is,  so  far  as  I  know, 
the  only  writer  who  mentions  the  em- 
plo.yment  of  eunuchs  by  the  Parthians. 
According  to  him,  eunuchs  occupied 
that  position  in  the  royal  harem  which 
is  usual  in  the  East  (Vit.  ApoU.  i.  37), 
and  lield  sometimes  the  office  of  satrap 
in  the  provinces  (ib.  i.  21). 

'"3  See  Justin,  xli.  2.  The  obverse  of 
Parthian  coins  frequently  exhibits  the 
monarch  thus  apparelled.  tPl.  X.  Fig.  2.] 

I"''  Compare  the  engravings  on  PI.  II. 

>»s  See  PI.  I.  Fig.  4. 

'"«  See  PI.  I.  Fig.  4  and  III.  Fig.  4. 

'«■'  See  PI.  II.  Fig.  4. 

'"8  Ou  the  obverse  of  the  early  Par- 
thian coins  the  monarch  is  usually  rep- 
resented in  this  attire.     [PI.  X.  Fig.  3.] 

'""See  text,  p.  229. 

"opiut.  Anton.  §44. 

"1  'Ava^okfU.    See  Plut.  Crass.  §  31. 

"^SeePl.  II.  Fig.  2.  I 

1 "  Philostratus  was  born  about  a.d. 
172,  and  lived  to  about  a.d.  244,  or  a 
little  later.  He  was  thus  contemporary 
M'ith  the  Parthian  kings  Volagases  HI., 
Volagases  IV..  Volagases  V.,  and  Arta- 
banus,  the  last  monarch.  His  life  of 
Apollonius   of    Tyana,  which  contains 


the  description  given  in  the  text,  as  well 
as  other  curious  information  about  Par- 
thia,  is  no  doubt  an  historical  romance; 
but  its  local  coloring  seems  intended  to 
be  correct,  and  is  probably  not  far  from 
the  truth. 

n-iPhilostr.,  Vit.  ApoU.  Ti/an.  i.  25. 

"^  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  0;  p.  397. 

""See  the  narrative  in  josephus  (Ant. 
Jud.  XX.  3,  §§  1,  2);  and  compare  text,  p. 
140. 

"'Posidon.  ap.  Athen.  Deipn.  iv.  13; 
p.  152,  F. 

>  18  Ibid.  p.  153,  A. 

"»  Philostrat.  Vit.  ApoU.  Tyan.i.  21 
and  28. 

'=»  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xx.  3,  §  3. 

>2'  Philostrat.  Vit.  Ap.  Tyan.  i.  28. 

i"ibid.  i.  34. 

'23  See  text,  p.  48. 

"24  Plut.  Cmss.  §  21.  Kara  yivo<: 
fiiv  ovv  cf  cipX'Js  cKEKTrjTo  fiacn\fl  yivojuei'w 
TldpBuii'  CTTiTiSeVat  to  £taS7j/xa  npuiTov. 

>"  Ibid.  1.  S.  C. 

126  This  appears  especially  in  the  case 
of  the  officer  employed  against  Crassus, 
wlio  was  attended  in  the  field  by  200 
litters  containing  his  wives  and  con- 
cubines. In  a  less  degree,  it  appears 
also  in  the  case  of  the  Mithridates  at- 
tacked by  Anilai.    (See  text,  p.  137.) 

1"  See  Philostr.  Vit.  Ap.  Tyan.  i.  22 
and  38;  Josepli.  Aiit.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4; 
Justin,  xli.  5;  Suet.  Caii  Vit.  §  5. 

128  Philostr.  i.  22. 

123  The  tiger  has  always  been  a  native 
of  Hyrcania  and  the  low  tract  south  of 
the  Caspian.  Bears  have  always  inhab- 
ited Mount  Zagros,  while  leopards 
abound  in  Mesopotamia. 

130  Philostr.  i.  38.  0^pia  PePaaavuraiva 
Kal  TTapa.  T))i'  <{>v<T{.y  TTjf  iavTuiv  &eSov\ujfxeva. 

131  Gen.  X.  9. 

132  Justin,  xli.  ii.  "  Vestis  perlucida  et 
fluida."    Cf.  Herodian  iv.  20. 

133  Lucian.  De  conscrib.  hist.  §  19. 
13''  Herodian.  1.  s.  c. 

135  Ibid. 

136  Joseph.  Ant.  Jud.  xviii.  2,  §  4.    Ma- 

\ai.po4>opi'Li'  «Sos  aTTacriv. 

13' Justin,  xli.  3,  ad  fin.  "In  cibo 
parens." 

138  Pliny,  H.  N.  xi.  53. 

139  Ibid.  xiv.  22.  According  to  Pliny, 
the  Parthians  of  his  time  (a.d.  50-70)  ate 
and  drank  so  immoderately  as  to  ren- 
der their  breath  unpleasent.  To  remedy 
this  defect,  the  nobles  were  in  the  habit 
of  munching  the  pips  of  citrons  (H.  N. 
xi.  .53:  xii.  3). 

1*"  Justin  says— "Carne  non  nisi  ve- 
natibus  quaesita  vescuntur"  (1.  s  c);  but 
we  must  correct  him  as  to  the  later 
period  of  the  Empire  from  Philostratus 
(Vit.  Ap.  Tyan.  i.  21). 

1"  Philostr.  1.  s.  c. 

■"Ibid. 

H3piin.  H.  JV^^  xviii.  11. 

114  Pliilostr.  1.  s.  c. 

iii^  Compare  Plin.  JFf.  N.  xiv.  16  with 
Philostr.  17/.  Ap.  Tyan.  i.  21;   p.  27. 

•"Philostr.  1.  s.  c. 


CH.  XXIII.  ] 


THE  SIXTH  MONARCHY. 


m'i 


"'  Herodian.  iv.  20;  Athen.  Deipn. 
xiv.  8. 

118  Philostr.  1.  s.  c. 

""Justin,  xli.  3.  "Femlnis  non  con- 
Tivia  tautum  virorum,  verum  etiam  con- 
spectum  interdicunt." 

""Justin,  1.  s.  c.  "Nee  ulla  delicta 
adulterio  gravius  vindicant." 

'51  See  the  story  told  by  Josephus, 
Ant.  ,Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  6. 

i^''' Justin,  xli.  3,  ad  init.  "  Uxores 
.  .  .  singuli  plures  habent." 

133  Plut.  Crass.  §  ai. 

1"  See  text,  p.  2^3. 

1"  Plut.  Crass.  §33. 

i'"' See  Num.  Chrom.  vi.  p.  104;  Lind- 
say, History  and  Coinage,  &c.,  p.  208; 
and,  for  the  Bactrian  writing,  compare 
Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  plates. 

IS'  Belt.  .Tud.  Proem.  §  1  and  §  2. 

"8  See  text,  p.  231. 

i5»  Philostr.  Vit.  Ap.  Ti/an.  i.  20. 

leoibirt.  i.  27,  ad  fin.  'Hpero  6i'o;aa  re 
auTou,  Kat  6  Tt  ^TTLTrjSevujv,  Kat  6  Tt  (/>otTair; 
Kat  aTToypa\pafji€uo^  ravra  €9  ypa/x/xaretoi', 
(TToA^i/  Te  avTov  Kat  et6o5,  eKelvov  ^kv  nepi,- 
f/Lflvai  KfAeiiet. 

'"i  Herodian.   iii.   1.     'O  Si   llapBvalo^ 

eircoreAeii'  e<|)))  toi;  traTpoiTrais.  Hero- 
dian uses  eTntrTeAAiH'  in  the  sense  of  cvlo-- 
ToAii?  irepiTreiv  constantly.  Compare  iv. 
18.  €7Tto*TtAAet  T(Z  /SafftAet  UapSvaiwy  .  .  . 
rd  6e  ypa/jtjtxaTa  eAe-yei'.  iv.  21.  epio"- 
Te'AAei  rf)  (ruy/cA^Tto.  V.  1.  eTrto-Te'AAti  Tuj 
Te  &rj^ui  ' Vojfxaioit'  Kai  Trj  <7vyK\riToi  .  .  . 
avayi'tiiO^ifTiq^  &€  tj)?  TotauTij?  ejrio"ToA^S, 

"■■^  Pliu.  If.  N.  xiii.  11,  ad  flu. 

i''^  Herodian.  iv.  18.    Ai  tiiiropuv. 

i«<  Ibid. 

•"^  Compare  Plin.  H.  N.  viii.  48;  xi.  23, 
23;  and  Athen.  Deipn.  v.  p.  197.  Strabo's 
statement  that  Borsippa  was  in  his  day 
"a  great  staple  of  the  linen  trade" 
(Aifouyeioi'  p-iya,  xvi.  i.  §  7)  is  also  an  in- 
dication that  manufactures  nourished 
under  the  Parthians. 

I'opiin.  H.  N.  xi.  23.  The  use  of  silk 
in  Part.liia  is  noted  as  early  as  B.C.  .'54, 
when  the  flags  attached  to  their  stand- 
ards are  said  to  have  been  made  of  it 
(Florus,  iii.  11). 

1"  Plin.  //.  N.  viii.  48. 

188  Ibid.  xii.  9;  xxi.  18. 

i"See  text.  p.  22.5. 

i'»  Euseb.  Cliron.  Can.  i.  40,  §  18,  ad  fin. 

"1  Note,  as  instances,  the  employ- 
ment of  Labienus  in  high  command  (see 
text,  p.  105)  and  the  satrapial  dignity  of 
the  Jews,  Asiuai  and  Anilai  (.Joseph. 
Ant.  Jud.  xvii'   o.  §§  4-7). 

"'  Dio  Ca.s3.  Aiviii.  24;  Joseph.  Bell. 
Jud.  vii.  7,  %  8. 


"^Joseph.  A\(   Jua.  xviii.  9.  §  S.    Oii 

yap  av  \j/<!vaaiT6  Tis  6tf  luiv  vn'  avToi  iduetut 
yci'o/Lte'vjjs. 

I'^Tbe  opposite  statement  of  Justin 
("P'ides  dictis  proniissisi|ue  nulla  ni.<i 
quateuus  exjjedit."  xli.  .i.  ad  fin.),  and 
the  sneer  of  Horace  ("  Parthis  men- 
dacior,"  Ep.  I.  ii.  112)  are  contradicted 
by  the  whole  tenor  of  Parthian  history, 
and  must  be  considered  as  merely  par- 
allel to  the  charges  of  "  Punic  perfidy," 
alleged  by  Livv  and  others. 

"*  Philostr.  Vit.  Ap.  Ti/un.  i.  21. 

i'«Posid.  ap.  Athen.  beipn.  iv.  13;  p, 
152,  F.  *^ 

1"  Plut.  Crass.  §  31. 
_i'8  Compare  the  remarks  of  Strabo— 
aiTto?  6  o  ^109  auTojr  Kai  ra  e0r)  Ta  i^^ovTa 
TToAii  fiev  TO  |3ap^apol'  ical  to  ^kvOikoi',  tt  A  t  - 
01'  uti'TOi  TO  X  prj(T  L  p.  ov  Trpbs  i7y«- 
p.0  1'  i  a  t' .     xi.  9,  §  2, 

I'l-See  text.  pp.  210,  211. 

i8"Eckhel  thought  that  the  entire 
series  of  tetradracluns  was  Greek  aud 
not  Parthian,  being  the  issue  of  the 
semi-indei)i'n(lent  (ireek  towns  in  the 
Parthian  tlominions  (Doctr.  Num.  Vet. 
vol.  iii.  pp.  .")19.  .WO).  M.  Lenormant,  in 
his  work  on  the  early  Parthian  coins, 
went  further,  and  maintained  (p.  3)  that 
all  the  good  coins  were  of  Greek  work- 
manship, and  only  the  barbarous  ones 
native.  But  the  best  authorities  seem 
now  convinced  that  (excepting  a  few 
tetradrachms  of  IMithridates  1.;  see  PI. 
I.  Fig.  3.)  the  coins  are  all,  in  the 
strictest  sense,  Parthian. 

1"  E.g.  AIII*.\lNOY2  appears  for 
EIII+ANOY2  on  a  coin  ascribed  to  Mith- 
ridates  I.  (Lindsay,  p,  lUO);  II.VKOPY 
for  IIAKOPOY  on  coins  of  Orodes  1.  (ib. 
p.  170),  &c. 

'82  The  famous  legend  of  Qotances, 
which  should  have  i-un  (as  is  supposed^ 
niTEPZII^  BASLVEYS  BASLVEON  AP- 
2AKH2  YI02  KEKAIl.MENOS  APTABA- 
NOY  api)ears  uniler  tin-  form  of  I'SiTE- 
PEII2  BA2IAE  .  .  .  BASIAEON  Al'SA- 
KOY  YOii  KEKAAY2N02  APTABANOV 
(Lindsay,  p.  l.OS). 

183  Among  these,  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable is  the  corruption  of  the  family 
title  .\P2AK0Y  (Arsaces)  into  a  fornj 
which  is  either  actually  or  nearly  API.\- 
NOY  a  geographical  or  ethnic  a)>pella- 
tive.  Other  emirs  merely  orthograj)hic, 
are  the  substitution  of  X  foi'  K  in  .M- 
KAIOY,  which,  from  the  time  of  Phra- 
ates  IV.,  is  almost  lunformly  written 
ilXAIOY;  of  X  for  N  in  <I'I  AKAAll  N()2, 
which  is  often  written  *IAEAAHXOi 
and  the  Uke. 


688 


TBE  SEVENTB.  MONARCHY. 


fcH.  li. 


NOTES  TO  THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


CHAPTER  I. 
1  See,  on  this  point.  Bishop  Thirlwall's 
excellent  remarks,  Hist,  of  Greece,  vol. 
vii.  pp.  121-124,  which  are  incompletely 
met  by  Mr.  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece,  vol. 
Xii.  pp.  352-366. 

*  Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  vii.  4. 

3  Compare  tne  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, p.  21. 

*  Arrian,  iii.  16,  22,  23;  vi  27,  29,  &c. 

6  See  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  6.  §§3-16;  and 
compare  the  Author's  Herodotus,  vol. 
ii.  pp.  462-3,  2nd  ed.,  and  his  Ancient 
Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p.  424,  2nd  ed. 

«  Arrian,  Fr.  1;  Zosim  i.  18;  Syncell.  p. 
284,  B.  Compare  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  p.  25. 

'  Some  were  no  doubt  plundered  un- 
der Alexander,  and  others  by  his  early 
successors  (Arrian,  vi.  29,  30;  Polyb.  x. 
a7,  §  12;  &c.).  But  many  remained  un- 
touched. 

8  See  Polyb.  xxxi.  11;  1  Macab.  vi.  1-4; 
Appian,  Syr.  p.  161,  C. 

9  Polyb.  1.  s.  c. 

•"Compare  the  Author's  Sixth  Mon- 
archy, p.  43. 

>'  Justin,  xxxvi.  1.  §  3. 

12  Ibid.  §  4,  and  xxxviii.  9,  §  2. 

15  Strabo,  xv.  3,  §§  3  and  24. 

'■^  Ibid.  §  17.  Bacri.Aevoi'Tai  vtto  toiv  airo 
yevov^-  6  S'  aTreiSui'  a;roT/u.>)9els  Ke<j>a\r]i'  Kal 
^pa\iova.  piTrrerat. 

'*Tabari,  Chronique,  torn.  ii.  p.  5. 

•*  Having  obtained  the  writings,  Alex- 
ander is  said  to  have  burned  them ;  but 
the  whole  character  of  his  policy  makes 
this  incredible. 

"  Strabo,  xi.  9,  §  3. 

1^  Agathias,  ii.  26. 

"  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  224. 

20  Moses  of  Choreng  tells  us  that,  when 
Artaxerxes  conquered  Armenia,  he 
found  the  sacred  fire  extinguished,  and 
1  caused  it  to  be  rekindled  (Hist.  Armen. 
ii.  94). 

2'  Herodian.  iv.  30. 

■■'2  Compare  the  domestic  image-wor- 
ship, witnessed  to  by  Josephus  {Ant. 
Jud.  xviii.  9,  §  5),  with  the  teraphim- 
worship  of  the  ancient  SjTians  (Gen. 
xxxi.  19-35). 

23  The  coins  of  the  Sassanians  exhibit 
from  the  first  the  fire-altar  upon  their 
reverse.  (PI.  XI.  Fig.  1.  and  PI.  XV.  Figs 
2  and  7.) 

2*  Agathias,  ii.  26;  Nicephorus,  Hist. 
Eccl.  i.  6;  p.  55,  B. 

2*  These  forms  appear  on  the  earliest 
ISassanian  bas-reliefs,  and  would  scarce- 


ly have  been  thus  used  unless  previous- 
ly familiar  to  the  people. 

26  Mos.  Chor.  1.  s.  0. 

27  See  text,  p.  244. 

26  See,  on  this  point,  the  Author'! 
Sixth  Monarchy,  pp.  11-14. 

29  Julian,  Orat.  ii.  p.  63. 

30  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  222,  223  and  238-240. 

31  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  106,  167. 

32lbid.  pp.  163andl67. 

33  Ibid.  p.  167. 

34  By  Trajan  a.d.  116:  by  Avidius  Cas- 
sius  A.D.  165;  and  by  Sept.  Severus  a.d. 
198. 

3  5  Dio  Cassius,  Ixxi.  2. 

3«  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  188  and  197. 
3'  Ibid.  p.  178. 

38  Ibid.  pp.  162-3,  169-70,  181,  199,  200. 

39  See  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  65 
and  68. 

40  Herodian.  vi.  6  and  11.  See  below, 
p.  263. 

■•iThe  generally  historical  character 
of  Firdusi's  Shah-naineh,  or  "  Book  of 
the  Kings,"  is  well  known.  The  best 
critics  admit  that  Firdusi  wrote  from 
materials  belonging  to  Sassanian  times 
(Max  Miiller  in  Bunsen's  Philosophy  of 
History,  vol.  iii.  p.  121). 

■•2  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  202.  203. 

43  Ibid.  pp.  199,  200. 

44  The  Roman  war  terminated  a.d.  217. 
The  first  i-evolt  of  Artaxerxes  probably 
occurred  ab.  a.d.  220. 

4  5  Agathangelus,  the  Armenian  histo- 
rian, makes  Artaxerxes  tax  Artabanus 
and  the  Parthians  generally  with  cruelty 
and  oppression  (ii.  §  5) ;  but  he  gives  no 
instances  of  either. 

46  Ahura-inazda  is  "  the  much-giving 
Spirit."  Mazda,  "  much-giving,"  was 
often  used  as  a  name  by  itself,  instead 
of  the  longer  Ahura-mazda. 

4'  Agathangelus     makes    Artaxerxes 

say  'Op/i>;<ra)fiei'  wpos   irapaTa^LV     KpflrTOV 
yap  Oavelv  yj   eli'ai  6oOAot  6€<T7t6tov  olSkkovv- 

To?  (i.  5,  ad  fin.) 

CHAPTER  n. 

1  The  area  of  France  was  estimated  in 
1868  at  213,324  square  miles.  It  is  now 
not  much  over  200,000  sq.  miles.  That 
of  Great  Britain  is  about  90,000  sq.  miles; 
that  of  Italy,  wthout  the  islands,  under 
100.000. 

2  strabo  says:  2xeSo«'  Sc  ti  Kai  ^  2ov(rt9 
/itepo9   yeyevriTai    rijs    IleptrtSos — "  SusianA 


ca.  It.] 


TltE  SJSVENTII  MONAUCIIT. 


63!) 


has  almost  become  a  part  of   Persia" 
(XV.  3,  §  -i). 

'  Carmauia  was  in  ancient  times  reck- 
oned a  part  of  Persia  (Herod,  i.  1:^5); 
but  the  later  classical  writers  (Strabo, 
Arrian)  and  the  Persian  authorities  for 
the  Sassauiau  period  make  it  a  distinct 
country. 

*  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  1. 

*  Ibid,  xxxviii.  1. 

*  See  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  1,  and  Nearch.  ap. 
Arr.  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  a-4.  The  latter  writer 
says:  T!y\v  5e  Il€p(n'6a  yrfv  Tpi\r)  vevc^rjadat 
Tuiv  u)p^iov  Aoyo?  Kare^ei.  To  fj.€i/  aOrij? 
7rpo9  Tj7  "Epvdpij  9a\d(Tajj  olKfo^epou  a/x- 
pLioSe^  re  elvai  Kai  aKapTou  vno  Kau/iaros*  to 
6'  CTTt  rfjSe  aj9  npos  ap/cTOf  re  Kat  ^operjv  aye- 
pLOV  iouTiov  KaAo)?  KeKpacrOai  Ta>i'  (jupe'oji'*  Koi 
TTjV  ^u}priv  TTOLujSca.  re  eivai  KaX  \tifxujva.^ 
vfipTjAou?  Koi  ap-TreAoi/  TroAAijf  ifyipitVy  KaX 
0(7oi  aAAot  KapTTol  TrArji'  eAatSj?*  napaSeicroKrC 
TC  7rai'T0Loc(Tt  Te^TjAei^at,  (Cat  TroTajULOLcrt  kolOo^ 
poiai  6iapp4eadat  /cat  Atfxi'|j(rt,  /cat  opi'tcrtt' 
6/c6(rot<rti'  ajLL(/)t  TroTa/jtoi/?  re  Kat  At'fjti'a?  ecrrt 
TO.  ^9ea,  iTTTroia't  Te  aya^rji'  eli'at,  /cat  roiaLU 
iWoKTiv  ifTTO^vyioKTi  vipetrdat.  /cat  uAoifiea 
Te  TToAAa;^*}  /cat  TroAu^T/poi^'  T>j»'  re  Trpdtrto 
€Tt  en'  apKTOV  LOVTiov  ;^€tjLteptTji'  /cat  vi^erui- 
Sea. 

'  The  natives  speak  of  a  ghermsir  or 
"  warm  district,"  and  a  serdsir  or  "cold 
region"  (Kinneir's  Persian  Empire,  pp. 
44,  200,  Pottinser,  Travels,  p.  221;  Geo- 
graph.  Journal,  vol.  xxvii.  p.  184).  The 
"  warm  region"  is  known  also  as  the 
Deshtistan,  or  "  low  country." 

*  See  Pottinger,  Travels,  p.  54 ;  Fraser, 
Khorasan,  p.  71;  Kinneir,  pp.  54,  70,  81, 
201. 

*  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  2. 

'"It  is  curious  that  Strabo  should 
characterize  the  middle I'egion  as  "flat" 
{■ne&Lvr)).  His  autliority,  Nearchus,  did 
not  make  this  mistake. 

"Contributions  towards  a  map  of 
Persia  Proper  have  been  made  by  Mr. 
Abbott,  General  Monteitli,  the  Baron  de 
Bode,  and  others  (see  (Jeograph.  Jour- 
nal, vols,  xiii.,  XXV..  and  xxvii.);  but 
much  still  remains  to  be  done,  especially 
towards  the  east  and  south-east. 

'^See  the  Author's  Ancient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  iii.  p.  87,  2nd  ed. 

"See  Kinneir,  Persian  Empire,  pp. 
195-200;  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pp. 
459,  472;  Morier,  Fir.vt  Joui-ney.  pp.  92, 
147,  148;  Gengraph.  Journal,  vol.  xxv. 
pp.  29-78,  vol."  xxvii.  pp.  149-lft4. 

'*  Fraser,  Khorasan,  p.  79;  Morier, 
First  Journei/,  p.  150. 

'"  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pp.  4.55-403. 

'«  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  j).  402. 

1'  Called  also  Lake  Kheir.  The  name 
Baklitigan,  which  maintains  its  place  in 
our  maps,  is  said  to  be  at  present  un- 
known to  the  natives  (Abbott,  in  Geo- 
graph.  Journal,  vol.  xxv.  p.  71  >. 

'"  Moore,  Lalla  Rookh,  "Veiled  Proph- 
et," p.  77;  "  Fire-Worsliippers,"  p.  232; 
&c. 

"  Ker  Porter,  TraveU,  uo).  i  a.  683. 


'"'Abbott,  in  Geograph.  Joxtmal,  voL 
xxv.  pp.  72-75. 

^'  Kinneir,  Persian  Empire,  p.  60. 

"^"^  The  ancient  capital,  PasargadEe,  was 
situated  in  the  vallej-  of  the  Pulwar  (or 
Cyrus),  a  tributary  of  the  Bendamir. 
Persepolis,  which  superseded  Pasar- 
^adaj,  was  at  the  opening  of  the  Pulwar 
mto  the  Bendamir  valley.  Remains  of 
Cyrus,  Darius,  Xerxes,  and  other  AchfB- 
meuian  kings  abound  in  these  two  vales. 

23  Ouseley,  Travels,  vol.  ii.  pp.  69,  70; 
Abbott,  in  Geograph.  Journal,  vol.  xxvii. 
p.  151. 

2^  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  p.  686. 

"  Ibid.  pp.  089,  693,  697,  &c. 

2«  Ibid.  p.  709. 

»'  Herod,  ix.  122.  Compare  Plat.  Leg. 
iii.  p.  695,  A;  Arr.  Exp.  Alex.  v.  4. 

28  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xxxvii.  2,  xxxviii. 
9. 

29  Ibid,  xxxviii.  6;  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  1. 
3"  See  text,  p.  251. 

31  Phn.  H.  N.  xix.  3. 

32  Ibid.  xxiv.  17,  xxvii.  13. 

'3  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p. 
140,  note  18. 

3<PliQ.  XV.  13  and  14.  The  word 
"peach"  is  corrupted  from  the  Latin 
persica.  (Compare  Germ.  Pfirsche, 
Russ.  persikie,  and  French  peche.) 

35  Plin.  H.  N.  xii.  3. 

30  Ibid   XV.  2t?. 

3'  Arrian.  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  4.  Compare 
Herod,  i.  136;  Nic.  Damase.  Fr.  66;  Strab. 
XV.  3,  §  18.  The  statement  of  Xenophon, 
that  ancientl3'  a  horse  was  a  rarity  in 
Persia  Proper (Q/)op.  i.  3,  §  3),  is  one  of 
the  many  to  be  found  in  the  work  known 
as  the  Cyropwdia,  on  which  no  depend- 
ence can  be  placed. 

3*  Kinneir.  Persian  Empire,  p.  41 ;  Fra- 
ser, Khorasan,  p.  72. 

3'  Strab.  XV.  3,  §  1 :  irpos  rats  etrxaTtai? 
elffiv  ol  Kap,rj\o^o(TKoi. 

*o  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xxxvii.  10;  He- 
rod, i.  126. 

*  1  Horned  cattle  are,  however,  men- 
tioned among  the  domestic  animals  of 
Persia  Proper.both  by  Herodotus  (1.  s.  c.) 
and  Nicolas  of  Damascus  (Fr.  66). 

■•2  Arrian,  Hist.  Ind.  xl.  4:  \u'P''\v  wo- 
Kvdy)pov. 

*^ Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p.  142. 

"  Ibid.  pp.  141-2. 

•"^  Nearcli.  ap  Arr.  Hist.  Ind.  xxxix.  4. 

^''Ibid.  xxxix.  5. 

"  Ouseley,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pp.  261,  446, 
&c. 

^''Plin.  H.  N.  vi.  2:3. 

<°  As  the  iritis,  a  species  of  rock-crys- 
tal (Plin.  //.  N.  xxxvii.  9.  sub  fin.);  the 
atizoe,  a  white  stone  which  had  a  pleas- 
ant odor  (ib.  xxxvii.  10);  the  niithrax.  a 
gem  of  many  hues  (iliid.);  the  nippa- 
rC'ne,  which  ri'sembled  ivory  (ibid.);  and 
the  th ell/card io.t  or  mule,  which  wa«  in 
special  favor  among  the  natives  of  the 
country  (ibid). 

'".Arrian.  ///.s/.  Ind.  xxxviii.  3.  The 
account  of  pearl-llshiiig  given  by  Isidore 
(see  MUllera  Geographi  Minores,  vol.  i 


640 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAnCttY. 


[CH.  nt 


pp  254,  aSB')  is  probably  a  description  of 
the  Persian  practice,  with  wliich,  as  a 
native  of  Charax  Spasini,  on  tlie  Persian 
Gulf,  he  is  likely  to  have  been  familiar. 
The  pearls  were  obtained  wholly  by 
means  of  divers. 

^^  Herod,  ix.  122. 

52  Dr.  Prichard  says  of  the  Persian 
physiognomy,  as  represepted  in  the  an- 
cient sculptures:  "The  outline  of  the 
coimtenance  is  not  strictly  Grecian,  for 
it  is  peculiar:  but  it  is  noble  and  digni- 
fied; and  if  the  expression  is  not  full  of 
life  and  genius,  it  is  intellectual  and  in- 
dicative of  reflection.  The  shape  of  the 
head  is  entirely  Indo-European,  and  has 
nothing  that  recalls  the  Tartar  or  Mon- 
golian." {Natural  History  of  Man,  p. 
173.) 

53Herod.  i.  71. 

^*  Ibid.  vii.  61:  Trepl  Tjjcri  K€<j>akfi<Ti.  elxov 
TTiAous  aTrayeas. 

S5  Xen.  Cyrop.  i.  2,  §§  8  and  11. 
»« Herod,  i.  71;  Xen.  Cyrop.  i.  2,  §  8; 
Strab.  XV.  3.  §  18. 
!^7  Herod,  i.  135;  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  1,  §40- 

58  Hei-od.  i.  133;  Heraclid.  Cuman.  ap. 
Athen.  Deipn.  iv.  p.  145,  F. 

59  Herod.  I.  s.  c. ;  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  8, 
§10. 

8»  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  8,  §  9. 

61  Herod,  vi.  112,  ix.  62,  71. 

«2  As  at  the  Grauicus  (Arrian,  Exp. 
Alex.  i.  15). 

63  Those  of  Issus  and  Arbela.  The  en- 
gagement at  the  Granicus  was,  com- 
paratively speaking,  unimportant. 

6*  See  PI.  XV.  Figs.  1  and  2,  and  com- 
pare them  with  the  Achaemenian  counte- 
nances on  PI.  XI.  Fig.  1. 

65  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  212-223. 

CHAPTER  in. 

1  Herod,  i.  95  and  214. 

2  Agathangelus,  the  earliest  of  those 
Armenian  historians  whose  works  have 
come  down  to  us,  was  the  secretary  of 
Tiridates  the  Great  (of  Armenia),  and 
lived  consequently  in  the  earlier  half  of 
the  fourth  century,  or  about  a  hundred 
years  later  than  Artaxerxes.  Moses  of 
'Chorene  wrote  a  century  later  (ab.  a.d. 
440).  Agathias  is  still  later;  he  did  not 
write  till  about  A.D.  580. 

3  Agathias,  ii.  p.  65. 

<  Gibbon  calls  Babek  a  "  tanner"  (De- 
cline  and  Fall,  ch.  viii.  vol.  i.  p.  331),  and 
De  Sacy  a  ''currier"  (corroyeur:  Me- 
moire  stir  les  Inscriptions  de  Nakhsh-i- 
Rustam,  p.  33,  note  49)  But  Agathias, 
their  authority,  has  o-KVTOTOfiw. 

*  So  Agathias,  ii.  p.  65,  C. 

6  IlavTaTrao-t  it.kv  a.arjixoTa.TO';.   (Agathias, 

1.  s.  c.) 

'  Agathangelus,  i.  9. 

8  See  Moses  of  Choren6  {Hist.  Armen. 
ii.  67),  who  declines  to  repeat  these  fa- 
bles, remarking:  "Alienum  est  fabulas 
commemorare,  de  somnio  cupidinis.  de 
judicio,  et  igne  at  '^nsane  orto,  de  grege 
concluso,  atque  oculi  albugine,  ot  divi- 


norum  seu  Chodiorum  proedictione.  cae- 
terisque  quee  sequuntur,  nempe  de  stu- 
prosa  Artasiris  mente,  et  caede,  de  ve- 
sana  magi  flliee  ob  vitulum  eloquentia, 
&c."  Compare  the  story  of  Heftwad 
and  the  worm,  related  in  the  Modjinel- 
al-Teicarikh  (Journal  Asiatique  for 
1841,  p.  501). 

9  Agathangelus,  i.  §  3;  Mos.  Chor.  Hist. 
Armen.  ii.  54,  66,  &c. 

10  De  Sacy,  Memoire,  &c..  p.  30;  Thom- 
as, in  As.  Society's  Journal,  New  Series, 
vol.  iii.  p.  269;  Spiegel,  Grammatik  der 
Huzvaresch-Sprache,  p.  172;  Haug,  Old 
Pahlavi-Pazand  Glossary,  p.  5.  The  in- 
scription of  Artaxerxes  is  confirmed  by 
those  of  his  son,  Sapor,  who  calls  Papak 
(Babek)  his  grandfather  (De  Sacy,  p.  31; 
Thomas,  in  Journal  of  the  Asiatic  Soci' 
ety.  New  Series,  vol.  iii.  pp.  301,  314; 
Haug,  Glossary,  p.  46).  There  are  also 
coins  of  Artaxerxes  which  have  his  head 
on  the  obverse,  with  the  legend  Ar- 
tahshetr.  and  on  the  other  side  the  head 
of  his  father,  with  the  legend  Mazddisn 
bag  Papak,  "the  Ormazd-worshipping 
divine  Papak."  (See  Moi-dtmann's  arti- 
cle in  {he  Zeitschrift  der  dentscJienmor- 
genldndischeii  Gesellschaft,  vol.  viii.  p. 
29;  compai'e  Thomas  in  Num.  Chron. 
for  187'2,  p.  48) 

11  See  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  i.  p. 
89;  Thomas  in  Num.  Chron.,  New  Se- 
ries, No.  xlv.  p.  47.  The  variety,  how- 
ever, of  the  Persian  accounts  is  almost 
infinite.  The  Lebtarikh  makes  Arta- 
xerxes the  son  of  Sasan,  and  calls  Babek 
his  maternal  grandfather  (D'Herbelot, 
Bibl.  Orient,  tom.  i.  p.  375).  The  Tarikh- 
Kozideh  and  Bina-Kiti  agree  on  the 
latter  point,  but  make  Sasan  the  other 
(paternal)  grandfather  (ibid.).  The 
Zeenutal-Tuarikh  has  two  Sasans,  one 
of  whom  is  the  father  and  the  other  the 
grandfather  of  Babek.  Magoudi  gives 
two  genealogies  of  Artaxerxes,  each 
containing  three  Sasans,  and  one  of 
them  two,  the  other  three  Babeks  (Prat- 
ries  d'Or,  tom.  ii.  p.  151): — 

Lohrasp  Lohrasp 


Gustasp 

Isfendiar 

I 
Bahman 

I 
Sassan 

I 
Dara 

I 
Behawend 

I 
Sassan 

I 
Babek 

Sassan 

Babek  (Shah) 

I 
*Td6shir 


Gustasp 
Isfendiar 

Bahman 

I 
Sassan 

Mehr6mas 

Babek 

Sassan 

Babek 

I 
Sassan 

I 
Babek 

Ard6shlr 


4m.  in.] 


tSb  seventb  monarchy. 


641 


<*  The  term  seems  to  have  been  first 
used  by  tlie  Armenian  writers,  wlio  re- 
garded Artaxerxes  as  the  son  of  Sasau. 
(See  Agathang.  i.  §  3,  ad  Jin.)  Adopted 
from  them  by  the  Byzantines,  it  i)assed 
into  the  languages  of  modern  Europe. 

"This  term  [Hukluimaiiisliiya)  was 
actually  used  by  the  kings  of  the  Great 
Persian  Empire  from  Cyrus  to  Artax- 
erxes Mnemon,as  appears  from  their 
inscriptions.  (See  Sir  H.  Rawlinson'.s 
Cuneiform  Inscriptions,  vol.  i.  pp.  !i70, 
271,  279,  3-.20,  34:i,  &c.;  and  Loftus,  Chal- 
doea  and  Susiana,  p.  S72.)  It  appears 
from  the  Behistun  monument  that  Da- 
rius Hystapis  connected  the  name  w-ith 
a  certain  Achasmenes  {Hakluhiianish), 
whom  he  regarded  as  his  ancestor  in 
the  fifth  degree.  (Compare  Herod,  i. 
125;  iii.  75;  vii.  11.) 

'*  Patkanian  (Journ.  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  128)  notes  tliat,  according  to  na- 
tive Persian  accounts,  the  first  Sassan 
was  a  son  of  Artaxerxes  Longimanus. 
The  Sassanian  kings  luidoubtedly  claim- 
ed to  descend  from  the  Acha3meni<l;e; 
but  it  is  very  unlikely  that  they  could 
really  trace  their  descent,  nor  has  Sasan 
the  form  of  an  old  Persian  name. 

'*  'Ek  t^s  TTaTpia?  T^s  'A(T(Tupi'as  (i.  §  3). 

••See  §§5  and  8. 

"  Sasan,  according  to  AgathiaS,  was 
travelling  through  the  Cadusiau  coim- 

try  (Sta   Trji;    Ka&ovcraiuiv   xojpa?)  when    he 

fe"ll  in  with  Babek  who  lived  tliere  (ii. 
p.  65). 

>"  Dio  Cass.  Ixxx.  3. 

•»  Herodian,  vi.  9. 

'"  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  66.  The  statement 
is  repeated  by  Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  367): 
"Anno  imperii  (Commodi)  decimo  ex- 
orti  IVrsa;  Babelem,  Aniidum,  et  Per- 
sian! occupiirunt,  duce  nempe  Ardashi- 
ro,  filio  HabtH'i  filii  Sasani.  IC'itochrista." 

^*  OiJTo<;  o 'Apxtto-tpa?  Tr)<;  Tiov  Sra^pt- 
TwJ'    Trarptfio?  aaTpanrj^  utttjpx^i'  (i.  9). 

^^  Tabari  says  he  was  a  native  of  a 
city  called  Tirouze,  which  was  in  the 
government  of  Istakr.  {Chronique,  ii. 
p.  67.) 

23  See  text,  p.  258. 

a^See  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Ori- 
entalc.  tom.  i.  p.  375,  ad  voc.  Ardschir- 
Babeqan. 

*f  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 

&.  89.  Tabari  calls  him  "Governor  of 
arabgird."  (Chronique,  tom.  ii.  p. 
68.) 

*'  These  inscriptions  were  first  copied 
by  Carsten  Niebuhr,  the  father  of  the 
historian  of  Rome,  and  are  given  in  his 
Voyiges.  torn.  ii.  pi.  .xxvii.  They  maj' 
be  found  also  in  Chardin,  Voyages  en 
Pdi-se,  tom.  ii.  pi.  Ixxiii. ;  Ve  Sacy,  Me- 
moire,  pi.  i. ;  Ker  Porter.  Travels,  vol.  i. 
pi.  23;  and  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse, 
tom.  iv.  pi.  180.  Papak  is  called  malka 
in  the  Persian,  and  pao-iAei/?  in  the  Greek 
version. 

"  Til/  tityiuTiviav  T«  'ApTa<Tipas  (i.  3). 

■•'*  Se«  note  21. 

'•  Herodian,  vi.  2. 


5»  Strabo,  xv.  3,  §  24;  Isid.  Char.  §  31. 

3'  Herod,  i.  107.  In  an  inscription  of 
Cyrus  he  calls  his  father  C-'amby.ses  •"  the 
powerful  king"  {kli.skayatkiua  cazurku) 

3'Mbid.  i.  110-118. 

3  3  Dio  Cass.  Ixxx.  3. 

34  Agathangelus,  i.  §§  8-9.  The  three 
battU's  are  witnessed  to  by  both  writers. 

^'J  The  Persian  accounts  will  be  found 
condensed  in  Malcolm,  Jlist.  of  Persia, 
vol.  i.  pp.  90-92.  Their  authority  is  but 
slight. 

3"  Malcolm,  p.  91. 

"  Ibid.  1.  s,  c. ;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  70.  Thom- 
as (Xum.  Chron.  No.  xlv..  New  Series, 
p.  51)  assigns  the  earliest  coins  of  Ar- 
taxerxes to  the  period  when  he  was 
King  of  Ears  only,  or  perhaps  of  Ears 
and  Kemian. 

3«  So  Agathangelus:   u>n-At'^€To  'Aprapi- 

vri'S  (A€Ta  napGuyv,  €\{iiv  Kai  ovk  b\i- 
y  o  u  ?  lie  per  a  9,  ixrj  KeKOivuti^iijKOTa^  ri)  tujv 
Ofxofjiv^.ioi'  ^ov\rj  (i.  §  8). 

3"  Ibid.  1.  s.  c. 

*"  Dio  Cassius  (Ixxx.  3)  and  Agathan- 
gelus (1.  s.  c.)  alike  note  the  tliree  en- 
gagements, but  give  no  indications  of 
locality.  We  are  indebted  to  the  Per- 
sian writers  for  the  mention  of  thr 
"plain  of  Hormuz."  (See  Malcolm, 
History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  91.)  They 
are  not,  however,  all  agreed  upon  the 
point,  for  the  Modjmel-al-'lewarikh 
places  the  battle  at  Nehavend  near  Ec- 
batana.  (See  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1841,  p.  501.) 

*'  Metaphrastus,  quoted  by  M.  Lang- 
lois  in  his  edition  of  Agathangelus,  pub- 
lished in  the  Fragm.  Hist.  Or.  of  Afons. 
C.  j\IUll('r,  vol.  V.  pars  2nda.  p.  113; 
Mo(lj>nel-al-Teu)arikh,l.  s.  c. ;  Tabari,  ii. 
p.  73. 

*''  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

"  Agathang.  Pref.  §  2;  Hist.  Regn.  Ti- 
lidat.  i.  §9;  Mos.  Choreu.  Hist.  Armen. 
ii.  65-69. 

■'''  Agathang.  Hist.  i.  §  9  (Greek  ver- 
sion); Procop.  De^dif.  Jiuitinian,  iii.  1. 

■•»  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  68;  Agathang.  1.  s.  c. 

•""Mos.  Chor.  ii.  69.  Compare  Hero- 
dian, vi.  5. 

*">  Mos.  Chor.  1.  s.  c. 

48  Dio  Cass.  1.  s.  c. 

4»  According  to  Agathangelus  (ii.  §  1), 
Chosroes  called  in  the  aid  of  the  .\lbiv- 
nians,  the  Iberians,  the  L<*pones,  the 
Silvani,  the  Caspians,  and  the  Iluns  (!). 
He  was  also  helped  by  the  Saracens  (ii. 
§41. 

60  Agathang.  ii.  6  2;  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  69. 

"  So  Moses(Hist.  Arm.  ii.  70,  ad  fin.). 
Agathangelus,  however,  the  earlier 
writer,  makes  no  such  extreme  asser- 
tion. According  to  him  Artaxerxes 
maintained  the  struggle,  but  with  con- 
stant ill  success,  for  twelve  years  (Hist. 
ii.  §§  2  and  3).  Patkanian  bi-lieves  Chos- 
roiis  to  have  ravaged  the  Persian  terri- 
tory as  far  as  Ctesijihon;  to  have  there 
quarrelled  with  his  allies,  who  quitt<'d 
him;  and  aftiT  this  to  have  ha<l  no  great 
success,  though  he  coutiuued  ttie  war 


642 


THE  SWENTB  MONAtiCnT. 


[2Vi.  m 


for  ten  years,  from  a.d.  227  to  a.d.  237 
(Journal  Asiatique,  1866.  pp.  143-3). 

*2  We  might  doubt  whether  any  re- 
verses at  all  were  sustained,  were  it  not 
for  the  statement  of  Dio:    inl  ttjv  "Ap^c- 

vtav  rJAa(re.  KavTavOa  7rp6?  Te  Toji'  ^TTi^aipitov 
KOLL  TTpbs  ^lrj6ixlV  TLl'ajl'  Ttur  TC  TOU  * ApTajidvov 
TratStur  7rTatO"a9,  tu?  p-er  Tti'es  AeyovfftJ', 
c^vyev,  w?  6'  erepot,  ai'6;^a»pT)(7e  Trpb?  Trapa- 

53  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  58-59. 

*■•  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  206.. 

5'  They  had  recently  murdered  their 
general,  Flavius  Heracleon  (Dio  Cass. 
Ixxx.  4). 

*«  Herodian,  vi.  2;  Dio  Cass.  Ixxx.  3. 

5'  Herodian,  1.  s.  c.  Compare  Lara- 
pridius  {Vit.  Al.  Sev.  §  56):  "Terras  in- 
teramnanas  ah  impura  ilia  belua  recepi- 

TJIMS." 

***  Herodian,  1.  s.  c. 

*'  Four  hundred  youths,  selected  from 
the  tallest  and  most  beautiful  of  the 
Persians,  dressed  in  rich  apparel,  and 
with  golden  ornaments,  mounted  more- 
over on  line  steeds,  and  armed  with 
bows,  carried  the  message  of  the  Per- 
sian monarch  to  Rome  (Herodian,  vi.  4). 

'•l  KeAeuei  jityas  ^acriAei'?  'Apraf epf r)s 
a<bC(TTa(Tdai  *Pa>/xatov?  Te  Kal  tov  ap)(Oi/ra 
avTuii'  ^up(a9  T€  CLTTaaTj?  'A<rCa<;  re  T^s  Evpto- 
TTf)  avTiKet/LteVr)?.      (Ibid.) 

*'  Eli-at  yap  avTO.  IIep(ra)i'  TrpoyoviKo.  iCTij- 
IJ-ara.      (Ibid.) 

'*  Especially  from  Illyria,  where  some 
of  the  best  Roman  troops  were  always 
stationed  to  defend  the  frontier  of  the 
Danube. 

*3  There  is  some  little  doubt  as  to  the 
exact  chronology.  I  follow  Clinton  (F. 
R.  vol.  i.  pp.  244-246).  De  Champagny 
makes  Severus  arrive  in  Antioch  two 
years  later — a.d.  233  (Les  Cesarsdu  troi- 
sieme  Steele,  tom.  ii.  p.  115). 

^*  Herodian,  vi.  4,  sub  fin. 

**  See  the  speech  of  Severus  in  the 
Senate  on  his  return  from  the  East,  re- 
corded by  Lampridius  (Vit.  Alex.  Sev. 
%  56). 

""  So  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall,  ch. 
viii.  vol.  i.  p.  253).  The  numbers  of  the 
chariots  and  of  the  elephants  are  espe- 
cially improbable.  Though  in  the  more 
ancient  period  of  Oriental  history  we 
find  instances  of  kings  possessing  1,200 
(Shishak,  Benhadad),  1,400  (Solomon), 
and  even  2,000  chariots  (Ahab,  accord- 
ing to  the  Black  Obelisk),  yet  in  later 
times  only  very  moderate  numbers  were 
brought  into  the  field.  Xenophon  reck- 
ons the  chariots  of  an  Oriental  army  at 
SOO  (Cyrop.  vi.  1,  §  28);  and  the  actual 
number  employed  at  Arbela  was  only 
200  (Arrian,  Exp.  Al.  iii.  11;  Q.  Curt.  iv. 
12;  Diod.  Sic.  xvii.  53).  The  Arsacid 
monarchs  do  not  seem  to  have  used 
chariots  at  all  in  warfare  (Sixth  Mon- 
archy, p.  229).  Nothing  can  well  be 
more  unlikely  than  that  Artaxerxes 
should,  within  six  years  of  his  establish- 
ment as  "great  king,"  have  collected  a 


force  of  1,800  war  chariots.  On  the  im 
probability  of  the  ' '  seven  hundred  ele- 
phants," see  the  excellent  note  of  Gib- 
bon. 

8'  On  the  Parthian  incapacity,  see  the 
Author's  Sixth  Monarchy,  note  54,  Chap- 
ter xxiii.  Tlie  early  Persians  had  shown 
no  such  weakness  (Ancient  Monarchies, 
vol.  iv.  p.  130);  but  the  warfare  of  the 
later  Persians  far  more  resembles  that 
of  the  Parthians  than  the  more  scientific 
method  of  their  own  ancestors. 

«8  Herodian,  vi.  5.  Compare  Lampri- 
dius, §  55. 

•'  •'  Terras  interamnanas  .  .  .  recepi- 
mus."  (Sever,  ap.  Lamprid.  §  56.)  The 
series  of  Mesopotamian  coins  shows 
this  boast  to  have  been  true.  (See  Mi- 
onnet,  Medailles,  tom.  v.  pp.  593-637; 
Supplemejit,  tom.  viii.  pp  391-416.) 

'"  Whatever  judgment  we  form  of  the 
result  of  the  campaign,  it  seems  to  me 
uncritical  to  set  aside  the  minute  details 
of  Herodian  with  respect  to  Alexander's 

Elans  and  intentions.  The  fact  that 
ampridius  is  completely  silent  with  re- 
spect to  all  the  details  of  the  war  ("  in- 
dique  aucun  des  details  de  la  guerre," 
De  Champagny,  ii.  p.  122)  is  almost  con- 
clusive against  the  veracity  of  his  story. 

'I  The  present  text  of  Herodian  has 
"north"  for  "  south"  here;  but  the  con- 
text clearly  shows  that  either  he  or  one 
of  his  copyists  has  made  a  mistake. 

'2  ^Keypdfxefo^  trvu  Tots  </»tAots  epeiixe  to 

o'TpaTiajTiKoi'  61?  Tptii  /uoi'paf .    (Herodian, 
vi.  5.) 

'3  The  relative  credibility  of  Herodian 
and  Lampridius  in  their  respective  ac- 
counts of  Alexander's  Persian  campaign 
has  long  formed  a  subject  of  dispute 
with  historical  critics.  Among  impor- 
tant names  on  either  side  are  Gibbon 
and  Niebuhr  for  Herodian ;  Eckhel,  Pro- 
fessor Ramsay,  and  De  Champagny  for 
his  impugner.  The  main  points  in  favor 
of  Herodian  are,  first,  his  being  a  con- 
temporary; secondly,  his  general  mod- 
eration and  good  sense;  and,  thirdly, 
the  minuteness  and  circumstantiality  of 
his  account,  which  stands  in  strong  con- 
trast with  the  vague  boasts  of  Alexan- 
der  himself  and  his  biographer.  It  is 
sought  to  discredit,  Herodian  by  imput- 
ing to  him  a  prejudi*  against  Alexan- 
der; but,  on  the  whole,  his  account  of 
that  prince  is  not  an  unflattering  por- 
trait. Again,  it  is  said  (De  Champagny, 
ii.  p.  121)  to  be  inconceivable  that,  if 
Herodian's  account  of  the  campaign 
had  been  true,  the  general  result  of  the 
contest  should  have  been  so  absolutely 
without  injury  to  Rome  as  he  himself 
admits  it  to  have  been.  Certainly  there 
is  a  difficulty  here;  but  it  is  not  insu- 
perable. We,  with  our  Western  notions, 
should  have  expected  Artaxerxes  to 
have  followed  up  his  successes  in  a.d. 
232  by  a  great  invasion  of  the  Roman 
territory  in  a.d.  233.  But  we  find  hia. 
absolutely  passive.  This  appears  strange 
until  we  reflect  that  an  Eastern  army 


iH.m.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAROHT. 


643 


after  a  victory  demands  a  time  for  i-est 
and  enjoyment;  that  it  has  almost  of 
necessity  to  be  disbanded,  and  can  only 
be  collected  again  after  a  considerable 
interval.  Eastern  kings,  moreover,  are 
often  lazy  or  capricious.  Orodes  did 
not  follow  up  his  victory  over  Crassus 
by  any  serious  attack  on  the  Roman 
territory  until  two  years  had  passed 
(Sixth Monarch!/,  pp.  100,101).  Andasim- 
ilar  neglect  of  favorable  opportunities 
is  observable  throughout  Oriental  his- 
tory. It  may  be  added  t'nat  there  is  at 
least  one  expression  in  Lampridius 
which  betrays  the  truth  that  he  endeav- 
ors to  conceal.  The  universal  cry  of  the 
Romans  who  accompanied  Alexander's 
triumphal  procession  from  the  Capitol 
to  the  Palace  was,  Lampridius  tells  us 
(§  57),  this—"'  Rome  is  saved,  since  Alex- 
ander is  aafe."  Safety  is  only  a  subject 
of  congratulation  after  imminent  dan- 
ger. 

'■•  There  is  some  difficulty  in  under- 
standing Herodian  here,  since  his  geo- 
graphical ideas  are  confused  (Gibbon, 
ch.  viii.  note  51).  He  speaks  of  the  sec- 
ond army  as  threatening  both  Parthia 
and  Persia.  The  real  Parthia,  between 
the  Caspian  and  Bactria,  cannot,  it 
eeems  to  me,  be  intended.  I  suspect 
that  he  means  by  Parthia  the  tract 
•bout  Ctesiphon.  recently  the  head- 
quarters of  Parthian  power. 

'^Meyt'cTTTj  avTrj  trvfjitjiopa.  .  .  .  'Pto^at- 
ou?  CTTeff^e,  Sui'a/jteaj?  fxeyio'Tr}';  8ia4)6apeLtnj^, 
yv(A}fj.Tfi  /cat  p(jt}iJ.J)  /X7j6e/xia5  Toil'  ap\aiiiji'  ano- 
Stovtrri^.     (v.  5,  sub  fin.) 

■"  Herodian,  vi.  6,  sub  init. 

"  Lampridius  tlms  sums  up  the  ac- 
count of  Herodian  and  his  followers: — 
"  Amisisse  ilium  (sc.  Alexandrum)  exer- 
citum  dicunt  fame,  frigore,  ac  morbo" 
(§  V>7);  but  Herodian  says  nothing  about 
famine.   His  words  are:  twv  Tpiuiv  ixoipuiv 

Tov    (TTpaTOv,    0)1/   trei/iif,    TO   TrXeiCTTOv    ano- 
^aXofTL  St.a(j)6poi^  a"u/LL(/>opai?,  t'Ofroj,  iTo\ip.(tt, 

Kpvii.    Lampridius  seems  to  have  read 

Ac/ioj  for  TToAe'^w. 

'"The  Persians  had,  however,  lost  a 
large  number  of  their  best  troops.  The 
Roi  nar.s  of  the  southern  army  had  fought 
well,  and  their  defeat  had  cost  tiieir 
enemy  dear.  (See  Herodian,  vi.  6,  sub 
fin.) 

'»  Persepolis  seems  to  have  now  be- 
come the  main  Persian  capital,  uniler 
the  native  name  of  Istaki-  or  S'akr. 
{Agathang.  i.  §  9.  sub  lin.)  It  was 
threatened  when  the  soutliern  army  of 
Severus  was  expected  to  invade  Persia 
Proper  (see  text,  p.  ao.")). 

*"  Lectures  on  Ancient  History,  vol. 
iii.  p.  278. 

'•  "Rome  must  on  that  occasion  have 
lost  many  parts  (if  her  Eastern  posses- 
sions "'  iNiebuhr,  1.  s.  c.)  The  nimiis- 
matic  evidence  is  in  favor  of  there  hav- 
ing been  no  loss.  The  effigy  of  the  Ro- 
man emperor  continues  upon  the  coins 
Of  the  Mesopotamian  cities  and  states 


after  the  expedition  of  Alexander  ixisi 
as  before. 

*2  Herodian,  vi.  5;  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  69. 
Moses,  it  is  true,  calls  the  Roman  envpe- 
ror,  who  was  the  ally  of  Chosroes.  Philip 
(1):  but  it  is  evident  that  he  has  been 
misled  by  a  false  view  of  Roman  chro- 
nology. 

83  See  text,  p.  26.5. 

<**  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  71 :  "  Utdimidiam  pap. 
tem  Ariornm  in  sua  ditione  teneret.^' 

'•''Acaic  in  the  Greek  text  of  Agathan. 
gelus,  Anno  in  the  Armenian  (§  13); 
Anaciis  in  Wliiston's  version  of  Moses  of 
Choren6  (ii.  71);  Anak  in  Sepeos  (iii.  1). 

**"  Agathang.  §  14. 

'*'  Ef  Toi?  (TTevoli;  nepiKVKXuxravTff  [oi 
c^Tparrai]  Toi/s  <j>vydSas  ei"  p.e(Tw  tUv  ye(t>v- 
pCiv  evdtv  Ka\  evBev,  iroTa/no^puvtovj  jrtn-oin- 
Ka(rii'.     (Ibid.  §  15.) 

*'»  Ibid.  c.  iii.  §  16. 

*»Mos.  Chor.  ii.  73.  Agathangelus  is 
silent  on  this  point. 

»»  Agathang.  1.  s.  c;  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  74. 

"'Tacitus,  according  to  Moses  (ii.  73); 
but  really,  it  is  probable,  the  third  Gor- 
dian. 

»2  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  viii.  (vol.  i.  n. 
349).  ^ 

*3  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  p.  383. 
This  writer  notes  that  the  assertion  of 
Gibbon  is  "somewhat  unwarrantable." 

"  See  text,  pp.  245,  246. 

"^  Agath.  ii.  p.  64. 

"•A  critical  analysis  of  the  Zendavesta 
into  its  earlier  and  later  portions  seems 
to  show  that  Dualism  was  a  develop- 
ment out  of  an  earlier  Monotheism.  (See 
the  Author's  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol. 
iii.  pp.  104-107.)  Rut  we  only  know  the 
Persian  religion  historically  from  the 
time  of  Darius  Hystaspis,  when  Dualism 
was  certainly  a  part  of  it. 

»'  Especially  Mithra,  the  sun-god, 
wliose  worsliip  may  be  traced  back  to 
the  earliest  Iranic  times. 

'^  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Monarch- 
ies, vol.  iii.  pp.  122-128. 

»»  Strabo,  xv.  3.  S§  14  and  15;  Dio  Chry- 
sost.  Ornt.  Borysth.  p.  449,  A;  Amm. 
Marc  xxiii.  6:  Agathias,  ii.  25. 

'<">  Herod,  i.  133;  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  13; 
Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.  The  early  priests 
of  the  Zoroastrians  were  called  kavi, 
"seers,"  karapan,  "sacrificers,"  or 
iisikhs,  "  wise  men"  (Haug.  Essays  on 
the  Siicred  Laniiuage,  n'ritiugs,  anil 
Religion  of  the  \Farsees.  pp.  245-347); 
never  Magi.  A  term  which  some  iden- 
tify with  Magus  (inaga  or  maghtiva)  oc- 
c"irr.  twice,  but  twice  only,  in  the  Zetida- 
vesta.  (See  Westergaaril,  Introduction 
to  Zendavesta,  p.  17.) 

""  Dino,  Fr.  8;  Schol.  ad.  Nicandr. 
Ther.  613;  Cic.  l)e  Div.  i.  2.3,  41;  Val. 
Max.  i.  6. 

■"^  Agathia.s.  ii.  p.  65. 

'»'  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  74. 

>o<  Herodian.  iv.  .30. 

"">  Mob.  Ghor.  1.  a  c ;  Dio  CJaes.  Ixxr 
13, 


644 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  m 


!••  Mos.  Chor.  1.  g.  c. 

107  "Whether,"  says  Professor  Max 
Miiller,  "  on  the  revival  of  the  Persian 
religion  and  literature,  500  years  after 
Alexander,  the  works  of  Zoroaster  were 
collected  and  restored  from  extant  MSS. 
or  from  oral  tradition,  must  remain  un- 
certain; and  the  disturbed  state  of  the 
phonetic  system  would  rather  lead  us  to 
suppose  a  long-continued  influence  of 
orcU  tradition."  (Bunsen's  Philosophy 
of  History,  vol.  iii.  pp.  116-7.) 

108  Mos.  Chor.  1.  s.  c:  "Statuas  .  .  . 
Solisque  et  Lunje  simulachra,  Artasires 
conf  regit." 

109  Agathias,  1.  s.  c. 

110  Amm.  Mare,  xxiii.  6;  p.  373.  The 
"  Magian  lands'  mentioned  in  this  pas- 
sage may  have  been  in  the  possession  of 
the  caste  under  the  Parthians;  but  at 
any  rate  Artaxerxes  must  have  sanc- 
tioned the  ari-angement. 

1 1 1  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p. 
338 

112  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  74. 

113  Seventy,  according  to  the  Oriental 
writers  ^see  Gibbon,  vol.  i.  p.  332)  ;  but 
this  round  number,  a  multiple  of  seven, 
is  suspicious. 

iKMilman,  History  of  Christianity, 
vol.  ii.  p.  251.  (Compare  the  dissertation 
of  Bredow.  prefixed  to  Syncellus,  vol. 
ii.,  in  tHe  Corpus  Hist.  Byzant.  of  B.  G. 
Niebuhr,  Bonn,  1829.) 

ii^Anquetil  Duperron,  who,  towards 
the  close  of  the  last  century,  professed 
to  translate  the  Zendavesta  into  French, 
was  incompetent  to  the  task,  and  gave 
a  wrong  impression  of  the  true  charac- 
ter of  the  volume.  Burnouf  first  edited 
with  correctness  a  portion  of  the  text, 
which  has  since  been  published  in  its 
entirety  by  Westergaard  (1852-1854)  and 
Spiegel  (1851-1858). 

ii«  See  his  Translation  of  the  Avesta, 
Berlin.  1861. 

ii'  On  this  point  the  reader  may  con- 
sult Haug's  Essays  on  the  Sao'ed  Lan- 
guage, <kc.,  of  the  Par  sees,  Bombaj', 
1862. 

118  Max  Miiller,  in  Bunsen's  Philosophy 
of  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  116. 

11*  The  Aryan  character  of  the  Zend 
was  first  proved  by  Rask,  and  is  now  ad- 
mitted by  all  scholars.  Zend  and  Sans- 
krit were  two  ancient  sister  forms  of 
speech.  From  Zend  came,  first,  Achse- 
menian  Persian,  or  the  language  of  the 
Persian  cuneiform  inscriptions;  then 
Pehlevi  or  Huzvaresh.  Persian  in  its  sold 
(Max  Miiller.  p.  119).  but  to  a  large  extent 
Semitic  in  its  vocabulary:  next,  Parsi, 
which  is  Huzvaresh  purified  from  its 
Semitic  ingredients;  and  finally,  the  lan- 
guage of  Firdusi,  which  continues  to  be 
spoken  at  the  present  day. 

120  See  the  account  given  by  Malcolm, 
from  Persian  sources. of  the  dying  speech 
of  Artaxerxes  (History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  S5).  Compare  Magoudi,  Prairies 
d'Or.  vol.  ii.  162. 

>*•  go  Miinian  {Hist,  o/  Christianity, 


vol.  ii.  p.  254),  whom  I  venture  to  follow, 
though  I  have  not  found  ancient  au- 
thority for  the  statement. 

122  (jibbon.  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p. 
338;  Milman.vol.  ii.  p.  252. 

i2aHj'de,  De  Religione  Persarum,c. 
21. 

12^  The  account  which  Magoudi  gives 
of  the  Court  and  governmental  system 
of  Artaxerxes  (Prairies  d'Or,  torn.  ii. 
pp.  153-157)  is  curious  and  interesting, 
but  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  authen- 
tic. Magoudi  did  not  write  till  about 
A.D.  950;  and  the  picture  which  he  draws 
represents  probably  the  later  rather 
than  the  earlier  period  of  the  Sassanian 
kingdom. 

125  Gibbon  declares,  but  incorrectly, 
that  "  the  prudent  Artaxerxes,  suffering 
no  person  except  himself  to  assume  the 
title  of  king,  abolished  every  interme- 
diary power  between  the  throne  and  the 
people"  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  340). 
Agathangelus  tells  us  that  he  called  a 
council  of  "all  the  kings,  the  rulers,  and 
the  generals"  (§12);  and  we  see  from 
Moses  that  he  was  willing  to  have  grant- 
ed the  kingly  title  to  Anak  (Hist.  Ar- 
nicn.  ii.  71).  The  very  retention  of  the 
title  "King  of  kings,"  so  frequent  on 
the  coins  and  in  the  inscriptions,  indi- 
cates a  state  of  things  exactly  the  op- 
posite of  that  described  by  Gibbon. 
Note  further  the  mention  of  the  subject 
"king  of  the  Cadusians,"  by  Jul.  Capito- 
linus  {Valer.  §  5). 

126  Agilthang.  1.  S.  c:  Trpoo-KaAco-a/iecos 
iravTa^  Tous  ^acrtAel?,  Ka\  Tondp\a^,  xat  (TTpa- 
Trji-ous. 

12'  So  Malcolm  (Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  94).  Gibbon  paraphrases  thus :  "The 
authority  of  the  prince  must  be  defend- 
ed by  a  military  force;  that  force  can 
only  be  maintained  by  taxes;  all  taxes 
must,  at  last,  fall  upon  agriculture;  and 
agriculture  can  never  flourish  except 
under  the  protection  of  justice  and 
moderation"  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i. 
p.  346). 

128  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p 
94. 

129  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
96.  There  is  a  remarkable  consensus  of 
authors  on  the  point  of  Artaxerxes'  love 
of  justice.  Agathangelus.  the  Arme- 
nian historian,  says:  efiaari\iv<Te  navra 
TrpaTTtoi'  eTTtet/co)?,  evvofjiia  \aipuiv  Koi  TroAt- 
Tcio  Si.Kai.oTa.Tji  (§  9).  '  Eutychius,  th« 
Latin  writer,  notes  of  him:  "Quanta 
fieri  potuit  cum  justitia  inter  homines 
versatus  est"  (vol.  i.  p.  373).  The  Per- 
sian historians  make  the  assertions 
given  in  the  text.  (See  Mohl's  extract? 
from  the  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  in  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  1841,  p.  502.) 

130  D'Herbelot,fii6h'o^/iegMe  Orientate, 
tom.  i.  p.  380. 

131  See  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  70  and  75. 

132  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  48. 

133  Agathang.  §  12. 

i3<  Tills  is  probably  what  Dean  Milman 


f 


€3.  III.] 


TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


645 


meant  when  he  said  that  "  the  Magian 
hierarchy  formed  the  great  council  of 
the  state"  (History  nf  ChristiaiLit;/,  vol. 
ii.  p.  254.)  It  is  implied  in  tlie  terms  of 
the  "testament,"  as  given  in  the  text. 

"35  See  Malcolm,  Hisi.  of  Persia,  vo\. 
i.  pp.  95-96,  who  in  this  follows  Firdusi. 
Firdusi  wrote,  according  to  Malcolm, 
from  trustworthy  Pehlevi  materials. 
Milman  regards  the  record  as  authentic 
(History  of  Christianity,  vol.  ii.  p.  253). 

"•  Magoudi,  Prairies  a' Or,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
lafi.  160. 

'3'  Tabari,  Chroniqne,  vol.  ii.  p.  74. 

138  See  PI.  XV.  Fig.  1. 

■39  See  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  torn. 
i.  pi.  14;  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  ii.  pi. 
66. 

I''"  Sir  R.  Ker  Porter  regarded  the  two 
main  figures  as  Artaxerxes  and  Oiinazd, 
the  prostrate  figure  as  a  symbf)l  of  the 
fallen  Arsacidte.  and  the  radiated  per- 
sonage as  either  Zoroaster  (!)  or  '"  a  per- 
sonification of  the  Mithratic  religion" 
(Travels,  vol.  ii.  p.  193).  Flandin  also 
thought  the  radiated  figure  to  be  Zo- 
roaster (  Voyage  en  Perse,  tom.  i.  p.  442). 
Mr.  Tlioinas  takes  tlie  view  of  the  mat- 
ter which  is  followed  in  the  text.  (Jour- 
nal of  As.  Society,  New  Series,  vol.  iii. 
p.  267,  note  3.) 

'■"See  PI.  XV.  Figs.  2  and  1;  and  com- 
pare Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pis.  21  and  28; 
Flandin.  vol.  i.  pis.  31  and  .33:  vol.  ii.  pis. 
4!)  nnd  .53;  vol.  iv.  pi.  185;  Texier,  pi.  129. 

'*2  See  Mordtmann,  in  the  Zeitschrift 
(ler  deiitschen  morgenUindischen  Gesell- 
scliaft  (vol.  viii.  pp.  29-34;  and  vol.  xix. 
pp.  41.5-6,  477-8);  and  Thomas,  in  the 
I^dtnismatic  Chronicle  for  1872  (No.  xlv. 
pp.  1S-.55). 

i"  Thomas.  Num.  Chron.  1872,  p.  54. 

'••<  Mr.  Thomas  regards  these  coins  as 
the  third  in  order  (ibid);  but  Mordt- 
mann is,  I  think,  riglit  in  giving  them 
the  second  place  (Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii. 
pp.  31-.33). 

'*'  Mr.  Thomas  renders  the  phrase  by 
"Ardeshir's  flre-altar,"  comparing  nu- 
vazi  with  the  Pehlevi  naus,  which  has 
this  meaning  {Num.  Chron.  1872,  p.  51). 
Mordtmann  thinks  this  translation  im- 
possible, and  suggests  "  Arta.\erxes  the 
clianter"  (dcr  Anrufcnde).  (See  the 
Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  32.)  De  Sacy 
originally  read  iezdani  for  nuvazi ;  but 
this  reading  is  now  generally  regarded 
as  mistaken. 

'*«  See  Longpfirier,  Mddailles  des  Sas- 
snnides,  pi.  2,  Nos.  4  and  5. 

'<'  As  Sapor  II. ,  Varahran  IV.,  Izdegird 
L,  and  others. 

'"Thomas,  in  Num.  Chron.  for  1873, 
p.  55.  and  pi.  'i.  No.  12;  Mordtmann,  in 
the  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  31,  and  pi.  10, 
No.  6. 

'"  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  212-223. 

""  Longp6rier,  Medailles  des  Sasaa- 
yides,  p.  2. 

-*'  For  a  representation  of  this  Nakhsh- 


i-Rustam  tablet,  see  the  Chapter  on  the 
Art  of  the  Sassanians. 

'*^  Besides  the  bas-relief  described  (p. 
277),  Artaxerxes  has  left  either  three  or 
four  others.  One,  also  at  Nakhsh-i- 
Rustam,  represents  Ormazd,  giving  Ar- 
taxerxes the  diadem,  on  foot  (Ker  Por- 
ter, vol.  i.  pi.  27.  No.  2;  Flandin,  Voyage 
en  Perse,  pi.  193).  Another,  at  Firuza- 
bad,  is  similar,  but  shows  us  Artaxerxes 
accompanied  by  four  attendants  (Flan- 
din. pi.  44).  A  third,  at  Takht-i-Bostan, 
exhibits  Artaxerxes  handing  the  diadem 
to  his  son.  Sapor  (Ker  Porter,  pi.  66; 
Flandin,  pi.  14).  The  fourth,  at  Salmos, 
to  the  west  of  Lake  Urumiyeh,  which 
may  have  been  the  work  of  Sapor,  rep- 
resents Artaxerxes  and  Sapor  on  horse- 
back, receiving  the  submission  of  the 
Armenians  (Ker  Porter,  vol.  ii.  pi.  82). 

1^3  Longperier,  Medailles  de  Sa.v-ia- 
nides.  Preface,  p.  iv.  and  also  p.  14.  The 
aureus  ot  Macrinus  weighs  from  1.35  to 
1-36  grains;  the  gold  coins  of  the  early 
Sassanians  weigh  exactly  136  grains. 

154  Ibid.  p.  14. 

is^Bactrian  gold  coins  are  rare,  but 
have  been  found  (Wilson,  Ariana  An- 
tiqua,  pp.  218,  223);  Indian  are  common 
(ibid.  pp.  347-380). 

156  Dio  Cassius,  Ixxviii.  27.  Compare 
the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy,  p.  206. 

1"  See  text,  p.  277. 

158  This  inscription,  which  was  first 
copied  with  any  accuracy  by  Carsteu 
Niebuhr,  will  be  found  in  his  Voyages, 
tom.  ii.  pi.  27.  It  is  also  represented  in 
the  work  of  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pi.  22, 
opp.  p.  .548.  Thougli  bilingual  onlj',  it 
is  triliteral;  the  Persian  transcript  being 
given,  with  only  slight  differences,  in  the 
two  sets  of  characters,  which  have  been 
recentljf  distinguished  as  ""  Chaldajo- 
Pehlevi "  and  '"  Sa-;sanian  Pehlevi " 
(Taylor,  in  Journal  of  Asiatic  Society, 
vol.  xii.  pp.  264-26()).  The  latter  an(l 
simpler  character  was  successfully  de- 
ciphered by  M.  De  Sacj'.  who  was  thus 
enabled  to  translate  the  in.scription 
(Memoire  sur  les  Inscriptions  de  Nak- 
schi-Roxi.'itan,  jip.  76  et  .seqq.).  The  other 
character  has  been  satislactorily  read 
by  Mr.  Thomas,  and,  more  recently,  by 
Dr.  Martin  Haug. 

168  i^cj.  Porter's  drawing  shows  us  that 
this  figure  was  represented  with  snakes 
at  the  front  of  the  helmet.  The  con- 
nection of  the  serpent  or  snake  with 
Ahriman  is  a  well-known  feature  of  the 
Zoroastrian  religion  (Vendidad.  i.  3; 
xviii.  1-6;  Herod,  i.  1-10;  &c). 

1 '" /^agra  is  t he  term  used  for  "god" 
throughout  the  Achwrnenian  inscrip- 
tions. It  is  there  applied  both  to  Or- 
mazd and  the  inferior  deities.  That  the 
bag  or  bagi  of  the  early  Sa-'J.sanians  rep- 
resents this  word  is  generally  agreed 
upon. 

"1  Alha  is  used  as  an  equivalent  term 
for  BAGI  in  the  Chaldaeo-l'ehlevi  tran- 
script of  this  and  other  inscriptions  o{ 


646 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


IcTL.  rv. 


the  early  Sassanian  kings.  It  clearly 
represents  the  Jewish  El,  or  Elohim,  and 
the  Arabic  Allah. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

'  The  Modjmel  -  at  -  Tewarikh  agrees 
with  Agathias  (iv.  24;  p.  259,  A)  and  Eu- 
tychius  (vol.  i.  p.  375)  in  giving  Artaxerx- 
es  a  reign  of  fourteen  years  only.  (See 
the  Journal  Asiatique  tor  1841,  p.  503; 
and  compare  Ma^oudi.  torn.  ii.  p.  159.) 
When  the  Armenian  writers  give  him 
forty,  forty-flve,  or  even  fifty  years  (Pat- 
kanian,  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  145),  they  perhaps  include  the 
time  during  which  he  was  tributary  king 
of  Persia.  (See  Tabari,  Chronique,  ii.  p. 
75:  "  Ardeschir  r6gna  quatorze  ansapres 
la  mort  d' Ardewan ;  puis  il  mourut,  apres 
avoir  r6gn6  en  tout  quarante-quatre 
ans.) 

*  This  is  the  form  of  the  name  on  the 
coins  of  Sapor,  and  in  his  inscriptions. 
The  word  means  "prince" —  literally 
"king's  son" —  from  Shah  (contracted 
form  of  khshayathiya,  "  king")  and 
puhr  (=Ach£emenian  ptdra),  "son." 
See  Mos.  Choren.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  74.) 

3  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
96,  note;  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Ori- 
entate, torn.  i.  pp.  378-9.  Some  writers 
are  content  to  make  her  an  Arsacid 
princess  (Tabari,  ii.  p.  76). 

*  As  Artaxerxes  only  reigned  fourteen 
years  after  his  last  victory  over  Arta- 
banus,  if  he  then  married  that  king's 
daughter,  and  Sapor  was  their  son,  he 
(Sapor)  could  not  have  been  more  than 
thirteen  at  his  father's  death.  But  the 
wars  in  which  he  is  at  once  engaged  do 
not  suit  this  age. 

*  Compare  the  stories  that  Cambyses 
was  the  son  of  Nitetis,  a  daughter  of 
Amasis  (Herod,  iii.  2);  that  Cyrus  was  a 
son  of  MandanS,  daughter  of  Astyages 
(ib.  i.  108);  and  that  Alexander  the  Great 
was  the  son  of  Darius  Codomannus,  the 
last  Acheemenian  monarch  (Malcolm, 
vol.  i.  p.  70). 

«  The  tale  that  his  mother  was  con- 
demned to  death,  but  spared  by  the 
chief  vizier  because  she  was  with  child, 
and  that  her  offspring  was  brought  up 
secretly  by  the  minister,  who  after  a 
time  revealed  the  matter  to  Artaxerxes 
(Tabari,  ii.  pp.  75-79;  Malcolm,  i.  96,  note; 
D'Herbelot,  1.  s.  c).  deserves  no  cre- 
dence.   Its  details  are  contradictory. 

'  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  97,  note. 

*  Tabari  calls  this  king  Satiroun,  and 
places  the  siege  of  Hatra  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Valerian  (Chronique,  ii.  pp.  80- 
82).  Satiroun  is  also  given  as  the  name 
of  the  Hatra  monarch  by  Ma(;oudi(tom. 
iv.  pp.  81-82). 

*  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  179  and  196. 

'"Malcolm,  i.  pp.  96-7.  Mapoudi  (iv. 
p.  84)  and  Tabari  make  Sapor  marry 
this  princess;  out  say  that  shortly  after- 
wards he  put  her  to  death  {Chronique, 
ii.  p.  84). 


■iGordian's  journey  to  the  East  is 
placed  by  Clinton  in  this  year  (F.  R.  i. 
p.  256).  Sapor's  aggressions  certainly 
preceded  this  journey.  They  must  have 
occurred  in  the  earlier  months  of  a.d. 
341,  or  the  later  ones  of  A  d.  240. 

'2  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  1. 
pp.  307-8;  DeChampagny,  CesarsduZnig 
Siecle,  tom.  ii.  pp.  134-136. 

13  The  two  Gordians.  father  and  son, 
who  were  shortly  afterwards  put  down 
by  Capelianus  (Gibbon,  vol.  i.  pp.  313- 
218) 

'<  Maximusand  Balbinus  (ibid.  p.  319). 

■^  M.  Antonius  Gordianus,  a  grandson 
of  the  elder  and  a  nephew  of  the  youn- 
ger Gordian.  He  was  only  thirteen  years 
of  age  when  he  was  proclaimed,  in  a.d. 
338(Herodian,  viii.  8). 

i^See  the  coins  {Miounet,  Medailles, 
tom.  V.  pp.  625-628;  and  Supplfiment, 
tom.  viii.  pp.  415,  416). 

1'  According  to  Persian  authorities, 
the  wall  fell  down  in  answer  to  the 
prayers  of  the  besiegers  (Malcolm,  vol. 
i.  p.  9.3.  Compare  Tabari,  Chronique,  ii. 
p.  79). 

'8  Hist.  August.  Gordiani,  §  27. 

""Ibid.  §26. 

'"'  The  name  is  given  as  Misitheus  in 
the  Historia  Augusta  (which  is  followed 
by  Gibbon  and  others),  as  Timcsitdes  by 
Zosimus  (i.  17).  But  inscriptions  show 
that  the  true  form  was  Timesitheus 
(Eckhel,  Doctr.  Num.  Vet.  vii.  p.  319; 
De  Champagny,  Cesars  du  3me  Siecle, 
tom.  ii.  p.  204,  note). 

2'  See  the  inscription  (No.  5530  in  the 
collection  of  Henzen)  summarized  by  De 
Champagny,  1.  s.  c. 

22  •■  Frequentibus  praeliis  pugnavit  et 
vicit"  (Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  26). 

^5  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5:  "  Apud  Resai- 
nam  fuso  fugatoque  Persarum  rege." 

"  Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  27. 

26  In  the  letter  which  he  wrote  to  the 
senate  from  Mesopotamia,  Gordian  said: 
"  Nisibin  usque  pervenimus,  et,  si  di  fa- 
verint,  Ctesiphonta  usque  veniemus" 
(Hist.  Aug.  1.  s.  c.) 

2  8  Hist.  Aug.  Gord.  §  28. 

2''  John  of  Antioch  makes  the  Roman 
army  penetrate  to  the  "  mouths  of  the 

Tigris"   (eis    tA   toO    Ti'-ypTjTos    (TTOfiia,   Fr. 

147);  but  this  is  very  improbable.  An 
advance  into  Southern  Mesopotamia  is, 
however,  distinctly  implied  in  the  posi- 
tion of  Gordian's  tomb,  which  was  some 
way  south  of  the  Khabour  (Amm.  Marc, 
xxiii.  5). 

^f'Hist.  August.  Gord,  §29. 

^^  De  Champagny  represents  the  peace 
made  as  altogether  favorable  to  Rome 
(tom.  ii.  p.  216),  and  speaks  of  Armenia 
as  having  become  Roman  in  consquence. 
But  this  was  certainly  not  so.  Armenia 
did  not  cease  to  be  Persian  till  the  third 
year  of  Diocletian,  a.d.  286  (Mos.  Chor. 
li.  79).  Some  ancient  writers  called  the 
peace  "very  tlisgraceful  to  Rome"  (Zo- 
sim.  iii.  32:  eip^i-Tji/  ala-xiTT-qy) ;  but  Nie- 
buhr's  conclusion  seems  to  be  just,  via. 


1 


CH.  IV.] 


TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


647 


that  "  Philip  concluded  a  peace  with  the 
Persians,  which  was  as  honourable  to  the 
Romans  as  circumstances  would  allow" 
{Lectures  on  Anc.  Hist.,  vol.  lii.  p.  284, 
E  T  ) 

30  From  A.D.  244  to  ad.  258. 

»»  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  69,  71,  &c. 

•*  See  the  statement  in  the  Historia 
Augufta  that  the  Bactrians,  among 
others,  declined  to  receive  the  over- 
tures made  to  theni  by  Sapor  after  his 
defeat  of  Valerian,  and  placed  their  ser- 
vices at  the  disposal  of  the  Romans 
(Jul.  Capit.  Valer.  §  7). 

3'  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Monarch- 
ies, vol.  iv.  p.  369. 

'<  Ibid.  vol.  iv.  p.  487;  Herod,  ix.  113. 

36  See  text.  p.  248. 

so  Philip,  Decius,  Gallus,  ^Emilianus, 
Valerian,  and  Gallienus,  whom  he  asso- 
ciated. Of  these  the  first  four  perished 
within  the  space  of  five  years  (a.d.  249- 
254). 

"  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  pp. 
298-3'^6;  Niebuhr,  Lectures  on  Ancient 
History,  vol.  iii.  pp.  290-294,  E.  T. 

S8  Amra.  Marc,  xxiii.  .'i.  Some  place 
this  capture  later,  as  Gibbon  (vol.  i.  p. 
328)  and  Clinton  (F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  288);  but 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  capture  of  the 
city  by  a  sudden  surprise  (as  related  by 
Ammianus)  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  capture  of  which  the  inhabitants 
had  due  notice  (mentioned  by  the  anony- 
mous author  of  the  Ti  neTa  Aitoi/a,  Fr. 
Hist.  Gr.  vol.  iv.  p.  192),  and  that  the 
former  preceded  the  oiher.  The  fact 
that  Ammianus  refers  the  surprise  to 
the  reign  of  Gallienus  is  not  conclusive 
against  this  view,  since  Gallienus  was 
associated  in  the  empire  as  early  as  a.d. 
353. 

'»  Zosim.  i.  32-34.  A  coin  of  Valerian, 
assigned  to  this  year,  has  the  legend 
"VICT.  PARTHICA"  (Clinton,  F.  R.  1. 
p.  282). 

<"  See  the  letter  of  Valerian  to  the 
Senate,  written  from  Mesopotamia,  and 
preserved  in  the  Historia  Angustn,  Mac- 
rian.  §  12:  — "Ego,  Patres  Conscripti, 
helium  Persicum  gerens,  Macriano  to- 
tatn  rempublicani  credidi  quidem  a 
parte  inilitari.  Ille  nobis  fidelis,  ille 
mihi  devotus,  itc." 

<'  Hist.  ^?(f/M.5^  Valerian.  §3:  "  Victus 
est  a  Sapore  rege  Persarum,  dum  ductu 
cujnsdam  sui  diicis,  cui  summam  omni- 
um belliearum  rerum  agendarum  com- 
miserat,  seu  fraude  seu  adversa  fortuna, 
in  ea  esset  loca  deductus,  ubi  nee  vigor 
nee  disciplina  n\;i-tar!.s.  qtu'n  caperetur, 
quidquam  valere  pcjtuit."  I  do  not  know 
why  the  recent  editors,  Jordan  and  Eys- 
senhardt,  reject  this  passage  (ed.  of 
1864,_p.  70). 

«3  Eutrop.  ix.  r. 

«3  Petrus  Patric.  Fr.  9;  Zosim.  i.  36. 

<♦  Zosim.  1.  8.  c.    Zvinaras  (xii.  23)  has 
a  different  accotmt.    According  to  him,    | 
Valerian    was    simply  captured   as  he 
■j'ied  to  escajie.  I 

*s  Gibbon  speaks  of  the  whole  array    | 


laying  down  its  arms  (vol.  i.  p.  328);  but 
the  position  of  Macrianus  at  the  head  of 
a  considei-able  force,  expressly  said  to 
be  the  remnant  of  the  lost  army,  im- 
plies the  escape  of  a  certain  number 
{Hist  Aug.  Gal  lien.  §  1). 

<»Tlie  Miriades  (Mariades)  of  Malala 
(xii.  p.  295)  can  scarcely  be  a  different 
person  from  the  Cyriades  of  the  Histo- 
ria Augusta,  Triginta  Tyraniii,  §  2. 
Whether  ho  was  brought  forward  as  a 
pretender  before  the  death  of  V'alerian 
or  after  is  perhaps  doubtful  (De  Cham- 
pagny,  Cesars  du  3me  Siicle,  tom.  ii.  p. 
436).  But  on  the  whole  Gibbon's  nexus 
of  the  events  has  the  greatest  proba- 
bility. 

■"  The  setting  up  of  Miriades  as  em- 
peror is  thought  to  be  represented  on 
more  than  one  of  Sapor's  bas-reliefs.  A 
tablet  on  a  large  scale  at  Darabgerd 
(Flandin,  pi.  33)  seems  to  exhibit  the 
Persian  king  on  horseback,  with  Vale- 
rian prostrate  beneath  his  charger's 
feet,  in  the  act  of  designating  Miriades 
as  monarch  to  the  assembled  Romans ; 
Sapor's  guards  stand  behind  him  with 
their  hands  upon  their  sword-hilts,  while 
in  front  of  him  the  Roman  soldiers  ac- 
cept their  new  ruler  with  acclamations. 
He  himself  raises  his  right  arm  as  he 
takes  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  his  suzerain. 

*^  See  the  fragment  of  the  anonymous 
continuator  of  Dio's  Roman  History,  in 
the  y<V.  Hist   Gr.  vol.  iv.  p.  192. 

*'  The  simile  is  used  by  Niebuhr  (Lec- 
tures, vol.  iii.  p.  294.  E.  T.). 

50  Zonaras,  xii.  23;  p.  630. 

"  See  Zosim.  i.  27  ad  fin.,  and  the 
comment  of  Gibbon  (vol.  i.  pp.  329,  330). 

«»  Agathias,  iv.  24;  p.  259,  B. 

*'  Zonar.  1.  s.  c. 

^*  Johann.  Malal.  Chronographia,  xii. 
p.  296. 

6*  See  the  fragments  of  Peter  Patri- 
cius  in  the  Frngmrnta  Hist.  Grcnc.  of  C. 
Miiller,  vol.  iv.  p.  187,  Fr.  10. 

*•  Hist.  August.  Valer.  §  7;  Gallien.  $ 
10:  Odenat.  S  15;  Agath.  1.  s.  c;  <S:c. 

"  Sext.  Rufus,  c.  23.  Compare  Hiero- 
nym.  Chron.  anno  2281. 

"'"  Odenathus  is  called  "Prince  of  the 
Saracens'"  by  Procopius  {Bell.  Pers.  ii. 
5).  and  John  of  Malala  (xii.  p.  297). 

^^  Hist.  Augu.<it.  Valerian,  S  *■  (Com- 
pare, however,  the  life  of  Odenathus, 
where  the  capture  of  the  concubines  is 
referred  to  a  later  date.) 

«»  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  11. 

«»  Pet,  Patric.  Fr.  11. 

"'■'  Historia  Augu.tta.  Valer.  §  7:  "  Va- 
leriano  apud  Persas  consenescente." 
Macrian.  ^  12:  "  Infelicissimo,  quod  se- 
nex  apud  Persas  conseniiit."' 

"Ibid.  Gallien.  §  1:  "  Erat  ingens  om- 
nibus mneror,  quod  imperator  Romanui 
in  Perside  serviliter  teneretur." 

•♦  The  stories  of  the  extreme  ill  treat 
ment  of  Valerian  start  with  Lactaiitius. 
or  the  riutlior  of  the  tre.-itise  /><•  .Morte 
Persrrulartim.  whoever  he  may  be. 
This  author  wrote  between  a.d.  312  and 


648 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  It. 


32; 


c; 


815  (Smith's  Did.  of  Biography,  ad  voc. 
CsBcilius),  or  above  fifty  years  after  the 
capture  of  Valerian.  He  asserts  posi- 
tively (c.  s.)  the  use  of  Valerian  as  a 
footstool  by  Sapor,  and  the  hanging  of 
his  skin  in  a  temple,  where  it  was  often 
seen  by  Roman  ambassadors.  Lactan- 
tius  is  followed  by  Eusebius  of  Csesarea, 
excepting  vrith  regard,  to  the  employ- 
ment of  Valerian  as  a  footstool;  and 
then  the  tales  are  repeated  by  Aurelius 
Victor  {De  Ccesaribus,  c.  33)  by  his  epi- 
tomator  {Epit.  c.  32),  by  Orosius  (viii.  23;, 
and  by  Petrus  Patrieius  (Fr.  13).  On  the 
whole  it  seems  to  me  that  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  skin  is  probably  true  (Euseb. 
Vit.  Constant,  iv.  11;  Orat.  Constant. 
xxiv.  2;  Lactant.  De  M.  P.  c.  5);  but 
that  the  employment  of  the  captive  em- 
peror as  a  stool  from  which  Sapor 
mounted  his  horse  is  a  rhetorical  inven- 
tion of  Lactantius,  fifty  years  after  the 
time,  from  whom  alone  later  wiuters  re- 
ceived it. 

«'  Euseb.  Orat.  Constant,  xxiv.  2. 

6«  Lactant.  1.  s.  c;  Victor,  Epit. 
Oros.  vii.  22. 

6' I.actant.  1.    s.   c;   Euseb.   1.    s 
Agath.  iv.  p.  133,  A. 

»»  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  i.  p.  331. 

"  De  Champagny,  Cesars,  &c.  torn.  ii. 
p.  437. 

'»  See  the  bas-reliefs  of  Sargon  (Botta, 
Monument  de  Ninive,  pis.  83,  118,  120) 
and  Asshur-bani-pal  (Layard,  Monu- 
ments of  Nineveh,  2nd  series,  pis.  45  and 
47) ;  and  compare  the  Behistun  Inscrip- 
tion (col.  ii.  par.  13  and  14;  col.  iii.  par.  8) 
and  the  Sassanian  relief  described  by 
Malcolm  {Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  254). 

71  See  Flandin,  pis.  33,  49,  53,  &c. ; 
Texier,  pi.  129,  &c. 

'2  It  has  been  said  that  there  is  one  ex- 
ception (Thomas  in  As  Soc.  Journal, 
vol.  iii.  N.  S.  p.  304).  But  the  figure  re- 
ferred to  represents,  I  believe,  Miriades. 
(See  PL  XIV.) 

'3  Tabari  is  the  only  Oriental  writer 
who  reports  that  Valerian  was  used 
cruelly;  but  his  statement  that  Sapor 
cut  off  his  prisoner's  nose  and  then  set 
him  at  liberty  (Chronique,  tom.  ii.  p.  80) 
can  scarcely  be  thought  worthy  of 
credit. 

'■•  Niebuhr,  Lectures  on  Ancient  His- 
tory, vol.  iii.  p.  295. 

''  Hist.  August.  Gallien.  §  3;  Quietus, 
§14. 

'«Ibid.  Odenath.  §  15.  Compare  the 
letter  of  Aurelian  preserved  in  this  valu- 
able compilation  (Zenob.  §  30). 

"Ibid.  Gallien.  §  10:  "  Ad  Ctesiphon- 
tem  Parthorum  multitudinera  obsedit."' 
Zosim.  i.  p.  39:    Ilepo-as  toi5  oixeioi?  kvarri- 

K\ei.<T(v.  Syncellus  makeshim  succeed 
in  taking  the  city  (KTT)<Ti(|>Mi'Ta  iroAiopKia 
irapacrTr)o-a/j,ei'os);'but  this  is  au  exagge- 
ration. (See  his  Chronographia.  pp. 
716-7.) 

■"^  Hist.  August.  Gallien.  §  10:  "  Fue- 
runt  longa  et  varin  praslia." 

"lb.     "Locorum     difflcultatibus    in 


alieno  solo  imperator  optimus  labora 

bat." 

0°  Of  these  he  sent  some  to  Gallienus, 
whom  that  weak  monarch  led  in  tri- 
umph (Hist.  August.  1.  s.  c). 

81  "Odenathum,  participato  imperio, 
Augustum  vocavit"  (Hist.  Aug.  GaUien. 
§12). 

«2  See  De  Champagny,  Cesars,  &c 
tom.  iii.  p.  45. 

83  Hist.  Aug.  Gallien.  §  13. 

8<"Zenobia  Palmyrenis  et  orientali- 
bus  plerisque  viriliter  imperante,"  ibid. 
(Compare  the  letter  of  Avirelian  to  the 
Senate,  preserved  in  the  Hist.  August., 
Triginta  Tyranni,  Zenob.  §  30.) 

86  See  above,  note  83;  and  compare 
Hist.  Aug.  Claud  §  4. 

88  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
98;  Texier,  Description  de  V Armenie,  de 
la  Perse,  &c.  pp.  205-208;  pis.  146  to  151; 
Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  tom.  ii.  pp. 
218-281,  pis.  45-54. 

87  The  sculptures  at  Shahpur  are 
generally  Sapor  the  First's.  They  may 
be  identified  by  the  resemblance  of  the 
chief  figure  to  the  head  upon  Sapor's 
coins,  and  to  the  figure  declared  by  an 
inscription  to  be  Sapor  at  Nakhsh-i-Ra- 
jab  (Ker  Porter,  pi.  28). 

88  See  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  opp  p.  255;  Tex- 
ier, pi.  146;  Flandin.  pi.  49. 

89  Texier,  pi.  147;  Flandin,  pi.  53. 

9  0  See  the  Jownal  of  the  Geographi- 
cal Society,  vol.  ix.  pp.  73-4;  vol.  xvi. 
pp.  27-8;  Loftus,  Chaldoea  and  Susiana, 
p.  298. 

91  Tabari,  Chronique,  tom.  ii.  p.  80. 

92  Loftus,  p.  299.  Compare  Geograph. 
Journal,  vol.  ix.  p.  75;  vol.  xvi.  p.  28. 

93  Niebuhr,  C.  Voyages,  tom.  ii.  p.  129; 
Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pp.  540-575; 
Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  254; 
Flandin.  Voyage  en  Perse,  tom.  ii.  pp. 
97-135,  &c.;  Texier,  Description  de  V Ar- 
menie. &c.  tom.  ii.  pp.  226-231,  &c. 

9'i  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pi.  21 ;  Texier,  pi. 
129. 

95  Texier,  pi.  139. 

98  See  Thomas  in  Journal  of  As.  So- 
ciety, iii.  N.  S.  p.  301 ;  and  compare  De 
Sacy,  Inscriptions  de  Nakschi-Roustam, 
pp.  31  and  105;  Spiegel,  Grammntik,  p. 
169.  The  inscription  may  be  thus  ren- 
dered:—"This  is  the  representation  of 
the  Ormazd-worshipping  divine  Sapor, 
king  of  kings  Arian  and  non-Arian, 
heaven-descended,  of  the  race  of  the 
gods,  son  of  the  Ormazd-worshipping 
divine  Artaxerxes,  king  of  the  kings  of 
Aria,  heaven-despended-  of  the  race  of 
the  gods,  grandson  of  the  divine  Papak, 
the  king."  See  Hang  on  the  Haji-abad 
Inscription,  which  commences  in  ex- 
actly the  same  way.  (Old  Pahlavi-Pa- 
Zand  Glossary,  pp.  48-51.1 

9'  Compare  the  Author's  Sixth  Morir 
arrhy.  p.  64. 

98  See  Longperier.  Medailles  des  Sas- 
sanides,  pi.  3  and  pp.  1:3-18. 

•9  A  few  coins  of  Sapor  I.  have,  on  the 
reverse,  a  lu-e-altar  without  supporters, 


CH.  t] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


649 


like  the  coins  of  his  father.  fPl.  XV.  Vis. 

v.] 

100  Fo,.  the  meaning  of  these  legends, 
see  text,  p.  276. 

""  See  Bohlen,  Das  alte  Indien,  vol.  i. 
pp.  369,  et  seq. 

lo^  MiUnan,  History  of  the  Jews,  vol. 
ii.  p.  48.5. 

103  Routh,  Reliquice,  Sacrce,  vol.  iv. 
pp.  147,  153,  &c. ;  Augustin,  De  Nat. 
Boni,p.  515;  Contr.  Faust,  passim;  Epi- 
phan.  Adv.  Hares.  Ixvi. 

"■'  Burton,  Eccles.  Hist,  of  First  Three 
Centuries,  vol.  ii.  p.  408. 

'06  Epiphan.  Adv.  Hares.  Ixvi.  §§  1-8. 
Compare  Jlilman,  History  of  Christi- 
anity, vol.  ii.  pp.  259,  260,  261,  &c. 

'o«  Burton,  p.  409;  Milman,  p.  263. 

lO'Milman,  pp.  2.59-271. 

'»*•  Burton,  p.  410. 

'09  According  to  the  interpretation  of 
one  writer.  Sapor  has  left  a  record 
which  sufflciently  indicates  his  adoption 
at  one  time  in  his  life  of  a  species  of 
mongrel  Christianity.  Mr.  Thomas  finds 
the  name  of  JESUS  in  the  Haji-abad  in- 
scription, accompanied  by  the  epithet 
"the  Lord,"  and  the  statement  that  He 
"mercifully  brought  joy  to  the  people 
of  the  world."  (See  his  explanation  of 
the  inscription  in  the  Journal  'of  the 
Royal  Asiatic  Society,  vol.  iii.,  New 
Series,  pp.  33S-9.)  Another  interpreter, 
however,  with  at  least  equal  claims  to 
attentiDU,  Dr.  Martin  Hang,  finds  no 
reference  at  all  to  Jesus  or  to  religion 
in  the  record,  which  describes,  accord- 
ing to  him.  Sapor's  sliooting  of  an  arrow 
from  the  Haji-abad  cave  at  a  target 
placed  without  it,  and  his  failure  to  hit 
the  mark,  thence  proceeding  to  give  a 
mystical  account  of  the  failure,  which 
is  ascribed  to  tlie  existence  of  an  invisi- 
ble target  at  tlie  spot  where  the  arrow 
fell.  {Old  Paldax-i-Pazaiid  Olosmry,  pp. 
45-65.)  It  seems  to  result  from  the  ex- 
treme difference  between  the  interpre- 
tations of  these  two  scholars,  that  the 
language  of  the  eai-ly  Sassanian  inscrip- 
tions is  as  yet  too  imperfectly  known  lo 
allow  of  any  conclusions  being  drawn 
from  them,  excepting  where  they  are 
accompanied  by  a  Greek  transcript. 
Macoudi  says  that,  on  the  first  preaching 
of  Manes,  Sapor  "  abjured  the  doctrine 
of  the  Magi  to  embrace  that  of  the  new 
teacher,"  but  that  he  afterwards  re- 
turned to  the  worship  of  his  ancestors 
'torn.  ii.  p.  164). 

"0  Burton,  1.  s.  c;  Milman,  p.  263. 

"'  Augustin.  Contr.  Fortunat.  adinit.; 
Contr.  Faust,  v.  1. 

""See  text,  p.  287. 

»"  See  text,  p.  290. 

"*  Besides  tlie  works  of  usefulness  al- 
ready mentioned  (p.  289),  Sapor  is  said 
to  have  constructed  the  great  bridge  of 
Dizful,  which  has  22  arches,  and  is  4.50 
paces  long.  (See  M.  Mold's  translation 
of  the  M(idJmel-al-Tewa rikh  in  the  Jour- 
nal Asiaiique  for  1841,  p.  511.) 

>  '-'Longp^rier  thinks  that  the  hand  of 


Greek  artists  is  to  be  recognized  in  the 
heads  and  emblems  upon  early  Sassa- 
nian coiun  {Medailles  des  Sassanides,  p. 
5). 

•"Tabari,  Chronique,  tom.  ii.  p.  81; 
Magoudi,  Prairies  d  Or,  tom.  ii.  p.  160, 
tom.  iv.  p.  83;  Mirkhond,  Histoire  del 
Sassanides,  pp.  2K5-7.  The  portrait  on 
the  gem  given  [PI.  XV.  Fig.  5]  tends  to 
confirm  the  testimony. 

"'  Malcolm,  History  of  Pertia,  vol.  i. 
p.  99. 

CHAPTER  V. 

1  See  Agathias,  iv.  p.  134:  Eutychius, 
vol.  i.  pp.  384.  387,  395. 

*  The  full  form  is  Hormisdates  or  Or- 
misdates,  "given  by  Ormazd."  This  is 
fli'st  contracted  into  Hormisdas,  and 
then  by  the  later  Persians  into  Hormuz. 
The  form  of  the  name  on  the  coins  cf 
Hormisdas  II.  is  Auhrmazdi. 

3  Agath.  1.  s.  c.  Compare  Tabari,  ii.  p. 
89;  MaQOudi,  ii.  p.  166. 

■•  So  Milman  (History  of  Christianity, 
vol.  ii.  p.  272);  but  Malcolm  places  his 
return  to  Persia  under  Varahran  I.  {Hist, 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  101).  So  Mirkhond, 
Histoire  des  Sassanides,  p.  295. 

6  MaQoudi,  tom.  ii.  p.  106:  Malcolm, 
Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  100;  Mirkhond, 
Histoire  des  Sa,ssanides,  p.  293. 

0  Magoudi  tells  us  (tom.  \i.  p.  2.38)  that, 
according  to  Abu  Obeidah.  Varahran 
was  the  son  of  Sapor  and  brother  of 
Hormisdas;  but  all  other  authorities,  so 
far  as  1  know,  make  him  the  son  of  Hor- 
misdas. 

'  The  orthography  of  the  name  upon 
the  coins  is  Varahran  (Longp^rier,  Md- 
dailles.  p.  20).  This  the  Greeks  express- 
ed by  Ovapavrfi;,  or  Oiiapapiirjjy.  The  later 
Persians  corrupted  the  name  into  Bah- 
ram.  That  the  Achfpmenian  Persians 
had  some  similar  contracted  form  of  the 
word  appears  from  the  name  Pharan- 
dates,  or  P/iereudates.  (See  Sir  H.  Raw- 
liiisoiis  remarks  on  this  name  in  the 
Author's  Herodotus,  vol.  iii.  p.  452,  2nd 
ed.) 

8  Mr.  Thomas  does  not  allow  that  any 
of  the  extant  coins  belong  to  Hormisdas 
the  F'irst  (see  yum.  Chron.  for  1872,  p. 
105).  Mordtmann  (Zeit.<ychrift,  vol.  viii. 
pp.  37-9;  vol.  xix.  pp.  423,  478)  regards 
as  his  the  coins  having  the  lion-crested 
cap  with  a  flower  rising  from  the  sum- 
mit. These  coins,  however,  must,  from 
the  Indian  emblems  on  some  of  them 
(Thomas.  1.  s.  c.  i,  belong  to  Horinisda.s 
II.  As  the  portraits  on  the.'se  coins  and 
on  those  with  the  eagle  cap  are  whollj' 
different,  I  suspect  that  the  latter  mav 
be  coins  of  the  first  Hormisdas.  [PI. 
XV.  Fig.  3,]  The  gem  regarded  by 
Mordtmann  as  bearing  the  name  and 
head  of  the  first  Hormisdas  {Zeitsclirift, 
vol.  xviij.  p.  7;  pi.  i.  flg.  5)  must  be  as- 
signed to  the  second  prince  of  the  name, 
from  the  resctnblance  of  the  head  to  the 
portraits  on  the  lion  coins 

•  Agath.  iv.  p.  134,  D:  rpia-'-v  tTeo-i  ^off-i 


650 


THE  SEVEJSTU  M0NAUCS7. 


[CH.  T, 


Aei5<rat.    So  Magoudi  (ii.  p.  167).    Eiitych.   ] 
vol.  i.  p.  384:    "Tres  annos  cum  tribus 
mensibus  regnavit." 

>"  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  1.  s.  c; 
Tabari,  torn.  ii.  p.  89;  Mirkhond,  Histoire 
des  Sassanides,  1.  s.  c. 

11  So  Milman  (Hist,  of  Christianity, 
vol.  ii.  p.  272).  Compare  Magoudi,  torn. 
ii.  p.  167. 

12  Milman,  1.  s.  c;  Mirkhond,  p.  296; 
Suidas  ad  voc.  &c. 

13  Besides  Valerian  (who,  according  to 
some,  was  flayed  alive)  and  Manes,  we 
hear  of  a  certain  Nachoragan  being 
flayed  alive  by  Chosroes  (Agath.  iv.  p. 
1.32,  D).  Some  of  the  ecclesiastical 
writers  call  flaying  alive  "the  Persian 
punishment"  (theodoret.  Adv.  Hosreses, 
\.  26;  Cyrill.  Catech.  vii.).  It  is  also 
mentioned  as  a  Persian  custom  by 
Faustus  (Bibl.  Hist.  iv.  21). 

'<  In  early  times  the  Achsemenian  Per- 
sians flayed  men  after  killing  them  (He- 
rod.  V.    2.5.    <7<|)afa?  arreSeipt).      The   Same 

was  the  practice  of  the  European  Scyth- 
ians (ibid.  iv.  64).  It  may  be  suspected 
that  the  flaying  process  which  is  repre- 
sented in  the  Assyrian  sculptures  was 
performed  on  dead  bodies  (^4 ncient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  i,  p.  244,  2nd  edition).  Mal- 
colm cautiously  says  of  Mani:  "  Mani 
and  almost  all  his  disciples  were  put  to 
death  by  order  of  Baharam;  and  the 
skin  of  the  impostor  was  hung  up;" 
which  does  not  imply  flaying  alive  (see 
Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  101). 

16  Malcolm.  1.  s.  c;  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c; 
Tabari,  tom.  ii.  p.  90. 

1' Burton  says:   "Manes  was  put  to 
death,  either  by  criicifixion  or  by  exco- 
riation"  {Lectures  on  the  First   Three 
Centuries,  vol.  ii.  p.  410),  which  shows 
that  two  accounts  were  known  to  him. 
Eutychius   gives   a    different    account 
from  either  of  these.     According  to  him, 
Varahran  "cut  Manes  asimder"  ("  Ma- 
nem  prehensum  medium  divisit  Bah- 
ram."  vol.  i.  p.  301). 
"Milman,  vol.  ii.  p.  273. 
18  Vopisc.  Vit.  Aurelian.  (in  the  His- 
toria  Augusta),  §  27. 
i»  Ibid.  §  28. 

"0  "  Zenobia,  cum  fugeret  camel  is  qvios 
dromadas  vocitant,  atque  ad  Peisas  iter 
tenderet,  equitibus  est  capta. ' '  (Vopisc. 
1.  s.  c.) 

21  "Hoc  munus  [sc.  pallium  breve  pur- 
pureum  lanestre,  ad  quod  cum  matronas 
atque  ipse  Aurelianus  jungerent  purpu- 
ras suas.  cineris  specie  decolorari  vide- 
bantur  cseterae  divini  comparatione  ful- 
goris]  rex  Persarum  ab  Indis  interiori- 
bus  sumptum  Aureliano  dedisse  perhi- 
betur,  scribens,  '  Sume  purpuram,  qua- 
ils apud  nos  est.'  "  (Vopisc.  Aurel.  § 
29.) 

I'lbid.  §  33:  "  Currus  regii  tres  fue- 
runt  .  .  .  unus  Odenati  argento,  auro, 
gemmis  optrosus  atque  distinctus;  alter, 
miem  re.r  Prrsarum  Aureliano  dono  de- 
dit.''"'  De  Champagny  has  represented 
this  as  a  charJDt  which  the  Persian  king 


had  given  to  Odemi.thus  {Cesars  du  2F" 
Siecte,  tom.  iii.  p.  119). 

23  Vopisc.  1.  s.  c. 

24  Ibid.  §3.5:  "Persis  .  .  .  bellum  in- 
dixit  [Aurelianus]." 

25  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
i.  p.  382. 

26  "  Parato  magno  potius  quam  ingenti 
exercitu."    (Vopisc.  Aurel.  §  35.) 

27  "  Blansionem  quae  est  inter  Heracli- 
am  et  Byzantium."  (Vopisc.  §36.)  For 
the  exact  sttuation.  see  Itiner.  Antonin. 
(p.  153,  ed.  Parthey  et  Pinder),  where  we 
find  that  it  was  18  Roman  miles  from 
Heraclea  (Perinthus),  and  47  from  By- 
zantium. 

28  Agath.  iv.  p.  134,  C;  Eutych.  1.  p. 
387;  Mirkhond,  p.  297;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  90. 

29  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
102;  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
pp.  297-8.  Magoudi  says  that  he  aban- 
doned himself  to  pleasure  and  idleness, 
passed  his  time  in  hunting  and  other 
amusements,  gave  the  management  of 
the  empire  to  unworthy  favorites,  and 
allowed  hundreds  of  towns  and  villages 
to  fall  into  ruin  (tom.  ii,  pp.  168-173).  It 
is  perhaps  a  sign  of  his  soft  and  pleas- 
ure-loving temperament  that  he  alone 
of  the  Sassaniau  kings  places  the  effigy 
of  his  wife  upon  his  coins.  This  em 
placement  implies  association  in  the 
kingdom.    [PI.  XV.  Fig.  4.] 

3"  Is  the  bas-relief  at  Nakhsh-i-Rustam.. 
represented  by  Ker  Porter  (vol.  i.  pi.  24), 
intended  to  commemorate  this  scene  ? 
It  "consists  of  a  king"  (wearing  the 
peculiar  headdress  of  Varahran  H.) 
"standing  in  a  niche  or  rostrum,  as  if 
dehvering  a  harangue"  (ibid.  vol.  i.  p. 
557.     [See  PI.  XVI.l 

31  Agath.  iv.  p.  135,  A. 

32  Saca-stan  is  "  the  country  of  the 
Saka"  (SacsB  or  Scyths).  It  received  the 
name  probably  at  the  time  of  the  great 
invasion  of  the  Yue-Chi.  (See  the  Au- 
thor's Sixth  Monarchy,  p.  65.) 

33  The  subjection  of  the  Segestani  is 
perhaps  the  subject  of  the  bas-relief  rep- 
resented by  Flandin  (pi.  51).  where  the 
monarch  wears  the  peculiar  headdress 
of  Varahran  II. 

34  The  bulk  of  the  Persian  forces  were 
"detained  on  the  frontiers  of  India' 
when  Carus  crossed  the  Euphrates  (Gib- 
bon, vol.  ii.  p.  55). 

35  Probus,  in  a.d.  279,  dismissed  a  Per* 
sian  embassy  with  threats  (Vopisc. 
p7-ob.  §  17).  Soon  afterwards,  however, 
he  "made  peace  witli  the  Persians" 
(ibid.  §  18).  But  a  little  before  his  death, 
in  A.D.  282,  we  hear  of  his  meditating  a 
Persian  expedition  (ibid.  §  20). 

3  6  Vopisc.  Car.  §8. 
"  Gibbon,  1.  s.  c. 

38  Vopisc.  1.  s.  c;  Eutrop.  ix.  18;  Au- 
rel. Vict.  Cces.  xxxviil.  Compare  Mos. 
Chor.  Hist.  Arm.  ii.  76. 

39  See  the  letter  of  the  secretary.  .Tu 
lius  Calpurnins,  preserved  by  Vopiscuf) 
(1.  s.  c),  and  translated  by  Gibbon  {De 
dine  one*  Fall,  vol.  ii.  pp.  55-6). 


CH.  VI.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAllCHY. 


851 


*"  Gibbon  seems  to  believe  that  Carus 
was  killed  by  lightning  (vol.  ii.  p.  56). 
Niebuhr  wavers  between  liehtaing  and 
assassination  (Lectures,  voL  iii.  p.  305, 
E.  T.).  De  Champagny  says  that  the 
whole  matter  is  shrouded  in  impenetra- 
ble mystery  (Cisars  du  Zme  Sidcle,  torn, 
iii.  p.  186). 

<i  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  3^1;  and 
compare  De  Champagny,  torn.  iii.  p.  186, 
note  1. 

*^  It  was  an  old  Roman  superstition 
that  "  places  or  persons  struck  with 
lightning  were  singularly  devoted  to  the 
wrath  of  heaven"  (.Gibbon,  vol.  i.  p.  413). 
There  was  also  a  special  belief  that 
"  when  the  prsetorium  was  struck,  it 
foreboded  the  destruction  of  the  army 
itself"  (Niebuhr,  Lectures,  vol.  iii.  p. 
305,  E.  T.). 

*'  When  Numerian  is  credited  with 
Persian  victories  (Nemes.  Cyneget,  71-2), 
it  is  on  the  notion  that,  liaving  been  as- 
sociated by  Carus,  he  had  part  in  the 
successes  of  a.d.  283.  That  Numerian 
retreated  upon  the  death  of  his  father 
without  tempting  fortune  any  further, 
is  clear  from  Aur.  Vict.  Cces.  xxxviii., 
and  Vopi.scus,  Numer.  §  11. 

<*  During  this  interval  Numerian  was 
killed,  Diocletian  invested  with  tlie  pur- 
ple, Carinus  defeated  and  slain,  and 
Maximian  associated.  (Gibbon,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  60-66.) 

*^  Moses  of  Choren6  makes  the  sub- 
jection of  Armenia  to  Persia  last  twen- 
ty-six years  (Hist.  Arm.  ii.  74,  sub  Jin.). 
Hut  if  he  is  right  in  making  Artaxerxes 
the  king  who  reduced  Armenia,  and  in 
stating  that  Tiridates  regained  the 
throne  in  the  third  year  of  Diocletian 
(ii.  19),  the  duration  of  the  subjection 
must  liave  been,  at  least,  forty-six  years, 
since  Artaxerxes  died  in  a.d.  ii4i,  and 
the  third  of  Diocletian  was  a.d.  226. 

*'  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  77. 

*'  Moses  ouuts  this  feature  of  the 
struggle,  but  Agathangelus  .supplies  it. 
(Agathang.  Hist.  Regn.  Tiridat.  c.  iii.  § 
21 :  6 /3a(7tAeu9  Tbi*  Ti)p?j6aT/^f,  .  .  ,  (TTpotTeu- 
ijta  ct9  ^or)Qet.av  ey\eipi(ra^,  a.TTe\v(r€v  ct's  rrjv 
i&iav  yiipav.) 

*»  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79. 

<*  Agathang.  iii.  §  21 ;  Mos.  Chor.  1.  s.  c. 

'"  Especiallj-  in  Assyria.     (Agathang. 

iv.  §55;  TTji'  67rapvtai' T]99  *A(ro*vpca5  CTrara^e 
fietvoTaTats  ffAijyais.  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79,  ad 
pi.) 

*' So  Moses.  Agathangelus,  while 
praising  highly  the  warlike  qualities  of 
Tiridates  (I.  s.  c),  avoids  these  improb- 
able details. 

"  Agathias,  iv.  p.  134.  D;  Eutych.  vol. 
i.  p.  387.  Mirkhond  agrees  (Histoire  des 
Sn^-sanides,  p.  299),  but  notes  that  his 
authorities  varied.  Malcolm  says  that 
siinie  of  the  native  writers  allow  him 
only  thirteen  years  {HiMortj  of  Persin. 
vol.  i.  p.  103.  note).  Tabari  gives  him  no 
nifire  tliaTi  fonri  (Chroniqnc,  ii.  p.  90). 

^^Tabaii  says  (1.  s.  c.)  that  Varahran 
11.  had  ni)  .son   but  was  succeeded  by  lii>- 


brother  Narses.  Narses  himself  saya 
that  he  was  the  son  of  Sapor  and  grand- 
son of  Artaxerxes.  It  is  thought  that  ho 
may  have  omitted  his  immediate  ances- 
tors as  persons  of  small  account  (Thom- 
as in  Num.  Chron.  for  1872,  p.  113);  but 
such  omission  is  very  unusual. 

"  Mirkhond,  p.  300.  A  bas-relief  at 
Nakhsh-i-Rustam  seems  to  represent 
him  as  receiving  the  crown  from  his 
mother.     (Ker  Porter,  pi.  19.) 

ss  The  inaugural  address  of  Varahran 
III.  is  reported  as  follows:  "I  ascend 
this  throne  by  right,  as  the  issue  of 
your  kings;  but  the  sole  end  which  I 
propose  to  myself  in  ruling  is  to  obtain 
for  the  people  who  shall  be  subject  to 
me  a  happy  and  quiet  life.  I  place  all 
my  trust  in  the  goodness  of  God,  through 
whose  help  all  things  may  end  happily. 
If  Ood  preseives  my  life,  I  will  conduct 
myself  towards  you  in  such  a  way  that 
all  who  hear  me  spoken  of  will  load  me 
with  blessings.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
angel  of  death  comes  and  carries  me 
airay,  I  hope  that  God  will  not  forsake 
you  or  sutler  you  to  perish."  (Mir- 
khond, Hist,  des  Sassunides.  1.  s.  c.) 

^8  Agathias,  1.  s.  c. ;  Eutych.  vol.  i.  p. 
395.  So  also  Firdusi  in  the  ishah-namen. 
Some  Oriental  writers,  however,  gave 
him  a  reign  of  nine  years.  (Mirkhond, 
1.  s.  c.) 

5'  Agathang.  iv.  §§  55  and  57. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

1  The  relationship  of  Narses  to  his 
predecessor  is  exceedingly  doubtful. 
He  himself  declares  in  an  inscription 
that  he  was  the  son  of  Sapor  and  the 
grandson  of  Artaxerxes  (see  note  53, 
(ihapter  V.);  and  his  statement  is  con- 
firmed by  the  Arabian  writer.  Abu  Obel- 
dah  (Ma(;oudi,  torn.  ii.  p.  238),  and  by 
the  Armenian  historian,  Sepeos.  (See 
the  Journal  Asiatiqne  for  1866,  p.  149.) 
Tabari,  however,  makes  him  the  son  of 
Varahran  I.  (Chrouique,  torn.  ii.  p.  90.) 
So  Ma90udi  (tom.  ii.  p.  174).  Agathias 
avoids  the  question  of  relationship. 
Mirkhond  (p.  301)  and  the  Persian 
writers  generally  say  that  he  was  thu 
son  of  Varalu-an  II.  For  my  own  part. 
I  should  incline  to  accept  liis  own  state- 
ment, and  to  suppose  that,  Varahran 
III.  having  died  without  issue,  the  crown 
reverted  to  his  great-great-uucle,  a  man 
of  years  and  exjjerience,  who,  however, 
was  not  allowed  to  enjoy  the  throne 
without  a  struggle  with  another  prince 
of  tlie  royal  house,  a  certain  Homiisdas. 

2  Tills  passage  of  history  rests  entirely 
on  a  single  sentence  in  ,a  Latin  writer  of 
uncertain  dat«,  the  nutliorof  the  "  Pane- 
gvric"  quoted  by  Oililioti  i^Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  81.  note  61). 

^  "  Ipsos  Persas  ipsumque  regem  ad- 
scitis  Saccis.  et  Russis.  et  Gellls.  petit 
frater  Oriiiies."  (Foneg.  Vet.  ii.  17.) 
The  Gt'Ui  are  well  identllied  by  Gibbon 
with  till-  iiihaliitanlsof  (Jhjian.  the  Chelae 
of  earlii-'r  writers.    The  Succa;  (SacajJ 


652 


TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  VI 


are  undoubtedly  Scyths.  They  may 
have  dwelt  on  the  Oxus.  or  possibly  in 
Affghanistan.  The  Russi  should,  by 
their  name,  be  "  Russians;"  but  it  must 
be  admitted  that  we  have  otherwise  no 
mention  of  them  by  the  classical  writers 
till  the  ninth  century  a.d.  If,  how- 
ever, they  are  intended  in  Ezek.  xxxviii. 
2.  3,  xxxix.  1  (as  Gesenius  and  Dean 
Stanley  argue),  they  may  be  meant  also 
in  the  present  passage. 

*  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  340,  where 
it  is  proved  that  the  first  campaign  of 
Galerms  was  as  early  as  a.d.  297.  If  so, 
the  movements  which  provoked  it  must 
have  fallen,  at  the  latest,  in  a.d.  296. 

6  See  text,  p.  300. 

«Mos.  Chor.  ii.  79,  ad  fin. :  "Etiam 
ultra  Ctesiphontem  incursiones  fecit." 

'  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5.  Compare  the 
treatise  De  Morte  Persecutorum,  §  9. 

*  Aurel.  Vict.  Caesar.  §  39:  Zonar.  xii. 
31. 

•Amm.  Mare,  xxiii.  5;  Zonar.  1.  s.  c. ; 
Eutrop.  ix.  24 ;  &c. 

'"  First  at  Alexandria  (Aurel.  Vict. 
1.  s.  c);  then  at  Antioch  (Lactant.  De 
Morte  Persec.  1.  s.  c). 

11  Lactant.  De  Morte  Persecutor.  §  9; 
Aurel.  Victor,  De  Ccesaribus,  §  39.  Zo- 
naras  makes  him  actually  invade  Syria 
(tou  NapcTou  Toivvv  Tovrov  t6t6  Trji/  'S.vpiav 
\r{iCotJ.ivov ,  xii.  31). 

'^See  Gibbon,  Dedine  and  Fall,  ch. 
xiii.  (vol.  ii.  p.  82j.  On  the  real  charac- 
ter of  the  region  see  the  Author's  Sixth 
Monarchy,  pp.  91,  92. 

13  Victor  expresses  the  commission  of 
Galerius  as  follows:  "  Provincia  credita 
Maximiano  Caesari,  uti  relictis  finibus 
in  Mesopotamiam  progrederetur,  ad  ar- 
cendos  Persarum  impetus."    (1.  s.  c.) 

I'' Oros.  vii.  25:  "Cum  duobus  jam 
prseliis  adversus  Narseum  conflixisset, 
tertio  inter  Callinicum  et  Carras  con- 
gressus  et  victus,  amissis  copiis,  ad  Dio- 
cletianum  refugit." 

1'  Aurel.  Vict.  Ccbs.  §39;  Zonar.  1.  s.  c; 
Eutrop.  ix.  24;  Julian,  Paneg.  Constant. 
p.  18.  A. 

1' Gibbon's  description  of  the  battle 
(1.  s.  c.)  is  wholly  imaginary,  no  classical 
writer  having  left  us  any  account  of  it. 
He  transfers  to  the  conflict  between  Ga- 
lerius and  Narses  all  that  Plutarch  and 
Dio  relate  of  Crassus  and  Surenas.  This 
is  scarcely  an  allowable  mode  of  writing 
history. 

1'  in  transferring  to  this  occasion  an 
anecdote  related  of  Tiridates  by  Moses 
of  Choren6.  and  attached  by  him  to  a 
defeat  of  Cams  by  the  Persians,  u-ltich 
never  took  place,  our  great  historian 
does  not  perhaps  transcend  the  limits  of 
a  sound  historical  criticism. 

18  JIos.  Chor.  ii.  76. 

I''  Eutrop.  1.  s.  c. ;  Amm.  Marc.  xiv.  11. 
The  "mile  almost"  of  Ammianus  be- 
comes "several  miles"  in  Eutropius, 
Festus  (§  25),  and  Orosius  (vii.  25);  and 
"several  leagues"  in  Tillemont  (Hist. 
des  Empereurs,  iv.  p.  37). 


*"  Oros.  1.  s.  c:  "Per  Illyricum  et 
McBsiam  undique  copias  contraxit." 

21  Jornandes,  De  Gothorum  rebus  ges 
tis  c.  21 

"  Aurel.  Victor.  CoES.  §39:  "Per  Ar- 
meniam  in  hostes  contendit,  quae  sola., 
seu  facilior,  vincendi  via  est." 

23  Festus,  §  25. 

24  Synes.  Beg.  p.  19,  A.  Compare  Fe8> 
tus,  1.  s.  c,  and  Eutropius,  ix.  25. 

25  Festus,  1.  s.  c.  Compare  Amm. 
Marc.  xxii.  4:  "Sub  Maximiano  Caesara 
vallo  regis  Persarum  direpto." 

26Zonaras,  xii.  31. 

27  Ibid.  Compare  Eutrop.  ix.  25 ;  Oros. 
vii.  25. 

28  "  Captivos  quamplurimos  Persarum 
nobilium  abduxit."    (Oros.  1.  s.  c; 

29  Zonaras  makes  him  pursue  Narses 
"into  the  inner  parts  of  Persia"  (n.cxpi 
Ti}?  ivSoT^pai  HipuiSo^);  and  Eutropius 
speaks  of  Narses  as  betaking  himself  to 
the  remotest  solitudes  of  his  kingdom 
(ix.  25).  But  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  the  defeated  monarch  ever  fled 
further  than  Media,  where  we  find  him 
when  an  ambassador  is  sent  to  him  by 
Diocletian  (Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  14). 

3"  Zonaras,  1.  s.  c. 

31  Petrus  Patricius.  Although  this  au- 
thor did  not  write  till  towards  the  close 
of  the  sixth  century,  he  is  generally  al- 
lowed by  historical  critics  to  be  among 
the  best  authorities  even  for  the  events 
of  three  centuries  previously.  (See  Gib- 
bon, Decline  and  Fall,  ch,  xiii.  vol.  ii.  p. 
84,  note  74;  C.  Muller,  Fr.  Hist.  Gr.  vol. 
iv.  pp.  181-4;  Niebuhr,  Preface  to  the 
Bonn  edition  of  the  Excerpta  de  Lega- 
tionibiis.) 

32 1  have  been  content  to  translate  Pa- 
tricius. Gibbon,  by  recasting  the  entire 
oration  and  changing  the  position  of  all 
its  parts,  produces  a  fine  result;  but  I 
have  not  felt  at  liberty  to  work  up  the 
ancient  materials  after-his  fashion. 

33  Note  the  absence  here  of  any  allu- 
sion to  fetters,  or  to  the  employment  of 
Valerian  by  his  captor  as  a  horseblock; 
and  remark  that  the  flaying  is  distinctly 
made  subsequent  to  his  decease. 

34  Gibbon  (1.  s.  c.)  has  incorrectly  plac- 
ed the  embassy  of  Apharban  after  the 
meeting  of  Galerius  with  Diocletian  at 
Nisibis,  and  has  made  both  monarchs 
present  at  the  interview.  De  Cham- 
pagny  has  seen  the  true  order  of  the 
events  {Cesar s  du  3me  Siecle,  torn.  iiL 
pp.  304-5). 

36  Eutrop.  ix.  25;  Julian,  Orat.  i.  p.  38, 
A. 

36  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  14. 

37  Gibbon,  ch.  xiii.  (vol.  ii.  p.  84). 

38  Aurel.  Vict.  1.  s.  c:  "Adeo  victor 
[Galerius  erat],  ut,  ni  Valerius,  cujus 
nutu  omnia  gerebantur,  incertum  qua 
causa,  abnuisset,  Romani  fasces  in  pro- 
vinciam  novam  ferrentur." 

39  Patricius  (1.  s.  c.)  calls  him  avriypaijtfa 
Ttjs  fxvrifnqs,  a  sort  of  "  Secretary  of 
State." 

"'  'Ev  Tois  ivSoTipoj  raif  PaaiAtiw*'.   (Pet 


CH.  VI.] 


THE  SEVEyTH  MONABCIIT. 


655 


Patric.  1.  s.  c.)  The  palace  seems  to 
nave  been  on  the  river  Asprudis,  which 
cannot  be  indentified. 

*' Patricius  calls  him  "governor  of 
Symium."  Gibbon  identifies  Symium 
with  Syuia,  a  tract  east  of  Mount  Ararat 
(Armen.  Geograph.  §  74). 

*''  Patricius,  1.  s.  c. 

^' Ainmianus  Marcellinus,  xxv.  7.  Gib- 
bon has  strangely  intermixed  the  state- 
ments of  the  two  writers,  ascribing  the 
mention  of  Intilene  to  Aminiauus.  and 
that  of  Rehimene  to  Patricius  (vol.  ii.  p. 
87,  note  79),  v/hich  is  the  reverse  of  the 
truth. 

<••  Pet.  Patrio.  Fr.  14. 

*' This  was  tiie  view  of  Valesius  (ad 
Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7),  of  Tillemont  (His- 
toire  des  Empereurs,  torn.  iv.  p.  40),  and 
of  most  writers  anterior  to  Gibbon.  It 
was  argued  that  the  provinces  vi^ere 
called  "  Transtigritanaj."  because  they 
were  so  to  the  Persians  ! 

■*«  De  Champagny  places  them  all 
"  west  of  Lake  Van  and  south  of  Arme- 
nia." iCesars  du  .S"'  Siicle,  torn.  iii.  p. 
305,  note.) 

■"  As  Gibbon,  vol.  ii.  p.  87;  Niebuhr, 
Lectures  on  Roman  History,  vol.  iii.  p. 
311,  E.  T.;  and  Mr.  James  in  Smiths 
Diet,  of  Geography,  ad  voc.  Cohdyenk. 

■•8  See  notes  42  and  43. 

4»  Menander  Protect.  Fr.  55.  p.  2.57. 

*"  See  I^ayard's  Nineveh  and  Babylon, 
p.  39,  and  compf.re  the  ma})  of  Armenia, 
Assyria,  and  Kurdistan  at  the  end  of 
the  book. 

«'  The  most  important  are  Eutrop.  vi. 
7;  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  8;  De  ASdiJic. 
iii.  2;  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  .55,  r)7,  and 
60;  Johann.  Epiphan.  Fr.  1,  §  3;  Armen. 
Geogr.  §  08. 

'2  It  is  remarkable  that  the  appella- 
tion has  changed  so  little  in  the  course 
of  centuries.  The  Assyrian  mouarchs 
call  the  country  Kirzan. 

'3  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7. 

'*  Layard,  Nineveh  and  Babylon,  p. 153. 

ssStrab.  xi.  12,  §  4,  xvi.  1,  §  24;  Plu- 
tarch. Lucull.  20;  &c. 

'<=  Xen.  Annb.  iv.  i.  §§  2-3;  Strab.  xvi. 
1,  §  8;  Arrian.  Exp.  Alex.  iii.  7:  Pliu.  H. 
N.  vi.  15;  VUA.  v.  13. 

'''The  "  Sophene"  of  Patricius  may 
safely  be  set  aside,  since  it  had  long 
been  Roman.  His  "  IntileiiA "  some 
woulil  change  into  Ingilene,  a  district 
mentioned  as  "lying  beyond  Mesopota- 
mia" by  Epii)hanius  {De  Hceres.  Ix.  vol. 
i.  p.  .")0.'>,  ed  Vales.).  The  "Rehimene" 
of  Ammiaiujs  is  confirmed  by  Zosimus, 
who  mentions  "  liemenians"  among  the 
tribes  ceded  by  Jovian  (iii.  31).  The 
"  Moxoene"  of  Ammianus  does  not 
elsewhere  occur.  Is  it  the  modern 
"district  of  Mokus"  (Layard,  Nin.  and 
Bab.  p.  417,  note)?  Zosimus  has  in  its 
place  "  Zalene,"  a  name  of  which  I  can 
make  nothing. 

'f  Coi-dnenas.  ttberit  regionis  et  nos- 
tra'. '     (.\inm.  Maic.  xxv.  7.) 

^^  Ibid.    Compare  Zosim.  iii,  31. 


"Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  e. :  " Petebat  rex 
obstinoiius  sua  dudum  a  Maximiauo 
erepla." 

«'  Pace  facta.  Mesopotamia  est  resti- 
tuta;  at  super  ripuin  7'i(/ridis  limes  est 
confirmatus.  ut  ("  with  the  further  con- 
dition that")  quinque  gentium  trans 
Tigridem  constitutarum  ditionem  asse- 
queremur."    (Festus,  §  14.) 

'^  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  xiii.  (vol  ii  d 
87.  note  77).  '  ^' 

"3  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  xiii.  (vol.  ii.  p. 
88). 

"■•  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  84. 

«s  We  can  only  say  with  De  Cham- 
pagny: ''L'ArmSnie,  vassale  de  Rome, 
fut  agrandie"  (Cesars,  tom.  iii.  p.  305), 
and  that  the  augmentation  was  on  the 
side  of  Media. 

«« Tacit.  Ann.  vi.  33:  "Iberi,  locorum 
potentes,  Caspia  via  Sarmatam  in  Ar- 
menios  raptim  efEunduut. "  Compare 
Dio  Cass.  Ixix.  1.5. 

"  Nineveh,  which  was  now  once  more 
a  place  of  importance  (see  Tac.  Ann.  xii. 
13;  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  7,  ad  init.;  Lay- 
ard, Nin.  and  Bub.  pp.  590-1).  and  which 
was  nearer  Nisibis  tliati  any  other  Per- 
sian town  of  consequence,  lay  at  the  dis- 
tance of  nearly  120  miles.  jVrbela  was 
nearly  00  miles  further  oft. 

«<*  On  the  trade  between  Rome  and 
Parthia,  see  Herodian.  iv.  18;  and  com- 
pare the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy,  p. 
23S.  It  is  probable  that  the  exchange 
of  Persian  for  Parthian  rule  had  made 
but  little  difference  in  the  course  or 
character  of  the  ti-afflc. 

"  See  text,  p.  307. 

'0  Lacant.  De  Morte  Persec.  §  9:  "  Con- 
citatus  domesticis  exemplis  avi  sui  Sa- 
poris,  ad  occupaudura  Orientem  magnis 
copiis  [Narse.sJ  inhiabat." 

' '  The  abdication  of  Narses  rests 
wholly  upon  the  authority  of  the  Ori- 
ental writers.  (See  Mirkh'ond,  Histoire 
des  Sas.^anidcs,  p.  302;  .Malcolm,  History 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  104.)  It  is  accepted, 
however,  as  a  fact  by  most  moderu.s. 
See  Malcolm,  1.  s.  c. ;  Plate  in  Smith's 
Diet,  of  Biography,  vol.  iii.  p.  717,  <S:c.) 

''^  Mirkhond,  I.  s.  c. 

'3  He  is  said  to  have  been  surnamed 
Nakhdjirkau,  or  "Hunter  of  wild  beasts'' 
(Mirkhond,  p.  303).  It  is  rennirkable 
that  tlie  he.vddress  which  distinguishes 
him  on  his  coins  is  adorned  with  horns, 
either  of  theibex  or  the  stag.  [PI.  XVIII. 
Fig.  2.]  This  ornamentation  is  quite 
peculiar  to  him;  and  it  adds  a  weight  to 
the  other  statements  of  the  native 
writers  as  to  his  pieilileclions. 

'*Dr.  Plate  says  he  died  in  the  year 
that  he  abdicated;  but  I  know  no  au- 
thority for  this.  That  he  did  not  outlive 
A.D.  309,  the  year  of  his  son's  death, 
seems  to  follow  from  jjie  difficulty  then 
felt  about  the  succession.  Perhaps  it  is 
most  pro))alile  that  he  died  in  a  d.  300, 
since  the  Armenians  regard  him  as  king 
up  to  this  date.  (See  Patkanian  in  the 
Journal  Asiuti'^ue  for  ISOO,  p.  1.50.) 


654 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAHCHT. 


[CH.  VII. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
i  See  Clinton,  F.  B.  vol.  ii.  p.  260.  Aga- 
thias  declares  that  both  Narses  and  Hor- 
misdas  i-eigned  exactly  seven  years  and 
Ave  months  (,p.  135,  A.).  So  Magoudi,  ii. 
p.  174. 

2  Mirkhond,  Uistoire  des  Sassanides, 
pp.  303-4.    Compare  Tabari,  ii.  p.  90. 

3  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  ch.  iii.  (vol. 
i.  p.  215). 

*  Mirkhond.  p.  304;  D'Herbelot,  Biblio- 
theque  Orientale,  torn  iii.  p.  221. 

5  D'Herbelot,  1.  s.  c. 

*  D'Herbelot  quotes  the  Lebtarikh  and 
the  Tarikh-Cozideh  to  this  effect. 

'  Mirkhond,  p.  293;  Malcolm,  Hist,  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  100. 

8  D'Herbelot,  1.  s.  c. 

9  Mirkhond,  p.  304;  Wilson,  Ariana 
Antiqua,  p.  385,  note  5. 

i"  See  text,  p.  297. 

I'See  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  pp. 
347-381. 

12  The  coins  of  Hormisdas  II.  not  un- 
frequeiitly  show  signs  of  Indian  influ- 
ence. On  the  reverses  of  some  we  see 
the  Indian  deity  Siva  and  his  Bull 
(Thomas  in  Num.  Cliron.  vol.  xv.  p.  180; 
New  Series,  No.  45,  p.  115),  as  in  the 
coins  of  Kadphises  (Wilson,  Ariana 
Antiqua,  pp.  350-7).  On  others  we  ob- 
serve an  Indian  altar  (Num.  Chron.  vol. 
XV.  p,  180,  fig.  10). 

13  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
p.  304. 

1^  The  relationship  of  the  "Prince 
Hormisdas,"  who  took  refuge  at  the 
court  of  Constantine  in  the  year  ad.  323, 
to  Hormisdas  II.  rests  on  the  authority 
of  Zosimus,  from  whom  all  the  details 
here  given  are  derived.  (See  Zosim. 
Hist.  Nov.  ii.  27.)  The  account  given  by 
Zonaras  (xiii.  5)  is  different. 

1*  The  latter  part  of  the  story  in  Zosi- 
mus implies  that  he  had  this  inclination. 
How  offensive  such  tastes  might  be  to 
the  Asiatics,  we  see  from  the  history  of 
Vonones  in  Tacitus  (Ann.  ii.  2). 

1*  Herod,  i.  1*1    Compare  ix.  110. 

1'  Compare  Mordecai's  treatment  of 
Haman  (Esther  iii.  2,  v.  9). 

18  See  text,  p.  294. 

1^  Some  writers  give  him  another  son, 
the  Artaxerxes  who  succeeded  Sapor  II. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  accept  this  view. 
See  text,  ch.  xii. 

20  Agathias,  iv.  p.  135;  Mirkhond,  pp. 
305-6;  Tabari,  tom.  ii.  p.  91:  Malcolm, 
History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  106.  Gibbon 
suggests  that  Agathias  obtained  the  his- 
tory from  the  Persian  Chronicles  (De- 
cline and  Fall,  ch.  xviii.  vol.  ii.  p.  367, 
note  .54). 

21  Sapor  (Shah-puhr)  means  "King's 
son,"  as  has  been  already  noted  (see 
note  2,  Chapter  IV.). 

22  Abulpharagius  in  one  place  has  six- 
ty-nine years  (p.  85),  in  another  (p.  90) 
seventy.  Agathius  (p.  135,  D)  and  Theo- 
phanes  (p.  7)  have  seventy.  Sir  John 
Malcolm,  following  Oriental  authorities, 
gives  seventy -one  (Hist,  of  Persia,  vol. 


i.  p.  110.)  Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  472),  Mir- 
khond (Hist,  des  Sassanides,  p.  306),  Ta- 
bari (Chronique.  tom.  ii.  p.  101),  and 
Magoudi  (tom.  ii.  p.  175)  say  seventy- 
two. 

23  Abulpharagitis,  p.  90. 

2*  Mirkhond  makes  Sapor  begin  to  ex- 
ercise some  of  the  offices  of  government 
at  eight  years  (p.  307),  but  admits  that 
he  did  not  undertake  the  direction  of 
military  expeditions  till  he  was  sixteen 
(ibid.).    So  Tabari  (tom.  ii.  p  93). 

25  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. ;  Tabari,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  91-2;  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  106. 

2'  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Orientale, 
tom.  V.  p.  143;  Gibbon.  Decline  and  Fall 
ch.  xviii.  (vol.  ii.  p.  367).  These  writers 
make  Thair  a  king  of  Yemen  or  Arabia 
proper;  but  Sir  J.  Malcolm  says  he  was 
a  mere  sheikh  of  some  of  the  tribes  of 
Mesopotamia  (vol.  i.  p.  107,  note). 

2'  Mirkhond,  p.  307;  Tabari,  tom.  ii.  pp. 
92-3. 

28  Fourteen  is  generally  regarded  as 
the  age  of  manhood  in  the  East  (Layard, 
Nin.  and  Babylon,  p.  205);  and  minori- 
ties usually  come  to  an  end  at  this  age. 
(See  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  pp. 
499,  506,  &c.) 

2»  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. ;  Tabari,  p.  93 ;  Ma- 
50udi,  p.  176. 

30  Mirkhond,  p.  308;  Tabari,  p.  94. 

31  This  is  Mirkbond's  account.  Other 
authorities  say  that  he  dislocated  (Mal- 
colm, vol.  i.  p.  107;  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p. 
177)  or  broke  (D'Herbelot,  Bibl.  Orient. 
tom.  V.  p.  141)  the  shoulders  of  his  prison- 
ers, to  disqualify  them  for  military  ser- 
vice. 

32  Gibbon,  following  an  apocrj-phal 
tale  related  hy  D'Herbelot,  but  not  adop- 
ted by  him,  gives  the  name  as  Dhou- 
lacnaf.  and  tianslates  it  "  Protector  of 
the  Nation"  (vol.  ii.  p.  367).  The  best  au- 
thorities are.  however,  all  agreed  that 
the  real  epithet  was  Dhoulactaf,  not 
Dhoulacnaf.  (See  D'Herbelot,  1.  s.  c; 
Mirkhond,  p.  308;  Tabari,  tom.  ii.  p.  91; 
Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  Iu7,  note;  Magoudi. 
tom.  ii.  p.  175.) 

;    33  Sozomen,  Hist.  Eccles.  ii.  9,  10. 

s*  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
tom.  iv.  p.  255:  "  Constantin  se  regar- 
dait  comme  le  protecteur  g6n6ral  de 
tons  les  serviteurs  de  Jesus-C^hrist." 

35Eusebius  {Vit.  Constant.  Magn.  iv. 
9  et  seqq.)  and  Theodoret  (i.  25)  give  the 
terms  of  a  letter  written  by  Constantine 
to  Sapor  at  this  time  in  favor  of  the 
Christians.  It  is  a  verbose  production, 
and  possesses  but  little  interest.  The 
greater  part  is  an  account  of  his  own 
religious  principles  and  feelings.  The 
concluding  portion,  which  alone  touches 
the  case  of  the  Persian  Christians,  runs 
as  follows:  "  You  can  imagine  then  how 
delighted  I  am  to  hear  that  Persia,  too, 
in  some  of  its  best  regions,  is  adorned 
and  illustrated  b.y  this  class  of  men,  on 
wliose  behalf  I  write  to  you — I  mean  the 
Christians — a  thing  most  agreeable  to 
my   wishes.      All    prosperity    then    btj 


en.  vm.] 


THE  SEVENTH.  MONARCHY. 


655 


yours,  and  all  prosperity  be  theirs— may 
both  flourish  alilce !  Thus  will  you  make 
God  the  Father,  the  Lord  of  all,  propi- 
tious and  friendly  towards  you.  These 
persons  then,  seeing  that  you  are  so 
great,  I  commend  to  you — I  put  them 
into  your  hand,  seeing  that  you  are  so 
conspicuous  for  your  piety.  Love  them 
with  that  love  which  befits  your  Ivnown 
benevolence.  For  thus  you  will  confer 
both  on  us  and  on  yourself  an  immeas- 
urable benefit." 

3«  Libanius,  Onit.  iii.  pp.  118,  120;  Au- 
rel.  Vict.  De  Ccesaiibus,  ^  41. 

''  Compare  Liban.  1.  s.  c.  with  Festus 
(§  26)  and  Euseb.  Vit.  Constant,  iv.  8. 
'  38  Some  writers  make  the  hostilities 
commence  in  the  lifetime  of  Constan- 
tine.  (See  Eutrop.  X.  8;  Chronic.  Pasch. 
p.  286,  C.)  But  Ammianus,  who  is  al- 
most a  contemporary,  assigns  the  out- 
break to  the  reign  of  Constautius  (xxv. 
4). 

'*  Sapor  is  said  to  have  sent  a  friendly 
embassy  to  Constantine  in  a.u.  333  (Eu- 
seb. Vit.  Const,  iv.  8;  Liban.  Or.  iii.  p. 
118).  In  A.D.  337  he  suddenly  threatened 
war,  and  demanded  the  restoration  of 
the  five  provinces  ceded  by  Narses  (Li- 
ban. Or.  iii.  p.  120).  Having  received  a 
refusal,  he  sent  another  embassy,  about 
Easter,  to  express  his  desire  for  peace 
(Euseb.  iv.  57). 

<»  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
pp.  I3J,  132,  145,  SiC. 

■•1  If  Prince  Hormisdas  was  a  son  of 
Hormisdas  II.  and  thrown  into  prison  at 
his  death  (see  text,  p.  315),  he  must  have 
passed  fourteen  yeara  in  confinement 
before  he  made  his  escape. 

<2  Zosim.  ii.  27. 

<3  Ibid.  ii.  27,  ad  fin.;  andiii.  13,  ad /iu. 

**  Suidas  ad  voc.  Maptruas. 

♦*  From  A.D.  333  to  a.d.  337. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

'  At  first  the  partition  was  into  five 
kingdoms;  but  tlie  dominions  of  Ual- 
matins  and  Hannibalianus  were  soon 
absorbed  into  those  of  the  sons  of  Con- 
stantine. 

2  Constantius  was  not  quite  twenty  at 
the  death  of  his  father.  He  was  born 
in  August,  A.D.  317.  Constantine  died 
Mav  22,  A.D.  337. 

3  The  natives  of  the  voluptuous  East 
were  never  a  match  for  those  of  the 
hardy  West.  Roman  legions  recruited 
in  Asia  Minor.  Syria,  and  Egypt  were  al- 
ways poor  soldiers. 

*  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  eh.  xviii. 
(vol.  ii.  pp.  9S-100). 

6  Iliid.  p.  103. 

«  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  ii.  77;  Aga- 
t'nangelus,  S§  110-132. 

'See  Milman,  Hist,  of  Christianity, 
vol.  ii.  p.  258,  and  the  authorities  there 
cited. 

<*  Chosroes  II.,  who  was  placed  on  the 
Mirone  by  Rome  in  ad.  316,  and  Tiranus, 
his  s-^n,  who  succeeded  Chosroes  in  a.d. 
W5. 


»  This  distinctly  appears  from  Faustus, 
iii.  20.  The  cession  seems  to  have  been 
made  by  Chosroes  II.  (Mos.  Chor.  iii.  8). 

'»  See  note  38,  Chapter  VII. ;  and  com- 
pare Liban.  Oral.  iii.  p.  117,  B. 

"  Liban.  Orat.  iii.  p.  121,  B. 

"  Julian.  Orat.  i.  pp.  :13  and  36. 

"Ibid.  pp.  36-;i8.  Among  other  im- 
provements introduced  by  Constantius 
at  this  lime  was  the  equipment  of  a  por- 
tion of  the  Roman  cavalry  after  tlie 
fashion  of  the  Persian  cataphracti,  or 
mailed  horsemen. 

i*Ibid.  pp.  33  and  37.  Compare  SI 
Martin's  additions  to  Le  Beau,  Bos-Em- 
pire, vol.  i.  pp.  406  et  seqq. 

"Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  37. 

1"  There  must  be  some  foundation 
for  the  statements  of  Libanius  and  Ju- 
lian, that  Sapor  at  fir.st  avoided  a  cou- 
rtict,  even  though  they  are  contained  in 
panegyrics.  (See  Liban.  p.  122,  A:  T019 
optoi;  ei/)ei(TT^Ket  Tois  YlfptriKo'i';,  eTri9u/jiu)i> 
oi/biafat  TTji'  &(^iav  Kal  6  Tov  9vn'ov  Se^d/xe- 
vo^  oifK  »Ji'*  aAA*  ot  Toi'  TToXefMOu  iladyovre^ 
ev  <t>vyfj  Tov  TToAe/ioi'  Sie<t>€poi>,  k.t.A.  Ju- 
lian. Orat.  i.  p.  3!):  Tooi/  TroAe/xiwi'  ou6ei? 
eToAfiijcrti'  ajxGi'ai  t>(  X'^P^  TTopflou/xeVjj-  Trai'- 
Ta  5e  Trap*  rnxa^  riyero  TaKiii'iov  dyadd'  Ttov 
(xei-  ouSt  6ts  ;^eipa?  ie'i'at  ToAjiupi'Tiuf) 

"Julian    Orat.  i.  p.  37. 

'8  Ibid.  p.  38. 

>9  Ibid.  p.  39. 

2"  This  is  well  urged  by  Gibbon  (De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  372). 

^'See  the  Assyrian  Canon,  passim; 
and  compare  Aiicient  Monarchies,  vol. 
i.  p.  2.58. 

■^2  Plutarch.  Lucull.  §  32. 

23  This  river,  now  called  the  Jerujer, 
anciently  the  Mygdonius  (river  of  Go 
zan  ?),  joins  the  main  stream  of  the  Kha 
hour  in  lat.  36°  20',  near  the  volcanic 
hill  of  Koiikab.  (Layard,  Nin.  and  Bab. 
pp  309,  322,  &c.) 

2^  As  appears  from  the  coins  of  Nisibis 
(Mionnet,  Description  des  Medailles, 
torn.  V.  pp.  62.5-S). 

25  This  is  evident  from  the  persistency 
of  his  attacks.  Ammianus  says  (xxv. 
8):  "  Constabat  orbem  Eoum  in  ditlo- 
nem  potuisse  transire  Persidis,  nisi  hajc 
civitas  (sc.  Nisibisl  liabill  situ  et  magni- 
tiidine  nuenium  restitisset."' 

-"On  the  (late  of  the  first  siege  of  Ni- 
sibis, see  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Ernpe- 
reurs.  torn.  iv.  p.  668;  Clinton,  F.  E.  vol. 
i.  p.  396. 

''I  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  287,  B;  Theopha- 
nes.  p.  28.  T). 

I"  So  Tillemont,  torn.  iv.  p.  319. 

2»  Tlieodoret,  ii.  30.  The  miracles  as- 
cribed by  this  writer  to  St.  .lames  are 
jiistly  ridiculed  by  Gibbon  (vol.  ii.  p. 
372.  note  65). 

3"  C7i)o»i.  Pasch.  1.  8.  c;  Hieronym. 
Chron.  anno  UZIA. 

"  Eutropius,  Festus,  Zosimus,  Zona- 
ras. 

"  The  first  and  second  speeches  of 
Julian  and  the  third  of  Libanius  belong 
to  the  latter  class;  the  Epistle  of  Julian 


G56 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  vin. 


to  the  Athenian  Senate  and  People,  and 
the  tenth  oration  of  Libanius  belong 
(so  far  as  Constantius  is  concerned)  to 
the  former.  The  later  writings  of  these 
two  authors  to  a  great  extent  invalidate 
the  earlier. 

'3  Nine  times,  according  to  Festus 
(§27);  frequently,  according  to  Eutro- 
pius  (x.  10);  whenever  he  engaged  the 
Persians,  according  to  Ammianus  (xx. 
\\,  ad  fin.)  and  Socrates  (Hist.  Eccles. 
ii.  25). 
'f  '■*  See  the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy, 
p.  228. 

36  Mos.  Chor.  Hist.  Armen.  iii.  10; 
Faustus,  iii.  21.  The  Persian  prince 
seems  to  have  been  named  Narses. 
Moses  calls  him  Sapor's  brother;  but 
this  is  very  improbable. 

5'  Faustus,  1.  s.  c. 

''  Hence  the  pi'actice  of  blinding  their 
near  relatives  upon  their  accession, 
which  the  Shahs  of  Persia  regularly 
pursued  till  within  the  present  century. 

^^  Faustus,  iv.  1. 

"  On  the  friendly  relations  which  sub- 
sisted at  this  time  between  Persia  and 
Armenia,  see  Faustus.  iv.  16. 

^"Jerome  says:  ^^  Qsupor  tribus  mensi- 
bus  obsedit  Nisibin;"  but  Theophanes 
gives  the  exact  duration  of  the  siege  as 
seventy-eight  days  (p.  31  D). 

■»>  Liban.  0?-a<."  iii.  p.  129,  A,  B. 

42  Ibid.  p.  130,  A. 

*^  On  the  position  of  Sin  jar  and  the 
character  of  the  siuTounding  country, 
see  Layai'd  (Nin.  and  Bab.  pp.  246-249). 

■'''  Liban.  p.  129,  D.  This  writer  pre- 
tends that  it  was  not  through  fear  of 
meeting  the  enemy  in  the  open  that 
ConsfaTitius  held  back,  but  because  he 
wanted  to  draw  his  adversary  on  and 
prevent  him  from  recrossing  the  Tigris 
without  fighting.  Perhaps  it  is  most 
probable  that  the  passage  of  the  river 
took  Constantius  by  surprise,  that  he 
was  too  weak  to  prevent  it,  and  was 
obliged  to  remain  on  the  defensive  until 
his  troops  could  be  concentrated. 

*^  Libanius  represents  the  entire  ar- 
rangement as  a  plan  carefully  laid 
(Orat.  iii.  p.  130.  C):  Julian,  on  the  con- 
trary, regards  the  flight  of  the  Persians 
as  a  real  panic,  and  their  victory  at  the 
camp  as  a  mere  piece  of  good  fortune 
(Orat.  i.  pp.  42-44). 

4"  Liban.  Ornt.  iii.  p.  1.31,  A. 

4'  Ibid.  p.  131,  D,  and  p.  132,  A.  Each 
legionary,  we  are  told,  stepped  aside 
out  of  the  way  of  the  horseman  who 
bore  down  upon  him.  and  then  struck 
him,  as  he  passed,  with  a  club. 

^s.TuHan.  Orat.  i.  pp.  42-3;  Liban.  p. 
130.  D. 

■"'  Liban.  p.  132,  B;  Julian,  p.  44.  The 
latter  writer  appears  to  ascribe  the  Ro- 
man disaster  mainly  to  the  troops  ex- 
posing themselves  as  they  di-ank  at  the 
Persian    cisterns    (Aaic/coi?    iiSaro?    evSov 

ivTvxdvTe';,  t'tjv  KakKiar-qv  viKrfv  SUiftSeipav). 

6°  The  Roman  writers  touch  lightly 
the  condition  of  the  Roman  troops  when 


the  Persians  fell  upon  them.  I  follow 
probability  when  1  describe  them  as 
"  sleepy  or  drunken." 

°' See  Aram.  Marc,  xviii.  5:  "Apud 
Singaram  .  .  .  acerrime  nocturna  con- 
certatione  pugnatum  est,  nostrorum  co- 
piis  ingenti  strage  confossis."  Com- 
pare Hiei-onym.  anno  2364;  and  Liban. 
Orat.  iii.  p.  132,  C.  Even  Julian  admits 
that  the  battle  was  commonly  regarded 
as  the  greatest  victory  gained  by  the 
Persians  during  the  war  (Orat.  i.  p.  41). 

»2  Liban^  p.  133,  D:    'Eirel&ov  [ol  U4p- 

trai]  Tov  ToO  ^a<7tAea)?  rraiSa,  to;'  rrj^  apxrj^ 
6ta6o;^or,  e^wypT/^ei'Of,  (cat  fj.a<jTLyovfj.€voy, 
Koi   KevTovfjLevov,   Kal   fxiKpov  vcrTepov  Kara- 

KOTTToixeyov.  Tillemont  has  seen  that  this 
treatment  could  not  have  been  possible 
till  the  troops  were  half-maddened  with 
despair  and  fury.  (Histoire  des  Empe- 
reiirs.  tom.  iv.  p.  347.) 

*5  So  much  we  may  accept  from  the 
boasts  of  Julian  (Orat.  i.  p.  4.5)  and  Liba- 
nius (Orat.  iii.  p.  133,  A),  corroborated 
as  they  are  by  the  testimony  of  Ammi- 
anus, who  says  (1.  s.  c.)  that  the  Persians 
made  no  use  of  their  victory  at  Singara; 
but  it  is  impossible  to  believe  the  state- 
ment of  Libanius.  that  the  whole  Per- 
sian army  fled  in  disorder  from  Singara 
and  hastily  recrossed  the  Tigris  (p.  133, 
D). 

^'^  Julian  maintains  that  both  sides 
suffered  equally  in  the  battle  (p.  41). 

65  Compare  the  grief  of  Orodes  on  the 
death  of  Pacorus  (Sixth  Monarchy,  p. 
110). 

»'  Jerome's  statement  that  Amida  and 
Bezabde  were  taken  by  Sapor  shortly 
after  the  battle  of  Singara  arises  appar- 
ently from  some  confusion  between  the 
events  of  the  year  a.d.  349  and  those  of 
A.D.  359. 

='  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  voL  ii.  p. 
377. 

"  JuHan.  Orat.  i.  p.  48. 

69  Ibid.  h.  p.  115. 

«» IlMd.  p.  116. 

«i  Zosimus,  iii.  8. 

82  Theodoret,  ii.  30. 

*'  Julian.  Orat.  ii.  p.  115:  'O  Uapdvaitov 

/SafftAeus  .  .  .  enLT€i\i^u)i'  Trjif  TrdAcf  ;^w)LLa- 
atv.  elra  et?  ravra  Sexofxevo^  Tor  Mvyfidi'tov, 
Xip^vqi'  a'r€<paLi'€TO  to  Tiept  tu>  dtrTet  xuipiov, 
Kal  ioaTrep  fTjaov  ev  avTjj  ^ui^ei\e  Trjv  tt6\li', 
fiiKphf  vnepexovaoju  Ka'i  vn€p\aivofJ.evbiv  Twtf 

cTToAfecor.    Compare  Orat.  i.  p.  49. 

«■•  Compare  Trajan's  construction  of  tt 
fleet  in  this  same  region  in  the  winter  of 
A.D.  115-116.     (Sixth  Monarchy,  p.  176.) 

*6  Julian,  1.  s.  c.  Gibbon  appears  to 
have  understood  Juliati  to  state  that  the 
balistce  discharging  these  huge  stones 
(stones  weighing  more  than  five  hun- 
dred-weight) were  carried  by  the  ships 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  108).  But 
Julian's  meaning  is  clearly  that  stated 
above  in  the  text. 

88  A  similar  danger  not  unfrequently 
threatens  Baghdad  from  the  swell  of  the 
Euphrates,  which  is  brought  to  its  walla 
through    the    Saklawiyeh   canal.      Mr, 


CH.  IX.] 


fUE  SEVENTU  MONARCHY. 


65t 


Loftus  gives  a  graphic  account  of  the 
risk  run  in  May  1849  (Chaldoea  and  Susi- 
ana,  pp.  7-8). 

"Julian,  p.  116. 

«e  Ibid.  p.  130. 

«9See  text,  p.  327.  The  weakness 
here  spoken  of  did  not  extend  to  the 
ancient  Persians,  who  were  fairly  suc- 
cessful in  their  sieges  (Ancient  Mon- 
uickies,  vol.  iv.  p.  130). 

">  .'Vmmianus  tells  us  that,  either  now 
or  at  some  other  time  in  the  siege,  the 
I'iM'sians  suffered  much  by  the  elephants 
tui-ning  against  their  own  side  and 
trampling  the  footineu  under  their  feet 
(XXV.  n. 

"Julian,  p.  122. 

'2  Zonaras,  xiii. 

'3  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  290,  A.  Julian  ex- 
aggerates when  he  says  the  time  wasted 
was  "  four  months"  (Orat.  i.  p.  .51). 

'■»  See  Wilson,  Ariana  Antiqua,  p. 
38fi. 

"  Zonaras,  xiii.  7.  The  original  ethnic 
character  of  the  Massagetse  is  perhaps 
doubtful.  They  may  have  been  degene- 
rated Arians;  but  in  their  habits  they 
are,  even  from  the  first,  scarcely  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  Tatar  or  Tura- 
nian liordes.  By  Sapor's  time  they  had 
probably  intermixed  largely  with  Ta- 
tars. 

'8  Julian.  Orat.  i.  p.  51;  Orat.  ii.  p.  123: 
(ayet  Trpo?  r)^a;  e'lpr^vriv  ex  toutou,  koI  aire 
ooKuiv  ouT€  (Tvv6j)Ku>v  iSeri<Tev '  ayaJTij  Si 
ocKot  iievutv,  K.T.A.) 

CHAPTER  IX. 

■  See  text,  p.  323. 

■■>  The  alliance  of  Arsaces  with  Rome 
is  misdated  both  by  Faustus  and  by 
Moses  of  Choren6.  The  former  places 
it  in  the  reign  of  Valens.  a.d.  3(54-379 
(Bihlioth&que,  iv.  5).  the  latter  in  that  of 
Valentinian  I.,  a.d.  364-375  (Hist.  Armen. 
iii.  21).  But  it  is  clear  from  Ammianus 
(xx.  11),  whose  authority  exceeds  that 
of  all  the  Armenian  historians  united, 
that  the  alliance  was  made  with  Con- 
stantius.  It  could  not  have  been  earlier 
than  A.D.  351,  since  Constans  did  not  die 
till  A.D  350;  and  it  could  not  have  been 
later  than  a.d.  3i>9,  since  it  is  spoken  of 
as  existing  in  that  year  (Amm.  Marc, 
xvii.  14). 

»  That  is  between  a.d.  350  and  357. 

*  Faustus,  iv.  15. 

6  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  11 ;  Athanas.  Ep.  ad 
!^olitar.  p.  8.56;  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  21. 

•  Pharandzem  was  tlie  daughter  of  a 
certain  Autor,  prince  of  Siunia,  and  was 
first  married  to  Gnel  or  Knel,  a  nephew 
of  Arsaces,  whom  he  put  to  death.  Her 
jealousy  impelled  her  to  contrive  the 
murder  of  Olympias,  who  is  said  to  have 
been  killed  by  poison  introduced  into 
the  sacred  elements  at  the  Eucharist. 
(See  Faustus,  I.  s.  c. ;  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  23, 
24.) 

'Amm.  Marc.  xx.  11:  "Audiehat  sae- 
pius  eum  tentatum  a  rege  Persarum  fal- 


laciis,   et   minis,    et  dolis."     Compare 
Faustus,  iv.  16,  20. 

"  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5,  §  1 :  "Rex  Per- 
sarum, in  confiniis  agens  adhuc  genti- 
um extimarum,  jamque  cum  Chionitis 
et  Gelanis.  onmium  acerrimis  bellatori- 
bus,  pignore  icto  societatis,"  &c. 

•  The  Chionites  are  mentioned  repeat- 
edly (Amm.  Marc.  xvi.  9;  xvii.  5;  xviii. 
6;  xix.  1,2,  &c.):  the  Vertas  twice  (xix. 
2  and  .5);  the  Euseni  and  Gelani  once 
each  (xvi.  9,  and  xvii.  5).  It  is  not  dis- 
tinctly said  that  the  Euseni  or  Vertae 
had  fought  against  Sapor. 

'"  Wilson,  Ariana  A7itiqua,  p.  386. 

"  Ibid.  p.  303.  Compare  the  Author's 
Sixth.  Monarchy,  p.  64. 

i^  So  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  ii. 
p.  408,  note  58). 

'3  Amm.  Ma''C.  xvii.  5. 

14  Ibid.  xvi.  8. 

i^Ibid.:  "Tamsapor  .  .  .  refert  ad  re- 
gem,  quod  acerrimis  bellis  Constantius 
implicatus  pacem  postulat  precativam." 
Comijare  xvii.  5. 

'8  Pet.  Patric.  Fr.  17.  Ammianus  calls 
the  ambassador  Narseus.  The  Persian 
name  was  Narsehi. 

1'  See  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5. 

'*  Themistius,  Oi'at.  iv.  in  laudem  Con- 
stanta, p.  57,  B. 

1"  Pet.  Patric.  1.  s.  c. 

2»  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.  I  have  some- 
what abbreviated  the  reply  of  Constan- 
tius, but  have  endeavored  to  preserve 
all  the  points  which  are  of  any  impor- 
tance. 

2'  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5,  sub  fin. 

«2  Eunap.  Vit.  Jamblich.  p.  23. 

23  Basil.  Ep.  i.  (Opera,  vol.  iii.  pp.>C9, 
70). 

'*■'  See  the  history  of  the  war  in  Am- 
mianus (xvii.  G-10)  and  Gibbon  (Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  pp.  412-418). 

26  Amm.  Marc.  xvii.  5,  and  xviii.  4. 

*•  Ibid,  xviii.  5. 

2'  "  Ipse  quoque  in  multis  ac  necessa- 
riis  operam  suam  fidenter  promittens." 
(Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  5,  ad  fin.) 

2"  Ibid,  xviii.  G. 

2»  Ibid.  Ammianus  himself  witnessed 
the  passage  of  the  river. 

3  0  Carrhae  alone  is  expressly  men- 
tioned. 

"  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  7. 

'2  Amm.  Marc,  xviii.  8. 

S3  Ibid,  xviii.  10. 

3«  "  A  latere  australi.  genieulato  Tjgri- 
dis  meatu  subluitur"  (ibid,  xviii  9).  The 
plan  given  by  the  elder  Niebulir  in  his 
Voyage  en  Arabic  (torn.  ii.  pi.  xlvili.) 
shows  this  bend  verj'  cl<'arly.  The  mod- 
ern town,  however,  is  not  washed  by  the 
river. 

s'  It  is  often  mentioned  in  the  As-sy- 
rian  inscriptions.  (Ancient  Monarchies, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  315,  371,  &c.)  Its  prefect  aj)- 
pears  as  eponj-m  in  the  Assyrian  Canon 
frequently. 

"  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

3'  The  legion  of  Constantine  contained 
from  1,000  to  l,.5cX)  men.    Seven  legiciw 


658 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAncllY. 


[CH.  IX 


would  therefore  give  a  force  of  from 
8.000  to  9,000. 

»«  Aium.  Marc,  xviii.  9,  sub  fin. 

"  "  Parte  indumenti  tragulae  ictu  di- 
scissa"  (ib.  xix.  1).  I  do  not  know  why 
Gibbon  speaks  of  the  dart  as  "  glancing 
against  the  royal  tiara"  (Decline  and 
Fall.  vol.  ii.  p.  407). 

*"  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  1. 

■"  Ibid.  xix.  2:  "Agitata  summa  con- 
silioriim  placuerat,  busto  urbis  subver- 
sse  expiare  perempti  juvenis  manes." 

*^  Inhabitants  of  Seistan,  probably  of 
Scythic  origin.    (See  text,  p.  297.) 

*^  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  6. 

**  Ibid.  xix.  2.  sub  fin.  The  legionaries 
were  about  8,000  or  9.000  (see  above, 
note  37);  the  other  soldiers  and  the  un- 
armed multitude  were  reckoned  at  20,000. 

*^  The  comparison  is  made  by  Ammia- 
nus:  "  Ubi  Grumbates  hastam  infectam 
sanguine  ritu  patrio  nostriqne  more  con- 
jecer&t  fetialis."  (xix.  2.) 

■*'Ibid,  1.  s  c.  It  is  not  clear  when 
this  capture  took  place;  but  it  can 
scarcely  have  been  in  this  year,  since 
Rome  holds  Singara  in  a.d.  3ti0. 

•"  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  5,  ad  init. 

48  Ibid.  xix.  3. 

■•»  Ibid,  xviii.  5. 

*"  "  Visebatur  ut  leo  magnitudine  cor- 
poris et  torvitate  terribilis,  inclusos  inter 
retia  catulos  periculo  ereptum  ire  non 
audens,  unguibusademptisetdentibus." 
(Amm.  Marc.  xix.  3,  ad  fin  ) 

5'  Four  himdred  were  killed  out  of 
probably  about  2,500.    (Ibid.  xix.  6.) 

62  Ibid.  xix.  4. 

'3  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  5,  ad  fin. 

'*!lbid.  xix.  9,  ad  init. 

56  "Nulla  quies  certaminibus  data." 
(Ibid.  xix.  7.) 

^'Ibid.  sub  fin. 

"Gibbon  says  "a  large  breach  was 
made  by  the  battering-ram  "  (Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  409);  but  he  has  ap- 
parently confused  the  capture  of  Sin- 
gara, related  by  Ammianus  (xx.  6),  with 
that  of  Amida,  which  is  expressly  as- 
cribed to  the  spontaneous  crumbling  of 
a  mound  in  bk.  xix.  ch.  viii.  ("diu  labo- 
rata  moles  ilia  nostrorum,  velut  terras 
quodam  tremore  quassata,  procubuit  "). 

6^  Pecorum  ritu  armati  et  imbelles 
sine  sexus  discrimine  trucidabantur." 
(Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.) 

"  Ibid,  xix  9,  sub'fin. 

•0  As  when,  on  the  capture  of  one  of 
the  fortified  posts  outside  Amida,  he 
sent  the  wife  of  Craugasius  unharmed 
to  her  husband,  and  at  the  same  time 
ordered  a  number  of  Christian  virgins, 
found  among  the  captives,  to  be  protect- 
ed from  insult  and  allowed  the  free  ex- 
ercise of  their  rehgion.  (Ibid.  xix.  10, 
sub  fin.) 

•1  Ibid.  xix.  9. 

«2  See  text,  p.  384. 

»'  Amm.  Marc.  xix.  9,  sub  init. 

•<  Gibbon  conjectures  that  Sapor's  al- 
lies now  deserted  him  (1.  s.  c),  and  says 


"  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  strength  of  the 
army  with  which  he  took  the  field  was 
no  longer  equal  to  the  unbounded  views 
of  his  ambition;"  but  Ammianus  tells 
us  that  he  crossed  the  Tigris  in  a.d.  360 
"  armis  multiplicatis  et  viribus"  (xx.  6, 
ad  init.). 

«5"Glandes."  (See  Amm.  Marc.  xx. 
6.) 

*'  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
397,  410,  423,  528;  vol.  iii.  pp.  496.  497;  vol. 
iv.  pp,  440,  448,  &c.  The  practice  was 
common  to  the  Assyrians,  the  Babylo- 
nians, and  the  Achsemenian  Persians. 

"  "  Ad  regiones  Persidis  ultimas  sunt 
asportati."  (Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.)  The 
regions  "furthest"  from  Mesopotamia 
would  be  those  of  the  extreme  East. 

"8  See  the  remarks  of  Ammianus  at 
the  close  of  bk.  xx.  ch.  6. 

*^  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7.  Compare  ch.  11. 

'"See  text,  p.  308. 

' '  Some  geographers  identify  Bezabde 
with  Jezireh  (Diet,  of  Gk.  and  Roman 
Geography,  sub  roc.  Bezabda);  but  the 
name  Fynyk  is  almost  certain  evidence 
of  the  real  site.  Fynyk  is  about  ten 
miles  from  Jezireh  to  the  north-west. 

'2  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7. 

'^  "  Christianse  legis  antistes  exire  se 
velle  gestibus  ostentabat  et  nutu,  &c." 
Ammianus  afterwards  calls  him  "  epis- 
copum."  and  says  that  his  intercession 
brought  on  him  an  imjust  suspicion  of 
collusion  with  the  enemy.    (1.  s.  c.) 

'4  "  Interceptis  aliis  castellis  viliori- 
bus."    (Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7,  sid)  fin.) 

'6  AsD'Anville  (Geographic  Ancienne, 
tom.  ii.  p.  201).  Gibbon  (Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  ii.  p.  410,  note  61).  and  Mr.  E. 
B.  James  (Diet,  of  Gk.  and  B.  Geogra- 
phy, ad  voc.  BiRTHA).  It  is  difficult, 
however,  to  suppose  that  a  position  so 
low  down  the  Tigris  as  Tekrit  was  held 
by  the  Romans.  I  am  almost  inclined 
to  suspect  that  the  Virta  of  Ammianus 
is  Bir  on  the  Euphrates  (lat.  37°  5',  long. 
38°  5'),  and  that,  when  he  speaks  of  it  as 
situated  in  the  remotest  part  of  Meso- 
potamia, he  means  the  part  most  re- 
mote fro7n  Persia. 

'«  Amm.  Marc.  xx.  7,  ad  fin. 

"  Ibid.  XX.  8. 

'8  We  find  him  at  Csesarea  Mazaca 
about  the  middle  of  the  year  (ib.  xx.  9), 
then  at  Melitina  (Malatiyeh),  Lacotina, 
and  Samosata  (ib.  xx.  11);  finally  at 
Edessa  (ibid.). 

'5  Ibid.  XX.  11,  ad  init. 

^o  "  Post  equinoctium  egreditur  au- 
tumnale."    (Ibid.) 

81  "  Assiduis  imbribus  ita  immaduerat 
solum,  ut  luti  glutinosa  mollities  per 
eas  regiones  pinguissimi  casspitis  omnia 
perturbaret. "    (Amm.  Marc  xx.  11.) 

82  According  to  Moses  of  Choren6,  Tl- 
ranus  was  still  king  at  the  time  of  the 
invasion  of  Julian  (Hist.  Armen.  iii.  15), 
and  Arsaces  (Ardshag)  did  not  succeed 
him  till  after  the  death  of  Jovian  (iii. 
17).    But  Ammianus  calls  the  king  eon* 


CH.  X.] 


TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


659 


temporary  with  the  later  years  of  Con- 
stantius,  Arsaces  (xx.  11;  xxi.  6).  So 
also  Sozoinen  {Hist.  Eccles.  vi.  1). 

*•  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  6. 

»*  Faustus  makes  Arsaces  leud  aid  to 
Sapor  in  one  of  his  attacks  on  Nisibis 
(iv.  20),  and  declares  that  he  completely 
defeated  a  large  Roman  army  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  place.  But 
the  entire  silence  of  Ammiauus  renders 
his  narrative  incredible. 

•s  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  7,  ad  fin. 

"Ibid.  xxi.  13. 

8' Ibid. 

•*  Ibid.  xxi.  7,  ad  init. 

8'  Ibid.  xxi.  13. 

'»  See  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
lii.  pp.  102-118). 

"  Amm.  Mare.  xxi.  13:  "Tardante 
trans  Tigridem  rege  dum  moveri  permit- 
terent  sacra;"  and  again,  further  on  in 
the  same  chapter:  '"  Is^untiatur  regem  ad 
propria  revertisse,  aitspiciis  dirimenti- 
ous.'''  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Per- 
sians were  believers  in  a  sort  of  divina- 
tion— that  by  means  of  the  barsom  or 
divining-rod  (Ancient  Monarchies,  vol. 
iii.  pp.  130-1);  baton  no  other  occasion 
do  we  And  it  even  said  that  their  military 
operations  were  dependent  on  "  aus- 
pices." 

92  See  text,  p.  328. 

"  Amm.  Marc.  xxi.  15;  Aurel.  Vict. 
Epit.  §  42.  Some  writers  substitute 
Mopsuestia  for  Mopsucrene  (Mos.  Chor. 
iii.  12;  Johann.  Mai.  ii.  p.  14;  Patkanian 
in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  18G6,  p.  151). 

CHAPTER  X. 

1  Julian  was  born  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  year  a.d.  331,  and  was  therefore  un- 
der thirty  at  his  accession  in  a.d.  360. 
(See  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  iv.  p.  198;  and  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i. 
p.  386.) 

!"  From  A.D.  350  to  359.  (Gibbon,  De- 
cline and  Fall.  vol.  ii.  pp.  414—121.) 

'  See  his  Coisares,  passim.  But  com- 
pare the  Orat.  ad  Themist.,  where  the 
palm  is  assigned  to  Socrates  over  Alex- 
ander (Op.  p.  264). 

■I  This  appears  from  the  position  as- 
signed to  these  two  emperors  in  the 
'Caesars." 

^  The  expedition  of  L.  Verus  (a.d.  162- 
164)  was  sent  out  by  M.  Aurelius.  (See 
the  Author's  Sixth  Monanhy.  p.  185.) 

•  Ammianus  tells  us  that  soon  after  his 
arrival  at  Constantinople,  on  being  ask- 
ed to  lead  an  expedition  against  the 
Goths.  Julian  replied  "  hostes  qiiaDrere 
se  meliores"  (xxii.  7^— an  expression 
which  clearly  points  at  the  Persians. 

'Ammianus  savs  "  P.arthicus"  (xxii. 
12).  But  Julian  himself  would  scarcely 
have  made  this  confusion. 

'  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
iii,  p.  181. 

"  f'ompare  the  Crpsarp.i,  p.  S*?!.  C. 
where  .M^xander  is  made  to  observe 
.that  the  Romans,  in  a  war  of  300  yearsi 


had  not  subdued  the  single  i)rovince  of 
Mesopotamia. 

1°  Ammianus  says:  "  Urebatur  bellan- 
di  gemino  desiderio:  prim<>,  quod  impa- 
tiens  otii  lituos  somniabat  et  prcelia: 
dein,  quod  ....  ornamenlis  illustriurn 
gloriarum  inserere  Parthici  cognomen- 
tum  ardebat"  (xxii.  12). 

'>  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p. 
209. 

12  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
tom.  iv.  p.  213.  "After  May  12"  (Clin- 
ton, F.  R.  vol,  i,  p,  448). 

'3  See  Zosimus,  iii.  11;  and,  on  the 
subject  of  Prince  Hormisdas,  compare 
text,  p.  319. 

"  Gibbon  places  his  arrival  in  August 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  181);  but 
Tillemont  argues  strongly  in  favor  of 
July  (Hist,  des  Empereurs,  tom.  iv.  p. 
297,  note  vi.  upon  the  reign  of  Julian). 
Clinton  shows  that  he  was  certainly  ac 
Antioch  before  August  1  (F.  R  vol.  i. 
p.  448).  He  concludes,  as  most  probable, 
that  he  arrived  at  Antioch  "about  Mid- 
siunmer." 

'5  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  12. 

"Zosim.  iii.  12.  ad  init..  and  13. 

"  See  the  Author's  Si.vth  Monarchy, 
pp.  177-179  and  194-197. 

"  Both  Trajan  and  Severus  had  had  to 
build  ships.  (Dio  Cass.  Ixviii.  26;  Ixxv. 
9.)  It  seems  scarcely  possible  that  Ju- 
lian shorM  have  collected  the  number 
that  he  did  (at  least  1.100)  without  build- 
ing. (See  Zosim.  iii.  13;  and  Amm.  Marc, 
xxiii.  3,  ad  fin.) 

19  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  14:  Zosim.  iii.  11; 
Libanius,  Orat.  x.  p.  307,  B. 

20  The  employment  of  spies  by  the 
Persians  is  often  noticed  by  the  Orien- 
tal historians  (Tabari,  tom.ii.  p.  96;  Mir- 
khond,  p,  31  n.  The  tale  that  Sapor  dis- 
guised himself  anil  visited  Constanti- 
nople in  person  (Tabari,  ii.  p.  99;  Ma- 
coudi,  ii.  p.  181)  is,  of  course,  not  true; 
but  we  may  well  believe  that  his  emis- 
saries went  as  far  as  that  city. 

2'  Libanius,  Orat.  viii.  p.  24.5,  A. 

'■'-  Socrat,  Hist.  Eccles.  iii.  19,  ad  fin. 

23  Amm   Marc.  xxii.  2,  ad  init. 

-*lh\(l.:  "Principe  respondrnie,  Ne- 
quaqnam  decere  adventiciis  adjumentis 
rem  vindicari  Romanam,  cujus  opibus 
foveri  conveniat  amicos  et  socios,  si 
auxilium  eos  adcgerit  necessitas  implo- 
rare." 

25  Ibid,  xxiii.  2;  Zosim.  iii.  25.  Tabari 
calls  these  auxiliaries  Khazars  (vol.  ii. 
pp,  95-97). 

2«  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  5,  ad  init. ;  Ju- 
lian, Ep.  ad  Liban.  p.  401,  D. 

2'  See  text,  p.  365. 

28  See  text,  p.  329. 

2»  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  2:  "Solum  Arsa- 
cem  monuerat.  Armeninc  regem,  ut  col- 
lectis  copiis  validis  jiW)cii(/a  opperiretur, 
quo  tendere.  quid  deberet  urgere,  pro- 
pere  cognilurus." 

'"  .\crording  to  the  .\rmeninn  histo- 
rians.  Arsaces  was  cruel  and  profligat*. 
He  put  to  death,  without  reason,  his  rv" 


660 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  X. 


lations  and  satraps,  persecuted  the  ec- 
clesiastics who  reproved  him,  and  es- 
tablished an  asylum  for  criminals. 
(Mos.  Chor.  iii.  20-32;  Faustus,  iv.  13-50.) 

'•  Faustus,  iii.  13. 

32  Mos.  Chor.  iii  13.  Moses  says  that 
Julian  required  the  Armenian  monarch 
to  hang  up  in  the  chancel  of  the  metro- 
jjolitan  church  a  portrait,  which  he  sent 
him,  of  himself,  containing  also  '"repre- 
sentations of  devils"— i.e.  of  the  heathen 
gods.  It  was  pointed  out  by  the  Arme- 
nian patriarch  that  this  was  an  insult  to 
Christianity  (iii.  14). 

53  The  letter  ascribed  to  Julian  on  this 
occasion  (Fabric.  Bibliothec.  Grcec.  vol. 
vii.  p.  86)  may  not  be  genuine,  although 
it  is  accepted  by  St.  Martin  (Notes  on 
Le  Beau  vol.  iii.  p.  37).  But,  even  apart 
from  this,  the  insolent  tone  of  Julian  to- 
wards the  Armenian  king  is  suflBciently 
apparent. 

2''  Zosimus  is  the  only  writer  who  gives 
an  estimate  of  the  whole  force,  which 
he  makes  to  consist  of — 

6.5,000  taken  with  him  by  Julian, 
18,000  detached  to  act  under  Pro- 

copius. 

Total  83,000 

Sozomen  raises  the  number  of  the  forces 
under  Procopius  to  "  about  20,000  "  (Hist. 
Eccles.  vi.  1),  and  Ammianus  to  30,000 
(xxiii.  3).  Libanius  savs  20,000  (Orat.  x. 
p.  312),  John  of  Malala  16,000  (p.  328). 
If  we  add  the  30,000  of  Ammianus  to  the 
6.0,000  who  accompanied  Julian,  we  get 
a  total  of  95,000,  which  is  Gibbon's  esti- 
mate {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  pp.  189, 
100), 

^^  .Armenia  furnished  7,000  foot  and 
6,000  horse  to  Antony  (Pint.  Anton.  § 
37).  It  was  calculated  that  the  horse 
might  have  been  increased  to  16,000 
(ibid.  §  50). 

2'  Julian  left  Antioch  on  March  5,  a.d. 
863.  (See  Ammianus,  xxiii.  2:  "  Tertio 
Nonas  Martias  profectus.") 

"  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  2,  3.  Zosimus 
makes  him  visit  Edessa  from  Batnse  (iii. 
12);  but  the  expression  used  by  Ammi- 
anus ("venit  cursu  propero  (jarrhas") 
contr£.Ii^ts  this. 

'8  The  identity  of  Carrhae  with  the 
Haran  of  Genesis  is  allowed  by  almost 
all  critics. 

"  Ammianus  says  that  he  had  care- 
fully provisioned  the  line  of  the  Tigris 
in  order  to  make  the  Persians  think  that 
it  was  the  line  which  he  intended  to  fol- 
low (xxiii.  3);  but  it  is  perhaps  as  prob- 
able that  he  wished  to  be  able  to  pursue 
the  Tigris  line  if  circumstances  proved 
favorable. 

*°  Zosimus  says  18,000  (iii.  12);  Sozo- 
men (vi.  1)  and  Labanius  (Orat.  Funebr. 
p.  312,  A)  say  20,000;  Ammianus  says 
30,000  (I.  s.  c). 

■"  See  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.  Zosimus 
regards  the  force  as  left  merely  for  the 
protection  of  Roman  Mesopotamia. 

■•2  .'Vmm,  Matc.  1,  s,  c, 

^^  Tiji:^  }§  tfie  estimate  of  .4fliaiianus. 


Zosimus  makes  the  number  consider- 
ably exceed  1,150  (iii.  13). 

**  Circesium  is  the  ordinary  form,  and 
is  that  given  by  Zosimus;  but  Ammia- 
nus has  "  Circusium"  (xxiii.  5j;  and  so 
the  Nubian  Geography. 

45  "  Principio  mensis  Aprilis."  (Amm. 
Marc.  1.  s.  c.) 

■"Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1.  Compare  Zo- 
sim.  iii.  14. 

•"  Amm  Marc,  xxiii.  5:  "  Pontem  avel 
li  jussit.  ne  cui  militum  ab  agminibus 
pro  priis  revertendi  flducia  remaneret," 

*^  •■  Classis.  licet  per  flumen  ferebatur 
assiduisflexibustortuosum,  necresidere, 
nee  prsecurrere  sinebatur."  Ibid.  xxvi. 
1.) 

••»  Called  Zautha  by  Zosimus  (iii.  14), 
perhaps  the  Asicha  of  Isidore  (Mans. 
Parth.  §  1). 

^0  Zosimus  places  the  tomb  at  Dura, 
two  days'  march  from  Zaitha  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxiv.  1);  but  Ammianus,  who  ac- 
companied the  army,  can  scarcely  have 
been  mistaken  in  the  fact  that  the  tomb 
was  at  any  rate  distinctly  visible  from 
Zaitha. 

^'  Gibbon  supposes  the  speech  to  have 
been  made  as  soon  as  the  Khabour  was 
crossed  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p. 
191);  but  Ammianus  makes  Zaitha  the 
scene  of  it.  In  the  course  of  it  Julian 
used  the  expression:  "  Gordianus,  cujus 
monumentum  nunc  vidimus"  (Amm. 
Marc,  xxiii.  5). 

•2  "  Emenso  itinere  bidui  civitatem 
venimus  Duram"  (ib.  xxiv.  1). 

'3  "  Dierum  quatuor  itinere  levi  per- 
acto."  (Ibid.)  Anathan  was  known  to 
the  Assyrians  as  Anat,  to  the  Greeks  of 
Augustus's  time  as  Anatho  (see  Isid. 
Char.  Mans.  Parth.  §  1).  It  is  perhaps 
the  "  Hena"  of  Isaiah  (xxxvii.  13). 

'*  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1;  Zosim.  iii.  14, 
ad  fin. 

*'  Amm,  Marc  1.  s.  c. 

*«  Ibid.xxiv.  2,  ad  init.\  Zosim.  iii.  15: 
(fipovpLov  oxvpiuraTov. 

s'  See  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex.  Iv.  21,  26,  29, 
&c. 

68  Ammianus  mentions  only  one  other, 
Acha'iachala;    but   Zosimus   speaks   of 

eVepa  (Jpoupio  (1.  S.  C). 

^^  This  site  is  certainly  identified  by 
the  mention  of  bitumen  springs  in  its 
neighborhood  (Zosim.  iii.  15:  Amm. 
Marc.  xxiv.  2).  There  are  no  bitumen 
springs  in  this  part  of  Mesopotamia  ex- 
cept those  of  Hit. 

*"  Hit  is  thought  to  be  mentioned  un. 
der  the  name  of  1st  in  a  hieroglyphical 
inscription  set  up  by  Thothmes  III. 
about  B.C.  14.50,  It  is  probably  the  Ahava 
of  Ezra  (vui.  15,  21). 

'1  The  words  used  are  Gibbon's  (De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  193).  The  fact 
is  recorded  both  by  Zosimus  and  Am- 
mianus. 

"'"Qua"  (i.e.  Diacira)  "  incensa,  cae- 
sisque  mulieribus  panels  quae  repertse 
sunt,  Ozogardanaoccupavimus"  (Amm, 
Marc.  xxiv.  2). 


I 


GH.  X.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


661 


;  •'  These  places  are  only  mentioned  by 

'       Zosimus  (iii.  15). 

[  "  Gibbon  implies  the  contrary  of  this, 

•when  he  says  in  the  most  general  way, 
"  During  the  march  the  Surenas,  or  Per- 
sian general,  and  Malik  Rodosaces  in- 
cessantly hovered  round  the  army; 
every  straggler  was  intercepted;  every 
detachment  was  attacked,  &c.  (De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  194.)  But 
Zosimus  strongly  notes  the  absence  of 

;       any    Persian    army  up    to    this  point: 

Savfido-a;  6'  6  j3a<rtAei/s  ore  Toaavrriv  ToO 
(TTpaToO  6ta5pandi'T05  b&hv  oOSels  ex  Ilep- 
aoiv  ouTe  A6;^os  e^  eviSpa^,  ovre  €/c  toO  Trpo- 
iliavovi  OTDJi'Trjtre  Ti  rroAe'/iiiov,  k.t.A.  (1.  S.  C.) 

"5  See  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  1,  ad  fin. 

•»  Ibid.  Compare  Liban.  Orat.  Funebr. 
p.  313,  D. 

'^  Gibbon,  following  Herodotus  (i.  IM), 
calls  this  tract  Assyria  (Decline  and 
Fail.  vol.  iii.  pp.  194-199);  but,  strictly 
speaking,  it  is  only  the  upper,  rolUng, 
slightly  elevated  plain  to  which  that 
name  belongs.  The  alluvial  plain  is 
properly  Babylonia. 

«8  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  2;  Zosim.  iii.  16, 
ad  init. 

"« It  has  been  argued  by  some  that 
Surena  is  not  a  name  of  office,  but  a 
Persian  family  appellation.  (St.  Martin, 
Notes  on  Le  Beau,  vol.  iii.  p.  79;  Patka- 
nian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1866, 
p.  130.)  There  was  certainly  a  family 
called  Suren-Pahlav  at  the  close  of  the 
Parthian  and  beginning  of  the  Neo-Per- 
sian  period  (Mos.  Chor.  ii.  65,  67).  But 
we  find  the  word  stirena  in  the  classical 
writers  before  the  time  when  the  Sure7i- 
Pahlav  family  is  said  to  have  originated. 
(See  the  historians  of  Crassus,  passim.) 

'">  Gibbon  calls  him  "  the  renowned 
emir  of  the  tribe  of  Qassan"  (vol.  iii.  p. 
194).  But  it  is  questionable  whether 
this  tribe  had  settlements  on  the  Eu- 
phrates. Moreover,  the  tribe  name  in 
Ammianiis  is  not  Gassan,  but  Assaii. 

"  Zosimus,  iii.  15;  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  2. 

72  Zo.sim.  iii.  16. 

"So  Ammianus  (1.  s.  c).  Zosimus 
(iii.  17)  gives  the  name  as  Beersabora 
(Bripa-a^utpa).  Libanius  says  it  was 
named  after  the  reigning  monarch  (toO 
TOTt"  ^aa'tA€vol'T05  inuivvixo';.  Orat.  E\t>' 
nebr.  p.  315,  .\). 

'<  Zosim.  iii.  18:  irdAeo)?  fif-ydArjs  KaX 
tm  kv  'Aaavpia  fxera  KTrjtrii^ioi'Ta  fieyicTTr)?. 

"  Ammianus  speaks  of  this  method  of 
construction  as  especially  strong  ("  quo 
SDdiflcii  genere  nihil  esse  tutius  con- 
stat ").  But  the  speedy  fall  of  the  cor- 
ner tower  sho\ild  have  taught  him  bet- 
ter. Bitumen,  though  useful  in  keep- 
ing out  damp,  is  not  really  a  good  ce- 
ment. 

'•"Evasit  .  .  .  verecundo  rubore  suf- 
fusus."    (Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.) 

"  So  Ammianus.  Zosimus  speaks  of 
the  terrible  engine  having  been  brought 
into  operation  (iii.  18,  pp.  149-150). 

'"  Zosimus,  iii.  19;   Amm.  Marc.  xxiv. 


"  The  distance  across  is  not  more 
than  about  15  miles  a  little  below  Baby- 
lon; in  the  latitude  of  C'tesiphou  it  is 
about  20  miles. 

•">  Anmi.  IMarc.  xxiv.  4. 

<*!  Zosim.  iii.  20:  p.  153. 

*^  Ibid.  p.  1.54:  Ot  ev  tuI  (fipovpiio  jroAojp- 
KOVfX€vrn   .   .    .   a(T(^dATcu    /3uJAous    7reTrupa>)x€- 

"l^iban.  Orat.  Funebr.  p.  317.  D; 
Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  4;  Zosim.  iii.  21;  p. 
1.55. 

^*  The  Mattiarii,  the  Laccinarii,  and 
the  Victores.     (Zosim.  iii.  22;  p.  156.) 

•*'  Liban.  p.  317,  B;  Zosim.  1.  s.  c. 

8«  The  Sophist  of  Antioch  endeavors 
to  defend  his  hero  from  the  charge  of 
cruelty  by  taxing  the  soldiers  with  dis- 
obedience to  their  generals  orders  (Or. 
Funebr.  p.  318.  C);  but  the  narratives  of 
Ammianus  and  Zosimus  contradict  him. 

8'  "Sine  sexus  discrimlne  vel  aetatis, 
quidquid  inqaelus  reperit,  potestas  ira- 
toruni  absumpsit"  (Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.) 
Tou?  €U  x^pt^tf  dv^jpovy,  ouxe  yvi'aiKoiP  ouTC 
TTaiSMv  di'exo/Ltei'ot  (Zosim.  iii.  22;  p.  1.57 1. 

S8  Nabdates  was  accused  of  having  de- 
fended Maogainalcha  to  the  last,  after 
having  promised  to  surrender  it.  He 
had  also  called  Hormisdas  a  traitor. 
I<'or  these  crimes  (?)  he  was  burned  alive! 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  5.) 

"» Ibid.  xxiv.  4,  sub  fin. 

^"The  similar  measures  adopted  by 
Marshal  Bugeaud  against  the  Arabs  of 
Algeria  some  thirty  years  ago  were  gen- 
ei-allv  reprobated. 

»' Ammianus  speaks  of  "pictures" 
("diversorium  opacum  et  amoeniim, 
gentiles  picturus  per  onmes  aedium 
partes  ostendens."  xxiv.  5).  But  the 
wall  decoration  of  the  Sfvssanians  was 
ordinarily  effected  by  bas-reliefs. 

'''  "  Ursos  (ut  sunt  Persici)  ultra  om- 
nem  rabiem  ssevientes."  (Amm.  Marc, 
xxiv. '5,  sub  init.) 

83  Zosim.  xxiii.  24;  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

'<  .\mm.  ]\larc.  xxiv.  4,  ad  fin. 

»'  So  Ammianus  (xxiv.  5).  Zosimus 
calls  the  suburb  Zochase  (iii.  2:3).  Origi- 
nally Coch*""  and  Seleucia  had  been  dis- 
tinct towns  (Arriaii,  Fr.  8);  but  it,  would 
seem  that  they  had,  by  this  time,  grow  ii 
into  one. 

»«  Libanius  gives  the  best  account  of 
Julian's  difficulty  with  respect  to  his 
fleet  and  his  mode  of  meeting  it.  (Orat. 
Funebr.  p.  319,  D,  and  p.  320.  A,  B.)  Gib- 
bon has,  I  think,  rightly  apprehended 
his  meaning. 

•'  Gibbon'supposes  Trajan  to  be  meant 
(Decline  and  Fall.  vol.  iii.  p.  202';  and 
so  Zosimusdii.  21l.  Ammianus  iiienlions 
both  Tr.ajan  and  Sevenis  (xxiv.  6.  ad 
init.}\  but  it  seems  clear  from  Dio  that 
the  former  monarch  at  any  rite  con- 
veyed his  ships  from  the  Euphrates  to 
the  Tigris,  by  means  of  rollers,  across 
the  land.     (Dio  t'a.ss.  xvjii.  28.) 

"''The  "  catarractaj"  of  .\mminnus 
(■'  avnlsis  catnrractisiindarnm  mugnilii- 
diue  classis  tecura  .  .  .  in  alveum  electa 


662 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAIWUT. 


[CH.  X. 


est  Tigridis"  1.  s.  c),  are  clearly  sluices, 
which  can  only  have  had  this  object. 

99  The  troops  under  Rodosaces  and 
the  Surena  (see  text,  p.  351)  had  been  a 
mere  detachment,  consisting  entirely  of 
horse,  and  had  been  intended  merely  to 
harass  the  Romans,  not  to  engage  them. 

l""  ZosimUS,  iii.  25:  Trji/  ai/rtTrcpa;  ox^Tif 
flfojpovvTes  v\fir)\oTepav,  Kal  afj.a  dpiyxov 
r  I  v  a  (Tvp.TTapaTei.votJ.fvoi',  ti?  €pu- 
fia  p-kv  irapa&eiaov  ^a<ri\iKoO  rrjr  apxh^ 
tuKoSopLrnxevov. 

loi-'Turmae  sic  confertae,  ut  laminis 
coaptati  corporum  flexus  splendore 
prsestringerent  occursantes  obtutus." 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  6.) 

102  '•  Contecti  scutis  oblongis  et  curvls, 
quae  texta  vimine  et  coriis  crudis  ges- 
tantesdensius  se  commovebant."  (Ibid.) 

i»3  "  Gradientium  coUium  specie." 
(Ibid.  1.  s.  c)    Compare  Libanius,  p.  320, 

B:  Karelxov  r'n^' oxOv  ■  ■  ■  P-^yeO€<TLV  e\e- 
f^avTwc,  015  Icrov  epyov  Slo.  (TTaxvtov  i\6elv 
KOI  (fxiXayyo';- 

I"''  Ammianus  says  they  all  opposed 
him  ("  duces  concordi  precatu  fieri  pro- 
hibere  tentabant").  Libanius  speaks  of 
one  in  particular  as  remonstrating  (p. 
321,  A:  v</)'  (J  S'  rjv  TTji  SwdiJ-eia^  to  n\eov, 
arreAcye). 

los  Compare  Zosim.  iii.  25  with  Amm. 
Marc.  xxiv.  6. 

ic^  Ammianus  alone  (1.  s.  c.)  mentions 
this  fact,  which  he  compares  w^ith  the 
swimming  of  the  Rhone  by  Sertorius. 

1"'  Ammianus  makes  the  battle  begin 
with  the  dawn  and  last  all  the  day. 
Zosimus  says  it  lasted  from  midnight 
te  midday.  We  may  best  reconcile  the 
two  by  supposing  that  the  passage  of 
the  Tigris  and  the  landing  were  at  mid- 
night—that then  there  was  a  pause- 
that  the  battle  recommenced  at  dawn — 
that  at  midday  the  Persians  were  beaten 
and  took  to  flight — and  that  then  the 
pursuit  lasted  almost  to  nightfall. 

'"^  The  names  are  uncertain.  Instead 
of  Tigranes  and  Narseus,  Zosimus  has 
Pigraxes  and  Anareus.  Some  MSS.  of 
Ammianus  have  Pigranes. 

'09  Zosim.  ii.  25:  TJ;?  4>vyri^  r)yr)(Taixevi»v 
Toil'  (TTpar-qyCii'. 

110  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  6:  Rufus,  §  28; 
Libanius,  Or.  Funebr.  p.  322,  A. 

1 1 1  The  fleet  was  formed  in  three  divi- 
sions, and  only  one  had  crossed.  The 
rest  of  the  army  passed  the  river  on  the 
day  after  the  battle  and  the  day  follow- 
ing (Zosim.  iii.  26). 

'I''  These  are  the  numbers  of  Zosimus 
fiii.  25,  mib  fin.).  Ammianus  agrees  as  to 
the  Persians,  but  makes  the  Roman  loss 
only  seventy  (1.  s.  c).  Libanius  raises 
the  loss  on  the  Persian  side  to  6,CKX) 
(Orat.  Funebr.  p.  322,  A). 

113  Zosim.  1.  s.  c. 

1"  Eunapius,  p.  68,  ed.  Niebuhr. 

iisSeetext,  p.  348. 

ii»  Ammianus  speaks  of  Ctesiphon  as 
'■' gifu  ip.vo  int^.xpugnabilis"  (xxiv.  7.  tid 
init.):  hut  it  occujiied  a  piece  of  alluvial 
plain,  and  had  been  taken  three  times 


by  the  Romans.  Gibbon  says:  "It  ia 
not  easy  for  us  to  conceive  by  what  arts 
of  fortification  a  city  thrice  besieged 
and  taken  by  the  predecessors  of  Julian 
could  be  rendered  impregnable  against 
an  army  of  60,000  Romans"  (Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  205).  I  should  doubt 
if  any  special  pains  had  been  taken  by 
the  Persians  to  strengthen  the  de- 
fences. 

i"  That  it  was  the  fear  of  attack  from 
Sapor's  army  which  caused  the  retreat 
of  Julian  is  confessed  by  Ammianus. 
("Itum  est  in  sententian  quorundam, 
facinus  audax  et  importunum  noscen- 
tium  id  agredi,  quod  et  civitas  situ  ipso 
inexpugnabilis  defendebatur,  et  cnm  me- 
tuenda  multitudine  protinus  rex  affore 
credebatur,"  1.  s.  c.) 

lis  It  was  already  the  month  of  June 
(Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  1.  p.  456). 

1 1 9  Libanius  confesses  the  want  of 
provisions  (Orat.  Funebr.  p.  320,  C). 
Ammianus  does  not  distinctly  mention 
it;  but  his  narrative  shows  that,  from 
the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Tigris, 
Julian's  army  depended  mainly  on  the 
food  which  it  took  from  the  enemy. 
(Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  7.) 

120  Twenty-two,  according  to  Zosimus 
(iii.  26);  but  Ammianus  twice  gives  the 
number  as  twelve. 

121  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  7. 
i"Ibid.  xxiv.  8. 

123  Gibbon  overstates  the  case  when 
he  says  "  The  Tigris  overflows  in  March. 
the  Euphrates  in  July"  (Decline  and 
Fall,  vol  iii.  p.  208,  note  84).  The  Tigris 
flood  does  indeed  begin  in  March,  but  it 
is  greatest  in  May ;  and  the  river  only 
returns  to  its  natural  level  about  the 
middle  of  June.  The  Euphrates  is  in 
full  flood  from  the  middle  of  June  to  the 
middle  of  Julj',  but  begins  to  swell  be- 
fore the  end  of  March.  (See  the 
Author's  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  i.  p. 
12.) 

124  This  is  allowing  Cordyene  to  have 
extended  southwards  as  far  as  the 
point  where  the  Greater  Zab  issues 
from  the  mountains. 

'26  Libanius,  0)-at.  Funebr.  p.  301,  A, 
B;  p.  322,  D;  Socrates,  Hist.  Eccles.  iii. 
21. 

129  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  toI.  iii. 
p.  206. 

12'  Ibid. 

i28Tabari  says  it  was  gathered  from 
all  parts  of  Irak,  Persia,  and  Khorassan 
(Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  97).  Gibbon  tells 
us  that  "  the  satraps,  as  far  as  the  con- 
fines of  India  and  Scythia,  had  been 
ordered  to  assemble  their  troops"  (vol. 
iii.  p.  205). 

129  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  8.  Some  writers, 
as  Tillemont  (Hist,  des  Empereurs.  torn, 
iv.  p  543)  and  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  iii.  p.  206).  interpose  at  this  point  an 
expedition  on  the  part  of  Julian  into  the 
interior  prnxinces  of  Persia,  «  itli  the  ob- 
jt^ct  of  iiK'Pting  Sapor  and  fon-ing  him 
to  an  engagement,  which  they  cousid6>r 


CH.  X.] 


THE  SEVENTH  2I0NAHC1I7. 


663 


to  have  been  frustrated  by  the  treach- 
ery of  his  guides.  No  doubt  there  are 
in  Libanius,  Gregory  of  Nazianzen,  and 
Sozomen,  statements  on  which  such  a 
view  may  be  based— and  we  cannot  but 
suppose  some  foundation  for  the  story 
of  the  treacherous  guides— but  tlie  plain 
narratives  of  Amniianus  and  Zosinius, 
and  considerations  of  time,  preclude  tlie 
possibility  of  anything  important  hav- 
ing been  undertaken  between  the  battle 
of  the  Tigris  and  tlie  commencement  of 
the  retreat.  Some  raids  into  the  rich 
country  on  either  side  of  the  Diyaleh, 
with  the  object  of  obtaining  provisions, 
seem  to  have  been  all  that  Julian  really 
attempted  in  this  short  interval. 

'30  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

"3"  Ibid.  XXV.  1. 

'^^Zosimus,  iii.  26-7;  Amm.  Marc. 
1.  s  c  :  Greg.  Naz.  p.  154,  B. 

'33  Tlie  distance  from  Ctesiphon  to 
Samarah,  a  little  south  of  wliieli  Julian 
died,  is,  by  the  shortest  route  upon  the 
eastern  side  of  the  Tigris,  about  100 
miles.  The  route  followed  was  proba- 
bly somewhat  longer;  and  the  march 
appears  to  have  occupied  exactly  ten 
days. 

'^'i  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  1. 

"5  Ibid.  Some  suppose  Meranes  not  to 
be  a  name,  but  (like  Surena)  a  title.  See 
Dr.  W.  Smith's  note  in  his  edition  of 
Gibbon's  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p. 
210,  and  compare  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers. 
i.  13;  p.  62. 

'3«  ■'  Cum  ad  tractimi  Maranga  nomi- 
natum  omnis  veiiisset  exercitus." 
(Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.)  Zosimus  changes 
the  "tract  called  Maranga"  into  a 
"  village  called  Maronsa"  (iii.  28). 

137  •'  Triduo  iiulutiis  de.stinato,  dura 
suo  quisque  vulneri  medetur  vel  proxi- 
mi."    (Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  2,  ad  init.) 

'3«  Ibid. 

'"  Amm.  Marc.  xxiv.  6,  ad  fin.  On 
accouTit  of  unpropitious  omens  .Julian 
had  sworn  that  he  would  never  sacrifice 
to  Mars  again. 

'^''"Exorto  jam  die."  (Ibid.  xxv.  2, 
ad  fin.) 

'♦'  Ammianus  calls  them  "lofty  hills" 
("celsos  colles");  but  there  are  none 
such  in  the  vicinity  of  Samarah. 

'<2  .\mmianns  is  confused  on  this 
point,  iti  one  place  making  it  the  right, 
m  anotlier  the  left  wing  that  suffered 
(xxv.  3:  "sinistro  corrui  inclinato  .  .  . 
exercitus  eornu  dextero  defatigato").  I 
conceive  that  the  entire  attack  was 
made  from  a  line  of  low  hills,  perhaps 
the  embankment  of  an  old  canal,  on  Ju- 
lian's right,  and  that  it  was  therefore  on 
this  side  that  his  army  suffered  its  main 
losses. 

'■^  Libanius.  Ornt.  Fnnehr.  pp.  303-4: 
Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  3.  It  is  curious  what 
differfwit  accntmts  are  given  of  .Tuli.iu's 
wound.  Zosjniiis  says.  TrATJTTeTai  fi<#>ei 
(iii.  20);  .Ani-elius  Victor.  "  rimto  percu- 
titur"  {Epit.  ■13>.    Libanius  in  one  place 


declares  that  the  blow  was  not  dealt  by 
one  of  the  enemy,  but  by  a  Christian  of 
.Julian's  army  (Orat.  Funebr.  p.  324). 
But  this  is  a  manifest  calumny. 

'<<Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c:  "Hastas  ad 
scuta  concrejians,  miles  ad  vindictaui 
.  .  .  involabat." 

'"Zosim.  iii.  29-30;  Amm.  Marc.  xxv. 
3. 

'■"Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

'■"  Me;^pi  cuKTOs  M'O'lS  apKicraj  aniSavtv. 
(Zos.  iii.  20.) 

1^**  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  5. 

'■"'  Ibid.  I.  s.  c.  Zosimus  gives  no  de- 
tails, but  simply  says  that  the  council 
by  common  consent  elected  Jovian  (iii. 
30). 

"o Jovian  was  "first  of  the  domes- 
tics," or  Comptroller  of  the  Royal 
Household.  His  military  rank  was  per- 
haps that   of   tribune.      (See  Zonaras, 

xiii.  p.  2'J:  'lo^tafb?  et?  TTji-  avTapxiau  npo- 
KEKpiTai,  Tore    ^i,  \  i,  apxCi  v  ■  ) 

'^'"Inertem  et  moilem."  (Amm. 
Marc.  1.  s.  c.  stib  fin.) 

'^•■J  Ibid. 

"3  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  6,  ad  init. 

'^•i  The  "  Jovians"  and  "Herculians" 
had  been  instituted  by  Diocletian,  and 
received  their  names  from  tlie  titles 
".Jovius"'  and  "  Herculins"  assumed  by 
that  emperor  and  his  son-in-law,  Gale- 
rius. 

'^5  Zosimus  (iii.  30)  is  here  fuller  and 
more  exact  than  Ammianus.  His  nar- 
rative has  all  the  appearance  of  truth. 

'^^  Mera  Ppvxri9fxov.     (Zosim.  1.  s.  c. ) 

i^' Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  6:  "  Prope  con- 
finia  noctis,  cum  ad  castellum  StDinre 
nomine  citis  passibus  tenderemus." 
Zosimus  seems  to  intend  the  sanje  place 
by  his  iioC/iia  to  <j)povpiov,  which,  however, 
he  makes  the  Romans  pass  early  in  the 
day. 

'"'8  Samarah  became  a  flourishing  and 
important  city  luider  the  Caliphs  of  the 
Abasside  dynasty.  The  8th  Caliph  of 
this  line,  Al-Motassem-Billah,  made  ic 
his  capital.  It  is  now  once  more  re- 
duced to  insignificance. 

'*"  Zosimus,  iii.  30:  'H/uepas  Tfcro-epa? 
irpoeKBovTei;. 

""  .A.S  Dura  (Diir^  is  but  eighteen  miles 
above  Samarah,  the  average  progress 
per  day  must  have  been  under  five 
miles.  Ammianus  gives  the  last  day's 
march  as  thirty  stades,  or  little  more 
than  three  miles  (.\xv.  0). 

""  Amm.  IMarc.  1.  s.  c. 

'"2  Julian  had  subsidized  them  for  a 
time,  but.  finding  that  his  supply  of  cash 
was  becoming  exhausted,  stopped  tho 
customary  jiayment.  The  Saracens 
complained,  whereupon  he  replied  that 
he  had  no  more  golil,  but  plenty  of  steel, 
at  their  service. 

i«3  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  iden- 
tity fif  Dura   lAofipa)   with    the   modern 
Dm-,  a  sm.ill  place  r)n  the  Tigris  bet  wei-n 
Tekrit  and  Sumarah.     (Rich.  Kurdistun 
vol.  ii.  ch.  xviii.;   Layard,  Nineveh  loid 


664 


THE  SEVENTH  MONABCHT. 


[CH.  X. 


Babylon,  p.  469.)  It  was  a  town  of  some 
importance  in  the  wars  of  the  succes- 
sors of  Alexander  (Polyb.  v.  48  and  52). 

i9<Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  6:  "Fama  cir- 
cumlata,  fines  haud  procul  limitum  esse 
nostrorum." 

'«^  Ibid.  Rafts  of  this  description  had 
been  used  on  the  Mesopotamian  rivers 
from  very  early  times.  They  are  repre- 
sented frequently  in  the  Assyrian  sculp- 
tures. (See  'La.yB.rd.Mommients  of  Nin- 
eveh. Second  Series,  pi.  13;  Nineveh  and 
Babylon,  p.  231,  &c.) 

i«'The  distance  from  Dur  to  Sinjar 
(Singara),  the  nearest  Roman  post,  is,  as 
the  crow  flies,  about  175  miles.  Slight 
deflections  from  the  straight  line,  ne- 
cessitated by  the  position  of  tlie  wells 
upon  the  route,  would  raise  the  distance 
to  200  miles. 

18'  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8,  ad  init. 

168  This  is  not  stated  by  the  authori- 
ties; but,  after  the  peace  was  made,  we 
hear  of  a  bridge  which  the  Persians 
were  accused  of  constructing  in  order 
to  pursue  Jovian  and  break  the  terms  of 
the  treaty.  (See  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.) 
As  Sapor,  if  wicked  enough,  can  scarce- 
Ij'  have  been  foolish  enough,  to  con- 
template breaking  the  very  advantage- 
ous treaty  which  he  had  just  concluded, 
I  suspect  that  the  bridge  was  begun 
while  the  negotiations  were  in  progress, 
to  be  used  if  they  failed. 

i«3 1  have  given  the  considerations 
which,  it  seems  to  me,  must  have  weigh- 
ed with  Sapor.  Ammianus  represents 
him  as  impelled  to  desire  peace :  1,  by 
the  losses  that  he  had  sustained;  2,  by 
fear  of  what  the  Roman  army  might  do 
if  driven  to  desperation;  and  3,  by  a 
general  dread  of  the  Roman  power  and 
a  special  fear  of  the  army  of  Mesopota- 
mia under  Procopius.  He  admits,  how- 
ever, that  the  successful  passage  of  the 
river  by  the  500  Gauls  and  Sarmatians 
was  the  circumstance  which  principally 
moved  him:  "  Super  omnia  hebetarunt 
ejus  anxiammentem  .  .  .  quingenti  viri 
transgressi  tumidum  flumen  incolumes," 
&c.    (Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7.) 

I'oibid.  1.  s.  c;  Zosim.  iii.  31. 

I'l '■  Humanorum  respectu  reliquias 
exercitus  redire  sinere  clementissimum 
regem,  qute  jubet  si  impleverit  cum  pri- 
matibus  Caesar."    (Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c.) 

>'2  Ibid.  1.  s.  c. 

"3  The  only  concessions  made  were 
the  permission  of  withdrawal  given  to 
all  the  inhabitants  of  Nisibis  and  Sin- 
gara, and  the  allowance  of  a  similar 
right  to  Roman  citizens  located  in  any 
part  of  the  ceded  territories. 

i'<  See  text.  pp.  308,  309. 

""This  is  not  distinctly  stated  as  a 
condition,  but  appears  from  what  is  re- 
lated of  the  actual  evacuation  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxv.  9). 

■'*  Orosius  sees  this,  and  therefore 
says:  "  Nisibin  oppidum,  et  partem  su- 
perioris  Mesopotamios,  Persis  concessit" 
<'Vii.  31), 


1"  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7,  ad  fin.;  Zo- 
sim.  iii.  31. 

"8  "Cum  pugnari  deciesexpediret.  ne 
horum  quidquam  dederetur."  (Amm. 
Marc.  xxv.  7.) 

'■"This  point  is  well  argued  by  Tille- 
mont  {Hist,  des  Empereurs.  torn.  iv.  p. 
583).  It  is  slurred  over  by  Gibbon,  who 
blames  Jovian,  but  leaves  it  doubtful 
what  he  would  have  had  him  do  [De- 
cline and  Fall.  vol.  iii.  p.  219). 

180  Gibbon  admits  as  much  in  a  note 
(note  1 10),  but  in  his  text  reproduces  the 
absurdity  of  Ammianus. 

isiEutrop.  Breviar.  x.  17,  §  9:  "Pa- 
cem  fecit  necessariam  quidem,  sed  ig- 
nobilem."  Compare  Orosius,  vii.  ;5l: 
"  Foedus,  etsi  parum  putaret  digiium, 
satis  tamen  necessarium.  pepigit." 

182  Ammianus  graphically-  describes 
the  passage  (xxv.  8).  Its  difficulties 
showed  tliat,  had  the  Persians  been  hos- 
tile, it  would  have  been  impossible. 

183  Ammianus  says  "a  Saracenis  vel 
Pejsis  csedebantur;"  but  it  is  not  clear 
that  there  were  really  any  Persians  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river. 

184  Zosim.  iii.  33;  Amm.  Marc.  1.  s.  c. 

185  Gibbon  denies  this  (p.  221,  note  116) ; 
but  it  seems  to  me  that  the  statements 
of  Ruflnus  (ii.  1 ;  p.  177)  and  Theodont 
(iv.  2;  p.  661,  B)  have  some  weight. 

186  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.  The  impor- 
tant words  "  Persicum  castellum"  have 
not  generally  been  noticed.  A  reader 
of  Gibbon  would  suppose  "the  castle 
of  Ur"  to  be  a  Roman  post. 

18' The  MSS.  vary  between  "ad  Ur 
nomine  Persicum  venere  castellum' '  and 
"  Adur  nomine  Persicum  v.  cast."  Am- 
mianus commonly  omits  "ad"  after 
"  venio." 

'88  Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  9;  Zosim.  iii.  33, 
sub  fin. 

189  The  reproach  addressed  by  the 
Parthian  chief  to  Crassus,  "You  Ro- 
mans are  not  very  apt  to  remember 
your  engagements"  (Plut.  Crass.  §  311. 
was  well  deserved,  and  is  echoed  by  the 
general  voice  of  history.  It  is  sadden- 
ing to  find  a  modern  writer  and  an  Eng- 
lishman approving  the  ordinary  Ro- 
man practice,  and  suggesting  that  Jo- 
vian ought  to  have  "  redeemed  his  pu- 
sillanimous behavior  by  a  splendid  act 
of  patriotic  perfidy"  (Gibbon,  Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  p.  223). 

i9»See  text,  p.  311. 

I'lZosimus  maintains  (iii.  32)  that 
Rome  never  gave  up  Nisibis  from  the 
time  of  its  capture  by  Lucullus  (B.C.  68). 
And  it  may  be  true  that  she  never  re- 
linquished'it  by  treaty.  But  Nisibis  and 
Mesopotamia  generally  were  Parthian 
until  the  great  expedition  of  Avidius 
Cassius  (A.D.  165). 

192  •'  Constabat  orbem  Eoum  in  ditio- 
nem  potuisse  transire  Persidis,  nisi  hwc 
civitas  habili  situ  et  moenium  magnitu- 
dine  restiti.sset."    (Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  8.) 

198  Zosim.  iii.  34,  sub  init.;  Johann 
Ant.  Fr.  181, 


CH.  XII.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHT. 


6fi5 


■84  Chosroes  Anusliirwan,  who  reigned 
from  A.D.  531  to  a.d.  579. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

'  See  text,  p.  348. 

2  Zosim.  iv.  4. 

3  Ainm.  Marc.  xxiv.  7,  ad  fin. 

*  Mos.  Chor.  Hifit.  Arinen.  iii.  15; 
Amm.  Marc.  xxv.  7. 

6  This  was  part  of  Julian's  original 
plan.  (See  Amm.  Marc.  Mciii.  3.)  That 
iD  was  executed  appears  from  the  same 
writer  (xxv.  7). 

'  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  15. 

'  Liban.  Orat.  Funebr.  p.  301,  D.  The 
passage  is  obscure,  but  appears  to  refer 
to  the  troops  under  Procopius  aud  Se- 
bastian. 

8  Mos.  Chor.  I.  s.  c. 

9  Ibid. 

'» Mos.  Chor.  iii.  17.  Moses  makes 
the  letter  to  be  addressed  to  Tiranus; 
but  he  ceased  to  reign  a.d.  341. 

■'Some  think  that  this  is  the  true 
account  of  the  matter— that  Arsaces 
ordered  his  general  to  withdraw  the 
troops,  but,  that  he  might  not  lie  com- 
promised, made  him  pretend  to  act  on 
his  own  authority. 

12  Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12.  The  seizure 
is  also  recorded  by  the  Armenian  histo- 
rians, Faustus  (iv.  54)  and  Moses  (iii. 
34);  and  also  by  Procopius  (Bell.  Pers. 
i.  5). 

i3-'Vinctum  catenis  argenteis,  quod 
apud  eos  liouoratis  vanura  supplieiorum 
sestimatur  esse  solatium."  (Amm. 
Marc.  1.  s.  c.)  Moses,  however,  gives 
him  fetters  of  iron  (iii.  35). 

'4  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  35;  Faustus,  iv.  51; 
Procop.  B.  P.  i.  5,  p.  29. 

'^Mos.  Chor.  I.s.  c. ;  Amm.  Marc, 
xxvii.  12;  Faustus,  iv.  55. 

i«  Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12. 

1'  Faustus,  iv.  55. 

18  "Per  Terentium  ducem  Para  re- 
ducitm-  in  Armeniam."  (Amm.  Marc. 
1.  s.  c.    Compare  Faustus,  v.  1.) 

i»  Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12;  Faustus,  iv. 
55:  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  35. 

"See  text,  p.  318. 

21  Valentinian  and  Valens.  Jovian  had 
died  in  a.d.  364,  after  a  reign  of  little 
more  than  eight  months.  Valentinian 
had  been  elected  his  successor,  and  had 
associated  his  brother  Valens  in  the 
empire.  To  Valens  had  been  assigned 
the  government  of  the  eastern  prov- 
inces. 

22  Amm.  Marc,  xxvii.  12:  "  Sauro- 
maces,  pulsus  .  .  .  Hiberise  regno,  cum 
duodecim  legionibusetTerentio  remitti- 
tur." 

23  "  His  percitus  Sapor,  pati  se  indigna 
damans,"  &c.    (Ibid.  1.  s.  c.) 

2*  Sapor  seems  to  have  considered 
that,  in  a  certain  sense.  Iberia  was  in- 
cluded in  Armenia.  When  Home  re- 
placed Sauroinaees  upon  the  Iberi.in 
throne,  he  complained  that  "  the  Ariue- 
nias  were  assisted  against  the  text  of 


the  treaty."  (Ibid.  I.s.  c.)  Rome,  no 
doubt,  contested  this  interpretation. 

2'  Amm.  Marc.  xxii.  12,  <id  Jin, 

2«Ibid.  xxix.  1. 

"  Ibid. 

2*  See  Amm.  Marc.  xxx.  2:  "  Sapor 
vero,  post  suorum  pristinam  cladem. 

29  "  Tentatis  ali(]U()ties  levibus  prseliis, 
varioque  fiuitis  eveutu."  (Ibid.  xxix. 
1.) 

3°  Ibid.    Compare  Zoslm.  iv.  13. 

'■Into  this  interval  fell  the  death  of 
Para,  whom  the  Persians  entrapped  and 
murdered  (Amm.  Marc.  xxx.  1 ;  Faustus, 
v.  32). 

32  Amm.  Marc.  xxx.  2. 

33  Zosim.  iv.  21,  sub  init.  Compare 
Amm.  Marc.  xxxi.  7. 

34  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  40;  Faustus,  v.  34. 

3^  Clinton  places  his  death  in  a.d.  379 
(F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  356);  but  Patkanian 
(Journal  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  234)  and 
Thomas  (Num.  Cliron.  for  1872,  p.  45) 
prefer  the  date  a.d.  380. 

^^  Zeitschriftd.  deutsches  morgenUlnd. 
Gesellschaft,  vol.  viii.  pp.  46-7. 

3'  M.  Longp6rier  agrees  with  Mordt- 
mann  on  this  point.  (See  his  Medailles 
des  Sassanides.  p.  42.) 

38  They  are  commonly  either  "Mazd- 
isn  bag  Shapuhrt  malkan  malka,"  or 
"Mazdisji  bag  Shapuhri  tiiulkan  malka 
Airan  ve  A7iiran. 

3"  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  47.  Toham  is  the  Saasanian  equi- 
valent of  the  Zend  taklviia,  "strong," 
which  is  found  also  iu  Achsemenian 
Persian. 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

1  See  the  passage  of  Syncellus  at  the 
head  of  the  chapter.  Agathias  agrees 
(iv.  26),  as  do  Tabari  (Chronique.  vol.  ii. 
pp.  102-3),  Magoudi  (Prairies  d'Or,  vol. 
11.  pp.  189-1'JO)  and  the  Modjmel-aire- 
ivarikh.  (See  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1811.  p.  513.) 

2  Faustus  does  not  mention  any  Per- 
sian king  by  name  after  Sapor  II.  The 
Roman  writers  do  not  seem  even  to 
know  the  name  of  the  prince  who  sent 
the  embassy  of  a.d.  :W4.  See  Oros.  vii. 
34;  Pacat.  Paneg.  xxii.  §  4;  Socrat.  H.  E. 
v.  12;  &c.) 

3  All  the  authorities  assign  four  years 
to  Artaxerxes  II.,  except  the  Modjmel- 
al  Teu-arikh,  which  gives  "  four  or  five, 
or  twelve"  (Juurn.  Asiat.  for  1841.  p.  513). 
Some  of  the  .Vnnenian  writers  give  Sa- 
por III.  no  more  than  two  years  (Patka- 
nian in  the  Joitru.  Asiat.  for  l.%ti,  p.  157). 

*  Artaxerxes  is  made  to  be  Sapor's 
brother  by  Agathias  (iv.  26>.  .Mirkhond 
(Hist,  des  Sii.vsdiiides.  p.  318).  Tabari 
(Chronique.  ii.  p.  102).  Ma<;oudi  (Prai- 
ries d'Or,  ii.  p.  180).  and  the  Modjmclal 
Tewarikh  (p.  513i.  The  Armenian  writers 
alone  make  him  .Sapor's  son  (See  Mos. 
Chor.  iii.  51.  and  eonip.ire  Patkanian  in 
Jonrn.  As  for  1806.  p.  l.V).)  The  histoi-y 
«f  the  mode  in  which  Sapor  II.  becam* 


666 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  xn. 


king  (see  text,  p.  316),  and  the  g^reat 
leiiffth  of  his  reign,  make  it  very  im- 
probable that  he  was  succeeded  by  a 
brother.  Add  to  this  that  the  coins  of 
Artaxerxes  II.  bear  the  head  of  a  young- 
ish man. 

*  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  1.  s.  c. 

•  Ibid. 

'  Mirkhond,  Hist,  des  Sassanides,  p. 
317,  note.  Malcolm  has,  by  mistake, 
transferred  these  qualities  to  his  suc- 
cessor (Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  112). 

"*  The  Armenian  synchronisms  are  ex- 
ceedingly doubtful;  but,  on  the  whole, 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  expidsion  of 
Varaztad  by  Manuel  must  have  hap- 
pened about  five  years  after  the  death 
of  Para.  If  that  event  occurred,  as  Am- 
mianus  (xxx.  1)  places  it,  in  a.d.  374,  the 
revolution  effected  by  Manuel  (Faustus, 
V.  37)  must  belong  to  the  year  a.d.  379, 
which  is  the  year  of  Artaxerxes'  acces- 
sion, probably. 

»  Faustus,  V.  34. 

I"  Ibid.  c.  35. 

11  Ibid.  c.  37. 

i»  Faustus,  c.  38. 

13  Ibid.  1.  s.  c. 

"  The  death  of  Para  (a.d.  374)  and  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  with  Rome  (ad. 
384)  are  two  fixed  dates  known  positive- 
ly from  the  Roman  writers.  Into  the 
ten  years  between  these  events  must 
faU  the  entire  reign  of  Varaztad  (four 
years  according  to  Moses  of  Choren6, 
iii.  40),  the  revolt  of  Manuel,  the  joint 
reign  of  Arsaces  and  Valarsaces  (one 
year,  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  41),  and  the  sole 
reign  of  Arsaces  from  his  brother's 
death  to  the  partition  of  Armenia  (five 
years,  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  46). 

1'  I.e.  between  a.d.  379  and  a.d.  383. 

"Faustus,  V.  38. 

1'  Ibid.  V.  39-43. 

1'  Ibid.  vi.  1.  Compare  Mos.  Chor.  iii. 
42. 

1^  Faustus,  v.  37.  The  "Koushans"  of 
this  passage  are  probably  Scyths  or  Ta- 
tars of  the  Oxianian  or  Transoxianiau 
country.  (See  M.  Vivien  St.  Martin's 
essay,  entitled  Les  Huns  Blancs  ou  Eph- 
thnlites.  pp.  48-52.) 

*"  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  346-350. 

21  Ibid.  pp.  3.52-5. 

22  See  the  Chronicles  of  Idatius  and 
Marcellinus,  and  compare  Cliron.  Pasch. 
p.  304.  D;  Socrat.  H.  E.  v.  12;  Oros.  vii. 
34:  and  Pacat.  Paneg.  xxii.  3-5. 

23  The  terms  of  the  treaty  are  given 
unusual  accord  by  Moses  (iii.  42)  and 
Faustus  (vi.  1).  The  latter  writer  is 
somewhat  the  fuller  and  more  exact  of 
the  two.  Procopius  (De  ^d.  Justinian. 
iii.  1)  has  quite  a  different  account  of 
the  matter;  but,  as  he  writes  a  century 
and  a  half  after  Faustus,  we  cannot  ac- 
cept hir.  nai-rative  against  tliat  of  the 
earlier  writer. 

2*  Orosiiis.  writing  in  a.d.  417,  says: 
"  Ictum  tunc  foedus  est,  quo  universus 
Oriens  usque  ad  nunc  tranquillissime 


fruitur."  (1.  s.  c.)  The  peace  lasted 
oiilv  three  vears  longer.  (See  Cliulou, 
F.  k.  vol.  i.p.  596.) 

"''Tabari,  Chroniqne,  ii.  p.  102;  Ma- 
goudi,  Pruiries  d'Oi ,  ii.  p.  189. 

2  6  See  text,  p.  378. 

27  Agath.  iv.  26,  ad  init;  Eutych.  vol. 
i.  p.  399:  "  Regnavit  post  ipsuiii  in  Per- 
sas  tilius  ipsius  Aidshir  Saporis  filius 
aiuios  quatuor;  dein  Diortuus  est." 

28Ma(;oudi.  vol.  ii.  p.  lf^9. 

2"  fllirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
p.  319. 

3"  De  Sacy  read  Varahran  for  Shah- 
puhi-i  in  the  third  line  of  the  right-hand 
inscription,  and  concluded  that  the 
right-hand  figure  was  that  of  Varahran 
IV.  (Memoire,  p.  263).  Many  writers 
have  copied  this  mistake.  (Malcolm, 
Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  2.58;  Clinton, 
F.  R.  vol.  ii.  p.  2(50,  note  12;  Patkanian 
in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  159, 
notel.) 

3'  See  Thomas  in  the  .Journal  of  the  R. 
Asiatic  Society,  New  Series,  vol.  iii.  p. 
343.  The  meaning  is — "This  is  the  im- 
age of  the  Ormazd-worshipping  kingly 
Sapor,  king  of  the  kings  of  Iran  and  Tu- 
i-ai),  heaven-descended  of  the  race  of  the 
gods,  son  of  the  Ormazd-worshipping 
kingly  Hormisdas,  king  of  the  kings  of 
Iran  and  Turan,  heaven-descended  of 
the  race  of  the  gods,  grandson  of  the 
kingly  Narses.  king  of  kings."  The  other 
inscription  is  identica'  except  in  the 
names,  and  the  omission  of  the  second 
word.  zant.  "  this." 

32  So  Thomas  in  the  number  of  the 
Journal  of  the  R.  Asiatic  Society,  quot- 
ed above  (p.  346).  Ker  Porter  ascribed 
the  erection  of  the  monument  to  Varah- 
ran IV.  {Travels,  vol.  ii.  p.  190).  But 
the  only  basis  of  this  is  the  local  tradi- 
tion, a  very  insecure  foundation. 

33  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  p.  51. 

3"  Ibid.  pp.  51-2. 

35  Longpfirier,  Medailles  des  Sassa- 
nides, pi.  7,  fig.  4. 

38  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p. 
52. 

37  Longp6rier,  pi.  7,  fig.  5;  Mordtmann, 
pp.  52-7. 

38  Blordtmann,  p.  53.  The  old  Persian 
name  for  Assjria  was  Athura,  whence 
probably  the  Aturia  ('Aroupia)  of  the 
Greeks  (Strab.  xvi.  1,  §  2;  Steph.  Byz.  ad 
voc.  Nu'05;  &c.). 

39  The  term  atur,  or  aturi,  is  found 
occasionally  in  combination  with  de- 
cided mint-marks,  denoting  places,  as 
Baba,  ''The  Porte,"  i.e.  Ctesiphon 
(Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  Nos.  108 
and  134);  Kir.  for  Kirman  (ibid.  No.  114): 
and  As,  whicla  is  probably  for  Aspadan 
or  Ispahan  (Nos.  101,  110,  and  144).  And 
these  places  are  not  in  Assyria. 

<"  Five  years,  according  to  Agathias 
(iv.  26)  and  Mirkhond  (p.  319);  four  years 
and  five  months,  according  to  Eutychius 
(vol.  i.  p.  472),  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  102J.  and 
Magoudi  (vol-  U.  p.  189), 


o'a.  xiTi/j 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


66? 


::  Mii-l<lionil  fp.  3201:  "Schapour  6tait 
un  roi  d'une  simplicity  extreme." 

*'^  So  Ma(;oudi  (1.  s.  c).  Tabari  assigns 
his  death  to  a  revolt  of  his  troops;  Mir- 
khond  to  accident,  or  to  a  conspiracy 
among:  his  chief  officers  (p.  319). 

<'  Varahran  is  made  the  son  of  Sapor 
III.  by  Agathias  (1.  s.  c),  the  sou  of  Sa- 

Eor  li.  and  brother  of  Sapor  111.  by  Ta- 
ari  and  Mirkhond  Eutychius  anil  Ma- 
goudi  leave  the  point  doubtful.  Patka- 
nian  (Journal  Asiatique  for  18UG,  p.  158), 
following  Armenian  authorities,  men- 
tions both  views,  but  inclines  to  believe 
him  Sapor  III.'s  bi-other. 

**  Agathias.  iv.  26;  p.  136,  C.  Compare 
Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  103;  Mirkhond,  p.  320; 
and  tlie  Modjmelal-Tewarikh  {.Journ. 
As.  1841.  p.  513).  Varahran.  we  are  told, 
gave  his  name  of  Kerman-sliah  to  a  town 
which  he  built  in  Media,  and  which  still 
bears  the  appellation  (Malcolm,  Hist,  of 
Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  113;  Ker  Porter,  Trav- 
els, vol.  ii.  p.  190). 

*^  Thomas  in  Journal  of  R.  As.  Socie- 
ty, New  Series,  vol.  iii.  p.  3r)0. 

<*  This  seal  is  without  inscription,  but 
is  identified  by  the  headdress,  which  is 
the  same  as  that  upon  Varahran's  coins. 
[PI.  XIX.  Fig.  4.] 

«'  Thomas  in  R.  As.  Soc.  J.  p.. 353. 

■•8  Oros.  vii.  34.  Compare  Mos.  Cho- 
ren.  Hi.it.  Arm.  iii.  51:  "Pax  fuit  inter 
Veramum  (qui  Cermanusappellatus  est) 
et  Arcadium." 

<»  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  46. 

'"  Ibid. ;  and  compare  Procop.  De  JEd. 
Justinian,  iii.  1;  p.  53,  B:  To  \oltt'ov  6 
*PujjLLaiajM  ^acriAeu?  ap;^oi'Ta  rots  *Ap)LLti/tot9 
del  Ka^t'cTTrj,  ovTiva.  ttotc  Kai  onyji'iKa  av 
ouTtii  ^ouAofiei'w  etT^*  KO/xTyra  re  T^5  *Ap/xe- 
viai;   CKaKovu  Kal    €t5  e/ie  TOI'   dp^oi'Ta  TOV~ 

*'  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  49.  This  writer  calls 
the  Roman  emperor  of  the  time  Area- 
dius,  and  the  Persian  monarch  Sapor; 
but,  if  he  is  right  in  assigning  to  Chos- 
roes  a  reign  of  five  years  only  (iii.  50), 
they  must  have  been,  as  represented  in 
the  text,  Tlieodosius  the  Great  and 
Varahran  IV. 

'^  The  Armenian  patriarch,  Aspuraces 
(Asbourag),  liaving  died,  Chosroes  ap- 
pointed his  successor  without  consult- 
ing Varahran. 

°'  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  50. 

" Ibid. 

*'  If  the  "  five  years"  of  ChosroSs  are 
counted  from  the  division  of  Armenia, 
A.D.  384,  his  revolt  and  deposition  would 
fall  into  the  year  a.d.  389.  the  year  after 
the  accession  of  Varahran.  But  it  is 
more  probable  that  they  date  from  the 
commeiu-ement  of  his  sole  reign,  which 
was  two  years  later,  a.d.  :K6. 

"  Miikhond,  Hist,  des  Sassanides,  p. 
320. 

"  Afndjmel-al-Tewarikh.as  translated 
by  M.  Mohl  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1841,  p.  r)13. 

»•  Tabari,   toI.   ii.   p.   103;    Mirkhond, 


1.  s.  c. ;  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  113. 

CHAPTER  Xm. 

'  The  name  upon  liis  coins  is  read  as 
''P'l;^"^"'.  The  Greek  writers  call  him 
"  Isdigerdes,"  the  Armenian  "  Yazgerd." 
Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  .548;  vol.  ii.  p.  79) 
uses  the  form  "  Yasdejerd." 

^  Mordtmann  interpolates  after  Va- 
rahran IV.  a  monarch  whom  he  calls 
"Isdigerd  I.,"  to  whom  he  assigns  a 
reign  of  a  year  over  a  portion  of  Pei-sia 
iZeiischrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  63)  This  prince 
he  makes  succeeded  by  his  son,  Isdigerd 
II.,  who  is  the  "  Isdigerd  I."  of  all  other 
wiiters.  I  cannot  find  any  sufficient 
reason  for  this  interpolation.  (The  im- 
mismatic  evidence  does,  perhaps,  show 
that  an  Isdigerd,  distinct  from  the  three 
known  Persi.an  monarchs,  once  reigned 
in  Seistau;  but  there  is  nothing  to  fix 
the  time  of  this  reign.) 

3  That  Varahran  IV.  was  the  father  of 
Isdigerd  is  asserted  by  Eutj'chius  (vol.  i. 
p.  548).  Tabari  (ii.  p.  103).  Abu  Obeidah 
(qiioted  by  Magoudi.  vol.  ii.  p.  2.38),  S6- 
peos  (p.  20).  and  others.  Lazare  de 
Parbe  makes  him  the  brother  of  Isdi- 
gerd (p.  33).  Agathias  (iv.  26)  is  ambig- 
uous. Mirkhond  (p.  321)  and  Tabari 
(1.  s  c.)  mention  both  views. 

■"  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c  ;  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

">  Several  of  thesi>  are  given  by  Mir- 
khond (pp.  321-2).  If  authentic^  they 
would  be  remarkable  as  indicating  a 
consciousness  that  there  lay  in  his  dis- 
position the  germs  of  evil,  which  the 
possession  of  supreme  power  would  be 
likely  to  develop. 

'  Eip^i'jj  a<i>96i'<a  xpuifxevo';  Siayeyovei'  ^m 
'Pu)fiaioi5  TOf  TiavTo.  xP^^""  (Procop.   De 

Bell.  Revs.  i.  2).  Ou6eVa  n-wTrore  icoTa  'Pu>- 
tJ.aiu)v  fjpaTo  ttoAc/ioi'  .  .  .  aAAi  /xe/iftTjueK 
ecra€t  cii'ous  T€  Ciu  Ka'i  eipiji'aiov  (Agath.  iv. 

26:  p.  137.  B). 

'  See  Tillemont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  V.  pp.  104-6.  211-221;  Gibbon,  De- 
cline  and  Fall,  vol.  iii.  pp.  351^02;  vol. 
iv.  pp.  23-31. 

8  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  29,  57,  &c. ;  Tille- 
mont, tom.  V.  p.  193. 

»  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  140-6.  The  death 
of  Eutropius  occurred  in  the  same  year 
with  the  accession  of  Isdigerd  (Clinton, 
F.  R.  vol.  i.  pp.  M2-6).  It  probably  fell 
late  in  the  year. 

i»  Gibbon,  vol.  iv.  pp.  144-6. 

"Ibid.  p.  145. 

'^See  Mordtmann.  in  the  Zeitsrhnft, 
vol.  viii.  pp.  64-7.  The  title  "  Raniash- 
tras"  is  wholly  new  when  Isdigerd  takes 
it.  Mordtmann  regards  it  a.s  a  super- 
lative form,  equivalent  to  "  Quietissl- 
mus." 

»'  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2;  Agath. 
iv.  26;  p.  136,  CD;  Theophan.  Chrono- 
graph, p.  C!),  A,  B. 

'*  IIoAAa  «!■  Toi?  iiaflTJKOic  in(aK\)/t,  **«_o- 
Bociu)  TJji'  ^a<riA€iai'  cOti'ti  t«  xal  irpoioi^ 
Tratrji  <rvvSiajr<^aa9ai.      (PrOCOp.  I.  ».  Cj 


m 


TEE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  xiv. 


>»  Cedrenus  p.  334,  C. 

J'Theophan.  p.  69,  B. 

1'  Theophan.  p.  69,  B.  Compare  Ce- 
drenus, p.  335, A. 

"8  The  phrasejused  by  Theophanes  and 
Cedrenus  [eKiroSoiv  -yeyofev)  is  ambiguous. 
(See  Theophan.  p.  70,  D;  Cedrenus,  p. 
336.  C.) 

"  Agath.  1.  S.  C:  OvSdva  TriairoTC  TOts 
'P<ofi.aiot?  ^paTO  TToAejU-Oi^,  ov6e  aAAo  Tt 
K  ar'    avTwi'    a;^apt    efipacre. 

2"  Procopius  wrote  about  a.d.  553; 
Agathias  after  a.d.  578;  Theophanes 
after  A.D.  812. 

2'  Tilleniont,  Hist,  des  Empereurs, 
torn.  vi.  p.  1,  and  note;  Gibbon,  Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  iv.  p.  159;  Smith's  Diet. 
of  Gk.  and  Rom.  Biogi-aphy,  vol.  ili.  p. 
1068,  &c. 

^2  They  consist  of  Philostorgius  (b.c. 
425),  Socrates  (ab.  a.d.  440),  Sozomen  (ab. 
A.D.  445),  Theodoret  (ab.  a.d.  450),  and 
Prosper  (ab.  a.d.  460);  all  of  whom  are 
ecclesiastical  writers,  rather  than  writ- 
ers of  civil  history.  Zosimus  is  so  brief  in 
his  notices  of  the  Eastern  Empire,  that 
his  silence  as  to  the  will  of  Arcadius 
cannot  be  regarded  as  of  much  conse- 
quence. 

23  Agathias  speaks  of  him  as  tos  n\e- 
laTo.  fjte/xa^ijKora,  /cat  Trao'ai',  ojs  etTreij', 
i  a  TO  p  i  av   6.va\€^dfxevov. 

24  Synes.  Ep.  110. 

26  The  Persian  to  whose  suite  Anti- 
ochus  had  belonged  is  called  Narses 
(Synes.  I.  s.  c.^  This  was  the  name  of 
the  favorite  minister  of  Isdigerd  (Taba- 
ri,  vol.  ii.  p.  104). 

26  Tillemont,  1.  s.  c. 

2'  Theophan.  p.  71,  A:  Eis  axpov  Beoae- 
^7)5  yeyocei',  olcrTf  e/meAAe  trx^^ov  p!a7rn<,'e(r- 
6ai..    Compare  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  8. 

2*  Theophan.  p.  69,  C;  Cedrenus,  p. 
334.  p. 

29  'ETr\aTvv6r)  iv  TlepcrCSi  6  xpKTTiavKTiJLOi . 
(Theoph.  1.  s.  c.) 

s"  Ibid.  p.  71,  A. 

'^  Ibid.:  Tou?  Mayou?  oj?  anaTCwva^  CKO- 

Xaiev.  Compare  Socrat.  Hist.  Eccl.  vii, 
8:  rifpiopyr)?  yeionei'o;  6  /SacrcAeus  to  tuiv 
Mayuyv  yevo?  ane&^KdToicre. 

s'-i  Tabari.  vol.  ii.  p.  104;  Magoudi,  vol. 
ii.  p.  190;  Mirkhond.  p.  321;  Malcolm, 
Hi!ft.  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  113. 

=3  Theophan.  p.  71,  B;  Theodoret,  v.  39. 

^^  Cyriil.  Monach.  in  the  Analecta 
Ovceca,  p.  20;  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. ;  Cedre- 
nus. p.  3.36,  C;  Theodoret,  v.  38. 

2^  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. 

3*  Ot  Mayot  Kara  TToAet?  /cat  ;^a>pa9  CTrijite- 
At05  iOrioevov  tous  \ai'8a.vovTa';.  (Theoph. 
1.  S.  C.)     BouAo/u.ei'Ot  oi  Mayot  navTai;  Sr/peC- 

aai  T0V5  Xpto-Ttavous.  (Cyriil.  Monach. 
l.s.  o.) 

3^  These  are  described,  with  much  de- 
tail, by  Theodoret  (H.  E.  v.  39);  but  the 
modern  reader  will  be  glad  to  be  spared 
all  particulars. 

3"  riAeio'Tot  (cai  iv  aurais  rats  Batrai'ots 
«i>'7)otOr)(ra>/.     (Theophan.  1.  s.  c.) 

'»  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  55,  ad  init. 

<"  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  55,  ad  init. 


*'  "  In  castello  Olivionis  libera  custo- 
dia  tenebatur." — Ibid.  1.  s.  c.  (VVhiston's 
translation). 

■*2  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56.  ad  init. 

43  Clinton  places  the  death  of  Isdigerd 
in  A.D.  420  (F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  596;  vol.  ii.  p. 
261);  Mordtmann  in  the  same  year  (Zeit- 
schrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  64);  Thomas  in  a.d. 
417  (Num.  Chron.  No.  xlvii.,  New  Series, 
p.  45). 

44  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56. 

45  Ibid.  iii.  58,  ad  fin. 

4«  Blordtmann  gives  as  mint-marks  of 
Isdigerd  I.  (his  Isdigerd  II.)  Assyria, 
Ctesiphon,  Ispahan,  and  Herat  {Zeit- 
schrift,  vol.  viii.  pp.  65-7). 

4'  See  Longpgrier,  Medailles  des  Sas- 
sanides.  pi.  vii.,  Nos.  2  and  3  (wrongly 
ascribed  to  Artaxerxes  II.) ;  Mordtmann, 
in  theZe«7sc7i)i/f  ,vol.  viii.  pi. vii.,  No.  17. 

48  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p. 
64,  No.  132;  vol.  xii.  p.  11,  No.  25. 

48  Ibid.  vol.  viii.  p.  67.  No  139. 

6"  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p. 
65. 

"  Ibid.  p.  67. 

52  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
pp.  321-2;  Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p. 
103. 

63  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  104. 

54  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2:   'lo-Styep- 

617s,  6  riepo'wt'  ^ao"tAeus  .  .  .  oiv  KaX  npvTe- 
pov  in\  TpoTTOv  iJLeya?<otfipo<TVV(]  6ta/36- 
7)T0S  ii  Tot  fiaAtiTTa,  tipeTTji'  en-eSet^aTO 
^avp-aTo?  Te  /cat  Adyof  d^iav. 

55  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  71,  A: 
'ItrStyepSi)?  .  .  .  ets  axpov  fleotTejSTjs  ye- 
yovefi.. 

56  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  1.  pp. 
114-5. 

5^  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  8;  Cedrenus,  p. 
336.  C;  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. ;  Cyriil.  Monach. 
Vit.  Eiithyni.  in  the  Analecta  Grceca, 
p.  20. 

58  Tabari,  vol,  ii.  p.  104;  Mirkhond,  p. 
328. 

59  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  114, 

<">  Tabari,  I.  s.  c. 

CHAPTEE  XIV. 

1  See  text,  p,  391. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56. 

3  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  105-112;  Magoudi, 
vol.  ii.  p.  191 ;  Mirkhond,  pp.  323-8;  Modj- 
melal-Teicarikh  (in  Journ.  Asiatique 
for  1841,  p.  515). 

4  Tabari,  p.  113. 

5  Mos,  Chor.  iii.  .55,  He  had  failed 
either  to  conciliate  or  overawe  the  great 
Armenian  chiefs. 

6  Ibid.  iii.  .56. 

">  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. ;  Mirkhond,  p.  329. 

8  In  this  part  of  the  history  fable  has 
replaced  fact.  According  to  Tabari  and 
others,  Varahran  made  no  use  of  his 
Arab  troops,  but  effected  his  purpose  by 
persuading  the  nobles  and  challeng- 
ing Chosroes  to  a  trial  of  a  strange  char- 
acter, "Let  the  Persian  crown,"  he 
said,  "  be  placed  between  two  himgry 
lions,  chained  one  on  either  side  of  it, 


CH.  XIV.  ] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


669 


and  let  that  one  of  us  who  dares  to  ap- 
proach the  Uons  and  take  the  crown  be 
acknowledged  as  king."  The  proposal 
pleased  the  nobles  and  Magi;  and  what 
Varahran  had  sut,gested  was  done. 
Chosroes  was  asked  if  he  would  make 
the  attempt  first,  but  decline<I.  Varah- 
ran then  took  a  club,  and,  approach- 
ing the  lions,  jumped  on  the  back  of  one, 
seated  himself,  and,  when  the  other  was 
about  to  spring  on  him,  with  two  blows 
dashed  out  the  brains  of  both  1  He  then 
took  the  crown,  and  was  acknowleded 
king,  Chosroes  being  the  first  to  swear 
allegiance.  (See  Tabari,  vol.ii.  ijp.  IIT- 
8:  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  515;  Mirkhond.  pp. 
330-1;  i<c.)  We  may  perhaps  conclude 
with  safety  from  the  Persian  accounts 
that  there" was  no  actual  civil  war,  but 
that  Varahran  established  himself  with- 
out having  to  flght 

»The  date  of  a.d.  417,  which  Patka- 
nian  (Journ.  As.  1866,  p.  161)  and  Thomas 
{Num.  Chron.  1872,  p.  45)  obtain  from  the 
Armenian  writers,  is  less  probable.  It 
contradicts  Abulpharagius  (p.  91).  Aga- 
thias  (iv.  26),  Theophanes  (p.  73,  D)  and 
others.  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p. 
546. 

""Socrat.  H.'E.  vii.  18;  Theodoret,  H. 
E.  V.  39. 

'•  Socrates  speaks  of  TiiJ.iapia<;  koX 
<rTpe3Aas  MipaiK  a.%  Si  a^o  pov<;  ■ 
Theodoret  is  painfully  diffuse  on  the 
subject. 

'^Socrat.  H.  E.  1.  s.  c. 
"Socrat.  H.  E.  1.  s.  c. 
"  This  is  the  first  that  is  heard  of  Ar- 
daburius.  He  was  of  Alanian  descent, 
and  was  afterwards  employed  to  put 
down  the  pretender,  Johannes  (Socr.  vii. 
24;  Olympiodor.  ap.  Phot.  Bibliotliec.  p. 
197;  Philostorg.  H.  E.  xii.  13),  whom  he 
made  prisoner  (a.d.  425).  In  a.d.  427  he 
was  consul. 

»*The  form  used  by  Socrates  is  Aza- 
zene;  but  Theophanes  has  "  Arzane  " 
(p.  74,  A),  whence  we  may  conclude  that 
the  district  intended  was  that  called  Ar- 
zanene  by  Ammianus  (xxv.  7),  which 
has  been  already  identified  with  the 
modern  Kherzan.     (See  text,  p.  308.) 

"  The  name  is  given  as  Arses  (Arsasus) 
by  Theophanes  (1.  s.  c),  but  as  Narses 
(NarsBBUs)  by  Socrates.  Tabai-i  says 
that  Narses  was  a  brother  of  Varahran 
(Chronique,  vol.  ii.  pp.  119  and  125). 
"'  See  text,  pp.  367-369. 
'8  Moundsir  was  at  the  head  of  the 
Mesopotamian  or  Saracenic  Arabs  at 
this  time,  according  to  the  Oriental 
writers  (Talmri,  vol.  ii.  pp.  110-116;  Mir- 
khond, p.  328,  who  gives  the  name  as 
Mondar,  a  form  easily  traceable  in  AI- 
Amundarus). 

•»  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii.  18,  sub  fin. 
"»  This  tale  is  related  both  by  Socrates 
(1.  s.  c.)  and  by  Theophanes  (p.  74,  B). 
It  must  have  had  some  foundation; 
but  no  doubt  the  loss  is  greatly  exag- 
gerated. 


^'  See  the  Chronicle  of  Marcellinus,  p. 

19;  and  compare  Theophanes  (pp.  74-5), 
who,  however,  makes  the  war  lust  three 
years,  and  Socrat.  H.  K.  vii.  18-20. 

2'^  Mos.  Chur.  iii.  .59. 

^'  The  authority  of  Moses  as  to  the 
strength  of  Theodosiopolis  (Hint.  Ann. 
1.  s.  c.)  is  preferable  to  that  of  Procopius, 
who  wrote  a  century  later.  Procopius 
makes  the  place  one  of  small  account  in 
the  time  of  Theodosius  (De  .^d.  Justi- 
nian, iii.  5). 

•"  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  59. 

"  Theodoret,  H.  E.  v.  37. 

=«Ibid. 

2'  Johann.  Malal.  xiv.  p.  25,  A. 

28  Tliese  details  are  given  by  .loliun- 
Malal.  only;  but  the  combat  is  mention- 
ed also  by  Socrates  {H.  E.  vii.  18,  ad 
fin.). 

2«  Socrat.  1.  s.  c. ;  Marcellin.  Chroni- 
con,  p.  23. 

30  Socrat.  1.  s.  c. 

31  Ibid. 

3'^  John  of  Malala  makes  Varahran 
propose  peace  immediately  after  the 
single  combat.  Theodoret  makes  peace 
follow  from  the  repulse  suffered  at 
Theodosiopolis. 

33  Socrat.  vii.  20. 

s*  Socrat.  vii.  20. 

3s  Socrates.  The  destruction  of  th«! 
"Immortals"  is  mentioned  also  by 
Theophanes  (p.  74,  B),  but  vaguely  and 
witliout  any  details. 

3"  The  actual  negotiator  was,  accord- 
ing to  Socrates,  Maxiinus  only.  Others 
mention,  as  concerneil  in  the  negotia- 
tions, Ilelion,  Anatolius,  and  Procopius. 
(See  Theoplian.  p.  75.  B;  Cedren.  p.  311, 
D;  Sidon.  Apollin.  Puneg.  Anthem.  I. 
75.) 

3'  Theophan.  1.  s.  c;  Socrat.  H.  E.  vii. 
21. 

38  Socrat.  1.  s.  c. 

"(jribbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  iv.  p. 
167. 

*«  See  text,  p.  890. 

*'Mos.  Chor.  iii.  56:  "  Fiebat  ut  regio 
nostra,  propter  timiultuosa  atque  turi)u- 
lentissima  tempor.a,  per  tres  annos  ab 
rectore  vacua  fuerit,  et  misere  spoliata, 
adeo  ut  vectigalia  regia  deflcerent.  et; 
plebis  itinera  interchulerentur,  omnis- 
que  omnium  rerum  ordo  perturbare- 
tur."    (Wliiston's  translation.) 

«»  Ibid.  iii.  57. 

<3Mos.  Chor.  iii.  .58:  "Rex  Persanim 
Veramus,  sine  satrapis  Armeniis  regio- 
nem  eam  se  tenere  noii  posse  intelligens, 
de  pace  egerat." 

■•*  See  St.  Martin.  Mi'moires  sur  VAr- 
mfnie,  vol.  I.  p.  410;  Notes  to  Le  Beau's 
Bus-Empire,  vol.  vi.  p.  32. 

<»Mos.  Chor.  iii.  63 

*'  The  reply  of  Isaac  to  the  nobles  is 
not  ill  rendered  by  Uibbon:  "Our  king 
is  too  much  addicted  to  licentious  pleas- 
ures; but  he  has  been  ptiritled  in  the 
holy  waters  of  baptism.  He  is  a  lover  <  if 
women;  but  he  does  not  adore  the  tlra 


m 


THS  SEVENTH  MONAltCllY. 


[CH.  XIV. 


or  the  elements.  He  may  deserve  the 
reproach  of  lewdness;  but  he  is  an  un- 
doubted Catholic,  and  his  faith  is  pure 
though  his  manners  are  flagitious.  I 
will  never  consent  to  abandon  my  sheep 
to  the  rage  of  devouring  wolves;  and 
3'ou  will  soon  repent  your  rash  exchange 
of  the  infirmities  of  a  believer  for  the 
specious  virtues  of  a  heathen."  {De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol  iv.  p.  169.) 

4'  Mos.  Chor.  iii.  64. 

■«8  Ibid.  The  name  of  the  first  gov- 
ernor, according  to  Moses,  was  Viuiiher- 
Sapor. 

49  Ibid.  iii.  65. 

^"  Tabari.  vol.  ii.  p.  119;  Magoudi,  vol. 
ii.  p.  190;  Mirkhond,  p.  335;  Modjmel-al- 
Tewarikh,  p.  516. 

*i  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  3;  Cosmas 
Indicopleust.  in  Moutfaucon's  Collectio 
nova  Pat  rum,  tom.  ii.  pp.  337-9;  Abul- 
pharag.  CVwojucon,  tom.  ii.  p.  77;  Eliaee, 
p.  13. 

^2  Mirkhond  calls  the  invader  "the 
Khacan  of  China"  (p.  334),  though  he 
speaks  of  the  army  as  composed  of 
Turks. 

53  Mirkhond,  p.  343;  Modjmel-al-Te- 
warikh,  p.  517;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  128. 

5*  Mos.  Chor.  Geogr.  Armen.  §  92.  I 
take  this  form  from  M.  Vivien  St.  Mar- 
tin, to  whose  little  work  on  the  Ephtha- 
liies  {Les  Huns  Blancs  on  Ephthalites, 
Paris,  1849)  I  own  myself  much  indebted. 
Whiston's  translation  gives  the  word  as 
Hephthal  [ii]. 

=5  Both  readings  occur  in  the  MSS.  of 
Procopius.  (See  the  note  of  Dindorf  in 
the  edition  of  Niebuhr,  p.  15.)  Theo- 
phanes  has  Nci^^aAiTai  only  (Chrono- 
graph, pp.  105-6).  Nei^eaAirai  is  also  the 
form  used  by  Agathias  (iv.  27).  Menan- 
der  Protector  has  'E<fi9aAiTai  (Frs.  9  and 
18). 

^*M.  "Vivien  St.  Martin  seeks  to  iden- 
tify the  Ephthalites  with  the  Yue-chi, 
one  form  of  whose  name  he  believes  to 
have  been  Yi-ta,  or  Ye-tha  (Les  Huns 
Blancs,  pp.  37-69.  Others,  e.  gr.,  De- 
guignes,  have  seen  in  the  word  Ephtha- 
lite  a  root  Tie-le,  which  they  regard  as 
equivalent  to  Turk. 

^^  As  Procopius  (1.  s.  c),  Theophanes 
(p.  105,  C),  and  Cosmas  (1.  s.  c). 

5«  Procop.  !.  s.  c. 

6»  Jornandes,  De  Gothorum  rebus  ges- 
tis.  %  35. 

"""Khan"  is  the  modern  contracted 
form  of  the  word  which  is  found  in  the 
middle  ages  as  Khagan  or  Chagan,  and 
in  the  Persian  and  Arabic  writers  as 
Khakan  or  Khacan.  Its  original  root  is 
probably  the  iC/iafc.  which  meant  "  King" 
m  ancient  Susianian,  in  Ethiopic  (Tir- 
hakah),  and  in  Egyptian  (Hyk-soa). 

«'  The  moderate  estimate  of  25,000  is 
found  in  Mirkhond  (p.  334)  and  in  the 
Rozut-ul-Suffa  (Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  117). 
Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  119)  and  the  2eetiut-al- 
Teivarikh  have  2.50.000. 

«»  Mirkhond,  pp.  334  and  336. 


«3  Ibid.  p.  .334.  Compare  Magoudi,  vol. 
ii.  p.  190. 

'"i  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  119;  Modjmel-al- 
Tewarikh,  p.  516;  Mirkhond,  p.  334. 

«5  Tabari,  1.  s.  c;  Mirkhond,  p.  335. 

"'Tabari  makes  the  number  only  300 
(vol.  ii.  p.  119);  but  Mirkhond  gives  the 
more  probable  figure  of  7,000  (p.  336). 

«'  Mirkhond,  p.  335. 

«8  Ibid.  p.  336. 

«8  The  noise  was  made,  we  are  told,  by 
filling  the  dried  skins  of  oxen  with  peb- 
bles, and  attaching  them  to  the  necks 
of  the  horses,  which,  as  they  charged, 
made  the  stones  rattle  (Mirkhond,  l.s.c. ; 
Malcolm,  vol.  i.  p.  118).  Some  authors 
make  Varahran  catch  a  number  of  wild 
beasts  and  let  them  loose  upon  the  Ta- 
tars (Modjmel-al-Teivarikh.  p.  517). 

">  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  190;  Mirkhond, 
p.  337. 

"Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  121. 

'2  According  to  Tabari  (p.  120),  the 
crown  was  ornamented  with  several 
thousands  of  pearls.  Compare  the  pearl 
ornamentation  of  the  Sassanian  crowns 
upon  the  coins,  especially  those  of  Sa- 
por II. 

"Tabari,  1.  s.  c. ;  Modjmel-al-Tewa- 
rikh,  p.  517.  The  latter  work  expressly 
calls  this  an  invasion  of  the  countiy  of 
Hei/athelah  (i.e.  of  the  Ephthalites). 

'*■  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  517;  Taba- 
ri, vol.  ii.  p.  120;  Mirkhond,  p.  337. 

'5  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

"Ibid.  vol.  ii.  pp.  124-5.  Compare 
Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  191;  Modjmelal-Te- 
ivarikh,  p.  516;  Mirkhond,  pp.  337-340. 

''''Modjmel-al-Tewarikh.  p.  515. 

'*  Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  80)  says  eigh- 
teen years  and  eleven  months;  the 
Modjmel-al-Tewarikh  mentions  nineteen 
years,  but  prefers  twenty-three  (p.  514); 
Agathias  (iv.  27)  Theophanes  (p.  71.  D), 
and  Abiilpharagius  (p.  91)  say  twenty; 
Patkanian  (Journ.  Asiatique  for  1866,  p. 
161)  prefers  twenty-one;  Magoudi  (vol. 
ii.  p.  190)  and  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  126)  agree 
with  the  Modjmel-dl-Teivarikh  in  giving 
the  number  as  twentj'-three. 

"  Tabari,  p.  126;  Mirkhond,  p.  341. 

8°  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i. 
p.  121.  note. 

*'  Mordtmann,  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  pp.  68-70. 

^2  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,  p.  515;  Taba- 
ri. vol.  ii.  p.  118;  Mirkhond,  pp.  332-3; 
Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  190. 

"3  The  wild  ass  is  called  by  the  Per- 
sians giir  or  gour.  Eutychius,  in  speak- 
ing of  Varahran  V.,  writes  the  word 
jaur  (vol.  ii.  pp.  80  and  83). 

8<  Mirkhond,  p.  334. 

85  Ibid.  p.  3;J3;  Tabari,  p.  118. 

8«  The  sculptures  which  Ker  Porter  a» 
signed  to  this  prince  (Travels,  vol.  i.  pp. 
533-540)  have  nothing  that  really  con- 
nects them  with  him.  In  none  of  them 
is  the  head-dress  of  the  king  that  which 
appears  on  the  coins  of  Varahran  V. 

»'  Mirkhond,  p.  333. 


cfi.  m] 


Tits  SEVElNTfJ  MONAKCHT. 


G71 


CHAPTER  XV. 

>  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  546. 
Mordtmann  puts  his  accession  in  a.d. 
444  {Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  70);  Patka- 
nian  {Journ.  Asiatique,  1866,  p.  167)  in 
AD.  438.  But  a  comparison  of  Marcelli- 
nus  (p.  25)  with  Moses  of  Choren6  (iii.  67, 
ad  init.)  shows  Clinton  to  be  right. 

2  Mos.  Chor.  1.  s.  e. 

3  Marcellinus,  Chron.  1.  s.  c. 

••  Theodoret,  H.  E.  v.  37.  The  invasion 
is  wrongly  assis^ned  by  this  writer  to  the 
reign  of  Varahran  V.,  which  was  just 
ended. 

*  Procop.  De  Bell.  Pers.  i.  2.  Anatolius 
is  also  mentioned  as  concluding  the 
peace  by  Marcellinus  (1.  s.  c). 

'  Procop.  1.  S.  O. :  T»)>'  (lp-i)vriv  ^wex'^PV' 
<j(.v  ouTws  (oiTrep  'AyaroAios  irpbs  ainov 
eXPvi^v- 

'  'ESpatre  Se  ovSkv  axapi.   (PrOCOp.  1.  S.  C.) 

8  So  TiUemont  suspects  fUist.  des  Eni- 
pereurs,  torn.  vi.  pp.  39-40). 

»  See  text,  p.  396. 

1"  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866.  pp.  164-6. 

1'  Patlianian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  164. 

12  See  text,  p.  376. 

1' The  entrance  of  the  army  is  noted 
by  Moses  of  Choren6  (Hist.  Armen.  iii. 
(18).  We  can  scarcely  be  mistaken  in  re- 
garding its  entrance  as  required  on  ac- 
count of  Roman  intrigues. 

!■•  St.  Martin,  Recherches  sur  VAi-me- 
nie,  torn.  i.  p.  323. 

'Mbid.  p.  323. 

"The  Armenian  term  is  Marzpan, 
"  Protector  of  the  Boitier,"  with  wliich 
Patkanian  well  compares  "  Margrave" 
{Journ.  Asiatique,  1866,  p.  114). 

"  St.  Martin,  Recherches,  p.  324. 

> 8  Ibid.  p.  326. 

1"  Marcian  became  emperor  in  .Au- 
gust, A.D.  4.50.  The  application  to  him 
for  aid  was  made,  according  to  St.  Mar- 
tin, towards  the  end  of  ad.  450,  or  early 
in  AD.  451. 

'■"•The  battle  of  Chalons  was  fought  in 
the  autumn  of  a.d.  451  (Clinton,  F.  R. 
vol.  i.  p.  642).  On  the  power  of  Attila  at 
this  time,  see  Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  iv.  pp.  231-6). 

2'  St.  Martin,  Recherches  sur  VArme- 
nic,  vol.  i.  p.  327. 

2'^  Ibid. 

23  Patkanian,  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique for  1806,  p.  165. 

2*  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  127)  says  he  reign- 
ed eighteen  years;  Ma^oudi  (vol.  ii.  p. 
395)  nineteen;  Agathias  (iv.  27)  seven- 
teen. The  statement  of  Agathias  is  pre- 
feried  by  Clinton  (F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  546): 
that  of  Magoudi  by  Patkanian  (p.  167) 
and  Thomas  (Xum.  Chron.  New  Series, 
No.  xlv.  p.  45).  All  moderns  agree  that 
he  died  ad.  457. 

"So  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

""See  Monltmann  in  the  Zeitsrhrift. 
vol  viii.  pp.  70-i.  LoTitrpHpier  has  mis- 
takenly assigned  to  Isdigerd  I.  two  coins 


(PI.  viii.,  Nos.  Sand  4)  which  really  be- 
long to  Isdigerd  II. 
2'  Mordtmann,  1.  s.  c. 

CHAPTER  XVI, 

'  The  Armenian  historians  make  Hor- 
misdas  the  elder,  and  Perozes  th« 
younger  sou  (Patkanian  in  the  Journal 
Asiatique  for  1806,  p.  169):  but  Tabari 
(Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  127),  Mirkhond  (p. 
342),  and  the  Persian  writers  generally, 
declare  the  reverse  to  liavt-  been  the 
case.  They  give  details  which  support 
their  view. 

2  Tabari,  1.  s.  c.  Mirkhond  says  that 
Isdigerd  regarded  Hormisdas  as"  better 
qualified  to  govern  than  Perozes,  since 
he  had  more  sweetness,  modesty,  and 
intelligence,  whereas,  in  l^avor  of  Perozes 
were  only  his  age  and  his  advantages  of 
person  (pp.  342-3). 

3  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  137. 

*  The  Greeks  shortened  the  name  into 
Cunchas  (Koiiyxas).  See  Priscus  Panites, 
Fr.  33. 

'  So  explained  by  Mirkhond  (p.  344). 

'  Amounting,  according  to  Blirkhond, 
to  no  fewer  than  30,000  men  (ibid). 

'  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  108. 

*  Elisee,  p.  1.53;  Moyse  de  Kaghank,  i. 
10.  These  writers  are  supported  by 
Tabari,  who  says  briefly,  "  Firouat  com- 
battit  son  frfire  Hormouz,  et  le  tua  "  (p. 
128). 

»  Mirkhond,  p.  U4. 

■"On  the  identity  of  Aghouank  with 
Albania,  see  St.  Martin's  Recherches  s^ir 
V Armenie,  torn.  i.  p.  214,  and  torn.  ii.  pp. 
358-9. 

"  Patkanian,  p.  168. 

"  Ibid.  p.  170. 

>3  Mirkliond,  p.  345;  Tabari.  p.  12». 

i<  Mirkhond,  p.  344;  Tabari,  1.  .s.  c. 

•5 So  Tabari.  Tlie  statement  is  con- 
firmed by  the  remarkable  fact  that  his 
coins,  which  are  abundant  up  to  liis 
sevtnth  year,  then  fail  entirely  for  five 
years,  after  which  they  reapp.-ar  and 
are  once  more  plentiful.  (See  'I'liomas 
in  Numismatic  Chronicle  for  1873,  vol. 
xiii..  No,  51,  p.  224.) 

"Tabari,  Chronique.  ii.  p.  130. 

"  Ibid.     Compare  Mirkhond.  p.  345. 

'*  Tabari  says  in  one  niaee  that  no  one 
died  of  want  ilurir)g  the  famine  (ii.  p. 
1.30);  but  in  another,  aiimits  that  one 
died  (ib.  p.  12»).     So  Mirkhond,  p.  346. 

i»  See  Tabari.  il.  pp.  129,  130. 

2"  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  31. 

"  On  the  superiority  of  Priscus  to  the 
general  run  of  Byzantine  historians,  see 
the  remarks  of  Nielndir  in  his  collection 
of  the  Byzantine  historians  (Bonn.  1829): 
"  Lontre  optimus  omnium  sequioris  wvi 
hist-oricorum  [Priscus):  ingeiiio.  flde, 
sapientia,  nulli  vel  optimornm  postha- 
bendus:  elejrans  quoque  et  sermone 
satis  puro  iisus,  laudem  atque  glorlam 
qnum  apnd  imii'vos  turn  inter  postero 
lufiiio  adi'ptiis  e.st :  ciii  ftiam  a  ValeHio 
et  Gibbono,  sumniis  vlris,  laudari  con- 


672 


THE  SEIVENTH  MONAHCIlY. 


[CH.  XYt 


tiglt."  Compare  Smith's  Diet,  of  Bio- 
graphy, vol.  iii.  p.  526. 

"2  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  39. 

's  Comijare  with  this  trick  the  some- 
what similar  one  said  to  have  been  play- 
ed oflf  by  Amasis  upon  Cambyses  (He- 
rod, iii.  1). 

24  Priscus  Panites,  Fr.  33. 

'*  Called  Gorgo  by  Priscus  (1.  s.  c.)  and 
Procopins  (Bell.  Pers.  i.  4).  The  old 
Persian  Varkana  and  the  Greek  Hyr- 
cauia  are  variants  of  the  same  word. 
Some  ruins  of  Gurg&n  still  exist  in  the 
valley  of  the  Gurgdn  river  (lat.  37°  20', 
long.  55°  15')  not  far  from  Asterabad. 

2«  So  Procopius,  Bell.  Pers  i.  3.  Priscus 
makes  the  patrician  Constantius  am- 
bassador from  Zeno  to  Perezes  about 
this  period  (Frs.  31,  32,  and  33):  proba- 
bly Eusebius  succeeded  him. 

2'  Such  is  the  account  given  by  Proco- 
pius (1.  s.  c).  The  Persian  writers,  Taba- 
ri  (vol.  ii.  pp.  132-136)  and  Mirkhond  (pp. 
348,  349),  substitute  a  story  in  which  the 
old  myth  of  Zopyrus  (Herod,  iii.  154-158) 
is  reproduced  with  little  alteration  from 
the  traditions  of  a  thousand  years  ear- 
lier. According  to  this  tale,  Perozes  was 
guided  to  his  destruction  in  the  desert 
of  Merv  by  an  Ephthalite  chief,  who  mu- 
tilated himself  in  order  to  deceive  the 
Persians  and  secure  the  success  of  his 
own  sovereign. 

28  The  first  Ephthalite  war  of  Perozes 
cannot  have  terminated  earlier  than 
A  D.  469,  since  in  a.d.  468  we  hear  of  the 
Persians  as  still  having  the  advantage 
in  the  struggle  (Priscus,  Fr.  41).  The 
troubles  in  Armenia,  which  led  to  the 
revolt  in  a.d.  481  (Lazare  Parbe,  Vie  de 
Vahan  le  Mamigonien.  p.  10).  must  have 
commenced  several  years  previously — 
probably  about  a.d.  475. 

29  See  text,  pp.  406-408. 

'"  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  173. 

3'  Lazare  Parbe,  Vie  de  Vahan,  p.  6. 
The  exodus  had  begun  even  earlier  in 
his  reign,  before  b.c.  464  (Priscus,  Fr.  31). 

32  See  Faustus,  iv.  2.  11,  15,  &c. ;  Zenob. 
de  Glag,  p.  337;  Mos.  Chor.  ii.  81,  85;  St. 
Martin,  Recherches  sur  V Armime,  vol. 
ii.  p.  23,  &c.  Compare  above,  pp.  256, 
306,  &c. 

33  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  8. 
3*  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  9. 
'5  Ibid.  pp.  10-14. 

3'  I^azare  Parbe,  pp.  15  and  16. 

^"i  Compare  the  "  Meranes"  of  Ammi- 
anus  (XXV.  1 ) ;  and  on  the  supposed  force 
of  the  word,  see  note  135,  Chapter  X. 

38  Lazare  Parbe,  pp.  18-28. 

39  Ibid.  p.  31. 
*°  Ibid.  p.  32. 

■"  This  expression  must  be  understood 
relatively.  Nothing  is  more  remarkable 
in  Lazare  Parbe's  account  of  this  war 
than  the  smallness  of  the  numbers  which 
he  represents  as  engaged  on  eitlier  side. 
Persian  armies  rarely  exceed  5,000  men. 
Armenian  are  still  smaller,  and  are  gen- 
erally counted  by  hundreds! 


42  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  33. 

■13  Ibid.  p.  35. 

44  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  137;  Mirkhond,  pp 
349-350;  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol, 
i.  p.  129. 

46  Wars  of  Perozes  with  the  Sagaruri, 
Acatiri,  and  others,  are  indicated  by 
Priscus  Panites  (Fr.  37).  A  great  war 
with  the  Koushans  is  witnessed  to  by 
Lazare  Parlje  (p.  10). 

46  Xpoi/o)  oil  TToAAoj  v<rTepov  (Procop.  Bell. 
Pers.  i.  4)'.  The  first  war  seems  to  have 
terminated  about  a.d.  470,  the  second  to 
have  commenced  in  a.d.  481.  (See  La- 
zare Parbe,  I.  s.  c.) 

47  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

48  Patkanian,  from  the  Armenian  au- 
thorities. Journal  Asiatique,  1866,  p.  171. 

49  "Une  arm6e  aguerrie."  (Mirkhond 
in  De  Sacy's  translation,  p.  350.) 

60  Tabari,  p.  138. 

"  On  the  true  relation  of  Balas  to  Pe- 
rozes, see  text,  p,  331. 

62  As  Tabari,  p.  139. 

63  Ibid. 

64  Tdi|)poi'  Pa6eldv  re  kol  evpovt  iKaviui 
exovo-ai/.  (Procop.  B.  P.  i.  4.)  Tabari 
says  it  was  fifteen  feet  deep  and  thirty 
wide  (vol.  ii.  p.  139). 

6' So  Tabari  (1.  s.  e.).  Neither  Proco- 
pius nor  Mirlchond  mentions  this  cir- 
cumstance. 

66  Mirkhond,  p.  350;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  141. 
Procopius  states,  instead  of  this,  that 
the  salt  by  which  Perozes  had  sworn, 
was  suspended  from  the  extreme  point 
of  the  royal  standard. 

6'  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

68  Thirty,  according  to  Procopius,  1.  4 
(p.  J9). 

69  A  magnificent  pearl  which  Perozes 
wore  as  an  earring,  and  an  amulet  which 
he  carried  as  a  bracelet,  are  particularly 
mentioned  (Procop.  1.  4,  pp.  21-24;  Ta- 
bari. ii.  p.  142). 

'"  Tabari  (1.  s.  c.)  makes  the  exact 
length  of  his  reign  twenty-six  years  and 
five  months.  Mirkhond  sa5  s  twentj--six 
years  (p.  351);  Eutychius  (vol.  i.  p.  100; 
vol.  Ii.  p.  127)  twenty-seven;  Ma50udi 
(vol.  ii.  p.  195)  twenty -nine;  Agathias 
(iv.  27)  twenty-four.  The  "twenty-four 
years"  of  Agathias  have  perhaps  come 
from  a  writer  who  assigned  the  first  two 
years  after  the  death  of  Isdigerd  II.  to 
Hormisdas.  The  true  chronology  ap- 
pears to  be  the  following :— Isdigerd  II. 
died  early  in  a.d.  457.  Both  Perozes  and 
Hormisdas  claimed  the  throne  and  reck- 
oned themselves  kings  from  this  time. 
Hormisdas  succumbed  in  a.d.  459.  Pe- 
rozes was  killed  late  in  a.d.  483,  twenty- 
six  years  and  five  months  after  the 
death  of  his  father,  twenty-four  yeai-s 
after  the  death  (or  dethronement)  of 
Hormisdas. 

61  Mirkhond,  p.  351;  Malcolm,  History 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  130. 

62  Compare  Agathias  (l.s.c): — dfijpToA- 

/lirjTia?    fjiiv    ayav    Kal     <j>i.\on6\efiO';  —  and 
aarain  irAeov  r)v  auroi  ToO  ^ouAevo/twi'ov  rt 


CH.  xvm.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


673 


•sTahaii,  ii.  p.  108;  Mirkhond,  p.  345. 

"  See  text,  pp.  411-112. 

«5  Malcolm,  vol.  i.  pp.  129-130;  Gibbon, 
vol.  V.  p.  H.i. 

*'  Zeitsclirift,  vol.  viii.  p.  71;  vol.  xii. 
p.  12.  The  uaiiie  on  these  coins  is  read 
as  Chodad-Varda,  Chodar-Varda,  or 
Chatar-Varda. 

«'  Num.  Cliron.  for  18T3,  No.  51  (New 
Series),  pp.  225-7. 

•*  See  text,  p.  411.  Mr.  Thomas  speaks 
of  Ram  (or  Raliau))  as  '"  the  paternally 
nominated  guardian  and  administrator" 
of  Hormisdas  (p.  226).  But  the  authors 
whom  lie  quotes,  Elis6e  and  Moyse  de 
Kaghank,  state  exactly  the  reverse- 
that  he  governed  for  Perozes,  defeated 
Hormisdas.  and  put  him  to  death. 

•»  Medailles  des  Sassanides,  pi.  ix.  fig. 

">  Mordtmann  denies  this  (Zeitschrift, 
vol.  viii.  p.  71).  but,  as  it  appears  to  me, 
without  sufficient  reason. 

"These  wings,  which  were  now  first 
introduced,  became  the  distinguishing 
feature  of  the  later  coinage  from  Chos- 
roBs  II.  downwards,  and  passed  to  the 
Arabs.  Some  coins  of  Perozes  are  with- 
out the  wings  (see  Mordtmann  in  the 
Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  No.  172;  Longpti- 
rier,  Medailles,  pi.  ix.  fig.  2). 

'2  Mordtmann,  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp. 
03  et  seqq.  On  the  meaning  of  kadi, 
compare  Thomas  in  Num.  Chron.  for 
187.3,  pp.  229-2.30. 

'5  Longperier,  Medailles,  p.  62. 

'*  Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  pp.  73-78;  vol. 
xii.  p.  12. 

"  Num.  Chron.  for  1873,  p.  223.  The 
abbreviated  form  of  aiost  of  the  mint- 
marks  renders  their  attribution  more  or 
less  doubtful;  hence  mach  of  the  diver- 
sit.y  in  the  lists  (see  text,  p.  420).  The 
general  tendency  to  extend  more  and 
more  widely  the  principle  of  local  mints, 
as  time  went  on,  is,  however,  quite  be- 
yond dispute. 

^'  See  tho  Annales  de  Vlnstitut  Archd- 
ologique  for  1843,  vol.  xv.  p.  105. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

1  This  is  M.  Longperier's  reading  of 
the  legend  upon  the  coin  which  he 
ascribes  to  Balas  {Medailles,  p.  05).  M. 
Bartholomasi  substantially  agrees  with 
him.  Mordtmann  differs  (Zeitschrift, 
Vol.  viii.  p.  71).  It  is  generally  allowed, 
however,  that  the  name,  whatever  its 
native  form,  represented  the  old  Par- 
thian Volgasu  or  Volagases. 

!"  I'abari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  138,142,  144;  Mir- 
khond, p.  351.  So  Macoudi,  vol.  ii.  p. 
105. 

3  Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  137,  D;  Theophan. 
Chronograph,  p.  106,  A. 

*  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  177. 

'Compare  Malcolm,  History  of  Per- 
sia, vol.  i.  p.  131,  note;  Patkanian  (1.  s.  c), 
<&c. 

•The  Greeks  make  him  father  of  a 
Bumerous   family   of    grown-up    sons,   l 


whom  he  took  with  him  to  the  Ephtha- 
lite  war  (Procop.  B.  P  \.  i;  p.  11,  A),  and 
wlio  perished  there  (ibid.  p.  12,  V);  but 
the  existence  of  these  persons  is  un- 
known to  the  native  historians. 

'Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  142;  Mirkhond,  p 
351.  r         ,  ,1. 

»  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  14.3. 

»  Procop.  Hell.  Pers.  i.  4,  ad  fin.  Com- 
pare Theophanes,  Chronograph,  p.  106, 
A  :  Cedrenus,  p.  355,  D. 

'"  Lazai-e  Parbe,  p.  38. 

' '  Sapor  and  Hazaravougd  liad  been 
both  required  to  march  with  all  their 
forces  to  Ctesiphon  (ib.  p.  36). 

"  See  Lazare  Parbe,  pp  38-39. 

"  Patkanian  (Journal  Asiatique,  1866, 
p.  176). 

"  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  39. 

■5  The  revolt  of  Zareh,  and  his  rela- 
tionship to  Perozes,  rest  wholly  on  the 
testimony  of  the  Armenian  writers,  who, 
however,  can  hardly  have  been  mis- 
taken in  the  matter.  (See  Lazare 
Parbe,  p.  42;  and  compare  Patkanian, 
ut  supra,  p.  175.  J 

i«  Patkanian,  p.  176. 

"  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  145;  Mirkhond,  p. 
352. 

leSee  text,  pp.  422-42.3. 

"  Lazare  Parbe.  p.  44. 

^"  Lazare  Parbe,  p.  45. 

2' Ibid.  p.  46. 

"Agathias,  iv.  27,  p.  1.38,  A;  Eutvch. 
ii.  p.  127;  Syncellus,  p.  360,  D;  Tabari, 
vol.  ii.  p.  144;  Mirkhond.  p. 3.52;  Macoudi, 
vol.  ii.  p.  195;  Lazare  Pai-be,  p.  46;  Pat- 
kanian, p.  176,  &c.  The  foiu-  years  were 
probably  not  complete,  Balasascending 
the  throne  in  a.d  484,  and  dj'ing  before 
the  terminal  ion  of  a.d.  487. 

23  There  is  not  the  same  universal 
agreement  here.  Tabari  (p.  144),  Mir- 
khond (p..  352),  Eutychius  (I.  s.  c).  and 
Agathias  (1.  s.  c),  speak  of  Balas  as  dying 
a  natural  death.  Lazare  Parbe  makes 
him  dethroned  by  his  subjects  as  too 
peaceful  (p.  46).  Procopius  (/?.  /'.  i.  5 
and  6)  and  others  (Theophan.  j).  100,  A; 
Cedrenus,  p.  356,  C)  confound  HuUls  with 
Zamaspes,  and  say  that  he  was  de- 
throned and  blinded  by  Kobad. 

2«  Mirkhond,  p.  a51 ;  Tabari,  ii.  p   144. 

^^  .\gatliias,  iv.  27:  Hp^oi  toOs  rponovt 

Kai  rjTTLO^. 

^'  .\gathias.  iv.  27.  See  the  passage 
prefixed  to  this  chapter. 

■J'  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. ;  Mirkhond,  p.  352. 

58  See  above,  note  9. 

"»  As  Tabari  (ii.  p.  146)  and  Mirkhond 
(1.  s.  c.)  relate. 

'"  Longperier.  Medailles  des  Sassa- 
nides, p.  65,  and  pi  ix.  fig.  5;  Thomas, 
Num.  Chron.  1873,  pp.  228-9. 

CHAPTER  XVin. 

'  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  140;  Mirkhond,  p. 
852. 
5  See  text,  p.  425. 
'  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 
*  Sufral  is  the  form  used  by  the  Pei^ 


6^4 


The  seventh  mokarcht. 


[CH.  XVIll. 


sians,  Suklira  that  employed  by  the 
Arabs  (MirkhuiiJ,  p.  353). 

s  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  145-6;  Miikhond, 
p.  3,5^'. 

«  Tabari,  p.  147. 

'  Tabari,  p.  148. 

•*  See  Fralin,  De  Chasaris,  Excerpta  ex 
Hist.  Arab.;  and  compare  St.  Martin's 
Notes  to  the  Bas-Empire  of  Le  Beau, 
torn.  xi.  p.  115;  Theophanes,  Chrono- 
graph, p.  298.  B;  Zeuss,  Die  Deutschen 
und  die  Nachbarstdmme,  pp.  721-742; 
Neumann,  Die  Volker  des  siidlichen 
Rus.ihmd.^Tp.  99;  &c. 

"Theoph.  Chron.p.  263,  C:  toOs  Tovp- 
icov;  OTTO  Tijs  ewa^,  oOs  Xa^apous  6i'o/u.a^ou- 
uii'.  Prichard',  Physical  History  of  Man- 
kind, vol.  iv.  p.  322;  Smith's  Notes  on 
Gibbon's  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
407.  &c. 

1"  See  a  paper  by  Mr.  H.  H.  Howorth 
in  the  Ethnological  Journal  for  1870, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  182-192. 

1 1  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  148. 

12  Ibid. 

"  So  Mirkhond  (p.  353),  who  is  follow- 
ed by  Malcolm  {Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
132). 

"  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  148;  Modjmel-al- 
Tewarikh,  quoted  by  St.  Martin  in  his 
notes  to  Le  Beau,  vol.  vii.  p.  322. 

IS  For  the  teaching  of  Mazdak,  see 
Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  148-9;  Mirkhond,  pp. 
3i>3-4;  Agathias,  iv.  27;  p.  138,  B;  Pro- 
cop.  Bell.  Pers.  i.  5:  Theophan.  Chrono- 
graph, p.  106,  A;  Cedrenus.  Hist  Com- 
pend.  p.  356,  C.  Among  modern  writers 
who  have  treated  of  the  subject  are 
Gibbon  (Decline  and  Fall.  vol.  v.  pp. 
181-2),  Malcolm  {Hist,  of  Peisia,  vol.  i. 
p.  132).  and  St.  Martin  (Notes  to  Le 
Beau,  vol.  vii.  pp.  322-338). 

'*  See  especially  Mirkhond,  p.  354. 

1'  Compare  the  case  of  Eudoxvis,  the 
predecessor  of  Epicurus,  as  reported  by 
Aristotle  (Eth.  Nic.  x.  2.  §  1). 

18  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  149:  "  Cette  doc- 
trine plut  aux  jeunes  gens,  aux  de- 
bauches et  a  la  populace." 

"Mirkhond,  p.  354. 

'"'Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  149;  Mirkhond,  p. 
354 

21  See  St.  Martin's  Notes  to  Le  Beau's 
Bas-Empire,  vol.  vii.  p.  338;  and  com- 
pare Gesenius,  De  Inscript.  Phcenico- 
Orceca  in  Cyrenaica  nuper  reperta, 
Halle,  1825. 

22  St.  Martin,  Recherches  sur  I'Arme- 
nie,  vol.  i.  pp.  328-9;  Lazare  Parbe,  Vie 
de  Vahan,  p.  47. 

23  As  it  was,  Kobad  retraced  his  steps 
in  Armenia,  recalled  the  proselj'tizing 
Marzpan,  and  reinstated  Vahan  in  the 
office.    (Lazare  Parbe,  p.  48.) 

2"  Tabari.  vol.  ii  p.  149. 

2-5  Agathias  (iv.  28;  p.  138,  C)  calls  him 
Zamasphes,  and  so  Theophanes  (Chro- 
nograph, p.  117,  C;  p.  119,  B).  But  Syn- 
ceilus  has  the  more  correct  Zamaspes 
(p.  360,  D).  Zamasp  is  the  form  upon 
the  coins  (Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 


vol.  viii.  p.  78).  Magoudi  (vol.  ii.  p.  195), 
Mirkhond  (p.  355),  and  Tabaii  (vol.  ii.  p. 
149),  have  Djamasp;  Eutychius,  cor- 
ruptly, Ramasph  (vol.  ii.  p.  176). 

2*  So  Agathias:  irpaoTTjTos-  T€  Ka\  Sixaio- 
<ruKiJ?  apiarra  ex^^"  SokoOi'to  (1.  S.  C.)  Taba- 
ri, however,  notes  that  he  did  not  a(i- 
minister  justice  satisfactorily  (p.  151). 

2' Procop.  Bell.  Pers.  i.  5;  p.  15,  B; 
Agathias,  1.  s.  c. 

28  Zamasp  is  assigned  two  j'ears  only 
by  Magoudi  (vol.  ii.  p.  196),  by  Procopius, 
who,  however,  calls  him  Biases  (B.  P.  i. 
7).  and  by  most  of  the  Armenian  writers 
(Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1806,  p.  178);  but  four  years  by  Aga- 
thias (p.  139,  A),  Theophanes  (p.  117,  C), 
Syncellus  (1.  s.  c).  and  some  of  the  Ar- 
menians. The  coins  have  a  notice  of 
the  </iird  regnal  year  (Mordtmann  in  the 
Zeitschrift,  vol.  xii.  p.  13). 

29  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  150.  Procopius 
tells  us  that  when  the  fate  of  Kobad  was 
being  debated,  an  officer  named  Gusa- 
nastades  drew  out  the  knife  with  which 
he  was  accustomed  to  cut  Iws  nai's,  and, 
showing  it  to  the  assembled  chiefs,  ex- 
claimed— "  You  see  how  small  this  knife 
is;  yet  it  is  big  enough  to  accomplish  a 
deed  which  a  little  while  hence  not 
twenty  thousand  armed  men  will  be 
able  to  manage."  (Bell.  Pers.  i.  5;  p.  15. 
B).  His  meaning  was  understood,  but 
the  advice  implied  was  not  adopted. 

3"  The  story  is  told  with  certain  varia- 
tions; but  all  the  accounts  agree  in  at- 
tributing the  escape  of  the  king  to  the 
assistance  lent  him  by  his  wife.  Ac- 
cording to  some,  she  changed  clothes 
with  him,  and  took  his  place  in  the 
prison  (Procop.  Bell.  Pers.  i.  6;  p.  18, 
B);  according  to  others,  she  carried  him 
out  of  the  prison  concealed  in  a  bundle 
of  bedclothes  and  coverlets  (Mirkhond, 
p.  356;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  151). 

31  See  text,  p.  410.  Other  instances 
will  occur  in  the  later  history. 

32  Procop.  Bell.  Pers.  i.  6;  p.  18,  D; 
Agathias.  iv.  28;  p.  138,  D. 

33  Mirkhond,  p.  356;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  151. 
^*  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

35  Agathias.  iv.  28;  p.  139,  A:    6  Zajui. 

(TTrjjs   CKajf   aTT€CTTr}  toO    BaKOV    Koi    /utflft^ai 

36  Bell.  Pers.  i.  6;  p.  19,  B. 

3'  Histoii-e  des  i^assanides,  p.  357: 
"  Kobad  pardonna  a  son  frere  et  dissipa 
toutes  ses  craintes  en  lui  prodiguant  les 
marques  de  sa  tendresse"  (De  Sacy's 
translation). 

38  See  LongpSrier,  Medailles  des  Sas- 
sanides,  pp.  70-71;  Mordtmann  in  the 
Zeitschrift,  vol.  viii.  p.  78;  xii.  p.  13. 

39  Coins  of  Kobad,  dated  in  his  eleventh 
year,  which  have  this  device  (Num. 
Chron.  for  1873.  p.  231),  are  perhaps  ear- 
lier than  those  of  Zamasp,  who,  how- 
ever, ascended  the  throne  this  same 
year  (a.d.  498).  The  device  was  con- 
tinued on  most  of  the  later  coins,  and 
was  adopted  by  the  Arabs. 


CH.  XTX.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAECIIT. 


675 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

>  So  Agathias,  in  direct  terms  (iv.  28"). 
Eutychius  (vol.  ii.  pp.  131,  176),  Magoudi 
(vol.  ii.  p.  195).  Mirlihoiid  (p.  3.58),  and 
Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  151)  make  his  two 
reigns,  together  with  that  of  Zamasp, 
cover  forty-three  years.  This  number 
involves  a  second  reign  of  twenty-nine 
or  thirty  years,  since  the  first  reign  of 
Kobad  lasted  eleven  years,  and  that  of 
Zamasp  between  two  and  three  years. 

5  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  pp.  716  and 
752. 

3  See  Smith's  Diet,  of  Gk.  and  Rom. 
Biography,  vol.  iii.  p.  539. 

*  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  745;  Diet,  of 
Gk.  and  Rom.  Biogr.  1.  s.  c. 
»  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  40. 
•Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  151. 
'  Tlie  main    authority  for  the  state- 
ments in  the  text  is  Johannes  Lydus 
(De  Maqistrat.  iii.  51-53),  an  earlier  and 
even  more  painstaliing  writer  than  Pro- 
copius.    He  lived  from  a.d.  491  to  about 
A.-i3.  553,  Procopius  from  about  ad.  500 
to  A.D.  .560.     He  is  confirmed  in  the  mat- 
ter by  Priscus  Panites,  who  wrote  about 
B.C.  470. 

8  So  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v. 
p.  87.  It  is  perhaps  not  quite  clear 
whether  the  Derbend  pass  or- that  of 
Moz(li)k  is  intended  by  Lydus. 

sjuroipach  is  the  form  used  by  Pris- 
cus (Frs.  31  and  37);  Biraparach  that 
given  by  Lydus  (iii.  52).  The  initial  ele- 
ment is  plainly  the  Bir  or  Vera,  which 
was  the  common  Persian  word  for 
"castle,"  and  which  probably  passed 
from    Persian  into  Hebrew,  becoming 

birah(l-]-^t'2)- 

t  • 

'•  Ai  ^5  ecr/3aXAovT«?  Ta  Te  irpb?  Evpoy 
Ilepo-ais   Ta  Te   irpb?   Jiopeav  'Pio/xai'oi!  avrj- 

KovTHL  eStjovv.    (Lydus,  1.  s.  c) 

"  Si'e  the  demand  made  on  Leo  in 
AD.  464  (Priscus,  Fr.  31),  repeated  in  a.d. 
466  (Fr.  37).  One  payment  seems  to  have 
been  made  by  Theodosius  II.  (Cf.  Ly- 
dus, De  Magistrat.  iii.  53,  where  I  con- 
ceive that  we  ought  to  read  fiiKpov  for 

/leifofo?.) 

i>  The  statement  of  Procopius  to  this 
effect  (Bell.  Pers.  i.  7,  ad  init.)  is  quite 
compatible  with  the  account  given  by 
Lydus,  and  explains  why  the  demand 
was  pressed  just  at  this  time. 

"  Procopius,  1.  s.  c. 

'♦  Theophanes,  Chronograph,  p  124.  C. 

>»  These  grounds  are  stated  by  Pro- 
copius as  determining  the  conduct  of 
Aiiastasius.  _, 

"Procop.  B.  P.  i.  7;  p.  20,  A;  Theo- 
phan.  Chronograph  1.  s.  c.  •.     » 

"'  On  the  foundation  and  strength  of 
Theodosiopolis,  see  text,  p.  396. 

'8  Procop.  B.  P.  1.  s.  c. 

'"Ibid. 

2  0  Vol.  i.  p.  175. 

"Theophan.  p.  124,  D. 

"  Pro-op.  />//.  Perx.  i.  7;  p.  21,  K. 

"Procop.  B.  P.  p.  21,  p.     In  later 


times  the  monks  were  accused  of  treach> 
erously  surrendering  their  trust  (Theo- 
phan.  Chronograph,  p.  125,  A;  MarceU 
lin.  Chronic,  p.  48);  but  Procopius  im- 
putes to  them  no  worse  crime  than 
remissness. 

^<  According  to  Procopius,  he  dre%r 
his  scimetar,  and  threatened  with  in- 
stant death  every  soldier  who  hesitated 
to  mount  the  scaling  ladders. 

25  Procop.  p.  22,  C: 

5' Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  125,  A: 

'Ecro)  T^5  TToAetu?  ycyovorc?,  Atji^ovo'i  iratrav 
Kat  Ka9fxipQ\j(Ti  Kai  ttXoOtoi'  \ay.^6.vov<Ti  iro- 
\vv. 

i"  Procop.  I.  s.  c.  Of  these  Kobad 
afterwards  released  a  large  number 
(ibid.  p.  22,  D). 

as  Ibid.  p.  22,  B.  Theophanes  calls  the 
time  "  three  months,"'  wliich  is  speaking 
roundly.  Marcellinus  speaks  of  the 
city  as  taken  "in  the  fifth  month,"' 
which  is  clearly  incorrect. 

29  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  718. 

30  Procop  B.  P.  i.  8;  p.  2.3.  A.  Celer. 
who  arrived  on  the  scene  the  latest  of 
the  four,  is  omitted  from  the  list  of  com- 
manders by  some  writers.  (Johann. 
Lydus,  De  Magist.  iii.  53;  Marcellin. 
Chron.  p.  48;  Johann.  Malal.  xvi.  p.  114, 
B.) 

31  See  text,  pp.  396-7. 

32  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  8;  p.  23,  C:    Srpa- 

Tcvfia  ToiovTO  tpafTLV  ouTe  TTporepov  OUT* 
i}<TTepov  enX  Ilepcras  'Vtofjiaiov^  |uirT7)i'Oi. 

33Tlieophan.  Chronograph,  p.  125,  B; 
Procop.  B.  P.  p.  23,  D. 
3<  The  phrase  used  by  Procopius  is 

((TTpaToneSevaavTO  iv  xiapio)  "A  p  ^  a  /oi  t  i'  ii>  i* 

(p.  24,  A).  I  suspect  that  Arzanene  is 
here  intended. 

36  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  24,  B. 
3  8  Ibid.  p.  24.  D. 

37  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  9;  p.  25,  B. 

3«  Theophanes  tells  us  that,  after  cap- 
turing Amida,  Kobad  sent  out  plunder- 
ing expeditions  which  ravaged  ail  Meso- 
potamia as  far  a.s  Si/rin  (Chronograph. 
p  126.  B).  Edessa  was  threatened  (Pro- 
cop. B.  P.  ii.  13;  p.  120,  B);  Constantia 
submitted  (ibid.). 

39  Procop.  B.  P.i.  8:  p.  24,  D.    Theo 


phanes  speaks  of  the  invaders  as 
"  Cadusinns  and  others"  (Chron.  p.  127. 
B).  But  Procopius  calls  them  "  Humi.  ' 
which  is  his  ordinary  name  for  the 
Ephthalites. 

<<>Theophan.  Chron.  p.  127,  A:  Pro- 
cop. B.  P.  p.  25,  A ;  Marcellin.  Chron.  p 
49. 

<>  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. 

"  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  25,  B. 

<3  The  capture  of  Glones  is  related  at 
length  by  Procopitis  (H.  P.  i.  0;  pp.  3.5-rii; 
alluded  toby  Theophanes  (Chron.  p.  126, 

**  From  Procopius  alone  we  should 
have  conclndcd  IhMt  tlii»  siirrender  of 
Amiriaand  thn  conchisioii  of  the  seven 
years'  iicncr  were  Hm'  .M'pjirati'  tniiis.ic- 
"tions.  (See  the  Bill.  /Vr.s.  i  0.  p.  -r,  > 
But  Theophanes  distinctly  regards  tU» 


676 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[en.  XIX, 


two  matters  as  parts  of  a  single  arrange- 
ment (Chron.  p.  127,  B,  C);  and  proba- 
bility is  on  Ijis  side. 

**  Procopius  gives  "Aspebedes"  as  the 
name  of  the  ambassador.  But  Aspebe- 
des  is  clearly  the  modern  Espebad,  a 
title  of  office,  corresponding  to  the  Ar- 
menian Sparapet  (or  Spahapet),  "  com- 
mander-in-chief." (See  Patkanian  in 
the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  114.) 
The  ambassador's  sister  was  married 
to  Kobad,  and  was  the  mother  of  Chos- 
roes.     (Procop.  B.  P.  i.  11;  p.  30,  A.) 

<6  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  9;  p.  25,  C. 

«'  Ibid.  p.  27,  D. 

*s  See  the  expression  of  Procopius 
(1.  S.  c);  Tov  TTpbs  Ovvvovi;  TToAejaou  jxriKV- 
voiJ-ivov ,  and  compare  p.  29,  B,  D, 
wlience  it  appears  that  Kobad  com- 
l)lained  of  the  conduct  of  the  Romans 
as  soon  as  his  war  with  the  Huns  was 
ended,  and  that  almost  immediately 
afterwards  Anastasius  died. 

••9  See  text,  pp.  396  and  404. 

50  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  10;  p.  29,  C. 

"  Ibid.  p.  29,  A;  Johann.  Malal.  xvi.  p. 
41,  C:  Johann.  Lydus,  De  Magistrat.  iii. 
47,  ad  lin.;  Theophan.  p.  129,  A. 

52  .Johann.  Malal.  1.  s.  c;  Evagrius, 
H.  E  iii.  37. 

53  Procopius  well  says  of  Daras  and 

Theodosiopolis,  e7r(.TcixiV;u.aTa  T17  avTuiV 
(s.  C.  T<i>v  TleptTuiv)  X'"Pf  y^yoviv  afjL<f>ii>. 
(B.  p.  i.  10,  ad  fin.) 

54  See  text,  p.  404. 

"  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  29,  B. 

*«  Ibid.  p.  29,  C. 

5''  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
36. 

'*  Zilgibis  is  the  form  used  by  J.  Mala- 
las  (Clironogr.  xvii.  p.  48,  C,  D);  Ziligdes 
that  found  in  Theophanes  (Chron.  p. 
143,  A). 

59  So  the  contemporary,  J.  Malalas 
(xvii.  p.  47,  C.  D).  Theophanes  makes 
Tzath  receive  his  crown  from  Kobad  and 
then  desert  to  the  Romans  (p.  144,  B). 
The  Paschal  Chronicle  follows  J.  Mala- 
las (vol.  1.  p.  332,  A). 

«"  The  figure  of  Justin  was  embroider- 
ed upon  Tzath's  robes.  His  diadem  was 
of  Roman  fashion.  (See  J.  Malal.  p.  47, 
D.  E). 

«»  Theophan.  p.  143,  A. 

'2  Justin  was  sixty-eight  at  his  acce.s- 
sion  (a.d.  518),  and  would  consequently 
be  seventy -two  in  a.d.  522.  If  Kobad 
was  eighty-two  at  his  death  in  a.d.  531, 
as  John  of  Malala  declares  (xviii.  p.  211, 
D),  he  would  be  seventy-three  in  a.d. 
5'22.  I  suspect  that  he  was  really  older, 
since  he  is  called  an  old  man  in  a.d.  502 
by  J.  Lydus  (De  Magistrat.  iii.  53). 

"3  So  the  Roman  writers  (Procop  B.  P. 
i.  11;  p.  30,  A;  compared  with  Theo- 
phan. Chron.  p.  145,  C).  Tabari  gives 
him  ten  sons  (Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  148). 

s-i  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  11 ;  pp.  30-32;  Tlieo- 
phan.  Chron.  p.  143.  C.  D. 

"^  Thi-  (.'round  of  the  refusal  is  said  to 
have  been,  that,  as  Justin  had  no  natu- 
ral son,  a  sou  by  adoption  might  have 


claimed  to  be  his  heir,  and  therefore  to 
inherit  from  him  the  Roman  Empire  1 

•«  See  text,  p.  433. 

"  The  only  ancient  writer  who  gives 
this  history  at  length,  Theophanes,  calls 
the  sectaries  "Manichees;"  but  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Mazdakites 
are  intended.  (See  Dr.  Plate's  article  on 
the  SASSANiDiE  in  Smith's  Diet,  of  Ok. 
and  Pom.  Biography,  vol.  iii.  p.  719) 

8s  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  11;  p.  30,  A. 

•9  As  a  Mazdakite  (Theophan.  Chron. 
p.  145,  C). 

'"John  of  Blalala  places  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Mazdakites  (Manichees) 
somewhat  later,  apparently  in  a.d.  529. 
(See  his  Chronographia,  xviii.  p.  61,  C.) 

'1  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  12;  p.  33,  B. 

^2  See  Herod  i.  140;  Strab.  xv.  3,  §  20; 
Agathias,  ii.  p.  60.  Compare  Vendiddd, 
Farg.  v.  to  Farg.  viii. 

'3  These  people  are  called  "  Huns"  by 
the  Byzantines  (Procop.  B.  P.  i.  12:  p. 
33,  D;  Job.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  56,  A),  who, 
however,  use  the  term  too  vaguely  for 
us  to  be  sure  that  real  Huns  are  in- 
tended. 

■<*  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  34,  C. 

"  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  34,  D. 

"Chnton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  746. 

"  See  Job.  Malal.  Chronograph,  xviii. 
p.  60.  B. 

'8  To  the  Lazic  war  of  this  period  seem 
to  belong  the  notices  in  Johann.  Malal. 
xviii.  p.  153,  C;  Chron.  Paschale,  vol.  i. 
p.  335,  and  Theophanes.  p.  149,  A.  The 
Roman  generals  quarrelled  among  them- 
selves, and  finally  the  Roman  troops 
were  withdrawn  from  the  country. 

"  See  text,  p.  438. 

*"  Joh.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  54,  B. 

"Procop.  £.  P.  i.  13;  p.  35,  B.  For 
the  position  of  Martyropolis,  see  ibid.  1. 
21 :  p.  62,  C. 

82  John  of  Malala  supplies  here  many 
facts  not  noted  by  Procopius,  but  quite 
consistent  with  his  narrative  (Chrono- 
graph, xviii.  p.  60,  B,  C). 

83  Johann.  Blalal.  xviii.  p.  60,  C;  Pro- 
cop. B.  P.  i.  13;  p.  .35,  C,  D. 

8  4  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  35,  D. 

8  5  Ibid. 

88  Ibid.  p.  37,  A. 

8'  The  name  Perozes  is  given  by  Pro- 
copius only  (B.  P.  p.  36,  C).  The  title 
Mihran  is  given,  as  if  a  proper  name,  by 
John  of  Malala  (Chronograph,  xviii.  p. 
60.  C). 

88  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  37,  A. 

89  Ibid.  p.  36,  C. 

9"  See  the  narrative  of  Procopius  (B. 
P.  pp.  37-8). 

91  Procop.  i.  14,  ad  init. 

92  The  following  were  the  letters  which 
passed  between  the  two  leaders,  if  we 
may  trust  Procopius.  Belisarius  wrote: 
"It  is  admitted  by  all  those  who  have 
even  the  smallest  .share  of  wisdom,  that 
peace  is  a  good  which  excels  all  others. 
Wherefore,  if  a  man  be  a  disturber  of 
peace,  he  will  cause  evil  not  only  to 
neighboring  nations,  but  a,lso  to  his  owu 


CH.  XIX.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


X)H 


kith  and  kin.    And  he  truly  is  the  best 
general  who  proves  himself  capable  of 
bringing  peace  out  of  war.    But  thou, 
when  Rome  and  Persia  were  on  the  best 
of  terms,  didst  force  upon  us  a  war  for 
which  there  was  no  reason,  since  our  re- 
spective kings  were  peaceably  disposed 
towards  each  other,  and  ambassadors 
had  come  and  were  at  no  great  distance, 
empowered  to  reconcile  our  differences 
—ambassadors,  I  say,  who  will  even  now 
arrange  terms  of  peace  between  us.  if 
no    insurmountable    impediment    arise 
from  this  iuvasion.    I  pray  thee,  with- 
draw thy  force  instantly  into   Persian 
territory,  and  be  not  an  obstacle  to  the 
prosperity  of  thy  country,  lest  perad- 
ventnre  thy  countrymen  shall  cast  on 
thee  the  blame  of  what  they  may  here- 
after   suffer."      Perozes    replied:     "I 
would  have  done  that  which  is  requested 
of  me,  convinced  by  what  thou  hadst 
written,  if  I  had  not  bethought  myself 
that  the  letter  came  from  Romans,  who 
are  always  ready  to  promise,  but  little 
inclined  to  perform  their  promises,  even 
when  they  have  sworn  to  them.    It  is 
on  account  of  the  deceits  which  you 
have  practised  upon  us  that  we  have 
been  compelled  to  take  up  arms;  there- 
fore, my  Roman   friends,  you  may  be 
sure  that  you  will  have  to  meet  the  Per- 
sians in  battle.    Our  resolution  is  taken 
either  to  compel  you  to  do  us  justice,  or 
else    to    hold    our  ijresent  position  till 
death  or  old  age  disable  us."    Belisarius 
made  the  following  rejoinder:— "  It  is 
wrong,  most  excellent  Mirrhanes,  to  in- 
dulge  in    vain    boasting,    and    wrong, 
moreover,  to  tax  one's  neighbors  with 
crimes  to  which  they  are  strangers.  We 
said  with  truth  that  Rutinus  was  near  at 
uand,  and  had  brought  with  him  terms 
of  peace— you  yourself  will  not  be  able 
CO  deny  this  much  longer.    If,  however, 
you  are  bent  on  fighting,  we  shall  meet 
you  confidently  in  the  belief  that  God  is 
on  our  side.     We  have  conciliated  His 
favor  by  the  fairness  of  our  proceedings, 
while  your  arrogance  and  rejection  of 
the  conditions  of  peace  which  we  offered 
must  have  offended  Him.    To  mark  the 
justice  of  our  cause,  we  shall  attach  to 
our  standards,  ere  we  engage,  the  docu- 
ments which  we  have    exchanged    re- 
cently."    Perozes  answered  to  this:— 
"We,  too,  believe  that  we  have  not  be- 
gun this  war  without  the  sanction  of  our 
own  gods;    under  their  protection   we 
shall  attack  you ;  and  we  trust  that  their 
aid  will  enable  us  to  take  Daras  to-mor- 
row.   Have  my  bath  and  my  breakfast 
in  readiness  for  me  within  the  walls.' 
(See  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  14:  pp.  38-9.) 
»3  Procop.  p.  40,  D. 
«<  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  41,  B,  C,  D. 
»6Ibid.  p.  42,  A. 

•'  'Iicai'bi'    auTois    KaTe<t>aii'€TO    t'iv 
axpaii^i'T}     SiaauxraaOat  •      fioKpou_ 
vpo  I'ou  'VuiuaiuJi'  Tfj  fiaxT)  fKfiij)  rn  r}jj.epc 
T)(7(Trj8r)0-ai'  nepo-ot.     (PrOCop.  B-  I  ■    i.  14 
^ub  fin.) 


vi.Kr\v 

yap 

mxepa 


"See  text,  p.  441. 

88  The  Pei-sians  are  estimated  at  30,000, 
the  Romans  at  less  than  half  that  num- 
ber (Procop.  i.  1.5;  p.  43,  D). 

'"A  fort 'named  Bolou,  not  far  from 
Theodosiopolis,  and  a  district  called 
Pharangium,  which  lay  between  Persar- 
menia  and  Tzania,  and  had  gold  mines 
in  it,  are  the  gains  mentioned  (ibid.  p. 
44,  C;  p.  45,  D). 

i""Ibid.  pp.  46-7.  Kobad  required 
that  either  Daras  should  be  evacuated 
and  destroyed,  or  that  the  trouble  and 
expense  of  defending  the  pass  of  Der- 
bend  should  be  shared  between  the  two 
nations. 

"01  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  IT;  p.  ."iO,  D,  and  p. 
51,  A;  Johann  Malal.  xviii.  p.  G9,  B; 
Theophan.  vol.  i.  p.  151,  D. 

lo^  Theophanes  says  '■  Chalcedon " 
(1.  s.  c),  but  probably  means  "  Chalcis," 
since  there  was  no  "Chalcedon"  in 
Syria. 

103  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  50,  A;  p.  51,  B. 

104  pi-ocop.  B.  P.  i.  IS,  ad  init. 
'"^So   I'roeopius  (1.  s.  c).     John  of 

Malala  calls  hmi  Exarath  (xviii.  p.  69, 
B). 

'"«  John  of  Malala  speaks  of  the  Per- 
sian arm}'  as  passing  6ta  toO  KipKrjcTtou, 
which  in  classical  Greek  would  mean 
"  through  Circesium;"  but  his  language 
is  so  impure  that  we  nuiy  understand 
him  to  mean  "  passing  by  it,"  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Euphrates.  So  the 
Latin  translator  renders  the  passage 
"Circesium  pnetergressiis.'" 

107  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  52,  C;  Johann. 
Mai.  1.  s.  c.  It  is  curious  that  Proco- 
pius  speaks  of  the  country  invaded  as 
Commaqene.  Commageiie  was  pro- 
perly the  small  tract  at  the  extreme  N.E. 
of  Syria,  having  Samosata  for  its  capi- 
tal, and  not  extending  further  south 
than  lat.  37°.  The  tract  invaded  by 
Azarethes  was  evidently  ("halybonitis, 
all  the  towns  that  are  mentioned  (Hie- 
rapolis.  Batnre,  Barbalissus,  Gabbula, 
&c.)  lying  in  that  region.  The  line  of 
the  Persian  march  is  given  best  by  J. 
Malalas,  who  names  successively  Cir- 
cesium. Callinicus,  and  Gabbula,  and 
places  Roman  troops  in  Hierapolis  and 
Barbalissus. 

""s  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Mon- 
archies, vol.  ii.  p.  406.  2nd  edition. 

'""It    appears  from   John  of   Malala 
that  the  expeditionary  force  was  seen 
as  it  passed  Callinicus,  and  that  intelli- 
gence was  at  once  conveyed  to  Belisa- 
1    rins  at  Daras. 

no  Procop.  R  P.  p.  52,  B. 

'iilbid.  p.  !j.5,  C. 

>i»So  Procopius  (p.  52.  C),  wlioso 
authority  on  such  a  point  must  be  pre- 
ferred to  Hint  of  J.  Malalas.  The  latter 
places  Belisarius  nt  Barbalissus,  thirty 
miles  enst  of  Gabbula. 

"3  Procop.  p.  .^3,  A. 

"<Ibid.  Compare  Jo.  Malal.  xviii.  p. 
70.  C. 

""•The  battle  was  fought  upon  Eas 


678 


THE  SEVKNTll  MOyAUClIY. 


[CH.  XX. 


ter  Eve,  when  the  Christians  of  the  sixth 
century  fasted  till  after  nightfall  (Pro- 
cop,  p.  53,  B). 

'i«Procop.  p.  66,  D. 

1"  Ibid.  p.  62,  C.  Compare  Jo.  Malal. 
xviii.  p.  7.S,  A,  B. 

ii8  procop.  p.  64   B. 

119  Jo.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  73,  O. 

120  Procop.  p.  63,  B;  Mirkhond,  p.  359. 

121  Jo.  Malal.  1.  s.  c. 

122  Procop.  i.  11;  p.  30,  A;  Mirkhond, 
p.  avi. 

'23  See  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 
vol.  viii,  pp.  78-83;  vol.  xii.  pp.  13-19; 
and  Thomas  in  the  Numismatic  Chron- 
icle for  1873,  pp.  230-232.  Both  authori- 
ties agree  as  to  the  meaning  of  afzui  or 
afzu.  (See  Zeitschr.  viii.  p.  79;  Num. 
Chron.  p.  231,  note  21.) 

i2'i  Kobad,  it  is  evident,  counted  to  his 
reign  the  two  years  during  which  Za- 
masp  was  king,  as  well  as  those  during 
which  he  actually  reigned.  His  two 
reigns  (ll-|-30)  comprised  really  but 
forty-one  j'ears.  Forty-three,  however, 
is  the  number  usually  assigned  to  him. 
(See  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  151;  Mirkhond,  p. 
3.58;  Jo.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  73,  D;  Eutych. 
vol.  ii.  p.  176.) 

12S  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  pp.  78-83;  Thomas  in  Num.  Chron. 
for  1873,  p.  232. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

1  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  21;  p.  63,  C. 

2  Ibid.  ^d<TKii>v  ox)Siva  ^prjuai  avTotiarov 
i<;  TTji'  PaaiXeiav  ievai,  dAAd  i/"?</><}>  Ilepcrwi' 
tCjv  Aoyi^JiUiv. 

3  Zames  (see  p.  440).  It  is  uncertain 
what  had  become  of  Phthasuarsas. 

<  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  23;  p.  66,  B.  Xoo-poTjs 
6  KaPdSov  araxTos  Te  iji'  ttji'  Sidvoiav  Koi 
veuiT€pit)v  Trpayfjidrwi'    aTonos    ipadTYj'^. 

6  Ibid.  p.  .30,  A. 

*  Ibid.  ■ETepo(^9aA;aoi'  rj  dWr]  Tipi  Xu)fii(i 
exofiEf'or  oil  fleets    Ilepo-ai;   Ba<Ti\ea   Ka6i<T- 

Taa9ai.    Compare  Herod,  iii.  73. 

'  Procop.  i.  23;  p.  66,  C. 

e  Procop.  p  66,  D. 

»  Ibid.  pp.  67-8. 

1"  Mirkhond,  pp.  62-3;  Tabari,  vol.  ii. 
p.  159. 

iiMebodes  was  "commanded  to  re- 
pair to  the  iron  tripod  which  stood  be- 
fore the  gate  of  the  palace,  where  it  was 
death  to  relieve  or  approach  the  victim, 
and  languished  there  several  days  be- 
fore his  sentence  was  pronounced  by 
the  son  of  Kobad."  (See  Gibbon,  De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  183;  and  com- 
pare Procop.  i.  23;  p.  68,  D.) 

12  Procop.  p.  68,  B. 

1'  J.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  213,  ad  init. 

1*  Ty)v  dnepavToi'  Ka\ov^i€VTjv  elprivrjv. 
(Procop.  B.  p.  i.  22;  p.  6.5,  D.  Compare 
ii.  3;  p.  94,  B,D;  B.  Goth.  iv.  14;  p.  607, 
B.) 

1*  For  the  terms  of  the  peace,  compare 
J.  M.ilal.  xviii.  p.  219  with  Procop.  if.  P. 
i.  22;  pp.  65-6. 

isSwtext,  p.  434. 


1'  Marcellin.  Chron.  p.  64. 

1^  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  v»l 
V.  pp.  101-114. 

19  Ibid.  pp.  121-123. 

2»  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  pp. 
132-154. 

21  See  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  26,  ad  init.;  ii. 
1,  2,  &c. 

22  Ibid.  i.  26;  p.  79,  C,  D.  Chosroes 
cloaked  his  insolence  under  a  mask  of 
f acetiousness ;  but  it  can  scarcely  have 
been  the  less  offensive  on  that  account. 

23  Ibid.  ii.  2;  pp.  89-90;  ii.  3;  pp.  93  1. 
2<  The    allusion  here  was  to  certain 

transactions  between  Justinian  and  Ala- 
mundarus,  the  slieikh  of  the  Saracens 
dependent  on  Persia,  wiio,  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Chosroes,  had  commenced  hos- 
tilities against  one  of  the  Roman  vassal- 
kings,  about  A.D.  538  (Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  1). 

26  He  had  been  killed  by  the  rebels  in 
Armenia.    (Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  3 ;  p.  92,  C.) 

2«  See  text,  p.  445. 

2'  Zenobia  was  in  the  Arabian  desert, 
to  the  west  of  the  Euphrates;  the  other 
towns  mentioned  were  on  the  opposite, 
or  Roman,  side. 

28  Gibbon  turns  Suron  into  Dura;  but 
Dura  was  on  the  Tigris.  Suron  appears 
as  a  Roman  town  on  the  Euphrates,  not 
only  in  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  5.  but  also  in  i. 
18;  p.  53,  B,  and  in  Agathias,  Prcefat.  p. 
9  A. 
'  29  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  5;  pp.  98-9. 

'"  EtTe  ^iXavOpoiiria  ei-€  (j>i.KoxpriiJ.aTi(f 
ixop-evo^  (ibid.  p.  99,  C). 

31  Ibid.  ii.  6;  p.  102,  B. 

3  2  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  6;  p.  102,  C. 

33  Ibid.  p.  103,  D. 

34  Ibid.  ii.  7;  p.  102,  D. 

35  See  text,  p.  283. 

3«  J.  Malal.  xvii.  p.  143;  Procop.  B.  P. 
ii.  14;  p.  122.  C;  Theophan.  Chronograph. 
p.  147,  C;  Evagrius,  H.  E.  iv.  5,  6;  Mar- 
cellin. Chron.  Tp.  61. 

3'  J.  Lydus,  De  Magistral,  iii.  54.  This 
feature  has  not  been  commonly  noticed. 

38  Theophan.  p.  151,  D.  Justin  had 
also  subscribed  largely  to  the  restora- 
tion (ibid.  p.  348,  A,  B). 

39  J.  Lydus.  1.  s.  c. 

••»  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  6;  p.  101,  B.  The 
defect  was  ob.served  by  Germantis  on 
his  arrival,  and  plans  were  proposed  by 
him  for  remedying  it ;  but  it  was  t  bought 
imprudent  to  call  attention  to  the  weak 
point,  and  so  nothing  was  done. 

<ilbid.  p.  101,  A. 

"Ibid.  ii.  3;  p,  92,  C,  D. 

■•3  Ibid.  ii.  6:  p.  100,  B. 

"Ibid.  7;  p.  103,  D. 

*5  BoiJ^T/S  .  .  .  d.T!iiav  (ayero  KaoTTOt  ttotc 
yrj^  €Tvy\ai'€i'  cure  Ti?  Ttoi'  €v  'lepaTroAei  'Poj- 
fxaiojv  ovT€  6  Twi*  TToAe/jtioji'  crrpaTO?  /xa^ctr 
icrxvcrei^.    (Procop,  B.  P.  ii.  6;  p.  101,  A.> 

■•6  Ibid.  ii.  8;  p.  105,  C. 

4'  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  8;  pp.  106-108. 

48  The  cathedral  was  spared  on  the 
ground  that  the  riches  found  in  it  niiglit 
be  considered  its  ransom.  The  church 
of  St.  Julian  and  some  neighboring 
houses  yvere  left  standing  as  forming 


CH.  XX.] 


THE  SEVENTH  M0NABGH7. 


679 


the  residence  of   Justinian's  ambassa- 
dors (ibid,  ii.  10;  p.  Ill,  B). 

4»ll)id.  p.  118,  D. 

6"  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  11;  p.  113,  A.  So, 
fourteen  centuries  earlier,  the  great  As- 
shur-izir  pal,  on  first  reaching  the  Medi- 
terranean, '"erected  altars  and  offered  i 
sacrifices  to  the  gods  of  Assyria."  (An- 
cient Monarchies,  vol.  ii.  p.  89,  2nd  ed.) 

61  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  11;  p.  114,  A,  B. 
Gilibon  gives  the  impression  that  the 
saored  relic  itself  was  adorned  with  gold 
and  gems  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
190) ;  but  Procopius  distinctly  states  that 
the  adornment  was  confined  to  the  case 
(©iJKrji/)  containing  it. 

^3  This  is  probabh)  the  meaning  of 
Procopius  (B.  P.  ii.  11;  p.  115,  A),  since 
he  makes  Chosroes  propose  the  terms  to 
the  bishop;  but  otherwise  he  might  be 
understood  as  speaking  of  all  the  valua- 
bles within  the  town. 

03  Ibid.  p.  11.5,  C. 

'<  On  the  factions  of  the  amphithea- 
tre, which,  beginning  at  Constantinople, 
spread  to  the  provincial  capitals,  see 
Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  pp. 
48-55.  The  presidency  of  Chosroes.  in 
the  Antiochian  hippodrome  is  related 
by  Procopius  (B.  P.  ii.  11;  p.  115,  C,  D). 

"Ibid.  ii.  12;  p.  116,  B. 

69  Ibid.  p.  116,  D. 

"  ri)id.  p.  119,  A,  B. 

68  Ibid.  ii.  13;  p.  120,  A. 

69  Ibid.  pp.  120-1. 
«»Ibid.  p.  119,  C. 

«>  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  13;  p.  121,  D. 

«2Ibid. 

«3  Here  the  Oriental  accounts  are  in 
entire  accord  with  the  Greek.  Mirkliond 
(p.  366)  and  Tabari  (ii.  p.  160)  relate  at 
length  the  construction  of  this  new  An- 
tiocli  in  the  vicinity  of  Al  Alodain,  add- 
ing that  the  name  given  to  it  was  Rumia 
(Rome),  and  that  it  was  an  exact  copy 
of  the  town  upon  the  Orontes. 

«■'  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  14;  p.  123,  A,  B. 

«6  See  text,  p.  430. 

"  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  15;  p.  123,  D. 

«'  Ibid.  p.  124.  B. 

'"The  Lazi  imported  salt,  corn,  and 
other  necessaries  from  abroad  (il).  p. 
I2:j,  D);  the  Roman  governor  under  Jus- 
tinian, John  Tzibus,  required  that  these 
commodities  should  be  purchased  from 
iioiiM  but  liiinself  (ib.  p.  124,  C). 

•"<  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  15;  pp.  124-6. 

'"The  Argonautic  myth  implies  the 
early  importance  of  Coichis,  either  as  a 
gold-pr(idu(ung,  or  possibly  merely  as  a 
gold-exporting  country.  The  story  of 
the  Egyptian  colony  settled  there  by 
Sesostris  (Herod,  ii.  103-5)  is  one  on 
which  it  would  be  uncritical  to  place 
much  reliance  But  th^re  is  satisfactory 
evidPTice  oC  the  trading  importance  of 
Colchis  from  the-  fourth  to  the  first  cen- 
tury n.r.  in  the  latrr  classical  writers. 
I.St-e  Strab.  Geoi/raph  xi.  2,  §  IT;  Pa- 
irocl.  Fi-.  T:  and  I'lin    //.  N.  vi.  17.) 

"  See  above,  note  OS. 


"Procop.  B.  P.  it.  15;  p.  123,  D,  and 
ii.  IT;  p.  128,  B. 

'3  So  Procopius  (B.  P.  ii.  15;  p.  125,  D). 
Gibbon  supposes  the  idea  to  have  origi- 
nated with  Chosroes  (Decline  and  Fall, 
vol.  V.  p.  200).  That  the  Romans  took 
the  same  view  of  the  importance  of 
Lazica  as  Chosroes  appears  from  Aga- 
thias  (Hist.  ii.  18;  p.  56,  A). 

'♦  Procop.  B.  P.  li.  15,  ad  fin. 

^6  Ibid.  il.  IT.;  pp.  128  9. 

"Ibid.  ii.  16;  p.  126.  D. 

"  Ibid.  ii.  18,  ad  init. 

"  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  18 ;  pp.  131-2. 

'9  Ibid.  ii.  19,  sub  init. 

80  Procoj).  B.  P.  ii.  19,  ad  fin. 

81'Ana  rjpi  apxo/j.fi'w  Xocrpoi;?  6  Ka^aJow 
TO  TpiTOv  fTTpaTfi}  fxtydAut  €?  yiji'  ttjv  'Pw^at- 
0)1'  ja-i^aWe.  (Ibid.  11.20.  ad  i7iit.)  And 
a  little  later:  €7rei  £e  «  t'tiv  Kofj-ayriviot/ 
XMpav  6  XoirpoT)?  ai^iKero.  Comniagene 
was  now  the  name  given  to  Upper  Syria 
generally.    (See  note  lOT,  Chapter  XIX.) 

"^Theophan.  Chronograph,  p  186,  A; 
Cedrenus,  Hi.st.  Compend.  p.  372,  B. 

"^  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  21,  ad  init. 

»*  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  21,  sub  fin. 

66  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  778. 

80  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  24,  ad  init. 

87  Ibid.  il.  21,  ad  fin. 

88  Ibid.  ii.  24;  p.  148,  C. 

89  Ibid.  p.  149,  A. 

90  Gibbon  speaks  of  "the  camp  of 
D^ibis'"  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
193);  but  Anglon  was  120  stades  (four- 
teen miles)  from  Dubis  (Procop.  ii.  35; 
p.  149,  D). 

91  Procop.  p.  151.  C. 

93  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  26;  p.  152,  A. 
93  See  text,  p.  SOT. 
9*  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  26-7. 
96  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  159,  B. 
9«  Ibid.  il.  28;  p.  159,  D. 
9'  Ibid.  p.  160,  A.    Compare  Marcellln. 
Chron.  p.  74. 

98  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  28;  pp.  160-1. 

99  Ibid.  pp.  161-2. 

'00  The  tale  is,  that  Chosroes  profess- 
ing to  send  an  ambassador  to  Justinian, 
who  was  to  pass  through  T>aras,  gave 
him  a  train  of  5(><)  pii'ked  soldiers,  with 
oriler.s  that  these  men  should  fire  tlia 
houses  in  which  they  slept,  and  then,  in 
the  confusion  that  was  .sure  to  follow, 
should  open  the  gates  and  admit  a  large 
Persian  force.  The  Romans,  suspecting 
the  design,  refused  to  reccivf  more  than 
twenty  of  the  r,00  into  the  town.  It  is 
evident  that  here  the  basis  of  fact  Is  tlm 
arrival  of  a  Persian  amliassador  at  the 
gates  of  Daras  with  a  train  of  unusual 
size.  The  re*  is  mere  Roman  (or  rather 
Greek)  suspicion. 

•01  Ibid.  ii.  29;  p.  16.3.  D. 

103  Procop.  //.  P.  ii.  29;  p.  161.  B.  Salt, 
wine,  and  corn  an-  especially  mentioned 
among  the  commodities  retpiired.  Y^t 
at  pre.sent  Mingrclia.  though  wi-ftehedly 
cultivated,  produces  maizt".  millet,  and 
barley  in  abundance  dlaxthausen, 
Transcaucaeia,  p.    19);    the  trees   are 


680 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XX 


everywhere  festooned  with  vines,  which 
grow  naturally  (ib.  p.  lb);  and  "  yield  a 
very  tolerable  wine"  (p.  31);  wliile  salt 


is  one  of  the  main  products  of  the  neigh- 
boring Georgia  (ib.  p.  81). 

103  Procop.  1.  s.  c. 

io<  Ibid.  p.  160,  C,  and  p.  161,  C. 

115  Ibid.  ii.  29;  p.  163,  C,  D. 

106  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  29.  30;  B.  Goth.  iv. 
8-16:  Agath.  ii.  18-22;  iii.  2-28;  iv.  1-23. 

""Agath.  ii.  18;  p.  56,  A;  Procop. 
B.  P.  ii.  15;  p.  125,  D;  ii.  28;  p.  161,  A; 
B.  Goth.  iv.  7;  p.  582,  B. 

i»8Haxthausen,  p.  22,  note:  "The 
soil  is  incredibly  rich  and  prolific." 

109  "During  the  whole  day  our  road 
lay  through  forests,  and  what  noble 
forests!  In  the  southern  acclivities  of 
the  Caucasus,  the  tree-vegetation  of  the 
north  is  found  together  with  that  of  the 
south;  and  I  have  rarely  seen  finer 
beeches,  oaks,  elms,  fir-trees,  inter- 
spersed with  planes,  chestnuts,  walnuts, 
olives,  laurels,  and  cherry-trees,  the  na- 
tive habitat  of  which  last  may  be  said 
to  be  Mingrelia."    (Ibid.  p.  17.) 

110  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  29;  B.  G.  iv.  2. 

111  As  especially  the  Khopi,  which 
forms  the  poi-t  of  Redout-Kaleh  (Hax- 
thausen,  p.  16). 

112  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  163,  A. 

lis  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  17;  p.  128,  C. 

114  Procop.  £.  Goih.  iv.  12;  p.  599,  B. 
Among  the  most  remarkable  of  these 
was  a  conduit,  with  three  channels 
placed  one  under  the  other,  which  con- 
tinued to  supply  the  town  with  water 
after  the  upper  and  middle  courses  had 
been  obstructed. 

115  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  29;  p.  164,  A.  Gib- 
bon {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  201) 
confuses  the  original  victualling  of  Pe- 
tra  with  its  revictualling  (see  text.  p. 
4(37).  The  great  supplies  found  when 
the  Romans  took  the  place  (Procop.  B. 
G.  p.  599,  A)  must  be  ascribed  to  the  re- 
victualling. 

ii«  Procop.  B.  P.  p.  16.5,  D. 
11' Ibid.  ii.  29;  p.  166,  B. 

118  Ibid.  ii.  30;  p.  166,  D. 

119  Ibid.  p.  168,  A. 
i2»  Ibid.  p.  169,  B. 

121  Procop.  B.  P.  ii.  30;  pp.  169-170. 
'22  Procop.  B.  Goth.  iv.  1. 
i^^Ibid.  iv.  8. 

124  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  9,  ad  init. 
i2sibid.  iv.  11;  p.  593,  B. 

p.  ,599,  A. 

p.  592,  C. 

difference 
to   have 


i2«Ibid. 

127  Ibid. 

ran  The 
struction 
^^■hereas 


iv.  12; 
iv.  11; 
chief 
seems 


con- 
that, 
were 


in  the 
been, 
the     ordinary    engines 
formed  of  solid  beams,  in  the  new  ones 
the  beams  were  replaced  by  a  number 
of    light  rods  tied  together.    (Procop. 
B.  G.  iv.  11;  p.  593,  D.) 
i2«  Ibid.  p.  594,  C. 
i3»Ihid.  p.  595.  A. 

131  These  were  Armenian  mountain- 
eers (ibid.  p.  .596,  B). 

132  Ibid.  p.  596,  A. 
i"IbJd.  p.  596,  CD. 


134  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  12;  pp.  597-8. 

135  Clinton,  F.  B.  vol.  i.  p.  792. 
i3«See  text,  p.  466. 

13'  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  13;  p  601,  A.  The 
writer  justly  admires  the  Persian  skill 
and  industry  in  making  the  wild  and 
mountainous  Lazica  practicable,  not 
only  for  cavalry,  but  for  the  ponderous 
elephant. 

138  'o  Be'<7(Tas  Toi'  Herpas  TrepcjSoXoi'  ii 
(Sa<l)0^  KaeeiKfv.     (Ibid.  p.  599,  D.) 

138  Ibid.  p.  602,  D.  Compare  iv.  16;  p, 
611,  C. 

1"  Procop.  B.  G.iv.  14;  Agath.  Hist. 
ii.  19,  ad  init. 

1"  Procop.  B.  G.  p.  611,  D. 

1*2  The  modern  Kutais  is  undoubtedly 
the  ancient  Cotj-aeum,  Cutatisium,  or 
Cotaisis  of  Procopius  and  Agatliias. 
The  similarity  of  name  is  supported  by 
the  descriptions  given  of  the  locality. 
(See  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  14;  p.  607,  A; 
Agath.  ii.  19;  p.  56,  B;  and  compare 
Haxthausen,  Transcaucasia,  p.  28.) 

143  The  position  of  Scymnia  is  uncer- 
tain. Suania  appears  to  have  lain  N.  E. 
of  Lazica,  on  the  flanks  of  the  Caucasus. 
The  inhabitants  of  this  region  still  call 
themselves  Suans.  (Max  Miiller,  Lan- 
guages of  the  Seat  of  War,  p.  114.) 

144  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  16,  sub  fin. 

145  Ibid.  iv.  11;  p.  591,  D.  Procopius 
specifies  one  of  these  alleged  infractions 
only.  viz.  the  encouragement  given  to 
Arethas  to  attack  Alamundarus;  but  he 
admits  that  Isdigunas  made  other 
charges. 

146  Ibid.  iv.  15,  sub  init.  This  was  at 
the  rate  of  400  pounds  for  each  year  of 
peace,  and  included  a  year  and  a  half  of 
negotiations. 

14'  Compare  Procop.  l.s.c.  with  Agath. 
ii.   18.    The  latter  writer  says:    "OAiyui 

e/J-npocrdev  eKf^^'P"^"  fTeTOirji'TO  ['Piojiatoi 
Ka'i  Ilipaai],  €<!>'  to  nivTOi  ov  TeAeiOTarrjv 
ayeii'  eip^frjf ,  ovSi  W(TT6  TrdvToBi.  Twi"  KivSv- 
voiv  TTGiravaOai,  ctAA'  baov  fxoi'ov  avo.  ttjj'  eoi, 
Ka'i  TO.  T^?  'Ap^enas  opia  e/caTepw  yeVei  «r- 
TTfltrOai,  aii.<j>l  &e  Trjv  KoAx'^"'  yV'^  '''•"'  fo^f" 
/lor  dLa<^ep€iV. 

148  Procop.  B.  G.  iv.  15;  pp.  608-9. 

149  Agathias.  ii  19;  p.  56,  D. 

150  Ibid.  ii.  20;  p.  58,  B. 

151  Ibid.  ii.  21;  p.  59,  A. 

152  Ibid.  ii.  22;  p.  60,  A. 

153  Agath.  ii.  22;  p.  60,  B. 

154  '\ySpa  Tuiv  c<l>6Spa  \oyiti.o>v  Kcu,  ovojua- 
aToTdTutv.     (Ibid   iii.  2;  p.  73,  C.) 

156  Ibid    p.  73.  D. 

158  Ibid.  iii.  3;  p.  75. 

15' Agath.  iii.  4;  p.  76,  B. 
isKIbid.  iii.  9-11. 

159  Ibid.  iii.  8;  p.  80,  D. 

160  Ibid.  iii.  6:  p.  78,  B. 

161  Ibid.  iii.  14;  p.  89,  C. 

162  Ibid.  iii.  15;  pp.  90-1. 

163  Agath.  iii.  15.  ad  init.;  17;  p.  92,  C. 

164  Ibid  iii.  18;  p.  94,  C. 

165  Ibid. 

If-    Ibid.  iii.  20. 

16' Ibid.  iii.  21;  p.  96,  D. 

168  Ibid.  p.  97,  A,  B. 


CH.  XX.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


681 


:«»  Agath.  iii.  23,  ad  init. 

i'»Ibid.  iil.  24. 

'"  Agathias  makes  Justin  lead  these 
troops  out  of  the  city  of  his  own  accord, 
and  without  any  miUtary  purpose;  but 
it  seems  almost  certain  that  what  he 
ascribes  to  accident  was  the  result  of 
design. 

I'a  Agath.  iii.  25-37. 

"3  Two  thousand  near  Archasopolis 
(see  text,  p.  471),  ten  thousand  in  the  bat- 
tle before  Phasis  (Agath.  iii.  27,  ad  fin.), 
and  two  thousand  more  on  the  day  fol- 
lowing (ib.  iii.  28). 

"<Ibid.  iii.  28,  ad  fin. 

'"Agath.  iv.  23.  Agathias  seems  to 
suppose  that  Nachoragan  was  flayed 
alive;  but  he  does  not  actually  assert 
it;  and  we  have  already  shown  (see 
text,  p.  294)  that  it  was  the  flaying 
of  criminals  after  death  which  was  cus- 
tomary in  Persia. 

i'«J.  Malal.  xviii.  p.  81,  A;  Theophan. 
Chronograph,  vol.  i,  p.  195,  B. 

'"  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  808. 

I'SAgath.  iv.  30;  p.  141,  D. 

"»Ibid.  p.  142,  A. 

'"0  Ibid.  Compare  Menand.  Protect. 
Fr.  11,  ad  init. 

"SI  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  pp.  812-3. 

's^  According  to  Menander  (Fr.  11,  pp. 
200-210),  the  ambassador  of  diosroes 
spoke  of  him  in  the  negotiations  of  a.d. 
562  as  having  already  reduced  to  sub- 
jection ten  nations,  and  crushed  tlie 
power  of  the  Ephthalites.  These  wars 
could  scarcely  have  been  carried  on 
simiiltaneousl.v  with  the  war  with  Rome. 

'  83  Menander  wrote  under  the  Empe- 
ror Maurice,  who  reigned  from  a.d.  582 
to  A.D.  602. 

'"■•See  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  11;  pp.208 
and  212-3. 

186  There  was  a  further  provision  that, 
at  the  end  of  the  seven  years,  a  second 

Eayment  in  advance  should  be  made, 
ut  only  for  three  years.  Afterwards 
the  payments  were  to  be  annual  (ibid.  p. 
209) 

"*«  Gibbon  says:  "The  smallness  of 
the  sum  revealed  the  disgrace  of  a  tri- 
bute in  its  naked  deformity"  (Decline 
and  Fall.  vol.  v.  p.  205);  and  again  he 
speaks  of  "  ths  annual  tribute  which  was 
poorly  disguised  by  the  name  of  pen- 
sion" (ib.  p.  364). 

'"Tabari  speaks  of  Rome  as  paying 
tribute  to  'Chosroes  {Chronique.  vol.  ii. 
p.  161).  So  also  Abu-Hanifah  Deinavari, 
quoted  by  Mirkhond  (p.  367). 

»8  See  text,  pp.  4.59  and  465. 

'"»  See  text,  p.  450. 

'""That  the  Ephthalite  war  preceded 
A.D.  562  appears  from  Menand.  Prot.  Fr. 
11;  p.  210.  It  is  not  likely  to  have  been 
begun  while  the  war  with  Rome  con- 
tinued. 

'"  Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  162. 

■"Ibid.  p.  101. 

10' The  remarkable  fulfilment  of  the 
prophecy  In  Oen.  xvi.  12  is  certainly  not 
jnvalidated  by  the  occasional  dominion 


of  foreigners  in  Arabia  during  the  space 
of  4,000  years.  (See  the  remarks  of 
Dean  Milman  in  Smith's  Gibbon,  vol.  v. 
p.  364,  note  a.) 

!'<  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
206. 

"*'  Gibbon  calls  Abraha  "  the  slave  of 
a  Roman  merchant  of  Adulis"  (Decline 
and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  208);  but  the  Orien- 
tal writers  unanimously  represent  him 
as  an  Abyssinian  of  high  rank.  (.See 
Johannseu,  Hist.  Yemunce,  p.  94.)  Ta- 
bari makes  him  a  member  of  the  royal 
family  {Chronique,  vol   ii.  p.  184). 

'""tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  188. 

"'Ibid.  p.  202.  Yaksoum  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  younger  brother,  Masrouq. 

loeProcop.  B.  P.  i.  19.  20;  .lo.  Malal 
Chronograph,  xviii.  pp.  57,  67,  68. 

'"»  Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  203. 

^o"  Ibid.  1).  208.  Masrouq  cursed  Sai'f 
and  liis  fiither.  Saif  knew  by  this  that 
he  could  not  be  the  son  of  the  same 
father  with  Masrouq,  and  forced  his 
mother  to  tell  him  the  truth. 

^oi  Only  eight  hundred,  according  t» 
Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  210);  but  this  is  inj- 
probable.  Ibn-Kutaiba,  as  quoted  by 
Ibn-Khallikan  (Biogr.  Diet.,  vol.  iii.  p. 
672,  E.  T.),  made  the  number  of  men 
sent  by  Chosroes  with  Sai'f  7,500. 

3»2fabari,  p.  211. 

203  Tabari  makes  the  Persians  600,  tli« 
Homerites  5,000.  Masrouq  sends  10,000 
men  against  them,  who  are  defeated. 
He  then  leads  against  them  an  army  of 
100.000,  who  are  equally  unsuccessful. 
He  himself  is  killed  by  the  commander 
of  the  Persian  contingent.  The  success 
of  the  Persians  is  attributed  to  their  use 
of  the  bow,  an  arm  previously  unknown 
in  Yemen! 

"">*  St.  Martin,  Notes  to  Le  Beau,  vol. 
X.  p.  78;  Tabari.  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  215. 

205  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  218. 

2o«  Tabari  (1.  s  c.)  makes  Wahraz  suc- 
ceed Sai'f,  and  gives  him  "a  son  called 
Merzeban."  No  one  can  fail  to  recog- 
nize in  this  pretended  name  the  favorite 
Persian  title. 

30'  Tabari,  p.  221;  Mirkhond,  p.  372. 

*08  Serendib  (Ceylon)  is  said  to  have 
been  the  resideuce'of  the  monarch.  The 
provinces  ceded  are  declared  to  have 
been  those  which  were  previously  ceded 
to  Bahramgur!     (Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  221.) 

2""  On  the  Indian  embassy,  see  Mir- 
khond, p.  375;  Ma(;oudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  202; 
Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  206. 

2'o  In  thedivision  of  his  empire  ascrib- 
ed to  Chosroes,  the  most  eastern  of  his 
provinces  appear  to  have  been  KJiora- 
san,  Seistan,  and  Kirman  (Mirkhond.  p. 
.304).  Gibbon  adds  to  these  "  Cabul  and 
Zablestan"  (l.s.  c),  but  without  much 
reason. 

"11  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  18;  p.  226. 

"1'  Ibid.  p.  225:  "O  K(iToi;A(J>ot  6  ■E<t«a- 
AiTTjs  .  .  .  fiio  r>)»'  «<c  ToO  Kav'  ai'TOv  ^aaiA*- 
cus  yey€t^rifx€i'rji'  fiiaiav  fJii^^v  Tfj  yvvaiKi  npov' 

StoKf  TO  6ix6<f>v\ov  Toi!  ToupKoic  Compitie 
Vi:  10. 


682 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XJC 


213  Ibid.  Fr.  18;  Theophan.  Chrono- 
graph, p.  207,  D;  Clinton.  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p. 
824. 

^^*  'Ev9ev  TOiyapovv  rj  Svdfieveia    rip^aro 

Heptriiv  re  /cat  TovpK(oi>.  (Menand.  Prot. 
1.  s.  c.) 

*i6  So  Clinton  understands  the  words 
of  Menander  (Fr.  20;  iv  opei  tcvI  Aeyonei'u) 
*EKTay,  0J9  av  etTTOt  xpvaovv  opo?  EAAtji' 
avrjp).  And  certainly  the  explanation 
of  the  name  points  in  this  direction. 
Otherwise  the  name  itself  might  seem 
to  point  to  the  modern  Ak  Tagh  (or  Ak 
Tai),  the  "White  Mountains"  directly 
north  of  Samarkand.  With  this  location 
would,  I  think,  agree  best  the  return 
march  of  the  ambassadors  as  described 
in  Fr.  21. 

218  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  20. 

^^''  IJistoire  des  Sassanides,  p.  365. 

iiis  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  32;  Theophy- 
lact.  Sim.  iti.  9. 

2"'  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  308,  A: 

inoveiSiaToy   elvat    (f>opo\oy^L<TQai   vtto    rdu 
Tlep<TC>v  Tous  "Pwjiiacovs.    Compare  Theo- 
phylact.  Sim.  iii.  9,  sub  fin. 
"0  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  15. 

221  Ibid.  Fr.  17,  adfi7i- 

222  The  weight  of  the  various  causes  of 
war  is  differently  estimated  by  different 
writers.  Menander  considers  the  invita 
tion  of  the  Turks  to  have  been  the  chief 
cause  (Fr.  32).  Theophylact  puts  in  the 
foreground  the  Arabian  expedition  and 
the  injuries  of  the  Abj'ssinians  or  Ho- 
merites  (iii.  9).  So  Theophanes  (Chro- 
nograph, p.  206,  D).  Evagrius,  Johannes 
Biclar.,  and  others  give  the  preference 
to  the  state  of  affairs  in  Armenia.  (See 
Evagr.  Hist.  Eccl.,  v.  7.) 

223  St.  Martin,  Memoires  sur  VArmenie, 
vol.  ii.  p.  :i31;  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  35  a; 
Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  7.  The  leader  of  the 
insurrection  was  Vartan,  the  Mamigo- 
nian,  the  son  of  Vart.    (See  text,  p.  424.) 

524  Eighty  years  old.  according  to 
Gibbon  (Decline  and  Full,  vol.  v.  p.  365); 
but  I  do  not  know  his  authority.  Me- 
nander   Protector    uses    the     inexact 

phrase,  ets  eVxoTOi'  yT)pa.';  iX.r)Ka.KM<;  (Fr.  36). 

He  had  been  on  the  throne  above  forty 
years. 

225  The  Arabian  expedition  to  Saif; 
the  Turkish  war  to  his  eldest  son,  Hor- 
mlsdas.    (See  text,  pp.  476,  477.) 

228  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  36:    "Ej>-q  &i, 

a>9  et  TTapad^irj  5dKTv\ov  eVa,  KivrjSrjcreTai, 
Kal  w?  e?  Trfu  llepaiov  eAacrot. 

227  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  8;  Theophylact. 
Simocatt.  iii.  10;  Joh.  Epiphan.  §  3; 
Theophan.  Byz.  §  4.  The  other  Theo- 
phanes (Chronograph,  p.  208,  A)  and 
Zonaras  (vol.  ii.  p.  71,  C)  wrongly  call 
him  Martinus. 

228  Jo.  Epiph.  §  4;  Theophylact.  Sim. 
Ui.  10. 

22»  The  Romans  were  delighted  with 
any  gleam  of  success,  and  the  battle  of 
Sargathon  is  celebrated  by  the  whole 
chorus  of  Byzantine  writers.  The  Ro- 
mans claimed  to  have  killed  1,200  of  the 


enemy,  while  their  own  loss  was  seven! 
(Theophan.  Byz.  §  4.) 

230  The  siege  was  commenced  by  Mar- 
cian;  but,  as  it  made  no  progress,  he 
was  shortly  superseded  by  Acacius  (Jo. 
Epiph.  §4;  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  11). 

231  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  9.  A  portion  of  the 
Roman  army  seems  to  have  thrown  it- 
self into  Mardin  (MapSrjs  or  MapSes).  (See 
Jo.  Epiph.  §  5;  Theophylact.  iii.  11.) 

232  Jo.  Epiph.  §  4;  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  9, 
10;  Theophylact,  1.  s.  c. 

233  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  10;  nip-mov,  KaX  np6g 
ye,  ixfjva.  Theophylact  says  "six  months" 
(1.  s.  c). 

234  Theophan.  Byz.  §  4. 

235  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  11.  Compare 
Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  10,  and  Jo.  Epiph.  §  5, 
where,  however,  the  text  is  mutilated. 
Theophanes  of  Byzantium  (1.  s.  c.)  as- 
cribes the  loss  of  Daras  to  the  Romans 
being  at  variance  among  themselves. 

2s»  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  11;  Theophylact, 
Is  c;  &c. 

237  By  sending  an  embassy  immediate- 
ly upon  the  capture  of  Daras  (Menand. 
Protect.  Fr.  37). 

23S  It  is  not  quite  clear  whether  the 
embassy  of  Zacharias  preceded  or  fol- 
lowed the  nomination  of  Tiberius  as 
Ceesar.  If  Clinton  is  right  in  saying 
that  the  nomination  was  not  made  until 
the  December  of  a.d.  574  (F.  R.  vol.  i.  p. 
834),  there  must  have  been  an  interval 
during  which  the  Empress  Sophia  had 
the  sole  direction  of  affairs.  Tiberius, 
however,  was  her  counsellor  (Menand. 
Prot.  Fr.  37,  suh  fin.). 

238  See  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  40.  The  date 
is  a  year  later;  but  the  sentiments  by 
which  Chosroes  was  actuated  were  prob- 
ably the  same  in  a.d.  574  as  in  the  year 
following. 

240  We  learn  this  fact  from  Menander 
only  (Fr.  38). 

241  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  14. 

242  That  Justinian  and  his  army  reach, 
ed  the  eastern  frontier  early  in  a.d.  575, 
before  the  one  year's  truce  had  expired, 
is  evident  from  John  of  Epiphania  and 
Theophylact.  The  reader  of  Gibbon 
would  suppose  that  they  did  not  arrive 
till  three  years  later. 

243  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  39;  Evagr.  H.  E. 
V.  12. 

244  See  Menander,  Frs.  39  and  40. 

_24s  Jo.  Epiph.  §  5,  suh^n.:    ToO  icaipoO 

T^S  es  o\iyov  yeyevTjpLcVijs  o.va.Kiii\T]'i  Trepatw- 

6ivTo<i.  Compare  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii. 
12;  p.  78,  C. 

246  Jo.  Epiph.  1.  s.  c;  Menand.  Prot. 
Frs.  40  and  50. 

24  7  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  12;  Theophylact. 
Sim.  l.s.  c. 

24  8  Again  we  are  indebted  to  Menander 
for  this  confession  (Fr.  40).  The  other 
Byzantine  writers  carefully  conceal  the 
fact  that  Rome  had  on  each  occasion  to 
pay  for  peace.   Gibbon  omits  to  notice  it. 

249  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  41;  Evagr.  H.  E. 
V.  14. 

"°  The  account  of  Evagriug  (1.  s.  c.)  is 


m.  Tixi.] 


TtlE  SEVENTH  MONAECnT. 


moderate  and  probable.  Theophylact 
(lii.  14)  and  Theopliaiies  (p.  212,  B,  C) 
have  greatly  exaggerated  the  impor- 
tance of  the  victory.  All  three  writers 
absurdly  state  that,  in  consequence  of 
his  danger  on  this  occasion,  ChosroBs 
issued  an  edict  that  no  Persian  king 
should  henceforth  go  out  to  battle! 

261  Theophylact,  iii.  15;  Theophan.  p. 
218,  C.  EvagVius  does  not  indulge  in  this 
flourish. 

262  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  14,  sub  fin. 

263  See  Menand.  Prot.  Frs.  41  and  42. 

264  That  ChosroSs  carried  on  this  siege 
in  person  is  distinctly  declared  by  Me- 
nander  (Fr.  41). 

266  Theophylact,  iii.  15;  p.  83,  C;  Me- 
nand. Prot.  Fr.  47;  Evagr.  H.  E.  v.  19, 
ad  init. 

256  Menand.  Prot.  Frs.  47  and  50. 

267  Ibid.  Fr.  50.  Compare  Theophy- 
lact, iii.  15;  p.  83,  D. 

258  Twelve  thousand  of  the  twenty 
were  native  Persians;  the  rest  consisted 
of  Saracens  and  Iberians.  (Menand. 
Prot.  1.  s.  c.) 

269  Theophylact,  1.  s.  c. 

2«o  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  .52;  Theophylact, 
1  s.  c. 

281  Our  knowledge  of  this  campaign  is 
derived  almost  wholly  from  Theophy- 
lact (iii.  15,  16),  whose  account  seems 
■worthy  of  acceptance.  Some  confirma- 
tion is  fiu-nished  by  Menander  (Fr.  55;  p. 
257)  and  Agathias  (iv.  29). 

2«2  See  text,  p.  367. 

383  Agathias,  iv.  29.  It  is  curious  that 
by  none  of  the  later  writers  is  this 
statement  repeated. 

264  Theophylact,  iii.  16. 

2«6  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  55,  ad  init. 

268  ii)id.  Fr.  54. 

2"  That  such  a  payment  had  been 
contemplated  by  both  parties  appears 
from  Fr.  47  (p.  251). 

29e'Hpos  opxo/iic>/ov  (Theophylact,  p.  84, 
D).  In  March  (Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p. 
842).  ^   , 

2»»  So  Agathias  (1.  s.  c),  Mirkhond  (p. 
387),  and  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  24).  The 
vxact  duration  of  his  reign  was  fortv- 
Beven  years  and  six  months  (Eutych. 
Vol.  ii.  pp.  179,  188),  from  Sept.  a.d.  531 
to  March  a.d.  579. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

•  See  especially  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  160, 
5J22-232;  Mirkhond,  pp.  302-4;  Magoudi. 
Prairies  d'Or.  torn.  ii.  pp.  204-5;  and 
Asseman,  Bibliotheca,  torn.  iii.  pp.  404- 
410.  .  . 

'Mirkhond  makes  him  express  nis 
intentions  in  his  very  first  speech  to  his 
nobles  (p.  362). 

»  See  text,  p.  4.50. 

*  Mirkhond.  p.  364. 

6  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
184. 

« Mirkhond  (p.  381)  mentions  this 
among  his  principles  of  government. 
It  wcks  an  old  practice  of  Persian  mon- 


archs.    (See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  IB. 
p.  21.S.) 

'  See  Mirkhond,  pp.  381-2. 

8  See  text,  pp.  449',  450. 

'  Meiiaiid.  Prot.  Fr.  46;  Mirkhond,  pp. 
303.  379;  Tabari,  p.  226;  &c. 

">  Mirkhond,  p.  382. 

"  Miikliond,  p.  372.  Tabari  makes  the 
highest  rate  of  taxation  one-fifth  (ii.  p. 
222). 

»2  See  the  story  told  of  Kobad  by  Ta- 
bari (ii.  pp.  152, 153),  where  tlie  cultivator 
.says:  "We  have  not  the  free  disposal  of 
our  property,  since  the  king  is  part 
owner  of  it,  and  we  do  not  dare  to  put 
our  hand  to  the  harvest  till  some  one 
has  come  on  the  king's  part  to  cut  what 
belongs  to  him." 

'3  Tabari,  ii.  p.  223.  The  dirhem  is  es- 
timated by  M.  Barbier  de  Mej-nard  at 
from  65  to  70  centimes.  (See  his  notice 
of  Ibn  Khordadbahin  tln^  Journal  Asia- 
tique  for  1865,  quoted  in  the  Numismat- 
ic Chronicle  for  1873,  p.  248.) 

14  Tabari,  p  222. 

■6  Ibid.  p.  226. 

"On  lands  where  the  cultivator  was 
the  owner,  half  the  produce  might  be 
paid,  as  it  was  by  the  helot  to  his  Spar- 
tan master.  (See  the  Author's  Herodo- 
tus, vol.  iii.  p.  279).  But  where  the  cul- 
tivator had  also  to  pay  a  rent,  such  a 
tax  would  have  been  cruelly  oppressive. 
Perhaps  Tabari  is  right  in  making  the 
highest  rate  paid  to  the  state  one-fifth. 
(See  above,  note  11.) 

"  Tabari,  ii.  p.  226. 

"S  Ibid.  p.  223.  Ma^oudi  gives  the  fol- 
lowing as  the  rate  of  payment:  "Four 
palms  of  Fars,  1  dirhem;  six  common 
palms,  the  same;  six  olives,  the  same; 
each  vine,  8  dirhems."  (Prairies  d'Or, 
ii.  p.  204.) 

'•Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

2"  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
p.  372;  Tabari,  l.s.  c. 

21  This  appears  not  to  have  been  the 
case  under  the  former  system;  for  the 
cultivator  whose  wrongs  called  forth 
the  compassion  of  Kobad  was  a  woman 
(Tabari,  ii.  p.  153). 

22  Tabari,  ii.  p.  224. 

23  Ibid.  p.  225. 

24  Ibid.  p.  2:^2. 

26  Tabari.  ii.  p.  227. 

26  charging  the  trea.sury  with  the  pay- 
ment of  a  larger  number  of  troops  than 
actually  maintained  is  one  of  the  com- 
monest modes  of  cheating  the  govern- 
ment in  the  East.  It  is  not.  however, 
noted  among  the  abuses  observed  by 
ChosroBs, 

27  Tabari,  ii.  p.  229. 

29  Tabari,  ii.  pp.  229-230;  Mirkhond,  p. 
378. 

2"  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Monarch 
ies.  vol.  ii.  pp.  3'i7-8. 

>»  Tabari,  li.  p.  160. 

31  Ibid. 

32  Mirkhond,  p.  3ra;  Tabari,  I  s.  c. 
"  Mirkhond,  p.  3t>4. 


684 


TEE  SEVENTH  M0NAECH7. 


[CH.  XX^ 


'*  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
184. 

S5  Tabari,  ii.  p.  160. 

3  8  See  text,  p.  458.  According  to  Asse- 
man  (Bibl.  Or.  vol.  ii.  p.  410),  large  num- 
bers of  Syi'ian  Christians  were  carried 
off  by  Chosroes  from  tlie  neighborhood 
of  Edessa  and  settled  in  various  parts 
of  Persia. 

3'  A  desire  expressed  by  the  Sogdians 
to  establish  a  trade  in  silk  with  the  Per- 
sians was  opposed  by  Chosroes  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  lead  to  intercourse 
between  his  subjects  and  the  Turlis  on 
whom  the  Sogdians  depended.  Such 
intercourse  he  thought  undesirable  (Me- 
nand.  Prot.  Fr.  18). 

38  Mirkliond.  p.  364. 

'»  Ibid.  p.  363.  On  the  postal  system 
existing  at  this  time  in  Persia,  see  Me- 
nand.  Protect.  Fr.  11;  p.  212. 

*"  Agathias,  ii.  30.  The  names  of  the 
seven  were  Damascius  of  Syria.  Simpli- 
cius  of  Cilicia,  Eulamius  of  Phrygia, 
Priscianus  of  Lj'dia,  Hermeias  and  Dio- 
genes of  Phoenicia,  and  Isidorus  of  Gaza. 

■*•  See  the  Essay  of  Sir  H.  Ranvlinson 
"  On  the  Religion  of  the  Babylonians 
and  Assyrians,"  contained  in  the  Au- 
thor's Herodotus,  vol.  i.  p.  484,  &c. 

<2  Matliise,  Manual  of  Gk.  and  Roman 
Literature,  p.  201,  E.  T. 

■•s  Agath.  ii  30,  31. 

^*  Ibid.  ii.  28.  The  translations  made 
by  the  Arabian  conquerors  of  Spain  are 
parallel,  and  lend  a  certain  support  to 
the  statements  of  Agathias.  Still  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  Persian  trans- 
lation extended  to  all  the  works  of  both 
philosophers.  Plato's  Timasus.  PhEedo, 
Gorgias,  and  Parmenides  are,  however, 
expressly  mentioned  among  the  treatises 
read  by  Chosroes  in  a  Persian  dress. 

*°  See  Agathias,  ii.  29,  ad  fin.:    'EwKa- 

Xeadfievo'S  Toii?  Mayovs,  e;  \6yovi  aiiTui  Ka9i- 
(TTaTO  yei'eVea)?  re  Kal  0i'creaj?  7^ep^,  koX  6t 
ToSe  TO  TTOiV  areAeuTTjTOi'  e<rTai,  Kal  iroTipov 
fjLiav   Ti>v    aTTavTuiV   a.pXT]v  vofi.t<TT4ov.     The 

reference  is  to  a  conference  between  the 
Magi  and  Uranius;  but  we  may  fairly 
conclude  that  similar  discussions  took 
place  between  the  Magi  and  the  Seven 
Sages. 

<  6  Ibid.  ii.  29,32. 

"Procop.  De  Bell.  Goth.  iv.  10;  p. 
590.  B. 

*>*  Asseman,  Bibl.  Or.  vol.  iv.  pp.  745-7. 

■">  Tabari,  ii.  p.  160. 

^o  So  Gibbon  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v. 
p.  185,  note  49).  Others  suppose  that  the 
original  "  Book  of  Kings"  was  composed 
by  order  of  Yezdegird  III.  (See  Atkin- 
son's Firdausi,  published  by  the  Orien- 
tal Translation  Fund,  Preface,  p.  xi. ;  and 
compare  Bun  sen,  Philosophy  of  History, 
vol.  iii.  p.  120.) 

'1  On  the  fables  of  Bidpai  or  Pilpay, 
see  Gibbon,  1.  s.  c,  with  the  note  of 
Dean  Milman.  »^-. 

^' Mirkhond.  p.  376;  Ma^oudi,  vol.' li. 
p.  203.  D'Herbelot  speaks  of  the  intro- 
duction of  another  game,  which  he  calls   , 


a  kind  of  draughts  or  trictrac.    (Biblio 
theque  Orientals,  vol.  iv.  p.  486.) 

53  See  text,  pp.  449,  450. 

SI  Mirkhond,  p.  360. 

55 See  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  36;  and  com. 
pare  Asseman,  Bibl.  Or.  vol.  i.  p.  205; 
vol.  ii.  p.  410;  &c. 

5«  Jlirkhond,  p.  367.  Was  this  wife 
the  Euphemia  whom,  according  to  Pro- 
copius  (if.  P.  ii.  5),  he  carried  off  from 
Suron  and  married? 

5'  Ibid.  p.  368. 

S8  Menand.  Prot.  Fr.  11;  p.  213.  It 
must  be  admitted,  however,  that  this 
toleration  was  not  the  free  act  of  Chos- 
roes, but  a  concession  which  he  made  in 
a  treaty. 

5'  Renaudot  ap.  Asseman,  Bibl.  Or. 
vol.  i.  p.  205.  Asseman  himself  believes 
that  Renaudot  is  mistaken,  and  that 
ChosroSs  really  favored  the  orthodox 
(ibid.  vol.  iii.  p.  407). 

^°  Agathias,  ii.  29,  ad  fin.  Compare 
his  discussion  of  Christian  doctrines 
with  the  Nestorian  primate.  Mar-abas, 
as  related  by  Barhebraeus  (Asseman, 
B.  O.  vol.  iii.  pp.  408-9). 

«i  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  i.  p.  755. 

«'^  Agath.  ii.  31. 

«3  Mirkhond,  pp.  367-8. 

^*  Ibid.  p.  368. 

^5  So  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c.  Procopius 
{Bell.  Goth.  iv.  10)  says  that  Chosroes 
exiled  Nushizad  (whom  he  calls  Anoto- 
zad)  to  a  place  called  Belapaton  in  Va- 
zaine  (Ahwaz  or  Khuzistan). 

**  Such  is  Mirkhond's  account.  That 
of  Procopius  is  not  very  different,  ex- 
cept that  he  omits  all  mention  of  the 
Christianity  of  Nushizad.  and  of  his 
special  appeal  to  the  Christians  of  the 
empire. 

^'  See  text,  p.  465.  The  Persian  writers 
call  this  general  Ram-Bourzin. 

«8  Mirkhond,  p.  371 ;  D'Herbelot,  vol. 
iv.  p.  488. 

«9  Procop.  B.  Goth.  iv.  10;  p.  590,  J). 
•  '"  Coins  of  this  type  have  been  figured 
by  Ker  Porter  (Travels,  vol.  ii.  PI.  Iviii. 
No.  10);  by  Longperier  (Medailles  des 
Sassanides.  PI.  x.  No.  4);  and  by  Bar- 
tholomffii  (Collection,  ed.  Dorn,  PI.  xxiv. 
No.  45).  The  engraving  [see  PI.  XXU. 
Fig.  3]  taken  from  Longpgrier. 

'  1  Mr.  Thomas  declines  the  task  of 
intei-preting  (Num.  Chron.  for  1873,  p. 
234). 

'2  See  the  account  of  Dom  Germain 
Millet  quoted  by  M.  Longp6rier  in  the 
Annates  de  Vlnstitut  Archeolog ique  for 
1843,  vol.  XV.  p.  100. 

'3  See  Nujuismatic  Chronicle  for  1873, 
pp.  2.34-5. 

'<  See  Mirkhond,  p.  387;  Tabari,  ii.  p. 
233:  D'Herbelot,  Bibl.  Or.  vol.  iv,  p.  489. 

'5  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
183. 

"See  Procop.  B.  P.  i.  28;  Menand. 
.  P^  Fr.  46;  Mirkhond,  p.  370;  Asseman, 
^BiOC.'Or.  vol.  iii.  p.  409. 

"  Procop.  B.  Goth.  iv.  10,  sub  fin. 

''"  Asseman,  Bibl.  Or.  vol.  iii.  p.  406. 


CH.  XXII.] 


THE!  SSlvmrH  MONAltCtiY. 


685 


'»  Mirkhond,  p.  368. 

8»  Ibid.  p.  382. 

*'  Ou  one  occasion,  Chosrogs,  being 
displeased  with  one  of  his  attendants, 
banished  him  from  the  court.  The  man 
absented  liiniself,  but  on  a  certain  day, 
wlien  all  subjects  had  the  riglit  of  ap- 
pearing before  the  king,  he  returned  to 
the  palace,  and,  resuming  his  old  duties, 
waited  on  the  guests  at  the  royal  table. 
While  thus  employed,  he  took  an  op- 
portunity of  secreting  a  plate  of  solid 
gold  about  his  person,  after  which,  quit- 
ting tlie  guest-chamber,  he  disappeared 
altogether.  Chosroes,  who  had  seen  the 
whole  transaction,  took  no  notice,  and. 
wheu  the  plate  was  missed,  merely  said: 
"  The  man  who  took  it  will  not  bring  it 
back,  and  the  man  who  saw  him  will  not 
tell."  A  year  later,  the  attendant  ap- 
peared once  more  on  the  same  day; 
whereupon  the  king  called  him  aside 
and  said:  "Is  the  first  plate  all  gone 
that  you  have  come  again  to  get  an- 
otlier  y"  The  culprit  owned  liis  guilt 
ind  implored  forgiveness,  whicli  he  ob- 
tained. Chosroes  not  only  pardoned 
feim,  but  took  him  back  into  his  service. 
(Mirkhond,  pp.  382-3.) 

^"^  ChosroL's  was  told  that  one  of  his 
subjects  surpassed  liim  in  wealth;  and 
te  replied  that  he  saw  no  hariYi  in  the 
circumstance  (Mirkhond,  p.  384).  He 
•^'ished  to  clear  a  space  before  his  pal- 
ace ;  but  an  olc  lady  who  owned  one  of 
♦.he  houses  which  occupied  the  ground 
Would  not  part  with  her  property.  Chos- 
roes cleared  the  rest  of  the  space,  and 
allowed  her  house  to  stand  (ibid.  p.  38.'i). 

85  Mirkhond,  pp.  ;i08-3r0. 
84  See  text,  p.  449,  450. 

86  Agathias,  ;..  28. 
8»  Ibid.  ii.  32,  ad  fin. 

8'  Compare  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, 
Fol.  V.  p.  18.5:  "The  studies  of  Chosroiis 
were  ostentatious  and  superficia,l." 

88  The  only  defeat  celebrated  by  the 
Byzantine  authors  is  that  near  Melitene 
fn  A.D.  575.     (See  text,  p.  480.) 

•'"  Evagrius,  who  is  the  writer  nearest 
to  the  time,  regards  the  check  as  slight, 
»nd  as  compensated  for  soon  afterwards 
by  a  victory  (Hist.  Eccl.  v.  14). 

"0  See  text,  pp.  472,  473. 

»»  See  text,  pp.  497-499. 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

'  This  name  is  given  by  MaQOudi  (vol. 
•i  p.  211). 

»  Mirkhond,  p.  388. 

s  Ibid. 

J  Tabari,  il.  p.  248. 

» Ibid.  p.  347^ 

•  Malcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p. 
IfSl ;  Gibbon,  De<.liae  ana  Fall.  vol.  v.  p. 
3'i7.     Neither  in  Tabari,  Mirkhond.  nor 
MaQoudi  is  there  any  mention  oi  Abu     i 
xurd-mihir  in  connection  with  Horinis-    I 
das. 

'See  Tabari,  ii.  pp.  27.3-4:  Mirkhond,    1 
|>,  388;  Magoudi,  ii.  p.  211;  Theophyiact.    i 


Simocatt.  iii.  16;  D'Herbelot,  Bibl.  Or. 
vol.  iii.  p.  222;  &c. 

8  Menand.  Protect.  Fr.  5.". 

•  Theophj-lact.  Siniocall.  iii.  17. 

■"  Ibid.  Aia  T7)?  ipi]ixov  to  \oirtov  T^? 
'Apa^ias  €19  TTji'  Mcx^vKu)  viav  ^weiyeTO 
yr)V  a(j)iKf<T0ai. 

"Theophyiact.  Simocatt.  iii.  17,  ad 
fin.  This  is  probably  the  victory  of 
Maurice  over  Adarnian,  whereof  Eva- 
grius speaks  somewhat  vaguely  in  his 
Hi-it.  Eccles.  v.  20. 

'2  See  the  prolix  account  given  by  Me- 
nander  Protector,  Fr.  00. 

"Theophyiact.  Simocatt.  iii.  18,  ad 
init.;  .Menaiider  Prot.  Fr.  (JO.  ad  fin. 

"Kvagr.  H.  E.  v.  20;  Theophyiact. 
Simocatt.  1.  s.  c. 

'5  Gibbon,  Decline  n?id  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
345. 

'«  Theophyl.  Sim.  i  9:  Tov  'luxi.cijr, 
ojTTep  iTTuji'V^j.ov  TO  TTj^  vKiputa^  ^€\vvr}<;  Ka- 
TdKOfxof.  Compare  Theophaii.  Clirouo- 
grapli.  p.  214,  B,    liuaii»)i' tot  Moi'trraicwva. 

"  Theophyl.  Sim.  i.  12,  ad  init. 

18  Theophyiact.  Sim.  i.  12. 

''•'  Ibid.  i.  13,  ad  init. 

2»  Ibid,  ad  tin. 

2'  Ibid.  i.  14. 

22  Ibid.  i.  15. 

23  Ibid.  ii.  3,  sub  fin. 

2'  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  216,  A; 
Theophyiact.  Sim.  ii.  3. 
•^  Theophvlact.  Sim.  ii.  5. 
26  Ibid.  c.  7. 
2Mbid.  c.  9,  su6 /in. 

28 'O  5' 'HpaxAfio?    TO    orrXiTiKOV    Sia- 

Ta|a5,  K.  T.  A.  (Theoph}'!.  Sim.  ii.  10,  ad 
init. 

2"  Theophyl.  Sim.  ii.  18. 

3"  Ibid.  iii.  1-2. 

31  Ibid.  c.  3. 

32  Ibid.  iii.  .5. 

33  Theophyiact.  Simocatt.  iii.  5.  Com- 
pare Evagr.  H.  E.  vi.  14. 

34  Theophan.  p.  221,  A;  Theoph}Mact. 
Sim.  iii.  G. 

s*"  Theophyiact.  Sim.  I.  s.  c.  Mebodes 
had  been  previously  killed  in  the  battle 
«  itli  Pliilippicus,  near  Martyropolis. 

3*  Hi'/)r)  xpvtTfa,  Tiapa?  Tf  llfpcriKa?,  Kai 
Ta9  \t9oKo\AriTov^  ^uivai;,   &•;  oi  fxapyaptTat 

Toi?  fiappdpoK;  \aft.Trpvi'ov<Ti.  (Theophy- 
iact. Sim   1.  s.  c.) 

3' Evagr.  H.  E.  vi.  15.  Theophyiact. 
Sim.  IV.  2.  ad  init. 

38  Mirkhond.  p.  .388;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  248; 
Ma<;oudi,  ii.  p.  21 1. 

3»  The  tribes  of  Kahtan  and  Madd,  ac- 
cording to  Ma.;oudi  (ii.  p.  212),  com- 
manded by  Kl -Abbas  the  one-eyed,  and 
Ann--el  Afwah.  (Comjjare  Mirkhond,  p. 
389,  and  Tabari.  ii.  ji.  2-19  ) 

4°  So  Mirkhond  (l.s.  c.)  and  MaQoudi 
{1.  s.  c).  Tabari  (1.  s.  c.)  raised  the  num- 
ber to  100, OIK).  From  the  Byzantine 
writers  it  would  seem  that  there  was  no 
truth  in  this  rumor. 

4' Three  hundred  thousand  men,  ac- 
conling  to  Tabari  (p.  248);  4(X).000,  ae 
cording  *o  Magoudi  (1.  s.  c.).;  either  .300,- 
DOO  or  SOO.oOO,  av2oruing  to  Mirkhond. 


686 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH    XXlIl. 


*2  The  Romans  seem  certainly  to  have 
made  no  great  effort  at  this  period;  and 
the  Kiiazar  attacii  is  doubtful.  Neither 
the  Armenians  nor  the  Byzantines  notice 
it.  Gibbon  exaggerates  tlie  peril  still 
more  by  imagining  a  correspondence 
between  the  Turkish  and  Roman  courts, 
and  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  two 
armies  to  effect  a  junction  {Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  V.  pp.  368-370).  Neither  the 
Oriental  nor  the  Byzantine  writers  know 
of  any  such  concert  or  correspondence. 

<3  Varahran  is  the  form  upon  the 
coins  (Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 
viii.  pp.  110-1),  Bahram  that  used  by  the 
Orientals,  both  Persians  and  Arabs. 
Theophylact  has  Bapd;u.  and  sometimes 

**  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  18;  Tabari,  ii. 
p.  252. 

<*The  "twelve  thousand"  of  Mir- 
khond  (p.  394),  Tabai'i  (p.  25G),  and  Ma- 
youdi  (p.  213)  seems  very  improbabl3^ 
small;  but  their  statement  that  quality 
jather  than  number  was  considered, 
may  be  accepted. 

*«  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. 

4'  Ibid. 

*8  Tabari,  ii.  p.  262;  Magoudi.  ii.  p.  213. 

<»  Tabari,  ii.  pp.  264-5;  Mirkhond,  p. 
394;  Magoudi,  ii.  p.  213. 

^°  According  to  some  writers,  the 
booty  was  conveyed  on  the  backs  of 
250.000  camels!     (Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c.) 

*i  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
368;  Diet,  of  Gk.  and  Rom.  Biography , 
s.  v..Mauricius,  vol.  ii.  p.  976. 

52  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  6;  Theophan. 
Chronograph,  p.  221,  B. 

°3  See  text,  p.  472. 

^*  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  7,  suh  fin. 

56  Tabari,  ii.  p.  266;  Mirkhond,  p.  395. 
The  Oriental  writers,  by  omitting  all 
notice  of  Bahram 's  defeat  on  the  Arax- 
es,  render  the  sequence  of  events  very 
improbable.  Theophylact,  most  fortu- 
nately, supplies  the  facts  which  are 
needed  to  make  their  accounts  intelligi- 
ble.   (See  the  passage  above  cited.) 

5'  Theophylact  mentions  the  depriva- 
tion and  the  female  garments  (iii.  8). 
Tabari  (1.  s.  c.)  and  Mirkhond  (1.  s.  c) 
testify  to  the  distaff.  Gibbon  from  his 
own  imagination  adds  a  spinning-wheel 
(Decline  and  FcUl,  vol.  v.  p.  370). 

5'  Theophylact  (1.  s.  c);  Tlieophan. 
Chronograph,  p.  222,  A. 

58  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  8,  sub  fin. 

5'  So  the  Orientals  (Tabari,  ii,  pp.  266- 
7;  Mirkhond,  p.  395).  The  Byzantines 
say  that  Bahram  pretended  to  have  re- 
ceived intelligence  that  Hormisdas  was 
about  to  diminish  the  soldiers'  pay,  and 
to  pimish  them  for  having  allowed 
themselves  to  be  defeated  on  the  Araxes 
(Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  18,  ad  fin.;  Theo- 
phan. Chronograph,  p.  222,  B.) 

«»  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  2. 

«i  Ibid.  iv.  3. 

•2  The  tale  that  Bahram,  in  order  to 
sow  jealousy  between  Hormisdas  and 
hie  son  Chosroes,  issued  coins  with  titc 


image  and  superscription  of  the  latter, 
that  Hormisdas  in  consequence  suspect- 
ed Chosroes,  and  that  to  escape  death 
the  young  prince  had  to  betake  himself 
to  banishment,  being  told  only  by  the 
Oriental  writers,  and  unsupported  by 
any  known  facts,  scarcely  deserves  our 
acceptance.  There  are  no  coins  of  Chos- 
roes II.  unlike  the  rest,  or  presenting 
any  appearance  of  having  been  issued 
under  abnormal  circumstances.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  are  coins  of  Bahram. 
issued  in  his  own  name,  which  may  well 
be  those  that  he  put  into  circulation  be- 
fore he  became  king.  (See  Thomas  in 
Numismatic  Chronicle  for  1873,  vol.  Ii. 
pp.  236-240.) 

^'  Mirkhond  makes  both  the  brothers 
suffer  imprisonment  (p.  395).  So  Ma 
goudi  (ii.  p.  215)  and  Tabari  (ii.  p.  269). 
Theophylact  (iv.  3)  and  Theophanes  (p. 
222,  1))  represent  Bindoes  as  the  only 
sufferer. 

e-i  See  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  3-6;  Theo- 
phan. Chron.  p.  223,  A,  B. 

^5  Dean  Milman  well  observes,  in  the 
notes  appended  to  SmitJi's  Gibbon  (vol. 
V.  p.  371),  that  the  orations  in  Theophy- 
lact "  read  rather  like  those  of  a  Grecian 
sophist  than  of  an  Eastern  assembly." 

""The  assassination  is  ascribed  to 
Bindoes  and  Bostam  by  the  Orientals 
(Tabari,  ii.  p.  279;  Mirkhond,  p.  396;  Ma- 
goudi, ii.  p.  219),  to  Chosroes  II.  by  the 
Byzantine  writers  (Theophylact.  Sim.  iv. 
7;  Theophan.  p,  223,  C). 

"  See  Theophylact.  Sim.  iii.  16;  Evagr. 
H.  E.  vi.  16;  Theophan.  Chronograph. 
p.  222,  B;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  273;  Mirkhond,  p. 
388;  Magoudi,  ii.  p.  211. 

'8  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. 

«9  See  PI.  XXII.  Fig.  4. 

■">  See  PI.  XXII.  Fig.  1. 

'1  That  is  to  say,  "  Hormisdas,  increase 
(be  his),"  or  "Hormisdas,  (may  he  be) 
greater." 

'2  Thomas  in  the  Numismatic  Chroni- 
cle for  18^3,  p.  236. 

'5  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift,  vol. 
viii.  pp.  100-110;  vol.  xii.  pp.  27-32. 

CHAPTER  XXin. 

>  On  the  doubt,  see  note  66,  Chapter 
XXII. 

'^  That  he  had  not  done  so  I  gather 
from  the  statement  of  Bahram  (see  text, 
p.  505),  that  "the  noble  and  respectable 
took  no  part  in  the  vote,  which  was  car- 
ried  by  the  disorderly  and   low-born" 

yevojaeVwi'  toc?  araKTOTepoi?  KaX  Svayet'care- 

pois  avSpMnois).  Gibbon  seems  to  sup- 
pose that  this  is  a  mere  rhetorical  flour- 
ish (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  372). 

3  Tabari,  ii.  p.  270. 

"  Ibid.  p.  268;  Magoudi.  ii.  p.  214. 

6  Mirkhond,  p.  396;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  279. 
The  beating  to  death  with  clubs  seems 
to  be  a  clumsy  invention  of  tlie  Bj'zan- 
tine  writers  (Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  7; 
Theophan.  p.  223,  C). 

'  Theophylact.  Sim.  1.  s.  c. 


«'ja.  xxiii.] 


THE  SBVENfB  MONARCHY. 


687 


1  Chosroes  had  emptied  the  prisons,  in 
order  to  produce  an  impression  that, 
unlike  his  father,  he  was  of  a  mild  and 
clement  disposition. 

*  Chosroes  styled  himself  "king  of 
Icings,  lord  of  lords,  master  of  masters, 
prince  of  peace,  saviour  of  mankind,  in 
the  sight  of  gods  a  virtuous  and  immor- 
tal man,  in  the  sight  of  men  a  most 
manifest  god,  surpassingly  glorious,  a 
conqueror,  rising  with  the  sun  and  fur- 
nishing to  the  night  her  eyes  (the  stars?), 
of  illustrious  ancestry,  a  king  averse  to 
war,  beneficent,  hirer  of  the  genii,  and 
custodian  of  tlie  Persian  kingdom" 
(Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  8).  The  thor- 
oughly Oriental  character  of  this  exor- 
dium seems  to  indicate  that  the  letter  is 
genuine. 

»  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  9. 

'0  Compare  Tabari,  ii.  p  ^76.  with  Ma- 
nendi, ii.  p.  215  and  Theophylact,  Sim. 
p.  102.  C. 

»»  Tabari  (pi).  266-7)  gives  the  details. 
Theophylact  (iv.  9)  speaks  more  gener- 
ally, but  quite  to  the  same  effect  (ttoAAcoi' 

(le'XP'^  eo'Trepa?  €7ricrToA>js). 

J 3  Theophylact.  Sim.  p.  103,  A. 

13  Tabari.  ii.  p.  278;  Mirkhond,  p.  396; 
Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  10, 

i<  The  Turks,  the  Caucasus,  and  the 
Romans  are  mentioned  by  Theophylact 
(1.  s.  c),  the  Arabs  by  Tabari  (1.  s.  c). 
The  Khazars  were  the  great  power  of 
the  Caucasian  region. 

"  So  Theophylact  (p.  104,  A).  Tabari 
gives  the  number  as  ten  (ii.  p.  279) 

"Theophylact.  Sim.  p.  103,  C;  Theo- 
phan.  p.  22;^,  D. 

i'  He  is  said  to  have  passed  Aboreo 
and  Anotho  (Theophylact,  p.  103,  D), 
The  latter  is  evidently  Auatho  or  Anat. 
Is  the  former  Perisabor.** 

1*  To  reach  Circesium,  he  must  have 
recrossed  the  Euphrates.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  mentioned. 

'"Tabari,  ii.  p.  280.  Compare  Mir- 
khond (p.  396)  and  Theophylact  (iv.  12, 
nub  init.). 

a»  Mirkhond,  p.  397;  Tabari,  ii.  p.  281. 

»>  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  10;  Theophan. 
1.  s.  c. 

*'  The  Orientals  carry  Chosroes  to 
Kdessa  (Ma9oudi,  ii.  p.  219)  or  Antioch 
(Tabari,  ii.  p.  289).  and  then  to  Constan- 
tinople (Mirkhond,  p.  .398;  Tabari,  ii.  p. 
291).  But  the  Greeks,  who  must  know 
best,  declare  that  he  proceeded  no  fur- 
ther than  HierapoHs  (Theophylact.  Sim. 
ir.  12  and  14;  Evagr.  H.  E.  \\.  19;  Theo- 
phan. p.  224,  A). 

"  Tabari,  ii.  p.  290;  Magoudi.  ii.  p.  193. 
The  reasonings  actually  used  may  be 
best  gathered  from  the  replies  to  them 
contained  in  the  second  letter  of  Chos- 
roes (Theopliylact.  Sim.  iv.  13). 

'*  The  "magnanimity"  of  Maurice  is 
put  forward  by  the  B}'zantine  writers  as 
specially  evidenced  by  his  conduct  to- 
wards ChosroBs  (Theophylact.  Sim.  p. 


IC/,  C;  p.  Ill,  A;  Evagr.  H.  E.  vi.  17). 
Moderns  will  scarcely  see  in  it  more  than 
an  intelligent  appreciation  of  Roman  in- 
terests. 

2"  Evagr.  1.  s.  c.  ChosroiJs  had  ap- 
pealed to  him  as  his  "father."  (Theo- 
phylact. Sim.  iv.  11,  sub  Jin.). 

28  Mirkhond  (p.  398) and  Magoudi  (ii.  p. 
220)  enumerate  them.  Evagrius  con- 
tents him.solf  with  a  general  statement, 
but  adds  that  the  empress  sent  at  the 
same  time  presents  for  Chosrogs'  wives, 
and  the  Imperial  children  presents  for 
Chosroes'  children. 

2'  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  14. 

''s  Tabari,  ii.  p.  291.  Magoudi  makes 
the  number  U)0,000  (ii.  p.  220).  Mirkhond 
mentions  both  reports  without  deciding 
between  them  (y).  399).  The  Byzantines 
give  no  estimate  of  the  number. 

'"'  Mac;oudi,  1.  s.  c. 

5"  On  reacliing  Hierapolis,  ChosroBs 
was  at  once  asked  to  order  the  surren- 
der of  Marty  ropolis.  He  pretended  to 
do  so,  but  secretly  gave  directions  that 
it  should  l)e  (lefen(]f(l  to  the  Utst  e.\- 
tremity  (Theopliylact.  Sim.  iv.  12,  13). 

3'  Ibid.  iv.  I.i;  p.  110.  B.  It  has  been 
thought  by  some  that  Nisibis  also  was 
ceded  (Smith  in  Notes  to  Gibbon,  vol.  v. 
p.  39.5).  But  the  authority  of  the  Arme- 
nian writers  is  scarcelj-  siiflficieut  to  es- 
tablish such  a  fact  against  the  silence 
of  the  Byzantines,  who  would  scarcely 
have  failed  to  notice  so  important  a 
gain. 

!'■' Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  12;  Magoudi, 
ii.  p.  219. 

33  Tabari.  ii.  pp.  283-4;  Theophylact. 
Sim.  iv.  14. 

3<  St.  Martin.  Notes  to  Le  Bas,  vol.  x. 
p.  312;  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique  forl8UG,  p.  193. 

3»  Theophylact.  Sim.  iv.  15;  p.  113,  A. 

38  Ibid.  V.  i. 

37  Ibid. 

38  Ibid.  V.  2. 

3»  The  date  of  Zadesprates'  death  is 
fixed  to  February  a.d.  591  by  the  letter 
of  Chosroes  preserved  in  Evagrius, 
which  mentions  that  the  head  of  /iide- 
sprates  was  brought  in  on  the  9th  of 
that  month  (Evagr.  H.  E.  vi.  21.) 

^o  Bindoiis  had  fled  to  Azerbijan  from 
Ctesiphon,  having  been  set  free  by  the 
con.spirators  whose  attempt  failed  (see 
above,  note  33).  He  had  bien  joined  by 
20,000  Persians  from  the  capital  (Tabari, 
ii.  p.  285;  compare  Theopliylact.  Sim. 
iv.  15,  ad  init.).  Bostam  was  sent  into 
Azerbijan  by  Chosroiis.  (Jbid.  iv.  12,  ad 
fin.) 

<'  Theophvlact.  Sim.  v.  9,  p.  131,  C; 
Patkanian,  I.  s.  c. 

<"  Theophylact.  iv.  15. 

"Ibid.  V.  3. 

••Mbid.  V.  4. 

"Theophylact,  v.  5,  ad  fin. 

"So  '1  lieopliylact  (V.  7,  svh  fin.). 
Theophanes  culls  the  place  Alexaiidriua 
(Chronograph,  p.  224,  B>. 


688 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHT. 


[CH.  XXIV. 


*'  Theophylact.  v.  8,  ad  init. 

<"  See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  i.  p. 
B5;i,  2nd  edition. 

<"  Tlieophylact.  Sim.  v.  9. 

'"'  According-  to  Tlieophylact  (1.  s.  c.) 
the  forces  of  Chosroes  amounted  to  60,- 
000,  those  of  Bahram  to  40,000.  The 
number  on  the  side  of  Chosroes  is  less 
tlian    we    should    have    expected;    but 

grobably  strong  Roman  garrisons  had 
een  left  in  Martyropolis  and  Daras.  and 
more  troops  may  have  accompanied 
Mebodes  than  is  stated. 

'1  Two  thousand,  according  to  Theo- 
phylact (v.  4);  but  the  number  is  im- 
probably small. 

62  Ibid.  V.  7. 

*3  See  text,  p.  500. 

^*  The  last  battle  only  is  mentioned 
by  Ala5oudi  (ii.  p.  223),  Tabari  (ii.  pp. 
294-6)  and  the  Oriental  writers  generally, 
including  the  Armenians.  Theophanes 
(p.  224)  confuses  the  circumstances  of 
tlie  two  engagements.  Theophylact 
alone  distinctly  gives  both  (v.  9-11). 

55  Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  9,  ad  fin. 

58  According  to  Tabari  (ii.  2.^52)  Bahram 
was  born  at  Rei,  of  a  noble  familJ^  He 
was  Marzpan  of  Rei  when  chosen  gener- 
al against  the  Turks  (ibid,  and  compare 
Magoudi,  ii.  p.  213).  Rei  was  the  place 
whence  he  issued  his  coins  (Tabari,  ii. 
p.  268),  and  whence  he  marched  against 
Chosroes. 

5'  Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  10,  sub  init. 
Canzaca  is  probably  the  modern  Takht- 
i-Suleiman,  which  is  strongly  situated 
near  the  sources  of  the  Jaghetu. 

58  See  Tabari  (ii.  p.  292).  On  the  iden- 
tity of  Shiz  with  Canzaca.  and  of  both 
with  Takht-i-Suleiman,  see  a  paper  by 
Sir  H.  Rawlinson  in  the  Journal  of  the 
Geoqraphical  Society,  vol.  x.  art.  i. 

5»  Theophylact.  Sim.  p.  13.3.  D.  No 
elephants  are  mentioned  previously. 

'"  Bahram's  army  at  this  time  is  reck- 
oned by  Tabari  at  lOO.OOO— the  combined 
Romans,  Persians,  and  Armenians  at 
90.000  (ii.  pp.  291-2). 

"'Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  10;  rpio-l  Ad^ois 

«^  From  the  earliest  times  the  Persian 
commander  in-chief  had  always  occu- 
pied a  central  position  in  the  line  of  bat- 
tle. (See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii. 
p.  186,  2nd  edition.) 

•3  Theophan.  p.  224.  C.    'O  Napo-^j?  t?,./ 

^lecnqv  Toiv  ^ap/3aptuv  Ste'Ai'O'e  (i>dAayya  •  tov- 
Tou  6e  ■yei'O/xeVou  Koi  ai  AoiTral  tou  Bapdfj. 
yjcO^vrjaav  tfydXayye^,  Kat.  yiifSTai  tov  Tvpdv- 

vov  iieydXri  (^vvt;.  Compare  Theophylact. 
Sim.  p.  133,  B. 

«*  Theophylact.  1.  s.  c. ;  Theophan.  p. 
224.  D.  .  i-  F 

«5  Tabari.  ii.  p.  296. 

««  Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  11,  ad  init. 

"  Ibid. 

*8  Eight  hundred,  according  to  Tabari 
(1.  s.  c);  but  the  ten  thousand  of  Theo- 
phylact (p.  1.34,  B)  is  more  probable. 

•'So  Tabari  (1.  s.  c).  Theophylact 
says  nothing  of  the  repulse. 


'»  Tabari,  Ii.  p.  297. 

'1  See  Thomas  in  the  Numismatic 
Chronicle  for  18T3,  pp.  236-9. 

'2  Varahran  V.    See  PI.  XXI.  Fig.  2. 

'3  This  is  the  rendering  of  Mr.  Thom- 
as, and  is  somewhat  uncertain.  Chubin, 
which,  according  to  the  Orientals,  was 
the  actual  epithet  of  this  monarch,  is 
said  to  mean  "dry  wood;"  and  they 
commonly  say  that  it  was  applied  to 
him  on  account  of  a  certain  dryness  in 
his  appearance.  (See  Malcolm,  History 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  120,  who  translates  it 
by  '•  the  stick-like,"  and  compare  D'Her- 
belot,  Bibl.  Or.  vol.  iii.  p.  46,  ad  voc. 

GlOUBIN.) 

CHAPTER   XXIV. 

'  Various  explanations  are  given  of 
this  title.  Mirkhond  (p.  401)  explains  it 
as  either  "  powerful  king,"  or  else  "  vic- 
torious." Gibbon  says  "  the  epithet  of 
Parvfe  alludes  to  the  charms"  of  (Chos- 
roes decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  376). 

2  See  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  ii.  pp.  153  and 
169.  Writers  who  regard  Chosroes  as 
having  one  reign  only,  which  they  date 
from  his  father's  death  (September,  a.d. 
590),  give  him  commonly  thirty-eight 
years.  See  Mirkhond,  p.  407;  Tabari, 
vol.  ii.  p.  304;  Eutychius,  Arincdes,  vol. 
ii.  p.  252;  Clinton,  F.  R.  vol.  ii.  p.  261; 
&c.)  The  exact  time  was  thirty-seven 
years  and  five  months. 

3  Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  11,  ad  fin.  and 
V.  13,  ad  init.;  Theophan.  Chronograph. 
p.  225.  The  number  of  the  guards,  ac- 
cording to  Theophanes,  was  one  thou- 
sand. 

*  Theophylact.  Sim.  v.  15,  sub  init. 

5  See  text,  p.  507. 

«  See  note  40,  Chapter  XXIII. 

'Theophylact,  1.  s.  c.  The  deaths  of 
Bindoes  and  Bostam  at  the  hands  of 
Chosroes  are  witnessed  to  by  the  Orien- 
tal writers  generally  (Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
303,  332;  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  223;  Mir- 
khond, p.  401);  but  the  manner  of  the 
death  of  Bindoes  rests  on  the  sole  au- 
thority of  Theophylact. 

»  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  301. 

9  Ibid.  p.  332. 

'"  The  Armenian  writers  say  that  Bos- 
tam, whom  they  call  Ustam,  conquered 
two  Kou.shan  kings,  Shog  and  Pariok, 
and  made  himself  very  powerful.  (Pat- 
kanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  195.) 

11  Tabari.  vol.  ii.  p.  303.  The  Arme- 
nians ascribe  the  assassination  to  Pa- 
riok.    (Patkanian.  1.  s.  c.) 

12  Milman  in  Smith's  Gibbon,  vol.  v. 
p.  374,  note  a. 

"Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  302. 

^*  Ibid.  pp.  302-3.  Mirkhond  agrees, 
but  enters  into  fewer  details  (p.  400). 

15  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  299. 

1"  Theophylact  relates  that  when  Pro- 
bus,  Bishop  of  Chalcedon,  was  sent  by 
Maurice  as  ambassador  to  Ctesiphon, 
Chosroes  requested  to  be  allowed  a  sight 
of  the  portrait  of  the  Virgin,  which  he 


CH.  XXIV.] 


TSE  SEVEN fn  MONAIiCrtY 


m'^ 


knew  to  be  in  the  ambassador's  posses- 
sion. His  request  being  granted,  he 
adored  the  picture,  and  said  that  he  liad 
seen  the  original  in  a  vision,  and  had 
been  promised  by  her  the  glories  of 
Alexander  the  Great.  CTheophylact. 
Sim.  V.  1.5.) 

>'  The  city  called  Razappa  by  tlie  As- 
syrians and  Reseph  or  Ra.sapli6  by  the 
later  Syrians,  received  the  honorable 
appellation  of  Sergiopolis  in  the  course 
of  the  fifth  or  sixth  century,  from  the 
fact  that  its  principal  church  was  dedi- 
cated to  St.  Sergius. 

18  See  Evagr.  //.  E.  vi.  21,  and  Theo- 
phylact.  Sim.  v.  13,  14. 

1*  As  the  reader  may  perhaps  desire  a 
specimen  of  Chosroes'  style,  the  open- 
ing passage  of  the  second  letter  is  here 
subjoined :  —  "  Chosroes,  king  of  kings, 
to  the  great  martyr  Sergius.  I,  Chos- 
roSs,  king  of  kings,  son  of  Hormisdas, 
have  sent  this  alnisdish  (?)  and  tliese 
other  gifts,  not  for  men  to  admire  them, 
nor  to  the  intent  that  by  my  words 
should  be  made  known  the  greatness  of 
thy  all-venerable  name,  but  that  the 
truth  of  that  which  has  been  done 
should  be  proclaimed,  and  the  many 
mercies  and  favors  which  I  have  re- 
ceived of  thee.  For  I  liold  it  as  a  piece 
of  good  fortune  that  my  name"  should 
be  inscribed  upon  tliy  vessels.  When  I 
■was  at  Beramae,  I  besought  thee,  O 
saint,  that  thou  wouldst  come  to  my  aid, 
and  cause  Sira  to  conceive  in  her  womb." 

'^^  "O  r)/oitTcpos  vo^xos  aSeiai"  rj/xii'  ov  nape- 

Xfi  'X.pKTTi.av'riv  €X""'  yc^i'-eTriv.    (Theopliy- 
lact.  Sim.  v.  14;  p.  13V,  C.) 
»» See  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  330. 

22  Patkanian  in  Journ.  Asiatique  for 
18Gfi.  p.  194. 

23  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  304.  The  stories  of 
the  loves  of  Shirin  and  Ferbad,  in  which 
the  Persian  poets  indulge,  are  scarcely 
to  be  accounted  as  history.  Tabari  has 
one  allusion  to  them  (1,  s.  c). 

•"Ibid.  p.  33.5;  Mirkhond,  p.  404. 

2'  See  text,  p.  515. 

28  Patkanian  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  IKIiG,  p.  194. 

2'  Tlieopiiylact.  Sim.  v.  15. 

28  Ibid.  viii.  1,  nd  init. 

2"  See  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol. 
V.  pp  383-5. 

3»  The  body  of  the  dead  Maurice  was 
cast  into  the  sea  by  order  of  Phocas. 
(Theophylact.  Sim.  viii.  12,  ad  init.)  His 
head  was  cut  off,  and  exposed  in  a  pub- 
lic place  in  Constantinople. 

3»  Five  sons  of  Maurice  were  murdered 
before  his  eyes.  One  was  a  mere  infant 
(Theophylact.  Sim.  viii.  11;  Theophan. 
Chronograph,  p.  243,  C,  D.) 

52  Theophylact.  Sim.  viii.  13,  ad  init. 

53  Ibid.  viii.  9. 
"Ibid.  viii.  13. 

"Theophan.  p.  244,  C.  The  Orientals 
seem  to  have  been  persuaded  that  Theo- 
dosius  actually  escaped,  and  took  ref  ii.cre 
with  Chosroiis.  (See  Patkanian  in  the 
Journal  Asiatique  for  IStJG,  p.  I'JT;  Ta- 


bari, Chroniipip.  vol.  ii.  p.  .?'^6.)  Mir 
khund,  hiiwevt-r,  is  aware  lliat  Theodo 
sins  was  killed  with  his  father  (Hintoirt^ 
de.s  .S''i.f.s((;i/f/t-.s-,  p  401). 

''"'Theoi)liyhict.  Sim.  \  iii.  15. 

"  Tlieojiliau.  Cltronogra/jh.  p.  245,  A. 
Narses  afterwards  retreated  from  Edes- 
sa  to  Ilieraixjlis  (ib.  p.  245,  C).  whence, 
trusting  to  tile  promises  of  Donientiio- 
lus,  he  proceeded  to  Constantinople, 
where  Phocas  burned  him  to  death  (nvpi 
KaTiKavtrtv). 

3«  Ibid.  1).  21.5,  B. 

3"  Chosroijs  beheaded  a  considerable 
number  of  his  pi-isoners,  probably  (a.s 
Gibbon  supposes)  because  he  regarded 
them  as  implicated  in  the  murder  of 
Maurice.  ^ 

■>"  Theophan.  p.  245,  D. 

■"  Bar-hehiseus  ap.  Assenian,  Bibl.  Or. 
vol.  iii.  p.  442. 

<2  The  fall  of  Daras  is  mentioneil,  not 
by  Bar-hebrtfusonly,  butby  Theophuue* 
(Chronograph,  p.  24U,  C),  Cedrenus  (p. 
40G,  A),  and  the  Armenian  writers  gen- 
erally. (See  Patkanian  in  the  Journai 
A.fiatique  for  IKtJtJ,  pp.  197  and  211.) 

<3  Bar-hebraeus,  vol.  iii.  p.  412. 

**  Patkanian,  p.  211. 

4'>Il)i(l.  p.  198. 

*'  Bar-hebrajus,  1.  s.  c. 

<' Patkanian,  p.  198. 

48  Chronograph,  p.  248,  B. 

*'>  See  text,  p.  521. 

^»  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  2.50,  D. 
Tip  6e  Maia>  (XTji/l  ctTTpaTevo'ai'  oi  Ilepffo* 
Kara   ^vpia^,   Kai   7rap€Aa(3oi'T7)>'  'Anaixeiay, 

K.T.A. 

*'  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  pp. 

3S8-9. 

62  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  251.  A; 
Bar-hebrams  ap.  Assenian,  liihi.  Or. 
vol.  iii.  p.  413.  The  Armenians  place  the 
capture  somewhat  earlier  (Patkanian, 
p.  198). 

^^  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  251,  D; 
Bar-hebraius,  1.  s.  c. 

^'i  The  details  of  the  war  in  Palestine 
are  given  most  fully  by  liiilycliius  (.In- 
nales,  vol.  ii.  pji.  212  3)!  lie  is  conllrni- 
ed,  generally,  by  Bar-hi'l)rauis  (1.  s.  c.J 
and  Theophanes"  (Chronograph,  p.  252, 

A). 

'5  Patkanian,  from  .■Vrmeman  sources 
(Journal  Aaiiitigue  for  18i;tj,  p.  20tl). 

6«  Entych.  Annalci.  vol.  ii.  pp.  212  and 
219.  Compare  the  Paschal  Chronicle, 
vol.  i.  p.  385,  B. 

"Theophanes  says  90,000  (p.  2.52,  A); 
but  this  is  improbable.  Patkauian's  .\r- 
menian  authorities  give  the  number  n« 
ir.OiX)  (Journ.  As.  18t;C,  1.  s.  c).  The 
Pdxchal  Chronicle  says  "many  thou- 
sands of  clergv,  monks,  and  nuns'' 
(1.  s.  c);  Eutychius  "an  imiumerabl* 
multitude"  (Ann.  vol.  ii.  p.  212). 

'■''  Patkanian,  1.  s.  c. 

^»  Eutvch.  .4)111.  vol.  ii.  p.  215. 

«"  Ibid.     Eutychius  sur)i>oses  her  to  be 

Maria,  the  daughter  of  Niaurice;  and  s"* 

the  Orientals  generally.     But.   the  mar- 

,    riage    of    Chosroes   with    this  priiiw;B» 


GOO 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XXIV. 


peeras  to  be  a  fable.  Shirin  is  no  doubt 
XDi-  wife  intended. 

«■  Tlieophan.  Chronograph,  p.  253,  B; 
Nicepli.  De  Kebus  post  Mnuricinm  gt-s- 
tis.  p.  7,  C;  Eutych.  A>i.ti.  vol.  ii.  p.  219; 
Mirkhond,  p.  402;  Bar-hebreeus,  1.  s.  c. 

"'^  Eiitychius,  1.  s.  c. 

'3  IlapeAa^ov  oi  Tlepo-ai  Tr}v  AiyvTTTOi', 
Kai  .  .  .  Al^u'r)^  €a)S  XiBioiria^.  (Tlieophan. 
Chronograph.  1.  s.  c.)  So  too  Bai-he- 
bneus,  1.  s.  c.  I  do  not  know  on  what 
authority  Gibbon  says  that  the  Persian 
arms  were  carried  westward  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Tripoli,  and  that  the 
Greek  cities  of  the  Cyrenaica  received  at 
this  time  their  death-blovv".  (Decline 
and  Fall.  vol.  v.  p.  393.) 

•<  Shahen  is  the  form  used  by  the  Ar- 
menian writers  (Patkanian  in  Journ. 
Asiatique,  1866,  p.  212).  The  Paschal 
Chronicle  has  Saen  (p.  386,  B).  Saina  is 
found  in  Bar-hebr8eus  (Asseman,  Bibl. 
<>)■.  vol.  iii.  p.  413).  Nicephorus  has  in- 
correctly "  Saitus"  (De  Rebus  post  Mau- 
ricium.  p.  2,  C). 

«6  These  were  Olympius,  the  praetorian 
prefect,  Leontius,  governor  of  Constan- 
tinople, and  Aiiastasius,  priest  in  charjre 
of  St.  Sophia's.  (Nicephorus.  p.  8,  D; 
Chron.  Pasch.  1.  s.  c.)  The  letter  which 
they  carried  to  Chosi-oes  is  preserved  in 
this  last-named  compilation.  It  is  writ- 
ten in  the  name  of  the  Greek  people. 
"^  Nicephorus,  p.  9,  A. 
«'  Ibid. 

"**  So  the  Armenians  (Patkanian,  p. 
201).  Theophanes  says  that  Chosro5s' 
answer  was:  '"  I  will  never  grant  you 
peace  till  you  deny  the  Crucified  One, 
whom  you  call  God,  and  worship  the 
sun"'  (p.  252,  D). 
«9  Theophan.  p.  252,  C. 
"•  On  the  width  of  the  canal  of  Con- 
st>autinople.  see  the  Author's  Herodotus, 
vol.  iii.  p.  6.5.  2nd  edition. 

"Theophan.  p.  253,  C;  Bar-hebraeus, 
{.  s.  c. 
'2  Bar-hebraeus.  1.  s.  c. 
'3  The   conquests   of    Chosroes   com- 
menced in  A.D.  605  (see  text,  p.  5t8).    An- 
cyra  and  Rhodes  seem   to    have  been 
taken  in  a.d.  620. 
''■'  Eutych.  Annales,  vol.  ii.  pp.  220-3. 
'*  See  a  paper  by  M.  Barbier  de  Mey- 
nard  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for  1865, 
p.  253. 

''Canon  Tristram.  See  his  Land  of 
Moab.  pp.  197  et  seq.  An  account  of  the 
palace  will  be  ^iven  in  the  Chapter  on 
Sassanian  Art  and  Architecture. 

"  Nicephorus,  p.  9,  B.  Famine  brought 
its  usual  companion,  pestilence. 
'8  Nicephorus,  p.  10. 
^'  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p. 
396. 
^^  Nicephorus,  p.  9,  B. 
**  Ibid.  The  treasure-ships  were  caught 
in  a  tempest.    Some  sank  ;  others  were 
cast  upon  the  Syrian  shore.and  the  spoil, 
being  conveyed  to  Chosroos,  formed  the 
treasure  called  Badawerd,  or  "wind- 


fall," which  was  among  the  glories  of 
his  palace  (Tabari.  vol.  ii.  p.  305). 

'-  The  importance  of  this  barrier  was 
evidenced  not  only  on  this  occasion, 
when  for  ten  years  the  heights  of  Chal- 
cedon  were  occupied  by  a  Persian  host, 
but  even  more  remarkably  in  later 
times,  when  for  centuries  it  proved  an 
impediment  which  the  Turks  could  not 
overleap. 

S3  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  254,  A. 

»*  Ibid. 

s^  Georg.  Pisid.  De  Exped.  Pers.  Aera 
as.  i.  132-5.  This  writer  accompanied 
the  expedition. 

88  Ibid.  i.  170-252. 

8'  The  locality  of  the  expedition  is 
mainly  fixed  by  the  statement  of  George 
(Acroas.  ii.  10)  that  the  fleet  sailed  to 
PylcB.  "  Non  enim  est  dubitandum,"  as 
Quercius  observes  (Anyiotationes  in 
Georgium  Pisid.  p.  100),  "  quas  Noster 
nominat  Pylas.  eas  esse  quae  in  historiis 
celeberrimae  sunt,  et  Armeniae  (?)  et 
Ciliciae  vel  Syriae  Pylae  vocantur."  Theo- 
phanes simply  follows  George. 

»8  Georg.  Pisid.  ii.  44-176;  Theophan. 
p.  2.54.  B. 

89  TheoDhan.  p.  2.55,  B. 

»»  Ibid.  p.  256,  A,  B;  Georg.  Pisid. 
Aci-oas.  iii.  210-275. 

91  Theophan.  p.  256,  C.  Gibbon  says 
that  after  the  battle  "'  Heraclius  boldly 
ascended  the  heights  of  Mount  Taurus, 
directed  his  march  through  the  plains 
of  Cappadocia,  and  established  his 
troops  for  the  winter  in  safe  and  plenti- 
ful quarters  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
Halys"  (Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  401). 
He  seems  to  quote  George  of  Pisid  ia  as 
his  authority;  but  that  writer  says 
nothing  of  any  movement  made  by  the 
army  after  the  battle.  Neither  does 
Theophanes. 

92  Eutych.  Annales,  vol.  ii.  p.  231. 
The  Khazar  alliance  is  mentioned  by 
the  Armenian  vsTiters  (Patkanian  in 
Journ.  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  213).  Nice- 
phorus puts  it  forward  verj'  strongly 
(De  Rebus  post  Mauricium,  p.  11,  C),  but 
calls  the  Khazars  Turks. 

9s  Eutych.  Annales,  1.  s.  c. 

94  Ibid. 

95  Moyse  de  Khaghank,  quoted  by  Pat- 
kanian, p.  204;  Nicephorus,  p.  11,  B. 

96  Patkanian,  p.  201. 

97  Patkanian,  p.  204. 

98  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  257,  D; 
Cedrenus,  p.  412. 

9  9  See  the  excellent  article  of  Sir  H. 
Rawlinson  in  the  Journal  of  the  Royal 
Geographical  Society,  vol.  x.  art.  ii. 

"»o  Theophan.  p.  257,  A,  B. 

""  Nicephorus  says  that  Heraclius  in- 
tercepted the  despatch  which  Chosroes 
had  addressed  to  Shahr-Barz,  recallimg 
him  to  his  aid.  and  altered  the  words  of 
it.  thus  deceiving  the  Persian  general, 
who.  imagining  that  he  was  not  wanted 
by  Chosroes,  proceeded  on  to  Chalcedon 
(De  Rebus  pos*  Mauricium,  p.  12,  B,  C). 


CH.  XXIV.] 


THE  SEVEN  Til  MONAIiCUT. 


fi91 


H-»Theophan,  p.  258.  A. 

104  'E;/  ravTai^  Tat9  5ucr\ajptai?  tottov  eic 
TOJrou  6  Hotxpoi^c  riixei^ev  ■  Kal  6  'HpafcAetos 
TOVTOV  StuiKMV  TToAAi?  TToAei?  in6p6iq<Tev  Kai 
vuipa!.  (Theophan.  p.  s!58,  B.)  It  is  evi- 
dent that  Chosroes  did  not  fly  straight 
to  Dastagherd,  but  kept  to  the  luountain 
country,  continually  shifting  his  quar- 
ters. 

i"5  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. ;  Patkauian,  p. 
205 

luo  Nicephorus,  De  Bebus  post  Mauri- 
ctwn,  p.  12,  A. 

«"'  Theophan.  p,  258,  C. 

i»8Ibid. 

>»»  Theophan.  p.  258,  D.  Compare 
Movse  de  Kaghank.  as  reported  by  Pat- 
Vanian,  Journal  Asiatique.  1866,  p.  205. 

"'"Tlie  Lazi,  Aba.sgi,  and  Iberians  are 
specially  mentioned  (Theophan.  p.  259, 
A). 

1 1 »  Shahr-Barz.  Shahen,  and  Shahrap- 
ghakan  (or  Sarablagas). 

112  Theophan.  d.  260,  B. 

i«3  Salban  is  ictentifled  by  Sir  H.  Raw- 
linson  with  the  modern  city  of  Van, 
situated  on  the  lake  of  the  sains  name 
(Journal  of  Geograph.  Soc.  vol.  x.  p  90). 
"Sal."  he  observes,  "is  evidently  the 
Kurdish  Shdl  or  Shar.  signifying  a  city, 
and  Ban  is  the  same  word  which  is 
written  Buana  by  Ptolemy,  and  Iban 
by  Cedrenus;  the  title  of  Salban  being, 
thus,  literally  the  city  of  Van." 

>i«  Theophan.  p.  26],  A. 

'•'Ibid.  p.  261,  B. 

'"Mr.  Layard  found  snow  on  the 
mountain-range  between  Van  and  Mu- 
kus  in  the  month  of  August  (Nineveh 
and  Babi/lon.  p.  418). 

n'This  is  the  conjecture  of  Sir  H. 
Rawlinson  (Journal  of  Geograph.  Socie- 
ty, vol.  X.  p.  91). 

i^Theophan.  p.  261,  D. 

>i»  See  text,  p.  519. 

i»»  Theophan.  p.  262,  A. 

1^'  Germa-nicaea  is  not  often  heard  of; 
but  its  position  is  clearly  marked  by  the 
Itinerary  of  Antonine,  which  shows  it 
to  have  lain  about  sixty  miles  west  of  Sa- 
mosata,  in  the  district  known  as  Com- 
magene  (pp.  81-3). 

I"  See  text,  pp.  522-.52.3. 

'"Theophan.  p.  262,  B. 

•'*  Ibid.  p.  262,  D,  aymviioiKvo^  vnep 
avOpitiTTov. 

'"  Ibid.  p.  263,  A.  Shahr-Barz  is  said 
to  have  remarked  on  his  conduct  to  one 
of  his  officers:—"©  Cosmas,  dost  thou 
see  the  emperor,  how  boldly  he  engages 
in  the  battle,  against  what  a  nmltitude 
he  contends  alone,  and  how,  like  an  an- 
vil, he  cares  not  for  the  blows  showered 
upon  him?" 

'■"Theophan.  p.  263,  A. 

y  Ibid.  p.  263.  B. 

i^S  2TpaTni<ra?  ftrou?  re  Koi  iroAiTa?  Kal 
otKtTas.  (Theophan.  1.  s.  c  )  This  levy 
of  slaves  and  foreigners  is  a  striking 
Innication  of  the  exhaustion  of  Persia. 

»"  Qibbou  says  "  tUe  aew  levies  wero 


divided  into  three  formidable  bodies'' 
(DecltTie  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  405);  but  he 
appears  to  me  to  have  misunderstood 
Tneophanes. 

""  Georgius  Pisid.  Bell.  Avaricum,  1. 
280:  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  26:J,  C. 

'3'  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. 

'  '2  Nicephorus,  De  Rebus  post  Mauri- 
ciuni,  p.  11,  D. 

'3'  Nicephorus,  De  Rebus  post  yiauri- 
icum.  p.  12,  A.  Compare  Theophan.  p, 
264,  B. 

i^''  This  fact,  and  those  which  follow, 
are  derived  from  the  Armenian  writers. 
(See  Patkanian's  digest  of  Armeniaa 
history  in  the  Journal  Asiatique  for 
1866.  p.  206.) 

'"Theophan.  p.  263,  D. 

'3«Georgius  Pisid.  Bell.  Avar.  I.  197; 
Theophan.  p.  263,  C.  According  to  the 
Pn.schal  Chronicle,  the  vanguard  of  the 
invaders  numbered  30,CKX)  men  (p.  392, 
B).  The  entire  force  is  reckoned  by 
George  the  Pisidian  at  80,000  (Bell.  Avar. 
1.  219). 

'"  Georg.  Pisid.  Bell.  Avar.  11.  269-273 
and  293-7. 

J  a*"  C/iron.  Pascftaie,  p.  393,  D. 

•39  Oi  'A(3apei9  .  .  .  ek  <rico(^7)  yAvirra  e'« 
ToO  'ItjTpov  TT\r)Oo<;  arreipov  Kal  apid^ou 
/cpeiTTOi'     (veyKairef     t'ov     Ko\nov     toO 

KipaTo^  crrA^pojcrai'  (Theophan.  Chro- 
nograph, p.  264,  C). 

n"  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  396,  C. 

'1'  Ibid,  p  394,  A. 

'"  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. 

'"  Chron.  Pasch.  p.  396,  D. 

'"Ibid.  p.  396,  A,  B. 

'■•5  Some  of  the  Oriental  authorities 
(Elmacin,  Hist.  Saracen,  pp.  1.5-16;  Jlir- 
khond,  Hisioire  des  Sas.'ianides,  p.  402) 
place  him  in  Mesopotamia  at  this  pe- 
riod: but  it  seems  very  improbable  that, 
in  that  case,  he  would  have  made  his  at- 
tack from  Lazica  in  the  autumn. 

'<«  Theophan.  p.  264,  D. 

'«'  Ibid.  p.  264,  B. 

'••8  Ibid.  p.  265,  A. 

'<'Ibid. :  Ot  S«  Toup<toi,  «  rbf^jeifioiua 
opoji'TC?  Kai  Ta?  <n)vc\ti.%  Triipofia?  fiav  II«p- 
<ru)i',  /it)  iiTroi^tpoi  re?  <Toyico7ri<fi'  T<p  ^a<TiAei, 
nplai/To  (Car"  oAiyor  v  oppftiv,  »cai  ndi'Ttt 
afpetn'c;  axtTov,  viriaTptxf/av. 

'50  Ibid.  p.  268,  A.  The  motive  of  his 
removal  from  Ctesiphon  is  said  to  have 
been  a  prophecy  that  when  he  should 
next  enter  Ctes'iphon  he  would  perish 
(Theonlian.  p.  269.  A). 

'"  On  the  position  of  Da-stagherd.  see 
the  remarks  of  Sir  II.  Itawliuson  in  the 
Journal  of  the   Gfogrnph.  Societu.  vol. 

I   X.  pp   95-6;  and  compare  Kiuneir,  Per- 
sian Empire,  p.  30H. 

I  "^TheophaiH's.  according  to  his  pres- 
ent text,  savs  C'haniaelha.  or  Chnma'tha 
(p.  265,  Bi:'buf  this  is  probably  to  be 
corrected  fioiii  Tlieopliylact  of  Simo- 
calia.  who  puis  t'lwuoltuis  in  abnut  the 
sum--  l.icaHtv  (Hist.  v.  8;  seet^-xt.  p.510). 
"-•^Theophan.  p.  26.">.  A.  B.  Nicepho- 
rusoalls  hiii)  Khnzat<'s  (/>>•  Krlms  post 
J/(tui(C<u/ii,    p.   13,    Cj,    the  .lUmeuiaa 


(;93 


THE  SEVENTH  .MONARCHY. 


[cH.  xxr? 


writers  Rhodja  Veh  (Patkanian  In  the 
Juiirn.  Asiatique,  1866,  p.  207). 

-s*Theopliaii.  p.  265,  D.  The  Arme- 
nians say  that  Rliazates,  having  repre- 
sented to  Cliosroes  the  certainty  of  de- 
feat, was  told  in  answer  that  he  could 
at  any  rate  fight  and  die.  "  My  God," 
he  exclaimed,  "judge  between  me  and 
my  pitiless  king!"  But  he  obeyed, 
fouglit,  and  fell  (Patkanian,  1.  s.  c). 

'"Theophan.  p.  266,  A. 

's^This  appears  from  the  subsequent 
occupation  of  Nineveh  by  Heraclius. 

""  Theophan.  p.  266,  A,  B.  Gibbon 
makes  Heraclius  kill  Rhazates  himself 
(Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  409);  but  I 
do  not  so  understand  Theophanes.  Ni- 
cephorus  certainly  assigns  him  a  share 
of  the  honor  (De  Rebus  post  Afauricium, 
p.  13,  D);  but  even  he  gives  the  main 
credit  to  a  guardsman. 

168  Theophan.  p.  266,  B. 
issibid.  p.  266,  C. 

leo  Ibid.  p.  267,  A. 

161  Theophan.  p.  267,  A.  Compare 
Cliron.  Pasch.  p.  399,  C. 

If 2  Theophan.  p.  266,  D. 

i"3Ibid.  p.  267,  B. 

I*''  On  the  Barazrud,  see  the  remarks 
of  Sir  H  Rawlinson  in  the  Journal  of 
the  Georp-aph.  Society,  vol.  x.  p.  95.  It 
•was  derived  from  the  Diyaleh  below  the 
Ilamnierin  Hills  at  a  point  where,  in 
former  times,  was  the  great  passage  of 
the  river. 

1*^6  Sir  H.  Rawlinson  identifies  the 
Torna  with  the  Ka-tui;  the  Arabic  name 
for  the  more  northern  part  of  the  great 
Nahr-wan  canal  (Qeograph.  Journ.  vol. 
X.  p.  93). 

188  Theophan.  p.  267,  C. 

i^^He  is  said  to  have  quitted  Dasta- 
gherd  by  boring  a  hole  through  the  town 
wall,  where  it  formed  the  boundary  of 
the  palace  garden  (Theophan.  p.  268,  D). 

188  Shirin,  her  two  sons.  Merdasas  and 
Saliarus,  and  three  wives  who  are  said 
to  have  been  also  his  daughters  (ibid.  p. 
269.  B;  p.  270,  D). 

169  That  the  '"  River  Arba"  of  Theo- 
phanes represents  the  Nahr-wan  canal 
is  sufficiently  clear:  1.  from  the  letter 
of  Heraclius  in  the  Paschal  Chronicle, 
where  the  form  given  is  Nap^ac  (p.  400, 
A):  and  2,  from  Magoudi  (vol.  ii.  p.  227), 
where  the  invading  arrny  is  said  to  have 
penetrated  to  Nahreudn. 

i">  Theophan.  p.  270,  A. 

I'l  Among  the  treasures  of  the  palace 
are  enumerated  aloes,  raw  silk  (merafa), 
pepper,  muslins,  sugar,  ginger,  silk 
dresses,  carpets,  embroidered  eovelets, 
and  bullion.  Most  of  these  things  were 
burnt  as  being  too  heavy  to  carry  off. 
In  the  paradise  attached  to  the  palace 
were  found  lions  and  tigers,  kept  for  the 
purpose  of  being  hunted,  ostriches,  ga- 
zelles, wild  asses,  peacocks,  and  pheas- 
ants. Heraclius  kept  the  Feast  of  the 
Epiphany  in  the  palace,  and  then  com- 
pletely destroyed  it  (Theophan.  p.  268,  C). 

"■^  theophan.  p.  270,  B. 


1"  Sir  H.  Rawlinson  says: — "In  th* 
year  of  the  Emperor's  visit  the  winter 
seems  to  have  set  in  remarkably  late'' 
{Journal  of  Geograph.  Society,  vol.  x.  p 
99). 

i'4  See  text,  p.  357  et  seqq. 

i'5  Theophan.  p.  270,  C. 

i'8  Heraclius  left  Shehrizur  on  Febru- 
ary 24  (Chron.  Pasch.  p.  400,  C).  Thfe 
distance  from  Shehrizur  to  Berozeh  (ol 
Banneh)  is  usually  reckoned  at  fom 
days'  march  (Geograph.  Journal,  vol.  x, 
p.  98);  but  Heraclius  appears  to  havf- 
occupied  five  days  in  traversing  the  dis- 
tance, for  it  was  Blarch  when  he  reached 
Berozeh.  (rol  MapTt'o)  ^'i}vl  IXOiiv  €t5  x^P^' 
oc  Ae-yo/nei/oi'  Bap^av.  '  Theophan.  1.  S.  C.) 

1"  Chron.  Pasch,  p.  401,  C,  D. 

178  They  were  found  in  the  palace  sH 
Dastagherd  (Theophan.  p.  268,  B). 

179  Ibid.  p.  270,  A. 

180  Theophan.  p.  270,  A. 
isilbid.  p.  269,  C,  D. 

182  Mirkhond,  p.  407;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p. 
328. 

183  He  is  said  to  have  put  many  of  the 
imprisoned  officers  to  death  (Tabari, 
1.  s.  c),  to  ^a''e  i"?? prisoned  his  sons  an6 
forbidden  them  to  inarry  (ibid.),  to  havfr 
mutilated  Merdanshah,  governor  of  Za- 
bulistan  (ibid.  p.  331),  &c.  Compare  als* 
Ma^oudi,  vol.  ii.  pp.  225-6. 

184  Theophan.  p.  270,  C. 

185  Gibbon  speaks  of  Siroes  as  "  glory- 
ing in  the  rank  and  merit  of  his  mother, 
Sira"  (Shirin);  but  this  contradicts  Theo- 
phanes, and  obtains  no  support  from  the 
Oriental  writers.  Tabari  makes  Siroi^s 
the  son  of  Maria,  daughter  of  the  Em- 
peror Maurice  (vol.  ii.  p.  332),  whom  h& 
distinguishes  from  Shirin  (pp.  304,  328, 
&c.).  Mirkhond  says  that  Siroes,  aftet 
the  death  of  his  father,  fell  in  love  witb 
Shirin,  and  seems  certainly  not  to  re. 
gard  her  as  his  mother  (p.  406). 

186  This  is  the  form  of  the  name  found 
in  the  letter  of  Heraclius  (C'/i7-oji.  Pasch 
p.  398,  D).  Theophanes  changes  it  intff 
Gundabunas  (p.  270,  C,  D). 

18'  Theophan.  p.  271,  B. 

188  Theophan.  1.  s.  c. 

189  C/ij-on.  Pasch.  I.  s.  c;  Theophan. 
p.  271,  p. 

i^o  Ei(ra70v<nv   avTov   ets   toi'   oTkoi"   to^ 

(TKOTOV*;,  OV  aVTOS    d}XVpt>JtT€V    €K    V€OV    KTiaaf 

et?  aTToSeuu' xpr)ju,aTaji'.   (Theophan.  1   S.  C.> 

191  Heraclius  says  (Pasch.  Chron.  j>. 
399,  A)  that  Siroes  destroyed  his  father 
by  a  most  cruel  death  (n-iKpoTaTo)  davdTU)). 
Theophanes  tells  us  (p.  27'2,  a")  that  hf' 
had  him  killed  by  arrows  (eKcAeuo-ei-  • 

2tp6T)?  ToiiTov  To^ot?  areAeli'). 

192  Chosroes  II.  is  generally  give» 
thirty-eight  years  (Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  332,- 
Mirkhond,  p.  407;  Eut.ycliius,  vol.  ii.  p. 
252;  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  232);  but  this 
number  is  reached  by  reckoning  to  him 
the  reign  of  Bahram"  (Jhobin  (Varahrar 
VI.). 

193  Histoire  des  Sassanides,  p.  401. 

194  Theophanes,  p.  268,  B,  C.  Compare- 
text,  p.  533, 


1 


CH.  XXV.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


fi03 


'»»  Tlie  most  remarkable  feature  of 
the  paldce  at  Canzaca  was  a  domed 
builditifj,  the  ceiHiig  of  which  was  orna- 
inentod  with  representations  of  the  sun, 
moon,  and  stars,  while  below  was  an 
image  of  the  monarch,  seated,  and  at- 
tepded  by  messengers  bearing  wands  of 
office.  A  machinery  was  attached,  by 
which  rain  and  thunder  could  be  imitat- 
ed (Cedrenus,  p.  412;  Tzetzes,  Chiliad. 
iii.  66). 

186  The  treasures  found  by  the  Tlo- 
mans  in  the  palace  of  Dastagherd  have 
been  already  enumerated  (see  above, 
note  171).  The  Orientals  say  that  the 
palace  was  supported  on  forty  thousand 
columns  of  silver,  adorned"  by  thirty 
thousand  rich  hangings  upon  the  walls, 
and  further  ornamented  by  a  thousand 
globes  suspended  from  the  roof  (D"Hei"- 
be'ot,  Bibl.  Orientate,  torn.  iii.  p.  480). 
Among  other  treasures  possessed  by 
Parviz,  Tabari  notices  a  throne  of  gold, 
called  Takdis,  supported  on  feet  wliich 
were  rubies,  a  napkin  which  would  not 
burn,  and  a  crown  enriched  with  a  thou- 
sand pearls,  each  as  big  as  an  egg 
(Chronique.  vol.  ii.  pp.  304-5). 

'"  According  to  Tabari,  Uhosroes  II. 
maintained  for  the  use  of  his  court  1,000 
elepliants,  12,000  white  camels,  50,000 
horses,  mules,  and  asses,  of  which  8,000 
were  kept  for  his  own  riding,  and  12,U00 
female  domestics,  of  whom  a  considera- 
ble number  were  slaves  (ibid.  i^.  305). 
MaQoudi  (vol.  ii.  pp.  230-3)  gives  him 
.50,00(5  horses  and  1,100  elephants,  whiter 
than  snow,  some  of  them  eleven  cubits 
high,  and  all  accustomed  to  kneel  at  the 
sight  of  the  king!  Mirkhond  raises  the 
number  of  the  elephants  to  1,200.  mak- 
ing the  camels  12,000,  and  the  horses 
50,000  (p.  404). 

•'^  The  number  of  his  concubines  was 
3,000,  according  to  some  writers  (Gibbon, 
Decline  and  Fall.  vol.  v.  p.  :i95),  12,000 
according  to  others  (Mirkhond  p.  404; 
Tabari,  \o\.  ii.  p.  305). 

""  Ma^oudi  says  (vol.  ii.  pp.  228-9)  that 
Parviz  (lOberwiz)  had  nine  seals  of  office. 
The  first  was  a  diamond  ring  with  a 
ruby  centre,  bearing  the  portrait,  name, 
and  titles  of  ths  monarch.  It  was  used 
for  despatches  and  diplomas.  The  sec- 
ond, also  a  ring,  was  a  cornelian,  set  in 
gold,  with  the  legend  '  Khornxsan  Klin- 
re^,"  which  was  used  for  the  State  ar- 
chives. The  third  was  an  onyx  ring 
with  the  legend  •'  Celerity,"  used  for 
letters  sent  by  post.  The  fourth,  a  gold 
ring  with  a  piidv  ruby,  had  the  legend 
"  Kiches  are  the  source  of  pros))erity.'" 
It  was  impressed  upon  letters  of  grace. 
The  fifth  seal,  a  red  ruby,  bore  the  le- 
gend '•  JGiiireh  va  Khoriem'  or  "Splen- 
dor and  Prosperity,"  and  was  impressed 
upon  the  chests  wherein  treasure  was 
stored.  The  si.xlli,  made  of  Chinese 
iron,  bore  the  emblem  of  an  eagle,  and 
was  used  to  seal  letters  addressed  to 
foreign  kings.  The  seventh  was  a  bi''Zo- 
ard,  bearing  on  it  a  fly.    It  was  impress- 


ed on  meats,  medicines,  and  perfumes 
reserved  for  the  king's  use.  The  eighth, 
a  pearl  ( ! ),  bore  the  emblem  of  a  pig's 
head,  and  was  placeil  on  persons  con- 
demned to  death,  and  on  death  warrants. 
The  ninth  was  an  iron  ring,  wliich  the 
king  took  with  him  to  the  bath. 

""><>  See  te.xt,  p.  502. 

!»»  See  text,  pp.  472,  501,  &c. 

»°2  The  Byzantines  agree  with  the  Ori- 
entals in  making  Cliosroes  faithful  to 
Shirin  to  the  last.  (Tabari.  vol  ii  np 
320,  339,  &c.:  Macoudi.  vol.  ii.  p.  232; 
Theophanes,  p.  270,  C,  D.)  Tabari  even 
represents  him  as  having  had  no  com- 
merce with  any  other  woman  (p.  335). 

203  According  to  Mirkliond  (p.  406), 
Shirin  was  sought  in  marriage  by  Siroes 
after  his  father's  death.  She  made  it  a 
condition  of  her  con.-^enting,  that  she 
should  be  allowed  first  to  visit  the  tomb 
of  Chosroes.  Having  obtained  permis- 
sion, she  entered  the  building  and  poi- 
soned herself. 

"">*  See  Mordtmaun  in  the  Zeitschrift 
der  deutschen  morgcnldndischen  OesAl- 
schaft,  vol.  viii.  pp.  111-140;  and  vol.  xi. 
pp.  :)3-14. 

•-•05  Mordtmann  conjectures  that  the 
monogram  represents  the  name  of  God, 
and  connects  it  with  the  rest  of  the  le- 
gend, regarding  the  meaning  of  the 
whole  a.s  "  Jlay  God  increase  Chosroes!" 
(Zeitscluift,  vol.  xii.  p.  ;i3  ) 

^"^  Ibid.  vol.  viii.  p.  Ill  etseqq.;  vol.  xii. 
p.  3:i  ct  seqq. 

21'  This  coin  has  been  represented  by 
Mordtnumn  (No.  723),  by  Longperier 
(MedaiUcs  de.i  Sassanides,  pi.  xi.  No.  3), 
and  others.  The  illustration  [see  Plate 
XXIV.  Fig.  1]  is  taken  from  Longp6rier's 
woi-k. 

'""*  See  Thomas  in  Numismatic  Chroiv- 
icle  for  1873,  j).  242. 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

'  Kobad  (Kavat)  is  the  form  found  in 
the  sui)erscrif)ti<>n  of  the  letter  written 
by  the  king  hunself  to  Heraclins  iJ'asch. 
Chron.  p.  402,  B).  It  likewise  appears, 
togelhei-  with  Firuz,  upon  the  king's 
coins.  Heraclius himself  (PuA'c/i.  Citron. 
p.  401,  C),  Eutychius  (Annalvx,  vul.  ii.  p. 
2,52),  Mayoudi  (Prairies  d'Or,  vol.  ii.  p. 
2.'52),  Jlirkhond  (Ui.sfoire  des  Sa.<:.'<anidcs, 
p.  407),  and  the  Armeniati  writers  (Pat- 
kanian  in  Journal  Asiatiqiie  for  1800, 
pp.  215-7)  have  both  names.  Tabai'i 
(vol.  ii.  pp.  327-317)  uses  the  name  SiroSs 
(Shirou'i)  only. 

To.'ich.  Cfiron.  p.  208.  D. 

5  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  333-345;  Mirkhond, 
p.  408. 

<See  text,  p.  531. 

'  Tu)  r)n<p(oTaTaj  /3a<nAf  r  'Puifiaiuiv.  Pasch. 
Chron.  p.  402.  Ii. 

•Compare  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  31G,  and 
Theophan.  p.  '271,  D. 

'  The  mutilation  of  Kobad's  letter  in 
the  \'atican  >IS.  renders  the  sense  of 
this  last  passage  somewhat  doul)tful. 

'  Nicephorua   gives  the  foUowmg  as 


694 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[CH.  XXV. 


the  main  purport  of  Heraclius'  reply  :— 
"  Heraclius  wrote  back  to  Siroes,  calling 
him  his  son,  and  saying  that  it  had 
r.ever  been  his  wish  to  deprive  any  king 
of  his  royal  state,  not  even  Chosroes; 
whom,  if  he  had  been  completely  victo- 
rious, he  would  have  replaced  upon  the 
throne,  notwithstanding  all  the  harm 
that  he  had  done  both  to  the  Romans 
and  the  Persians.  But  Heaven  had  decid- 
ed otherwise,  and  to  prevent  further  dis- 
aster, had  punished  Chosroes  as  he  de- 
served, and  opened  to  himself  and 
Siroes  the  wa}^  of  reconciliation."  (De 
Bebus  post  Muuricium  gestis,  p.  14,  B.) 

9  From  April  .3  to  April  8.  (See  the 
letter  of  Heraclius  to  the  Senate  in  the 
Paschal  Chronicle,  p.  401,  C,  D.) 

i^The  recall  of  the  troops  is  proved 
by  Theopbanes  (,p.  272,  C),  who  assigns 
it  to  the  first  year  of  Siroes.  The  recall 
implies  the  surrender. 

'1  Theophan.  p.  272,  B. 

'2  Nicephorus,  p.  14,  C;  Theophan. 
1.  s.  c. 

13  The  safe  conduct  of  the  Persians 
was  entrusted  to  Theodore,  brother  of 
Heraclius  (Theophan.  p.  272,  C). 

1^  So  Gibbon  in  a  note  {Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  v.  p.  414);  but  I  do  not  know 
his  authority. 

IS  Theophan.  p.  273,  B,  C;  Cedrenus, 
p.  420,  A. 

i^See  Eutychius,  Annates,  vol.  ii.  p. 
952;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  346;  Mirkhond,  p. 
409;  Moyse  de  Kaghank,  ii.  12;  <S:c. 

1'  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. ;  Eutych.  Ann.  1.  s.  c. 

1"  Moyse  de  Kaghank,  1.  s.  c. 

"  Mirkhond.  p.  409;  Eutych.  1.  s.  c. 

20  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

21  See  test,  p.  532. 

22  S6p66s,  the  Armenian  historian, 
distinctly  asserts  that  Shahr-Varaz 
(Shahr-Barz)  refused  to  evacuate  the 
Roman  territory  at  the  command  of 
Kobad.  (See  Patkanian  in  Journ.  Asia- 
tique  for  1866,  p.  216.)  The  narrative  of 
Nicephorus  (De  Rebus  post  Manricium, 
p.  15)  implies  that  the  evacuation  was 
not  complete  till  Shahr-Barz  became 
king  of  Persia. 

23  Shahr-Barz  is  called  by  Eutj^chius 
"praefectus  limitum  occidentalium" 
lAnnales,  vol.  ii.  p.  252). 

24  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  347. 

2s  Nicephorus.  De  Rebus  post  Mauri- 
ciuni.  p.  15,  A,  B. 

2'  Mirkhond  makes  the  number  fifteen 
(p.  409),  Tabari  sixteen  (vol.  ii.  p.  346), 
tlie  Modjmel-al-Tewarikh  seventeen, 
Eutychius  eighteen  (Anr^ales,  vol.  ii.  p. 
252),  Thomas  of  Maraga  (ap.  As.seman, 
Bibl.  Or.  vol.  iii.  p.  92)  twenty-four,  the 
Armenian  writers  forty  (Patkanian  in 
Journ.  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  215).  Thom- 
as of  Maraga  ascribes  the  massacre  to  a 
Christian,  named  Samatas,  who  acted 
without  the  knowledge  of  Kobad. 

2'  Histoire  des  Sassanides,  p.  409. 

2«  See  Taban.  vol.  ii.  p.  347. 

-•"  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. 

'°  Eutychius,  Annates,  vol.  ii.  p.  352. 


31  S6p66s,  the  Armenian  writer,  saye 
that  Kobad  H.  reigned  six  months  (Pat- 
kanian in  J.  Asiatique  for  1866,  p.  216); 
Tabari  makes  him  reign  '"  seven  months 
in  all  "  (1.  s.  c.) ;  Eutychius  (1.  s.  c.)  eight 
months:  so  also  Miikhond  (l.s.  c);  Ma- 
50udi  alone  gives  him,  in  accordance 
with  his  coins,  a  reign  exceeding  a  year. 
He  makes  Kobad  reign  eighteen  months 
(Prairies  d'Or,  vol.  ii.  p.  233). 

32  Eutychius,  1.  s.  c. 

33  Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  232. 

3*  Thomas  in  Numismatic  Chronicle 
for  1873,  p.  250;  Mordtmann  in  the  Zeit- 
schrift, \ol.  viii.  p.  141. 

36  The  eighteen  months  of  Magoudi 
would  not  be  complete  until  August  23; 
but  they  were  probably  incomplete. 

3«  So  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  347),  Magoudi 
(vol.  ii.  p.  233),  and  Mirkhond  (p.  409).  Ta- 
bari notes  that  some  accounts  said  he 
was  only  one  year  old. 

3'  Tabari,  1.  s.  c.  On  the  high  dignity 
of  purveyors  in  Oriental  courts,  see  1 
Kings,  iv.  7-19. 

38  See  Patkanian  in  the  Journ.  Asia- 
tique for -iSm,  p.  219. 

3"  Nicephorus,  De  Rebus  post  Mauri- 
ciuni.  p.  15,  A. 

*"  Nicephorus,  De  Bebus  post  Maxiri- 
cium,  p.  15,  B. 

41  So  the  Armenians.  (Patkanian,  l.s.c.) 

4  2  Tabari.  1.  s.  c. 

43  Ibid.     Compare  Mirkhond,  p.  410. 

4  4  Bar-hebrEBUs  explains  the  name 
Shahr-Barz  as  equivalent  to  hzir  baro, 
"wild  boar."  Mirkhond  seems  to  ap- 
prove the  derivation  (Histoire  des  Sas- 
sanides, p.  410). 

46  Mirkhond  (p.  411)  and  Tabari  (vol. 
ii.  p.  348)  give  Shahr-Barz  a  reign  of 
forty  days;  Magoudi  (vol.  ii.  p.  233)  and 
Theopbanes  (p.  273,  D)  of  two  months. 
Some  authors  only  allowed  him  twenty- 
days.  (Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c. ;  Blagoudi, 
l.s.c.) 

4"  By  this  supposition  we  may  best 
reconcile  Theopbanes  (p.  272,  B)  with 
Nicephorus  (p.  15,  A,  ad  fin.). 

4'  Moyse  de  Kaghank,  li.  16. 

4s  Patkanian  in  Journ.  Asiatique  for 
1866,  p.  222. 

49  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  348.  Compare  Mir- 
khond, p.  411. 

60  Tabari,  1.  s.  c,  Mirkhond,  1.  s.  c.  Ma- 
goudi (vol.  ii.  p.  233)  makes  Chosroes. 
son  of  Kobad,  succeed  Shahr-Barz.  and 
reign  three  months.  Next  to  this  Chos- 
roes he  places  Bourati  (i.e.  Purandocht). 

61  See  text,  pp.  506-513. 

62  The  shortness  of  her  reign — seven 
months,  according  to  Theojjhanes  (p. 
273,  D),  sixteen  months,  according  to 
Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  350)  and  Mirkhond  (p. 
412),  eighteen  months,  according  to  Ma- 
goudi (vol.  ii  p.  233)— raises  the  suspicion 
of  a  violent  death;  of  which,  however, 
there  is  no  direct  evidence. 

63  Mirkhond,  p.  415;  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p. 
352;  Eutj'chius.  Anvales.  vol.  ii.  p.  255. 

'4  Tabari  gives  the  order  as  follows:--" 
Kobad  Artaxprxes  III.,  Shah>'-Barz,  Por 


CH.  XXVI.  ] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARJUT. 


695 


randocht,  Kusliensadeh,  Azermidocht, 
Chosroes  III.,  Khordad-Chosroes,  Firuz, 
and  Ferukhzad-Chosroes  (vol.  ii  pp. 
.336-3.53);  Macjoudi  as  Kobad.  Artaxerxes 
III.,  Shahr-Barz,  Chosroes  III.,  Bouran 
(PuraiKlocht),  Finiz-Kosliei)shi(it'h, Azer- 
midocht, aud  Ferhad  Khusru  ivol.  ii.  pp. 
2.33-4);  Eutychius  as  Kobad,  Artaxerxes 
III.,  Jorhan  (  =  Shahr-Barz >.  Chosroes 
IIL.  Miirla,  Hoshnashtadah,  Arzinan- 
docht,  and  Pharachorad-Choshra  (An- 
nales,  vol.  ii.  jip.  2.'52-2r)5).  Mirkhond 
ag:rees  in  the  main  with  Tabari,  out 
omits  Khordad-Chosroes  and  Firuz  (pp. 
40«-41.i). 

^^  These  are  the  words  of  Gibbon  {De- 
cline and  Full.  vol.  v.  p.  412;,  who  has 
in  his  mind  the  following  passage  of  Eu- 
tychius:— "Erant  aiitem  affectus  ipso- 
nim  diversi,  coetus  divisi,  et  se  mutuo 
bellis  laoessentes,  nniuscujusque  terrae 
tractus,  urbis,  aut  oppidi  per  totiim  reg- 
num  incolis  vicinis  suis  beUum  inferen- 
tibus;  manseruntfiiie  hoc  statu  urbes, 
videlicet,  rebus  dissolutis,  poptilo  diviso, 
regno  corrupto,  hominibus<]ue  inter  se 
dissentientibus  octo  (?)  annos."  (An- 
nales,  vol.  ii.  p.  256.) 

6»See  Clinton,  Fasti  jBomant,  vol.  ii. 
p.  172. 

6'  The  Armenian  writers  speak  of  an 
opposition  to  Isdigerd  in  the  early  part 
of  his  reign  (Patkanian  in  the  Journal 
Asialique  for  1SB6,  p.  22();  but  neither 
the  Arabs  nor  the  Persians  mention  any. 

*"  Shahriar  is  clearly  the  "Saliarus" 
of  Theophanes,  who  accompanied  Chos- 
roes, when  he  fled  from  Ctesiphon  to 
Seleucia  (see  note  168.  Chapter  XXIV.). 

»»  This  seems  to  be  the  true  account. 
It  is  given  by  Tabari  (vol.  ii.  p.  328),  Mir- 
khond (p.  416),  and  JMayoudi  (vol.  ii.  p. 
231).  Eutychius  (vol.  ii.  p.  2.")6i,  and  El- 
macin  (a/>.  Paniniii,  vol.  ii.  p.  VDO)  make 
Isdigerd  111.  tile  son  of  Chosroes  II. 

•"Tabari,  vol   ii.  p.  33t). 

"Ki)bad  II.  would  i)robably  have  put 
him  to  death,  had  he  known  of  his  ex- 
istence. Cho.sroes  II,  threatened  his 
life  on  account  of  a  prophecy  (Tabari, 
p.  320). 

"Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  353;  Mirkhond,  p. 
416. 

»'  Eutychius,  Annales,  vol.  ii.  p.  256; 
Tabari  (1.  s.  c.)  makes  hiiu  sixteen. 

•<  Mohammed  made  his  first  converts 
about  A.D.  6!  4-617,  when  Chosroes  was 
gaining  his  greatest  <?uccesses,  (See 
Ockley,  Hittory  of  the  Saracens,  pp. 
14-16.) 

»*•' Mohammed,"  says  Ockley,  "was 
now  (A,D.  627)  so  well  "contirmed  in  his 
power  that  he  took  upon  himself  the  au 
thority  of  a  king"  (p.  45).  It  seems  to 
have  been  in  a.d.  628  that  he  addressed 
letters  to  Heraclius,  Chosrogs,  and 
others,  announcing  himself  as  "  the 
apostle  of  God."  ami  calling  upon  them 
to  embrace  his  religiDU.  Chosroes  tore 
(he  letter  in  pieces;  whereupon  Mo- 
hamrnecl  remarked,  "He  has  torn  up 


his  own  kingdom"  (Tabari,  vol,  ii.  p. 
326). 

•«  Ockley.  p.  52;  Gibbon,  Decline  and 
Fall,  vol.  vi.  pp.  2.57-8. 

•''  "  Mahomet  displa3-ed  his  banner  at 
the  head  of  ten  thousand  horse  and 
twenty  thousand  foot"  (Gibbon,  p.  258). 
Dr.  Smith  remarks  that  "thirty  thou- 
sand is  I  lie  longest  number  as.signed;" 
but  he  ;i(Ms  that  "a  large  part  deserted 
at  the  oummencement  or  the  march" 
(p.  25!i,  note  a). 

«8  Badsan,  or  Badham.  (See  Ockley, 
p.  50.) 

«»Ibid.  p.  51.  Ockley  says  that  Al 
Mondar  afterwards  routed  the  Per- 
sians and  made  a  great  slaughter  of 
them." 

'»  Ibid.  p.  90.  The  term  Bahrein,  which 
is  now  applied  only  to  the  island  cele- 
brated for  its  pearl  fisherj-  (lat.  26°,  long. 
.50°  ;i5'),  was  formerly  given  to  that  por- 
tion of  the  mainland  which  lies  directly 
west  of  the  upper  ]iart  of  the  Persian 
Gulf.  A  remnant  of  tliis  use  will  be 
fotuid  in  Carsten  Niel)iihr  (Description 
de  I'Arabie,  p.  293,  and  compare  the 
map,  opp.  p.  268). 

"  See  text,  p.  558. 

CHAPTER  XXVI, 

'  See  Ockley,  History  of  the  Saracens, 
pp.  8i~'M.  It  is  surprising  that  Gibbon 
omits  all  notice  of  this  time  of  revolt 
and  disturbance.  "After  the  simple  in- 
auguration of  Abubeker."  he  says,  "he 
was  obeyed  in  Media,  Mecca,  and  the 
provinces  of  Arabia;  the  Hasheniites 
alone  declined  the  oath  of  fidelity"  (De- 
cline and  Fall,  vol.  vi.  pp.  270-1).  This 
is  the  reverse  of  the  fact.  (See  Tabari. 
ed.  Kosegarten,  vol,  i.  pp.  1-50;  Ma(;oudi, 
vol.  iv.  pp.  180-3.) 

''Abubekr  was  sixty-three  at  his  de- 
cease (Ockley,  p.  141),  and  consequently 
above  sixty  at  his  accession,  since  he 
reigned  orily  a  little  more  than  two 
years  (Weil.  Geschichle  der  Chalifen, 
vol.  i.  p.  46  and  p.  53). 

3  See  Tabari,  vol.  i.  pp.  53-251  (ed.  Kose- 
garten). 

■•  He  had  affected  to  treat  Mohammed 
as  an  equal,  and  liad  addressed  a  letter 
to  him  as  follows:—"  From  Moseilaraa, 
the  Apostle  of  God,  to  Mohammed,  the 
Apostle  of  God."  Mohammed  sent  a 
reply  with  the  address:— "  From  Mo- 
hammed, the  .Apostle  of  God.  to  IMosel- 
lamn.  the  liar  '^  (See  note  in  Bohn's 
edition  of  Ockley,  p.  88.) 

'  So  Ockley  (p.  88v  who  takes  the 
number  from  El  niacin. 

«  Tabari  gives  a  long  account  of  the 
circumstances  luider  which  lyas  had 
been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  .\r.ib 
tribes  subject  to  Persia  in  the  plaee  of 
Noinaii.  the  jjist  of  the  grent  .\l  .Mondar 
line  (vol,  ii.  pp.  .3ll(l-19.  ed.  Zotenhergi. 

'Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten).  vol.  ii.  p.  11. 

*  The  stream  in  question  left  the  Eu- 
phrates at  Hit,  and  skirting  the  Arabiati 


696 


THE  SEVENTH  3I0i\AIiCHT. 


[CH.  XXVI 


desert,  fell  into  the  Persian  Gulf  oppo- 
site the  island  of  Biibian.  It  was  known 
to  the  Arabs  as  Kerek  Sa'ideh  or  the 
canal  of  Saideh,  and  was  believed  to 
have  been  the  work  of  Nebuchadnezzar. 
(See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  p.  57, 
2nd  edition.) 
« Tabari    (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  p. 

10  Ibid.  pp.  320-1.  Sir  H.  Rawlinson 
identifies  El  Lis  with  the  modern  El 
Kadder,  which  is  on  the  line  of  the  Kerek 
Saideh,  about  long.  43°  41'  east  from 
Greenwich.  Banikiya  and  Barasuma 
seem  also  to  have  been  on  the  same  cut 
ting  (Tabari,  ed.  Kosegarten,  vol.  ii.  p. 
7j.    The3'  lay,  probably,  north  of  El  Lis. 

"The  site  of  Hira  is  tolerably  certain. 
It  lay  on  the  sea  of  Ned  jif,  southeast  of 
Weshed-Ali,  and  almost  due  south  of 
Kufa,  in  lat.  3]°  50',  long.  44°  20'  nearly. 
(See  the  Map  in  Mr.  Loftus's  Chaldcea 
and  Stisiana,  opp.  p.  430.) 

'2  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  pp. 
r,  33,  &c. 

•3  Ibid.  p.  5;  but  another  account  (p. 
37)  reduces  the  amount  to  190,000  dir- 
heras. 

1*  Ibid.  p.  11. 

'*Sir  H.  Rawlinson  places  Obolla 
"twelve  miles  above  Busrah,"  between 
that  city  and  the  place  where  the  Shat- 
el-Arab  divides  into  two  streams  (Geo- 
(iraj)h.  Journal,  vol.  xxvii.  p.  188).  He 
conjectures  its  identity  with  the  ancient 
Teredon  or  Diridotis. 

'^  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  p.  9. 

'^  So  the  Persian  translator  of  Tabari 
(ed.  Zotenberg,  vol.  iii.  p.  323).  But  in 
the  Arabic  no  number  appeal's  to  be 
mentioned. 

1^  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  p. 
13.  The  perpetual  single  combats  of 
Kaled,  in  all  of  which  he  is  victorious, 
severely  try  the  credulity  of  the  modern 
reader  of  Tabari. 

■8  Ibid.  p.  15. 

2"  Ibid.  pp.  19-74.  The  most  impor- 
tant of  these  was  the  capture  of  Perisa- 
bor  or  Anbar,  a  city  on  the  Euphrates, 
nearly  in  the  same  parallel  with  Bagh- 
dad. 

21  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  p. 
57.  Ten  distinct  governors  are  men- 
tioned. 

"  Ibid.  p.  77;  Ockley,  Histoi-y  of  Sara- 
cens, p.  97. 

»3  Ockley,  pp.  103-138;  Irving,  Succes- 
sors of  Mahomet,  pp.  19-42;  Tabari,  vol 

ii.  pp.  i.'jg-icg. 

^-i  Tabari  makes  Rustam  at  this  period 
the  general  of  Puran  (or  Puran-docht), 
the  daughter  of  Chosroes  II.  (vol.  ii.  pp. 
179-181):  but  inexorable  chronology 
shows  this  to  be  impossible.  As  the 
'•  era  Yezrligerd  "  was  undoubtedlv  June 
16,  A.D.  632  (Gibbon,  Derli))<'  and  Fall, 
vol.  vi.  p.  292,  note  19),  all  ihe  Arab 
attacks  on  Persia  must  have  been  in  his 
reign. 

26  The  name  Sawad  is  given  by  the 
Arab  writers  to  the  wttole  fertile  tract 


between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Desert, 
from  Hit  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  is  di- 
vided by  Tabari  into  Sawad  of  Hira,  the 
northern,  and  Sawad  of  Obolla,  the 
southern  province  (vol.  ii.  p.  57). 

2«  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  p. 
183. 

2'  Ibid.  pp.  183-9. 

28  Ibid.  p.  195.  For  the  explanation  of 
the  term,  see  Zotenberg's  Tabari,  vol. 
iii.  p.  376. 

2  8  JIalcolm,  History  of  Persia,  vol.  L 
p.  171. 

3"  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  ii.  p. 
193;  Magoudi,  vol.  iv.  p.  200. 

51  So  the  Persian  translator  of  Tabari 
(ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  p.  374,  who  did 
not  find  the  numbers  in  the  Arabic 
original. 

32  In  one  place  Tabari  estimates  the 
Arabs  uudei-  Abu  Obeidah  at  from  6.000 
to  10,000  (ed.  Kosegarten,  vol.  ii.  p.  193); 
in  another  (vol.  ii.  p.  199)  he  makes  them 
9.000. 

33  Ibid.  p.  193. 

3<  '■  Equos  cataphractis  tectos"  (ibid, 
p.  197).  On  the  character  of  the  pro- 
lection,  see  text,  Chapter  XXVIU. 

35  "Ut  vero  Persffi  cum  elephantis  ac 
tintinnabidis  in  Moslemos  irruerunt, 
eorum  turmas  disjecerunt,  neque  re- 
sistebant  equi,  nisi  consternati."  (Ibid. 
1.  s.  c.) 

3«  Tabari  (p.  193).  Six  thousand  Per- 
sians had  fallen,  he  says. 

3'  Ibid.  p.  197. 

38  So  Washington  Irving  (Successors 
of  Mahomet,  p.  118),  I  know  not  on  what 
authority.  Tabari  (p.  193)  makes  the 
breaker  of  the  bridge  an  Arab  of  the 
tribe  called  Beni-Tliakif. 

3»  Tabari,  p.  199. 

"  Ibid. 

♦1  He  received  a  spear-thrust  through 
his  corslet,  which  drove  some  of  the 
rings  of  the  chain-armor  into  his  breast. 

<2  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  201. 

<  3  Ibid.  p.  205. 

■»■»  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  205.  On  the  prob- 
ability that  Mihran,  wherever  it  occurs, 
is  really  a  title,  and  not  a  name,  see  note 
135,  Chapter  X.,  and  note  37,  Chapter 
XVI.  ^ 

*5  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  215.  According  to 
reports  which  Tabari  had  heard,  the 
Persians  slain  in  this  battle  were  near 
upon  100,000  (ibid.  p.  217). 

<«  Ockley,  History  of  the  Saracens,  p. 
146. 

■"■Tabari,  vol.  ii.  pp.  229-235.  The 
Arabs  are  said  to  have  penetrated  at 
this  time  to  the  close  neighborhood  of 
Baghdad  (ibid.  p.  231). 

^8  Ibid.  p.  291.  (Compare  vol.  iii.  pp. 
1,  5,  26,  &c.)  Ebn  Ishak,  however,  who 
is  quoted  by  Tabari  (vol.  iii.  p.  66),  made 
the  number  only  60,000.  With  this  esti- 
mate Magoudi  agrees  (vol.  iv  p.  208). 

•"  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  287. 

«"  Ibid.  pp.  297-9. 

51  Ibid.  p.  25.5. 

52  Sa'ad  w£vs  gent  to  supersede  Al  JIp 


CH.  XXVI.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


697 


thanna;  but  the  latter  died  while  Sa'ad 
was  still  upon  his  march  (ib.  p.  253). 

63  Ibid.  vol.  iii.  p.  2tj. 

5<  Ibid.  pp.  22  and  33. 

"  Ibid.  p.  21. 

*«  On  the  Persian  preference  for  this 
position,  see  Xen.  Anab.  i.  8;  §  21-23; 
Arrian.  Exp.  Alez.  ii.  8,  ad  Jin.;  iii.  11. 

''  A  fighting  elephant  was  attached  to 
each  4,000  men.  (Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  26.) 
Ruiitam  had  in  his  centre  eighteen  fighi- 
ing  elephants,  besides  one  on  which  he 
rode  himself  (ib.  p.  21).  These  eighteen 
imply  the  presence  of  72,000  men. 

58  Ibid.  p.  22. 

59  See  text,  p.  546. 

«o  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  31. 

8iToIeicha  led  the  Asadites  (whose 
name  is  said  to  have  meant  "lions") 
into  battle.    See  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  30. 

92  See  Weil,  Geschichte  der  Chalifen, 
vol.  i.  p.  67. 

"s  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  31. 

^*  So  the  Persian  Tabari  (vol.  iii.  p. 
390) ;  but  perhaps  from  a  mistaken  ren- 
dering of  the  words  "  Armath"  and 
"  Agwath." 

"6  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  34.  The  entire 
number  sent  from  Syria  was  6,000.  Of 
these  5,300  arrived  during  the  second 
day's  fight. 

••  Ruz-el-Agwath.  See  Price,  Moham- 
med nn  History,  vol.  i.  p.  112. 

"  Tabari,  p.  35. 

•«  Ibid.  pp.  34  and  37-8. 

9"  Ibid.  p.  34.  Compare  Magoudi,  vol. 
iv.  p.  212. 

">  Tabari,  p.  36. 

"  Ibid.  p.  3S. 

"  Ibid.  p.  41.  Magoudi  makes  the  loss 
on  the  side  of  the  Arabs  2,500  (vol.  iv.  p. 
210) 

"  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  pp.  43-48. 

'<  Ibid.  p.  48. 

's  Weil.  Oeschichfe  der  Chalifen,  vol. 
i.  p.  68;  Price,  Mohammedan  History, 
p.  114. 

'« Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  iii.  p. 
49. 

"  Ibid.  p.  .55. 

'8  Price,  Mohammedan  History,  vol. 
i.  p.  114. 

'«  Tabari  (ed.  Kosegarten),  vol.  iii.  pp. 
55-6 

""See  text,  p.  557. 

81  Like  Xerxes  at  Salamis  (Herod,  viii. 
69),  Rustam  surveyed  the  battle  from  a 
throne,  set  for  him  in  a  convenient  sit- 
uation (Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  55;  Magoudi, 
vol.  iv.  p.  221). 

8'  Tabari  makes  the  bag  break  some 
of  Rustam's  vertebrve  (vol.  iii.  p.  56),  af- 
ter which  he  runs  to  the  Atik,  plunges 
m,  and  begins  to  swim  !  It  is  needless 
to  say  that  this  is  ([uite  impossible.  Ma- 
goudi says  that  the  bag  fell  on  him  and 
broke  some  of  his  ribs  {yol.  iv.  p.  222). 

83  Magoudi,  1.  s.  c. ;  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. 

8<  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  61. 

'"Ibid.  p.  .56. 

8"  Magoudi,  vol.  iv.  p.  224. 

"'See  text,  p.  546.    The  soldier  who 


took  the  standard  sold  it  for  .30,000  dir 
hems  (780i.).  Its  real  value  was  1,200,000 
dirliems,  or  more  tiian  30,000/. 

88  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  p.  57. 

8«  Ibid.  pp.  85-7. 

»nbid.  p.  80. 

"  Tabari  (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  p. 
414.  The  Arabic  Tabari  of  Kosegarten 
here  fails  me;  and  I  have  to  rely  almost 
entirely  on  the  Persian  translator,  who 
is  said  frequejitiy  to  misrepresent  his 
original.  His  numbers  are  particularly 
uutruslworthy. 

'•■i  Ibid. 

»3H)id.  p.  415. 

'■^  Ibid.  Compare  Kosegarten's  Taba- 
ri, vol.  iii.  p.  71. 

95  Holwaii  was  not  "  at  the  foot  of  the 
Median  hills,"  as  Gibbon  iDfcline  and 
Fall,  vol.  vi.  p,  294)  and  Wa.shiiigtou  Ir- 
ving (Successors  of  Mahomet,  p.  127)  as- 
sert. It  was  situated  at  Sir-pul-i-Zohab, 
far  within  the  mountain-region,  not  far 
from  the  sources  of  the  Holwan  river,  in 
lat.  34°  30',  long.  45°  57'  nearly.  At  a 
few  miles'  distance  ai'e  the  celebrated 
"Gates  of  Zagros."  a  narrow  defile, 
guarded  bj'  a  wall  in  which  isagateway. 
Numerous  Sassanian  traditions  cling  to 
thislocahty.  (See  Geograph.  Journ.  vol. 
ix.  pp.  .32-:5.").) 

"9  The  Persian  translator  of  Tabari 
makes  the  number  200,000  (vol.  iii.  p. 
420);  but  this  is.  I  think,  incredible. 

"  Gibbon  says  "  the  capital  was  taken 
by  assatilt  "  (I.  s.  c),  which  is  the  re- 
verse of  the  truth.  See  Tabari  (vol.  iii. 
p.  415,  ed.  Zotenberg);  and  compare 
Ockley,  History  of  the  Saracens,  p.  215, 
and  Irving,  Successors  of  Maliomet,  p. 
128. 

»8  The  subjoined  particulars  are  taken 
chiefly  from  Tabari  (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol. 
iii.  ch.  xlix.  pp.  41.5-7. 

"9  Or.  more  correctly,  "T&k-i-kesra." 
But  I  have  followed  tlie  form  commonly- 
used  by  our  older  travellers. 

i»»See  PI.  XXVII.  Fig.  2. 

lo'  D'Hert)elot,£i6/io</ie(iue  Orientale, 
vol.  iii.  p.  480. 

'"■^The  Arabs  are  said  to  have  mLs- 
taken  this  for  salt,  and  to  have  mixed  it 
with  their  bread  (Gibbon,  Decline  and 
Fall.  vol.  vi.  p.  295;  Irving,  Succesaora 
of  Mahomet,  p.  129). 

'"3  Estimating  the  dirhem,  with  M. 
Barbier  de  Meynard  {.Toiirnal  Asiatique, 
IHOo,  p.  2.53),  as  worth  from  65  to  7(5 
Freiicu  centimes.  I  find  the  entire  booty, 
exclusive  of  the  works  <>f  art.  to  have 
been  worth  from  23.40<),(H>V.  to  25.200,- 
0001.  of  our  money.  Major  Price,  by 
substituting  dinars  for  dirhems  on  the 
authority  (as  it  would  seem)  of  the  Ha- 
beib-asseir,  raises  the  value  to  the  in- 
credible sum  of  3iiO.000.000/.  (Moliamme- 
dan  History,  vol.  i.  p.  122). 

'»<  Tabari  (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  p. 
418. 

""Ibid. 

in«  I'rice,  Mohammedan  History,  p  125. 

ID-  Taburi,  vol.  iii.  p.  118. 


698 


THE  SEVENTH  MONAIWHT. 


[CH.  XXVII. 


1"*  Ibid.  p.  419.  Rei  is  generally  iden- 
tified with  Rhages,  one  of  the  most  an- 
cient and  important  of  the  cities  of  Me- 
dia. (See  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  ii. 
p.  272,  2nd  edition.)  But,  while  it  is 
quite  possible  that  the  name  travelled 
westward,  it  would  seem  to  be  certain 
that  the  original  Rhages  was  very  much 
nearer  than  Rei  to  the  Caspian  Gates. 
(See  Arrian,  Exp.  Alex.  iii.  20.) 

losTabari,  1.  s.  c.  Kasr-i-Shirin  re- 
tains its  name.  It  is  a  village  about 
twenty  miles  west  of  Hoi  wan,  on  the 
road  leading  from  Baghdad  to  Hama- 
dau.  {Geographical  Journal,  vol.  ix.  p. 
33;  Rich,  Kurdistan,  vol.  ii.  p.  264.)  The 
word  signifies  "the  palace  of  Shirin;" 
and  the  place  is  supposed  to  have  been 
ene  where  Chosroes  II.  built  a  residence 
for  his  favorite  wife. 

I'OTabari,  vol.  iii.  pp.  420-2.  Accord- 
ing to  this  author  the  Roman  territory 
included  at  this  time  both  Mosul  (Nine- 
veh) and  Tekrit.  A  Roman  general, 
Antag  (Antiochus  ?),  defended  Tekrit 
with  20,000  men.  It  is  just  possible  that, 
on  the  collapse  of  the  Persian  power, 
Rome  attempted  to  obtain  a  share  of 
the  spoil. 

"'  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  ch.  Iviii.  pp.  447-9. 

i^ibid.  pp.  44T-452. 

"3  Ibid.  pp.  452-454. 

>i*  Tabari  (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  p. 
457. 

n 6  Ibid.  p.  461. 

"•See  Washington  Irving's  Success- 
ors of  Mahomet,  p.  132.  Compare  Ta- 
bari, vol.  iii.  pp.  423-4. 

1'^  Tabari,  p.  467  and  pp.  472-4. 

''8  Ibid.  Compare  Price,  Mohamme- 
dan History,  vol.  i.  p.  128. 

11"  The  intention  had  perhaps  been 
expressed  after  the  battle  of  Jalula  (Ta- 
bari, p.  419);  but  it  had  never  really  been 
entertained.  Istakr,  which  was  beyond 
the  mountain-line,  had  been  assailed  in 
A.D.  639  (ibid.  p.  452). 

120  Tabari  (ed.  Zotenberg),  vol.  iii.  pp. 
467-8. 

121  Ibid.  p.  468. 

122  See  text,  p.  550. 

123  Tabari,  1.  s.  c. ;  Price,  vol.  i.  p.  129. 
12*  Tabari.  vol.  iii.  p.  471. 

125  Ibid.  p.  472. 

i2«  Price,  vol.  i.  p.  133. 

127  Tabari.  vol.  iii.  p.  477. 

128  Ibid.  p.  478. 

129  Ibid.  p.  479. 

130  "The  battle  of  Nehavend,"  says 
Malcolm,  "decided  the  fate  of  Persia; 
which,  from  its  date,  fell  under  the  do- 
minion of  the  Arabian  caliphs"  (History 
of  Persia,  vol.  i.  p.  177).  This  seems  to 
me  the  true  view.  It  is  well  expressed 
bv  Mr.  Vaux.  who  says.  "  The  sack  of 
Madain  (Ctesiphon)  and  the  carnage  of 
Nehavend  followed,  and  the  empire  of 
the  Sassanidae,  and  with  it  the  religion  of 
Zoroaster,  as  a  national  faith,  fell  from 
the  grasp  of  Yezdigerd  III.,  the  last  fee- 
ble mler  of  this  house.  TTius  ended, 
A.D.  641,  a  dynasty  which  had  riUed  Per- 


sia for  415  years."  (Persia  from  the 
Earliest  Period  to  the  Arab  Conquest,  p- 
177.) 

131  The  battle  of  Nehavend  is  called  by 
the  Arabs  the  "  Fattah-hul-FutLuh."  or 
"  Victory  of  Victories."  (Sc  Price,  Mo- 
hammedan  History,  vol.  i   p.  134.) 

131!  The  order  of  conqueht  seems  to 
have  been  the  following: — Media,  North- 
ern Persia,  Rhagiana,  Azerbijan,  Gur- 
gan,  Tabaristan,  and  Khorassan  in  a.d. 
642:  Southern  Persia,  Kerman,  Seistan, 
Mekran,  and  Kurdistan  in  ad.  643;  Merv, 
Balkh,  Herat,  and  Kharezni  in  a.d.  6.50 
or  052.     (See  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  pp.  480-57'i.) 

133  Tabari.  vol.  iii.  pp.  503-4. 

134  Malcolm,  Hist,  of  Persia,  vol.  i.  pp. 
177-8;  Price,  Mohammedan  History,  vol. 
i.  p.  162;  Irving,  Successo7-s  of  Mahomet, 
p.  152.  The  circumstances  of  the  death 
of  Isdigerd  are,  however,  extremely 
doubtful.  (See  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  pp.  510-1 
and  pp.  570-1.) 

135  Irving,  1.  s.  c. 

13*  Tabari,  vol.  iii.  504.  They  included, 
according  to  this  author,  slaves  of  the 
palace,  cooks,  valets,  grooms,  secreta- 
ries, wives,  concubines,  female  attend- 
ants, children,  and  old  men. 

13' Malcolm,  p.  178;  Price,  p.  124;  Ir- 
ving, pp.  152-3;  Yaux,  Persia  from  the 
Earliest  Period,  p.  177. 

138  See  Jlordtmann  in  the  Zeitschrift, 
vol.  viii.  p.  143;  vol.  xii.  p.  44;  Thomas 
in  Kumismatic  Chronicle  for  1873,  pp. 
251-3. 

138  Thomas  in  Num.  Chron.  1873,  p. 
253. 

CHAPTER  XXVn. 

1  See  Fergusson,  History  of  Architec- 
ture, vol.  i.  pp.  377-380,  2nd  edition. 

2  Compare  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse, 
planches,  vol.  ii  ;  Texier.  Description  de 
I'Armenic,  la  Perse,  et  la  Mesopotamie, 
vol.  ii.  planches  91-119;  and  the  Author's 
Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  273^17, 
2nd  edition. 

3  From  B.C.  150  to  a.d.  226.  (See  the 
Author's  Sixth  Monarchy,  p.  43  and  p. 
210.; 

*  Mr.  Fergusson  says  broadly,  "the 
Parthians  have  left  no  material  traces 
of  their  existence"  (Hist,  of  Architec- 
ture, vol.  ii.  p.  422,  1st  edition).  This  is 
true,  so  far  as  buildings  are  eoncenaed. 

8  For  an  account  of  this  building,  see 
the  Author's  Sixth  Monarchy,  pp.  213- 
216;  and  compare  Fergusson,  History  of 
Architecture,  vol.  i.  pp.  378-380,  2nd  edi- 
tion. 

«  A  ruin  at  Shapur,  seen  and  de.scribed 
by  M.  Flandin  (Voyage  en  Perse,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  280-1),  may  be  a  portion  of  one  of 
these  early  palaces.  It  was  built  of 
hewn  stone;  its  plan  was  square;  and 
its  ornamentation  recalled  the  Perse- 
politan  edifices,  but  was  extremely  rude. 
(Ibid,  planches,  vol.  i.  pi.  47.)  I  should 
incline  to  attribute  its  construction  to 
Sapor  I, 


CH.  XXVII.] 


TUE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


699 


''  Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  pp.  382-6. 

8  It  is,  perhaps,  doubtful  how  far  this 
can  be  stated  positively  of  the  Takht-i- 
Khosrn,  or  palace  of  Chosroes  I.  at 
Ctesiphon.  The  e.xistiuK  building  is  a 
mere  f rafrnient  (Fergussoii,  vol.  i.  p.  385), 
\?hieh  different  persons  will  probably  be 
inclined  to  complete  differently. 

9  As  in  the  Serbistan  palace,  which  is 
42  metres  by  37.  (See  Flandin,  Voyage 
en  Perse,  planches,  vol.  i.  pi.  28;  .and 
compare  Fergusson,  History  of  Archi- 
tecture, vol.  i.  p.  Sa.) 

'"The  Sassanian  palace  at  Firuzabad 
has  a  length  of  103,  and  a  breadth  of  55 
paStres  (Flandin,  pi.  39). 

» 1  This  is  the  case  at  Firuzabad  and  at 
Mashita. 

1^  The  Serbistan  palace  has  thirteen 
entrances  to  the  same  number  of  rooms. 
Tlie  fragment  at  Ctesiphon  has  four  en- 
trances. 

'3  At  the  Takht-i-Khosru. 

14  Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture, 
vol.  ii.  p.  437,  1st  edition.  Compare 
Te.xier,  Description  de  VArmenie,  vol.  i. 
pis.  5,  43,  76. 

16  Fergusson,  vol.  ii.  p.  443,  1st  edition. 

>«At  the  Takht-i-Khosru.  (See  PI. 
XXVIII.  Fig.  1.) 

1'  See  Flandin,  vol.  1.  pi.  40. 

18  This  is  the  height  at  Firuzabad.  If 
the  Ctesiphon  palace,  as  originally  built, 
had  domes,  their  height  probably  ex- 
ceeded a  hundred  feet. 

"See  Fergusson,  vol.  i.  p.  383,  2nd 
edition;  and  compare  PI.  XXVII.  Fig.  1. 

'"'  As  at  the  Serbistan  palace.  (See 
Flandin,  pi.  29,   "Coupe    sur   la   ligne 

A.  B.") 

2'  This  is  the  number  at  Firuzabad. 
The  Mashita  palace  seems  to  have  had 
forty-four  rooms. 

3^  Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  385. 

23  As  at  the  Takht-i-Khosru  (Fergus- 
son,  Hist,  of  Architecture,  vol.  i.  p.  386, 
2nd  edition),  and  to  some  extent  at  Ma- 
shita (Tristram,  Land  of  Moah.  opp.  p. 
371).  Mr.  Fergusson  has  made  the 
string-course  a  marked  feature  of  his 
restoration  of  the  Ma.shita  palace  (Fron- 
tispiece to  Land  of  Moab,  and  Hist,  of 
Architecture,  vol.  i.  p.  392,  2nd  edition). 

"  See  Plate  XXVII. 

26  See  Plate  XXVIII. 

"^  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  386;  Land  of  Moab.  p.  384; 
Flandin,  Voyaqe  en  Perse,  vol.  ii.  p.  347. 

"'  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse  ;  Planches 
Anciennes,  vol.  i.  pi.  29. 

^^  As  especially  in  the  Firuzabad  pal- 
ace, described  in  text,  p.  565. 

2»  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  382. 

30  Fergusson,  p.  386.  note  2. 

3'  All  the  measurements  and  details 
of  this  description  are  taken  from  the 
great  work  of  Messrs.  Flaiulin  ami  Coste 
—the  •'  Voyage  en  Pccsc"'— wliioli  Mr. 
Fergusson  "rightly  calls  "  the  great  aud 


best  authority  on  Sassanian  art."  (See 
his  contribution  to  Canon  Tristram's 
Land  of  Moab,  p.  374,  note  )  Plates  28 
and  29  of  the  "  Voyage"  present  us  with 
all  necessary  particulars. 

3'  Here  again  the  description  is  drawn 
from  the  Voyage.  See  Planches  Anci- 
ennes, pis.  38-42.  Mr.  Fergusson  has 
abridged  the  account  of  Flaudin  care- 
fully and  well  in  his  History  of  Archi- 
tecture, vol.  i.  pp.  38;i-5. 

33  Fergusson,  vol.  i.  p.  386,  note  2. 

3*  The  same  peculiarity  belongs  to  the 
Mashita  palace  in  its  complete  state. 
The  object  of  having  only  one  entrance 
would  seem  to  be  greater  security. 

35  See  text,  p.  563.  The  entire  descrip- 
tion of  this  building  is  drawn  from  th« 
elaborate  plans,  elevations,  and  sec- 
tions of  M.  Flandin  (Voyage  en  Perse, 
Planches,  vol.  i.  pis.  39  to  42;. 

3«  Fergusson,  History  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  384. 

3'  Tradition  seems  to  have  been  righl 
for  once  in  attaching  this  edifice  to  the 
first  Chosroes.  His  erection  of  it  ia 
mentioned  by  Theophylact  of  Simocat- 
ta,  who  says  that  (jreek  materials  and 
Greek  workmen  were  employed  in  its 
construction  (Hist.  v.  6). 

38  See  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architec- 
ture, vol.  i.  p.  385. 

39  The  doorways  still  remain.  See  PI. 
XXVIII.  Fig.  1.) 

■""This  is  the  length  of  the  present 
fagade.  It  does  not,  however,  corre- 
spond with  either  of  the  two  measure- 
ments given  by  Tabari  as  those  of  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  building. 
(See  text,  p.  566.) 

*'This  description  is  taken  mainh 
from  Mr.  Tristram's  account  of  the  pal- 
ace in  his  Land  of  Afo«6  (London,  1873), 
but  some  points  are  added  from  Mr.  Fer 
gusson's  account  in  his  History  of  Arch^ 
itectnre,  vol.  i.  pp.  387-392,  2nd  edition. 

*^  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  388. 

<3  Tristram,  Land  of  Moab,  p.  202. 

•><  See  text.  pp.  562,  563. 

*'  Tristram,  1.  s.  c. 

<'  An  external  wall,  strengthened  with 
semicircular  bastions,  and  without  gate- 
waj-s,  was  carried  round  the  entire  en- 
closure of  the  palace,  and  prevented  in- 
gress or  egress  anywhere  except  by  thi^ 
great  portal  in  front.  (See  the  ground- 
plan,  PI.  XXIX.  Fig.  1. 

<'  Tristram,  pp.  202,  204. 

<8  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p.  390. 

<»  Tristram,  p.  200. 

'»  Ibid.  pp.  200-201. 

»'  Ibid.  p.  197. 

'''This  arch  has  been  thoroughly  ex- 
amined by  M.  Flandin.  and  is  exhaus- 
tively rei)resented  in  his  great  woric 
(Voi/age  en  Pi^rse,  Planches,  vol.  i.  pis.  2 
to  12). "from  which  the  present  Autnor's 
description  is  wholly  taken.  For  a  rep- 
resentation of  the  arch  on  a  small  scale, 
see  PI.  XXXIV.  Fig.  1. 


?(.() 


THE  SiSVENTIl  MONARCllt. 


[CH.  XXVit 


63  See  Flandin,  pis  17  bis  and  27  bis. 

"Ibid.  pis.  17  and  27. 

5=  See  PI.  XXXII.  C,  and  compare 
Flandin,  vol.  i.  pis.  6  and  8. 

»»  Mr.  Fergusson  considers  that  these 
figures  "are  evident  copies  of  those 
adorning  the  triumphal  arches  of  the 
Koinans"  {Hist,  of  Architecture,  vol.  i. 
p.  394),  and  appears  to  think  that  they 
must  have  been  the  work  of  Bs'zantine 
artists;  but  the  correctness  of  this  latter 
opinion  may  be  doubted. 

6'  As  does  the  crescent  on  the  head  of 
Chosroes.     (Flandin,  pi.  9;  see  PI.  XLI.) 

"  See  Pis.  XLIII.  and  XLIV. :  and  for 
a  description  see  text,  pp.  574-576. 

s"  Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  304; 
Magoudi,  vol.  ii.  p.  215. 

60  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
1  s  c. 

«i  So  M.  Flandin  thought.  (See  his 
Voyage  en  Perse,  vol.  ii.  pp.  277-8.) 

^'^  Description  de  VArvievie,  de  la 
Perse,  &c.,  vol.  ii.  p.  233.  M.  Flandin 
imagined  that  the  original  height  was 
between  seven  and  eight  metres. 

•3  See  Pis.  XII.  and  XIV. 

6<"Les  cheveux,"  says  M.  Texier, 
"sonttrait^s  avec  un  flni  qui  rappelle 
les  sculptures  de  Persepolis"  (Descrip- 
tion, vol.  ii.  p.  234). 

«'  It  is  curious  that,  in  M.  Flandin's 
representation  of  the  statue  in  its  pres- 
ent condition,  the  right  hand  and  the 
two  feet  have  the  appearance  of  being 
delicately  carved.  The  left  hand  is  not 
seen.  (Voyage  en  Perse,  Planches,  vol. 
i.  pi.  54.) 

«» Eighteen  are  represented  by  M. 
Flandin  in  the  first  volume  of  his  plates; 
thirteen  by  M.  Texier.  Others  are  add- 
ed by  Sir  R.  Ker  Porter. 

«^  See  especially  Flandin,  Planches, 
vol.  i.  pi.  50. 

■^8  I  cannot  but  suspect  that  JI.  Texier's 
engravings  are  occasionally  improve- 
ments on  the  originals.  But  I  have  no 
proof  that  my  suspicions  are  well 
founded. 

89  It  is  thus  that  I  interpret  the  bas- 
relief;  but  I  am  bound  to  add  that  M. 
Texier  himself  sees  in  the  figure  in  ques- 
tion "  a  captive  general  who  presents  to 
.Sapor  his  manacled  arms"  (Description, 
vol.  ii.  p.  226).  It  is  evident  from  his  en- 
graving that  the  relief  is  defective  in 
this  part. 

"'  Full  representations  will  be  found 
in  Flandin  (Voyage,  Planches,  vol.  i.  pi. 
53)  and  Texier  (Description,  vol.  ii.  pi. 
147).  They  diflfer  curiously  in  some  de- 
tails. 

"See  Pis.  XVI.,  XVII.,  and  XVIII. 
Compare  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse, 
Planches,  vol.  i.  pis.  13,  51,  and  52; 
Texier,  Description,  vol.  ii.  pis.  riS,  134, 
140.  and  148  (numbered  by  mistake  130). 

'2  See  text,  p.  384. 

"  As  by  Ker  Porter  (Travels,  vol.  i.  pi. 
20);  by  Flandin  (Voyage,  Planches,  vol. 
jv.\  and  hy  Texier  (vol.  ii.  pi.  132). 

'■i  See  the  gem  and  the  coin  figured  on 


PI.  XIX.  Figs.  3  and  4.  The  peculiarity 
consists  in  the  two  wings,  one  on  either 
side  of  the  inflated  ball.  Two  wings  do 
not  otherwise  occur  luitil  the  time  of 
Perozes,  with  whom  the  cre.scent,  which 
does  not  appear  on  the  Nakhsh-i-Rustam 
bas-relief,  is  a  distinguishing  feature. 

'8  See  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  p  537;  Flan- 
din, Voyage  en  Perse,  vol.  ii.  p.  101;  Tex- 
ier, Description,  vol.  ii.  p.  228,  Ker  Por- 
ter says:  '•  The  next  bas-relief  .  .  .  rep- 
resents a  combat  between  two  horsemen; 
and  has  been  designed  with  great  fire, 
and  executed  in  a  style  very  superior  to 
the  preceding  one.  The  proportions  of 
the  figures  are  good;  and  everything 
proclaims  it  to  have  been  the  work  of  a 
different  hand." 

"  For  this  tablet,  see  Texier,  vol.  il.  pi. 
131,  and  Ker  Porter,  vol.  i.  pi.  22. 

''''  See  the  description  of  M.  Texier: — 
"  Le  cavalier  vainqueur  ...  a  une  coif- 
fure des  plus  singulifires;  c'est  un  bon- 
net surmontS  de  trois  pointes,  lesquelles 
sont  terminSes  par  trois  boules  can- 
nel6es."    (Description,  I.  s.c.) 

'8  See  the  Voyage  en  Perse,  Planches, 
vol.  i.  pi.  43. 

"  This  is  shown  by  the  streaming  rib- 
bons, by  the  balls  flying  from  the  shoul- 
ders, and  the  sun  and  moon  emblem  0 
on  the  caparison  of  the  horse  and  the 
quiver. 

80 1  am  not  aware  that  the  sculpture 
in  question,  which  is  figured  by  Flandin 
(Voyage.  Planches,  vol.  i.  pi.  50)  and 
Texier  (Description,  vol.  ii.  pi.  151),  has 
ever  been  assigned  to  Chosroes  I,;  but, 
as  he  is  the  only  Sassanian  monarch  who 
represents  himself  upon  his  coins  as 
facing  to  the  spectator,  and  leaning  both 
hands  upon  his  straight  sword,  with  its 
point  between  his  feet  (see  PI.  XXII.),  I 
make  no  doubt  that  the  relief  is  his. 

81  Especially  the  one  figured  by  Texier 
in  pl.  147  of  his  second  volume. 

82  See  Pis.  XXIII.  and  XXIV. 

83  See  Pis.  XXXI.-XXXIV. 

»*  The  name  Sheb-Diz  signifies  "  Color 
of  Night"  (Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p  304). 

8s  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  vol.  i.  pp. 
434-6. 

8' Yet  I  suspect  that  all  the  three 
horsemen,  who  are  on  a  larger  scale 
than  the  others,  do  in  fact  represent  the 
king — the  first,  towards  the  top,  as  he 
begins  the  day;  the  second,  towards  the 
middle,  as  he  engages  in  the  hunt;  the 
third,  near  the  bottom,  as  he  rides  home, 
after  having  enjoyed  the  sport. 

8'  The  musicians  occupy  the  upper 
portion  of  the  central  compartment  on 
either  side  of  the  monarch. 

88  Compare  PI.  CXXXV. 

8»  The  best  representation  of  the  boar 
hunt  is  that  given  by  Ker  Porter  (vol.  ii. 
pl.  63).  which  is  at  once  exact  and  spirit- 
ed.   His  stag-hunt  (pl.  64)  has  less  merit. 

•0  See  Pl.  XLVI. 

91  See  text,  p.  573. 

«2  Travels,  vol.  ii.  p.  178. 


Ctt.  XXVIII.  J 


I'llE  SEVBNTtI  MONAnCllY. 


701 


93  Thomas  in  Numismatic  Chron.  for 
1873,  p.  a43. 

^*  Fergusson,  Hist,  of  Architecture, 
vol.  i.  p,  394.  2nd  edition. 

»» Ibid.  p.  390. 

••  Theophylaet.  Simocatt.  v.  C;  p.  128, 
C. 

"  See  Tabari,  vol.  ii.  p.  .304. 

98  So  Mr.  Fergusson  {History  of  Archi- 
tecture, vol.  i.  pp.  390-1). 

»9  See  Pis  IXXIX.  and  XL. 

lO"  See  PI.  XL. 

1"'  There  was  scarcely  any  time  when 
.Justinian  and  Cho.sroes  I.  were  on  such 
terms  as  to  render  the  transaction 
spoken  of  at  all  probable.  The  "'  end- 
less peace"  was  followed  almost  imme- 
diately by  covert  hostility,  issuing  short- 
ly in  renewed  warfare.  The  peace  of 
A.D.  562  did  not  indicate  any  real  friend- 
liness on  the  part  of  the  contracting 
powers;  and,  moreover,  soon  after  its 
conclusion  Justinian  died.  Theophylaet, 
it  must  be  remembeied,  did  not  write 
till  the  reign  of  Heraclius,  half  a  centu- 
ry after  the  death  of  Justinian. 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

J  See  text,  pp.  270.  271. 

^  Zoroastrianism  is  the  religion  of  the 
Parsees  (I^ersians),wlio,  decliningio  sub- 
mit to  the  religion  of  Mohammed,  quitted 
their  country,  and  sought  a  refuge  in 
Western  India,  where  they  still  remain, 
chiefly  in  Bombay  and  Guzerat. 

3  See  text,  p  270. 

*  Oatha  ahunavaiti,  iii.  3,  in  Haug's 
Oalhas,  vol.  i.  p.  7.  Spiegel  agrees  in 
the  translation  (Avesta,  vol.  ii.  p.  150). 

*  Haug's  Gathas,  vol.  ii.  p.  9. 
'  Haug's  Essays,  p.  257. 

'  Yacna,  xxxi.  7;  Ii.  7. 

8  Ibid.  xii.  1. 

«  Ibid,  xliii.  4,  5. 

1°  Ibid.  xxxv.  1. 

n  Ibid.  xlvi.  2. 

13  Ibid,  xliii.  5. 

13  Ibid.  xlv.  .5. 

i<  Ibid.  xxxi.  8. 

i»Ibid.  xlvii.  1. 

i«Ibid.  xliii.  2. 

1'  Ibid.  xxxv.  1. 

18  Ibid.  xxxv.  3. 

1*  Haug,  Essays,  p.  257. 

3"  Yacna,  xxxiv.  1 ;  xlvii.  1,  2,  &c. 

»i  Ibid,  xliii.  4.  5. 

2"  See  the  remarks  of  Dr.  Pusey  in  liis 
Lectures  on  Daniel,  pp.  530-1,  3rd  edi- 
tion. 

»3  See  Spiegel's  Avesta,  vol.  ii.  p.  218, 
note,  an "^  vol.  iii.  p.  xxxix. 

'♦See  Yagna,  xii.  1;  and  compare 
Haug's  Essays,  p.  143,  note. 

"^  See  above,  note  19. 

'*  Ormazd  has  a  fravashi,  which  is  dis- 
tinct from  himself,  and  yet  a  part  of 
himself  (Faf  )ia,  xxvi.  3;  Vcndi/.hid,  xix. 
4(5.  &c.).  lie  has  also  a  soul,  and,  in  a 
certain  sense,  a  body.  (See  Ya(^-nu,  i.  2; 
Spiegel,  Avesta,  vol.  ii.  p.  203.) 

'^  Even  this,  however,  is  disputed. 
(See  Pusey's  Daniel,  p.  530,  note  3.) 


"8  See  especially  the  first  Fargard  of 
the  Vendiaud,  translated  by  Hang,  in 
Bunsen's  Philosophy  of  History,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  488-90. 

'i*  Herodotus  expressly  denies  that 
there  were  any  such  in  his  day  (i.  131). 
No  representations  other  than  sj-niboli- 
cal  are  found  in  the  Achasineniau  sculi> 
tures. 

3"  Ormazd  was  symbolized  by  the 
winged  circle,  of  which  sometimes  an 
incomplete  human  form  was  a  yjarc. 
Ahriman  was  ])erliiips  symbolized  by 
the  monstrous  figures  common  on  the 
gems  and  at  Persepolis. 

31  See  PI.  XXXV. 

s^This  epithet  of  Ahriman  is  common 
in  the  Zendavesta.  See  Vendidad,  Farg. 
i.  I  -3,  5.  6,  &c. 

33  See  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pi. 
27;  Flandin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  pi.  193; 
Texier,  Description  de  VAi-mdnie,  &c. 
pi.  141. 

3<  See  PI.  XII. 

3s  See  text,  p.  275. 

36  In  the  arch  at  Takht-i-Bostan,  Choe- 
roes  II.  represents  himself  as  receiving 
the  diadem  from  two  deities,  one  male 
and  one  female.  Tlie  male  deity  is 
probably  Ormazd ;  the  female  one  may 
be  either  Armaiti  or  Anahit.  (See  PI. 
XLll.) 

3'  Hormisdates(="  given  by  Ormazd  ") 
is  not  an  uncommon  name  for  a  Sassa- 
nian  monarch  to  give  to  bis  sou;  but  no 
other  name  constructed  in  this  maimer 
is  used.  There  is  no  Mithridates  in  the 
Sassanian  royal  line. 

38  In  every  e.xtant  inscription  the  king 
gives  himself  the  epithet  of  mazdisn  or 
"  Ormazd- worshipping." 

39  Cyrus  is  made  to  swear  by  l\Iithra, 
in  the  Cyropa^dia  of  Xenophon  ( viii.  3,  § 
53).  He  had  for  treasurer  a  INHthredath 
(Mithridates).  whose  name  signifies 
"given  by  Mithra."     (See  Kzra.  i,  8  ) 

*"  As  Mnemon  (Loftus,  Cluddwa.  and 
Susiana,  p.  372)  and  Oehus  (Jieh.  Ins. 
vol,  i.  p.  342). 

11  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  3,  §  12. 

■•3  As  in  the  following  passages — 
"Come  to  our  help,  Mithra  and  .\hura 
(=  Ormazd),  ye  great  ones"  (,lie.s/a,  iii. 
2);  "Mithra  and  .\lnu*a,  the  two  great, 
imperishable,  pure  ones,  we  praise"  (ib. 
iii.  12);  "Wherefore  ma3-tl1e.se  come  to 
our  aid,  Mithra  and  Aluira,  the  great 
ones,  yea,  Mithra  and  Ahura,  the  great 
ones"  (ib.  iii.  97). 

"  Mihir  Yasht,  54. 

<<Ibid. 

«  Avesta,  iii.  79. 

*'  The  disk,  or  circle,  repre-sents  Mith- 
ra on  the  tombs  of  the  Achajinenlan 
kings.  (See  the  Author's  Ancient  Mon- 
arcliies.  vol.  iii.  pp  320  and  352.)  It  is 
sometimes,  Viut  rarely,  used  by  the  Sas- 
sanians,  who  in  general  substitute  for  it 
a  six-rayed  star.  (See  the  later  coins, 
passim.) 

*'  Berosus  ap.  Clem.  Alex.  Protrept. 
g  5.    The  noble  figure,    marked  by  its 


702 


TUB  SEVENTH  MOl^AtiCHr. 


[Cfl.  XXVIIJ. 


wearing  a  Persian  or  Phrygian  cap, 
stabbing  the  bull  in  the  classical  Mith- 
raic  emblem  (Lajard,  Quite  de  Mithra, 
pi.  Ixxv.,  Ixxviii  ,  Ixxx.,  Ixxxii.,  Ixxxiii.. 
&c.),  probably  carries  out  the  Oriental 
idea. 

*8  Spiegel,  Tradit.  Schrift.  d.  Pars.  p. 
135. 

<9  Xen.  Cyrop.  viii.  3,  §  24;  Ov.  Fast.  i. 
355;  Yagna,  xliv.  18. 

'"  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Monarch- 
lies,  vol.  iii.  pp.  99,  lia,  and  116. 

*i  Haug's  Eemys,  p.  232. 

"Ibid.  p.  231. 

"  Ibid.  p.  193. 

'■•  Spiegel,  Avesta,  iii.  72. 

s'  Haug,  Essays,  p.  263.  Compare 
Wiudischmann,  Zoroastrische  Studien, 
p.  59. 

*»  Yagna,  xxxiii.  3. 

6'  Haug,  p.  261. 

'8  Spiegel,  Avesta,  vol.  iii.  p.  x. 

6*  Yac7ia,  xxxi.  9. 

«» Ibid.  xxxi.  10. 

«'Ibid.  xliv.  11. 

«2  Haug,  JEssays,  pp.  11,  136,  &c. 

•3  Yagna,  xliii.  6.  Compare  Soph. 
aSd.   Tyr.   837-844:  —  vSfioL   ui/ziVoSes,  Siv 

dvepwi/  €TiKT6^,  ovifie  /A^v  7roT6  KdOa  KaraKoi- 
/xotrei. 

«■•  Yaf  7ia,  xii.  1-9. 

^^  Ancient  Monarchies,  vol.  i.  p.  138; 
vol.  ii.  p.  24,  2nd  edition. 

6«  Herod,  i.  131. 

«'  Berosus  ap.  Clem.  Alex.  Protrept. 
§  5.  The  erection  of  the  statue  at  Susa 
was  commemorated  by  Mnemon  in  an 
inscription.  (Loftus,  Chaldcea  and  Su- 
siana,  p.  372.) 

«8  See  Herod,  i.  199;  Strab.  xvi.  i.  §  20; 
Baruch,  vi.  43. 

•' Windischmann,  Ueber  die  Persische 
Anahita  Oder  Anaitis,  p.  19. 

'»  See  text,  p.  582. 

'>An  idolatrous  worship  of  Bahman 
('O/oiaios),  and  Amerdat  fAvaSaros)  was 
established  in  Western  Asia  in  Strabo's 
age  (Strab.  xi.  8,  §  4,  and  xv.  3,  §  15);  but 
it  is  uncertain  whether  these  corrup- 
tions continued  into  Sassanian  times. 

"Haug,  Essays,  p.  230;  Windisch- 
mann,  Zoroastrische  Studien,  p.  59. 

"  Haug,  pp.  142  and  258. 

■'■•  Caurva  is  identified  (Haug,  Essays, 
p.  230)  with  the  Indian  Shiva,  who  has 
the  epithet  Sarva  in  one  of  the  later 
Vedas  (Yajar-Veda,  xvi.  28).  Naon- 
haitya  represents  the  Aswins,  whose 
collective  name  in  the  Vedas  is  Nasatyas. 
Taric  and  Zaric  are  peculiar  to  the  Ira- 
nian system. 

'*  Yac7ia.  xii.  4. 

"Ibid.  XXX.  6. 

"  The  Gathas  have  been  collected  and 
published  by  Haug,  in  two  volumes 
(Leipsic,  1858-60).  They  are  metrical, 
iUid  are  supposed  to  form  the  earliest 
portion  of  tlie  Zendavesta. 

'^  Several  of  the  Yashts  are  translated 
by  Haug,  in  his  Essays  on  the  Religion. 
of  the  Parsees,  Bombay,  1862. 


^^  The  following  is  a  specimen: — "  We 
worship  Ahuramazda  (Ormazd)  the 
pure,  tne  master  of  purity.  We  wor- 
ship the  Amesha  Spentas,  the  possessors 
of  good,  the  givers  of  good.  We  wor- 
ship the  whole  creation  of  the  true  spirit, 
both  tlie  spiritual  and  the  terrestrial,  all 
that  supports  the  welfare  of  the  good 
creation,  and  the  spread  of  the  good  and 
true  religion. 

"  We  praise  all  good  thoughts,  all 
goods  words,  all  good  deeds,  which  are 
or  shall  be;  and  we  likewise  keep  clean 
and  pure  all  that  is  good. 

"  O,  Ahura-mazda,  thou  true,  happy 
being!  We  strive  to  think,  to  speak,  and 
to  do  only  such  things  as  may  be  best 
fitted  to  promote  the  two  lives  (i.e.  the 
life  of  the  body  and  the  life  of  the  soul). 

"  We  beseech  the  spirit  of  earth  for 
the  sake  of  these  our  best  works"  (i.e. 
our  labors  in  agriculture),  "to  grant  us 
beautiful  and  fertile  fields,  to  the  be- 
liever as  well  as  to  the  unbeliever,  to 
him  who  has  riches  as  well  as  to  him 
who  has  no  possessions."  (Facjia,  xxxv. 
1-4.) 

8°  See  the  Author's  Ancient  Monarch- 
ies, vol.  ii.  p.  338.  2nd  edition. 

81  Herod,  i.  132;  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6. 

8^  Yagna,  xxxiii.  3. 

*3  See  above,  note  64;  and  compare 
Yagna,  xii.  8;  xxxii.  5;  xxxiii.  2;  xlvii. 
1;  xlix.  4;  <Sc. 

84  See  especially  the  Vendidad,  Farg. 
8-11,  and  16,  17. 

86  Herod,  i.  139;  Strab.  xv.  3;  §  15  and 
16;  Agathias,  ii.  p.  60. 

8«  Vendidad,  Farg.  19,  §30-32;  Haug, 
Essays,  p.  156. 

8'  The  Magi  can  scarcely  have  been 
the  priests  of  the  Persians  when  Darius 
Hystaspis  proclaimed  a  general  massa- 
cre of  them,  and  establisned  the  annual 
Magophonia  (Herod,  iii.  79);  but  when 
Herodotus  wrote,  about  seventy  years 
later,  they  had  attained  the  position  (ib. 
i.  132>.  See  the  Author's  "  Essay  on  the 
Religion  of  the  Ancient  Persians,"  in  the 
first  volume  of  his  Herodotus  (pp.  34(5- 
350,  2nd  edition),  and  compare  Wester- 
gaard,  "Preface"  to  the  Zendavesta,  p. 
17. 

88  See  text,  pp.  271,272. 

89  Patkanian,  in  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866,  p.  115. 

""Ibid.  Mov-pet  or  Mog-pet,  "Mago- 
rum  caput,"  becomes  in  the  later  Per- 
sian Mooed. 

61  See  text,  p.  430. 

"  See  text.  pp.  297,  417,  418,  486,  &e. 

*^Hyde  compares  them  to  the  "Bi.sh- 
ops"  of  the  Christian  Church  (De  relig. 
Pers.  c.  30,  p.  372). 

"^Strabo,  xv.  3,  §  15;  Diog.  Laert. 
Prooeni.  §  6.  The  pointed  cap  and  cloak 
were  still  worn  in  Parthian  times.  (See 
PI.  IX.) 

96  Amm.  Marc,  xxiii.  6;  p.  373. 

»«  See  text,  p.  486. 

9'  The  statement  of  He? odotus  that 
til"  Pei-sian.s  had  no  temples  (i.  131,  ad 


ctr.  xxviii] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


703 


init.)  is  not  even  true  of  his  own  age,  as 
appears  from  the  Behistun  inscription, 
where  Darius  states  that  he  rebuilt  the 
'temples"  (uyadaiid)  which  Gomates 
the  Magician  had  destroyed  (Beh.  Ins. 
tol.  i.  par.  14.  §  5).  In  Sassanian  times 
their  fire-temples  are  freiiueully  men- 
tioned. (See  text.  p.  5i4;  and  compare 
Nicephorus,  De  Rebus  post  Mduricium, 

El.  12,  A;  Hyde,  De  relic;.  Pers.  c.  29,  p 
59;  Creuzer,  Symbol,  i.  pp.  6,jl,  719,  2nd 
edition;  Patkanian,  in  Journ.  Asiatique, 
1866,  p.  112;  &c.) 

'»  IIOo   aa^iCTov  ^vkarrovuiv  oi   Mayoi 
(Strab.  XV.  3,  §  15). 
»9  See   the   representations  on  coins. 

Pis.  XL.  XV.,  XIX ,  XXI.,  xxn. 

1"°  As  in  the  coins  given  (see  Pis.  XXI.- 
XXIII.) 

""  These  guardians  became  ultimate- 
ly so  debased  as  soarct'ly  to  present  the 
appearance  of  human  figures.  They  are 
liowever  mahitained,  together  with  the 
fire-altar,  to  the  very  close  of  the  ern- 
t>ire.  (See  the  coin  of  Isdigerd  III.,  PI. 
XXIV.) 

"^  Herod,  i.  107,  103,  120;  vii.  19,  37; 
Cic.  de  Div.  i.  23,  41,  &c.  That  the  Magi 
of  Sassanian  times  undertook  to  ex- 
pound omens,  appears  from  the  story 
of  Kobad's  siege  of  Amida  (see  text,  p. 
4.35). 

109  Dino,  Fr.  8;  Schol.  Nic.  Ther.  613; 
Vendidad.  Farg.  xviii.  1-6. 
">«  Vendidad,  1.  s.  c. 
106  See  Herod,  i.  140. 
io«  See  especially  the  central  figure  in 
ihe  archway  at  takht-i-Bostan,  which 
represents  Chosroes  II.  in  his  robes  of 
state.      (Flandin,   Voyage  en  Ferse,  pi. 
9.) 

lO'Tabari,  Chronique,  vol.  ii.  p.  305. 
This  is,  of  course,  an  exaggeration, 
loeiiiid.  p  ;j04. 

io»  D'Herbelot.  Bibl.  Orient,  vol.  iii.  p. 
480. 
•loCedrenus,  p.  412. 
Ill  D'Herbelot,  1.  s.  c. 
ii»  See  MaQoudi,  vol.  li.  pp.  156-9. 
'13  So  Gibbon,  following  certain  Orien- 
tal a\ithorities  {Decline  and  Fall,  vol.  v. 
J).  395).    Other  writers  (as  Mirkhond  and 
Tabarl)  raise  the  number  to  12,000.    (See 
note  198,  Chapter  XXIV.) 
11*  Tabarl,  vol.  ii.  p.  305. 
115  See    Pis.    Xm.,    XIV.,    XVI.,   and 
XXXV. 

11 'See  Pi.  XV.;  and  compare  PI. 
IXITI. 

'"  See  Longpgrier,  Medailles  des  Sa.i- 
sanides,  pi.  xli.,  coins  of  Pouran-  (docht) 
and  Azermi-  (docht).  It  is  however  very- 
doubtful  whether  we  have  any  coins  of 
these  queens. 
■19  See  PI.  XXXV. 

"'This  and  the  following  names  are 
taken  from  Patkanian's  summary  or 
Sassanian  history  in  the  Journal  Asia- 
tique for  1866,  pp.  114-116. 

i^ochosroBs  II.  (Parwiz)  is  assigned 
this  ntmiher  by  Tabari  (vol.  11.  p.  305l. 
who  reckons  the  entim  royal  stud  at  5(y 


000 !    Probably  a  cipher  should  be  struck 
off  both  numbei-s. 

I'l  Mirkhond,  Histoire  des  Sassanides, 
p.  404.  Compare  Tabari  (1.  s.  c.)  and  Ma- 
voudi  (vol.  ii.  pp.  230-2). 

123  Here  again  I  am  Indebted  to  Pat- 
kanian for  the  native  names  of  the  offi- 
cers. (See  above,  note  119.)  In  modern 
Persia  the  corresponding  officer  is  called 
the  Buzark-Feriaander. 

"3  As  Ellsaeus  and  Lazare  Parbe,  who 
wrote  between  a.d.  400  and  .500,  and  S6- 
peos,  who  wrote  between  a.u.  COO  aud 
700. 

■'■i  This  was  the  chief  seat  of  the  court 
in  the  earlier  times— from  the  founda- 
tion of  the  empire,  at  any  rate,  till  the 
time  of  Julian.    (See  text,  p.  354. 

126  See  text,  p.  .529. 

126  Those  of  Serblstan  and  Firuzabad 
in  Persia  Pi-oper,  of  Ctesiphon  In  Irak, 
and  of  Mashita  in  the  laud  of  Moab. 
(See  Pis.  XXVII.-XXXI.) 

12'  See  note  195,  Chapter  XXIV. 

i28Theophan.  Chronograph,  pp.  268- 
270. 

1"  See  PI.  XII. 

130  See  especially  PL  XXXV. 

131  The  patterning  appears  in  the  fig- 
ure representing  Chosroijs  II.,  under  the 
archatTakht-i-Bostan,and  In  the  statue 
of  Sapor  I.  In  this  latter  case  the  pat- 
tern Is  a  cro.ss.    (See  PL  XXXV.) 

132  See  the  figures  of  Sapor  I.  (Pis. 
XIII.  and  XIV.);  and  compare  that  of 
Artaxerxes  I.  (PI.  XXXV. ). 

133  The  round  cap,  with  its  ornamen- 
tation of  jewels  or  pearls,  may  be  best 
seen  in  the  gem  portraits  of  Sapor  I.  (PI. 
XV.),  and  Hormlsdas  II.  (PI.  XVIII. ).  It 
seems  to  be  still  worn  in  the  time  of 
Chosroiis  II.  (PL  XLVL),  but  is  lower, 
oidy  just  covering  the  head. 

13-1  See  especially  the  figure  of  Chos- 
roiis II.  under  the  arch. 

13' Ear-rings  are,  I  believe,  universal 
upon  the  coins;  but  In  the  sculptures 
they  are  not  unfrcciupnllv  omitted.  (See 
the" head  of  Narses,  PI.  XVlll.) 

136  See  the  coins  (Pis.  XII.,  XV.,  XVIII. 
&c.). 

137  See  the  bas-relief  of  the  stag-hunt 
(PL  XLIIL). 

i3SThe  following  description  is  tak»n 
almost  wholly  from  the  figure  repre- 
senting Chosroes  II.  on  his  war  hoi-se, 
Sheb-Diz.  In  the  lower  conij>artmeiit  of 
the  great  relief  at  Takhl-i  lioslaii.  Au 
excellent  repi-esentatk>ii  of  this  figure  is 
given  by  Flandin  (Vdi/due  en  I'erse, 
Planches  Anoietuies,  vol.  I.  pi.  10). 

i3»xhe  bow-case  Is  not  seen;  but  it 
may  have  hung  on  the  left  side;  or  an 
attendant  may  have  handed  the  king 
his  bow  when  he  required  it. 

Ko  The  chase  of  the  stag  and  wild- 
boar  Is  represented  at  Taklit  i-Bost«n 
(see  Pis.  XLHI.  and  XldV.);  that  of  the 
wild  boar,  the  Ibex,  the  antelope,  and 
the  buffalo,  is  seen  in  the  previous  vase 
of  FIruz  (.see  text,  p.  420). 

'<i  Lions,  tigers,  and  wild  assaa  were 


704 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCHY. 


[cH.  xxnit 


found  by  Heraclius  in  tlie  paradise  at- 
tached to  the  Dastagherd  palace,  where 
there  were  also  a  number  of  antelopes 
(Theophan.  C'lironoyruph.  p.  268.  C). 
Julian  found,  in  paradises  near  Ctesi- 
phon.  lions,  bears,  and  wild  boars  (see 
text.  p.  354). 

K2  vVhen  Stilicho  visited  the  Persian 
court,  he  was  entertained  in  this  man- 
ner, and  acquired  great  credit,  if  we 
may  believe  Claudian,  for  his  skill  in  the 
chase.  (See  the  poem  De  laudibus  Sti- 
luhoriis.  i.  11.  G4-6,) 

><3  Seven  horsemen  accompanj'  the 
monarch  in  the  great  stag-hunt  of  Chos- 
roe.s  II.  (PI.  XLIIL).  They  are  probably 
participators  in  the  sport. 

'^■'This  difference  is  marked  in  the 
lines  of  Claudian, 

Quis  Stilichone  prior  ferro  penetrare 

leones 
Comminiis,  aut  longe  virgatas  flgere 

tigres? 

(De  laud  Stilich.  i.  64-5). 

K^The  Sassanian,  like  the  Jewish 
kings  (1  K.  i.  33),  sometimes  condescend- 
ed to  ride  mules.  The  saddle-mule  of 
Chosroes  I.  is  represented  in  a  bas-reHef . 
(PI.  XLVI.  Fig.  •..'  ) 

'■'•'  See  the  two  hunting  bas-reliefs 
(Pis.  XLIIL  and  XLIV.). 

!•"  See  the  representation  of  the  stag- 
hunt  (PI.  XLm.). 

1*8  The  word  Shahpan  is  somewhat 
doubtfully  rendered  as  "  Head  Falco- 
ner" by  Patkaniau  (Journal  Asiutique, 
1866,  p.  115);  but  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  he  is  right.  The  modei-n  Persians 
call  their  favorite  falcon  the  Shaheen, 
and  another  variety  the  Shah-bazd  (La- 
yard,  Nineveh  and  Babylon,  pp.  480-1). 

'■•*  Mr.  Layard  says  that  he  observed 
a  falconer  with  a  hawk  on  his  wrist 
among  the  sculptures  of  Khorsabad 
(ibid.  p.  483,  note),  which  belong  to  the 
eighth  century  b.c. 

1^1  Theophan.  Chronograph,  p.  268,  C. 

151  See  text,  p.  490. 

152  D'Herbelot,  Bibliotheque  Orientale, 
vol.  iv.  p.  486. 

153 1  find  only  two  occasions  during  the 
Sassanian  period  where  chariots  are 
mentioned  in  connection  with  the  armed 
force.  One  is  the  famous  occasion  of 
the  invasion  of  Alexander  Severus  (see 
text,  p.  264),  where,  according  to  him, 
1,800  scythed  chariots  w^ere  brought  into 
the  field  against  him  I  The  other  is  to- 
wards the  close  of  the  empire,  when, 
after  the  battle  of  Nineveh,  some  cha- 
riots are  said  to  have  been  taken  by 
Heraclius  (see  text,  p.  530).  There  is  no 
mention  of  their  actual  employment  in 
any  battle,  and  only  one  representation 
of  a  chariot  on  the  sculptures.  (See 
PI.  XLVI.) 

"4  See  text,  pp.  264,  300,  327,  861,  365, 
&c. 

s"  See  text,  pp.  546  and  548. 


156  On  the  employment  of  elephants 
in  the  Lazie  war,  see  note  137,  Chapter 
XX.  Elei)hanls  are  frequent  upon  the 
sculptures.    (See  Pis.  XLIIL  and  XLIV.) 

15'  Pa,tka.ni&Ji  hi  the  Journal  Asiatique 
for  1866.  p.  114. 

158  See  text,  p.  361. 

159  Ibid.  pp.  361,  365,  and  368. 

1"  See  the  representation  of  ChosroSs 
II.  (PI.  XLI.)  and  compare  Julian,  Orat. 
ii.  p.  116. 

"1  The  pay  of  an  archer  considerably 
exceeded  that  of  an  ordinary  foot  sol- 
dier (see  text.  p.  487). 

162  See  text,  pp.  356  and  443. 

i"See  text,  p.  361. 

'"  See  text,  pp.  262  and  558. 

185  Compare  Virg.  Georg.  ill.  31;  Hor. 
Od.  i.  19,  11 ;  ii.  13. 17;  Justin,  xli.  2;  Tac. 
Ann.  vi.  35;  Claudian,  De  laud  Stilich. 
i.  68,  &c. 

i«6  See  text,  pp.  443,  526,  &c. 

i''  The  only  distinct  corps  ot  which  we 
hear  is  that  of  "  the  Immortals,"  which 
was  a  division  of  the  cavalrj'  numbering 
10,000,  and  therefore  not  regimental. 
(See  text,  pp.  396  and  444 ;  and  compare 
Herod,  vii.  83.) 

168  Tjig  satraps  collected  the  forces  of 
their  respective  provinces  imder  the 
Achsemenians  (Herod,  vii.  26),  and  led 
them  into  battle.  The  same  system 
probably  prevailed  under  the  Sassa- 
nian s. 

16"  On  these  and  the  following  names 
of  office,  see  Patkanian  in  the  Journal 
Asiatique  for  1866.  pp.  114-5. 

i'»  See  text,  p.  546. 

I'l  See  Ker  Porter,  Travels,  vol.  i.  pis. 
20  and  22;  Texier,  Description  de  I  Ar- 
menie.  &c.,  vol.  ii.  pis.  131  and  133. 

i'2  The  single  ring  may  be  an  emblem 
of  the  sun;  but  the  five  striated  balU 
defy  conjecture.  They  are  certainly 
not  the  five  planets. 

1"  See  text,  p.  530. 

i'4  See  text,  pp.  442,  443,  466,  471,  523, 
&c. 

175  See  text,  pp.  3.34,  417,  and  427;  and 
note  60,  Chapter  XXHI. 

'■"At  the  great  siege  of  Daras  by 
Chosroes  I.  (see  text,  p.  479),  Rustam's 
army  at  Cadesia  numbered  120,000  (ibid, 
p.  547).  The  army  brought  by  Artaxer- 
xes  I.  against  Alexar.uer  Severus  (ibid, 
p.  264)  is  not  taken  into  account  here, 
since  the  orly  estimate  which  we  have 
of  its  number  is  quite  untrustworthy. 

1"  Out  of  the  140,000  brought  into  the 
field  by  Chosroes  I.  only  40,000  were 
horse. 

i'8  See  text,  p.  445. 

"9  Ibid.  pp.  302  and  327. 

ie»  Ibid.  pp.  334-5. 

181  Ibid.  pp.  335,  336,  338,  &C. 

182  Ibid.  pp.  335,  336,  4a5,  &c. 

183  It  was  in  this  way  that  Daras  was 
taken  (see  text.  p.  479). 

!"*<  Hyde  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  a 
second  wife  was  not  taken  excepting 


cit.  xxvni.] 


THE  SEVENTH  MONARCTIT. 


m 


with  the  consent  of  the  first  wife,  and 
in  the  case  of  lier  barrenness  (De  reliy. 
veterum  Persumm,  c.  34,  p.  413). 

18*  Indications  of  tlie  non-seclusion  of 
women  are,  the  occurrence  of  female 
heads  on  the  Sassanian  coins  (see  I'i. 
XV.);  tlie  reigns  of  two  female  sover- 
eigns (see  text.  pp.  540-541);  the  mention 
of  women  as  cultivators  and  taxpaj-ers 
(see  note  ai.  Chapter  XXI.);  and  again 
as  owners  of  houses  (see  note  82,  Chap- 
ter XXL);  &c. 

i8«See  text,  pp.  484^86.  Compare 
text.  p.  314. 

»-'  Patkanian,  in    the  Journal  Asia- 


tique  for  18(50,  p.  113.  Compare  Elisfe, 
pp.  102,  107,  and  Lazare  Farbe,  pp.  80 
and  140. 

'«»  See  text,  pp.  294,  427,  431,  440,  449, 
4.50.  47^,  491,  501,  515,  532,  and  537. 

i»«  If  we  compare  the  Sassanian  pe- 
riod with  the  Achsemenian.  we  shall 
find  that  a  considerable  improvement 
had  taken  place  in  respect  of  the  num- 
ber and  the  severity  of  punishments. 
No  such  barbarities  are  related  of  any 
Sassanian  monarch  as  were  common 
under  the  kings  of  the  older  line.  (8e« 
the  Author's  Ancient  Monarchies,  voL 
iii.  pp.  244-7,  2nd  edition.) 


/ 


I 


GENERAL    INDEX. 


Abdafls  hums  a  fire-temple lil,  389 

Abdi-MUkut  taken  prisoner 1,  4t)8 

AbdlUhat  yields  to  Sennacherib i,  448 

Abgarus  In  the  camp  of  Crassus lil,   itl 

—  submits  to  Trajan ill,  175 

—  Imprisoned  by  Caraealus lil,  2tK) 

Abraha  conquers  the  Yemen ill,  47 1 

Abu-bekr  succeeds  Mohammed iii,  Mi 

Abu-Obediah  killed  In  battle 111,546 

Abu-Shahrein,  Temple  of i,  34 

Ahyssinia.     See  also  Ethiopia. 

Abyssinian  conquests  in  Arabia Hi,  475 

Abysslnians  driven  out  of  Arabia ill,  47fj 

Acacius,  bishop,  saves  captives ill,  398 

Achaemenes,  as  a  name 11,  4;S( 

—  slain  by  Inarus 11,  503 

Achoris  joins  Cyprian  revolt ii,  524 

Acra,  or  citadel  at  Eebatana II,    12 

Acropolis  taken  by  Xerxes  1 11,  4!i6 

Adenystrae  betrayed  by  a  garrison. . .  Hi,  177 

Adcr-Vcshnasp  slain  by  Vasag Hi,  416 

Adlab6n6.    See  also  Assyria. 

Adrammeleoh  falls  in  battle 1,  467 

Adrapan,  a  city  of  Media ii,    16 

Adarman  destroys  Apamea ."  Hi,  4711 

—  passes  the  Euphrates Hi,  479 

—  ravages  Syria Hi,  479 

—  sent  against  Maurice iii,  496 

Adrian.    See  Hadrian. 

j^ilian,  defender  of  Amlda,  crucified.  111,337 
Afghatdstan  princess  marries   Hor- 

mldas ill,  314 

Agate  abundant  in  Persia II,  314 

Agesllaiis  in  Asia  Minor 11,  .523 

Agriculture,  a  duty  in  Persia iii,  5S6 

—  In  Babylimla 11,  155,  218 

—  In  Zoroastrianism 111,  487 

—  of  Assyria 1,  .325 

Ahaz  pays  tribute  to  Assyrians 1,  430 

Ahriman,  the  principle  of  Evil 

ii.  428;  iii,  223.  270,  580 
Ahura-mazdaand  Jehovah  compared    II,   47 

—  the  spirit  of  good ii,   52 

^  See  also  Ormazd. 

Al,  the  Oriental  sun-goddess 1,   81,353 

Airyanam.  god  of  marriage lil,  58;i 

Ali-Su,  river  in  Media ii,     G 

Akhsherl  slain  by  his  subjects 1,  479 

Akko  yields  to  Sennacherib 1,448 

Al  Modain.    See  Ctesiphon. 

AIMothanna,  Death  of Hi,  547 

Ala  Invades  Persia  Proper ill,  554 

Alabaster  perfume  boxes H,  344 

Alaniandarus  threatens  Antloch 111,445 

—  treacherous  to  Maurice lil,  4i(6 

Alani  invade  western  Asia Hi,  166 

-make  Inroads ill,  182 

Alans  defeated  In  L,azlca 111,466 

Albania  reached  by  Heraclius HI,, 524 

—  recovered  by  Perozes lil.  412 

Albanians,  King  given  to 111,176 

Aleinannl  attack  Persia ill,  282 

Aleppo.    See  Berha'a. 

AU'Xander  Severus.    See  Severus. 
vMexander  the  Great,  Accession  of. . .    II.  .533 

—  crosses  the  Eujihrates II.  54.5 

—  crosses  the  Hidlespdnt ll,i>ii 

—  fa'^ors  Zoroiistri.iiiistn ill,  245 

—  master  of  Asia  Minor II,  .5:i8 

—  occupies  Egypt H,  M'i 

—  scorns  Persian  envoys II,  r>44 

—  TlPtorlous  at  Arbela II,  548 


Alexander  victorious  at  Is«us 11,  539 

Alexandria  taken  by  C'hosroPs  II HI,  .520 

Alluvial  deposits  on  Persian  Gulf 1,     3 

Alpliabetlecliaractersof  the  Medes..    H,   76 

Altaku.  Kgvpliaiis  defeated  at 1,449 

Alyattes  takes  Smyrna 11,101 

Amasls  sends  Nitetls  to  Cambyres. . .    11,  448 

Auibris  deposed  b.v  Sargon 1,442 

Amestrls,  wife  of  Xerxes  1 11,501 

Amida  occupied  by  Phillppicus Hi,  498 

—  Romans  defeated  near HI,  333 

—  surrender  to  Rome  by  Kobad HI,  437 

—  taken  by  C'hosroBs  II ill,  .519 

—  taken  by  Heraclius 111,525 

—  taken  by  Kobad HI,  4;15 

—  taken  by  Sapor  II HI,  3;17 

—  threatened  by  Tamchosro lil,  481 

Amidi  taken  by  Assyrians 1,  400 

Amoo  river.    See  Gxus. 

Amorges,  the  Sacaean  king 11,  441 

—  holds  Caria  11,  508 

Amran,  mound  of  Babylon II,  179 

Amyitis,  wife  of  Nebuchadnezzar.  .11,  93,  218 

Amyntas  submits  to  Hystaspls 11,479 

Ainyrtieus  defeats  the  Persiaus 11,  5ll3 

Ana.  the  Chalda^an  deity 1,    74 

Analtis,  the  Babylonian  Venus 111.  ,584 

Anak  assassinates  ChosroC-s ill,  269 

Anastasius  and  Kobad  make  a  peace  ill,  438 

—  biHlds  Daras  fortress HI,  438 

—  Death  of Ill,  4;» 

—  refuses  monej'  to  Kobad ill,  434 

—  sends  four  generals  to  the  East HI,  4,S6 

Anata,  the  Chaldni>au  deity 1.  75 

Anathan  surrenders  to  .Julian Ill,  ,349 

Anatho  occupied  by  Mlr-adurls Ill,  ,508 

Anatolius  enters  Perslai    camp Ill,  404 

Anchlalus,  Building  of 1,  488 

—  Roman  alliance  with HI,  174 

Ancyra  taken  l>y  Chosrofis  II HI,  ,521 

.Anecdote  of  a  Persian  paymaster 111,  4i*7 

Anglon,  Romans  defeated  at HI,  4tSJ 

Angora     See  Ancyra. 
AiigroMainvus.    See  Ahriman. 

Anilai,  the  robber-chief HI,  i:tfi 

Animals  in  .Assyrian  sculpture I,  217 

—  of  .Assyria 1.  14C 

—  of  B.abv Ionian  empire II,  158 

—  of  Media II,   29 

—  of  Persia  Proper II.  3(r.' 

—  Antaleldas,  Peace  of,  concluded  . .    11.  524 

—  Second  embassy  of 11,526 

Antegan  made  governor  of  Arinenia  HI,  424 
.'Vntloeh,  l'"ouiidingof,  on  theOrontes  Hi,   20 

—  Earthquake  at Ill,  17i; 

—  captured  by  Sapor  1 HI,  281 

—  recovered  by  Tlinesltheus III.  281 

—  saved  by  Bellsarlus 111,445 

—  again  taken  bv  Sapor  I HI.  2K1 

—  Eiirthiiuakes  of.  H.  C.  525 Ill,4;>» 

—  taki'U  liy  t'hosroOs  I HI.  45,') 

—  taken  by  Chosrof'sII 111.519 

AntlochusIJdetes.  Accession  of lil,    .54 

.\ntonlnus  IMus  sui eds  Hadrian III.  Is'! 

Antoninus,  the  Roman  oftldal ill.  Xii 

Ann,  the  Assyrian  deity I,  .146 

Anunit,  the  cirlenfal  sun-godilesa 1,  81,  .'tt.3 

.Anushlrwan.  the.Iiist.  .Sicrhosrofsl. 
Apamea  deslmyeil  liv  A<l.'irmnn HI,  479 

—  Its  fragment  of  "  true  cross  " Ill,  UV' 

—  sacked  by  ("hosroCs  II III.  519 

—  taken  by  CliosroCs  I, Ill,  ¥*i 


708 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Apharban,  speech  at  Roman  camp Hi,  305 

Aphumon  taken  by  Maurice iii,  482 

Apis,  Incarnation  of ii,  451 

Arab  chiefs  executed  at  Nine  veil i,  484 

Arabia  Invaded  by  Asshurbanl-pal. . .     i,  484 

—  invaded  by  Esarhaddon i,  469 

—  Invaded  by  Sargon i,  439 

—  Position  of  affairs  in iii,  474 

—  reduced  to  submission iii,  543 

Arabian  dynasty  of  Berosus i,  IIU 

—  Peninsula,  Great il,  296 

—  possessions  in  danger iii,  M2 

Arabion  castle  assigned  to  Manl Iii,  294 

Arabs  cross  the  Euphrates Hi ,  500 

—  and  Persians  contend  for  Euphrates, iii,  514 

—  rush  into  the  Euphrates iii,  395 

—  take  Nehavend iii,  558 

—  terrified  by  elephants iii,  546 

Aracusthe  pretender  crucified 11,464 

Aramaeans  defeated  by  Assyrians 1,384 

—  of  Chaklaea 1,   28 

—  subdued  by  Sargon 1,  441 

—  subdued  by  Sennacherib 1, 447 

Aras,  river  of  Media »  11,     5 

Araxes  crossed  by  Antony Hi  115 

—  crossed  by  Heraellus lil,  52:i 

Arbas,  Mustacon  defeated  at Iii,  497 

Arbela  as  a  necropolis ill,  203 

—  Persians  vanquished  at ii,  548 

Arcadlus,  emperor  of  the  East Ui,  386 

—  commits  his  son  to  Isdigerd ill,  387 

Arceanus.    ■Sec  Sargon. 

ArehseopoUs  repulses  Mermervfis Hi,  468 

Archers  of  Parthian  cavalry ill,   90 

—  of  the  Assyrians 1,  254 

Archery  of  the  Median  horsemen il,   4() 

—  of  the  Sassanians Hi,  595 

Arches  of  Assyrian  buildings 1,  205 

Architecture  of  Asshurbanl-pal 1,48(5 

—  of  Assyrians 1,178 

—  of  Babylon ii,  189 

—  of  Chaldaea 1,   51 

—  of  Esar  haddon 1,  473 

—  of  Sennacherib i,  462 

—  of  Shalmanezer  II 1,411 

—  of  the  Parthians Hi,  212 

—  of  the  Persians 11,  379 

—  of  the  Sassanians Hi,  5<)0 

Ardd-Vlraf ,  the  Magian IH,  272 

Ardaburius  defeats  Narses HI,  395 

—  retires  from  Nisibis Ill,  395 

Ardazanes  slain  in  single  combat iii,  896 

Ardishlr.    See  Artaxerxes  I. 

Areobindus  overruns  Arzanene lil,  486 

—  i-etires  into  Constantia iii,  436 

—  slays  Ardazanes ill,  396 

Arethas  deserts  BeUsarius Hi,  460 

Aria,  adjoining  Parthla iU,     6 

Arlan  character  of  Medes  and  Per- 
sians  11,  36,  315 

—  religion.  Earliest  phase  of ii,   46 

Arlaranines  captures  a  few  Scythians   11,  478 

Ariaspes  takes  his  own  life 11,528 

Ariobarzaues,  Revolt  of 11,  527 

Aristagoras  takes  Sardis U,  482 

Arithmetic  of  Chaldafia i,   64 

Armenia  becomes  a  Persian  province  iii,  2ii9 

—  becomes  a  Roman  province iil,  174 

—  declares  for  Chnsrofis  II iii,  508 

-- Eastern,  described li,    19 

—  forced  into  Zoroastrianism Hi,  408 

—  formidable  to  the  Medes ii,   22 

—  given  to  Tigranes 111,154 

—  In  a  state  of  anarchy Hi,  390 

—  invaded  by  Esarhaddon 1,  468 

—  invaded  by  Heraellus iii,  523 

—  Invaded  by  Volasases  I Hi,  150 

—  loses  her  opportunity iii,  30) 

—  made  neutral  by  treaty iii,  36!) 

—  NIkhor  made  governor  of iii,  423 

—  pacified  by  Balas Hi,  424 

—  plundered  by  Alexander  Severus. .  iii,  2tj5 

—  rebels  against  Isdigerd  II iii,  407 

T-  relinquished  to  Parthla. . , , , HI,  162 


Armenia  revolts  from  Sapor  n Hi,  829 

—  surrendered  to  the  Persians Hi,  301 

—  tributary  to  Parthla iU,  152 

—  won  over  by  Sapor  II Hi,  323 

Armenian  attitude  toward  Julian Hi,  .370 

—  cavalry  defeats  Zareh 111,423 

—  cheek  to  the  Epht  halites iii,  517 

—  chiels  summi meil  to  Persia, iil,  407 

—  history  reviewed Hi,   70 

—  mountains  described i,  137 

Armenians  defeat  Theocritus lil,  201 

Armies  of  Persians,  Size  of HI,  596 

Armor,  Defensive  of  Persians ii,  822 

Armory  of  Chosroes  taken  by  Arabs.,  ui,  553 
Arms  and  armor  of  Assyrians 1,  260 

—  of  Babylonian  soldiers ii,  214 

—  of  Persian  soldiers il,  821 

Army  of  Xerxes  I.  estimated Ii,  490 

—  supplies  of  Persians li,  332 

Aroer,  Assyrian  victory  of i,  437 

Arrian  drives  out  the  Alani iil,  183 

Arrow-head  writing  in  Assyria 1, 171 

—  writing  of  Chaldaea 1,   43 

Arrows  of  the  Assyrians I,  2t& 

Arsaces  asks  Constantius  for  a  wife.  IU,  329 

—  offended  by  emperor  Julian Hi,  .346 

—  refuses  to  aid  Julian Hi,  371 

—  blinded  by  Sapor  II • Hi,  373 

Arsaces  I-,  Revolt  of iii,   25 

Arsaces  II.,  or  Tiridates HI,  27 

Arsames  assassinated  by  Ochus II,  538 

Arsamo.sata  castle  besieged Hi,  158 

Arsanias  river  bridged iii,  158 

Arsenic  found  in  Bactria il,  812 

Arses  accedes  to  Persian  throne U,  533 

.Assassinated  by  Bagoas 11,  533 

Arsites  executed  for  revolt 11,  507 

Art,  Mimetic,  of  Babylon il,  197 

—  Mimetic,  of  Persia 11,  412 

—  of  the  Assvrians i,  507 

—  of  the  Chaldaeans 1.   48 

—  revival  in  Persia Hi,  276 

Artabannes  exe(5uted  as  a  traitor iii,  373 

Artabauus  I.,  of  Parthla Hi,   .30 

Artabanus  II.,  Accession  of ill,  62 

—  Death  of IH,   68 

Artabanus  III.,  Accession  of Ill,  120 

—  Death  of in,  140 

Artabanus  IV.  defeated  and  slain  ill,  210,  260 

Artabanus  and  Volaga-ses  accede iii,  199 

—assassinates  Xerxes  I ii,  501 

—  consents  to  the  marriage IH,  202 

—  slain  by  Arta.xerxes 11,503 

Artabardes  defeats  the  false  Smerdis    11,  4B4 

Artabazus  defeated  at  Plataea 11,  499 

Artaphernes  defends  Sardis 11,  482 

Artases  made  viceroy  of  Armenia. . .  Hi,  .390 
Artavasdes  carried  captive  to  Egj'pt,  Hi,  116 

—  claims  Parthian  throne iii,  210 

—  deserts  the  Roman  cau.se iii,  114 

Artaxata  destroyed  by  Prisons iii,  186 

—  taken  by  Corbulo iii.  154 

—  taken  by  Vahan iii,  416 

Artaxerxes  I.,  of  Persia,  accedes 11,  503 

—  character  of il,  506 

—  makes  peace  with  Greece 11,  505 

.\rtaxerxesII.,(Mnemon)Accessionof  11,  512 
Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  Character  of. .    11,  628 

—  Death  of H,  627 

—  invades  Cadusia 11,625 

—  wounded  at  Cunaxa li,  518 

Artaxerxes  III.,  (Ochus),  accedes  —    il.  529 

—  crushes  Phoenicians ii,  530 

—  defeated  by  Nectanebo 11,  629 

—  poisoned  by  Bagoas 11.533 

—  reduces  Egypt 11, 631 

Artaxerxes  I.,  the  Sassanian,  accedes  Hi,  267 

—  defeats  Alexander  Severus Hi,  266 

—  Death  of ill,  279 

—  driven  to  India HI,  261 

—  his  dying  speech UI,  374 

—  marries  a  Parthian  princess IU,  210 

—  victorious  at  Hormuz Hi,  210,  260 

i  .Vrtaxerxes  II.  succeeds  Sapor  U lUi  3T9 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


TOO 


Artaxerxes  III.  slain  by  Shahr-Barz. .  UI,  ^lo 

—  succeeds  Kobad  II ill,  Sii!) 

Artaxerxes  of  Armenia  deposed iil,  ;«i;i 

Artaxlas  succeeds  Artavasdes Iil,  lit; 

Arteman,  the  site  of  Adrapan 11,    17 

Artogerassa  talcen  by  Sapor  II  Ill,  ;i73 

Arts  and  Sciences  of  Babylon 11,  IHS 

Arxamas,  Leontlus  defeated  at 111,518 

Aryandes.goveruor  of  Egypt,  executed  ii,  4(;5 

Aryenis  marries  Astyages 11,  105 

Arzanene  ceded  to  the  Romans HI,  3(18 

—  Invaded  by  Celer Ill,  4:^7 

—  occupied  by  Maurice iil,  481 

Ascalon  taljen  by  Sennacherib 1, 448 

Ascalus,  Founding  of 11,   Hi) 

Ashdod,  as  the  key  of  Syria il,  148 

—  talsen  by  Psamatlk  I il,  105 

—  taken  by  Sargon 1, 440 

Asia  Minor,  a  terrestrial  paradise —    U,  28:5 

—  invaded  by  Asshur-banl  pal 1,  47!) 

—  overrun  by  Alexander  the  Great. .    ii,  5.38 

—  Persian  ravages  In ill,  284 

—  possessed  by  Ostrogoths ili,  o87 

Asfnal,  the  robber-chief iil,  VM', 

Aspacures  made  King  of  Iberia iil.  373 

Aspadan,  the  Median  town il,   17 

Aspamitres,  the  eunuch  slain Ii,  503 

Aspebed  executed  by  Chosroes  I Hi,  440 

Aspls  of  Cappadocla  revolts ii,  ,527 

Asps  charmed  in  the  East ii,  300 

Assaf oetlda,  or  SUphlum  of  Cyrene. . .    11,311 

—  found  In  Persia 11, 35;  Ui,  2">.! 

Asshur,  the  chief  god  of  Assyria 1,  34 1 

Asshur,  the  third  city  of  Assyria 1, 133 

Asshur-banlpal  or  Sardanapalus.. .. .  _^1,  374 

—  Accession  of J,  473,  477 

—  Architecture  of i,  486 

—  attacks  Tyre 1,478 

—  Character  of 1.489 

—  Death  of 1,  490,  407 

—  defeats  Tlrhakah 1,  477 

—  Hunting  exploits  of 1,  484 

—  invades  Arabia 1,  48-1 

—  Invades  Asia  Minor 1,  470 

—  Invades  Egypt 1,478 

—  Literary  taste  of 1,  4.84 

—  loses  Egypt 1,  18:! 

—  Palace  of 1.  4.8t; 

—  sacks  Thebes 1,  478 

—  Severities  of 1,  4SI 

—  subdues  Kharbat 1,  479 

—  subdues  Susiana 1,  48:^ 

—  takes  Izlrtu 1,  470 

—  takes  I'etra 1,  481 

Asshurbilkala,  Reign  of 1,  .304 

Asshur-daniu-pal,  Rcljelllonof 1,  414 

Asshur-dayan  I.,  of  Assyria 1,  3.80 

Asshur-dayau  III.,  Relgu  of 1,  423 

Asshur-emid-Uin.    See  Saracus. 
Asshur-lzir-pal,  Accession  of 1,  3flG 

—  Campaigns  of i,X)i 

-Death  of 1,407 

—  Expedition  of 11,  2:« 

—  his  love  of  hunting .     1,401 

—  Palace  of 1.  40-J 

Asshurlush,  Reign  of ),  *2.i 

Asshur-ris-illm,  Accession  of 1,  381 

Assyria,  the  second  monarchy 1,120-513 

—  Agriculture  of 1,  325 

—  Antiquity  of,  discussed 1,  •*>» 

—  Architecture  of 1. 178 

—  betrayed  by  Nabopolassar 1,  4!W 

—  Birds  of 1.14? 

—  Cltlesof 1.131 

—  Chronology  of J.  J'O 

—  Climate  of J.  IW 

—  Commerce  of 1.  oli 

—  Description  of 1,120 

—  Domestic  animals  of ,!•  1?, 

—  Early  relations  to  Media 11,   8.5 

—  Ethnology  of J,  151 

—  Fertilttv  of 1,141 

—  Fruits  of j.  144 

—  History  of l>  307 


Assyria,  Independence  of 

—  Intemperance  in 

—  Irrigation  of 1,14: 

—  Kings  of.  Table  of 

—  Language  of 

—  Manna  of 

—  Military  tactics  In 

—  Military  usages  of 

—  Mimetic  art  of 

—  Minerals  of 

—  Mythology  of 

—  Political  geography  of _ 

—  Products  of   1,143, 

—  Prophetic  description  of 

—  Religion  of 

—  Rivers  of 

—  Science  in 

—  Strength  and  weakness  of 

—  Temples  of 

—  weakened  Ijy  Scythians 

—  Zoology  of 

—  See  also  Bal)yIou  and  Nineveh. 
Assyrian  archery  service 

—  arrowhead  writing 

—  art.  Periods  of 

—  bas-reliefs 

—  battering-rams 

—  boats  and  rafts 

—  bows  and  quivers 

—  brick-making 

—  bronze  worlc  . 

—  carving  and  patterns 

—  cavalry  force 

—  coloring  pigments 

—  colors,  Retlnement  in 

—  conquests  of  Tiglath-PUeser  I 

—  costume  of  people 

—  costume  of  royalty 1,  28;' 

—  Court  ceremonial 

—  deities.  Table  of 

—  dominion.  Extent  of 

—  dwellings 

—  -  emljosseil  work 

—  empire.  Overthrow  of 1,  .500;  11, 0: 

—  enameleti  lirlcks 

—  execution  of  captives 

—  exports 

—  fasts  and  festivals 

—  fleet  on  the  Tigris 

—  food.  Articles  of 

—  furniture 

—  glassware 

—  history  reviewed 

—  implements  of  labor 

—  Importations 

—  infantry  .service 

—  liiheritanee  of  Babylon 11 

—  kings  as  monogamists I 

—  kings.  Table  of I 

—  Ihm-huntiug I 

—  memorials  of  conquest 1 

—  metal  castings 1 

—  military  decline I 

—  moHarchy ,  Antl<iuity  of 1 

—  monarchy,  Note**  to I 

—  musical  instriunents I 

—  offensive  arms I 

—  ornamentation 1 

—  palaces  described 1 

—  pottery 1 

—  power  declines I 

—  pride  of  character I 

—  pursuit  in  boats 1 

—  resemblance  to  Jews 1 

—  royal  attendants I 

—  royal  names,  Meaniog  of I 

—  rulnsiocated I 

—  sacred  symbols I 

—  sacrifices  of  worship I 

—  sculptures I 

—  sensuousness I 

—  shields  and  mall 1 

—  siege-tactics I 

—  spirit  In  >var 1, 


.377 
3.3S 
325 
373 
IfiT 
145 
269 
^41 
210 
14j 
:U4 
12U 
:525 
489 
:ui 
123 
238 
.i03 
197 
49G 
146 

2;>4 
171 
214 
212 
274 
315 
2IVI 
2:il 
225 
208 
249 
ZM) 
228 
:i84 
;52S 
28K 

2;h 

■■m 

115 

:!:ir> 

223 
2:!9 
227 
278 

;b» 

3fi5 
437 

:«2 

2.33 
5U0 

■.w 

■Ml 
252 
124 

204 
r,13 
295 
282 
.^» 

JS 

■■ua 

m 

2»B 
20<i 
179 
231 
491 
15C 
281 
153 
291 
5(« 
131 
.■U4 

:«{ 
5II6 

IM 
2fil 
271 


710 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Assyrian  gtatnes  and  statuettes i,  211 

—  swords  and  spears i,  267 

—  tablets  and  cylinders 1, 169 

—  terra  cotta  work 1,  232 

—  toilet  articles 1,  331 

—  traces  in  Egypt i,  305 

—  trade— land  traffic 1,  311) 

—  traits  of  character 1, 156 

—  tribute  of  Persia 1,   21 

^  vehicles  described i,  3;39 

—  war  chariots i,  242 

—  wars  of  Sargon i,  437 

—  weapons  of  warfare i,  260 

—  wine  drinking i,  333 

^  women  secluded i,  287 

—  worship  of  Asshur 1,  342 

Assyrians  as  navigators 1,  313 

—  Civilization  of i,  ai5 

—  defeat  Phraortes i,  491 

—  Invade  Palestine 1,  400,  448 

—  Origin  of 1,374 

—  Physique  of  the 1,153 

Astrology  in  Babylon ii,  210 

Astronomical  use  of  color  In  Babylon  ii,  191 
Astronomy  in  Assyria i,  238 

—  in  Babylon ii,  205 

—  iu  Chaldaea i,   64 

Astyages  defeated  and  captured. .  .ii,  115,  433 

—  Domestic  relations  of ii,  109 

—  marries  Aryenis ii,  105 

—  releases  Cyrus  from  court 11,  112 

—  succeeds  Cyaxares  1 11, 107 

Athenian  disaster  in  Sicily ii,  50S 

—  expedition  to  the  East ii,  501 

—  fleet  defeats  Persian  squadron ii,  503 

—  fleet  stranded  in  Egypt 11,  504 

Athens  occupied  by  Mardonius ii,  498 

—  taken  by  Xerxes  I ii,  496 

—  walls  of,  rebuilt 11,  524 

Athos,  Canal  of,  made ii,  489 

Atrines  assumes  Suslanian  crown. . .    ii,  461 

—  the  pretender,  executed ii,  461 

Atropaten6  now  called  Azerbijan —    ii,     3 

Attica  occupied  by  Xerxes  1 11,  496 

Attila,  at  the  height  of  his  power iii,  407 

Audience,  Great  Hall  of,  at  Persepolis   11,  397 
Aurelian  accepts  a  robe  from  Persia  iii,  296 

—  assassinated iii,  29<) 

—  carries  Zenobia  to  Rome iii,  29*! 

Aurelius  succeeds  Antoninus  Pius. . .  iii,  18") 

—  Emperor,  death  of iii,  189 

Augustus  sends  Tiberius  to  Armenia,  iii,  120 

Avars  overrun  Thrace iii,  522 

Avesta.    See  Zendavesta. 

Axumites  favored  by  Justinian iii,  475 

Axumites.     See  Abysslnians. 

Azarethes  censured  by  Kobad iii,  447 

Azariah  defeated  by  Tiglath-Pileser  II     i,  429 
Azermidocht  .succeeds ner  sister.  ...  111,541 

—  succeeded  by  Isdigerd  III iii,  541 

Azerbijan,  the  ancient  Atropaten6... .    ii,     3 

Azotus,  Cendcb.-fiis  defeated  at iii,    54 

Baal  of  Tyre  submits  to  Asshur-banipal    i,  478 
Bahek,  the  paymaster.  Anecdotes  of.  iii,  487 

Babil  mound.  Size  of  the ii,  178 

Babylon,  Architecture  of ii,  189 

—  Astronomy  in 11,  205 

—  attacked  by  Tiglath-Plleser  1 1,  393 

—  Bricks  of,  described il,  196 

—  Bronze  castings  of il,  203 

—  Chronology  of.  Table  of il,  237 

—  Colors  used  in ii,  191,  20(i 

—  Commmereeof il,  2  8 

—  Description  of 11,170 

—  Glassware  of ii,  204 

—  Hanging-gardens  of ii,  175,  248 

—  History  of 11,230 

—  Human  sacrifices  of 11,174 

—  Importations  of ii,  219 

—  Kasr  mound  of 11, 179 

—  Mechanical  arts  of 11,  20] 

—  Metal-work  In ii,  202 

^  Mimetic  art  of ii,  197 

^  Palaces  of.,,,.,,,,..- : ii,lT4. 193 


Babylon,  Pigments  used  in H,  201 

—  pillaged  by  .Sennacherib 1,459 

—  Pottery  of Ii,  203 

—  revolts  under  Susub 1,  458 

—  Religion  of 11,224 

—  revolts  against  Xerxes  1 11,  487 

—  Ruins  of ,  located i,    14 

—  Science  in 11,  205 

—  Size  of.  uncertain 11, 170 

—  taken  by  Cyrus  the  great 11,  267,  443 

—  taken  by  Darius  Hystaspis ii,  461 

—  taken  by  Intaphres 11,464 

—  taken  by  Senriacherib 1,  447 

—  taken  by  Sep.  Severus ill,  194 

—  taken  by  Trajan iii,  177 

—  Textile  fabrics  of li,  204 

—  Tiglath-Pileser  II.  attacks 1,  429 

—  True  greatness  of Ii,  259 

—  Walls  and  gates  of 11, 172,176 

—  War  tactics 11,  215 

—  Wise  men  of ii,  217 

Babylonia,  the  fourth  monarchy ii,  122 

—  Agriculture  in ii,  218 

—  conquered  by  Antiochus  Lidetes..  iii,  56 

—  Date  culture  of ii,  220 

—  Domestic  animals  of ii,  160 

—  extent  of  the  empire ii,  122 

—  Fertility  of li,  22ii 

—  Geography  of 11,  124 

—  Products  of iii,   45 

—  Shalmanezer  IL,  invades i,  409 

—  subdued  by  Sargon 1,  44 1 

—  under  Assyrian  rule 11,  236 

Babylonian  empire,  Boundaries  of ...   11,149 

—  Character  of il,  2r>8 

—  Founding  of li,  23S 

—  its  animals ii,  15S 

—  its  birds ii,  1.59 

—  its  cities ii,  147 

—  its  gems ii,  157 

—  its  lakes ii,  143 

—  its  productions 11,  154 

—  its  rivers ii,  134 

—  overthrown ii,  2.')7 

Babylonian  alliance  with  Lydla ii,  252 

—  arts  and  sciences ii,  iss 

—  captivity  of  the  Jews il,  244 

—  cement n,VM\ 

—  civilization 11,  2 M) 

-  commercial  enterprise 11,  166 

—  costume ii,  211 

—  cruelties  mentioned ii,  168 

—  ethnology 11,  162 

—  gods  named ii,  22(; 

—  images  of  worship ii,  174 

—  immorality 11,  167 

—  kings  tortured ii,  168 

—  luxury  of  living ii,  167 

—  manners  and  customs li,  211 

—  military  dress 11,214 

—  military  power II,  167 

—  musical  instruments ii,  222 

—  names,  Meaning  of 11,  262 

—  palace  described Hi.  2:W 

—  power  broken  by  Sargon \'^^^ 

—  religious  practices 11,169 

—  satrap — his  revenue i^-^'l^. 

—  science   "•  ^Sj 

—  skill  In  cutting  gems il,  202 

—  symbolism  In  worship li,  229 

—  Talmud,  the iii,  291 

—  tribute  to  Persia i,   21 

—  Venus  worshiped  In  Persia 11,  427 

—  wheat  crops 11,  155 

—  women  disgraced 1,  367;  ii,  166,  222,  228 

—  worship 11,225 

Babylonians  defeat  Auilai, ill,  13S 

—  defeated  by  .Sargon 1.  436 

—  defeated  by  Shammuz-Vul  II i,  417 

Bactria  conquered  by  Cyrus ii,  440 

—  in  time  of  Sapor  I ill,  282 

Bactrian  revolt.  The ill,    25 

Pjictrlans  defeated  by  Artaxerxes  I. .    11,  503 
Badaoa  taken  by  Sennacherib J,  458 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


711 


Baglstan,  a  city  of  Media 11,  9,   Vt 

Batjdas  assassinates  Arses 11,  r>;«i 

—  exalted  by  Ochus 11,  5M2 

—  poisoned  Ochus 11,  533 

Bahr  Lut.    See  Dead  Sea. 

Bahram  and  his  army  revolt Hi,  501 

—  appointed  general ill,  MK) 

—  assumes  the  crovvu  of  Persia ill,  &  8 

—  flies  to  the  Turks Hi,  51! 

—  insulted  by  Hormlsdas  IV iii,  6<il 

—  refuses  to  treat  with  his  king Hi,  5f«i 

—  slaiu  by  a  poisoned  dagger ill,  Slo 

—  See  Varaliran. 

Balas,  Death  of Hi,4il 

—  pacifies  Armenia iii,  'IJ I 

—  succeeds  Perozes iii,  421 

Balkans  crossed  by  Darius Hystaspis.    ii,  4^s 
Balkh  occupied  by  the  Turks Hi,  5U0 

—  See  also  Bactria. 

Banquets  of  Assyrians i,  334 

—  or  Babylonians H,  221 

~  of  the  Medes,  Luxury  of ii,   43 

—  of  the  Persians 11,  344 

Bar,  or  Nin,  the  god  Saturn 1,  81),  35;^ 

Barada,  or  river  of  Damascus ii.  140 

Barbarian  inroads  of  history 1,  4'.I2 

Barbarians  of  northern  Asia Hi,   (i(! 

Bardanes.    See  Vardanes. 

Baresmanes  slain  at  Daras Hi,  444 

Barsemius  aids  Niger  In  Syria Hi,  l'.)l 

Bas-relief  of  Artaxerxes  1.  (Sass) Hi,  2;.S 

Bas-reliefs  of  Assyrians 1,  212 

—  of  Chald;eans 1,   (il 

—  of  Parthla Hi,  221 

—  of  Sapor  I Hi,  2sS 

—  of  Shalmanezer  II 1,  412 

—  of  the  Sassanians :. .  Hi,  570 

Batterlug-ranis  of  Assyrians 1,274 

Battle  ax  of  the  Assyrians i,2W 

Battle  of  the  Bridge Hi,  5 :(! 

Bdellium  Imported  by  Parthians Hi,  2;W 

Beasts  of  Burden  In  Babylonia 11,  101 

Beavers  of  Assyria 1,  M<> 

Beheading  of  Assyrian  captives 1,  278 

Behistun  rock-sculpture  of  Persia —    11,  474 

—  the  site  of  Baglstan 11,   1.') 

Bel,  the  Assyrian  deity 1,  76,  317 

Bel-kudur-uzur,  of  Assyria 1,  ;i80 

Bel-Merodach,  or  Chaidusan  Jupiter..     1,   87 

Belisarlus  arrives  at  Daras ■ —   ill,  100 

Belisarlus  defeats  Perozes ill,  444 

—  destroys  Vandalsin  .Africa ill,  451 

—  drives'garrison  into  Nlsibis HI,  40O 

—  Invades  Persarmeiiia Hi,  411 

—  made  "  General  of  the  East " IH,  442 

—  reaches  Europus 111,401 

—  saves  Antioeh 111,445 

—  sent  against  the  Vandals 1"-''.'^ 

—  sulxlucs  the  Moors ill,  451 

—  taki^s.Slsauranon IH.  4M) 

Bells,  Bronze,  In  Assyria t.  337 

Hi'i-hazzar's  Feast 11,  2.)7 

Belteshazzar— meaning  of  the  name.     11,  2(\o 
Beltls,  the  oriental  deity 1.  77,  .3.)0 

—  Degraded  worship  of..i,  .367 ;  U,  106,  222,  2'J8 

Belus,  Great  temple  of H,  !'•'! 

Ben-hadad   assassinated  by  Hazael.. .     1,410 

Bendamir  or  Araxes  river 11,  20S 

Bera,  king  of  Sodom,  defeated 1,  !"•> 

Berhoea  ransomed  from  plunder ill,4.>l 

—  taken  by  Chosroes  II Hi.  •")!'■' 

B«u-03ian  dynasty.  Fourth 1,  107 

—  ay  nasty,  Fifth 1.  Ill 

Berosus,  an  fwithorlty  on  Babylon  ...    11,  123 

—  Assyrian  dates  of ,]',-, 

—  describes  vegetables 1'   iS 

—  his  Chaldsean  chronology ••    1.  f> 

—  Median  dynasty  of "',','?•  ,^l 

Bessas  captures  the  Lazic  fortress...  Hi,  4M 

—  supersedes  Dagisttueus Hi,  4'i" 

Bosuchls.     See  Maogainaicha. 

ik'th  Kahlrl  taken  by  Sennacherib...     1,458 
Both  Sakin,  People  of.  emigrate 1,  4.><> 

—  taken  by  Sargon »•  ■'" 


Bezabde  resists  Constantlus : II,',  340 

—  taken  by  Sapor  II lU,  S!* 

Biblical  testimony  on  Chaldaea 1,   Si 

Bidpai,  Fables  ol Hi,  4aO 

Bii,  the  Chalda?un  deity  1,  76,  »47 

Biudoes  and  Bostam  join  Chosroes..  111,610 

—  drowned  In  tlio  Tigris 111,515 

—  Imprisoned  by  Hormlsdas IV lii,fiU2 

Birdsof  Assyria 1,14)) 

—  of  Babylonia H,  15J 

—  ofChalda-a 1,   26 

—  of  .Media 11,   30 

—  of  Persia  Proper 11,  3l« 

Birket-ei-Kercjun,  or  Lake  Moerls 11,293 

lilrsiNimrud  located 11,184 

r.it  Iiiild  taken  by  Asshur-banl-pal...     1,  482 

Hit  Vakin  founded 11,234 

Hits  of  i:liariot-liorses 1,  247 

Bltuineri,  Blazing  balls  of Hi,  3.51 

—  ])its  of  Kerkuk 1, 14ti 

Blaek-01)elisl£kinglnvades Babylonia  11,  233 

Blinding,  an  oriental  practice 111,537 

Hlocks  of  stone,  Bloving  of 1,  2;iD 

"  Boat,  The,"  as  a  puiHshment 11,  ;5C4 

lioats  of  the  Assyrians 1,  315 

Hokhara  taken  by  the  Turks 111,477 

Bolon  restored  to  Persia Hi,  450 

Borslppa,  Inscription  about 11,  2tll 

-  Lficatiiiu  of 11,  185 

—  Ruins  of,  located 1,   11 

—  surrenders  to  the  Persians 11,2.57 

Bostam  assassinated  by  his  wife 111,515 

IJoundaries  of  the  I'erslan  t'mpire II,  2CG 

Rowariyeli  mound,  Size  of 1,102 

Bows  an<l  quivers  of  Assyria 1,  264 

Brick-ma  king  In  Assyria 1,  XH 

—  InBahvlon II,  20l 

—  in  Clialdaea 1,   4'J 

Brick-masonry  of  Babylon 11,171) 

Bricks,  Enameled,  of  Assyri.a 1,227 

—  of  Baliyionians  described 11,  158,  l'.«i 

—  preferred  by  Assyrians I,  2i 'J 

Bridge  of  Xerxes  I.  destroyed H,  407 

Bridges  la  Babylon 11,173 

—  of  the  Persians 11.  IM 

Bronze  castings  of  Baliyhm 11,  2o;j 

—  work  of  Assyrians 1,  225 

Bryzacius  slain  at  a  bimqiiet Hi,  .5''.* 

Buffaloes  domesticated  In  Bal)ylonia   ii,  101 
Building  stone  In  Persia 11,  313 

—  of  Assyria : i.  2iiU 

Bull  hunting  In  Assyria 1,21)8 

Burbur  or  Akkad,  Trlbeof 1,   37 

Burial  a  sacrl lege  in  i'ersla HI,  4!)0 

—  places  of  Chahlc-ea 1.  6T 

—  prohibited  in  Persia 11,0:1;  111,441 

Burzes  disappears  from  Antioeh.   .  .  111,454 

Cadesia  Invested  by  Pers'an.s Hi,  547 

C'adusiaiis,  a  nomad  tribe II,   Vi 

—  Campaign  against 11,525 

—  subii.it  to  tile  Jledes 11,10!) 

Ca-sareaJIazaca  taken  by  Chosroes  II  ill,5.'0 

—  taken  by  Sapor  I ill,  2x1 

Calah,  the  secon<I  city  of  Assyria...!,  133,  1611 

—  Palace  of  Ksar-haddon  at   1,474 

—  rises  Into  graiiileur 1,406 

(^allas  (let'eatiil  by  Mentor ll,.5:'4 

Calllas,  Peace  of,  concluded 11,. 505 

Callidromus,  a  (ireck,  captured HI,  1(>8 

Calllnlcus,  Battle  of 1M,446 

—  razed  1)V  Chosroes  I l'l,46l 

Calllnlcus "flii's  to  Parthla 111,166 

Calmness  a  trait  of  tile  Babylonians.    II,  170 

(\alneh,  of  Moses,  located I,    14 

Caltropsiised  bv  Darius Codomaunus  Ii,  ?a(i 

—  usc(l  bv  the  Parthians Hi,  2tr.,  227 

Cambyses,  Character  of 11,  4»V 

—  or  Atradatcs,  of  Persia H,  4:W 

—  conquers  Egypt H,  449 

—  defeats  Psammenlfus II,  449 

—  father  of  Cyrus,  killed II,  *:« 

—  loses  an  ariny  In  the  desert 11,451 

—  punishes  the  Egyptian  rebels 11,4.53 

—  takes  hlsoNynlUe U,  «o8 


712 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


rsamela  of  Media,  Three  kinds  of 11,  S3 

--  used  by  theParthians...  ill,  229  , 

Canal  of  Athos,  made  by  Xerxes 11,489 

Canals  of  Mesopotamia 11,  247 

Candidus  defeats  Niger  at  Issus lil,  192 

Cannibalism  among  tneMassagetse..  ill,   67 

Canzaca  occupied  by  Chosroes  II ill,  523 

Capital  of  Baby  Ionia  described ii,  170 

Cappadocia  invaded  by  Sapor  I Ill,  2S1 

Captives,  Colonization  of i,  l^S ;  ii,  215 

—  released  by  Heraclius Ill,  6 '4 

—  transplanted  to  Babylonia ii,  2J5 

—  Treatment  of  Assyrian  1,  279 

Captivity  of  the  Jews,  First 1,  4:S0 

—  of  the  Jevrs,  Second i,  443 

—  of  the  Jews,  Third  ii,  244 

Caracallus  becomes  emperor Ill,  2()0 

—  betrays  the  Parttilans lii,  203 

—  imprisons  Abgarus lii,  2()0 

—  murdered  by  a  guard ill,  204 

—  seeks  a  Parthian  wife Hi.  201 

Carehemish  described Ii,  148 

—  taken  by  Assyrians i,  400 

—  taken  by  Neco 11,  106 

Carla  submits  to  Persia 11,  440 

—  under  Amorges 11,  608 

Carmana,  City  of 11,  271 

Carmania  reduced  by  the  Persians  ill,  209, 260 

—  Varahran  of,  accedes  In  Persia —  Hi,  38-3 
Carrhae,  Romans  routed  at lii,   95 

—  taken  and  lost  by  Sapor  I lii,  2S1 

—  taken  by  Chosroes  II lii,  519 

—  taken  by  Odenathus ill,  2«7 

Carrhenes,  the  general,  captured —  lii,  147 

Carthage  saved  oy  Phoenicians 11,  4)0 

Carus  crosses  the  Euphrates Ill,  297 

-- dies  In  his  tent 111,293 

Carving  and  patterns  In  Assyria 1,  207 

Caspian  Gates,  Expense  of  defending  lii,  456 

—  to  be  defended  by  Persia lii,  473 

Cassandan^,  wife  of  Cyrus 11,  417 

Cassius  alone  successful  in  the  East,  lii,  2i8 

—  assumes  the  purple lii,  189 

—  disciplines  Syrian  troops ill,  186 

—  made  generalissimo Hi,  186 

—  victorious  at  Sura Hi,  187 

Caunians  burn  their  capital 11,  440 

Cavalry  of  the  Persians 11,  .322 

—  of  the  Sassanians 111,594 

—  service  of  Assyria i,  249 

Cedar-wood  Imported  by  Assyrians  1, 322,  400 

Celebrated  products  of  history 11,  310 

Celer  invades  Arzanene lii,  437 

—  threatens  Nisibis ill,  437 

Cement  of  Babylon ii,  196 

Cendebseus  defeated  at  Azotu lii,   54 

Ceramics  of  A.ssyrlan8 1,  231 

—  of  Babylon ii,  203 

Cerastes,  a  venomous  snake 11,  309 

Cereals  <>f  Mesnpotainia 1,21;  11, 155,  327 

Cersobleptes  assisted  by  Persians 11,  5.32 

Chalccdon  taken  by  Chosroes  II ill,  521 

Chalcis  ransomed  from  Persia lii,  4.il 

Chaldeea,  the  fir.st  monarchy 1,     1 

—  Ancient  extent  of 1,     3 

—  Arabian  dynasty  of 1,  110 

—  Architecture  of i,   61 

—  Art  and  Science  in 1,  48,   64 

—  Astronomy  in i,    64 

—  Brick-making  In 1,    49 

—  Burial-places  of 1,    57 

—  Chronology  of  early 1,  98,  113 

—  Cities  of,  located 1,   15 

—  Climate  of i,    18 

—  conquered  by  Tiglathl-Nin 1,  379 

—  Costumes  of i,    67 

—  Earliest  knowledge  of i,   97 

—  Ethnology  of 1,   28 

—  Fertility  of 1,   20 

—  Kings  of,  tabulated i,  113 

—  Language  of 1,   41 

—  Minerals  of i,   25 

—  Temperature  of i,    18 

-^  Ttxtiie  fabrics  of i,  64 


Chaldsea,  View  of  the  country. 1,    1 

—  Zoology  of 1,   25 

Chaldsean  arrow-head  writing 1,   43 

—  bas-reliefs 1,   61 

—  cement 1,   51 

—  deities  described 1,  75,    93 

—  empire  overthrown 1,  379 

—  history,  Dawn  of 1, 100 

—  history,  General  results  of 1,  ll/> 

—  Jupiter  or  Bel-Merodach 1,   8T 

—  learning  surveyed 1,   41 

—  maritime  pursuits 1,   70 

—  monarchy,  Fall  of 1,118,379 

—  monarchy,  Kotes  to i,  615l 

—  similarity  to  Classical  mythology.     1,   71' 

—  temples 1,  52,   55  I 

—  tradition  of  Deluge 1,    94  | 

Chaldgeans,  Coffins  of  the i,   58 

—  Cushite  origin  of 1,   31 

—  First  mention  of i,   38' 

—  Food  of  the 1,   08 

—  General  character  of 1,   40 

—  Metallurgy  of 1,    63 

—  Physical  traits  of 1,   35 

—  Religion  of  the 1,   70 

Chaldee  astrology 11,  210 

Chameleons  described 11,309 

Chanaranges  retires  into  Persia Hi,  447 

—  the  general,  murdered Hi,  450 

Chandragupta  or  Sandracottus Hi,   34 

Charax,  a  city  of  Media 11,   15 

—  Spaslni,  on  the  Persian  Gulf 11,    15 

Chariot  attack  at  ArOela 11,  547 

Chariot-horses,  Trappings  of i,  245 

Chariots  of  the  Assyrians i,  241 

—  of  the  Persians H,  324 

Checkers  or  tric-trac  In  Persia Hi,  593 

Chedor-laomer,  king  of  Chaldaea..  .1, 105, 115 

Chess  introduced  into  Persia Hi,  490 

Chilmad,  Ruins  of,  located  1,   15 

Chine.se  calmness  of  manners ii,  170 

Chinzinus  and  Porus  succeeds  Nadius  11,  23^. 
Chionites  and  Persians  take  Aniida..  Hi,  337 

ChlomarSn,  Siege  of,  raised Hi,  493 

Chnsethas  reached  by  Heraclius lii,  529 

Chorasmians,  Country  of  the ii,  278 

Clioaspes  river  or  the  Kerkhah 11, 136 

Clii  irasrnia  adjoining  Parthia Hi,     5 

Choriancs  killed  by  an  arrow Hi,  4tJ6 

Chosroes,  king  of  Armenia,  accedes.  HI,  170 

—  king  of  Armenia,  aids  Artaxerxesliii,  261 

—  expels  Parthamaspates Hi,  180 

—  flies  before  Trajan lii,  173 

—  invades  Sjria Hi,  1S5 

—  restored  by  Isdlgerd lil,  390 

—  slain  by  Anak 111,269 

Chosroes  I.  appoints  a  paymaster- 
general  Hi,  486 

—  as  a  ruler Hi,  483 

—  burns  Turkish  goods Hi,  477 

—  dies  at  Ctesiphon Hi,  482 

—  Domestic  relations  of ill,  491 

—  drives  out  the  Abyssinians Hi,  476 

—  enters  Commagene Hi,  461 

—  evacuates  Lazica HI,  474 

—  executes  80  tax  gatherers Hi,  484 

—  falls  to  take  Edessa. Hi,  463 

—  founds  a  medical  school Hi,  489 

—  his  first  Roman  war Hi,  453 

—  his  jeweled  cup Hi,  493 

—  Lazlc  war  of,  541  A.D IH,  458 

—  massacres  the  Mazdakltes 111,450 

—  occupies  Hierapolis lii,  453 

—  offers  terms  to  Justinian Hi,  450 

—  overruns  Khazar  country Hi,  474 

—  patronizes  learning  Hi,  489 

—  razes  Calllnicus HI,  461 

—  slays  Ephthalite  monarch 111,474 

—  succeeds Kobad Hi,  44S 

—  takes  Antioch 111,455 

—  takes  Apamea Hi,  4.56 

—  takes  Daras Hi,  479 

—  takes  Petra HI,  459 

Chosroes  II,,  Arch  of.... ill,  5dJ 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


713 


Chosroes  II.  assassinated  In  prison,   ill,  5.'52 

—  defeats  Bahram ill,  513 

—  defeats  Germanus ill,  518 

—  defeats  Leontius Ill,  618 

—  evacuates  Canzaea   HI,  ,524 

—  executes  Shahr-Barz Ill,  532 

—  files  from  Cteslphon ill,  5  16 

—  flies  from  Dastagherd lii,  631 

—  his  character ill,  S'^S 

—  his  palace  pillaged Hi,  531 

—  imprisoned  iu  his  treasury ill,  532 

—  imprisons  defeated  generaU ill,  5;i2 

—  invades  Syria ill,  5l9 

—  invited  to  Hlerapolis til,  507 

—  occupies  Rhodes iii,  521 

—  rids  himself  of  Baliram 111,616 

—  seizes  Llllus,  the  envoy  111,518 

—  succeeds  Hormjsdas  IV 111,502 

—  takes  Alexandria lil,  520 

—  takes  Amida iii,  619 

—  lakes  Ancy ra Hi,  521 

—  takes  Aiitloch iii,  319 

—  takes  Apamea Hi,  619 

—  takes  Berhcea 1)1,519 

—  takes  Caesarea  Hazaca Hi,  520 

—  takes  Damascus Hi,  520 

^  takes  Daras iii,  518 

—  takes  Jerusalem Hi,  520 

Christian  burial  a  sacrilege  in  Per.sia  111,  4!X) 

—  churches  pillaged  in  I'ersia lil,  52G 

—  devotion  of  the  Lazl ill,  464 

Chrlstlauitv  espoused  by  Chosroes  II.  Hi,  51() 

—  in  Armenia HI,  290 

—  In  Parthia Hi,  225 

—  reinstated  in  Armenia iii,  424 

Christians  persecuted  by  Sapor  II._,. .  lil,  318 

—  persecuted  in  Persia Hi,  ;>S9 

—  to  1)0  protected  iu  Persia iii,  473 

—  treated  mildly  in  Persia iii,  4'JO 

Chronology  of  Assyria 1,  370 

—  of  Babylon,  Table  of li,  2:37 

—  of  Chaldiea 1,  98,  113 

—  studied  in  Assyria 1,  'OS 

Cicero  marches  into  Cappadocia Hi,  101 

Clllcia  invaded  by  Sapor  I Hi,  284 

—  Queen  of.  nieets  Cyrus 11,  .''lU 

—  ravaged  by  Esar-baddon 1,  4(;8 

—  subdued  by  ^>enna(■hl•ril) 1,  459 

Cimmerians  enter  Asia  Witior 11, 100 

—  expelled  from  Asia H,  101 

Cimon  dies  at  Citium il,  .504 

Clrcesium  reached  by  Chosroes  II  . . .  ill,  6u7 
Clssla.    .See  Suslana. 

Cities  and  towns  of  Assyria 1, 131 

—  of  aiu'ient  Chaldsea 1,    15 

—  of  Assyria  located i,  131, 134 

—  of  Babylonian  empire .    li,  M" 

—  of  Media  mentioned 11,     9 

—  of  Persian  empire II,  293 

Citium,  Siege  of,  raised 11,  r)04 

Citron  trees  of  Assyria 1,  143 

Civilization  of  Assyrians 1,505 

Cleombrotus,  Death  of H.  4;i8 

Climate  of  Assyria 1,  l-''9 

—  of  Babylonian  empire H,  151 

—  of  Chaldsea 1,    18 

—  ofMedla H,   22 

—  of  Persia  Proper il,  293  ;  lil,  250 

Clo;A«  miide  of  goldcloth HI,  182 

Coats  of  mail  of  Assyrians 1,  2iW 

Coch6,  the  suburb  of  Cteslphon lil,  :i55 

Oodomannus.    See  Darius  III. 

Coffins  of  the  Chalda^ans 1,   r>8 

Coin  legends  of  i'crsla Ill,  27G 

—  testimony  of  Sapor  II HI,  377 

Coinage  of  Darius  Hystaspis H,  473 

Coins  of  Balas  of  Persia HI,  425 

—  of  Chosroes  1 111,491 

—  of  Chosroes  II 111,634 

—  of  Hormlsdas  IV 111,593 

—  of  Isdlgerd  I Ill,  390 

—  of  Isdlgerd  III HI,  5")9 

—  of  Kobad  1 111,448 

—  oflCobadU 111,539 


Coins  of  Perozes,  of  Persia Ill,  420 

—  of  Persian  empire 11,  41T 

—  of  Sapor  III HI,  883 

—  of  Varahran  V Ill,  402 

—  of  the  usurper  Bahram 111,518 

Colchis.    See  also  Lazlca. 

Collection  of  tablets  found  at  Nineveh    1,  48( 

Colonlzal  ion  of  captives 1,  443  ;   11,  245 

Colonizing    of    Palestine    by    Esar- 

haddou 1, 473 

Colophon  taken  by  Gyges 11,  lit) 

Color  in  Assyrian  statuary 1,219 

Colors  of  Assyrian  bas-reliefs 1,  2.'1 

—  of  Assyrian  ornamentation 1,206 

—  of  Babylonish  art 11,2  0 

—  of  enameled  bricks 1, 227 

—  of  Median  battlements 11,    13 

—  used  iu  Babylonian  art 11, 191 

Comanl  countiy  eomiuered 1,  :i.85 

Comeutiolus  replaces  Pliilippicus...  Ill,  4'JJ 
Commagene  reached  by  Chosroea  I . .  Ill,  4iil 

—  reported  unfriendly 111,105 

Commerce  of  Assyria 1,  317 

—of  Babylon 11, 218 

—  scorned  by  the  Persians 11,  3ol 

Commercial  enterprise  of  Babylon.. .    11,  IBS 

Comndssariat  of  a  Per-lan  army 11,  .333 

Commodus  liecomes  emperor Ill,  ls9 

Concobar,  aolty  of  Media H,    17 

Conquests  of  iMithridates HI,   45 

Consolidation  of  I'arthla ill,   29 

Constantia,  lloman  liead-quarters..  111,450 
Constantina  ransomed  from  Persia.,  ill,  458 
Constantine  receives  Hormlsdas 111,319 

—  the  emperor  dies HI,  313 

—  results  of  his  death lil,  320 

Constantine  III.  marries  Gregorla 111,  639 

Constantius  falls  to  retake  Bezabde.  111,840 

—  repeatedly  defeated  by  Persluus..  111,322 

—  replies  to  Sapor  II HI,  Sil 

—  scorned  by  Sapor  II HI,  b'20 

-sends  a  wife  to  Arsaces 111,323 

Constantinople  clamors  for  food 111,  622 

—  resists  the  Persians HI,  52^ 

Corbulo  advancis  a  second  time ill,  1(!0 

—  cros.sps  the  Euphrates HI,  157 

—  sends  embassy  to  Parthia Ill,  152 

Cordveno  ceded  to  the  Rouums Ill,  308 

Cordvene ravaged  by  Kurs,  the  Scyth- 
ian  : 111,482 

Cosmetics  used  by  Persians II,  SCI 

Cosmogony  of  the  Chuldfeans 1,   75 

I'ossa^ans,  adjacent  to  Media 11,   21 

Costume  of  Assyrian  royalty i,  28.3,  288 

—  of  Assyrian  soldiers 1,  257 

—  of  Assyrians 1,  ,328 

—  of  Balivlonians 11,211 

—  of  Clialdfeaus i,   CT 

—  of  Parlhlan  kings 111,232 

—  of  Parthian  nobility Iit,2,3ti 

—  of  Parthlans Hi.  219,  222 

—  of  Persian  court  officers II,  ;J3<1 

—  of  Persian  kings H,  339 

—  of  Persian  populace II,  -iSG 

—  of  Sassauians HI,  255,  592 

—  of  the  Magi Ill,  5SJ 

—  oftheMedes H.    11 

—  of  wi imcn  in  Baliylon II,  22 ! 

Cotton  fabrics  of  Babylon 11,201 

Countries  bordirlngon  Persia. 11,  29i 

(\iurt  ceremonial  In  Assyria ),  2ft3 

—  ceremoidals  In  Media H.   43 

—  customs  of  Pers'.a 11,  3'W 

Crassus  betrayed  and  slahl HI,   97 

—  Expedition" of HI,  84 

—  the  younger  takes  hl3  own  life —  HI,  93 

Cremnlion  InPartlda 111.216 

Crlndualcode  In  Persia 11,30* 

Croesus  defeated  bv  Cyrus II.  S-Vi.  437 

Cross  of  Helena  taken  by  Persians.. .  HI.  6X 
Crucifixion  as  a  i)unlshment 11,3.3:1 

—  the  penalty  of  rehelllon 11  4tM 

rruel  practices  In  Babvoii II,  I't' 

Cteslus,  ua  Assyrian  uuihoiity 1,  oOl 


714 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Oteslaa,  his  duplicating  of  kings ii,   83 

—  his  long  ctironology ii,   82 

—  on  the  size  of  Babylon ii,  172 

Ctesiphon,  a  court  city  of  Parthla iii,  51 

—  its  Fire-temple  burned iii,  3H9 

—  occupied  by  Cassius ill,  187 

—  Plundered  by  Sep.  Severus iii,  194 

—  taken  by  Cariis iii,  298 

—  taken  by  Sa'ad iii,  553 

—  taken  by  Sept.  Severus Iii,  194 

—  taken  by  Tayer iii,  316 

—  taken  by  Trajan iii,  178 

Cunaxa,  Persians  defeated  at ii,  519 

Cuneiform  writing  of  Chaldaea i,   43 

Cup  used  by  Chosroes  I ill,  492 

Cushite  origin  of  Chaldseans i,   31 

Customs  of  Babylonians 11,  211 

—  of  the  Scythians 1,  494 

Cyaxarcs  I.  attacks  Lydia, ii,  103 

—  captures  Nineveh ii,  93,  239 

—  Conquests  of ii,  92,  240 

—  Death  of ii,  lOfi 

—  defeated  by  Madyes ii,   89 

—  invades  Assyria 1,  499 

—  invests  Nineveh 1,  491 

Cylaees  killed  as  a  traitor 111,373 

Cylinder  Inscription   of    Tiglath- 

Pilespr  I i,  392 

Cymbals  of  the  Assyrians i,  308 

Cyprian  revolt  under  Evagoras Ii,  524 

Cyprus  erects  an  effigy  of  Sargon 1, 442 

—  Island  of,  described ii,  284 

—  reduced  by  Idricus 11,  530 

Cyrenaica,  as  a  Persian  province ii,  285 

Cyropolis  on  the  Jaxartes ii,  4 12 

Cyrus  II.,  the  Great,  accedes ii,  433 

—  at  the  Median  court ii.  111,  432 

—  Character  of ii,  446 

—  crosses  the  Tigris 11,  254 

—  conquers  Boctria 11,  440 

—  Death  of iii,  445 

—  defeats  Nabonadlus ii,  254 

—  overthrows  Media 11,  114 

—  takes  Babylon ii,  257,  443 

—  takes  Sardls Ii,  253,  437 

—  Tomb  of ii,  4(r2,  405 

Cyrus,  the  prince,  saved  from  death .    ii,  512. 
Cyrus  the  Younger,  Rebellion  of ii,  513 

—  Character  of ii,  519 

—  falls  at  Cunaxa ii,  518 

Cy  thera  seized  by  Persian  fleet 11,  524 

Dacia  subdued  by  Trajan 111,170 

Daggers  of  the  Assyrians i,  268 

Dagisthceus  abandons  Petra ill,  466 

—  superseded  by  Bossas Iii,  466 

Dahae  invade  Parthia Hi,  1,51 

Damascus— its  position ii,  128 

—  reduced  by  Tiglath-Pileser  II i,  429 

—  Shalmanezer  II.  attacks 1, 409 

—  taken  by  the  Persians  iii,  520 

—  taken  by  Tiglath-Pileser  II i,  430 

Damascius  ^velcomed  in  Per.sia. .  .•. ..  111,489 

Damaspia,  wife  of  Artaxerxes  I ii,  50fi 

Dancing  at  Parthian  feasts iii,  237 

Dara  or  Dareium  founded iii,   30 

Daras,  Belisarius  victorious  near Iii,  444 

—  besieged  and  ransomed iii,  457 

—  Fortress  of,  built iii,  4;^ 

—  taken  by  Chosroes  I iii,  479 

—  taken  by  Chosroes  II ,  iii,  518 

—  to  remain  a  fortified  post Hi,  4.50 

Darics  coinetl  by  Darius  Hystaspls. . .    ii,  474 
Darius  Hystaspls.  Accession  of 11,  4S8 

—  Character  of ii,  485 

—  Coinage  of 11,  473 

—  conquers  the  Getae ii,  478 

—  conquers  Thrace ii,  479 

—  Death  <.f ii,  485 

—  executes  governors ii,  465 

—  founds  a  government 11,  466 

—  massacr-s  ilagian  priests 11,  458 

—  Palace  of ii,  3SS 

—  quells  ri'volts 11,  460 

—  quells  the  Ionian  revolt 11,  483 


Darius  HyStaspjs  reduces  Sagartla..    11,  46S 

—  Scythian  expedition  of 11,  477 

—  Second  period  of 11,  475 

—  takes  Babvlon 11,  461 

—  takes  Miletus 11,  483 

Darius  Nothus,  Accession  of 11, 506 

—  character  of 11,  511 

—  executes  Arsites 11, 507 

Darius  III.  (Codomannus)  accedes 11,  533 

—  defeated  at  Issus 11, 539 

—  his  conduct  at  Arbela 11, 549 

—  sends  embassies  to  Alexander 11, 544 

—  sets  out  from  Babylon 11, 638 

—  vanquished  at  Arbela 11,  548 

Dastagherd,  Persian  court  at 111,529 

Date  culture  of  Babylonia il,  220 

Date-palm  of  Chaldeea 1,   23 

Dates  used  tor  making  liquor Ill,  286 

Datis  defeated  at  Marathon ji,  48.5 

Dav-Klua,  the  Chaldaean  deity i,   80 

Dead,  Disposal  of  in  Persia 11, 63 ;  111,  441 

Dead  Sea  described 11, 144 

Debt  avoided  by  Persians ii,  319 

Decidius  Saxa  killed 111,106 

Deer-hunting  in  Assvria i,  301 

Deities  of  Assyria,  Table  of 1,358 

—  of  the  Assyrians 1,346 

—  of  the  Chaldseans 1,  72 

—  of  Zoroastrianlsm ill,  583 

Deity  in  Zoroastrianlsm Hi,  580 

Deluge,  Chaldeean  tradition 1,  91 

Demavend,  Peakof 11,     2 

Demetrius  II.  taken  prisoner Hi,   46 

—  released  by  Phraates  II Hi,  56 

Democedes,  Voj'age  and  escape  of...    11,476 
Demosthenes   defends  Cassarea  Ma- 

zaca Hi,  284 

Derbend  Pass,  Fortification  of Ill,  433 

Deriah-i-Nemek  lake 11,  269 

Deserts  of  Persia  Proper 11,  273 

Dlacira.    See  Hit. 

Diadem  of  Persian  kings 11, 339 

Diarbekr.    See  Aniida, 

Dice-playing  in  Persia II,  352 

Dlo  better  authority  than  Herodlan.  111,203 
Diocletian  and  Narses  make  a  treaty  ill,  307 

—  appears  in  Armenia ill,  299 

—  humiliates  Galerius iii,  303 

—  makes  war  on  Narses Hi,  302 

Divination  of  the  Magians 11,   63 

Divisions  of  Persia  under  Chosroes  I.  iii,  484 

Dly  aleh  river  described ...   1,  7,  124 

Dlzabul  retires  before  Hormlsdas ill,  477 

—  sends  embassy  to  Chosroes  I iii,  477 

—  the  Turk  invades  Per.sia Hi,  477 

Dogs  of  Media 11,   33 

Domentziolus  succeeds  Leontius 111,518 

Domestic  animals  as  captives i,  28o 

—  animals  of  Assyria 1, 150 

—  animals  of  Babylonia  11, 160 

—  animals  of  Chaldaea 1,  27 

—  animals  of  Persia ii,  304 

Dorians  submit  to  Persian  rule ii,  440 

Drangiana  assists  Cyrus 11, 442 

Dream  of  Nebuchadnezzar 11,  249 

Dress,  a  luxury  of  the  Medes 11,   39 

—  See  Costume. 

Dualism  in  Zoroastrianlsm 11,  421;  Jil,  579 

—  Origin  of 11,  52 

Dur  taken  by  Assyrians 1, 430 

Dura  reached  In  retreat Ill,  365 

—  Treaty  made  at iii,  367 

—  War  after  Treaty  of ill.  375 

Earthen  ware  of  Eal)ylon ii,  203 

Earthquake  at  Antioch 111,176 

Earthquakes  at  Antioch 111,454 

Eastern  conquests  of  Cyrus 11,  441 

Eating  and  drinking  in  Persia H,  356 

Eberwiz.    See  Chosroes  II Hi,  503 

Ecbatana,  Northern,  or  Gaza 11,    i> 

—  taken  by  Darltis  Hvstaspis 11,  4P2 

Ecbatanas,  The  two,  of  Media H,     9 

Eclipse  of  7."'3  B.  C i.  374 

—  of  the  sua  stops  a  battle 11, 104.  2W 


\ 


SEVEN-  GREAT  ilONATtCHIES. 


716 


Edessa  besieged  by  CHosroeSl.TrnT.  UI,  463 

—  burued  by  Lucius  Quietus ill,  179 

—  Christian  churcliat lii,  225 

--  occupied  by  Narses 111,518 

—  ransomed  from  Persians ill,  457 

—  taken  by  Cliosroes  II lii,  519 

Edomltes  subdued  by  Esar-haddon. .     i,  409 

Education  of  Persian  sons li,  358 

Egeau  islands  ruled  by  Persia 11,  283 

Es^y  ut,  a  natural  enemy  of  Babylon. .    ii,  150 

—  after  time  of  Sargon 1,  439 

—  as  a  Persian  province ii,  284 

—  attacked  )jy  Ipliicrates ii,  526 

—  ftttaclied  by  Sargon ii,  235 

—  conquered  by  Cainbyses 11,  449 

—  conquered  by  Esar-haddon 1,  471 

—  Governor  of,  executed 11,  405 

—  Invaded  by  Asshur-bani-pal 1,  478 

—  Invaded  by  Chosroes  II lii,  520 

—  Invaded  by  Nebuchadnezzar ii,  245 

—  liberated  by  Psammetlchus i,  4S3 

—  occupied  by  Alexander ii,  543 

—  reconquered  by  Asshur-bani-pal..     1,  477 

—  recovered  to  Persia,  455  B.  C 11,  504 

—  reduced  by  Artaxerxes  III 11,  631 

—  revolts  against  Darius  Nothus li,  509 

—  revolts  under  Artaxerxes  I li,  fl03 

—  threatened  by  Scj'thians 1,  49li 

Egyptian  grain  as  triV)ute ii,  409 

—  Influence  in  Assyrian  art 1,  224 

—  revoltof  487  B.C li,  4S5 

Egyptians  defeated  by  Sargon i,  438 

—  defeated  by  Nebuchadnezzar 11,  241 

—  defeated  by  Sennacherib 1,  449 

Elcron  taken  by  Sennacherib 1,  449 

El  Hadhr.    See  Hatra. 

El  Kasr  mound  of  Babylon -.    ii,  17S 

Elam  or  Susiaua  located i,  17 ;  11,  VH 

—  War  of  Asisy ria  with i,  479 

Elamites,  Antiquity  of i,  105 

Elamitlc  campaign  of  Sennacherib. . .     i,  458 
Elburz  and  Zagros  compared li,     2 

—  mountain-chain 11,279;  ill,   37 

Elephants  a  terror  to  Arabs ill,  540 

—  first  used  in  battle ii,  545 

—  Use  of,  in  war 111,229 

Eltekeh,  Sennacherib  victorious  at.. .     i,  449 

Elulneus,  king  of  Babylon il,  234 

Elweud,  modern  of  Mount  Orontes.  11,  9,   15 
Embassadors  reply  to  Crassus ill,   80 

—  of  Persia  made  prisoners lii,  20-1 

Embassies  of  Darius  to  Alexander. . .    11,  5l4 

—  respected  by  the  Parthians ill,  Sfl 

Emblems  of  Asshur,  the  deity 1,  343 

Embo.ssed  work  of  Assyria i,  223 

Eniesa  resists  the  Persians ill,  284 

Empalement  as  a  punishment 1,  278 

Employments  of  Assyrians 1,  .337 

Enameled  bricks  in  Assyria 1,  227 

Encampments  of  the  Persians il,  331 

Ennea  Hodul,  Sacritlces  at 11,  427 

Enu,  the  Cliuldcean  deity 1,   70 

Ephesus,  Greeks  defeated  near. 11,  482 

Ephralm.Antloch bishop,  denounced  ill,  4."i3 
Ephthallte  war  of  Kobad 111,438 

—  monarch  slain  bv  Chosroes  I ill,  474 

BphthaUtes  assist  f  erozes Ill,  41i» 

—  attacked  by  Isdlgerd  II Hi,  405 

—  attacked  by  Turks 111,476 

—  cut  up  by  Romans lili  ■130 

—  defeated  by  Smbat HI.  517 

—  ensnare  Isdlgerd  II ill,  4l'8 

—  Invade  Persia 111,4110 

—  receive  I'rlnce  Koliad HI.  '123 

Epyaxa,  queen  of  Clilcin "•  -^li 

Esar-haddon,  Accession  of 1.  ^0; 

—  Architecture  of '•  ''iV 

—  conquers  Egypt 1,  4il 

—  Death  of \.i''-\ 

—  Invades  Arabia ;•  iS 

—  Invades  Armenia {.  ■{{►'J 

—  Invades  Bikau !•  ^'\ 

—  Palaceof )• '{i;* 

—-penetrates  Arabia l-  ■ -0 


Esai  -naddon  relates  a iTcdian  Invasion  li,  84 

—  subdues  ClUcia 1,  4»j8 

—  subdues  Chaldeea. 1,  4(J9 

—  subdues  Edom  1,  409 

—  takes  Siilou 1,  41a 

—  takes  Thebes \,Wi 

—  transplants  Sldonlans, 1,  4'a 

—  Wars  of 1,  408 

Ethiopia,  as  a  neighbor  of  Persia 11,  297 

—  submits  toSargon 1,110 

—  See  also  Abyssinia. 

Ethiopian  king  recovers  Egypt J,  478 

—  sujiri'iuaey  in  Egypt ' 1,  4;W 

Ethnic  character  of  the  Medians 11,   30 

Ethnology  of  Assyria 1,  151 

—  of  Babylonia 11,  162 

—  of  Chaldaja 1,   28 

—  of  Persian  races 11, 274. 282,  315 

—  oftheMedes 11,    73 

—  of  the  Parthians Ill,     9 

Etiquette  of  the  Persian  court 11,351 

Euuomius  defends  Theodoslpolis HI,  396 

Eunuchs,  among  Assyrians I,  2'.'0 

—  of  the  Persian  court 11,  348 

Euphrates  and  Tigris  compared 1.     6 

—  crossed  by  AlexanderatThapsacus  11,545 

—  crossed  by  Alexander  Severus ill,  2io 

—  crosseil  by  Cams ill,  2'.»7 

—  divided  Babylon 11,172 

—  passed  by  Chosroes  II HI,  619 

—  passed  by  Persians  at  Obbani; ,  ill,  457 

—  turned  tnnn  its  channel 11,  2i6 

Europeans  as  army  ofticers ill,  242 

—  at  court  of  Chosroes  I ill,  48e' 

Europus,  headquarters  of  Bellsarlus  111,401 

Eusebius,  embassador  from  Zeno 111,  413 

Evagoras  and  Cyprian  revolt 11,524 

—  defeated  by  Tlribazus 11,  525 

EvU-JIerodach  accedes  in  Babylon ...    H,  249 

Execution  of  captives  by  Assyria 1,  278 

Exedares  made  king  of  Armenia.  . . .  Ill,  170 

Exportatioiis  of  Assvria 1,  323 

Kablesof  Bidpaiuf  ilindustan 111.490 

Faklm,  the  Turkish  princess  ill.  4'.6 

Famine  in  Persia  under  Perozes HI.  411 

Fan-bearers  in  Assyria 1.  2".»2 

Fars,  or  modern  Persia  defined 11,  267 

Fasting  at  Nineveh 1,  420 

Fasts  and  festivals  of  Assyrians 1,  :«i5 

Feastlngoftheancienls... 1,334;  11,43,221,  344 

Festivals,  Religious,  in  Babylon  11,227 

Fifth  Monarchy .    Sec  Persia. 

Firdausl,  his  gi-eat  work Ill,  490 

Fire-altars  of  the  Persians 111,271 

Flre-templea  of  Persians 111.  iSS 

First  Monarehy.     See  Chaldiea. 

Firuzabad  palace  described 111.665 

Fish  diet  of  Chaldfcans 1.   C9 

—  of  the  Chaldaiau  marshes H,  100 

—  of  the  I'erslan  Gulf Il,3ii7 

—  scarce  In  Media 11,   31 

Fishing  device  of  storks II,  l.'>9 

—  InAssyrla l.-HM 

Flood  seasons  of  Mesopotamia. 1.     9 

—  Tradition  of.  In  Chald»a 1,   95 

Flowers  at  Assyrian  feasts 1,  X'x) 

—  of  Media  named 11,  28 

Food  of  the  Assyrians 1,  3.32 

—  of  the  Babyliiniaus 11.221 

—  of  theChaidicans 1.   t'>8 

—  of  the  Persians il,  .1)7 

Foot-soldiers  of  Assyria 1,  SiJ 

Fourth  Monarchy.    See  Babvlon. 

Frankincense  used  In  Assyria 1,323 

Fruit  trees  of  Media 11,   26 

Fruits  of  Assvria 1,  144, .'Kti 

—  of  Babyloidii.  11,155 

—  of  Cbaldwa 1,   24 

—  of  Persia  Proper 11.  3lt2 

Furniture  of  Persian  court 11,345 

—  of  the  Assyrians 1,  23,'),  33G 

Oablnliis  marches  to  Egypt 111.   83 

Oalerliisdereate.l  by  the  Persians.. .  111.  :i03 

—  restores  Tiridatei* HI,  30i 


71(5 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Galleys  Of  the  ASSyPiaHS. 1,  316 

—  o(  the  Persl&iis 11,  333 

Gainbalu  tribe  resist  Esar-haddon i,  471 

—  tribe  subdued 1,  480 

Game  plentiful  in  Assyria 1,  303 

Gandarlaus  of  Persia 11, 274 

Gardens  of  Babylon 11, 175 

Gates  of  Babylon 11,172 

Gateway  of  enormous  stones 11,  408 

Gutlias,  or  songs  of  the  Zendavesta.  11,  40,  5tj 

Gaza  taken  by  Neco 11,  241 

Gecko,  or  nocturnal  lizard ii,  SU8 

Gem-cutting  in  Assyria 1,230 

Gems  of  ancient  Persia 11,  306,  314 

—  of  Habylonian  empire 11,  157 

Geneslus,  Theory  of i,   39 

Genii  of  the  Assyrians 1,  359 

Gennesa'-et.    Hee  Sea  of  Tiberias. 

Geography  of  Assyria 1,120, 129 

~  of  Ohaldaea 1,     3 

—  of  Parthia  Proper Ill,     1 

—  of  Persian  empire ii,  2CiJ 

George,  envoy,  treats  with  Persians. .  ill,  517 
Georgia,  Christians  of,  persecuted. . .  ill,  414 

Germauleus  sent  into  Asia ill,  127 

Germanus  defeated  near  Daras Hi,  618 

—  assigned  to  defend  Antloch iii,  454 

—  saves  Constantlna iii,  499 

Ghilan  and  Mazanderan,  Modern il,    18 

Giido  the  Moor  detaches  Africa Hi,  38*> 

Glassware  of  Assyrians 1,  233 

—  of  Babylon ii,  204 

Clones,  entrapped  by  stratagem ill,  437 

Gobryas,  the  Suslanlan  rebel ii,  405 

Goby,  a  flsh  of  Chaldasa 1,   27 

Gold !! nd  silver  work  in  Assyria i,  225 

—  yield  of  Lydia ii,  lii3 

Golden  Horn  a  barrier  to  the  Persians  ill,  528 

—  images.  Solidity  of ii,  2i'2 

Gordian  murdered  at  Zaitha Ill,  282 

Gorges  of  Persia  Proper ii,  2G9 

Gotarzes,  Accession  of Ill,  141 

—  Death  of iii,  149 

Government  of  vassal  kingdoms i,  ,502 

—  founded  by  Darius  Hystaspis 11,  4GB 

Grand  vizier  of  Assyria i,  291 

Granicus,  Battle  of  the 11,  53() 

Great  Hall  of  Audience  at  Persepolls  ii,  397 
Great  Pillared  Halls  at  Persepolls. . .    11, 394 

Grecian  possessions  of  Persia ii,  283 

Greene,  a  tempting  land  to  Persia ii,  297 

—  and  Persia  conclude  a  peace 11, 505 

—  March  of  Xerxes  through 11.  493 

Greek  cit.v  built  near  Ctesiphon iii,  458 

—  fleet  defeated  by  Sennacherib 1,  459 

—  physician  sent  to  Per.sia ill,  464 

—  sages  welcomed  in  Persia ill,  489 

—  temples  burned  by  Persians 11,424 

—  towns  of  Parthia iU,   49 

—  traditions  of  Sardanapalus 1,488 

Greeks  bribed  by  Persian  gold il,  5IJ8 

—  rf)iit  I'lTsians  at  Cunaxa ii,  S2i) 

—  vleti.rious  at  PlatEea il,5(X) 

—  victorious  at  Salamis ii,  497 

Green  rubies.    See  Emeralds. 

Gregorla  marries  Constantine  III iii,  539 

Greyhounds  esteemed  in  Media ii,   33 

Grumbates  lo.ses  his  son  at  Amida. . .  ill,  334 
Gubazes  assassinated  by  Romans iii,  470 

—  hides  in  the  mountains iii,  4(J8 

—  saved  from  assassination ill,  405 

—  submits  to  Chosroes  I iii,  459 

—  succeeded  by  Tzathes ill,  470 

Guebres  or  fire-wor.shipers 11,   63 

Gula,  the  oriental  sun-goddess i,  81,353 

Gum-tragacanth  found  In  Media 11,  26 

Gurdanaspa  imprisons  Chosroes  II... .  iii,  532 

Gurgeues  retires  into  Lazica ill,  441 

Gurguna  succeeds  Ismi-dagon 1, 108 

Gyges,  Accession  of 11,   99 

—  of  Lydia,  Embassy  of 1,  479 

—  rebels  atfaiast  Assyria 1,  483 

—  takes  Colophon ii,  100 

Gynteceujii  of  the  Persian  court il,  346 


Hadrian  succppds  Trajan Iii,  180 

—  witlHli'iiws  t'r.jm  Assyria Hi,  182 

Hagisa  dethroned  at  Babylon 11,  236 

Hagmatan.    See  Eebatana. 

Hair  and  beards  of  Babylonians 11, 105 

Halieariiassus  taken  by  Alexander. .    11,  537 

Hall  of  an  Hundred  Columns 11,  395 

Hall  of  Audience  at  PersepoUs ii,  397 

Hamadan,  the  site  of  Eebatana 11,     9 

Hamath  atttacked  by  Assyrians i,  410 

Hanging-gardens  in  Assyria i,  337 

—  of  Babylon u,  173,  248 

Hareem  court  of  Sargon 1, 190 

Harp-playing  iu  Assyria 1,  306 

Harpagus  succeeds  Mazares ii,  438 

Hatra,  Architecture  of ill,  213 

—  besieged  by  Sept.  Severus iii,  195 

—  besieged  by  Trajan iii,  179 

—  betrayed  to  the  Persians Ill,  280 

—  palace  a  Sassanian  model ill,  501 

—  taken  by  Trajan iii,  177 

Hawking  a  Persian  sport Ill,  693 

Hazael  assassinates  Ben-hadad 1,410 

—  submits  to  Esar-haddon 1,  469 

Hazaravougd  invades  Armenia Ill,  416 

Hazllu  rebels  against  Assyria 1,  399 

Hea,  the  oriental  deity i,  78,  349 

Head-dress  of  Persian  kings 11,  339 

Hecatoiiipylos,  in  Parthia Hi,  26,   30 

Helena,  Church  of,  burnt Hi,  520 

Helepolis,  or  movable  towerof  attack  iii,  352 

Heliocles,  the  parricide ill.   43 

Hellespont  bridged  by  Xerxes  1 11,  488 

Helmets  of  the  Assyrians i,  260 

Heracliauus  defeated  by  Zenobla Hi,  288 

Heraelius  appointed  by  Phillppicus.  111,498 

—  attempts  resistance  to  Persia iii,  522 

—  consults  the  Gospel  as  an  oracle.. .  iii,  624 

—  defeats  Shahr-Barz Hi,  623 

—  defends  the  Sarus  bridge ill,  526 

—  driven  to  despair Hi,  522 

—  invades  Armenia Hi,  623 

—  makes  pilgrimage  to  Jerusalem. . .  Hi,  635 

—  plunders  Persian  palaces ill,  531 

—  reaches  Chnasthas 111,529 

—  succeeds  Phocas iii,  619 

—  takes  Amida  and  Marty ropolis iii,  625 

—  takes  twenty  (iglit  .standards 111,630 

—  tries  to  reach  Carthage iii,  622 

—  winters  iu  Cappadocia HI,  526 

Herodotus,  Assyrian  dates  of 1, 370 

—  estimated  as  an  authority i,  30 

—  on  size  of  Babylon  Ii,  171 

Herons  of  Babylonia  described II,  169 

Hezekiah  besieged  by  Sennacherib. . .     1,  449 

—  treats  with  the  enT-oys 1, 452 

Hierapolis,  Chosroes  II.  a  guest  at ill,  607 

—  ransomed  with  silver iii,  453 

—  taken  b.v  Chosroes  II Hi,  619 

Hieroglyphs  noticed  In  Assyria 1, 223 

Hieroiuax  river  located 11,142 

HiUuh,  .-Mnuiidsof 1,477 

HlUal  slays  Rustam Hi,  651 

Hindustan  searched  for  its  learning.  HI,  490 

Hippophagy  In  Persian  religion ii,  56 

Hira  reduced  by  Kaled ill,  544 

History  and  chronology  of  Babylon. .    U,  230 

—  of  ChakUea,  Dawn  of 1, 100 

Hittites  conquered  by  Assyrians 1,  384 

Hoa,  the  oriental  deity 1,  78,  349 

"Hollow  Syria"  described 11, 127 

Holwan  taken  by  Sa'ad IU,  654 

Holy  Land.    See  Palestine. 

Homa  ceremony  in  Persia 11,  56;  111,  586 

Homerites  rise  against  Abyssinia Hi,  475 

Honesty  of  the  Babylonians 11, 109 

Honorius,  emperor  of  the  West Ill,  386 

Hordes  annoy  Parthia  on  the  north,  ill,    63 
Hormuz  killed  by  Kaled HI,  544 

—  Parthians  defeated  at ill,  210,  260 

—  or  Ram-Aormuz  built HI,  313 

Horinuz.iu  beecun.'s  an  Islamite ill,  555 

Hormisdas  luses  Die  throne HI,  30i 

—  Prince,  imprisoned iii,  3:5 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


717 


Bormlsdas  Prince  escapes  to  Rome.  111,319 
Hormisdas  I.  succeeded  by  Varahran  I  111,  294 

—  succeeds  Sapor  I Ill,  29;i 

Hormisdas  II.,  death  of 111,315 

—  Marrlatje  of HI,  314 

—  succeeds  Narses HI,  312 

Hormisdas  III.  defeated  by  Perozes.  HI,  410 
Hormisdas  IV.  becomes  a  tyrant HI,  5(K) 

—  blinded  and  Imprisoned Ill,  W2 

—  drives  out  the  Turks HI,  477 

—  insults  Bahram Ill,  liOl 

—  succeeds  Chosroes  I Ill,  495 

Horses  as  offerings  of  sacrifice 11,   56 

—  inferior  in  Babylonia 11, 100 

—  of  A  ssy ria 1, 150 

—  of  Assyrian  chariots 1,  245 

—  of  Media H,   Si 

—  of  Persia  Proper 11,  305 

—  protected  Ity  armor 11,  .323 

—  reared  in  Persia Ill,  2.53 

—  sacrificed  in  Persia 11,  422 

Hoshea,of  Israel  taken  by  Shalmanezer  1,  iXi 

Hostages  In  the  East ill,  2:^1 

Houses  of  the  Assyrians i,  335 

Human  sacrificial  altars 11,174 

Humbanlgas  defeated  by  Sargon 1,  436 

Hunuic  allies  .suggest  a  new  ram Hi,  407 

Huns,  Peculiarities  of  the IH,  400 

Hunting,  a  Sassanian  sport ill,  592 

—  habits  of  Parthlans Hi,  238 

—  in  Media 11,    44 

—  in  Persia 11,  352 

—  lions  in  Assyria 1,  2U5 

Hur  or  Ur,  the  early  capital 1,    12 

Hurki,  the  Chaldseau  deity 1,   80 

Huruk  or  Erech  in  Chaldaea -. ...     1, 104 

Hyrcanla,  adjoining  Parthla Hi,     7 

—  Revolt  in ill.  153 

Hyrcanlans  conquered  by  Cyrus 11,  441 

—  Country  of  the 11,  280 

—  defeated  by  Darius  Hystappis 11,  403 

Hyrcanus  deposed  at  Jerusalem Hi,  ]0<! 

Iberia  divided  between  claimants...  111,375 

—  rises  against  I.sdlgerd  n ill,  407 

—  secured  b.v  Kobacl lil,  441 

—  .surrendered  to  Rome 111,  3<l7 

Iberian  king  dethroned  by  Sapor  II.  lil,  373 

Idolatries  adopted  by  Persians H.  428 

Idolatrous  Images  of  Babylon 11, 174 

Idolatry  in  Assyria 1,  3til 

—  in  Sassanlan  religion lil,  585 

—  overthrown  by  Cyrus 11,  444 

—  Persians  averse  to 11,  422 

Idols,  Assyrian,  Composition  of i,  3<i2 

Idrleus  reduces  Cyprus 11,  530 

Idumsea  located *^'  'iS 

Iguanas  persecuted  by  Mohammedans  11,  308 

II,  the  Chaldaean  deity 1,   73 

Ilgi  succeeds  Urukh  in  Chaldaea 1,  llM 

Image-worship  in  Parthla 1"' ?Hi 

Images  carried  captive 1,  27i 

—  of  Babylonian  worship 11,227 

Immnrallty  In  Babylon 11,107 

ImnKU-tallty  In  Zoroastrlanlsm..H,56;  111,  587 

"Immortals"  cut  to  pieces HI,  3!I7 

Implements  of  labor  In  Assyria '•?!}? 

Imports  of  the  Assyrians 1,  321 

—  of  the  Babylonians H.  219 

Inarus  crucified  in  Persia 11,  .504 

—  Slavs  Archaemenos 11,  .503 

Indates  defeated  by  the  Syrians HI,   Wi 

Indian  dominion  of  Persia  doubted,  ill,  4i(> 
Indus  river  as  a  Persian  stream ">■■'?' 

—  tract  conquered  by  Persia H.  ^75 

—  Valley  of  the 11.27? 

Infantry  of  the  Sassanlans ill.  pjj' 

—  service  of  AssvrliL 1.  '^'- 

Inscriptlon  of  Nebuchadneszar H,  2<jO 

—  of  Tliil.athPlleser  I ,.}•  Sfi 

Inscriptions  of  a  bas-relief ill.  "'8 

Insects  of  Babylonia. "•  "i! 

—  of  Media .  J« 

—  of  P€>rHla  Proper i\.^ 

Intat'lios  on  Assy  rlan  stones i.  ** 


Intaphres  takes  Babylon U,  464 

Intemperance  in  Assyria 1,  333 

—  in  Parthla HI,  2:19 

Intoxication,  as  a  duty,  In  Persia 11,  357 

Ionian  Revolt  reviewed 11,  481 

Iphicrates  and  I'baruabazus  attack 

Eg.vpt U,526 

Iran,  Great  plateau  of U,  273 

Iranlc  character  of  the  Medes 11,    36 

—  character  of  the  Persians 11,  315 

—  legends.  Character  of U,  53,   59 

—  phases  of  religion 11,    60 

Iron  unknown  In  Chaldaea 1,   62 

—  in  boulders  in  Persia 11,  312 

Irrigating  channels 1,325;  11, 27;  Hi,  251 

Irrigation  In  Assyria 1, 142,  325 

—  in  Media 11,   «7 

—  necessary  in  Mesopotamia 1,   22 

Isdlgerd  I.,  Death  of IH,  3!« 

—  guardian  to  son  of  ArcadluB Ill,  387 

—  persecutes  Christians 111,389 

—  succeeds  Varahran  I Ill,  385 

Isdlgerd  II.,  Death  of  111,408 

—  attempts  to  convert  Armenia. Ill,  406 

—  defeated  by  Ephthalites IH,  406 

—  expels  the  Tatars Ill,  405 

—  makes  peace  with  Rome ill,  4114 

—  succeeds  Varahran  V Hi,  403 

Isdlgerd  111.  escapes  from  Rel HI,  558 

—  murdered  by  a  subject HI,  5,58 

—  resists  the  Arabians 111,542 

—  retreats  from  Sa'ad ill,  ,552 

—  succeeds  Azermldocht 111,641 

Isdlguuas  treats  with  Justinian HI,  409 

Isfahan,  the  site  of  Aspadan 11,   17 

Ishtar,  the  oriental  Venu.s 1,90,356 

Islamism.    See  Mohammedanism. 

Isml-dagon,  king  of  Chaldaea 1,  108 

Ispabara  restored  to  his  throne I,  443 

Israel,  First  captivity  of 1,430 

Issus,  Persians  defeated  at 11,  539 

Istakr,  Palace  at H,  403 

—  See  also  Persepolls. 

Iva,  the  oriental  deity 1,  85,  362 

Ivories  of  As.syrlan  art I,  226 

Ivory,  an  Assvrlan  Import 1,321 

Izates  burled"lu  Palestine lU,  151 

—  receives  Artalianes Ill,  140 

Izirtu  taken  by  Asshurbanl-pal 1,  479 

Jabbok  river  located 11.  142 

Jaghetu  river  in  Media.  11,     6 

Jarmak  river  located  II,  142 

Jars,  Burial,  of  Chaldaja 1,   59 

Jaxartes  river  described II,  289 

Jeholaklm,  king  of  Judah  killed 11,243 

Jerahl  river  located II,  135 

Jerusalem  sacked  by  Chosroes  II ill,  520 

—  taken  by  Nebuchadnezzar II,  244 

Jet— origin  of  Its  name 11,  314 

Jewelry  worn  by  Assyrian  king* 1,  286 

.Jewish  appi'arancc  of  Assyrians 1,  153 

—  Captivity,  Klrst 1,  4.30 

—  CaptlvltV,  Second 1,  443 

~  Captivity,  Third 11.244 

—  giant  sent  to  Tiberias Ill,  2:}1 

—  temple— Its  building  stopped II,  456 

.lews  never  revolted  against  pcrslail,  47,  425 
Jezdlgerd.     See  Isdlgerd. 

Jiihaiincs  defeiitecl  and  recalled Ill,  iV! 

John  the  M<'rcll'iil  llli's  to  Cyprus HI,  520 

Jopna  taken  by  Sennacherib 1,448 

Jordan  rlvi>r  described II,  Ml 

—  Vallev  descrll)ed II.  I2!t 

Joseph,  patriarch,  martyred  In  Persia  III,  408 
Joslah  defeated  by  Neco 11,106 

—  mi>rtallv  wounded II,  241 

Jntapn  maVi  led  to  Alexander HI.  117 

Jovian  makes  treaty  with  Sapor 111,367 

—  proclaline<l  emperor Ill,  3fi4 

Judaism,  changes  occur  In HI,  291 

Jildea  Invaded  liv  Scjinncherlb I,  449,  462 

Judith,  as  a  literary  authority H,  13S 

Jmiijiiina  mound  of  H.'ibylnn II,  179 

Julltui  ttddrv'sscs  lUi>  army  at  Zoltha  HI,  34* 


flB 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Julian  avoids  taking  Cteslphon 111,358 

—  becomes  emperor HI,  343 

—  burns  Anathan Ill,  349 

—  burns  Diaclra       lU,  350 

^  defeats  Meranes  at  Merangea lU,  361 

—  his  military  force Ill,  347 

—  killed  In  battle 111,363 

^  offends  Arsaces,  of  Armenia ill,  340 

^  opens  war  with  Persia lii,  344 

—  passes  the  Tigris Hi,  357 

—  tears  up  a  Persian  message ill,  345 

^  threatens  Constantlus ill,  341 

—  takes  Maogamalcha ill,  354 

—  takes  Perlsabor til,  362 

Jurolpach,  Fortress  of,  Derbend  pass  lii,  4;i3 

Justice,  Court  of,  in  Persia iii,  314 

Justin  becomes  emperor Hi,  4:38 

—  breaks  peace  with  Persia iii,  478 

—  refuses  to  adopt  Chosroes iii,  439 

—  sends  embassy  to  Ziligdes ill,  439 

—  succeeds  Justinian lii,  477 

Justinian  orders  a  new  fortress iii,  Hi 

—  purchases  peace  from  Chosroes  I.  iii,  4t»4 

—  ratifies  the  "Endless  Peace" iii,  451 

—  restores  Martyropolis iii,  442 

—  succeeds  Justin ill,  442 

—  treats  with  the  Axumites iii,  475 

—  general.  Invades  Persian  Armenia  iii,  480 

—  the  general,  takes  command.   ..     .  iii,  480 
Kadislyeh.    See.  Cadesla. 

Kale<l  reduces  Hira Hi,  544 

—  takes  OboUa ill,  544 

Kanats.    See  Irrigating  channels. 

Kapranlsa  taken  by  Assyrians i,  398 

Kaoses  and  his  brothers  slain 111,  449 

Eapotan  Zow  or  Blue  Sea  of  Media. . .    11,     8 

Kar-banlt,  Battle  near i,  477 

Kara-in-das,  king  of  Chaldaea 1,111 

Kargar,  Sargon  victorious  at 1,  4u7 

Karun  river,  the  great  dyke iii,  289 

Kasr  mound  of  Babylon ii,  179 

Katulphus  betrays  the  Ephthalites..  ill,  47(i 

Kawan,  Leather-apron  of Hi,  546 

Kerek  Saideh,  its  length 11,246 

Keresaspa,  an  ancient  hero 11,   58 

Kerkhah  or  Choaspes  river ii,  136 

Kerman.    See  Carmanla. 

Kermanshah,  Sculpture  of ill,  381 

Kettledrums  during  an  onset Hi,  230 

Khabour  river  described 1,  7, 123 

Khalull,  Battle  of 1,  459 

Khammurabi,  king  of  Chaldaea 1,  110 

Khanun  carried  to  Assyria i,  438 

Kharbat  subdued  by  Asshur-banl-pal    i,  479 

Khareg  sends  embassy  to  Sargon i,  442 

Khatoun,  the  Tartar  queen,  captured  111,401 

Khatounlj'eh  lake  described i,  126 

Khatti  defeated  by  Assyrians i,  ;tt4 

Khazar  war  of  Kobad lii,  427 

—  couBtry  overrun  by  Chosroes  I iii,  474 

Khazars  invade  Armenia 111,500 

Khirkl  subdued  by  Assyrians 1,  408 

Khoonazabernl  river ii,  269 

Khorassan,  Narses,  governor  of iii,  401 

Khorsabad  palace  of  Sargon 1,  184,  444 

—  Ruins  of i,  134,  159,  180 

Khosr  river  in  Assyria 1,  ItiS 

Khush-uewaz  ensnares  Persian  army  ill,  418 

—  marries  a  Persian  slave lii,  413 

—  receives  Perozes ill,  410 

Kldarls  or  tiara  of  Persian  kings il,  340 

Klleh-Sherghat,  Ruins  of i,  13;3,  13f> 

Klnalua  occupied  by  Assyrians i,  400 

Kings  of  Assyria,  Tables  of 1,  372,  613 

Kis,  Assyrian  victory  near 1,  447 

Klzil-Uzen  river  in  Media Ii,     6 

Kobad  I.  arrested  and  imprisoned. . .  ill,  430 

—  anxious  about  the  succession lii,  4;i9 

—  called  to  defend  his  frontier iU,  437 

—  censures  Azarethes 111,447 

—  claims  Persian  throne ill.  423 

—  Death  of HI,  447 

—  declares  ■vvar  with  Rome HI,  434 

—  demands  a  Pioman  payment iil»  434 


Kobad  I.,  First  reign  of ill,  426 

—  tiles  to  Ephthalites ill,  431 

—  his  contemporaries Hi,  432 

—  leaves  his  crown  to  ChosroSs Hi,  447 

—  makes  treaty  with  Romans iii,  437 

—  massacres  the  Mazdakltes lii,  440 

—  occupies  Iberia ill,  441 

^  requests  Rome  to  adopt  his  son. . .  ill,  439 

—  retires  upon  Nisibis Hi,  436 

—  Second  reign  of ill,  432 

—  takes  .'Vmida iii,  436 

—  takes  Theodoslopolls ill,  435 

—  victimized  by  a  priest Hi,  429 

Kobad  II   dies  of  grief lU,  5:^8 

—  executes  his  brothers ill,  537 

—  favors  Shahr-Barz Hi,  537 

—  succeeds  Chosroes  II lU,  5:55 

Koushans  checked  by  Smbat ill,  517 

—  def  f-at  Perozes lii,  416 

Koweik  or  river  of  Aleppo il,  1:^8 

Koy  unjlk.  Mound  of 1, 162,  179 

—  Palace  at 1,486 

Kiidriis,  Battle  of H,  462 

Kudur-Lagamer,  Conquests  of 1,106,  116 

Kudur-Mabuk,  of  Chaldcea 1,107 

Kudur-Nakhunta  flies  to  Khldala i,  458 

Kurrl-galzu,  king  of  Chaldsea 1,  111 

Kui'gawai',  the  siteof  Concobar .    11,   17 

Kur  or  Araxes  river, 11,  268 

Kuran  river  located U,  i:55 

Kurdistan,  formerly  called  Cordyene  Hi,  808 

—  identical  with  Zagros 11,     1 

—  ravaged  by  Romans Ill,  496 

Kurdiyeh  assassinates  Bostam 111,  515 

Kurs,  the  Scythian,  ravages  Cordy^n^iii,  482 
—the  Scythian, captures  Persian  camp  ill,  480 
Labienus  captured  and  slain HI,  107 

—  successful  in  Asia  Minor Ill,  106 

Laborosoarchod  succeeds  Nerigllssar   11,  251 

Lachish  Invested  by  Sennacherib 1,  452 

Lagby  an  oi'j  en tal  beverage 1,   23 

Lail6  submits  to  Esar-haddon. 1,  470 

Lake  of  Hems  described 11, 146 

Lake  Van— its  blue  water 11,  291 

Lakes  of  Babylonian  empire 11,  143 

—  of  Persia  Proper n,269;  Hi,  252 

Lakl  subdued  by  Assyrians 1, 1*97 

Land  system  of  Chosroes  I Hi,  485 

Language  of  Assyrians i,  167 

—  Human,  Divisions  of 1,   41 

—  of  the  Chaldseans 1,   41 

—  of  the  Medes ii,    67 

—  of  the  Persians 11,  365 

Lapis  lazuli  of  Persia 11,  314 

Larrak,  or  Larsa,  located 1,   12 

Lazic  warof  541  A.D Hi,  458 

—  of  549  A.D Hi,  -Jfo 

Lazica  assisted  by  Rome lii,  464 

—  occupied  by  Persians 111,  441 

Learning  of  the  Babylonians ii,  259 

Leonidas  defends  Thermopylae 11,  495 

Leontius  defeated  by  Chosroes  II Hi,  518 

Libnah  submits  to  Sennacherib i,  453 

Libyan  desert,  Army  perishes  In  the.    11,  451 

Licelarius  recalled  by  Justin Hi,  442 

Licorice  plant  of  Assyria i,  144 

Lighting  of  Assyrian  palaces 1, 195 

Lilius  im  prisoned  by  Chosroes  II Hi,  518 

Linen  used  for  paper  In  Parthla lii,  238 

Linguistic  testimony  on  Chaldaea 1,   34 

Lion-hunting  in  Assyria 1, 295 

—  of  As.shur-bani-pal 1,  484 

Lions  of  Assyria  described 1,  146 

—  of  Clialdffia  desci'ibed i,   26 

Liquor  made  from  dates ill,  236 

Litauy ,  or  river  of  Tyre  described. . .  11, 1.39 
Locust  plagues  In  Babylonia. .  .11,  160;  lii,  156 

—  of  Media 11,   32 

—  of  Persia  Proper 11,  304 

Locusts,  Two  kinds  of,  in  Persia 11,  304 

Longlmanus.    Sec  Artaxerxes  L 

Lubarna  submits  to  Assyrians I,  400 

Lucialianus  defend  Nisibis HI,  326 

Lullya,  king  of  Sidon,  escapes i,  447 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


719. 


Luluml  subdued  by  Assyrians 1,  892 

Luxury  of  the  Assyrians 1, 157 

—  weakens  each  conquering  power.    11,   39 

Lycanthropy,  a  kind  madness 11, 24'J 

LyciauandCarlan  revolt 11,5(15 

Lyeon  bribed  to  betray  Lydla 11,5(17 

Lydla  Invaded  by  Cyrus  the  Great. . .    11,  1:17 
T-.ydlan  alliance  against  Fersia 11,  '&'i 

—  coalition  against  CyaxaresI 11,  KB 

—  embassy  of  King  GyK»s 1,  47'J 

—  kingdom— Its  antiquity 11,   >« 

—  revolt  of  Pissuthni-s 11,  50? 

Lyres  of  the  Assyrians 1,  'Mi 

I  Ililace  of  the  Assyrians 1,  2(18 

Macedon  submits  to  Darius  Hystaspls  II,  47'J 
Macedonian  envoys  massacred 11,  471) 

—  victory  at  Arbela 11,  .548 

—  victory  on  tlie  Granlcus 11,  6:37 

Macedonians  vlctorlus  at  Issus 11,  539 

MacrlanuB  betrays  the  Koman  army.  Ill,  283 
Macrlnus  becomes  emperor Ill,  204 

—  defeated  at  Nlsibls ill,  201 

Mabog.    See  Hlprapolls. 

Madyes,  the  Scythian,  defeats  Cy ax- 
ares ii,   89 

Magi  of  the  Persian  system li,  425 

—  of  the  Sassanians lil,  58? 

—  or  priesthood  of  Parthia lil,   47 

—  opposed  to  cremation lil,  2(9 

MaKian  convention  In  Persia Ill,  272 

—  jirlcsts  iiiiiHsaiTfd  by  Darius 11,458 

—  supervision  of  taxes ill,  4Ht; 

Maglaus  of  Persia 11,  425 ;  lil,  24"),  270 

—  persecuted  by  Isdlgerd Ill,  88'.) 

Maglsm  dellned li,    m 

Magnlfyiug-glasses  of  Babylon 11,  202 

Magoijhonia  estaljllshed 11,458 

Mahometanlam.  See  Mohammedanism. 

Maka  or  Mycians,  Countr.v  of 11,  279 

MamlgoTiian  family  of  Armenia ill,  4i5 

Manasseh,  Revolt  of  1,  472 

—  taken  to  Babylon 1,  472 

Mandrocles— his  bridge  of  boats 11,478 

Manna  of  Assyria 1,  145 

Manners  of  the  Babylonians 11,  211 

—  of  the  Parthians Hi,   13 

Mani  offers  a  new  creed Hi,  292 

—  put  to  death  by  Varahrau ill,  294 

Manlchteans  persecuted  in  Persia ill,  295 

Manlzeu  betrayed  by  his  daughter. . .  Hi,  280 

Manuel,  the  Armenian,  Death  of Hi,  3tO 

Maoganialcha  taken  by  Julian HI,  ;!5J 

Maranga,  Battle  at Hi,  3»;i 

Marathon,  Battle  of 11,  4K5 

Mardan  made  prefect  of  the  East.  . .  HI,  478 

Mardlans  subdued  by  Phraates  I Ill,    35 

Mardonlus  occupies  Athens 11,  498 

—  n^treats  Into  Asia 11,  4S4 

—  slain  at  Plataea H,  4'.t;i 

Marglan  rebels  reduced  to  submission  11,  4(^1 

Mari/lana,  ailjacent  to  Parthia lil,     (> 

Marriage  and  divorce  in  Persia II,   05 

—  customs  of  Persia 11,3.58 

—  enforced  l)y  Chosroes  1 111,488 

Martes,  the  pretender,  slain II,  4(il 

Martlalls  slays  Caracallus 111,2114 

Martlnus  expellecl  from  Telephis HI,  409 

Martvropolls  betraveil  to  Persians.. .  HI,  49'.l 

—  defended  by  Llttas 111,447 

—  Maruzas  killed  at HI,  r.l9 

—  restored  bv  Justinian Hi,  442 

—  taken  by  Heracllus ill,  .525 

Maruzas  killed  at  MartyropoHs 111.499 

Mashlta  palace  described id,  5i'.)! 

Masonry  of  Assyrian  work.s I.  203 

Massacre  of  Syrian  soldiers HI,   .58 

Massagetag  defeated  by  Cyrus II.  445 

—  described HI.   0<i 

Matynt  taken  by  Assyrians 1,398 

Maurice  becomes  Emperor 111,497 

—  defeats  Adarman HI,  4'.'(! 

—  defeats  Bn<l  slays  Tamchosro lil,  41*7 

—  espouses  enuse  of  ChosroSs  II HI.  ftW 

—  Buuccods  Justinian,  the eeueral...  Ul,  181 


Maurice  murdered  by  Phocas Ill,  518 

—  takes  Slngara lil,  4m1 

Maxindn  succeeds  Severus ill,  288 

Maxlmus  appears  In  Persian  camp. .  HI,  397 

—  defeated  and  slain HI,  179 

MazaresreducesSanllstosubndsslon  II,  438 
Mitzdak  feeds  aflre-altar  by  fraud...  Ill,  429 
Mazdakltes  massacred  by  Chosroes  I  III,  4.50 

—  massacred  by  Kobad Ill,  440 

Meaning  of  Assyrian  nameij 1,508 

Mebarsapes  yields  to  Trajan HI,  n? 

Mebodes  and  Sapoes  enter  Armenia.  HI,  4S1 

—  executed  by  Chosroes  I HI  4,5(J 

—  secures  Cteslphon  for  Chosroes  II.  111,510 

—  takes  Seleucia HI,  5lo 

MechaiHcalartsof  Babylon 11,201 

—knowledge  in  Assyria 1,259 

Medea's  oil  or  naphtha. ill,  4(17 

Medes  attack  Nineveh 1,  4M 

—  expel  the  Scythians 11,   91 

—  Language  of  the 11     i;7 

—  Origin  of  thi' II,   77 

—  their  early  possession  of  Babylon.    11,   78 

—  Writing  practical  among  the 11,   73 

Media,  the  third  monarchy 11, 1-121 

—  Atropaten6.    See  Atropat6u6. 

—  causes  of  Its  overthrow H,  116 

—  Description  of 11,     1 

—  Ethnologyof ||,   36 

—  Hunting,  a  sport  of 11,   43 

—  Invaded  by  (Scythians I,  495  ;    II,    89 

—  Magna  Joined  to  Parthia Ill,   42 

—  Polygamy  In 11,   44 

—  reduced  by  Sargon I,  443 

—  Religion  In 11,    45 

—  Zoology  of II,   29 

Median  alliance  against  Armenia HI,  116 

—  and  Persian  names II,   G9 

—  alphabetic  characters 11,   75 

—  apple  or  citron 11,   34 

—  archers— their  skill H,    40 

—  barbarity  in  conquest 11,    38 

—  battlements  In  seven  colors 11,    13 

—  cities  mentioned H,     9 

—  cities  without  walls II,    12 

—  climate  and  productions 11,  22,    28 

—  costume— Its  richness II,   42 

—  court  splendors H,  loT 

—  dynasty  of  Berosus II,   81 

—  equipment  In  v,-ar II,   40 

—  fictitious  kings.... II,   85 

—  fondness  of  ornament II,  42,  107 

—  Irrigating  system 11,   27 

—  luxury  at  banquets 11,    12 

—  nHlltary  prowess II,   38 

—  mineral  resources 11,   28 

—  monarchy  overthrown II,  113 

—  palace  at  Ecbataua 11,    10 

—  physiognomy II,   .37 

—  profusion  of  flowers II,   28 

—  revolt  against  Darius  Hystaspls. . .    II,  i(>i 

—  type  of  women II,   .'17 

—  weapons  of  warfare II,   41 

—  writing  materials II,   77 

Medians  revoltagalnst  DarlusNothus  II,  510 
Medical  School  founded  by  Persia...  HI,  4Sy 

Medo-I'erslan  empire  founded II,  114 

Megabazusconciuers  Thrace II,  479 

—  goestoSardls 11,480 

Megabyzus  recovers  Babylon  to  Persia  1 1,  487 

—  relieves  Memphis II.  .504 

—  revolts  In  Syria II,  r*5 

Meherdates  lefves  Home  for  Parthia  III,  143 

.Melltene  burnt  bv  Persians 111,480 

Memphis  surremlcrs  to  Cambyses.  . .    II,  419 

—  taki-n  bv  I'.sar-haildon 1,472 

Memnon,  the  Hhodlan,  Death  of II,  838 

—  the  Hhodlan, sent  tothe Hellespont  11.534 

Menagerie  jiark  In  Assyria I,  401 

Menahem  n  ml  I'll  I,  the  Assyrian I,  424 

Ment'.r  honored  for  vlctofv  11,532 

Meraiies  killed  near  Saiiuir'ah Ill,  .IBS 

—  pursues  Julian's  army 111,3(51 

Mercury  or  Ncbo  of  the  orientals.. .  .1,  91,  Sfif 


720 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Verdasas  assassinated iil,  532 

^eruierues,  Deata  of ill,  409 

—  defeated  la  Armenia lii,  444 

—  relieves  Petra iii,  406 

—  takes  Telephls ill,  409 

Merodach,  tlie  Assyrian  god 1,  SoS 

-Merodach-Baladau,  King  of  Babylon.    11,  233 

—  captured  by  Sargon 1,  441 

—  flies  to  an  Island 1, 451 

—  succeeds  Elulaeus 11,  234 

j —  taken  captive il,  236 

[Merodach-belatzu-lkbl  defeated 11,  232 

aierodach-lddln-akhl  accedes 11,  231 

i—  captures  Idols 1,  393 

aierodach-shaplk-zlrl.  Reign  of 11,  231 

iMeroiii  or  Bahr-el-Huleh 11, 140 

iJIeru  overrun  by  barbarians lii,  400 

iMesopotamia,  Description  of 11, 325 

< —  Invaded  by  Eellsarius HI,  441 

,—  Invaded  by  Sapor  I ill,  2»1 

—  ravaged  by  Carus Ill,  298 

—  reduced  by  Trajan iil,  175 

—  Elvers  of 1,     5 

—  traversed  by  Cyrus  the  younger.. .    il,  615 

—  Two  roads  into Hi,  347 

Metal  castings  of  Assyria 1,222 

Metallurgy  of  Chaldaeans 1,   63 

Metals  of  Persian  empire 11,  312 

Metal-work  In  Babylon 11,  202 

Mllir-Hasis  appointed  regent ill,  539 

—  slain  by  Shahr-Barz lii,  540 

Mihr-Narses  sent  to  Armenia Hi,  406 

Miletus  submits  to  Cyrus 11,  439 

—  taken  by  Alexander 11,  537 

—  taken  by  Darius  Hystaspls 11,  483 

Military  dress  of  Babylonians 11, 214 

—  dress  of  Persians 11,  321 

—  organization  in  Assyria 1,  269 

—  power  of  Babylon 11, 107 

—  system  of  Parthla Ill,  225 

—  tactics  of  Sassanlans Ill,  594 

—  usages  of  As-syrlans 1,  241 

Mimetic  art  of  Assyrians i,  210 

—  art  of  Persia 11,412 

—  art  of  Sargon 1,  445 

—  art.    See  also  Bas-reliefs 1,  210 

Mineral  products  of  Assyria 1, 145 

—  products  of  Babylonia 11,  157 

—  products  of  Media 11,    28 

Minerals  of  Chaldaea 1,   25 

—  of  Persia 11,  305,  312 

Mining  as  a  siege  tactic 1,  276 

Mir-aduris  killed  at  Anatho Ill,  509 

—  occupies  Anatho 111,  5(J8 

Miriades,  the  pretending  emperor...  111,283 

—  See  Cyrlades. 

Mlthra.  Worship  dt .  ri,  421,  427 ;  ill,  224,  271,  585 
MithridatesI.,Deathof 111,   40 

—  of  Parthla,  accedes Ill,   33 

Mithrldates  II. ,  Accession  of ill,   69 

—  Death  of ill,   76 

Mithrldates  III.,  accedes Hi,   82 

—  executed  by  Orodes ill,   83 

MlthridatesV.,ofPontus— his  empire  ill,    75 
Mitrobates,  the  governor,  murdered.   11,  464 

Moerls,  Lake,  described 11,  293 

Mohammed,  Death  of ill,  543 

—  succeeded  by  Abu-bekr ill,  543 

Mohammedanism  founded ill,  542 

Monsesos  flees  to  Antony ill,  112 

—  invades  Armenia ill,  155 

Monitors,  or  small  crocodiles 11,  3u6 

Mouobazus  succeeds  Izates ill,  151 

Monophysltes  join  the  Nestorians 111,  490 

Monotheism  versus  idolatry 11,  444 

Mons  Masius,  Region  of 1, 120 

Moon-god  of  the  orientals 1,  81,  350 

Moors  subdued  by  Bellsarlus lii,  451 

Moseilama  opposes  Abu-bekr Ill,  543 

Mound  of  Nebbi  Yunus 1,  470 

Mounds  of  Babylonia 11, 178 

-  of  Hillah 1,477 

Moushegh  rules  in  Armenia ill,  379 

■Stoviuij  of  stone  block* i«^ 


Mughelr,  Temple  of 1,   S2 

Mules  used  in  Babylonia 11, 160 

Slulita,  the  oriental  deity 1,  77,  350 

Murgab.    See  Pasargadse. 

Music  in  Parthian  feasts ill,  236 

—  of  the  Babylonians 11,  221 

Musical  instruments  of  Assyria. 1,305 

—  instruments  of  Persia Hi,  593 

Musiclansof  the  Assyrians 1,  311 

Muskai  or  Mosclilans  subdued 1,  383 

Musr  in  Kurdistan  conquered 1,  385 

Mustacon  defeated  and  recalled Ill,  497 

Mutaggll-Nebo,  Accession  of 1,  380 

Mycale,  Persians  defeated  at 11,  600 

Mylltta,  the  Assyrian  deity 1,  350 

Mythology  of  Assyrians 1,  344 

—  ofChaldeea 1,   72 

—  of  Zoroastranism U,  63,  58,  423 

—  studied  in  Assyria 1,  238 

Nabedes  defeats  the  Romans lU,  4iiz 

Nabonadlus  defeated  by  Cyrus  the' 

Great 11,  254 

—  made  king  of  Babylon U,  251 

—  strengthens  Babylon 11,  253 

—  surrenders  to  Cyrns 11,  257 

Nabonassar,  king  of  Babylon 11,  233 

Nabopolassar,  as  a  peace-maker 11,  240 

—  betrays  Assyria 1,499 

—  Death  of 11,241 

Nachoragan  falls  totalie  Phasls Hi,  471 

—  punished  for  failure  111,472 

—  succeeds  Mermeroes Hi.  470 

Nadlus  succeeds  Nabonassar 11,  234 

Nahld-Marduk  submits  to  Esar-haddon  1,  469 

Nahr-el-Kelb  tablet 1,471 

Nairiagaln  subdued 1,398 

—  tribes  defeated  by  Assyrians 1,384 

Nakhsh-i-Rustam,  Tower  of il,  407 

Names,  Babylonian,  Meaning  of II,  262 

—  of  Assyrian  kings,  Meaning  of 1,  508 

—  of  Babylonian  temples U,  230 

—  Persian  and  Median II,   69 

Naua  or  Ishtar,  the  Oriental  Venus.  .1,  90,  356 

Naram-SIn,  king  of  Chalda;a 1, 108 

Narses  abdicates  Persian  throne Ill,  312 

—  ascends  the  throne 111,  301 

—  concludes  a  treaty  with  Diocletian  111,307 

—  defeated  by  Ardaburius lii,  ,395 

—  defeats  Bellsarlus Hi,  441 

—  defeats  Galerius ill,  3(13 

—  madw  governor  of  Khorassan ill,  401 

—  occupies  Edessa ill,  618 

—  retires  Into  Nisibls Hi,  395 

—  sent  to  the  East  by  Maurice ill,  60^ 

—  subdues  Armenia iil,  802 

Naval  service  of  Persians 11,  333 

Navigation  of  the  Assyrians 1,  313 

Navy  of  Xerxes  I U,  488 

Nazl-bugas  deposed  and  killed 1,  111 

Nebbl-Yunus,  Mound  of 1, 162,  476 

Nebo,  the  oriental  Mercury 1,  91,  357 

Nebo-bel-suml  joins  the  Elamltes 1, 481 

—  takes  his  own  life" I,  482 

Nebo-zirzi-sldl    defeated  by  Esar- 
haddon  1. 469 

Nebuchadnezzar,  Accession  of 11,  242 

—  Character  of 11,247 

—  Death  of H,  219 

—  defeats  Neco H,  106,  241 

—  Dream  of 11,  249 

—  Inscription  of U,  260 

—  Invades  Egypt 11,  245 

—  Palace  of H,  178 

—  Belgnof 11,231 

—  takes  Jerusalem 11,  244 

—  takes  Tyre 11,244 

—  Worksbuiltby 11,246 

Neco  defeats  Josiah 11, 106,  240 

Nectanebo  defeats  the  Persians 11,  529 

—  overthrown  by  Ochus 11, 531 

Nehavend  taken  by  Arabs Ill,  558 

Nergal,  the  oriental  Mars 1, 89,  a'io 

Nerigllssar,  Palace  of 11,  250 

,ri8UCceedB  E vll-Merodach 11,  230 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


^21 


Vero  entertains  Tlrldates HI,  161 

—  Impersonated  by  an  Impostor ill,  168 

Neyrlz  Lake  In  Persia II,  269 ;  111,  252 

NlcStas  flies  to  Cyprus ill,  520 

Niffer,  Ruins  of,  located 1,   U 

Nik6  marries  son  of  lleraclius Ill,  5:J9 

NUchor  made  Rovernor  of  Armenia. .  ill,  423 

Nile,  Persian  Interest  in  the 11,  286 

Ntmrod,  Successors  of 1, 101 

Nlmrnd.    See  Calah. 

Nin,  the  god  Saturn 1,  85,  353 

Nina-paia-zlra,  of  Assyria 1,  380 

Nineveh  definitely  located 1, 132 

—  Description  of 1,  158 

—  First  Median  expedition  against.,    il,   86 

—  flooded  by  the  Tigris 11,  95 

—  overthrown  by  the  Medes 1,  500 

—  Persian  generals  killed  near Ill,  53ii 

—  Population  of 1,  164 

—  Siege  and  Capture  of II,   9:i 

—  Size  of,  estimated 1,161;  il,  ITl 

—  taken  by  Cyaxares  1 11,  93,  239 

—  Walls  of 1, 164 

Nisasa,  a  subdivision  of  Media 11,     8 

Nlseean  horses  of  Media 11,   34 

Nlsibis  again  taken  by  Sapor  L Ill,  283 

—  approached  by  Belisarlus lii,  4tKJ 

—  Battle  of,— Romans  defeated ill,  204 

^  deserts  cau.se  of  Bahram 111.  508 

—  In  a  state  of  siege HI,  192 

—  recovered  by  Tlmeslthens Ill,  281 

—  surrendered  to  Persia  by  treaty.. .  lii,  368 

—  taken  by  Lucius  Quietus lit,  1T9 

—  taken  by  Odenathus lii,  287 

—  taken  by  Sapor  I lii,  281 

—  the  third  siege lii,  .326 

—  threatened  by  Celer lii,  437 

—  thrice  repela  Sapor  II Ill,  822,  323,  327 

Nisroch,  the  Assyrian  deity 1,  SCO 

Nitetis  sent  as  wife  to  Canibyses H,  448 

Nohodares,  the  Persian,  killed Ill,  363 

Nomad  races  threaten  Parthla lii,   66" 

Noman  takes  Nehavend Ill,  5.58 

Notes  to  Assyrian  monarchy 1,631 

—  to  Chaldiean  monarchy 1,  515 

Numerals  of  Persian  language 11,  37 1 

Numerian  becomes  emperor Ill,  2'.tJ 

Numl  conquered  by  Assyrians 1,  397 

Numismatics,  Sassanian 111,276 

Nur-Vul,  king  of  Chaldaja 1,  110 

Nushizad  seizes  the  Persian  crown. .  ill,  491 
Obbane,  Persians  pass  Euphrates  at.  Ill,  457 
Obelisk  of  black  marble 1.412 

—  of  wliite  stone,  Assyrian 1,  4U5 

Obelisks  of  As.syria 1,  169 

Obolla  taken  by  Kaled 111,544 

Ochus  murders  Sogdianus 11,  506 

—  See  Artaxerxes  III. 

Octavlan  receives  Tlrldates 111,118 

Odenathus  assassinated llli  288 

—  harasses  the  Persian  army Hi,  285 

—  passes  the  Kupiirates Ill,  287 

Odors  of  Persian  perfumery 11,  343 

Officers  of  Persian  courts 11.  '144 

Olymplas  scut  as  wife  to  Arsaces —  lii,  329 

Opis,  the  town,  described II.  1<7 

Oriental  plane-tree  of  Media 11,   26 

Ormazd,  the  Zoroastrian  deity 

11,420;  ill,  22:J,  270,  581 
Orodes  and  Pompey  correspond Ill,  10.J 

—  assassinated  by  his  son ill.  UO 

—  laments  his  son  Pacorus HI.  HO 

—  the  Parthian  peneral 1(1.   52 

—  successful  in  Armenia. I'l.   !W 

Orodes  L,  made  king  of  Parthla. ill.   8:1 

Orodes  II.,  Accession  of HI.  1^ 

Oroetes,  governor  of  Sardls,  executed  11,  4(i,2 

Orontes  bribed  by  Persian  gold 11.527 

Orontes,  Mount  In  Media H,     9 

Orontes  river  described H.  138 

Osaces,  the  general,  idlled HI,  101 

Ostrogoths  possess  A.sia  Minor HI,  .W 

Otanes  succeeds  Megabazus 11,  4hO 

-  the  I'ersian  noble H.  <5'J 


Outrages  of  Cambysps  In  Egypt 11,  452 

Overthrow  of  Babylonian  empire 11,  237 

—  of  Assyrian  empire 1,  500;  II,  93,  2.39 

—  of  Chaldaian  empire 1, 118,  37tf 

—  of  Median  empire II,  113 

—  of  Parthian  euiplre 111,210 

—  of  Persian  empire H,&18 

—  of  Sassanian  empire 111,557 

Oxus  crossed  by  barbarians HI.  400 

Oxus  river,  as  a  Persian  stream 11,  2.s8 

Pacorus,  of  Parthla,  Death  of HI,  169 

—  slain  In  battle Hi,  las 

—  summoned  to  Parthla ill,  li  2 

—  succeeded  by  Chosroes HI,  170 

—  succeeds  Volagases  I HI,  163, 168 

Pactyas  heads  revolt  of  Sardls H,  438 

Padan-Aram  located 1, 1.30 

Paddlrl  conquered  by  Assyrians 1,479 

Padl,  expelled  from  Ekron 1,  448 

—  restored  by  Sennacherib 1,  449 

Pseoniaus  transported  to  Persia. Il,  4T9 

Paetus  defeated  the  Parthians Hi,  l.Vi 

—  enters  Armenia HI,  1.57 

—  Invades  Commagen6 Hi,  166 

Palace  at  Cteslphon  descrliied HI,  553 

—  at  Ecbatana II,   10 

—  at  Hatra  described 111,213 

—  at  Istakr II,  4t)3 

—  at  Susa  in  Persia 11,401 

—  lighting  and  roofing 1, 192 

—  of  Asshur.-hanl-pal 1,  486 

—  of  Asshur-lzlr-pal 1,  403 

—  of  Babylon H,  174,  lil3 

—  of  Darlus-Hystaspls II,  .388 

—  of  Esar-hadilon 1,  474 

—  of  Nerl^llssar II,  2.J0 

—  of  PersepoHs,  Great 11.382 

—  of  Sargon 1,  184,444 

—  of  Sennacherib 1,181,462 

—  of  Shalmanczer  11 1,  411 

Palace-roof  of  sapphires Ill,  2:!3 

Palaces,  Architecture  of  Babylonian.    11,  19;i 

—  of  Assyrians 1.  179 

—  of  the  Persians 11.381 

—  of  the  Sassanlans 111,564 

Palash.    See  Balas Ill,  421 

Palestine,  Climate  of 11,  15.3 

—  described II,  129 

—  entered  by  Chosroes  II ill,  520 

—  Invaded  by  Assyrlan.s I,  4(«),  448 

—  reduced  by  Nebuchadnezzar 11.  214 

Pallacopas  canal  of  Mesopotamia II.  247 

Palmyren<5,  or  the  Syrian  desert 11, 1:13 

I'antheon  of  the  Assyrians I.  .341 

—  of  the  Chalda»ans 1,   71 

Papremis,  Persians  defeated  near. . .    II,  W3 

Papyrus  or  byblus  of  Egypt 11,811 

Para  executes  two  traitors 111,  874 

Parasol-bearers  of  Persia HI.  600 

Parasol  of  the  Persian  court 11.340 

Parchment  used  in  Assyria 1,  170 

Parmenlo.  a  general  at  Arbela. It.  .M8 

Parthla,  the  sixth  monarchy HI,  l-'i40 

—  and  Rome  at  pe>iee 111,164 

—  and  Rome  compared H1.2;fi) 

—  invaded  by  thoDahsB HI.  151 

Parthian  fvs'thetie  art 111,222 

—  and  Roman  tactics  compared HI,  1H> 

—  architecture Ill,  212 

—  attitude  to  women 111,2(2 

—  cavalry  described HI,  90 

—  contempt  of  Crassus Ill,   80 

—  costume  of  kings 111.  232 

—  court  customs HI,   51 

—  court  splen<lor Ill,  2:U 

—  empire  overthrown HI,  210 

—  habltof  Intemperance 111,2.351 

—  history.  Dark  period  of HI,   77 

—  hunting  habits HI.  2:« 

—  Infantry  secondary 111,226 

—  Institutions HI,   47 

—  Invasion  of  Syria 111.106 

—  marriage  customs HI.  2.37 

--  mildness  toward  Persia 1I1,2U 


722 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Parthian  military  system Ill,  225 

—  nobles— their  dignity Ill,  234 

—  princes  In  Rome ill,  119 

—  procession  to  Rome Ill,  161 

—  respect  for  embassies Ill,  231 

—  religious  belief Ill,  223 

—  toleration  In  religion  ill,  2:38 

—  trade  and  exports Ill,  238 

Parthlans  defeated  by  Darius  Hys- 

taspls 11,  4G3 

—  do  not  oppose  Severus Ill,  19? 

—  Early  mention  of  the HI,     8 

—  had  no  literature ill,  238 

—  In  control  of  western  Asia.  Ill,  106 

—  practiced  cremation ill,  246 

—  surrender  the  Roman  trophies ill,  118 

—  understood  other  languages ill,  237 

—  vanquished  at  Hormuz ill,  21U,  2(iO 

—  victorious  at  Nisibls ill,  204 

Parthamaslris  suggested  as  king HI,  174 

Parthamaspates  made  Icing ill,  179 

Parvlz.    See  Chosroes  II Ul,  502 

Parysatls  poisons  queen  Statira ii,  528 

—  wife  of  Darius  Nothus 11,507 

Pasargadae-,  Astyages  defeated  at  11,  114,  432 

—  Ruins  at 11,402 

—  the  early  capital 11,  270 

Patena  country  entered  by  Assyrians    i,  400 
Patricius  besieges  Amida ill,  437 

—  destroys  800  Ephthalites   ill,  436 

Pausanlas   assassinates  Philip  of 

Macedon 11,  533 

Peace  of  Antalcidas  concluded II,  524 

—  of  CalUas  concluded 11,  5u5 

Pearls  of  the  Persian  Gulf 1,  322 

—  valued  in  Persia 11,  356 

Pedo,  M.  Virglllanus,  kiUed ill,  176 

Pekan  subdued  by  Assyrians i,  430 

Pelopldas,  embassador  to  Susa 11,  526 

Peluslum,  Death  of  Assyrian  soldiers  at  1,  454 

—  Plague  breaks  out  at ill,  462 

—  taken  by  Chosroes  II Hi,  520 , , 

People  of  Babylonia 11, 162 

Peoples  transplanted  by  conquerors. 

1,443;  11,245 

Perfumery  of  the  Persians Ii,  343 

Perlnthus  repulses  Philip  of  Macedon   11,  532 

Perlsabor  taken  by  Julian iii,  352 

Perozes  declared  king ill,  412 

—  defeated  by  Bellsarius ii  1,  444 

—  defeated  by  Koushans ill,  415 

—  does  homage  to  the  Ephthalites. . .  Ill,  414 

—  flies  to  the  Ephthalites ill,  410 

—  perishes  in  a  ditch Hi,  419 

—  persecutes  the  Christian ill,  414 

—  reattacks  the  Ephthalites ill,  417 

—  recovers  Albania ill,  412 

Persarmenla  Invaded  by  Bellsarius. .  ill,  441 

—  Romans  driven  from Ill,  462 

Persecution  adopted  in  Persia ill,  273 

—  of  Christians  by  Sapor  II Ul,  318 

PersepoUs,  Great  palace  of 11,  382 

—  Pillared  Halls  at 11,394 

—  the  second  capital 11,  270 

Persia,  the  Fifth  Monarchy U,  266-550 

—  Architecture  In 11,379 

—  Capital  cities  of 11,270 

—  Chief  districts  of II,  271 

—  described 11,  267 

—  divided  into  four  provinces ill,  484 

—  Eating  and  drinking  in 11,  356 

—  extent  of  the  empire 11,  260 

—  First  king  of— Achaemenes H,  431 

—  Lakes  of U,  2G9,  291 

—  secure  against  India 11, 296 

—  "Seven  Princes  "of 11,350 

--  Ten  tribes  of 11,  355 

—  Zoroastrianism  in 11,  420 

Persia  Proper,  Climate  of H,  298 

—  infested  vrlth  scorpions 11,  304 

—  Its  animals II,  302 

—  Its  birds 11,302 

-^Its  fruits H,  302 

—  Us  Insects H,  301 


Persia  Proper,  its  locusts 11,  30< 

—  Its  minerals 11,  30a 

—  its  precious  stones 11,  806 

—  its  reptiles 11,303 

—  its  trees 11,302 

—  paid  no  tribute 11,  468 

—  Population  of II,  360 

—  Products  of H,  301 

Persian  alliance  with  Sparta H,  509 

—  altars  of  sacriflce 11,  422 

—  and  Median  names 11,   69 

—  Antloch  built  near  Ctesiphon Hi,  458 

—  architecture.  Peculiarities  of 11,  40S 

—  army  perishes  In  the  desert ii,  461 

—  bridges  of  boats ii,  336 

—  cavalry  service ii,  322 

—  chariots  described II,  324 

—  coin  types U,417 

—  commissariat  service II,  3.32 

—  contempt  for  trade 11,  361 

—  court  etiquette il,  351 

—  court,  Eunuchs  of  the 11,348 

—  court  furniture ii,  345 

—  Court  life H,  338 

—  court  officers 11,344 

—  criminal  code 11,  364 

—  defensive  armor il,  322 

—  devotion  to  their  kings U,  320 

—  dice-playing II,  352 

—  encampments II,  331 

—  famine  under  Perozes Hi,  4U 

—  fleet  seizes  Cythera 11,524 

—  gem  engraving 11,  413 

—  gold  bribes  the  Greeks II,  508 

—  government  of  Darius  Hystaspls.  11,  466 

—  host  surveyed  by  Xerxes  1 11,  492 

—  Intemperance  common 11,  857 

—  kings  as  InfaUlble H,  338 

—  kings  carving  wood il,  .353 

—  kings.  Costume  of 11,339 

—  kings  Illiterate H,  353 

—  kings  on  battle-flelds H,  328 

—  kings.  Tombs  of 11,354,404 

—  language  and  writing 11, 366,  378 

—  line  of  march H,  329 

—  love  of  truth 11,318 

—  Magophonia  founded 11,  458 

—  marriage  customs 11,   85 

—  military  dress 11,  321 

—  military  officers H,  327 

—  mimetic  art ii,  412 

—  naval  service 11,  833 

—  naval  tactics 11,  337 

—  numerical  strength ii,  328 

—  palaces  described 11,  381 

—  parasol  bearers 11,  342 

—  peace  with  Greece ii,  505 

—  perfumes  described II,  343 

—  personal  adornment 11,  418 

—  plague  in  time  of  Kobad  II ill,  538 

—  post-houses  established H,  473 

—  practice  of  non-burial ill,  441 

—  processional  scenes 11,  415 

—  punishments  named 11,  363 

—  rescripts  ol)tained  for  Greece 11,  526 

—  revolts  against  Darius  Hystaspls. .  ii,  460 

—  royal  amusements II,  351 

—  royal  charioteers U,  341 

—  seragUos  described 11,346 

—  siege  tactics 11,  327 

—  sons,  Education  of 11,  358 

—  sympathy  for  the  Jews 11,  47,  425 

—  taxation  of  satrapies 11,  469, 

—  territory.  Nations  of 11,  2741 

—  throne  described 11,  340 

—  toilet  customs 11,  361 

—  tribute  from  Mesopotamia 1,   81 

—  war  tactics 11,  825' 

—  weakness.  Revelation  of II,  521 

—  wine  and  fruits Ill,  253 

—  women,  Seclusion  of U,  349 

—  See  also  Sassanian.  '    ' 
Persian  empire.  Beginning  of !'•  ^ 

—  Citiesof ,.  U,,^ 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


72S 


Persian  Empire,  Decay  of 11,527 

—  Dlvlslonsof 11,  2rit5 

—  Its  animals 11,  307 

—  Us  birds 11,  :«7 

—  its  gems II,  iiU 

—  Its  minerals 11,312 

—  Its  products 11,  30fi,  310 

—  its  reptiles 11,308 

—  Neighbors  of 11,  294 

—  overthrown  at  Arbela 11,  518 

—  Rivers  of 11,286,200 

—  Six  great  rivers  of  11,  280 

—  New.    See  Sassanlan. 

Persians  borrowed  certain  vices 11,  362 

—  burned  Greek  temples II ,  424 

—  capture  Babylon il,  257 

—  conclude  Peace  of  Antalcidas 11,  524 

—  defeated  at  Issus 11,  539 

—  camp  and  pavilion  lost  at  Issus II,  541 

—  defeated  In  Lazlea Ill,  KiG 

—  defeated  at  Marathon II,  485 

—  defeated  at  Mycal6 11,  500 

—  defeated  at  Plataea 11,500 

—  defeated  at  Salamis II,  497 

—  defeated  by  Inarus 11,  503 

—  Ethnology  of 11.815 

—  gave  quarter  to  enemies 11,  332 

—  not  scientific 11,419 

—  Old  and  New,  compared 111,25') 

—  pillage  Sardls 11,437 

—  routed  on  the  Granlcus 11,  537 

—  tolerant  to  Jews. 11,   48 

—  Warlllce  character  of 11,  318,  320 

Pestilence  in  army  of  Casslus Ill,  187 

Petra  besieged  by  Daglsthaeus Ill,  4t;fi 

—  in  Lazlea  taken  by  Bessas Ill,  468 

—  In  Lazlea  taken  bv  ChosroSs  I HI,  459 

—  taken  by  Asshur-banl  pal 1.  484 

Petroleum  found  In  Chaldwa 1,25,  HO 

Phseak  sent  to  Heraclius Ill,  .535 

Pharandzem  taken  prisoner  by  Sa- 
por II  111,373 

Pharasmanes,  the  Iberian  takes  the 

field 111,131 

Pharnabazus  quarrels  with  Iphlcrates  II,  526 

Pharnaces  of  Cappadocla 11,  431 

Phasls  lost  by  the  Persians ill,  471 

Pherochanes,  the  general,  murdered  HI,  501 
Philip  of  Macedon  assassinated II,  533 

—  repulsed  from  Perlnthus U,bSi 

Philip  succeeds  Gordlan  as  emperor  111,  282 
PhlUpplcus  replaced  by  Comentlolus  111,  499 

—  victorious  at  Solachon ill,  498 

Philistines    subdued  by  Tlglath- 

Pileser  II 1,430 

Philology,  Comparative,  in  Assyria. .     1,  2:« 

—  of  Median  names It,    69 

Philosophy  studied  by  Chosroes  L. . .  HI.  489 
Phllostratus  describes  palaceat  Baby- 
lon   HI,  233 

Phocas  succeeded  by  Heraclius Ill,  519 

—  succeeds  Maurice HI.  518 

Phoenicia  reduced  by  Alexander 11,  543 

—  reduced  by  Shalmanezer  IV 1,  433 

Phoenicians  as  merchants il,  128 

—  defeated  off  Salamis 11,  ,504 

—  rebel  against  Persia 11.  529 

—  refuse  to  attack  Carthage 11,  450 

"  submit  to  Assyrians I,  400 

—  submit  to  Caiiibyses 11,  449 

—  take  the  prize  for  sailing II,  491 

I'hraataces  deposed  and  slain ill,  125 

—  poisons  his  father HI.  121 

Phraates  I.,  of  Parthla HI,   :i5 

Phraates  II.,  Accession  of HI.   53 

Phraates  III.,  Accession  of HI.   80 

—  assassinated HI.   82 

Phraates  IV.,  Character  of 111.121 

—  poisoned  by  his  wife HI.  121 

—  succeeds  Orodes  I 111.  1 10 

Phrantos.  the  prince,  dies  in  Syria. . .  HI,  130 

I'Uraortes  defeated  bv  .\ssyrlans I,  V.>\ 

Phthasuarsas  favored  bv  Maf.dakltes  HI.  410 
PhyslcRl  characteristics  of  Chaldoeaus  1,   ;;,j 


Physiognomy  of  Medians 11,  S7 

—  of  the  Persians U,  316 

Pigments  of  Assvrian  coloring 1,  230 

—  of  Ihrl'.alivlnnlans 11.201 

Pillared  Hulls  at  I'eisepolls 11,  394 

Pissuthnes  executed  forrebelUon II,  ,507 

—  revolts  against  Persia  il,  505 

Pistachlo-uut  of  Assyria 1,  144 

Pltane,  Siege  of,  raised 11,  5:« 

Plague  breaks  out  at  Peluslum Ill,  462 

—  ravages  Persia  \inder  Kobad III.  .5;W 

Plancts,Col()rsa>sigu<-dt(),lnBabylim  II.  191 

Platoea.  I'ersiaiis  <lereated  at II.  .500 

Plateau.  Pei-slan,  Nations  of  the 11,275 

Platform  of  the  PersepoUs  Palace. . .    11,383 

Plowing  In  Babylonia II.  220 

Poly  crates  of  Samos,  put  to  death...    11,464 
Polygamy,  a  law  of  Parthia Hi,  2;t7 

—  in  Media il.   44 

—  in  Persia 11.358 

Polytheism  In  Assyria i,  342 

—  InChaldaea 1,   70 

Pompey  hesitates  to  attack  Parthla.  Hi,   81 

Population  of  Persia  Proper 11,  .360 

Post  houses  of  Darius  Hystaspls 11,  473 

Pottervof  the  Assvrlans i,  2;il 

—  of  the  Babylonians  11.203 

—  of  the  Chalda?ans 1,  60 

Prei'lousstoneslmported  by  Assyrians  I,  322 

—  of  Babylonian  empire il,  157 

—  of  Media 11.   35 

—  of  Persia H,  306.  314 

Prexaspcs  exonerates  himself il,  452 

Pride  of  the  Babylonians H,  168 

Priests,  Dress  of,  in  Babylon U,  214 

—  of  Babylon H,  218 

Princes  sent  as  hostages 11,  4.S2 

Probus  receives  Chosroes  II 111,507 

—  Slcorius  as  Roman  envoy Ill,  3U6 

Procoplus  as  an  authority 111.432 

—  commands  under  Julian HI.  .'148 

—  sent  against  Varahrau HI.  .396 

Productions  of  Assyria i,  143,  325 

—  of  Babylonia 11,164 

—  of  Chiildaea 1.   22 

—  of  Media H,   26 

—  of  Persia  Proper H,  .301 

Propvlieaat  PersepoUs H,  393 

Provinces  of  Persian  empire H,  267 

—  of  Western  Persia 11,  281 

Provincial  cities  of  Babylon II,  147 

Psamatlk  I.  takes  Ashdod il,  105 

Psainmenltus  executed  by  Persians.    11,  451 

—  vancnHshed  bv  t'ainliyses 11,449 

Psammetlchus  lihirales  Egypt 1.483 

—  succeeded  by  Neco II,  240 

Ptolemy  Eueruetes.lnvaslon  into  Asia  ill,   27 

Ptolemy's  Canon,  Weaknessof 11.  204 

Pul.  the  Scriptural  Assyrian....!,  423;   11,  383 

Puleheria,  Intrigues  of Ill,  387 

Punishments  In  Persia II,  .364 

Punjab  region  acquired  by  Persia...    11,  4. j 
PuraudoclitbecomesQucenof  Persia  ill,  fM 

—  sister  of  Kobad  II '"•  S2 

T>urn!i-pnrlvas,  King  of  Chaldsea..  .1,  111,  377 
Pyl.-B  Casj)lre.    See  Caspian  Gates. 

PyUe  CllleliP,  passed  by  Cyrus  the 

younger !','  ™ 

Quarter  given  by  Persians ')•  22j 

—  seldom  gniiifrd  by  Assyrians 1,272 

Quartz  found  in  Media '!•  ™ 

Queen,  Assyilan,  Costume  of 1,288 

(5ueen-Mother  at  Persian  court 11,348 

Queen  I'urandocht  of  Pirsla HI.  .540 

Queens  of  Persia,  Power  of 11.  ;M6 

Queens,  their  status.  In  Parthla HI.  2:13 

Quivers  and  hows  of  Assyria i.  264 

QuniMuikh  defeated  by  Assyrians....     1,  3^ 

Ra,  the  Chaldienn  deity I.   78 

Races  In  Persian  territory II.  274.  288 

Haftsof  the  Assyrians i.  3U 

UukM.  in  Media.     .SV<;  Khages.  ..   „„, 

l{anis<if  I  lie  Persian  navy 11.  W5 

Raplkh,  Battle  of U*K 


'724' 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Raza  taken  by  Sennacherib '. 1,  458 

KebelUon  punished  severely 1,  503 

Eeeds  of  great  height  In  Chaldsea....     1,   25 

Regatta  ordered  by  Xerxes  1 11, 492 

Eel,  Persian  defeat  at 111,658 

Religion  of  Assyrians 1,  341 

—  of  Babylonians 11, 169.  224 

—  of  ChaldEeans 1,   70 

—  oftheMedes 11,   45 

—  of  theParthlans 111,223 

—  of  the  Persians 11,  420 

' —  of  the  Sassanlans Hi,  579 

—  of  the  Scythians 1,  494 

' — the  parent  of  architecture 1,   48 

i  Reptiles  of  Babylonia 11, 160 

,— of  Media  IJ,   31 

1—  of  Persia  Proper 11,303 

'  —  of  Persian  empire 11,  308 

Resurrection  of  the  body— origin  of 

belief 11,   57 

Retreat  of  Ten  Thousand  Greeks it,  521 

Revenue  of  the  Persian  crown 11,  470 

Rezln,  of  Damascus  slain 1,  430 

Rhadamlstis  kills  Mlthrldates Ill,  150 

Rhages,  a  city  of  Media 11,  9,   14 

Rhaglana,  a  subdivision  of  Media...    11,     8 

Rhazates  slain  near  Nineveh lii,  530 

Rhodes  submits  to  Chosroes  II lii,  521 

Rhoeteum,  Callas  retires  Into 11,  535 

Rivers  of  Eastern  Assyria 1, 12,^ 

—  as  property  of  the  Persian  crow^n. .    11,  470 

—  of  Media 11,2,     5 

—  of  Mesopotamia 1,     6 

—  ofParthla Ill,     3 

—  of  Persia  Proper 11,  268 

—  of  Persian  empire 11,  290 

—  of  the  Babylonian  empire 11, 134 

—  Six  great,  of  Persian  empire . .    11,  286 

Robes  and  draperies  of  Assyria 1,  237 

Rodosaces,    the    Saracen,    harasses 

Julian 111,351 

Roman  alliances  with  Armenia lii,  829 

—  army  trapped  at  night ill,  325 

—  embassy  visits  Turkish  court Ill,  447 

~  garrisons  massacred  by  Artaxlas.  lii,  117 

—  retreats  disastrous Hi,  228 

—  soldiers  enervated  In  the  East Hi,  262 

Romans  and  Lazi  defeat  the  Persians  lii,  H'lH 

—  begin  Asiatic  conquest Ill,   74 

—  cross  the  Araxes Ill,  115 

—  cut  to  pieces  at  Singara lii,  325 

—  defei^ted  byZenobia. lii,  2S'8 

—  defeated  near  Amida Ill,  8.S3 

—  march  to  Praaspa ill,  114 

—  massacred  In  Mesopotamia Hi,  192 

—  retreat  under  Alexander  Severus.  HI,  266 

—  retreat  under  Julian Hi,  361 

—  under  Bessas  take  Petra Hi,  468 

—  under  Crassus  defeated  by  Par- 

thlans IH.   97 

—  victorious  at  Sura Hi,  187 

Rome  and  Parthla  compared Hi,  239 

—  concludes  the  "Efidless  Peace"...  Ui,  450 

Roofing  of  Assyrian  Palaces 1, 193 

Ropes  made  of  date-palm  fiber 1,   23 

Rosas  kills  Zadesprates 111,509 

Roses  of  every  shade  in  Media 11,   28 

Roxana  hewn  In  pieces li,  510 

Royal  costume  in  Babylon li,  213 

—  house  of  the  Sassanlans ill,  599 

—  River  constructed 11,246 

Rumla  peopled  by  captives lii,  488 

Rustam  appointed  to  command ill,  545 

—  attacks  Cadesia Hi,  517 

—  crosses  Euphrates Ill,  548 

—  slain  by  Hillal Hi,  551 

Sa'ad  appointed  to  command Ill,  548 

—  takes  Cteslphon Ill,  553 

—  takes  Hoi  wan 111,6.54 

Sabaces  slain  at  Issus 11,  511 

Sabakhah  lake  descrfbed 11, 1 13 

Saeaa  invade  Parthla ill,  1.51 

KacADS  conquered  by  Cyrus 11,  440 

Sp.!?3«6ije, an  Armenian  province.. ;>     1,496 


SacrlfldSs  of  Assyrian  worship 1,  36J 

—  of  Zoroastrlanism 11,    69 

Sagahassus  taken  by  Alexander 11,  688 

Sagartla,  adjacent  to  Parthla lii,     7 

Sagartian  rebel  crucified li,  468 

Saga  rtians,  a  nomadic  race, ii,   21 

—  of  Persia 11,  274 

Saif  killed  by  his  body-guard lii,  478 

Saint  James,  of  Nlslbis Hi,  322,  328 

Sajur  river  located 11, 137 

Salamis,  Battle  of T....    11,497 

—  besieged  by  Piribazus 11,  525 

Salban,  Persians  defeated  at ill,  625 

Salt  abundant  in  Persia 11,  313 

—  and  saline  springs  in  Media Hi,   29 

Samarah,  Battle  near lii,  .362 

Samaria  reduced  by  Shalmanezer  IV.     1,  4.33 

—  reduced  by  Tiglath-Pileser  II 1,  430 

—  taken  by  Sargon 1,  4.36 

Samaritans  stop  building  of  Temple.    H,  456 

Samarkand  taken  by  Dizabul ill,  477 

Sammuramlt.    See  Semiramls. 

Samoa  revolts  against  Persia 11,  505 

San,  the  Chalda?an  deity 1,   H2 

Sana,  Church  built  at Hi,  475 

Sanatroeces,  Death  of ill,   80 

—  the  octogenarian,  accedes lii,   78 

Sand  drifts  of  Chaldaea  1,   19 

Sandii  arra  executed  for  revolt 1,  468 

Sanitation  of  Zoroastrlanism..  11,   CI 

Sapoes  lays  waste  Armenia ill,  481 

Sapor  I.,  Accession  of Ill,  279 

—  captures  Antioch lii,  281 

—  checked  at  Emesa lii,  281 

—  Death  of Hi,  292 

—  defeated  by  Odenathus lii,  288 

—  defeated  near  Resaina ill,  281 

—  executes  daughter  of  Manlzen Hi,  280 

—  his  father's  advice lii,  274 

—  his  memorial  sculptures lii,  289 

—  insults  the  offering  from  Palmyra  Hi,  286 

—  quells  Armenian  revolt lii,  280 

—  reattacks  the  Romans Hi,  283 

—  rejects  a  new  creed iil,  292 

—  seizes  Valerian Ill,  283 

—  takes  Csesarea  Mazaca Hi,  284 

—  takes  Nlslbis Hi,  281 

Sapor  II.  attacks  Rome Hi,  .318 

--  Birth  of iil,  316 

—  captures  Artogerassa ill,  373 

—  Death  of lit,  377 

—  defeats  Romans  at  Singara HI,  325 

—  dethrones  .Sauromaces iil,  373 

—  fails  to  take  Vlrta Hi,  339 

—  his  barbarity  to  enemies Hi,  317 

—  his  great  Invasion Hi,  333 

—  imprisons  Arsaces Ill,  .373 

—  Invades  Iberia lii,  373 

—  loses  his  son Hi,  325 

—  makes  Arsaces  king lii,  ,323 

—  makes  treaty  with  Jovian Hi,  367 

—  persecutes  the  Christians HI,  318 

—  raises  sieges  of  Nlslbis Hi,  322,  323,  .327 

—  reaches  his  majority Hi,  31T 

—  replies  to  Tam-sapor 111,3.30 

—  takes  Amida ill,  ,337 

—  takes  Bezabde  fortress iU.  .339 

—  takes  Singara Hi,  ,338 

Sapor  III.,  Accession  of Hi,  381 

—  Death  of Hi,  383 

Sapor,  Prince,  killed  In  the  palace. . .  ill,  .390 

Sapphires  in  a  palace  roof Hi,  233 

Sarablagus  avoids  Heraclius Hi,  .525 

—  enters  Tlfiis Hi,  527 

Saracus,  Accession  of 1,  497 

—  burns  himself  In  his  palace 1,  500 

—  palace  of H,   92 

Sarangia,  adjoining  Parthla ill,     6 

Sarcophagi  at  Persepolis 11,  406 

Sarvlanapalus.    .See  Asshur-bani-pal. 
SarcUs,  the  Lydian  capital H,   98 

—  Governor  of,  executed ii,465 

—  revolts  against  Cyrus ii,  438 

—  taken  by  Arlstagorus ii,  483 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


725 


t<ardl8  taken  by  Cimmerians.. li,  loi 

-  taken  by  Cyrus  the  Great 11,  253,  437 

Sarepta  yields  to  Sennacherib 1,  448 

Sargon  attacks  Egypt 11,  235 

—  builds  Kliorsabad  palace 1,  IM,  444 

—  carries  Jews  captive 1,  443 

—  conquers  Babylon  11, 236 

—  Death  of 1,  445  ;  11,  236 

—  defeats  Merodach-Baladetn 1,  430 

—  defeats  Yahu -bid \,m 

—  deposes  Ambrls 1,442 

—  Embassy  of  Uplr  to I,  442 

—  his  Invasion  of  Media. 11,   8:J 

—  Invades  Suslana 1, 4;xi 

—  Palace  of 1, 184 

—  reduces  Ethiopia 1, 440 

—  reduces  Media 1,  443 

—  restores  Ispabara 1, 443 

—  subdues  Aramaeans 1,441 

—  subdues  Babylonia 1, 441 

—  subdues  Thamudltes 1, 4.39 

—  takes  Ashdod 1,  440 

—  takes  Beth- Yakin 1,  441 

—  transplants  peoples 1,  443 

—  usurps  Assyrian  throne 1,435 

Sarus  bridge  defended  by  Heracllus.  Hi,  526 

Saspelres,  Country  of  the 11,  282 

Sassanlauor  new  Persian  Empire  111,  241-5!t!) 
~-  architecture Iil,6ti0 

—  armies.  Size  of ill,  596 

—  army  trapped  by  Ardaburlus 111,397 

—  bas  reliefs 111,570 

—  captives  ransomed ill,  398 

—  cavalry  sent  to  Italy Hi,  460 

—  coin  legends Hi,  276 

—  complaint  of  Parthla Ill,  207 

—  costumes Hi,  591 

—  dominion  In  Lazica Ill,  4t» 

—  envoys  Imprisoned ill,  246 

—  hatred  of  Europeans Ill,  242 

—  Jealousy  of  Abyssinia Hi,  475 

—  king  kicked  by  a  horse IH,  392 

—  king  killed  by  a  tent-pole Hi,  383 

—  kings,  Table  of Hi,  599 

—  land  and  tax  system Hi,  485 

—  military  reforms  111,487 

—  monarchy  bounded ill,  250 

—  monarchy  overthrown ill,  .%7 

—  musical  instruments 111,593 

—  national  standard Hi,  5;t6 

—  numismatics '. Hi,  276 

—  palaces  described Hi,  50-1 

—  practice  of  non-burial ill,  441 

—  race  traits Hi,  254 

—  reasons  for  the  revolt ill,  248 

—  revolt  against  Parthla Hi,  2(XS 

—  royal  chronology Hi,  599 

—  royal  hfousehold. HI,  5'.W 

—  rule  of  Chosroes  I Hi,  483 

—  revival  of  art Ill,  276 

—  siege  tactics Ill,  i»;»7 

—  slave  sent  as  a  bride Hi,  413 

—  throne  seized  byShahr-Barz 111,540 

—  war  costume HI,  59J 

—  war  tactics Ill,  594 

Sassanlans  attacked  by  barbarians. .  Ill,  .328 

—  capture  Hatra HI,  280 

—  changed  their  generals Hi,  416 

—  compared  to  Old   Persians 111,2.56 

—  conclude  the  "Endless  Peace" 111,450 

—  contented  under  Parthla 111,245 

—  cross  the  Euphrates HI,  445 

—  defeat  Galerlus HI,  303 

—  defeated  at  Rel 111,658 

—  defeated  at  Salban HI,  52;') 

—  defeated  at  Sisarbftn6n HI,  499 

—  discover  chess  In  Hindustan Ill,  490 

—  fall  to  tak.>  Nlslbls HI,  322,  327 

—  harass  .TuUan HI,  351 

—  Invade  .Syria  under  Sapor  I Hi,  2^1 

—  Invest  Cadosla lil,  517 

—  offer  terms  at  Dura HI,  .367 

—  Overthrow  of  the "'-O 

—  pillage  Jerusalem 111,620 


Sassanl.ing,  Plague  among  the lll.S.SS 

—  pursue  Julian Ill,  3fil 

—  ravage  Asia  Minor IH,  284 

—  raze  a  new  fortress ill,  442 

—  Religion  of  the 111,679 

—  retire  into  Cteslphon 111,357 

—  subdue  Egypt 111,521) 

—  suggest  a  single  combat lil,  396 

—  take  Dara.s ill,  518 

—  threatened  by  Arabs Hi,  544 

—  threatened  by  the  nomads HI,  JOG 

—  victorious  at  Hormuz HI,  210,  200 

—  Se,e  also  Persians. 

Sasanid.-e— origin  of  name Ill,  2.58 

S<itala  taken  by  the  Persians HI,  519 

Satrapial  cities  of  Persia II,  2'.4 

Saiil-Mugiua  appointed  viceroy 1,  477 

—  burned  alive 1,  4.s2 

—  rebels  against  Assyria I,  4hI 

Sauromaces  dethroned  bv  Iberia 111,373 

Scamander  river  reached  ny  Xerxes  I    11,  491 

Scepter  of  the  Persian  kings Ii,;j^l0 

Science  of  the  Assyrians 1,  2.'W 

—  of  the  Babylonians 11,205 

—  of  the  Chakiieans 1,  48,   64 

—  patronized  by  Chosroes  I ill,  489 

Sciences  and  arts  of  Babylon 11,  1S8 

Scientific  learijing  In  Babylon II,  Via 

Scorpions  of  Media 11,   32 

—  plentiful  In  Persia U,  ,3i« 

Sculptural  art  In  Babylon 11,198 

Sculpture  of  Assyrians 1,606 

Sculptured  animafe  of  Assyria 1,147 

—  memorial  of  Sapor  III HI,  .381 

Sculptures  of  Assnur-lzlr-pal 1, 404 

—  of  the  Medes U,   44 

—  of  Vullush  III 1,431 

Scymnia,  Persian  dominion  In HI,  468 

Scythian  chiefs  massacred II,    SHJ 

—  conquests  of  Sesostrls  a  myth HI,   10 

—  ethnology Ill,   66 

—  expedition  of  Darius  Hystaspis. . .    II,  477 

—  inroads.  Features  of 1,  492 

Scythians  as  Persian  neighbors 11,  295 

—  expelled  from  Media II,  91 

—  Invade  Media 1,  494;U,   89 

—  reinstate  PhraatesIV lU,  117 

—  Religion  of  the 1,494 

—  repulsed  bv  Mithrldates  II HI,  69 

—  threaten  Egypt 1,496 

—  weaken  Assyria 1, 496 

Scvthopolis,  a  town  of  Syria 1,496 

Scy  ths,  Characteristics  of  the 1,  493 

Sea  of  Antioeh  located 11,146 

—  of  Tiberias  described 11,  145 

Seal  eviluders  of  Chaldaea. I,   61 

Seals. "Chalci.'ean  writing 1,   47 

Sebi>ethes,  Persian  envoy, dismissed.  111,478 
Second  Monarchy.    Hee  As.syrla. 

Secydlanus  reigns  six  months II,. 506 

Segestanl  subdued  by  the  Persians.. .  HI,  2'.»7 
Selt^cla,  Building  of Hi,   20 

—  burned  bv  Casslus HI,  187 

—  burned  by  Trajan HI,  179 

—  declares  its  independence 111,110 

—  occupied  by  Mebodes HI,  .MO 

—  taken  by  Cams 1II,2'.K 

—  taken  by  Sept.  Severus.. 111.  194 

Seleucid  satraps  tyrannical 111,24.1 

Seleucus  Nleator  flies  to  Egj-pt HI,    IS 

.Semlramis,  Cavalry  service  of 1,  249 

—  Mythlc^U  character 1,  421 

Semitic  character  of  Assyrians 1.  152 

—  character  of  Chaldoeans I,   28 

—  theory  examined 1.   29 

—  words.  Vocabulary  of 1,174 

.Sennacherib,  Accession  of 1.445 

—  Architecture  of 1.  *« 

—  builds  Tarsus   1.469 

—  carries  Jews  captive l.v50 

—  Death  In  the  camp  of I,  tni 

—  Deathof I.4.i5 

—  d. 'feats  Egyptians 1,449 

—  defcais  Susub 1,  451.  450 


726 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Sennacherib  Invades  remote  Media. .    li,  84 

—  invades  Syria 1.  447,  452 

—  invests  Lachlsh I,  452 

—  Military  genius  of ; 1,  461 

—  pillages  Judea i,  449 

—  punishes  Babylon i,  459 

—  ravages  Susiana i,  457,  458 

—  reduces  Libnah 1,  453 

—  slain  by  his  sons i,  466 

—  subdues  Cilicia 1,  459 

—  subdues  Zagros  tribes i,  447,  456 

—  succeeded  by  Esar-haddon i,  407 

—  takes  Ascalon i,  448 

—  takes  Babylon i,  447,  458 

'  —  takes  Badaca 1,  458 

—  takes  Beth-Kahirl i,  458 

—  takes  Ekron 1,449 

—  takes  Raza 1,  468 

—  takes  Sldon i,  447 

—  victorious  at  Khaluli 1,  459 

—  Palace  of 1,181,462 

—  Spearmen  of 1,258 

Septlniius  Severus.  See  Severus,  Sep- 

timius. 
Semlramis— her  efQgy  at  Bagistan,...    11,   15 

Seraglios  of  the  Persian  kings 11,  346 

Serbistan  palace  described ill,  564 

Serglopolls,  Bishop  of,  ransoms  cap- 
tives   111,453 

Sergius,  St.,  and  Chosroes  II 111,516 

Serpent-charming  in  the  East 11,  ,3U9 

"Seven  Princes"  of  Persia li,  .350 

—  Spheres  in  Babylon 11,191 

Seventh  Moiiarchy.    See  Parthia. 

Severianus  besieged  in  Elegeia ill,  185 

Severus,Alexander,orosses  Euphrates  ill,  265 

—  defeated  by  Persians iii,  266 

—  emperor ill,  262 

—  murdered  by  Maximin ill,  280 

—  plunders  Armenia ill,  26.'5 

Severus,  Septimus,  besieges  Hatra..  111,195 

—  captures  Ctesiphon ill,  194 

—  crosses  Euphrates ill,  192 

—  Death  of lil,  199 

—  (iefeats  and  slays  Niger ill,  192 

—  grants  a  truce  to  Armenia 111,193 

—  raises  siege  of  Hatra ill,  197 

—  takes  Babylon  111,194 

—  takes  Seleucia  on  Tigris ill,  194 

Shah-nameh  or  "  Book  of  the  Kings."  ill,  490 
Shahen  defeated  by  Heraclius ill,  525 

•  —  derfeated  by  Theodore ,....  111,528 

—  dies  of  disappointment iii,  528 

—  marches  through  Asia  Minor lil,  521 

Shahpuhrl.    See  Sapor  I. 

Sliahpur,  Ruins  of 111,288 

Sliahr-Barz  attacks  Byzantines ill,  528 

—  assassinated  by  his  troops ill,  540 

—  defeated  by  Heraclius ill,  523,  525 

—  defeated  by  Khazars ill,  540 

—  negotiates  with  Heraclius 111,539 

—  recalled  from  Chalcedon ill,  5.30 

■-  retreats  from  Cilicia ill,  526 

—  slays  Artaxerxes  III lil,  540 

—  takes  Damascus lil,  620 

Shalmanezer  I.,  of  Assyria i,  378 

Shalmanezer  II.,  Accession  of i,  407 

—  Campaigns  of. 1,  408 

—  Death  of 1,414 

—  his  empire 1,  414 

—  Palaceof 1,411 

—  vanquishes  Hazael 1,  411 

Shalmanezer  III.,  Reign  of 1,  423 

Shalmanezer  IV.,  Accession  of i,  432 

—  reduces  PhCBnlcla 1,  4.3;i 

Shamas,  the  oriental  sun-god 1,  82,  351 

Shamuz-Vul  I.,  Reign  of 1,  395 

Bhamuz-VulII.,  Accession  of 1,  414 

—  Invades  Babvlonla 1,  417 

Shebll  canal  at  Baby  Ion li,  187 

Sheep  of  Persia  Proper 11,  305 

SliephSlah  dcicribed 11,131 

Sherghis,  or  sirocco  wind li,  153 

Shields  of  the  Assyrians 1.  261 


Shops  constructed  for  the  Tigris 111,  177 

—  of  the  Persian  navy 11,  3;tt 

Shiraz  wine  of  Persia Hi,  253 

Shirln,  wife  of  Chosroes  II lil,  634 

Shoes  of  Assyrian  kings 1,  285 

Shoulders  of  prisoners  pierced ill.  317 

Shuhite  rebellion  crushed 1,  399 

Shuster,  Great  dyke  at. Hi,  289 

Slcachotes,  Smerdis  killed  at li,  468 

Slcorlus  Probus,  the  Roman  envoy. .  Hi,  307 

Slddim,  Chaldaean  victory  in i,  ltt6 

Sldka,  king  of  Ascalon,  transported.  1,448 
Sldon,  Citizens  of,  massacred H,  530 

—  taken  by  Esar-haddon i,  468 

—  yields  to  Sennacherib 1,  447 

Sidonians  burn  themselves  and  fami- 
lies     11,530 

Siege  tactics  of  Assyrians i,  274 

—  tactics  of  Sassanians Ill,  697 

Signets  of  Chaldaean  kings 1,   47 

Silk,  an  Assyrian  product 1, 143 

Silphlum,  Cerenaic,  or  assafcetlda li,  311 

Simpllcius  welcomed  In  Persia 111,489 

Sin  series  of  Chaldaean  kings i,  lOti 

Sin,  the  oriental  moon-god i,  80,  850 

Sinatroces.    See  Sanatroeces. 

Sinde  or  Indus  valley 11,  278 

Slngara,  Battle  of ill,  325 

—  taken  by  Maurice Hi,  482 

—  taken  by  Sapor  II iii,  .338 

Sinjar  range  in  Assyria 1, 127 

Sinkara,  Ruins  of,  located I,   12 

Sippara  reservoir  built 11,  246 

Sira,  the  Christian  wife  of  Chosroes.  Hi,  516 

Sirocco  winds  of  the  East 11,153 

Slroes  rebels  against  Chosroes  II lil,  532 

Slroes.    See  Kobad  II ill,  635 

Slsygambis,  the  infant  prince 11,  543 

Sisarbanon,  Persians  defeated  at 111,  499 

Slsauranon  taken  by  Belisarius 111,  460 

Sittas  betrays  Martyropolis 111,499 

—  deceives  Chanaranges iii,  447 

—  defeated  by  Persians Hi,  442 

—  defeats  the  Persians  in  Armenia. .  Ill,  444 
Six  Hundred,  Charge  of,  at  Cunaxa. .  11,  620 
Sixth  Monarchy.    See  Parthia. 

Skulls  as  drlnking-cups i,  493 

Sllngers  of  the  Assyrians 1,2.56 

Smbat  defeats  Ephthalites Hi,  617 

Smerdis  assassinated  by  Darius 11,  458 

—  the  impostor,  burns  temples 11,  456 

Smyrna  taken  by  Alyattes 11, 101 

Snakes  abundant  in  Media 11,  31 

Soaemus  expelled  from  Armenia lil,  186 

—  restored  to  Armenian  throne Hi,  186 

Sogdianus  reigns  six  months 11,  606 

Solachon,  Persians  defeated  at Hi,  498 

Solomon,  Empire  of 1,501 

Soma  ceremony  in  Persia il,  56 ;  Hi,  686 

—  worship  in  Media 11,   50 

Sophen6  invaded  by  Persians 111,447 

Sophia,  Empress,  and  Count  Tiberius  HI,  179 

Sparethra,  queen  of  the  Sacse ii,  441 

Sparta  and  Persia  make  a  treaty 11,  ^iS 

—  refuses  an  apology  to  Persia 11,  623 

Spearmen  of  the  Assyrians 1,  256,  2.58 

Statianus  defeated  and  slain Hi,  114 

Statira  poisoned  by  Parysatls 11,  528 

—  faithful  to  Artaxerxes  Mnemon. . .    11,  628 

—  saved  from  execution il,  611 

Statues  of  Assyrians 1,211 

Sterility  of  Media  explained 11,     6 

Stlllcho,  the  general,  feared ill,  386 

Stool-bearer  of  the  royal  chariot 11,  342 

Strongholds  of  Assyrian  enemies 1,  273 

Suicide  of  King  Urza 1,  442 

Sukhra  employed  against  Ephthalites  111,  422 

—  minister  for  Kobad Hi,  426 

Sundials  used  in  Babylon        11,208 

Sun-god  of  the  orientals i,  82,  351 

Sunflower  upon  a  Persian  bas-relief,  ill,  27J 

Suiierstition  (if  the  Magi H,    64 

Sura,  Riininn  victorv  at Hi,  18" 

Surena,  or  fleld-marshal  of  Parthia..  ill,  235 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCHIES. 


727 


Suronas  1:111(^(1  by  Orodes Hi,  100 

Hurfln  |jUl;it;ed  by  Chosroes  I lil,  45;i 

Susa,  Darius  llystaspis  retires  to li,  480 

—  Ureal  antiquity  of 1, 105 

—  Palace  at li,  404 

—  palace.  Seraglio  of  ttie li,  347 

Suslana  becomes  Assyrian  province.     1,  483 

—  Climate  of »,  153 

—  Invaded  by  Sennacherib 1,  457,  458 

—  or  Elam  located i,   17 

—  revolts  against  Darius  Hystaspis. .    11.  401 

—  See  also  Elaui. 

Suslanian  supremacy 1, 105 

—  war  of  Asshur-bani-pal 1,  4T:» 

Susub  carried  to  Nineveh i.  4.58 

—  desecrates  temple  of  Bel i,  45it 

—  escapes  frona  Nineveh i,  458 

—  Subdued  by  Sennacherib i,  451 

Swords  of  the  Assyrians 1,  a(i7 

—  worshiped  by  Scythians i,  494 

Syennesis,  proposes  a  peace ii,  104 

Symbolism  of  Assyrian  worship i,  344 

—  of  Babylonian  worship ii,  229 

Symeou,  the  archbishop,  slain iii,  318 

Syria,  Climate  of ii,  153 

—  invaded  by  ChosroesII iii,  51!) 

—  invaded  by  Parthians iii,  185 

—  Invaded  by  Sapor  I iii,  281 

—  overrun  by  Parthians iii,  1()6 

—  Productions  of ii,  15(! 

—  ravaged  by  Adarman lit,  479 

—  submits  to  Shalmanezer  II 1,  411 

—  Three  strongholds  of ^ if,  148 

Syrian  campaign  of  Ashur-izir-pal. . .     1,  400 

—  Desert  described ii,  133 

—  Invasions  of  Sennacherib i,  447,  452 

—  revoltof  Megabyzus ii,  505 

—  traclc  of  oriental  armies ii,  127 

—  war  of  Tiglath  Pileser  II i,  429 

Syrians  massacred  by  Parthians iii,   58 

Table  of  Assyrian  kings 1,  372,  513 

~  of  Chaldaean  kings i,  113 

—  of  Assyrian  deities i,  358 

—  of  Sassanian  kings lil,  599 

Tables  of  Persian  language ii,  3WJ 

Tablets  and  obelisks  of  Assyria 1,  109 

—  collected  by  Asshur-banl-pal 1,  485 

—  of  the  Chaldaians i,   40 

Tabriz  marble  of  Media 11,   2;i 

Tachos,  king  of  Egypt,  enters  Syria. .    li,  527 

—  returns  to  Egypt ii,  527 

Tactics  of  Assyrian  armies ii,  270 

—  of  Persian  armies 11,  325 

—  of  Rome  and  Parthla  compared. . .  iii,  109 

Takht-1-Khosru,  Palace  of. Iii,  55.3 

Tamchosro  defeated  and  slain iii,  497 

—  defeats  the  Romans ill,  481 

Tammarlt,  king  of  Elam,  sent  to  Nine- 
veh       1,4S2 

Tamna  taken  by  Sennacherib 1,  449 

Tamsapor  negotiates  with  Saporll..  Hi,  330 

Tarblsa,  Ruins  of 1,134 

Tarsus  built  by  Sennacherib 1,  4.59 

—  captured  by  Sapor  I HI,  2S4 

Tatar  invasion  of  Persia Iii,  328,  401 

Tatars.  Isdlgerd  II.  expels  the ill,  405 

Tax  collectors  executed  for  fraud. . .  HI,  48t 
Taxation  of  satraps  of  Persian  empire  ii,  409 

Taxes  not  collected  by  a  king Hi,  378 

Tayer  takes  Ctesiphon lH,3:(i 

Taylor  cylinder.  Testimony  of 1, 455 

Tehrak  niarclies  to  aid  Egj'pt 1,  4.54 

Telspps  Kurcreiis  Achaimenes 11,  4;U 

Tel-el-Lalun,  Tombs  of  1,   5S 

Telcphis  taken  by  Mermeroes Ill,  4iSt 

Temln-Ummaii  executed 1,  480 

Temple  court  of  Sargou 1,1.89 

—  of  Belus  In  Babylon H,  173 

Temples,  Architecture  of  Babylonian  H,  189 

—  in  Assyria 1,197 

—  of  Asshur-lzir-pal 1,  •11)5 

—  pluuderod  by  AntlochusEplphanesHl,  243 
Ten  Thousand  Creeks.  Retreat  of.. . . .  II,  521 
Teunes  excuuted  by  'Jehus il,  530 


Teraphlm  or  sacred  Imaptes  in  Partblalll,  225 

Tereiitius enters  Iberia ill,  375 

Tcrituchnies  slain  for  rebellion 11,  510 

Terra  eotta  Work  In  Assyria 1,232 

TexUe  fabrics  of  Babylon H  204 

—  fabrics  of  Chaldaea l    61 

Thamudltes  subdued  by  Sargon ij  439 

Thapsacus   reached  by  Cyrus  the 

younger h,  615 

Thasas  taken  by  the  Persians 11.  484 

Thebes  .sacked  by  Asshur-bani-pal. . .     1,  473 

—  taken  by  Esarhaddon 1,  472 

Theocritus  defeated  by  Armenians..  Ill,  2iU 
Theoctlstus  arrives  to  defend  Antloch  ill,  4ji 

Theodore  defeats  Shaheu 111,538 

Theodore,  of  Samos,  the  metallurgist   II,  M6 
Theodosiopolis  resists  Chosroijs  I. . . .  HI,  481 

—  Siego  of Ill,  396 

—  taken  by  ChosroesII Hi,  519 

—  taken  by  Kobad lil,  435 

Theodosius  establishes  peace HI,  380 

—  refuses  to  surrender  refugees 111,394  , 

Thermopyl;ie,  Dereii((' of 11.494  / 

Thilutha  passed  by  Julian Ill,  349  ) 

Third  Jlonarchy.    Sec  Media. 

Thrace  conquered  Viy  Darius  Hysta.spl8 11,  479 

Thraetoua,  the  mythical  hero 11,   68 

Throne  of  the  Persian  court 11,340 

Tibarenl  carried  to  Assyria 1,443 

Tiberius,  Count,  Death  of Ill,  497 

—  raises  an  army ill,  480 

—  succeeds  .lustin HI,  47it 

Tiflis  attacked  by  Heracllus Hi,  527 

Tiglath-Pileser  I.,  Accession  of 1.  382 

—  attacks  Babylon 1, 393 

—  Document  about 1,382 

—  his  conquests 1,  384 

—  rebuilds  a  temple 1.387 

Tigiath  Pileser  II.,  Accession  of 1,427 

—  Buildings  of. 1,431 

—  Campaigns  of I,  428 

—  carries  Jews  captive 1,  430 

—  invades  Syria I,  429 

—  Reign  of H,233 

Tlglath-Pileser  cylinder I,  380 

Tigiathi-Nln  I.,  of  Assyria I,  373,  378 

—  conquers  Chaldiea 1,  379 

Tiglathl-Nin  II.,  Reign  of I,  396 

Tlgranes,  of  Armenia, enemy  to  Rome  III,   75 
Tigris  and  Euphrates  compared I,     5 

—  as  a  boundary  line ill,  309 

—  crossed  by  Alexander 11,54(J 

—  passed  by  Julian Ill,  357 

Timesltheus,  Death  of 111,281 

—  recovers  Antloch HI,  281 

Tin,  an  Assyrian  Import I,  321 

Tiranus,  the  Armenian  captured HI,  321 

Tirhakah  defeateil  by  Assyrians 1,  477 

—  recovers  Egypt I,  47! 

—  retreats  to  Ethiopia 1,472 

Tlrlbazus  defeats  Evagoras II,  625 

Tlridates  defeats  Sassanian  Persians  HI,  300 

—  enforces  Christianity HI,  320 

—  llees  to  Octavluu Ill,  118 

—  in  triura|)hant  procession HI,  161 

—  t) vercomo  by  Nar.sos Ill,  302 

—  reinstated  by  Galerius HI,  :9>4 

—  treats  with  Corbulo Hi.  ISO 

Tissaphernes  assigned  to  Lydia 11.  5(.r7 

—  watches  Cyrus  the  younger II,  612 

Titus  congratulated  by  Voiagases HI,  165 

Toilet  customs  of  Persia I).  361 

TonibotCvrusat  Murgab U,  402,  405 

Tombs  of  Chaldaea I,   57 

—  of  Persian  kings U,  351,  404 

Tortures  used  lulVrsla li,  3G3 

Tower  of  Balx-I.  Site  of II.  1H5 

—  of  Nakhsli-l-Rustani li,  407 

Trade  Ignored  as  Involving  falsehood   li,  361 

—  of  the  Assyrians 1,  317 

Trailillon  of  the  Klooil  In  Chaldaea.. .     I,    95 
Trajfin  betr.iys  Parlhania-slrls 111.  174 

—  captures  Itabvlon Hi,  177 

—  captures  the  PurtUlau  diadem 111,  17ti 


fV 


728 


&ENERAL  INDEX 


Trajan  escapes  an  earthquake ill,  176 

—  marches  Into  Asia iii,  170 

—  marches  to  Edessa ill,  175 

—  met  by  Parthian  envoys lil,  172 

—  reduces  Mesopotamia Ill,  175 

—  refused  a  crown  to  Armenia ill,  174 

—  succeeded  by  Hadrian iii,  180 

—  takes  Ctesiphon ill,  178 

—  tribunal  at  Zaragardia lil,  350 

Transplanting  captive  peoples.  .1,  i43 ;  11,  2t5 

Transports  of  the  Persians li,  335 

Treaty  of  Narses  with  Diocletian ill,  307 

—  of  peace  of  557  A.D  iii,  473 

—  with  Jovian  at  Dura iii,  367 

Trees  found  la  Media li,   26 

—  of  Assyria 1, 144 

—  of  Persia  Proper il,302 

Triaconters  of  the  Persians li,  335 

Tribes  occupying  Persia  11,274,  282 

Tribunus,  ac  the  Persian  court ill,  489 

Tribute  paid  by  Persian  satraps 11,  468 

Trictrac  or  draughts  In  Persia iii,  593 

Trinity,  Doctrine  of  the 1,343 

Triremes  of  the  Persian  navy ii,  334 

Tsur  taken  by  Assyrians 1,399 

Turanian  cast  of  Parthian  names lil,   13 

—  character  of  Babylonia 11, 162 

Turkish  embassadors  poisoned ill,  477 

Turks  attack  the  EphtnaUtes iii,  476 

—  pass  the  Oxus iii,  500 

—  seek  to  trade  with  Persia Ill,  477 

—  send  an  embassy  to  Justin ill,  477 

—  under  Dlzabul  invade  Persia iii,  477 

Turpentine-tree orterebinthof Media  11,   26 
Turquoise  abundant  In  Persia 11,  314 

—  found  in  Parthla Iii,     5 

Tyrants  deposed  in  Greek  cities 11,  484 

Tyre  attacked  by  Asshur-banl-pal 1,  478 

—  repels  the  Assyrians i,  433 

—  taken  by  Nebuchadnezzar ii,  214 

Tyrian  Christians  threatened iii,  5H 

Tzath  married  to  a  Roman  lady ill,  439 

Tzathes  succeeds  Gubazes  in  Lazica.  iii,  470 
Uaphris  becomes  king  of  Egypt 11,  243 

—  driven  back  to  Egypt li,  244 

Udlastes  slays  Terituchmes 11,  510 

Ummanmiiian  bribed  by  Surub 1,  459 

TJiuraldius  sends  embassy  to  Parthla  iii,  152 

Unir,  Embassy  of,  to  Babylon 1,  442 

Ur  of  the  Chaldees  located.. » 1,   12 

tJr,  the  capital  of  king  Urukh 1, 104 

Uranlus  well  treated  In  Persia ill,  489 

Uranography  in  Babylon il,  206 

UrdamanI  succeeds  Tlrhakah 1,  478 

Urtakl,  Capture  and  escape  of 1,  480 

Urukh,  a  Chaldaean  king 1,  lOl 

—  Great  buildings  of j,  103 

TJrumlyeh  Lake  in  Media ii,  3,     7 

XTrslcinus— his  advice  rejected 111,335 

Urza,  Defeat  and  suicide  of 1,  442 

U.st-Urt,  Plateau  of 11,277 

Utensils  of  Assyrians 1,  336 

Uzzlah  dereated  bvTlglath-Pileser  II.   1,  429 
Vagabanta,  Sapor  II.  attacks  Romans 

at  Hi,  375 

Vahalll  Bubinits  to  the  Assyrians 1,  479 

Vahan  becomes  a  Zoroastrlan Hi,  415 

—  makes  terms  to  Persia lil,  422 

—  recovers  Armenia Hi,  415 

—  vindicates  himself  In  Persia ill,  415 

Valteha  defeated  by  Assyrians 1,  484 

Van,  Lake,  Altitude  of 11,291 

—  monarehs  of  Armenia, li,   20 

Valens  weak  as  a  commander iii,  376 

Valerian  captured  by  Sapor  I ill,  28.3 

—  his  treatment  by  Sapor iii,  286 

Varahran  I.  succeeds  Hormisdas iii,  294 

Varahran  II.  succeeds  his  father ill,  296 

Varahran  III.,  Reign  of Hi,  300 

Varahran  IV„  Death  of Hi,  .385 

—  succeed  s  Sapor  III ill,  383 

Varahran  V.,  Accession  of HI,  .390,  393 

—  besieges  TheodoslopoUs iii,  396 

—  Coins  of  111,402 


Varahran  V.,  Death  of lil,  40t 

—  persecutes  the  Christians Hi,  394 

—  routes  the  Tatar  Invaders HI,  401 

Varaztad  executes  Moushegh Hi,  379 

—  made  king  of  Armenia Hi,  378 

Vardanes  assassinated ill,  143 

—  succeeds  Gotarzes Hi,  142 

Vartan,  the  Mamlgonian,  slain iii,  407 

Vasag  defeats  Ader-Veshnasp ill,  416 

—  the  Marzpan,  deserts  Armenia Hi,  408 

Vases  of  the  Chaldseans 1,   61 

Vatch6  rebels  from  Persia Hi,  412 

Vay  u,  god  of  the  wind 11,  49 ;  iu  583 

Vegetable  products  of  Chaldaea i,   24 

Vegetables  described  by  Berosus H,  154 

—  of  Assyria  1, 144 

—  of  Persia  Proper  11,  301 

Vehicles  of  the  Assyrians i,  339 

Vendidad,  Translation  from  the il,  119 

Venus,  or  Ishtar  of  the  orientals ....  1,  90, 356 

Veracity  among  the  Persians 11,319 

Verus,  Lucius,  sent  to  the  East Ill,  185 

Vespasian  declinesthe  aid  of  Parthla  ill,  165 

—  declines  to  aid  Volagases Hi,  167 

Vetranio,  the  imperial  pretender 111,  328 

Vices  borrowed  by  Persians li,  362 

Virta  fortress  resists  Sapor  II iii,  339 

Vitelllus  marches  for  the  Euphrates,  ill,  1.3^ 

Vltianus  exterminates  the  Arabs HI,  397 

Vizier  of  As.sy rian  courts 1,  291 

Vocabulary  of  Semitic  words 1, 174 

Volagases  I. ,  Accession  of Hi,  149 

—  and  Vardanes  contend  for  power.  Hi,  153 

—  calls  a  council ill,  155 

—  his  character Hi,  K7 

—  Invades  Armenia iii,  150 

—  offers  aid  to  Vespasian lil,  165 

—  quarrels  with  Izates ill,  150 

—  defeats  Paetus Hi,  158 

Volagases  II„  Accession  of ill,  182 

Volagases  III.,  Accession  of Hi,  184 

—  defeated  near  Europus ill,  186 

—  expels  Soa^mus Hi,  185 

—  Death  of Hi,  190 

Volagases  IV.,  becomes  king HI,  190 

—  Death  of ill,  199 

—  expels  the  Romans Hi,  193 

—  succeeded  by  his  sons HI,  199 

Volagases  V.  and  Artabanus  accede..  Hi,  199 
Vonones  I.,  Accession  of Ill,  125 

—  retires  to  Armenia ill,  126 

—  overtaken  and  slain Ill,  129 

Vonones  IL,  his  sons Hi,  149 

Vul,  the  oriental  deity 1,85,  362 

Vul-baladin,  of  Babylon  slain. 1,  380 

VullushlL,  Reign  of 1,396 

Vul-lush  III.,  Accession  of 1,  418 

—  Sculptures  of i,  421 

Walls  of  Babylon II,  172, 176 

—  of  Nineveh 1,  164 

War  implements  of  Persia 11,  321 

—  ships  of  the  Persians ii,  333 

—  tactics  of  Assyrians 1,  269 

—  tactics  of  Babylon 11,215 

Warka  mound.  Size  of 1, 102 

—  ruin  of  Chaldaea 1, 13,   51 

Warlike  character  of  Persia U,  318,  320 

—  spirit  of  Assyrians 1, 155 

—  usages  of  Assyrians 1,  241 

Water-system  of  Persia HI,  488 

Weapons  of  Median  warfare 11,   41 

—  of  the  Chaldajans 1,   63 

Whales  of  the  Indian  Sea 11,303 

Wheat  culture  in  Chaldaea 1,   22 

—  raising  In  Babylonia U,  155 

Winds— the  sirocco  of  the  East 11, 153 

Wine-drinking  at  banquets 11,   43 

Winged  circle  as  a  symbol 1,  344 ;  li,  422 

—  human-headed  bulls 11,  423 

Wise  Men  or  Sophl  of  Parthla Ill,   47 

—  men  of  Chaldaea 11,  217 

Women  as  captives— how  treated 1,  280 

—  Costume  of  Babylonian 11,  223 

—  of  Babylon  disgraced.!,  367;  11, 166, 223, 228 


SEVEN  GREAT  MONARCTIJ'ES. 


729 


Vr omen  of  Assyria,  Dress  of ^1.3^ 

—  of  Media •• 11 '  346 

—  of  Persian  royalty.. Ui' 232 

-  of  the  FartUlaa  court "  •  g^ 

_  required  to  marry  m  Persia m.  «^ 

-  '^""^"^  VX  pf/sli^"""  ■  ■  ■  ■. V  ii;  m  ik  5^7 
_  secluded  lu  Pel  sia. .         iil  237 

_  of  the  Babylonians "•  ^ 

_  of  the  Persians 

-  See  also  Religion.  ,  _ .     i,  1G9 

Writing  among  tlie  Assyrians....  ^    ^3 

_  Hieratic,  of  Chaldaea .j'   ,,3 

_  in  Media  ■•     ~ 


_    materials'of  the  Medes ii"  365!  378 

Xa?^^Jl^{tf;^^^ndeV.cruci^^      U. .« 

Xerxes  I.,  Accession  of •  •  •  •  •        490 

_-  Army  of ,  estimated jj- 5^2 

—  as  a  builder. 11,502 

—  assassinated •.•• 11,494 

_  assaults  Th'-rmopylffi.  •  -  ■  -^ •-  •  J    ^yg 

—  banquets  along  the  mat  en i  i  488 

Z  brWges  the  Hellespont »;  ^ 

_  Characterof jl  503 

=  ^l!^^^t^^-^water-:::::::::u.g3 

—  occupies  Attica.  ...  ■■■■■■■ ; " ; ;  u  488 

i.icDares  to  invade  ureece u Ha 

Z  fu'..'i;l  Egyptian  rebellion l*.  f^^ 

i<-ats  into  Asia      


Zadcsprates  slain  by  ^^- ■-:■■■  "'•  ■*? 
Zagro8,-its  location  and  character. .    1  ,     1 

—  range  of  mountains |-  i]» 

-  tribes  reduced  by  Sargon    . .... ...      .443 

-  tribes  subdued  by  Sennacherib. . ...  447 

Zaltha  reached  by  Julian m  -m 

Zamasp  abdicates  the  throne 1   .  431 

-  crowned  as  Icing  ...-• \\\'  ^ 

Zames  and  his  brotiiers  slain. ...... .  •      .  «» 

Zaragardlaand  Trajan's  tribunal. . . .      ,  SaO 

Zareh  claims  Persian  crown 1}  ,  4^3 

Zarina,  queen  of  the  Scythians ■   91 

Zedekiah,  made  Icing  of  Judah ,  213 

Zend  language  in  Media il  '  oi/; 

—  writings  preserved...... 1 1  io? 

Zendavesta  averse  to  Idolatry n.^i 

_  its  origin.. "J'~{| 

—  mentions  Rhages •    »'•   " 

_  silent  on  tlie  Parthians Ul.  ».   i^ 

Zenderud  river  in  Media. ".     < 

Zeno  crowned  as  Artaxlas. i"i  ^-^ 

ZeSobia  carried   captive   by  Aure- 

lian ill'  2«s 

-defeats the  Romans .^ 

Zenodotium  resists  Grassus H). .  t» 


Zerreh.orSeaof  Selstan }  .^ 

Ziebel  joins  the  Romans '  1^ 

Z  ggurits  or  temple  towers. .199 

Ziligdcs.  Embassy  to  the  Him  Ui.  «» 

Zir.Tianit.  the  Chaldaean  deity |.   89 

Zoology  of  Assyria....... '■  ,:^ 

-  of  Babylonian  empire i'.  ^'^ 

—  of  ChakUea jj'   29 

_  of  Media ,••  3,^ 

_  of  Persia  Proper '•'  *  * 

Zapyrus.  the  satrap,  slain ".  «| 

Zor6aster,  Birthplace  of ".  ^ 

_  the  Median  Icing Win-  "   "" 

v^,.«o<:trinn  dualism U.  »-l  . 


,'.. treats  into  Asia ,,   ,,>i     _  the  Aleiiiau  b.i"B Vi  ioi  .  ui  .'iTS 

:  V..Vted  on  a  marble  throne ij.  *^^    zoroastrlan  dualism "•  ^^^  '  "iVis 

Xerxcsll^ccesslonor.......;;;;;::    „;50«    Z  S^ui-e  in  anar:rirVs:::::::^:^m.'4^ 

=  S»uiu-i^i^rius-;;.:..;ii;^ 

Zoroastrianlsm  defined M  b-,9 

—  described.. ■• 111.408 

_  forced  on  Armenia .^-  •^-        ^ 

_  Immortality  In ",^,   ^^,  ^ 

—  InMedia.. ;;;;  m'-MC 

—  in  Parthia 11,420 

—  i?^oredinPaVthii:"----^;VT--  'il'm 
Z  Translation  from  the  Sendldad. . .  ^11.  IW 

Z  S^^als^X^na;;  andAhur^oii^a.  ■  ^^ 


Xerxes  11.,  ACV^=='"","-1  n,iMO 

-  murdered  »*»  festival   ...^  3,j^ 

Ifrfel:  s^oWK^btffieTs' W  ^^_  ^^,^ 

Xisuthms,-  VheChaldianNoah U  Jj 

Yad  War  with  tribes  of. '  j>  ^37 

&-bid  taken  and  slain .-•  j.*;  \J^ 

Yaksoum  becomes  Mng^.. •  •  ^  ^^^^ 

Yaman  captured  in  Eg.mj^—g  j,i  4-5 

Yemen  restored  to  the  Homeriie ^^^ 

—  subdued  by  Abraha 

Yezdijird.    Seelsdigerd.    . jj_   53 


Yima.  the  mythical  hero ^,^43 

Zab  crossed  after  Arbela j  5^,,j 

-  crossed  by  Chosroes  II • ;  j  .,,  ^o;! 


Zur-sm,  king  of  Chald.nea.. j-  ^ 

,  Zacharlua  oftirlea  UXio  rei—" 


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